

Introduction to Sociology – 3rd Canadian Edition

Introduction to Sociology – 3rd Canadian Edition

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About the Book

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This textbook was created with several goals in mind: accessibility, affordability, customization, and student engagement—all while encouraging learners toward high levels of learning. Instructors and students alike will find that this textbook offers a strong foundation in sociology.

It is available for free online as a webbook and can be downloaded as a PDF or EPUB. There is also a low-cost print version that can be ordered.

To broaden access and encourage community curation, *Introduction to Sociology* is openly licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution \(CC BY\) license](#). Everyone is invited to submit examples, emerging research, and other feedback to enhance and strengthen the material and keep it current and relevant for today's students. You can make suggestions by filling out this [Report an Error form](#).

To the Student

This book is written for you and is based on the teaching and research experience of numerous sociologists. In today's global socially networked world, the topic of sociology is more relevant than ever before. We hope that through this book, you will learn how simple, everyday human actions and interactions can change the world. In this book, you will find applications of Sociology concepts that are relevant, current, and balanced.

To the Instructor

This text is intended for two one-semester introductory courses. It adheres to the scope and sequence of typical introductory sociology course offerings. In addition to comprehensive coverage of core concepts, foundational scholars, and emerging theories, it incorporates section reviews with engaging questions, discussions that help students apply the sociological imagination, and features that draw learners into the discipline in meaningful ways. Although this text can be modified and reorganized to suit your needs, the standard version is organized so that topics are introduced conceptually, with relevant, everyday experiences.

If you are an instructor who is using this book for a course, please fill out our [Adoption of an Open Textbook](#) form.

Features of *Introduction to Sociology: 3rd Canadian Edition*

The following briefly describes the special features of this text.

Modularity

This textbook is published on a platform called Pressbooks. You can use Pressbooks to rearrange and modify the content to suit the needs of a particular professor or class. That being said, modules often contain references to content in other modules, as most topics in sociology cannot be discussed in isolation.

For instructors teaching at British Columbia post-secondary institutions, you can create a Pressbooks account here: [Pressbooks for B.C. Post-Secondary Faculty](#)

Learning Objectives

Every module begins with a set of clear and concise learning objectives. These objectives are designed to help the instructor decide what content to include or assign, and to guide the student with respect to what they can expect to learn. After completing the module and end-of-module exercises, students should be able to demonstrate mastery of the learning objectives.

Key Features

The following **Making Connections** features show students the dynamic nature of Sociology:

- **Sociological Research:** Highlights specific current and relevant research studies. Examples include “The Hawthorne Effect” and “Deceptive Divorce Rates.”
- **Sociology in the Real World:** Ties chapter content to current events and discusses sociology in terms of the everyday. Topics include “Secrets of the McJob” and “Muslim Women – The Niqab, Hijab and Burka”
- **Big Picture:** Features present sociological concepts at a national or international level, including “The History of Homosexuality: Making Up People?” and “Is there a Canadian Identity?”
- **Case Study:** Describes real-life people whose experiences relate to chapter content, such as “Catherine Middleton: The Commoner Who Would Be Queen.”
- **Social Policy and Debate:** Discusses political issues that relate to chapter content, such as “The Legalese of Sex and Gender” and “Corporal Punishment”
- **Classic Sociologists:** Discusses the insights and contributions of the founders of sociology, such as “Talcott Parsons: The Sociological Explanation of Everything.”

Section Summaries

Section summaries distill the information in each section for both students and instructors down to key, concise points addressed in the section.

Key Terms

Key terms are bold and are followed by a definition in context. Definitions of key terms are also listed in the Key Terms, which appears at the end of the module online and at the end of the chapter in print.

Section Quizzes

Section quizzes provide opportunities to apply and test the information students learn throughout each section. Both multiple-choice and short-response questions feature a variety of question types and range of difficulty.

Further Research

This feature helps students further explore the section topic and offers related research topics that could be explored.

CHAPTER 1. AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY



Figure 1.1 Canada Day celebrations. Sociologists study how society affects people and how people affect society. How does one's behaviour change when in a crowd? What is the meaning of public celebrations in people's lives? (Photo courtesy of Derek Hatfield/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Learning Objectives

1.1. What Is Sociology?

- Explain what sociology is and does.
- Describe the different levels of analysis in sociology: micro-level sociology, macro-level sociology, and global-level sociology.
- Define the sociological imagination.
- Analyze the relationship between the individual and society.

1.2. The History of Sociology

- Explain why sociology emerged when it did.
- Describe the central ideas of the founders of sociology.

1.3. Theoretical Perspectives

- Explain what sociological theories and paradigms are and how they are used.
- Describe sociology as a multi-perspectival social science divided into positivist, interpretive and critical paradigms.
- Define the similarities and differences between quantitative sociology, structural functionalism, historical materialism, feminism, symbolic interactionism and social constructivism.

1.4. Why Study Sociology?

- Explain why it is worthwhile to study sociology.
- Identify ways sociology is applied in the real world.

Introduction to Sociology

Public holiday events, concerts, sports games, and political rallies can have very large crowds. When a person attends one of these events they may know only the people they came with, yet they experience a feeling of connection to the group. They are one of the crowd. They read the cues of others about how to respond to events. They cheer and applaud when everyone else does. They boo and yell alongside them. They line up to get in and feel offended when someone cuts in ahead of them. They move out of the way when someone needs to get by, and they say “excuse me” when they need to leave. They know how to behave in this kind of crowd.

It can be a very different experience if a person is traveling in a foreign country and they find themselves caught up in a crowd moving down the street. They may have trouble figuring out what is happening. Is the crowd just the usual morning rush, or is it a political protest of some kind? Perhaps there was some sort of accident or disaster? Is it safe in this crowd, or should they try to extract themselves? How can they find out what is going on? Although they are *in* it, they may not feel like they are *part* of this crowd. They may not know what to do or how to behave.

Even within one type of crowd, different groups exist and different behaviours are on display. At a rock concert, for example, some may push up to the stage front for a closer view, others prefer to sit back and observe, while still others join in a mosh pit or try crowd-surfing. On February 28, 2010, Sydney Crosby scored the winning goal against the United States team in the gold medal hockey game at the Vancouver Winter Olympics. Two hundred thousand jubilant people filled the streets of downtown Vancouver to celebrate and cap off two weeks of uncharacteristically vibrant, joyful street life in mid-winter Vancouver. Just over a year later in the same city, the Vancouver Canucks lost the seventh hockey game of the Stanley Cup finals against the Boston Bruins. One hundred thousand people had been watching the game on outdoor screens. Eventually 155,000 people filled the downtown streets. Rioting and looting led to hundreds of injuries, burnt cars, trashed storefronts, and property damage totaling an estimated \$4.2 million. Why was the crowd response to the two events so different?



Figure 1.2 People's experiences of the post-Stanley Cup riot in Vancouver were not all the same (photo courtesy of Pasquale Borriello/Flickr) [CC BY 2.0](#)

A key insight of sociology is that the simple fact of being in a group changes one's behaviour. The group, just like social life in general, is a phenomenon that is *more than the sum of its parts*. Each individual might be independent and unique but together they act as part of a group. Why does one feel and act differently in different types of social situations? Why do people go along with the crowd? Why might people exhibit different behaviours in the same situation? These are some of the many questions sociologists ask as they study people and societies.

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1.1. What Is Sociology?



Figure 1.3 Sociologists can learn about society as a whole by studying face-to-face interactions (photo courtesy of Tom Waterhouse/
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Dictionaries define **sociology** as the systematic study of society and social interaction. The word “sociology” is derived from the Latin word *socius* (companion) and the Greek word *logos* (speech or reason), which together mean “reasoned speech or discourse about companionship.” How can the experience of companionship or togetherness be put into words and explained? While this is a starting point for the discipline, sociology is actually much more complex. It uses many different theories and methods to study a wide range of subject matter, and applies these studies to the real world.

The sociologist Dorothy Smith (1926-2022) defines *the social* as the “ongoing concerting and coordinating of individuals’ activities” (Smith, 1999). Whenever there is more than one person in a situation there is coordination and mutual attunement of behaviours. Sociology is therefore the systematic study of all those aspects of life designated by the adjective “social.” They concern relationships, and they concern what happens when more than one person is involved. These aspects of social life never simply occur; they are organized processes. They can be the briefest and most unconscious of everyday interactions — moving to the right to let someone pass on a busy sidewalk, for example — or the largest and most enduring interactions — such as the billions of daily exchanges that constitute the circuits of

global capitalism. If there are at least two people involved, even in the seclusion of one's own mind, then there is a social interaction that entails the "ongoing concerting and coordinating of activities." Why does the person move to the right on the sidewalk? What collective processes lead to the decision that moving to the right rather than the left is normal? Is it different in countries where people drive on the left? Think about the T-shirts in the chest of drawers at home. What are the sequences of linkages, exchanges, transportation conduits, and social relationships that connect one's T-shirts to the dangerous and hyper-exploitative garment factories in rural China or Bangladesh? These are the type of questions that point to the unique domain and puzzles of *the social* that sociology seeks to explore and understand.

What are Society and Culture? Micro, Macro and Global Perspectives

Sociologists study all aspects and levels of society. A **society** is a group of people whose members interact, reside in a definable area, and share a culture. A **culture** includes the group's shared practices, values, beliefs, norms, and artifacts. One sociologist might analyze video of people from different societies as they carry on everyday conversations to study the rules of polite conversation from different world cultures. Another sociologist might interview a representative sample of people to see how email and instant messaging have changed the way organizations are run. Yet another sociologist might study how migration determined the way in which language spread and changed over time. A fourth sociologist might study the history of international agencies like the United Nations or the International Monetary Fund to examine how the globe became divided into a First World and a Third World after the end of the colonial era.

These examples illustrate the ways in which society and culture can be studied at different *levels of analysis*, from the detailed study of face-to-face interactions to the examination of large-scale historical processes affecting entire civilizations. It is common to divide these levels of analysis into different gradations based on the scale of interaction involved. As discussed in later chapters (specifically, see [Chapter 7. Groups and Organizations](#)), sociologists break the study of society down into four separate levels of analysis: micro, meso, macro, and global. The basic distinctions, however, are between **micro-level sociology**, **macro-level sociology** and **global-level sociology**.

The study of cultural rules of politeness in conversation is an example of micro-level sociology. At the *micro-level* of analysis, the focus is on the social dynamics of intimate, face-to-face interactions. Research is conducted with a specific set of individuals such as conversational partners, family members, work associates, or friendship groups. In the conversation study example, sociologists might try to determine how people from different cultures interpret each others' behaviour to see how different rules of politeness lead to misunderstandings. If the same misunderstandings occur consistently in a number of different interactions, the sociologists may be able to propose some generalizations about rules of politeness that would be helpful in reducing tensions in mixed-group dynamics (e.g., during staff meetings or international negotiations). Other examples of micro-level research include seeing how informal networks become a key source of support and advancement in formal bureaucracies, or how loyalty in criminal gangs is established.

Macro-level sociology focuses on the properties of large-scale, society-wide social interactions that extend beyond the immediate milieu of individual interactions: the dynamics of institutions, class structures, gender relations, or whole populations. The example above of the influence of migration on changing patterns of language usage is a macro-level phenomenon because it refers to structures or processes of social interaction that occur outside or beyond the intimate circle of individual social acquaintances. These include the economic, political, and other circumstances that lead to migration; the educational, media, and other communication structures that help or hinder the spread of speech patterns; the class, racial, or ethnic divisions that create different slangs or cultures of language use; the relative isolation or integration of different communities within a population; and so on. Other examples of macro-level research include examining why women are far less likely than men to reach positions of power in society, or why fundamentalist Christian religious movements play a more prominent role in American politics than they do in Canadian politics. In each case, the site of the analysis shifts away from the nuances and detail of micro-level interpersonal life to the broader, macro-level systematic patterns that structure social change and social cohesion in society.

In *global-level* sociology, the focus is on variables, structures and processes that extend beyond the boundaries of states or specific societies. In the era of globalization, as Ulrich Beck (2000) has pointed out, in many respects people in modern societies no longer “live and act in the self-enclosed spaces of national states and their respective national societies.” Issues of climate change, the introduction of new technologies, the investment and disinvestment of capital, the images of popular culture, or the tensions of cross-cultural or religious conflict, etc. increasingly involve people’s daily life in the affairs of the entire globe, by-passing the traditional borders that defined distinct societies and, to some degree, distance itself. The example above of the way in which the world became divided into wealthy First World and impoverished Third World societies reflects social processes — the history of colonization or the formation of international institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and non-governmental organizations, for example — which are global in scale and global in their effects. With the boom and bust of petroleum or other export commodity economies, it is clear to someone living in Fort McMurray, Alberta, that their daily life is affected not only by their intimate relationships with the people around them, nor only by provincial and national based corporations and policies, etc., but by global markets that determine the price of oil and the global flows of capital investment. The *context* of these processes has to be analyzed at a global scale of analysis.

The relationship between the micro, macro, and global remains one of the key conceptual problems confronting sociology. What is the relationship between an individual’s life and social life? The early German sociologist Georg Simmel (1908/1971) pointed out that macro-level processes are in fact nothing more than the sum of all the unique interactions between specific individuals at any one time, yet they have properties of their own, which would be missed if sociologists only focused on the interactions of specific individuals. Émile Durkheim’s (1897/1951) classic study of suicide is a case in point. While suicide is one of the most personal, individual, and intimate acts imaginable, Durkheim demonstrated that rates of suicide differed between religious communities — Protestants, Catholics, and Jews — in a way that could not be explained by the individual factors involved in each specific case. The different rates of suicide had to be explained by macro-level variables associated with the different religious beliefs and practices of the faith communities; more specifically, the different degrees of *social integration* of these communities. The discussion returns to this example in more detail later in this chapter. On the other hand, macro-level phenomena like class structures, institutional organizations, legal systems, gender stereotypes, population growth, and urban ways of life provide the shared context for everyday life but do not explain its specific nuances and micro-variations very well. Macro-level structures constrain the daily interactions of the intimate circles in which people move, but they are also filtered through localized perceptions and “lived” in a myriad of inventive and unpredictable ways.

The Sociological Imagination

Although the scale of sociological studies and the methods of carrying them out are different, the sociologists involved in them all have something in common. Each of them looks at society using what pioneer sociologist C. Wright Mills (1916-1962) called the **sociological imagination**, sometimes also referred to as the “sociological lens” or “sociological perspective.” In a sense, this was Mills’ way of addressing the dilemmas of the macro/micro divide in sociology. Mills (1959) defined sociological imagination as how individuals understand their own and others’ lives in relation to history and social structure. It is the capacity to see an individual’s private troubles in the context of the broader social processes that structure them. This enables the sociologist to examine what Mills called “personal troubles of milieu” as “public issues of social structure,” and vice versa.

Mills reasoned that private troubles like being overweight, being unemployed, having marital difficulties, or feeling purposeless or depressed can be purely personal in nature. It is possible for them to be addressed and understood in terms of individualistic, personal, psychological, or moral attributes — either one’s own or those of the people in one’s immediate milieu.

In an individualistic society like North American society, this is in fact the most likely way that people will regard the issues they confront: “I have an addictive personality,” “I can’t get a break in the job market,” “My husband is unsupportive,” etc. However, if private troubles are widely shared with others, they indicate that there is a common social problem that has its source in the way social life is structured at a macro or global level. At this level, the issues are not adequately understood as simply private troubles. They are best addressed as public issues of social structure that require a collective response to resolve.

Obesity, for example, has been increasingly recognized as a growing problem for both children and adults in North America. Michael Pollan (2006) cites statistics that three out of five Americans are overweight and one out of five is obese. In Canada in 2018, just over one quarter adults (26.8%) were obese, up from 16% of men and 14.5% of women in 2003, and 36.3% were overweight (Statistics Canada, 2019). Obesity is therefore not simply a private concern related to the medical issues, dietary practices, or exercise habits of specific individuals. It is a widely shared social issue that puts people at risk for chronic diseases like hypertension, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease. It also creates significant social costs for the medical system.

Pollan argues that obesity is in part a product of the increasingly sedentary and stressful lifestyle of modern, capitalist society. More importantly, however, it is a product of the industrialization of the food chain, which since the 1970s has produced increasingly cheap and abundant food with significantly more calories due to processing. Additives like corn syrup, which are much cheaper and therefore more profitable to produce than natural sugars, led to the trend of super-sized fast foods and soft drinks in the 1980s. As Pollan argues, trying to find a processed food in the supermarket without a cheap, calorie-rich, corn-based additive is a challenge. The sociological imagination in this example is the capacity to see the private troubles and attitudes associated with being overweight as an issue of how the industrialization of the food chain has altered the human/environment relationship — in particular, with respect to the types of food people eat and the way they eat them.

By looking at individuals and societies, and how they interact through this lens, sociologists are able to examine what influences behaviour, attitudes, and culture. By applying systematic and scientific methods to this process, they try to




Figure 1.4 Sociology begins with an act of sociological imagination. How do personal problems of milieu relate to public issues of social structure, and vice versa? (image courtesy of Mike Kline/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

do so without letting their own biases and preconceived ideas influence their conclusions (see [Chapter 2. Sociological Research](#)).

Studying Patterns: How Sociologists View the Relationship between Society and the Individual

All sociologists are interested in the experiences of individuals and how interactions with social groups, and society as a whole, shape those experiences. To a sociologist, the biographical details of an individual and the personal decisions an individual makes do not exist in a vacuum. Social patterns and social forces put pressure on people to select one choice over another. Sociologists try to identify these general patterns by examining the behaviour of large groups of people who live in the same society and experience the same societal pressures.

When general patterns persist through time and become habitual or routinized at micro-levels of interaction as **social scripts**, or institutionalized at macro or global levels of interaction as rules, laws, or power relations, they are referred to as **social structures**. Social structures are repeated patterns of behaviour and social coordination that persist through time. They have three general properties:

1. they *control* or constrain individuals so they act in the same way in the same circumstances;
2. they *change* individuals so they fit within the expectations and rules of social or institutional situations; and
3. they both *resist* social change and *enable* social change in that they persist through time and yet enact processes that affect themselves and other social structures and processes (Tepperman, 2010).

Often the collective effects of social structures are referred to as “society.”

As noted above, understanding the relationship between the individual and society is one of the most difficult sociological problems. Partly, this is because of the reified way the two terms are used in everyday speech. **Reification** refers to the way in which abstract concepts, complex processes, or fluid social relationships come to be thought of as “things.” A prime example of reification is when people say that “society” caused an individual to do something, or to turn out in a particular way. In writing essays, first-year sociology students sometimes refer to “society” as a cause of social behaviour or as an entity with independent agency — “Society did something to somebody” — but society is not an agent or an object. On the other hand, the “individual” is a being that seems solid, tangible, and independent of anything going on outside of the skin sack that contains its essence. But the individual is a social being through and through.

This conventional distinction between society and the individual is a product of reification, as both society and the individual appear as independent objects acting upon each other. A *concept* of “the individual” and a *concept* of “society” are given the status of real, substantial, independent objects, like pool balls on a pool table. As discussed in the chapters to come, society and the individual are not objects, nor are they independent of one another. An “individual” is inconceivable without the social relationships to others that define their internal, subjective life and their external, socially defined roles. “Society” is inconceivable without the living, breathing, desiring, interacting individuals that compose it.

One problem for sociologists in grasping the individual/society relationship is that the concepts of the individual and society, and their relationship, get reified in terms established by a very common *moral* framework in modern democratic societies — namely, that of individual responsibility and individual choice. Individual responsibility and individual choice are components of the idea of **individual agency**: the capacity of individuals to act and make decisions independently. The individual is morally responsible for their behaviours and decisions. They are “good persons” or “bad

seeds.” Often in this framework, any suggestion that an individual’s behaviour needs to be understood in terms of that person’s social context is dismissed as “letting the individual off” from taking personal responsibility for their actions. Talking about societal forces and structures is akin to being morally soft or lenient.

Sociology, as a social science, remains neutral on these types of moral questions. For sociologists, the conceptualization of the individual and society is much more complex than the moral framework suggests and needs to be examined through evidence-based, rather than morality-based, research. The sociological problem is to be able to see the individual as a thoroughly social being and, yet, as a being who has agency and free choice. Individuals are beings who *do* take on individual responsibilities in their everyday social roles, and risk social consequences when they fail to live up to them. However, the manner in which individuals take on responsibilities, and sometimes the compulsion to do so, are socially defined. Individuals *do* often have “the freedom to do ‘what they want’; yet seemingly, what they want often falls into predictable patterns” (Tepperman, 2010). The sociological problem is to be able to see society as a dimension of experience characterized by regular and predictable patterns of behaviour that exist independently of any specific individual’s desires or self-understanding. At the same time, a society is nothing *but* the ongoing social relationships and activities of specific individuals.

A key basis of the sociological perspective therefore is the concept that the individual and society are inseparable. It is impossible to study one without the other. German sociologist Norbert Elias (1887-1990) called the process of simultaneously analyzing the behaviour of individuals and the society that shapes that behaviour **figuration**. He described it through a metaphor of dancing. There can be no dance without the dancers, but there can be no dancers without the dance. Without the dancers, a dance is just an idea about motions in a choreographer’s head. Without a dance, there is just a group of people moving around a floor. Similarly, there is no society without the individuals that make it up, and there are no individuals who are not affected by the society in which they live (Elias, 1978). “Society” is a kind of shorthand term for the “web of interdependences formed among human beings and which connects them: that is to say, a structure of mutually oriented and dependent persons” (Elias, 2000).

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

The Individual in Society: Choices of Indigenous Gang Members



Figure 1.5 While Indigenous people account for about 5% of the Canadian population, in 2020 they made up 30% of the federal penitentiary population (photo courtesy of Fiore Power/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

In 2010, the CBC program *The Current* aired a report about several young Indigenous men who were serving time in prison in Saskatchewan for gang-related activities (CBC, 2010). They all expressed desires to be able to deal with their drug addiction issues, return to their families, and assume their responsibilities when their sentences were complete. They wanted to have their own places with nice things in them. However, according to the CBC report, 80% of the prison population in the Saskatchewan Correctional Centre were Indigenous and 20% of those were gang members. This is consistent with national statistics on Indigenous incarceration. While Indigenous people account for about 5% of the Canadian population, in 2020 they made up 30% of the federal penitentiary population. In 2001, they made up only 17.6% of the penitentiary population. Overrepresentation of Indigenous people in prisons has continued to grow substantially (Office of the Correctional Investigator, 2020).

The outcomes of Indigenous incarceration are also bleak. The federal Office of the Correctional Investigator summarized the situation as follows. Indigenous inmates are:

- Routinely classified as higher risk and higher need in categories such as employment, community reintegration, and family supports.
- Released later in their sentence (lower parole grant rates); most leave prison at Statutory Release or Warrant Expiry dates.
- Overrepresented in segregation and maximum security populations.

- Disproportionately involved in use-of-force interventions and incidents of prison self-injury.
- More likely to return to prison on revocation of parole, often for administrative reasons, not criminal violations (Office of the Correctional Investigator, 2013).

The federal report notes that “the high rate of incarceration for Aboriginal peoples has been linked to systemic discrimination and attitudes based on racial or cultural prejudice, as well as economic and social disadvantage, substance abuse, and intergenerational loss, violence and trauma” (Office of the Correctional Investigator, 2013).

This is clearly a case in which the situation of the incarcerated inmates interviewed on the CBC program has been structured by historical social patterns and power relationships that confront Indigenous people in Canada generally. How do sociologists understand it at the individual level, however — at the level of personal decision making and individual responsibilities? One young inmate described how, at the age of 13, he began to hang around with his cousins who were part of a gang. He had not grown up with “the best life”; he had family members suffering from addiction issues and traumas. The appeal of what appeared as a fast and exciting lifestyle — the sense of freedom and of being able to make one’s own life, instead of enduring poverty — was compelling. He began to earn money by “running dope” but also began to develop addictions. He was expelled from school for recruiting gang members. The only job he ever had was selling drugs. The circumstances in which he and the other inmates had entered the gang life, and the difficulties getting out of it they knew awaited them when they left prison, reflect a set of decision-making parameters fundamentally different than those facing most non-Indigenous people in Canada.

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1.2. The History of Sociology



Figure 1.6 People have been thinking like sociologists long before sociology became a separate academic discipline. Plato and Aristotle, Herodotus, Ma Duan-Lin, Ibn Khaldun and Montesquieu (from left to right) all set the stage for modern sociology. (Images (a) [Public Domain](#), (b) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#), (d) [CC BY-SA 3.0](#), (e) via Wikimedia Commons, [Public Domain](#), (c) courtesy of YouTube, [Fair Dealing](#).)

Since ancient times, people have been fascinated by the relationship between individuals and the societies to which they belong. The ancient Greeks might be said to have provided the foundations of sociology through the distinction they drew between *physis* (nature) and *nomos* (law or custom). Whereas nature or *physis* for the Greeks was “what emerges from itself” without human intervention, *nomos* in the form of laws, customs, or ways of life were human conventions designed to shape human behaviour. The modern sociological term “*norm*” (i.e., a social rule that regulates human behaviour) comes from the Greek term *nomos*. *Histories* by Herodotus (484–425 BCE) was a proto-anthropological work that described the great variations in the *nomos* of different ancient societies around the Mediterranean, indicating that human social life was not a product of nature but a product of human creation. If human social life was the product of an invariable human or biological nature, all cultures would be the same. The concerns of the later Greek philosophers – Socrates (469–399 BCE), Plato (428–347 BCE), and Aristotle (384–322 BCE) – with the ideal form of human community (the *polis* or city-state) can be derived from the ethical dilemmas of this difference between human nature and human norms. As Aristotle (1984) puts it, humans create the *polis* or community “not only in view of living but rather for living well.” Moreover, in a very modern sociological formulation, he argued “the *polis* is by nature prior to the family [*oikia*] and to each individual, because the whole is necessarily prior to the parts.”

In the 13th century, Ma Duan-Lin, a Chinese historian, first recognized social dynamics as an underlying component of historical development in his seminal encyclopedia, *General Study of Literary Remains*. The study charted the historical development of Chinese state administration from antiquity in a manner very similar to contemporary institutional analyses.

The next century saw the emergence of the historian some consider the world’s first sociologist, the Berber scholar Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) of Tunisia. His *Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History* is known for going beyond descriptive history to an analysis of historical processes of change based on his insights into “the nature of things which are born of civilization” (Khaldun quoted in Becker and Barnes, 1961). Key to his analysis was the distinction between the sedentary life of cities and the nomadic life of pastoral peoples like the Bedouin and Berbers. The nomads, who exist independent of external authority, developed a social bond based on *blood lineage* and “*esprit de corps*” (*Asabijja*), which enabled them to mobilize quickly and act in a unified and concerted manner in response to the rugged circumstances of desert life. The sedentary population of the city entered into a different cycle in which *esprit de corps* is subsumed to institutional power and the intrigues of political factions. The need to be focused on subsistence is replaced by a trend toward

increasing luxury, ease, and refinements of taste. The relationship between the two poles of existence, nomadism and sedentary life, was at the basis of the development and decay of civilizations (Becker and Barnes, 1961).

Finally, the French political philosopher, Montesquieu (1689-1755) outlined an early sociological framework in his comparative and historical classification of political structures. In his attempt to define the “laws of laws,” the social determinants that caused different legal structures and national identities to develop in different jurisdictions, he pioneered a uniquely sociological approach to variations in human society.

However, it was not until the 19th century that the basis of the modern discipline of sociology could be said to have been truly established. The impetus for the ideas that culminated in sociology can be found in the three major transformations that defined modern society and the culture of modernity: the development of modern science from the 16th century onward, the emergence of democratic forms of government with the American and French Revolutions (1775-1783 and 1789-1799 respectively), and the Industrial Revolution beginning in the 18th century. Not only was the framework for sociological knowledge established in these events, but also the initial motivation for creating a science of society. Early sociologists like Comte and Marx sought to formulate a rational, evidence-based response to the experience of massive social dislocation brought about by the transition from the European feudal era to capitalism. This was a period of unprecedented social problems, from the breakdown of local feudal communities to the hyper-exploitation of industrial labourers. Whether the intention was to restore order to the chaotic disintegration of society, as in Comte’s case, or to provide the basis for a revolutionary transformation in Marx’s, a rational and scientifically comprehensive knowledge of society and its processes was required. It was in this context that “society” itself, in the modern sense of the word, became visible as a phenomenon to early investigators of the social condition.



Figure 1.7 Newton, William Blake, 1795 (photo courtesy of William Blake/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

The development of modern science provided the model of knowledge needed for sociology to move beyond earlier moral, philosophical, and religious types of reflection on the human condition. Key to the development of science was the technological mindset that Max Weber termed the **disenchantment of the world**: “principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather one can, in principle, master all things by calculation” (1919). The focus of knowledge shifted from intuiting the intentions of spirits and gods to systematically observing and testing the world of things through science and technology. Modern science abandoned the medieval view of the world in which God, “the unmoved mover,” defined the natural and social world as a changeless, cyclical creation, hierarchically ordered and given purpose by divine will. Instead, modern science combined two philosophical traditions that had historically been at odds: Plato’s **rationalism** and Aristotle’s **empiricism** (Berman, 1981). Rationalism sought the laws that governed the truth of reason and ideas, and in the hands of early scientists like Galileo and Newton, found its highest form of expression in the logical formulations of mathematics. Empiricism sought to discover the laws of the operation of the world through the careful, methodical, and detailed observation of the world. The new scientific worldview therefore combined the clear and logically coherent, conceptual formulation of propositions from rationalism, with an empirical method of inquiry based on observation through the senses. Sociology adopted these core principles to emphasize that claims about social life had to be clearly formulated and based on evidence-based procedures. It also gave sociology a technological framework as a type of knowledge which could be used to solve social problems.

The emergence of democratic forms of government in the 18th century demonstrated that humans had the capacity to change the world. The rigid hierarchy of medieval society was not a God-given eternal order, but a human order that could be challenged and improved upon through human intervention. Through the revolutionary process of democratization, society came to be seen as both *historical* and the *product of human endeavours*. Age of Enlightenment philosophers like Locke, Voltaire, Montaigne, and Rousseau developed general principles that could be used to explain social life. Their emphasis shifted from the histories and exploits of the aristocracy to the life of ordinary people. Mary Wollstonecraft’s *A Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1792) extended the critical analysis of her male Enlightenment contemporaries to the situation of women. Significantly for modern sociology, they proposed that the use of reason could be applied to address social ills and to emancipate humanity from servitude. Wollstonecraft for example argued that simply allowing women to have a proper education would enable them to contribute to the improvement of society, especially through their influence on children. On the other hand, the bloody experience of the democratic revolutions, particularly the French Revolution, which resulted in the “Reign of Terror” and ultimately Napoleon’s attempt to subjugate Europe, also provided a cautionary tale for the early sociologists about the need for sober scientific assessment of empirical evidence to guide public policy and restrain excesses of power.

The *Industrial Revolution* in a strict sense refers to the development of industrial methods of production, the introduction of industrial machinery, and the organization of labour to serve new manufacturing systems. These economic changes are emblematic of the massive transformation of human life brought about by the creation of wage labour, capitalist competition, increased mobility, urbanization, individualism, and all the social problems they wrought: poverty, exploitation, dangerous working conditions, crime, pollution, disease, and the loss of family and other traditional support networks, etc. It was a time of great social and political upheaval with the rise of empires that exposed many people — for the first time — to societies and cultures other than their own. Millions of people were moving into cities and many people were turning away from their traditional religious beliefs. Wars, strikes, revolts, and revolutionary actions were reactions to underlying social tensions that had never existed before and called for critical examination. August Comte in particular envisioned the new science of sociology as the antidote to conditions that he described as “moral anarchy,” whereas Marx saw its potential to determine paths to social liberation.

Sociology therefore emerged; firstly, as an extension of the new worldview of science; secondly, as a part of the Enlightenment project and its focus on historical change, social injustice, and the possibilities of social reform; and thirdly, as a crucial response to the new and unprecedented types of social problems that appeared in the 19th century with the Industrial Revolution. It did not emerge as a unified science, however, as its founders brought distinctly different perspectives to its early formulations.

August Comte: The Father of Sociology



Figure 1.8 Auguste Comte is considered by many to be the father of sociology (photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

The term sociology was first coined in 1780 by the French essayist Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès (1748–1836) in an unpublished manuscript (Fauré et al., 1999). In 1838, the term was reinvented by Auguste Comte (1798–1857). The contradictions of Comte's life and the times he lived through can be in large part read into the concerns that led to his development of sociology. He was born in 1798, year 6 of the new French Republic, to staunch monarchist and Catholic parents. They lived comfortably off his father's earnings as a minor bureaucrat in the tax office. Comte originally studied to be an engineer, but after rejecting his parents' conservative, monarchist views, he declared himself a republican and free spirit at the age of 13 and was eventually kicked out of school at 18 for leading a school riot. This ended his chances of getting a formal education and a position as an academic or government official.

He became a secretary to the utopian socialist philosopher Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) until they had a falling out in 1824 (after St. Simon reputedly purloined some of Comte's essays and signed his own name to them). Nevertheless, they both thought that society could be studied using the same scientific methods utilized in the natural sciences. Comte also believed in the potential of social scientists to work toward the betterment of society and coined the slogan “order and progress” to reconcile the opposing progressive and conservative factions that had divided the crisis-ridden, post-revolutionary French society. Comte proposed a renewed, organic spiritual order in which the

authority of science would be the means to create a rational social order. Through science, each social strata would be reconciled with their place in a hierarchical social order. It is a testament to his influence in the 19th century that the phrase “order and progress” adorns the Brazilian coat of arms (Collins and Makowsky, 1989).

Comte named the scientific study of social patterns **positivism**. He described his philosophy in a well-attended and popular series of lectures, which he published as *The Course in Positive Philosophy* (1830–1842) and *A General View of Positivism* (1848/1977). He believed that using scientific methods to reveal the laws by which societies and individuals interact would usher in a new “positivist” age of history. In principle, positivism, or what Comte called “social physics,” proposed that the study of society could be conducted in the same way that the natural sciences approach the natural world.

While Comte never in fact conducted any social research, his notion of sociology as a positivist science that might effectively socially engineer a better society was deeply influential. Where his influence waned was a result of the way in which he became increasingly obsessive and hostile to all criticism as his ideas progressed beyond positivism as the “science of society” to positivism as the basis of a new cult-like, technocratic “religion of humanity.” The new social order he imagined was deeply conservative and hierarchical, a kind of a caste system with every level of society obliged to reconcile itself with its “scientifically” allotted place. Comte imagined himself at the pinnacle of society, taking the title of “Great Priest of Humanity.” The moral and intellectual anarchy he decried would be resolved through the rule of sociologists who would eliminate the need for unnecessary and divisive democratic dialogue. Social order “must ever be incompatible with a perpetual discussion of the foundations of society” (Comte, 1830/1975).

Karl Marx: The Ruthless Critique of Everything Existing




Figure 1.9 Karl Marx was one of the founders of sociology. His ideas about social conflict are still relevant today (photo courtesy of John Mayall/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Karl Marx (1818–1883) was a German philosopher and economist. In 1848, he and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) co-authored the *Communist Manifesto*. This book is one of the most influential political manuscripts in history. It also presents in a highly condensed form Marx's theory of society, which differed from what Comte proposed. Whereas Comte viewed the goal of sociology as recreating a unified, post-feudal *spiritual* order that would help to institutionalize a new era of political and social stability, Marx developed a critical analysis of capitalism that saw the *material* or *economic* basis of inequality and power relations as the cause of social instability and conflict. The focus of sociology, or what Marx called **historical materialism** (the “materialist conception of history”), should be the “ruthless critique of everything existing,” as he said in a letter to his friend Arnold Ruge (1802–1880). In this way the goal of sociology would not simply be to scientifically analyze or objectively describe society, but to use a rigorous scientific analysis as a basis to change it. This framework became the foundation of contemporary **critical sociology**.

Although Marx did not call his analysis “sociology,” his sociological innovation was to provide a *social analysis* of the *economic system*. Adam Smith (1723–1790) and the political

economists of the 19th century tried to explain the economic laws of supply and demand solely as a market mechanism, similar to the abstract discussions of stock market indices and investment returns in the business pages of newspapers today. Marx's analysis showed the *social relationships* that had created the market system, and the *social repercussions* of their operation. As such, his analysis of modern society was not static or simply descriptive. He was able to put his finger on the underlying dynamism and continuous change that characterized capitalist society.

Marx was also able to create an effective basis for critical sociology in that what he aimed for in his analysis was, as he put it in another letter to Arnold Ruge, “the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age.” While he took a clear and principled value position in his critique, he did not do so dogmatically, based on an arbitrary moral position of what he personally thought was good and bad. He felt, rather, that a critical social theory must engage in clarifying and supporting the issues of social justice that were inherent within the existing struggles and wishes of the age. In his own work, he endeavoured to show how the variety of specific work actions, strikes, and revolts by workers in different occupations — for better pay, safer working conditions, shorter hours, the right to unionize, etc. — contained the seeds for a vision of universal equality, collective justice, and ultimately the ideal of a classless society.

Harriet Martineau: The First Woman Sociologist?

Harriet Martineau (1802–1876) was one of the first women sociologists in the 19th century. There are a number of other women who might compete with her for the title of the *first* woman sociologist, such as Catherine Macaulay, Mary Wollstonecraft, Flora Tristan, and Beatrice Webb, but Martineau's specifically sociological credentials are strong. She was for a long time known principally for her English translation of Comte's *Course in Positive Philosophy*. Through this popular translation, she introduced the concept of sociology as a methodologically rigorous discipline to an English-speaking audience. But she also created a body of her own work in the tradition of the great **social reform** movements of the 19th century, and introduced a sorely missing woman's perspective into the discourse on society.

It was a testament to her abilities that after she became impoverished at the age of 24 with the death of her father, brother, and fiancé, she was able to earn her own income as the first woman journalist in Britain, and to write under her own name. From the age of 12, she suffered from severe hearing loss and was obliged to use a large ear trumpet to converse. She impressed a wide audience with a series of articles on political economy in 1832. In 1834, she left England to engage in two years of study of the new republic of the United States and its emerging institutions: prisons, insane asylums, factories, farms, Southern plantations, universities, hospitals, and churches. On the basis of extensive research, interviews, and observations, she published *Society in America* and worked with abolitionists on the social reform of slavery (Zeitlin, 1997). She also worked for social reform in the situation of women: the right to vote, have an education, pursue an occupation, and enjoy the same legal rights as men. Together with Florence Nightingale, she worked on the development of public health care, which led to early formulations of the welfare system in Britain (McDonald, 1998).



Figure 1.10 Harriet Martineau portrait by Richard Evans, 1834 (image courtesy of National Portrait Gallery: NPG 1085 [London]/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Émile Durkheim: The Pathologies of the Social Order



Figure 1.11 Émile Durkheim (photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY SA 4.0](#)

Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) helped establish sociology as a formal academic discipline by establishing the first European department of sociology at the University of Bordeaux in 1895, and by publishing his *Rules of the Sociological Method* in 1895. He was born to a Jewish family in the Lorraine province of France (one of the two provinces, along with Alsace, that were lost to the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871). With the German occupation of Lorraine, the Jewish community suddenly became subject to sporadic anti-Semitic violence, with the Jews often being blamed for the French defeat and the economic/political instability that followed. Durkheim attributed this strange experience of anti-Semitism and scapegoating to the lack of moral purpose in modern society.

As in Comte's time, France in the late 19th century was the site of major upheavals and sharp political divisions: the loss of the Franco-Prussian War, the Paris Commune (1871) in which 20,000 workers died, the fall and capture of Emperor Napoleon III (Napoleon I's nephew), the creation of the Third Republic, and the Dreyfus Affair. This undoubtedly led to the focus in Durkheim's sociology on themes of moral anarchy, decadence, disunity, and disorganization. For Durkheim, sociology was a scientific but also a “moral calling” and one of the central tasks of the sociologist was to determine “the causes of the general temporary maladjustment being undergone by

European societies and remedies which may relieve it” (1897/1951). In this respect, Durkheim represented the sociologist as a kind of medical doctor, studying social pathologies of the moral order and proposing social remedies and cures. He saw healthy societies as stable, while pathological societies experienced a breakdown in social norms between individuals and society. He described this breakdown as a state of normlessness or **anomie** — a lack of norms that give clear direction and purpose to individual actions. As he put it, anomie was the result of “society's insufficient presence in individuals” (1897/1951).

Key to Durkheim's approach was the development of a framework for sociology based on the analysis of **social facts** and social **functions**. Social facts are those things like law, custom, morality, religious rites, language, money, business practices, etc. that can be defined *externally* to the individual. Social facts:

- Precede the individual and will continue to exist after she or he is gone;
- Consist of details and obligations of which individuals are frequently unaware; and
- Are endowed with an external coercive power by reason of which individuals are controlled.

For Durkheim, social facts were like the facts of the natural sciences. They could be studied without reference to the subjective experience of individuals. He argued that “social facts must be studied as things, that is, as realities external to the individual” (Durkheim, 1895/1964). Individuals experience them as obligations, duties, and restraints on their behaviour, operating independently of their will. They are hardly noticeable when individuals consent to them but provoke reaction when individuals resist.

Durkheim argued that each of these social facts serve one or more social *functions* within a society; they exist to fulfill a societal need. For example, one function of a society's laws may be to protect society from violence and punish criminal behaviour, while another is to create collective standards of behaviour that people believe in and identify with. Laws create a basis for **social solidarity** and order. In this manner, each identifiable social fact could be analyzed with regard to its specific function in a society. Like a body in which each organ (heart, liver, brain, etc.) serves a particular function in maintaining the body's life processes, a healthy society depends on particular functions or needs being met.

Durkheim's insights into society often revealed that social practices, like the worshipping of totem animals in his study of Australian Aboriginal religions, had social functions quite at variance with what practitioners consciously believed they were doing. The honouring of totemic animals through rites and privations functioned to create social solidarity and cohesion for tribes whose lives were otherwise dispersed through the activities of hunting and gathering in a sparse environment.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

Durkheim and the Sociological Study of Suicide



Figure 1.12 The chalice is at the center of Catholic religious ritual and practice. In what way is it an example of a social fact? How does it function to bind the community of the faithful? (Photo courtesy of Mary Harrsch/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

Durkheim was very influential in defining the subject matter of the new discipline of sociology. For Durkheim, sociology was not about just any phenomena to do with the life of human beings, but only those phenomena which pertained exclusively to a *social level* of analysis. It was not about the biological or psychological dynamics of human life, for example, but about the external *social facts* through which the lives of individuals were constrained. Moreover, the dimension of human experience described by social facts had to be explained in its own terms. It could not be explained by biological drives or psychological characteristics of individuals. It was a dimension of reality *sui generis* (of its own kind, unique in its characteristics). It could not be explained by, or reduced to, its individual components without missing its most important features. As Durkheim put it, “a social fact can only be explained by another social fact” (Durkheim, 1895/1964). These social facts were often hidden causes, not immediately evident to the individuals caught up in them, and required sociological investigation. As he said, “If we had really only to open our eyes and take a good look to perceive at once the laws of the social world, sociology would be useless or, at least very simple” (Durkheim, 1897/1997).

This is the framework of Durkheim's famous study of suicide. In *Suicide: A Study in Sociology* (1897/1997), Durkheim attempted to demonstrate the effectiveness of his rules of social research by examining suicide statistics in different police districts. Suicide is perhaps the most personal and most individual of all acts. Its motives would seem to be absolutely unique to the individual and to individual psychopathology. However, what Durkheim observed was that statistical *rates of suicide* remained fairly constant, year-by-year and region-by-region. The rates of suicide constituted a social fact independent of the unique circumstances of each case. Moreover, there was no correlation between rates of suicide and rates of psychopathology. Suicide rates did vary, however, according to the social context of the suicides. For example, suicide rates varied according to the religious affiliation of suicides. Protestants had

higher rates of suicide than Catholics, even though both religions equally condemn suicide. In some jurisdictions Protestants killed themselves 300% more often than Catholics. Durkheim argued that the key factor that explained the difference in suicide *rates* (i.e., the statistical rates, not the purely individual motives for the suicides) were the different degrees of *social integration* of the different religious communities – the number and strength of social ties connecting individuals to each other and society – measured by the degree of authority religious beliefs hold over individuals, and the amount of collective ritual observance and mutual involvement individuals engage in religious practice. A social fact – suicide rates – was explained by another social fact – degree of social integration.

The key social function of religion was to integrate individuals by linking them to a common external doctrine and to a greater spiritual reality outside of themselves. Religion created moral communities. In this regard, he observed that the degree of authority that religious beliefs and rituals held over Catholics was much stronger than for Protestants, who from the time of Luther had been taught to take a critical attitude toward formal doctrine. Protestants were more free to interpret religious belief and in a sense were more individually responsible for supervising and maintaining their own religious practice. Moreover, in Catholicism the ritual practice of the sacraments, such as confession and taking communion, remained intact, whereas in Protestantism ritual was reduced to a minimum. Participation in the choreographed rituals of religious life created a highly visible, public focus for religious observance, forging a link between private thought and public belief. Because Protestants had to be more individualistic and self-reliant in their religious practice, they were not subject to the strict discipline and external constraints of Catholics. They were less integrated into their communities and more thrown back on their own resources. They were more prone to what Durkheim termed **egoistic suicide**: suicide which results from the individual ego having to depend on itself for self-regulation (and failing) in the absence of strong social bonds tying it to a community.

Durkheim's study was unique and insightful because he did not try to explain suicide rates in terms of individual psychopathology, mental states or intentions. Instead, he regarded the regularity of the suicide rates as a social fact, implying "the existence of collective tendencies exterior to the individual" (Durkheim, 1897/1997), and explained their variation with respect to another social fact: degree of social integration or the strength and number of social bonds tying individuals to society. A group is more socially integrated, "the more active and constant is the intercourse among its members." Therefore he proposed a social law, "Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social groups of which the individual forms a part" (Durkheim, 1897/1997).

Contemporary research into suicide in Canada shows that suicide is the second leading cause of death among young people aged 15 to 34 (behind death by accident) (Navaneelan, 2012). The greatest increase in suicide since the 1960s has been in the age 15-19 age group, increasing by 4.5 times for males and by 3 times for females. In 2009, 23% of deaths among adolescents aged 15-19 were caused by suicide, up from 9% in 1974, (although this difference in percentage is because the rate of suicide remained fairly constant between 1974 and 2009, while death due to accidental causes has declined markedly). On the other hand, married people are the least likely group to commit suicide. Single, never-married people are 3.3 times more likely to commit suicide than married people, followed by widowed and divorced individuals respectively. How do sociologists explain this?

It is clear that adolescence and early adulthood is a period in which social ties to family and society are strained. It is often a confusing period in which teenagers break away from their childhood roles in the family group and establish their independence. Youth unemployment is higher than for other age groups

and, since the 1960s, there has been a large increase in divorces and single parent families. These factors tend to decrease the quantity and the intensity of ties to society. Married people, on the other hand, have both strong affective affinities with their marriage partners and strong social expectations placed on them, especially if they have families: their roles are clear and the norms which guide them are well-defined. According to Durkheim's proposition, suicide rates vary inversely with the degree of integration of social groups. Adolescents are less integrated into society, which puts them at a higher risk for suicide than married people who are more integrated. It is interesting that the highest rates of suicide in Canada are for adults in midlife, aged 40-59. Midlife is also a time noted for crises of identity, but perhaps more significantly, as Navaneelan (2012) argues, suicide in this age group results from the change in marital status as people try to cope with the transition from married to divorced and widowed.

Max Weber: Verstehende Soziologie



Figure 1.13 Max Weber. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Prominent sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) established a sociology department in Germany at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich in 1919. He wrote on many topics related to sociology including political change in Russia, the condition of German farm workers, and the history of world religions. He was also a prominent public figure, playing an important role in the German peace delegation in Versailles and in drafting the ill-fated German (Weimar) constitution following the defeat of Germany in World War I. His central concept however was his analysis of **rationalization** (see [Chapter 4. Society and Modern Life](#)), which referred to the general tendency for modern society for all institutions and most areas of life to be transformed by the application of technical rationality. He argued that the global power and domination of Western societies had its source in the application of methodical, calculative reason and efficiency to the

solution of problems and the organization of life. Two chief consequences of rationalization for the social life of modern societies were the **disenchantment of the world** (mentioned above) and the Protestant work ethic.

Weber also made a major contribution to the methodology of sociological research. Along with the philosophers Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) and Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936), Weber believed that it was difficult if not impossible to apply natural science methods to accurately predict the behaviour of groups as positivist sociology hoped to do. They argued that the influence of culture on human behaviour had to be taken into account. What was distinct about human behaviour was that it is essentially *meaningful*. Human behaviour could not be understood independently of the meanings that individuals attributed to it. A Martian's analysis of the activities in a skateboard park would be hopelessly confused unless it *understood* that the skateboarders were motivated by the excitement of taking risks and the pleasure in developing skills. This insight into the meaningful nature of human behaviour even applied to the sociologists themselves, who, they believed, should be aware of how their own cultural biases as they could influence their research. To deal with this problem, Weber and Dilthey introduced the concept of **Verstehen**, a German word that means to understand something from a subject's point of view. In seeking *Verstehen*, outside observers of a social world – an entire culture or a small setting – attempt to understand it empathetically from an insider's point of view.

In his essay “The Methodological Foundations of Sociology,” Weber described sociology as “a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects” (Weber, 1922). In this way he delimited the field that sociology studies in a manner almost opposite to that of Émile Durkheim. Rather than defining sociology as the study of the unique dimension of external *social facts*, sociology was concerned with **social action**: actions to which individuals attach *subjective* meanings. “Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course” (Weber, 1922). The actions of the young skateboarders can be explained because they hold the experienced boarders in esteem and attempt to emulate their skills, even if it means scraping their bodies on hard concrete from time to time. Weber and other like-minded sociologists founded **interpretive sociology** whereby social researchers strive to find systematic means to interpret and describe the subjective meanings behind social processes, cultural norms, and societal values. This approach led to research methods like ethnography, participant observation, and phenomenological analysis. Their aim was not to generalize or predict (as in positivistic social science), but to systematically gain an in-depth understanding of social worlds. The natural sciences may be precise, but from Weber's point of view their methods confine them to study only the external characteristics of things.

Georg Simmel: A Sociology of Forms

Georg Simmel (1858–1918) was one of the founding fathers of sociology, although his place in the discipline is not always recognized. In part, this oversight may be explained by the fact that Simmel was a Jewish scholar in Germany at the turn of 20th century and, until 1914, he was unable to attain a proper position as a professor due to anti-Semitism. Despite the brilliance of his sociological insights, the quantity of his publications, and the popularity of his public lectures as *Privatdozent* at the University of Berlin, his lack of a regular academic position prevented him from having the kind of student following that would create a legacy around his ideas. It might also be explained by some of the unconventional and varied topics that he wrote on: the social structure of flirting, the sociology of adventure, the importance of secrecy, the patterns of fashion, the social significance of money, etc. He was generally seen at the time as not having a systematic or integrated theory of society. However, his insights into how social *forms* emerge at the micro-level of interaction and how they relate to macro-level phenomena remain valuable in contemporary sociology (see [Chapter 6. Social Interaction](#)).

Simmel's sociology focused on the key question, "How is society possible?" His answer led him to develop what he called **formal sociology**, or the sociology of social forms. In his essay "The Problem of Sociology," Simmel reaches a strange conclusion for a sociologist: "There is no such thing as society 'as such.'" 'Society' is just the name we give to the "extraordinary multitude and variety of interactions [that] operate at any one moment" (Simmel, 1908/1971). This is a basic insight of micro-sociology. However useful it is to talk about macro-level phenomena like capitalism, social solidarity, or rationalization, in the end what these phenomena refer to is a multitude of *ongoing, unfinished processes of interaction between specific individuals*. Nevertheless, the phenomena of social life do have recognizable forms, and the forms do guide the behaviour of individuals in a regularized way. A bureaucracy is a form of social interaction that persists from day to day. One does not come into work one morning to discover that the rules, job descriptions, paperwork, and hierarchical order of the bureaucracy have disappeared. Simmel's questions were: How do the forms of social life persist? How did they emerge in the first place? What happens when they get fixed and permanent?

Simmel's focus on how social forms emerge became very important for micro-sociology, symbolic interactionism, and the studies of hotel lobbies, cigarette girls, and street-corner societies, etc., popularized by the Chicago School in the mid-20th century. His analysis of the creation of new social forms was particularly tuned in to capturing the fragmentary everyday experience of modern social life that was bound up with the unprecedented nature and scale of the modern city. In his lifetime, the city of Berlin where he lived and taught for most of his career expanded massively after the unification of Germany in the 1870s and, by 1900, became a major European metropolis of 4 million people. The development of a metropolis created a fundamentally new human experience. The inventiveness of people in creating new forms of interaction in response became a rich source of sociological investigation.



Figure 1.14 Georg Simmel. (Photo courtesy of Julius Cornelius Schaarwächter/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

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1.3. Theoretical Perspectives



Figure 1.15 People protesting Covid-19 public health measures in 2022. What are the causes of this social movement? How do participants and outsiders “read” this situation? (Photo courtesy of Maksim Sokolov/ Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

Sociologists study social events, interactions, and patterns. They then develop theories to explain why these occur and what can result from them. In sociology, a **theory** is a way to tentatively explain different aspects of social interactions and create testable propositions about society (Allan, 2006). For example, Durkheim’s proposition that differences in suicide rate can be explained by differences in the degree of social integration in different communities is a theory.

As this brief survey of the history of sociology suggests, there is considerable diversity in the theoretical approaches sociology takes to studying society. Sociology is a **multi-perspectival science**: a number of distinct perspectives or *paradigms* offer competing explanations of social phenomena. Perspectives or **paradigms** are frameworks or models used within a discipline to tie different concepts, analyses, explanations, and ways of formulating problems together (Drengson, 1983). Sociologists use these models to pose or address research questions.

Talcott Parsons’ reformulation of Durkheim’s and others work as **structural functionalism** in the 1950s is an example of a paradigm because it provides a general model of analysis applicable to an unlimited number of research topics. As a framework for research, it can generate numerous specific theories or explanations. Parsons proposed that any identifiable social structure (e.g., roles, families, religions, or states) could be explained by the particular function it performed in maintaining the operation of

society as a whole. **Historical materialism** and **symbolic interactionism** are two other examples of sociological paradigms which formulate explanatory frameworks and research problems differently.

The variety of paradigms and methodologies makes for a rich and useful dialogue among sociologists. It is also sometimes confusing for students who expect that sociology will have a unitary, scientific approach like that of the natural sciences. However, the key point is that the subject matter of sociology is fundamentally different from that of the natural sciences. The existence of multiple approaches to the topic of society and social relationships makes sense given the nature of the subject matter of sociology. The “contents” of a society are never simply a set of objective qualities like the chemical composition of gases or the forces operating on celestial spheres. For the purposes of analysis, the contents of society can sometimes be viewed in this way, as in the positivist perspective, but positivists and other schools of thought in sociology recognize that social reality is more complex. It is imbued with social meanings, historical contexts, political struggles, and human agency.



Figure 1.16 The South Asian fable of the blind men and the elephant from the poem by John Godfrey Saxe. The inquisitive blind men want to know what an elephant is. The first one feels the elephant's flank and says, "the elephant is very like a wall!" The second one feels the elephant's tusk and says, "an elephant is very like a spear!" The third one feels the elephant's trunk and says, "the elephant is very like a snake!" (Illustrations courtesy of Mlke Kline/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

This makes social life a complicated, moving target for researchers to study, and the outcome of the research will be different depending on where and with what assumptions the researcher begins. Even the elementary division of experience into an interior world, which is "subjective," and an exterior world, which is "objective," varies historically, cross-culturally, and sometimes moment-by-moment in an individual's life. From the **phenomenological perspective** in sociology, this elementary division, which forms the starting point and basis of the "hard" or "objective" sciences, is in fact usefully understood as a social accomplishment sustained through social interactions. People actively divide the flow of impressions through their consciousness into socially recognized categories of subjective and objective, and they do so by learning and following social norms and rules. The division between subjective impressions and objective facts is natural and necessary only in the sense that it has become what Schutz (1962) called the "natural attitude" for people in modern society. Therefore, this division performs an integral function in organizing modern social and institutional life on an ongoing basis. People assume that the others they interact with view the world through the natural attitude. Confusion ensues when they do not. But other societies have been based on different ways of being in the world.

Despite the differences that divide sociology into multiple perspectives and methodologies, its unifying aspect is the systematic and rigorous nature of its social inquiry. If the distinction between "soft" and "hard" sciences is useful at all, it refers to the degree of rigour and systematic observation involved in the conduct of research rather than the division between the social and the natural sciences *per se*. Sociology is based on the scientific research tradition which emphasizes two key components: empirical observation and the logical construction of theories and propositions. **Science** is understood here in the broad sense to mean the use of reasoned argument, the ability to see general patterns in particular incidences, and the reliance on evidence from systematic empirical observation of social reality. However, as noted above, the outcome of sociological research will differ depending on the initial assumptions or perspective of the researcher. Each of the blind men studying the elephant in Figure 1.16 are capable of producing an empirically true and logically consistent account of the elephant, albeit limited, which will differ from the accounts produced by the others. While the analogy that society is like an elephant is tenuous at best, it does exemplify the way that different schools of sociology can explain the same factual reality in different ways.



Figure 1.17 German sociologist, Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929).
(Image courtesy of Wolfram Huke/ Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 3.0](#)

Within this general scientific framework, sociology can be broken into the same divisions that separate the forms of modern knowledge more generally. As Jürgen Habermas (1972) describes, by the time of the European Enlightenment in the 18th century, the unified perspective of Christendom had broken into three distinct spheres of knowledge: the natural sciences, hermeneutics (or the interpretive sciences like literature, philosophy, and history), and critique. In many ways the three spheres of knowledge are at odds with one another and reveal a different aspect of the world, but each serves an important human interest or purpose. The natural sciences are oriented to developing a technical knowledge useful for controlling and manipulating the natural world to serve human needs. Hermeneutics is oriented to developing a humanistic

knowledge useful for determining the meaning of texts, ideas, and human practices in order to create the conditions for greater mutual understanding and consensus. Critique is oriented to developing activist knowledge useful for challenging entrenched power relations in order to enable human emancipation and freedoms.

Sociology is similarly divided into three types of sociological knowledge, each with its own strengths, limitations, and practical purposes: **positivist sociology** focuses on generating types of knowledge useful for controlling or administering social life; **interpretive sociology** focuses on types of knowledge useful for promoting greater mutual understanding and consensus among members of society, and **critical sociology** focuses on types of knowledge useful for challenging power relationships and emancipating people from conditions of servitude. Each type of knowledge is useful for changing and improving the world. Within these three types of sociological knowledge, six paradigms of sociological thinking are discussed below: **quantitative sociology, structural functionalism, historical materialism, feminism, symbolic interactionism and social constructivism.**

Table 1.1 Types of Sociological Knowledge: Strengths, Limitations, and Practical Purposes [\[Skip table\]](#)

Types of sociological knowledge	Paradigms	Human interest or purpose
Positivist sociology	Quantitative sociology	Technical knowledge useful for controlling or administering social life
	Structural functionalism Rational choice theory Logical positivism Sociobiology	
Interpretive sociology	Symbolic interactionism	Hermeneutic knowledge useful for promoting greater mutual understanding and consensus among members of society
	Social constructivism Phenomenology Ethnomethodology Dramaturgical analysis Structuralism	
Critical sociology	Historical materialism	Activist knowledge useful for challenging power relationships and emancipating people from conditions of servitude
	Feminism Critical race theory Queer theory Deep ecology Poststructuralism	

I. Positivism

The **positivist perspective** in sociology — introduced above with regard to the pioneers of the discipline, August Comte and Émile Durkheim — is most closely aligned with the forms of knowledge associated with the natural sciences. The emphasis is on empirical observation and measurement (i.e., observation through the senses), the value of neutrality or objectivity, and the search for law-like statements about the social world (analogous to Newton's laws of gravity for the natural world). On this basis, sociology is conceived as a *predictive* science: given a set of initial conditions, it makes predictions about **possible future outcomes**. For Durkheim, for example, measurably less social integration predicts measurably higher suicide rates. Since mathematics and statistical operations are the main forms of logical demonstration in the natural scientific explanation, positivism relies on translating human phenomena into quantifiable units of measurement. It regards the social world as an objective or “positive” reality, in no essential respects different from the natural world. Positivism is oriented to developing a knowledge useful for controlling or administering social life, which explains its ties to the projects of social engineering going back to Comte's original vision for sociology. The outcome of Durkheim's analysis, for example, might be to prevent suicides by finding ways to increase the quantity and quality of people's social ties, or to find more inclusive ways of organizing institutions like the family or school.

Two forms of positivism have been dominant in sociology since the 1940s: **quantitative sociology** and **structural functionalism**.

Quantitative Sociology

In contemporary sociology, positivism is based on four main “rules” that define what constitutes valid knowledge and what types of questions may be reasonably asked (Bryant, 1985):

1. **The rule of empiricism:** Scientists can only know about things that are actually given in experience. They cannot validly make claims about things that are invisible, unobservable, or supersensible like metaphysical, spiritual, or moral truths.
2. **The rule of value neutrality:** Scientists should remain value-neutral in their research because it follows from the rule of empiricism that “values” have no empirical content that would allow their validity to be scientifically tested.
3. **The unity of the scientific method rule:** All sciences have the same basic principles and practices, whether their object is natural or human.
4. **The rule of law-like statements:** The type of explanation sought by scientific inquiry is the formulation of general laws (like the law of gravity) to explain specific phenomena (like the falling of a stone).

Much of what is referred to today as **quantitative sociology** fits within this paradigm of positivism. Quantitative sociology uses statistical methods such as surveys with large numbers of participants to quantify relationships between social variables. In line with the “unity of the scientific method” rule, quantitative sociologists argue that the elements of human life can be measured and quantified — described in numerical terms — in essentially the same way that natural scientists measure and quantify the natural world in physics, biology, or chemistry. Researchers analyze

this data using statistical techniques to see if they can uncover patterns or “laws” of human behaviour that predict future outcomes. Law-like statements concerning relationships between variables are often posed in the form of statistical relationships or multiple linear regression formulas. These mathematically formulate the degree of influence different causal or independent variables have on a particular outcome or dependent variable, usually in terms of statistical probabilities. (Independent and dependent variables will be discussed in [Chapter 2. Sociological Research](#).) For example, the degree of religiosity of an individual in Canada, measured by the frequency of church attendance or religious practice, can be predicted by a combination of different independent variables such as age, gender, income, immigrant status, and region (Bibby, 2012; See [Chapter 15. Religion](#)). This approach is value neutral for two reasons: firstly because the quantified data is the product of methods of systematic empirical observation that seek to minimize researcher bias, and secondly because “values” *per se* are human dispositions towards what “should be” and therefore cannot be observed like other objects or processes in the world. Quantitative sociologists might be able to survey and quantify what people say their values are, but they cannot determine through quantitative means what is valuable or what *should be* valuable.

Structural Functionalism

Structural Functionalism also falls within the positivist tradition in sociology due to Durkheim’s early efforts to describe the subject matter of sociology in terms of objective **social facts** — “social facts must be studied as things, that is, as realities external to the individual” (Durkheim, 1895/1997) — and to explain them in terms of their social functions, *independently* of the subjective understandings that individual members of society might have.

Following Durkheim’s insight, **structural functionalism** therefore sees society as composed of different **social structures** that perform specific **social functions** to maintain the operation of society as a whole. *Structures* are simply regular, observable patterns of behaviour or organized social arrangements that persist through time. Institutional arrangements that define roles and interactions in the family, workplace, or church, etc. are structures, for example. *Functions* refer to how the various social and biological needs of a society are satisfied. The continuity of society requires children to be properly socialized, food and resources to be distributed, and belief systems to be commonly shared. The family, the economy, and religious institutions perform these social functions. Different societies have the same basic functional requirements, but they meet them using different configurations of social structure (i.e., different types of kinship systems, economy, or religious practice). Thus, society is seen as a *system* not unlike the human body or an automobile engine. *With respect to a system, when one structure changes, the others change as well.* According to American sociologist Talcott Parsons (1881–1955), in a healthy society, all of these parts work together to produce a stable state called **dynamic equilibrium** (Parsons, 1961).

In fact, the English philosopher and biologist Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) likened society to a human body. Each structure of the system performs a specific function to maintain the orderly operation of the whole (Spencer, 1898). When they do not perform their functions properly, the system as a whole is threatened. The heart pumps the blood, the vascular system transports the blood, the metabolic system transforms the blood into proteins needed for cellular processes, etc. When the arteries in the heart get blocked, they no longer perform their function. The heart fails, and the system as a whole collapses. In the same way, the family structure functions to socialize new members of society (i.e., children), the economic structure functions to adapt to the environment and distribute resources, and the cultural structure functions to provide common beliefs to unify society, etc. Each structure of society provides a specific and necessary function to ensure the ongoing maintenance of the whole. However, if the family fails to effectively socialize children, or the economic system fails to distribute resources equitably, or culture fails to provide a credible belief system, repercussions are felt throughout the system. The other structures have to adapt, causing further repercussions. Spencer continued the analogy to the body by pointing out that societies evolve from simple to complex forms just as the bodies of humans and other animals do (Maryanski and Turner, 1992).

Part of the power of structural functionalism is its ability to provide explanations of social phenomena that can

predict outcomes independently of the specific goals and intentions of individuals. In a system, there is an interrelation of component parts where a change in one component affects the others *regardless* of the perspectives of individuals. Noted structural functionalist, Robert Merton (1910–2003), pointed out for example that social processes can have more than one function. **Manifest functions** are purposes or goals that are consciously sought or anticipated in a social process or institution, while **latent functions** are the unsought consequences or purposes of a social process or institution.

A manifest function of university education, for example, includes gaining knowledge, preparing for a career, and finding a good job that utilizes that education. But students often wonder why universities make these goals so difficult to accomplish. They get distracted by the lure of partying, they get overworked by unexpected course loads, they find it easier to cheat or learn information by rote and forget it after exams, or they get trained in knowledges that do not have immediate or practical value in the work place, etc. These contradictions can be partially explained by the latent functions of the university, which are byproducts of its manifest purposes and can often exist at cross-purposes with them. One latent function is providing an institutional venue of social solidarity for young adults in their first fledgling outside the family: meeting new people, participating in extracurricular activities, or even finding a spouse or partner. This liminal period of freedom and adulthood can easily lead to excesses. On the other hand, the obligation for students to discipline their work habits, intensify their use of time and focus on minutiae, has a latent function of providing individual efficiency and self-autonomy that employers in the knowledge economy value and can exploit. The credentialism that requires advanced certificates and degrees for jobs that do not actually need them is a latent function of the increasing numbers of university graduates since the 1960s, creating a hierarchy of employment and limiting access to it.

Latent functions can be beneficial, neutral, or harmful. Social processes that have undesirable consequences for the operation of society are called **dysfunctions**. Each of the latent functions of university education can be pursued to excess, for example, with a detrimental effect on the ability of the university to perform its manifest function of preparing students to participate in society: over-partying as a product of excessive social solidarity might lead to dropping out, cheating as a product of excessive concern with grades might lead to learning nothing, anxiety as a product of excessive overwork might lead to chronic mental illness, or over-education as a product of excessive academic rigour might lead to boredom with respect to job requirements. These dysfunctions are products of a system which has failed to integrate its component parts and has become dysfunctional.

Making Connections: Classic Sociologists

The AGIL Schema: A Sociological Explanation of Everything




Figure 1.18 Talcott Parsons (1902–1979) was a major figure of American sociology from the 1940s to the 1970s. Founder of the paradigm of structural functionalism, his AGIL schema was the basis of a comprehensive research program in which everything could be explained sociologically. (Photo courtesy of Wikipedia.) [Fair Dealing](#)

Talcott Parsons was a key figure in systematizing Durkheim's views in the 1940s and 1950s. He argued that a sociological approach to social phenomena must emphasize the systematic nature of society: the relation of definable *structures* to their *functions* in relation to the needs or *maintenance* of the system. This system quality could be observed at all levels of social existence, from the micro to the macro. He noted that all systems have a limited number of needs or "functional requisites" which have to be satisfied in order for the society to be viable or to achieve "stable equilibrium" (Parsons, 1951). Parsons reduced these universal functional requisites to "four spheres of activity that any society must accomplish in order to maintain itself": namely, Adaptation, Goal attainment, Integration, and Latent pattern maintenance. This became known in sociology as Parsons' "AGIL" schema.

Because systems can be observed in phenomena from the micro-scale to the universal, his AGIL schema provided a useful analytical grid for sociological theory in which an individual, an institution, or an entire society could be seen as a system composed of structures that satisfied these four primary functions:

- **Adaptation (A):** how the system adapts to its environment;
- **Goal attainment (G):** how the system determines what its goals are and how it will attain them;
- **Integration (I):** how the system integrates its members into harmonious participation and social cohesion;
- **(Latent) Pattern Maintenance (L):** how basic cultural patterns, values, belief systems, etc. are regulated and maintained.

The AGIL Schema

Adaptation (A)	Goal attainment (G)
Economy	Political System
(Latent) Pattern Maintenance (L)	Integration (I)
Cultural institutions: common values	Social roles and norms

So, for example, the social system as a whole relied on the economy to produce and distribute goods and services as its means of *adaptation* to the natural environment, on the political system to make decisions as its means of *goal attainment*, on social roles and norms to regulate social behaviour as its means of social *integration*, and on cultural institutions to reproduce and circulate social values as its means of *latent pattern maintenance*. Following Durkheim, Parsons argued that explanations of social functions had to be made at the level of systems and system requirements and not simply as the sum of individuals' wants and needs. The whole is more than the sum of its parts because it is a system. In a system, there is an interrelation of component parts where a change in one component affects the others regardless of the specific biographical details of the lives of individuals.

In this way, sociology promised to be the explanation of everything. Any enduring feature of society must perform a function, which could be understood as part of a larger system of interrelated parts and functional requisites. The AGIL functions were *universal* properties of any system. No matter the variation in societies historically or cross-culturally, every society was a system and had the same universal functional requisites that had to be satisfied to be able to operate and survive through time.

Criticisms of Positivism

The main criticisms of both quantitative sociology and structural functionalism have to do with whether social phenomena can truly be studied like the natural phenomena of the physical sciences. Critics challenge the way in which social phenomena are regarded as objective social facts. On one hand, interpretive sociologists suggest that the quantification of variables in *quantitative sociology* reduces the rich complexity and ambiguity of social life to an abstract set of numbers and statistical relationships that cannot capture the meaning it holds for individuals. Measuring someone's depth of religious belief or "religiosity" by the number of times they attend church in a week explains very little about the religious experience itself. Similarly, interpretive sociology argues that *structural functionalism*, with its emphasis on macro-level systems of structures and functions tends to reduce the individual to the status of a sociological "dupe," assuming pre-assigned roles and functions without any individual agency or capacity for self-creation.

On the other hand, critical sociologists challenge the conservative tendencies of quantitative sociology and structural functionalism. Both types of positivist analysis represent themselves as being objective, or value-neutral, whereas critical sociology notes that the context in which they are applied is always defined by relationships of power

and struggle for social justice. In this sense sociology cannot be neutral or purely objective. The context of social science is never neutral.

For critical sociologists, both types of positivism also have conservative assumptions built into their basic approach to social facts. The focus in *quantitative sociology* on observable facts and law-like statements presents an ahistorical and deterministic picture of the world that cannot account for the underlying historical dynamics of power relationships of class, gender, or other struggles. One can empirically observe the trees but not see the forest, so to speak. Similarly, the focus on the needs and the smooth functioning of social systems in *structural functionalism* supports a conservative viewpoint because it relies on an essentially static model of society. The functions of each structure are understood in terms of the needs of the social system as it exists at a particular moment in time. Each individual has to fit the function or role designated for them. Change is not only dysfunctional or pathological, because it throws the whole system into disarray, it also is very difficult to understand why change occurs at all if society is functioning as a system.

Therefore, structural functionalism has a strong conservative tendency, which is illustrated by some of its more controversial arguments. For example, Davis and Moore (1944) argued that inequality in society is necessary because it functions as an incentive for people to work harder. Talcott Parsons (1954) argued that the gender division of labour in the nuclear family between the husband/breadwinner and wife/housekeeper is necessary because the family will function coherently only if each role is clearly demarcated. In both cases, the order of the system is not questioned, and the historical sources of inequality are not analyzed. Inequality, in fact, performs a useful function for those who hold power in society. Critical sociology challenges both the social injustice and the practical consequences of social inequality. In particular, social equilibrium and function must be scrutinized closely to see whose interests they serve and whose interests they suppress.

2. Interpretive Sociology

The interpretive perspective in sociology is aligned with the hermeneutic traditions of the humanities like literature, philosophy, and history. The focus in interpretative sociology is on understanding or interpreting human activity in terms of the meanings that humans attribute to it. In contrast to the deterministic and functionalist models of explanation, interpretive sociology emphasizes human **agency** to capture the way that individuals actively *construct* a world of meaning that affects the way people experience the world and conduct themselves within it. The world evidently has a reality outside of these meanings, but interpretive sociology focuses on analyzing the processes of collective meaning construction that give people access to it.

Max Weber's *Verstehende* (understanding) sociology is often cited as the origin of this perspective in sociology because of his emphasis on the centrality of meaning and intention in social action:

Sociology... is a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects. In "action" is included all human behaviour when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it.... [Social action is] action mutually oriented to that of each other (Weber, 1922).

This emphasis on the meaningfulness of **social action** — action to which individuals attach subjective meanings and interpret those of others — is taken up later by phenomenology, ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism and various contemporary schools of social constructivism. The interpretive perspective is concerned with developing a knowledge of social interaction from the point of view of the meanings individuals attribute to it. Social interaction is a meaning-oriented practice. As a result of its research, interpretive sociology works toward greater mutual understanding and the possibility of consensus among members of society.

Symbolic Interactionism

Symbolic interactionism is one of the main paradigms of interpretive sociology. It provides a theoretical perspective that helps scholars examine how relationships between individuals in society are conducted on the basis of shared understandings and where these understandings come from. This perspective is centered on the notion that communication — or the exchange of meaning through language, gestures and symbols — is how people make sense of their social worlds. As pointed out by Herman and Reynolds (1994), this viewpoint also sees people as active in shaping their world, rather than as entities who are acted upon by society. This approach looks at society and people from a micro-level perspective where the processes of communication and meaning generation occur on an ongoing basis.

George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) is considered one of the founders of symbolic interactionism. His work in *Mind, Self and Society* (1934) on the “self” and the stages of child development as a sequence of role-playing capacities provides the classic analyses of the perspective. This textbook discusses Mead further in [Chapter 5. Socialization](#), but Mead’s key insight is that the self develops only through social interaction with others. The individual is not separate from society. The individual self is a thoroughly social being. People *learn* to be themselves by the progressive incorporation of the attitudes of others towards them into their concept of self.

His student Herbert Blumer (1900–1987) synthesized Mead’s work and popularized the theory. Blumer coined the term “symbolic interactionism” to emphasize that humans make meaning and interact by exchanging symbols like language or gestures. He identified three basic premises:

1. Humans act toward things on the basis of the meanings they ascribe to those things.
2. The meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with others and the society.
3. These meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things they encounter (Blumer, 1969).

In other words, human interaction is not determined in the same cause and effect manner as natural events. Symbolic interactionism focuses on how individuals interpret reality and reach common **definitions of the situation** in which they are involved. Through the back and forth of mutual interactions and communication (i.e., symbolic interaction), individuals move from ambiguous or undefined situations to those characterized by mutually shared meanings. On the basis of shared meanings, a common and coordinated course of action can be pursued.

In this way, people are able to decide how to help a friend diagnosed with cancer, how to divide up responsibilities at work, or even how to agree to disagree when an irresolvable conflict arises. The passport officer at the airport makes a gesture with her hand, or catches a passenger’s eye, which the passenger interprets as a signal to step forward in line and pass her their passport so she can examine its validity. Together the officer and passenger create a joint action — “checking the passport to cross a border” — which is just one symbolic interaction in a sequence that travelers typically link together in pursuing the sociological phenomenon known as “going on a vacation.” Randall Collins (2005) argues that all social life can be seen as the stringing together or aligning of multiple joint actions like these into **interaction ritual chains**. Symbolic interactionism emphasizes that individuals and groups have the freedom and agency to define their situations in potentially numerous ways but often find themselves following well-worn chains of interaction.

Social scientists who apply symbolic-interactionist thinking look for patterns of interaction between individuals. Their studies often involve observation of one-on-one interactions. For example, Howard Becker (1953) argued in his classic study of marijuana users that becoming a marijuana user has less to do with its physiological effects in the body than with the process of communication (or symbolic interaction) about the meaning of the effects. New marijuana users need to go through three stages to become a regular user: they need to learn from experienced smokers how to identify the effects, how to enjoy them, and how to attach meaning to them (i.e., that the experience is funny, strange or euphoric, etc.). Becker emphasizes, therefore, that marijuana smoking is a thoroughly social process and that the experience of “being high” is as much a product of mutual interactions as it is a purely bio-chemical process. In a

sense, smoking marijuana could be experienced in numerous ways because the individuals involved exercise agency. No fixed reality of effects, physiological or otherwise, pre-exists the mutual interactions of the users.

Symbolic interactionism has also been important in bringing to light the experiences and worlds of individuals who are typically excluded from official accounts of the social order. Howard Becker's *Outsiders* (1963) for example described the process of **labeling** in which individuals come to be characterized or labelled as deviants by authorities. The sequence of events in which a young person, for example, is picked up by police for an offense, defined by police and other authorities as a "young offender," processed by the criminal justice system, and then introduced to criminal subcultures through contact with experienced offenders needs to be understood as a process of mutual definitions that create a new identity. Breaking the law does not automatically mean one becomes a "deviant." Individuals are not born deviant or criminal, but become criminal through an institutionalized symbolic interaction with authorities. As Becker says, deviance is not simply a social fact, as Durkheim might argue, but the product of a process of definition by moral entrepreneurs, authorities, and other privileged members of society:

...social groups create deviance by making rules whose infraction creates deviance, and by applying those roles to particular people and labelling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by other of rules and sanctions to an "offender." The deviant is one to whom that label has been successfully applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label (1963).

Studies that use the symbolic interactionist perspective are more likely to use qualitative research methods, such as in-depth interviews or participant observation, rather than quantitative methods because they seek to understand the symbolic worlds in which research subjects live. Only on this basis can an adequate explanation of their behaviour be proposed.

Social Constructivism

Social constructionism is a theory of knowledge that holds that the categories, facts, world views and cosmologies that make up knowledge are dependent on their social, cultural and historical context. For example, characteristics typically thought to be immutable or solely biological – such as gender, race, class, physical ability, and sexuality – are products of human definition and interpretation shaped by specific cultural and historical factors (Subramaniam, 2010). As such, social constructionism highlights the ways in which cultural categories – like "men," "women," "black," "white" – are not "things" *per se*, but concepts created, changed, and reproduced through historical processes within institutions and culture. This approach differs from symbolic interactionism by the scale of the analysis. Whereas symbolic interactionists focus on micro-level inter-personal interactions of individuals in particular social settings, social constructivists are interested in large-scale social processes like the development of scientific classification systems, the formation of religious or moral categories, the circulation of images and representations in the media, and the interventions of social movements.

For example, human bodies exist independently of social categories, but that does not mean that social categories do not affect how bodies are perceived or lived in. Social constructivists examine how social categories based on selected bodily features are constructed, how meanings are attached to these categories, and how people are then placed into these categories and treated accordingly. By the "one-drop rule," (i.e., one drop of African blood), regardless of their appearance, individuals with any African ancestor are considered Black in the United States (see [Chapter 11. Race and Ethnicity](#)). In contrast, racial conceptualization and thus racial categories are different in Brazil, where many individuals with African ancestry are considered to be white. This shows how identity categories are not based on strict biological characteristics, but on the social perceptions and meanings that are assumed. Modern biology itself, and biological ways of thinking, were themselves invented in the 19th century, and not without controversy. Categories are not "natural" or fixed and the boundaries around them are always shifting – they are contested and redefined in different historical

periods and across different societies. Therefore, the social constructionist perspective is concerned with *how* meaning is created and given authority through processes by which groups of people, experience, and reality are defined and categorized in specific cultural and historical contexts.

Social constructionist approaches to understanding the world challenge the essentialist understandings that typically underpin contemporary “common sense” ways in which people think about race, gender, and sexuality. **Essentialism** is the idea that the characteristics of persons or groups are significantly influenced by an underlying human nature, and are therefore largely similar in all human cultures and historical periods. A key assumption of essentialism is that “a given truth is a necessary natural part of the individual and object in question” (Gordon and Abbott 2002). In other words, an essentialist understanding of sexuality would argue that not only do all people have a sexual orientation, but that the range of sexual orientations do not vary across time or place. In this example, “sexual orientation” is a pre-given *truth* about individuals – it is thought to be inherent, biologically determined, and essential to the nature of their being.

In response to essentialism, social constructivism firstly makes apparent how even the things commonly thought to be “natural” or “essential” in the world are socially constructed. Understandings of “nature” change through history and across place according to systems of human knowledge. Secondly, the social construction of essences and the differences between them occurs within relations of power and privilege. Sociologist Abby Ferber (2009) argues that these two aspects of the social construction of difference cannot be separated, but must be understood together. Discussing the construction of racial difference, she argues that inequality and oppression actually *produce* ideas of essential racial difference, (i.e. not the other way around as in many biological determinist arguments). The racial categories that are thought to be “natural” or “essential” are created within the context of racialized power relations— in the case of African-Americans in the United States, that includes slavery, laws regulating interracial sexual relationships, lynching, and white supremacist discourse. Social constructionist analyses seek to better understand the processes through which racialized, gendered, or sexualized differentiations occur, in order to untangle the power relations within them.

Because social constructionist analyses examine categories of difference as fluid, dynamic, and changing according to historical and geographical context, a social constructionist perspective suggests that existing inequalities are neither inevitable nor immutable.

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Criticisms of Interpretive Sociology

From the point of view of positivism and critical sociology, one of the problems of interpretive paradigms that focus on micro-level interactions is that it is difficult to generalize from very specific situations, involving very few individuals, to make social scientific claims about the nature of society as a whole. The danger is that, while the rich texture of face-to-face social life can be examined in detail, the results will remain purely descriptive without any explanatory or analytical strength. In discussing the rich detail of the rituals and dynamics of authority in a street gang, can a sociologist make conclusions about the phenomenon of street gangs in general, or determine the social factors that lead individuals to join street gangs? Can one go from a particular observation to a general claim about society? For critical sociologists moreover, it is very difficult to get at the historical context or the societal relations of power and deprivation that structure or condition face-to-face, symbolic interactions of gang members.

In the case of Becker’s marijuana users, for example, it is difficult to go from Becker’s analysis of symbolic interaction

between individuals to a strong explanation for the reasons why marijuana was made illegal in the first place, how the underground trade in marijuana works (and contextualizes the experience of the beginning user), or what the consequences of criminalization are on political discourses, the criminal justice system, and the formation of subcultures (i.e., like the jazz musician subculture Becker studied in the 1950s). Essential aspects of the political context of specific symbolic interactions fall outside the scope of the analysis, which is why, from a critical perspective, the insights of microsociology need to be broadened through the use of the sociological imagination.

A second issue for positivists, specifically, is the emphasis on meanings of social behaviour and the use of empathy to understand these meanings. If “meaning” is, strictly speaking, unobservable and therefore not verifiable through empirical methods, how can anything definitive be said about it? Carl Hempel (1965) argues for example that empathic understanding does not guarantee a sound explanation for a social behaviour because there is a danger of “reading into” it an interpretation that is incorrect or has little predictive value. A psychological factor like empathy is too variable to serve as a standard in assessing worth of an explanation. Empathic understandings “lack cognitive significance unless supplemented by testable explanatory principles in the form of laws or theories” (Hempel, 1965).

For positivists, the social constructivist emphasis on the constructed nature of social reality makes it difficult to formulate law-like relationships between variables or to predict outcomes given certain initial conditions. As the ability to predict is key to the validity of scientific claims, positivists have difficulty with the fluid, processual nature of social reality proposed by social constructivists. The positivist position is typically aligned more with forms of essentialism.

On the other hand, critical sociologists are more in agreement with social constructivism. Social constructivist sociology largely comes from the critical tradition, with its attention to how constructed categories of race, sexuality, gender are used in organizing relationships of power. As Kang et al. (2017) explain:

This perspective is especially useful for the activist and emancipatory aims of feminist movements and theories. By centering the processes through which inequality and power relations produce racialized, sexualized, and gendered difference, social constructionist analyses challenge the pathologization of minorities who have been thought to be essentially or inherently inferior to privileged groups. Additionally, social constructionist analyses destabilize the categories that organize people into hierarchically ordered groups through uncovering the historical, cultural, and/or institutional origins of the groups under study. In this way, social constructionist analyses challenge the categorical underpinnings of inequalities by revealing their production and reproduction through unequal systems of knowledge and power.

3. Critical Sociology

The critical perspective in sociology has its origins in social activism, social justice movements, revolutionary struggles, and radical critique. As Karl Marx put it, its focus is the “ruthless critique of everything existing” (Marx, 1843). The key elements of this analysis are the critique of power relations and the understanding of society as historical — i.e., subject to change, struggle, contradiction, instability, social movement, and radical transformation. Rather than objectivity and value neutrality, the tradition of critical sociology promotes practices of liberation and social change in order to achieve universal social justice. As Marx stated, “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it” (1845). This is why it is misleading to call critical sociology “conflict theory” as some introductory textbooks do. While conflict is certainly central to the critical analyses of power and domination, the focus of critical sociology is on developing types of knowledge and political action that enable emancipation from power relations (i.e., from the conditions of conflict in society). Historical materialism, feminism, environmentalism, anti-racism, queer studies, and poststructuralism are all examples of the critical perspective in sociology.

One of the outcomes of systematic analyses, such as these, is that they generate questions about the relationship between people’s everyday life and issues concerning social justice and environmental sustainability. In line with the philosophical traditions of the Enlightenment, critical sociology is sociology with an “emancipatory interest”

(Habermas, 1972); that is, a sociology that seeks not simply to understand or describe the world, but to use sociological knowledge to change and improve the world, and to emancipate people from conditions of servitude.

What does the word *critical* mean in this context? Critical sociologists argue that it is important to understand that the critical tradition in sociology is not about complaining or being “negative.” Nor is it about adopting a moral position from which to judge people or society. It is not about being “subjective” or “biased” as opposed to “objective.” As Herbert Marcuse put it in *One Dimensional Man* (1964), critical sociology involves two value judgments:

1. That human life is worth living, or rather that it can be and ought to be made worth living; and
2. In a given society, specific possibilities exist for the amelioration of human life and the specific ways and means of realizing these possibilities.

Critical sociology therefore rejects the notion of a value-free social science, but does not thereby become a moral exercise or an individual “subjective” value preference as a result. Being critical in the context of sociology is about using objective, empirical knowledge to assess the possibilities and barriers to improving or “ameliorating” human life.

Historical Materialism

The tradition of **historical materialism** that developed from Karl Marx’s work is one of the central frameworks of critical sociology. Historical materialism concentrates on the study of how people’s everyday lives are structured by the connection between history, relations of power and economic processes. The basis of this approach begins with the macro-level question of how specific relations of power and specific economic formations have developed historically. These form the context in which the institutions, practices, beliefs, and social rules (norms) of everyday life are situated. The elements that make up a culture — a society’s shared practices, values, beliefs, and artifacts — are structured by the society’s economic **mode of production**: the different historical ways human societies have acted upon their environment and its resources in order to use them to meet their needs. Hunter-gatherer, agrarian, feudal, and capitalist modes of production have been the economic basis for very different types of society throughout world history (see [Chapter 4. Society and Modern Life](#)).



Figure 1.19 *The Last of the Clan* painted by Thomas Faed, (1865). (Photo courtesy of Thomas Faed/Wikimedia Commons.)
[Public Domain](#)

It is not as if this relationship is always clear to the people living in these different periods of history, however. Often the mechanisms and structures of social life are obscure. For example, it might not have been clear to the Scots, who were expelled from their ancestral lands in Scotland during the Highland clearances of the 18th and 19th centuries, and who emigrated to the Red River settlements in Rupert's Land (now Manitoba), that they were living through the epochal transformation from feudalism to capitalism. This transition was nevertheless the context for the decisions individuals and families made to emigrate from Scotland and attempt to found the Red River Colony. It might also not have been clear to them that they were participating in the development of colonial power relationships between the Indigenous peoples of North America and the Europeans that persist up until today. Through contact with the Scots and the French fur traders, the Cree and Anishinabe were gradually drawn out of their own Indigenous modes of production and into the developing global capitalist economy as fur trappers and provisioners for the early European settlements. It was a process that eventually led to the loss of control over their lands, the destruction of their way of life, the devastating spread of European diseases, the imposition of the Indian Act (1876), the establishment of the residential school system, institutional and everyday racism, and an enduring legacy of intractable social problems.

In a similar way, historical materialism analyzes the constraints that define the way individuals review their options and make their decisions in present-day society. From the types of career to pursue to the number of children to have, the decisions and practices of everyday life must be understood in terms of the 20th century shift to corporate ownership, and the 21st century context of globalization in which corporate decisions about investments are made.

The historical materialist approach can be called dialectical. **Dialectics** in sociology proposes that social

contradiction, opposition, and struggle in society drive processes of social change and transformation. It emphasizes four components in its analysis (Naiman, 2012). The first is that everything in society is related — it is not possible to study social processes in isolation. The second is that everything in society is dynamic (i.e., in a process of continuous social change). It is not possible to study social processes as if they existed outside of history. The third is that the gradual accumulation of many social changes eventually create a qualitative transformation or social turning point.

For example, the self-immolation of the street vender Mohamed Bouazizi, in 2010, led to the Tunisian revolution of 2011 because it “crystallized” the multitude of everyday incidences in which people endured the effects of high unemployment, government corruption, poor living conditions, and a lack of rights and freedoms. It is not possible to examine quantitative changes independently of the qualitative transformations they produce, and vice versa.

The fourth analytical component of the dialectical approach is that the tensions that form around relationships of power and inequality in society are the key drivers of social change. In the language of Marx, these tensions are based on “contradictions” built into the organization of the economic or material relationships that structure people’s livelihoods, their relationships to each other, their relationship to the environment, and their place within the global community. The capitalist class and the working class do not simply exist side by side as other social groups do (e.g., model boat enthusiasts and Christian fundamentalists), but exist in a relationship of contradiction. Each class depends on the other for its existence, (i.e., the owners “provide” employment for workers; the worker’s exploited labour “provides” profit for the owners), but their interests are fundamentally irreconcilable, (i.e., owners need to cut wages to compete; workers need more wages to survive), and therefore the relationship is fraught with tension and conflict. Social tensions and contradictions in society may simmer or they may erupt in struggle, but in either case it is not possible to study social processes as if they were independent of the historical formations of power that both structure them and destabilize them.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

“Wanna go for a coffee?”

A good example of the dialectical approach to everyday social life would be to think about all the social relationships that are involved in meeting a friend for a cup of coffee. This is a common everyday event that usually passes without a great deal of sociological reflection. On the one hand, it might offer the sociologist numerous opportunities to study the social aspects of this event in isolation or at a micro-level: conversation analysis, the dynamics of friend relationships, addiction issues with caffeine, consumer preferences for different beverages, beliefs about caffeine and mental alertness, etc. In this regard, a symbolic interactionist might ask: Why is drinking coffee at the center of this specific interaction? What does coffee *mean* for the friends who meet to drink it?

On the other hand, if one was to take a more systematic and critical sociological view of the activity of coffee drinking, one would note how the practice also embeds people in a series of relationships to others and the environment that are not immediately apparent if the activity is viewed in isolation (Swift, Davies, Clarke and Czerny, 2004). When a person purchases a cup of coffee, they enter into a relationship with the growers in Central and South America. They are involved with their working conditions and with the global structures of private ownership and distribution that make selling coffee a profitable business. They are also involved with the barista at the counter who works in the coffee shop for a living; with the fluctuations of supply, demand, competition, and market speculation that determine the price of coffee; with the marketing strategies that lead people to identify with specific beverage choices and brands; and with the modifications to the natural environment where the coffee is grown, through which it is transported, and where, finally, the paper cups and other waste are disposed of, etc.

Ultimately, over a cup of coffee, people find themselves in the midst of a long political and historical process that is part of the formation of low wage or subsistence farming in Central and South America, the transfer of wealth to North America, and recently, various forms of resistance to this process like the fair trade movement. Despite the fact that people can be largely unaware of the web of relationships that they have entered into when they sit down to coffee with a friend, a systematic analysis would emphasize that their casual chat over coffee is just the tip of a vast iceberg composed of the activities and circumstances of countless individuals, including the activities and work relationships people themselves engage in to earn



Figure 1.20 According to a 2010 study, 65% of Canadians drink coffee daily. The average coffee drinker drinks 2.8 cups of coffee per day. Source: Coffee Association of Canada, 2010. (Photo courtesy of Duncan C/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

the money to pay for the coffee. These relationships involve people in dialectical economic and political processes every time they have a cup of coffee. One question for sociologists is therefore about how modern life can be so structured that people typically remain unaware of this vast network of economic relationships and catastrophes?

Feminism

Another major school of critical sociology is feminism. From the early work of women sociologists like Harriet Martineau, feminist sociology has focused on the power relationships and inequalities between women and men. How can the conditions of inequality faced by women be addressed? As Harriet Martineau put it in *Society in America* (1837):

All women should inform themselves of the condition of their sex, and of their own position. It must necessarily follow that the noblest of them will, sooner or later, put forth a moral power which shall prostrate cant [hypocrisy], and burst asunder the bonds (silken to some but cold iron to others) of feudal prejudice and usages. In the meantime is it to be understood that the principles of the Declaration of Independence bear no relation to half of the human race? If so, what is the ground of this limitation?

Feminist sociology focuses on analyzing the grounds of the limitations faced by women when they claim the right to equality with men.

Inequality between the genders is a phenomenon that goes back at least 4,000 years (Lerner, 1986). Although the forms and ways in which it has been practiced differ between cultures and change significantly through history, its persistence has led to the formulation of the concept of patriarchy. **Patriarchy** refers to a set of institutional structures (like property rights, access to positions of power, relationship to sources of income) that are based on the belief that men and women are dichotomous and unequal categories. Key to patriarchy is what might be called the **dominant gender ideology** toward sexual differences: the assumption that physiological sex differences between males and females are related to differences in their character, behaviour, and ability (i.e., their gender). These differences are used to justify a gendered division of social roles and unequal access to rewards, positions of power, and privilege. The question that feminists ask therefore is: How does this distinction between male and female, and the attribution of different qualities to each, serve to organize institutions and to perpetuate inequality between the sexes? How is the family, the law, the occupational structure, the religious institutions, and the division between public and private spheres of life organized on the basis of inequality between the genders?

Feminism is a distinct type of critical sociology. There are considerable differences between types of feminism, however; for example, the differences often attributed to the first wave of feminism in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the second wave of feminism from the 1950s to the 1970s, and the third wave of feminism from the 1980s onward. Despite the variations between the different types of feminist approach, there are four characteristics that are common to the feminist perspective:

1. Gender differences are the central focus or subject matter.
2. Gender relations are viewed as a social problem: the site of social inequalities, strains, and contradictions.
3. Gender relations are not immutable: they are sociological and historical in nature, subject to change and progress.
4. Feminism is about an emancipatory commitment to change: the conditions of life that are oppressive for women need to be transformed.

One of the keen sociological insights that emerged with the feminist perspective in sociology is that “the personal is political.” Many of the most immediate and fundamental experiences of social life — from childbirth to who washes the dishes to the experience of sexual violence — had simply been invisible or regarded as unimportant politically or socially. Dorothy Smith’s development of **standpoint theory** was a key innovation in sociology that enabled these issues to be seen and addressed in a systematic way (Smith, 1977). Smith recognized from the consciousness-raising exercises and encounter groups initiated by feminists in the 1960s and 1970s that many of the immediate concerns expressed by women about their personal lives had a commonality of themes. These themes were nevertheless difficult to articulate in sociological terms let alone in the language of politics or law.

Part of the issue was sociology itself. Smith argued that instead of beginning sociological analysis from the abstract point of view of institutions or systems, women’s lives could be more effectively examined if one began from the “actualities” of their lived experience in the immediate local settings of everyday/everynight life. She asked, what are the common features of women’s everyday lives? From this standpoint, Smith observed that women’s position in modern society is acutely divided by the experience of **dual consciousness**. Every day women crossed a tangible dividing line when they went from the “particularizing work in relation to children, spouse, and household” to the abstract, institutional world of text-mediated work, or in their dealings with schools, medical systems, or government bureaucracies. In the abstract world of institutional life, the actualities of local consciousness and lived life are “obliterated” (Smith, 1977). While the standpoint of women is grounded in bodily, localized, “here and now” relationships between people — due to their obligations in the domestic sphere — society is organized through “relations of ruling,” which translate the substance of actual lived experiences into abstract bureaucratic categories. Power and rule in society, especially the power and rule that constrain and coordinate the lives of women, operate through a problematic “move into transcendence” that provides accounts of social life as if it were possible to stand outside of it. Smith argued that the abstract concepts of sociology, at least in the way that sociology was taught in the 1960s and 1970s, only contributed to the problem.

Criticisms of Critical Sociology

Whereas critical sociologists often criticize positivist and interpretive sociology for their conservative biases, the reverse is also true. In part the issue is about whether sociology can be “objective,” or value-neutral, or not. At a deeper level the criticism is often aimed at the radical nature of critical analyses. Marx’s critique of capitalism and the feminist critique of patriarchy for example lead to very interesting insights into how structures of power and inequality work, but from a point of view that sees only the most radical, revolutionary transformation of society as a solution.

Critical sociology is also criticized from the point of view of interpretive sociology for overstating the power of dominant groups to manipulate subordinate groups. For example, media representations of women are said to promote unobtainable standards of beauty or to reduce women to objects of male desire. This type of critique suggests that individuals are controlled by media images rather than recognizing their independent ability to reject media influences or to interpret media images for themselves. In a similar way, interpretive sociology challenges critical sociology for implying that people are purely the products of macro-level historical forces and struggles rather than individuals with a capacity for individual and collective agency. To be fair, Marx did argue that “Men make their own history;” it is just that they “do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances encountered, given, and transmitted from the past” (Marx, 1851).

Theoretical Approaches Summary




Figure 1.21 Theoretical Approaches Summary. (Source: William Little and TRU Media.)

To get a clearer picture of how these three sociological perspectives differ, it is helpful to map them out using a diagram. As noted above, the sociological perspectives differ according to the initial assumptions of the researcher. One way to show this is to position them along two axes according to (a) whether they view society as governed by agreed-upon norms (*normative*) or by power relations and conflict (*conflictual*), and (b) whether individuals are subject

to structures beyond their control (structure) or are agents who act and change the conditions of their existence (agency). The emphasis of positivism on generating law-like statements suggests that individuals are not agents, but rather are subject to scientific laws (structure); moreover, its focus on empirical observation relies on the assumption that an underlying consensus exists about the meaning of observed behaviours. That is, there is no essential difficulty in understanding what one is “seeing,” and the agreement between the observer and the observed with respect to the meaning of the observed behaviours (normative) can be taken for granted. Interpretive sociology also emphasizes the importance of shared meanings that guide human behaviour (normative), but at the same time — especially in the tradition of symbolic interactionism — focuses on how these shared meanings are created through the mutual interactions of agents in concerted action (agency). Critical sociology does not assume that an underlying agreement or consensus exists about the norms governing society; rather, the accent is on analyzing relations of power and conflict (conflictual). Some perspectives in critical sociology like Marxism and feminism emphasize the agency of collective actors like the working class or women’s movements in praxis or struggles for change (agency), whereas other perspectives like poststructuralism emphasize the way in which subjects or agents are themselves constructed within relations of power (structure).

Overall, since social reality is complex and multi-faceted, the possibility of fundamental disagreement exists between the different theoretical approaches in sociology. Is society characterized by conflict or consensus? Is human practice determined by external social structures or is it the product of choice and agency? Does society have a reality over and above the lives of individuals or are the lives of individuals the only reality? Is human experience unique because it revolves around the meanings of social action, or is it essentially no different than any other domain studied by science? The answer to each of these questions is: it is both. Similar to the problem in physics about whether light is a particle or a wave, society appears in one guise or another depending on the perspective one takes or the research tool that one adopts. Using Habermas’ framework discussed above, sociology takes different forms depending on whether it is to be used for the purposes of administration (e.g., positivism), mutual understanding (e.g., interpretive sociology), or social justice (e.g., critical sociology). However, just like the wave/particle uncertainty in physics, the fundamental ambiguity in determining which sociological perspective to adopt does not prevent brilliant insights into the nature of social experience from being generated.

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1.4. Why Study Sociology?



Figure 1.22 Tommy Douglas (1904–1986). As premier of Saskatchewan's CCF government, Douglas introduced legislation for the first publicly funded health care plan in Canada in 1961. Sociologist Bernard Blishen (1919–2017) was the research director for the Royal Commission on Health Services which drew up the plan for Canada's national medicare program in 1964. (Photo National Archives of Canada, C-036222.) [Public Domain](#)

When Bernard Blishen picked up the phone one day in 1961, he was surprised to hear Chief Justice Emmett Hall on the other end of the line asking him to be the research director for the newly established Royal Commission on Health Services. Publically funded health care had been introduced for the first time in Canada that year, by a socialist Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) government in Saskatchewan, amid bitter controversy. Doctors in Saskatchewan went on strike and private health care insurers mounted an expensive anti-public health care campaign. Because it was a Progressive Conservative government commission, appointed by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, Blishen's colleagues advised him that it was going to be a whitewash document to defend the interests of private medical care. However, Blishen took on the project as a challenge, and when the commission's report was published it advocated that the Saskatchewan plan be adopted nationally (Vaughan, 2004).

Blishen went on to work in the field of medical sociology and also created a widely-used index to measure socioeconomic status known as the Blishen scale. He received the Order of Canada in 2011 in recognition of his contributions to the creation of public health care in Canada.

Since sociology was first founded, many people have been driven by the scholarly desire to contribute knowledge to this field, while others have seen it as way not only to study society, but also to improve it. Besides the creation of public health care in Canada, sociology has played a crucial role in many important social reforms such as equal opportunity for women in the workplace, improved treatment for individuals with mental and learning disabilities, increased recognition and accommodation for people from different ethnic backgrounds, the creation of hate crime legislation, the right of Indigenous populations to preserve their land and culture, and prison system reforms.

The prominent sociologist Peter L. Berger (1929–2017), in his 1963 book *Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective*, describes a sociologist as “someone concerned with understanding society in a disciplined way.” He asserts that sociologists have a natural interest in the monumental moments of people's lives, as well as a fascination with banal, everyday occurrences. Berger also describes the “aha” moment when a sociological theory becomes applicable and understood:

[T]here is a deceptive simplicity and obviousness about some sociological investigations. One reads them, nods at the familiar scene, remarks that one has heard all this before and don't people have better things to do than to waste their time on truisms — until one is suddenly brought up against an insight that radically questions everything one had previously assumed about this familiar scene. This is the point at which one begins to sense the excitement of sociology (Berger, 1963).

Sociology can be exciting because it teaches people ways to recognize how they fit into the world and how others perceive them. Looking at themselves and society from a sociological perspective helps people see how they connect to different groups based on the many different ways they classify themselves and how society classifies them in turn.

It raises awareness of how those classifications — such as economic class, social status, education, ethnicity, or sexual orientation — affect perceptions and privileges.

Sociology teaches people not to accept easy explanations. It teaches them a way to organize their thinking so that they can ask better questions and formulate better answers. It makes people more aware that there are many different kinds of people in the world who do not necessarily think the way they do. It increases their willingness and ability to try to see the world from other people's perspectives. Sociology prepares people to live and work in an increasingly diverse and integrated world.

Making Connections: Sociological Research

Farming and Locavores: How Sociological Perspectives Might View Food Consumption



Figure 1.23 Locavore: “One who eats goods grown locally whenever possible.” (Image courtesy of Anton Diaz/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

The consumption of food is a commonplace, daily occurrence, yet it can also be associated with important moments in people's lives. Eating can be an individual or a group action, and eating habits and customs are influenced by culture. In the context of society, a nation's food system is at the core of numerous social movements, political issues, and economic debates. Any of these factors might become a topic of sociological study.

A structural-functional approach to the topic of food consumption might be interested in the role of the agriculture industry within the nation's economy and the social system as a whole. Food production is a primary example of Talcott Parsons' function of adaptation: human systems need to adapt to ecosystems. In this regard the structural-functionalist would be interested in the potential for disequilibrium in the human/environment relationship that has resulted from increases in population and the intensification of agricultural production — from the early days of manual-labour farming to modern mechanized agribusiness. In many respects the concerns of environmentalists and others, with respect to the destructive relationship between industrial agriculture and the ecosystem, are the results of a dysfunctional system of adaptation. The concept of sustainable agriculture, promoted by Michael Pollan (2006) and others, points to the changes needed to return the interface between humans and the natural environment to a state of dynamic equilibrium.

A sociologist viewing food consumption through a symbolic interactionist lens would be more interested in micro-level topics of the shared meaning of food, such as the symbolic use of food in religious rituals, the attitudes towards food in fast food restaurants, or the role it plays in health regimens or the social interaction of a family dinner. This perspective might also study the interactions among group members who identify themselves based on their sharing a particular diet, such as vegans (people who do not eat meat or dairy products) or locavores (people who strive to eat locally-produced food). The increasing concern that people have with their diets speaks to the way that the life of the biological body is as much a symbolic reality, interpreted within contemporary discourses on health risks and beauty, as it is a biological reality.

A critical sociologist might be interested in the power differentials present in the regulation of the food industry, exploring where people's right to information intersects with corporations' drive for profit and how the government mediates those interests. Critical sociologists might also be interested in the power and powerlessness experienced by local farmers versus large farming conglomerates. In the documentary *Food Inc.* (Kenner, 2009), the plight of farmers resulting from Monsanto's patenting of seed technology is depicted as a product of the corporatization of the food industry. Another topic of study might be how nutrition and diet varies between different social classes. The industrialization of the food chain has created cheaper foods than ever, yet with the trade-off that the poorest people in society eat the food with the least nutritional content.

Sociology in the Workplace

Employers continue to seek people with what are called “transferable skills.” This means that they want to hire people whose knowledge and education can be applied in a variety of settings and whose skills will contribute to various tasks. Studying sociology can provide people with this wide knowledge and a skillset that can contribute to many workplaces, including:

- An understanding of social systems and large bureaucracies;
- The ability to devise and carry out research projects to assess whether a program or policy is working;
- The ability to collect, read, and analyze statistical information from polls or surveys;
- The ability to recognize important differences in people's social, cultural, and economic backgrounds;
- Skill in preparing reports and communicating complex ideas; and
- The capacity for critical thinking about social issues and problems that confront modern society (Department of Sociology, University of Alabama, 2015).

Sociology prepares people for a wide variety of careers. Sociologists are skilled at communications (oral, written and, increasingly, digital), at research methods (both qualitative and quantitative), and at policy analysis and provision. Besides actually conducting social research or training others in the field, people who graduate from university with a degree in sociology are hired by government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and corporations in fields such as social services, counseling (e.g., family planning, career, substance abuse), designing and evaluating social policies and programs, health services, polling and independent research, market research, and human resources management. Even a small amount of training in sociology can be an asset in careers like sales, public relations, journalism, teaching, law, and criminal justice.

So what jobs DO sociologists have?...

Business	Community Affairs	Government	Teaching / Education
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • actuary • administrative assistant • advertising officer • computer analyst • consumer relations • data entry manager • human resources specialist • insurance agent • journalist • labour relations officer • market analyst • merchandiser/purchaser • personnel officer • production manager • project manager • public relations officer • publishing officer • quality control manager • real estate agent • sales manager • sales representative • technical writing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • addictions counselling • adoption counselling • caseworker • child development • community organizer • environmental organizer • family planning • fundraising • gerontologist • group home programmer • health outreach work • homeless / housing worker • hospital administration • housing coordinator • marriage / family counselling • occupational / career counsellor • public health worker • rehabilitation work • residential planning • social assistance advocate • welfare counselling • youth outreach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • affirmative action work • community affairs • development aide • foreign service work • human rights officer • information officer • legislative assistant • personnel coordinator • policy research • urban / regional planner 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • admissions counsellor • alumni relations • continuing studies • post-secondary recruitment • public health educator • records & registration • school counselling • student development • teacher
		Social Research <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • census officer/analyst • consumer researcher • data analyst • demographer • market researcher • social research specialist • survey researcher • systems analyst 	

Figure 1.24 Occupational Destinations for Sociology BAs in Broad Labour Market Sectors. (Table courtesy of UBC Sociology and the Canadian Sociological Association). Used with permission.

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Chapter 1 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

agency: The capacity of individuals to act and make decisions independently.

AGIL schema: Talcott Parsons' division of society into four functional requisites: Adaptation, Goal attainment, Integration, and Latent pattern maintenance.

anomie: A social condition or normlessness in which a lack of clear norms fails to give direction and purpose to individual actions.

capitalism: An economic system characterized by private or corporate ownership, production, and sale of goods in a competitive market.

collective representations: The shared meanings, symbols, concepts, categories and images of a social collectivity.

content: The specific reasons or drives that motivate individuals to interact.

critical sociology: A theoretical perspective that focuses on inequality and power relations in society in order to achieve social justice and emancipation through their transformation.

culture: A group's whole way of life including shared practices, values, beliefs, norms and artifacts.

definition of the situation: The mutual understanding of the tasks or situation at hand shared among co-participants.

dialectics: A type of analysis that proposes that social contradiction, opposition, and struggle in society drive processes of social change and transformation.

disenchantment of the world: The replacement of magical thinking by science, technological rationality, and calculation.

dominant gender ideology: The belief that physiological sex differences between males and females are related to differences in their character, behaviour, and ability.

dual consciousness: The experience of a fissure or division in consciousness when one crosses a line between the abstractions of institutional knowledge and the direct, lived experiences of everyday/every night life.

dynamic equilibrium: A stable state in which all parts of a functioning society are working together properly.

dysfunctions: Social patterns that have undesirable consequences for the operation of society.

empiricism: The philosophical tradition that seeks to discover the laws of the operation of the world through careful, methodical, and detailed observation.

egoistic suicide: Suicide which results from the absence of strong social bonds tying the individual to a community.

essentialism: The idea that the characteristics of persons or groups are significantly influenced by biological factors or human nature, and are therefore largely similar in all human cultures and historical periods.

feminism: The critical analysis of the way gender differences in society structure social inequality.

figuration: The process of simultaneously analyzing the behaviour of an individual and the society that shapes that behaviour.

formal sociology: A sociology that analytically separates the contents from the forms of social interaction to study the common forms that guide human behaviour.

functionalism (or functionalist perspective): See *structural functionalism*.

global-level sociology: The study of structures and processes that extend beyond the boundaries of states or specific societies.

historical materialism: An approach to understanding society that explains social change, human ideas, and social organization in terms of underlying changes in the economic (or material) structure of society.

interaction ritual chain: A series of linked mechanisms of mutually focused emotion and attention, producing a continuous shared reality, which thereby generates solidarity and symbols of group membership.

interpretive sociology: A perspective that explains human behaviour in terms of the meanings individuals attribute to it.

labelling: A social process in which an individual's social identity is established through the imposition of a definition by authorities.

latent functions: The unrecognized or unintended consequences of a social process.

macro-level sociology: The study of society-wide social structures and processes.

manifest functions: Sought consequences of a social process.

micro-level sociology: The study of specific, local relationships between individuals or small groups.

mode of production: The way a human society acts upon its environment and its resources in order to process and distribute them to meet their needs.

multi-perspectival science: A science that is divided into competing or diverse paradigms.

paradigms: Philosophical and theoretical frameworks used within a discipline to formulate theories, generalizations, and the experiments performed in support of them.

patriarchy: Institutions of male power in society.

phenomenology: The study of social structures and processes on the basis of a systematic description of the contents of subjective experience.

positive stage: A stage of social evolution in which people explain events in terms of scientific principles and laws.

positivism (positivist perspective or positivist sociology): The scientific study of social patterns using the methodological principles of the natural sciences.

quantitative sociology: A sociological approach which transforms aspects of social life into numerical variables, such as statistical methods and surveys with large numbers of participants.

rationalization: The general tendency of modern institutions and most areas of life to be transformed by the application of instrumental reason.

rationalism: The philosophical tradition that seeks to determine the underlying laws that govern the truth of reason and ideas.

reification: Referring to abstract concepts, complex processes, or mutable social relationships as “things.”

social action: Actions to which individuals attach *subjective* meanings.

social constructivism: A theoretical perspective that focuses on the socially created nature of social life.

social facts: The external laws, morals, values, religious beliefs, customs, fashions, rituals, and cultural rules that govern social life.

social function: The role a social phenomenon performs in satisfying a social or biological need and ensuring the continuity of society.

social reform: An approach to social change that advocates slow, incremental improvements in social institutions rather than rapid, revolutionary change of society as a whole.

social script: Pre-established patterns of behaviour that people are expected to follow in specific social situations.

social solidarity: The degree to which a group of people cohere or are bound together through shared consciousness, qualities or social ties.

social structure: General patterns of social behaviour and social coordination that persist through time and become habitual or routinized at micro-levels of interaction or institutionalized at macro or global levels of interaction.

society: A group of people whose members interact, reside in a definable area, and share a culture.

sociological imagination: The ability to understand how personal problems of milieu relate to public issues of social structure.

sociology: The systematic study of society and social interaction.

standpoint theory: The examination of how society is organized and coordinated from the perspective of a particular social location, group or perspective in society.

structural functionalism: A theoretical approach that sees society as a structure with interrelated parts designed to meet the biological and social needs of individuals that make up that society.

symbolic interactionism: A theoretical perspective that focuses on the relationship of individuals within society by studying their communication (language, gestures and symbols).

theory: An explanation about why something occurs.

Section Summary

[1.1 What Is Sociology?](#)

Sociology is the systematic study of society and social interaction. In order to carry out their studies, sociologists deploy the sociological imagination to identify cultural patterns and social forces, and determine how they affect individuals and groups. Patterns and social forces can be analyzed at three different levels of analysis: micro, macro and global.

[1.2 The History of Sociology](#)

Sociology was developed as a way to study and try to understand the changes to society brought on by the Industrial Revolution in the 18th and 19th centuries. Some of the earliest sociologists thought that societies and individuals' roles

in society could be studied using the same scientific methodologies that were used in the natural sciences, while others believed that it was impossible to predict human behaviour scientifically, and still others believed that the role of social science was to address power inequities. These differing perspectives continue to be represented within sociology today.

1.3 Theoretical Perspectives

Sociologists develop theories to explain social events, interactions, and patterns. A theory is a proposed explanation of those patterns. Sociology is a multi-perspectival science: a number of distinct perspectives or *paradigms* offer competing explanations of social phenomena. There are three different types of theory in sociology: positivist, interpretive and critical.

1.4 Why Study Sociology?

Studying sociology is beneficial both for the individual and for society. By studying sociology people learn how to think critically about social issues and problems that confront society. The study of sociology enriches students' lives and prepares them for careers in an increasingly diverse world. Society benefits because people with sociological training are better prepared to make informed decisions about social issues and take effective action to deal with them.

Questions

Quiz: An Introduction to Sociology

1.1 What Is Sociology?

1. Which of the following best describes sociology as a subject?
 - a. The study of individual behaviour
 - b. The study of primitive and modern cultures
 - c. The study of society and social interaction
 - d. The study of market behaviour
2. Wright Mills once said that sociologists need to develop a sociological _____ to study how society affects individuals.
 - a. theory
 - b. imagination
 - c. method
 - d. habit
3. A sociologist defines society as a group of people who reside in a defined area, share a culture, and who:
 - a. interact.
 - b. are incorporated.
 - c. identify with a national identity.
 - d. are anonymous.

4. Seeing patterns means that a sociologist needs to be able to:
- compare the behaviour of individuals from different societies.
 - compare one society to another.
 - identify structures.
 - separate the individual from society.

1.2 The History of Sociology

5. Which of the following was a source of early sociology?
- Astrology
 - Social chaos
 - The Council of Trent
 - Historical modes of production
6. Which founder of sociology believed societies changed due to class struggle?
- August Comte
 - Karl Marx
 - Ibn Khaldun
 - Émile Durkheim
7. The difference between positivism and interpretive sociology relates to:
- whether sociologists are positive or negative towards society.
 - whether research methods use statistical data or sociological imagination.
 - whether sociological studies can predict or only describe society.
 - all of the above.
8. Which would a quantitative sociologist use to gather data?
- A large survey
 - A literature search
 - An in-depth interview
 - A deconstruction of media images
9. Weber believed humans could not be studied purely objectively because they were influenced by:
- biochemistry.
 - their culture.
 - their subconscious.
 - the researcher's questions.

1.3 Theoretical Perspectives

10. Which of these theories is most likely to look at the social world on a micro-level?
- Structural functionalism.
 - Critical sociology.
 - Quantitative sociology.

- d. Symbolic interactionism.
11. Who believed that modern society was afflicted by normlessness or anomie?
- a. Karl Marx
 - b. Émile Durkheim
 - c. Margaret Mead
 - d. George Herbert Mead
12. “Function” in structural functionalism refers to:
- a. meeting a need.
 - b. an institutional or organized event.
 - c. a persistent pattern of behaviour.
 - d. a mathematical operation.
13. A symbolic interactionist may compare social interactions to:
- a. involuntary behaviours.
 - b. space travel.
 - c. human organs.
 - d. role playing.
14. Which paradigm is most concerned with challenging essentialist explanations?
- a. Historical materialism.
 - b. Social constructivism.
 - c. Post-essentialism.
 - d. None of the above.
15. Which classical sociologist described sociology as the study of social forms?
- a. Martineau
 - b. Simmel
 - c. Weber
 - d. Comte

1.4 Why Study Sociology?

16. Studying Sociology helps people analyze data because they learn:
- a. interview techniques.
 - b. to apply statistics.
 - c. to generate theories.
 - d. all of the above.
17. Berger describes sociologists as concerned with:
- a. monumental moments in people's lives.
 - b. common everyday life events.
 - c. both 1 and 2.

- d. none of the above.

[\[Quiz answers at the end of the chapter\]](#)

Short answer

[1.1 What Is Sociology?](#)

1. What do you think C. Wright Mills meant when he said that to be a sociologist one had to develop a sociological imagination? What is imaginative about sociology?
2. Describe a situation in which a choice you made was influenced by societal pressures. How would you describe the pressure?

[1.2 The History of Sociology](#)

3. Some figures in sociology are famous and controversial beyond the confines of the discipline. What do you make of Karl Marx's contributions to sociology? What perceptions of Marx have you been exposed to in your society, and how do those perceptions influence your views?
4. Why do you think sociology is still influenced by 19th century thinkers? Is that the same or different than other sciences and disciplines of study?

[1.3 Theoretical Perspectives](#)

5. From your experience of the social world, which theory provides the most convincing account of how societies operate — structural functionalism, historical materialism or symbolic interactionism? Why?
6. Do you think the way people behave in social interactions is due to cause and effect, or is it more spontaneous, like actors improvising in a theatrical production? Why? Think of an example to demonstrate your answer.

[1.4 Why Study Sociology?](#)

7. What type of skills do you think sociology students learn?
8. What sort of career are you interested in? How could studying sociology help you in this career?

Further Research

[1.1 What Is Sociology?](#)

Sociology is a broad discipline. Different kinds of sociologists employ various methods for exploring the relationship between individuals and society. Check out [CRStal Radio](#), the podcast of the Canadian Review of Sociology.

[1.2 The History of Sociology](#)

Many sociologists helped shape the discipline. Learn more about [prominent sociologists](#) on the John J. Macionis website, and how they changed sociology.

[1.3 Theoretical Perspectives](#)

Sociology is a multi-perspectival science. Learn more about the different sociological paradigms through mini-lectures and screen cast videos on [society and culture](#) from the Khan Academy.

[1.4 Why Study Sociology?](#)

The Canadian Sociological Association has produced a useful pamphlet “[Opportunities in Sociology](#)” which includes sections on: (1) The unique skills that set sociology apart as a discipline; (2) An overview of the Canadian labour market and the types of jobs available to Sociology BA graduates; (3) An examination of how sociology students can best prepare themselves for the labour market; (4) An introduction, based on sociological research, of the most fruitful ways to conduct a job search.

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Solutions to Quiz: An Introduction to Sociology

1 C, | 2 B, | 3 A, | 4 C, | 5 B, | 6 B, | 7 C, | 8 A, | 9 B, | 10 D, | 11 B, | 12 A, | 13 D, | 14 B, | 15 B, | 16 D, | 17 C [\[Return to Quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 2. SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH



Figure 2.1 The January 29, 2017 Quebec mosque attack in which six worshippers were shot and five critically injured. What social factors led to the process of the gunman's radicalization and political violence? How do sociologists study these questions? (Image courtesy of Caribb/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

Learning Objectives

2.1. Approaches to Sociological Research

- Distinguish between scientific and non-scientific ways of thinking.
- Explain how the scientific method is used in sociological research.
- Understand the difference between quantitative and qualitative approaches to the scientific method in sociology.
- Define what reliability and validity mean in a research study.
- Familiarize oneself with critical research strategies.

2.2. Research Methods

- Differentiate between four kinds of research methods: surveys, experiments, field research, and secondary data or textual analysis.
- Understand why certain topics are better suited to different research approaches.

2.3. Ethical Concerns

- Understand why ethical standards exist.
- Demonstrate awareness of the Canadian Sociological Association's Code of Ethics.
- Define value neutrality, and outline some of the issues of value neutrality in sociology.

Introduction to Sociological Research

In an unfortunate comment following the Boston Marathon bombing in April 2013, then Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper said “this is not a time to commit sociology.” He implied that the “utter condemnation of this kind of violence” *precluded* drawing on sociological research into the causes of political violence (Harper cited in Cohen, 2013). In the Prime Minister’s position, there is a split between taking a strong political and moral stance on violence, on one hand, and working towards a deeper, evidence-based understanding of the social causes of acts of violence on the other.

Behind the political and moral rhetoric of statements about terrorism are a number of densely solidified beliefs about the nature of a “terrorist” individual — “people who have agendas of violence that are deep and abiding, [who] are a threat to all the values that our society stands for” (Harper cited in Cohen, 2013). In this framework, the terrorist is a kind of person who is beyond reason and morality. Therefore, sociological analysis is not only futile in the former Prime Minister’s opinion but also, for the same reasons, contrary to the “utter determination through our laws and through our activities to do everything we can to prevent and counter [terrorist violence]” (Harper cited in Cohen, 2013).



Figure 2.2 Aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing, April 13, 2013. (Image courtesy of Aaron Tang/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

In the research of Robert Pape (2005), a different picture of the terrorist emerges. In the case of the 462 suicide bombers Pape studied, not only were the suicide bombers relatively well-educated and affluent, but as other studies of suicide bombers in general confirm, they were not mentally imbalanced *per se*, not blindly motivated by religious zeal, and not unaffected by the moral ambivalence of their proposed acts. They were apparently well-integrated individuals — individuals who were not socioeconomically deprived or repressed in any absolute sense. They were ordinary individuals who became radicalized by being caught up in extraordinary circumstances. How would this understanding of the terrorist individual affect the drafting of public policy and public responses to terrorism?

Sociological research is especially important with respect to public policy debates. The political controversies that surround the question of how best to respond to terrorism and violent crime are difficult to resolve at the level of political rhetoric. Often, in the news and in public discourse, the issue is framed in moral terms and therefore, for example, the policy alternatives get narrowed to the option of being either “tough” or “soft” on crime. Tough and soft are moral categories that reflect a moral characterization of the issue. A question framed by these types of moral categories cannot be resolved using evidence-based procedures. Posing the debate in these terms narrows the range of options available and undermines the ability to raise questions about what responses to crime actually work.

In fact, policy debates over terrorism and crime seem especially susceptible to the various forms of specious, unscientific reasoning described later in this chapter. The familiar story of a shocking act of violence that spirals in the

media into a moral panic and becomes the basis for the widespread belief that the criminal justice system as a whole is “soft” and has failed, illustrates several qualities of unscientific thinking: knowledge based on casual observation, knowledge based on overgeneralization, and knowledge based on selective evidence. The sociological approach to policy questions is essentially different because it focuses on examining the effectiveness of different social control strategies for addressing different types of violent behaviour and the different types of risk to public safety. Thus, from a sociological point of view, it is crucial to think systematically about who commits violent acts and why.

Although moral claims and opinions are of interest to sociologists, sociological researchers use **empirical evidence** (that is, evidence corroborated by direct experience and/or observation) combined with the **scientific method** to deliver sound sociological research. A truly scientific sociological study of the social causes that lead to terrorist or criminal violence would involve a sequence of prescribed steps: defining a specific research question that can be answered through empirical observation; gathering information and resources through detailed observation; forming a hypothesis; testing the hypothesis in a reproducible manner; analyzing and drawing conclusions from the data; publishing the results; and anticipating further development when future researchers respond to and re-examine the findings.

An appropriate starting point in this case might be the question, “What are the social conditions of individuals who are drawn to commit terrorist acts?” In a casual discussion of the issue, or in the back and forth of Twitter or news comment forums, people often make arguments based on their personal observations and insights, believing them to be accurate. But the results of casual observation are limited by the fact that there is no standardization or *universal criteria* (see discussion of CUDOS below). Who is to say if one person’s observation of an event is any more accurate than another’s? To mediate these concerns, sociologists rely on systematic research processes.

It is important to note that within sociology there are a variety of ways of approaching social scientific research. The appropriate starting point for the sociological study of terrorism will differ between positivist, interpretive, and critical approaches. For positivist sociology, the research question might be, “Are there social background variables that can predict which individuals will be drawn to commit terrorist acts?” An interpretive approach might ask, “What is the process and timeline or sequence of events of individuals that become violently radicalized? Through what processes do they come to reinterpret their world?” Critical sociologists might pose the question as, “What is the historical, sociopolitical context of violent radicalization?” These different questions entail the choice of different methodologies as discussed below, but all three require a systematic approach to finding the answers.

The unwillingness to “commit sociology” and think more deeply about the roots of political violence might lead to a certain moral or rhetorical image of an “uncompromising” response to the “terrorist threat,” but this response has not proven to be effective in practice, nor is it one that exhausts the options for preventing and countering acts of political violence. Contrary to the former Prime Minister’s statements, the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing is precisely a moment to commit sociology if the issues that produce acts of violence are to be addressed.

Media Attributions

- **Figure 2.1** [The World comes to my front door](#) by Caribb, via Flickr, is used under a [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#) licence.
- **Figure 2.2** [Spectators helping victims soon after the attack](#) by Aaron Tang, via Wikipedia, is used under a [CC BY 2.0](#) licence.

2.1. Approaches to Sociological Research



Figure 2.3 Sherlock Holmes as sociologist? The character Sherlock Holmes was known for his keen observation of social life. (Photo courtesy of Special Collections Toronto Public Library/ Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

When sociologists apply the sociological perspective and begin to ask questions, no topic is off limits. Every aspect of human behaviour is a source of possible investigation. Sociologists question the world that humans have created and live in. They notice patterns of behaviour as people move through the world. Using sociological methods and systematic research within the framework of the scientific method, sociologists have discovered workplace patterns that have transformed industries, family patterns that have enlightened parents, and education patterns that have aided structural changes in classrooms.

Depending on the focus and the type of research conducted, sociological findings could be useful in addressing any of the three basic interests or purposes of sociological knowledge discussed in the last chapter: the positivist interest in quantitative evidence to determine effective social policy decisions, the interpretive interest in understanding the meanings of human behaviour to foster mutual understanding and consensus, and the critical interest in knowledge useful for dismantling power relations and building alternatives to conditions of servitude. It might seem strange to use scientific practices to study social phenomena — a bit like the contents of a petri dish examining themselves — but, as argued above, if the goal of sociology is to improve the operation of society, it is extremely helpful to rely on systematic approaches that research methods provide.

Sociologists often begin the research process by asking a question about how or why things happen. It might be a unique question about a new trend or an old question about a common aspect of life. Once a question is formed, a sociologist proceeds through an in-depth process to answer it. Depending on the nature of the topic and the goals of the research, sociologists have a variety of methodologies to choose from. In deciding how to design that process, the researcher may adopt a **positivist methodology** or an **interpretive methodology**. Both types of methodology can be useful for **critical research strategies**. The following sections describe these approaches to acquiring knowledge.

Science vs. Non-Science

Contemporary society is going through an interesting time in which the certitudes and authority of science are frequently challenged. In the context of the natural sciences, people doubt scientific claims about climate change and the safety of vaccines. In the context of the social sciences, people doubt scientific claims about the declining rate of violent crime or the effectiveness of needle exchange programs. Sometimes there is a good reason to be skeptical about science, when scientific technologies prove to have adverse effects on the environment, for example. Sometimes skepticism has dangerous outcomes, when people act on conspiracy theories and misinformation or epidemics of diseases like measles suddenly break-out in schools due to low vaccination rates. In fact, skepticism is central to both natural and social sciences; but from a scientific point of view, the skeptical attitude needs to be combined with systematic research in order for knowledge to move forward.

In sociology, science provides the basis for being able to distinguish between everyday opinions or beliefs and propositions that can be sustained by evidence. In his paper, *The Normative Structure of Science* (1942/1973), the

sociologist Robert Merton argued that science is a type of empirical knowledge organized around four key principles, often referred to by the acronym **CUDOS**:

1. **Communalism**: The results of science must be made available to the public; science is freely available, shared knowledge, open to public discussion and debate.
2. **Universalism**: The results of science must be evaluated based on universal criteria, not parochial criteria specific to the researchers themselves.
3. **Disinterestedness**: Science must not be pursued for private interests or personal reward.
4. **Organized Skepticism**: The scientist must abandon all prior intellectual commitments, critically evaluate claims, and postpone conclusions until sufficient evidence has been presented; scientific knowledge is provisional.

For Merton, therefore, non-scientific knowledge is knowledge that fails in various respects to meet these criteria. Types of esoteric or mystical knowledge, for example, might be valid for someone on a spiritual path, but because this knowledge is passed from teacher to student through direct transmission and it is not available to the public for open debate, or because the validity of this knowledge might be specific to the individual's unique spiritual configuration, esoteric or mystical knowledge is not scientific *per se*. Claims that are presented to persuade (rhetoric), to achieve political goals (propaganda, of various sorts), or to make profits (advertising) are not scientific because these claims are structured to satisfy private interests. Propositions which fail to stand up to rigorous and systematic standards of evaluation are not scientific because they can not withstand the criteria of organized skepticism and scientific method.

The basic distinction between scientific and common, non-scientific claims about the world is that in science “seeing is believing” whereas in everyday life “believing is seeing” (Brym, Roberts, Lie, & Rytina, 2013). Science is, in crucial respects, based on systematic observation following the principles of CUDOS. Only on the basis of observation (or “seeing”) can a scientist believe that a proposition about the nature of the world is correct. Research methodologies are designed to reduce the chance that conclusions will be based on error. In everyday life, the order is typically reversed. People “see” what they already expect to see or what they already believe to be true. They do not systematically test what they believe to be true. Prior intellectual commitments or biases predetermine what people observe and the conclusions they draw.

Many people know things about the social world without having a background in sociology. Sometimes their knowledge is valid; sometimes it is not. It is important, therefore, to think about how people know what they know, and compare it to the scientific way of knowing. Four types of non-scientific reasoning are common in everyday life: knowledge based on casual observation, knowledge based on selective evidence, knowledge based on overgeneralization, and knowledge based on authority or tradition.

Table 2.1. Scientific and Non-Scientific Ways of Knowing [\[Skip Table\]](#)
Note. (Blackstone, 2012) [CC BY-NC-SA 3.0](#) (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/>)

Way of Knowing	Description
Casual Observation	Occurs when individuals make observations without any systematic process for observing or assessing the accuracy of what they observed.
Selective Observation	Occurs when individuals see only those patterns that they want to see, or when they assume that only the patterns they have experienced directly exist.
Overgeneralization	Occurs when individuals assume that broad patterns exist even when their observations have been limited.
Authority/Tradition	A socially defined source of knowledge that might shape individuals' beliefs about what is true and what is not true.
Scientific Research Methods	An organized, logical way of learning and knowing about the social world.

Many people know things simply because they have experienced them directly. Someone who has grown up in Manitoba

has probably observed what plenty of kids learn each winter, that it really is true that one's tongue will stick to metal when it is very cold outside. Direct experience may provide accurate information, but only if the observer is lucky. Unlike the fictional detective Sherlock Holmes, in general, people are not very careful observers. In this example of the “winged ship” in Figure 2.4, the observation process is not deliberate or systematic. Instead, the observers come to know what they believe to be true through **casual observation**. The problem with casual observation is that sometimes it is right, and sometimes it is wrong. Without any systematic process for observing or assessing the accuracy of observations, a person can never really be sure if their informal observations are accurate.



Figure 2.4 “A Winged Ship in the Sky” seen by all in Sacramento in 1896. (Photo courtesy of The San Francisco Call/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Many people know things because they overlook disconfirming evidence. Suppose a friend declared that all men are liars shortly after she had learned that her boyfriend had deceived her. The fact that one man happened to lie to her in one instance came to represent a quality inherent in all men. But do *all* men really lie *all* the time? Probably not. If the friend is prompted to think more broadly about her experiences with men, she would probably acknowledge that she knew many men who, to her knowledge, had never lied to her and that maybe even her boyfriend did not generally make a habit of lying. This friend committed what social scientists refer to as **selective observation** by noticing only the pattern that she wanted to find at the time. She ignored disconfirming evidence. If, on the other hand, the friend's experience with her boyfriend had been her only experience with a man, then she would have been committing what social scientists refer to as **overgeneralization**, assuming that broad patterns exist based on very limited observations.

Another way that people claim to know what they know is by looking to what they have always known to be true. There is an urban legend about a woman who for years used to cut both ends off of a ham before putting it in the oven (Mikkelsen, 2005). She baked ham that way because that is the way her mother did it, so clearly that was the way it was supposed to be done. Her knowledge was based on a family tradition or **traditional knowledge**. After years of tossing

cuts of perfectly good ham into the trash, however, she finally asked her mother why she did it and learned that the only reason her mother cut the ends off ham before cooking it was that she did not have a pan large enough to accommodate the ham without trimming it.

Without questioning what one thinks one knows is true, one may wind up believing things that are actually false. This is most likely to occur when an authority tells us that something is true, a case of **authoritative knowledge**. Mothers are not the only possible authorities people might rely on as sources of knowledge. Other common authorities people might rely on are political figures, churches and ministers, media influencers and social media networks. Although it is understandable that someone might believe something to be true if they look up to, or respect the person who has said it is so, this way of knowing differs from the sociological way of knowing. Whether quantitative, qualitative, or critical in orientation, sociological research is based on the scientific method.

The last four paragraphs on the four types of non-scientific reasoning are adapted from Amy Blackstone, *Sociological Inquiry Principles: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods* (V. 1.0, 2012). Used under a [CC BY-NC-SA 3.0](#) licence.

The Scientific Method

Sociologists make use of tried-and-true methods of research, such as experiments, surveys, field research, and textual analysis. But humans and their social interactions are so diverse that they can seem impossible to chart or explain. It might seem that science is about discoveries and chemical reactions, or about proving hypotheses about elementary particles right or wrong, rather than about exploring the nuances of human behaviour. However, this is exactly why scientific models work for studying human behaviour. A scientific process of research establishes parameters that help make sure results are objective and accurate. Scientific methods provide limitations and boundaries that focus a study and organize its results. This is the case for both positivist quantitative methodologies, which seek to translate observable phenomena into unambiguous numerical data, and interpretive qualitative methodologies, which seek to translate observable phenomena into definable units of meaning. The social scientific method in both cases involves developing and testing theories about the world based on empirical (i.e., observable) evidence. The social scientific method is defined by its commitment to systematic observation of the social world, and it strives to be objective, critical, skeptical, and logical. It involves a series of established steps known as the **research cycle**.




Figure 2.5 The research cycle passes through a series of steps. The conclusions and reporting typically generate a new set of questions, which renews the cycle. [CC BY 4.0](#). [\[Image Description\]](#)

No matter what research approach is used, researchers want to maximize the study's *reliability* and *validity*. **Reliability** refers to how likely research results are to be replicated if the study is reproduced. Reliability increases the likelihood that what is true of one person will be true of all people in a group. **Validity** refers to how well the study measures what it was designed to measure. If the researcher wishes to examine people's depth of religiosity — i.e., how strong is someone's religious belief? How central is religious belief to their life? — does a measure like “frequency of church attendance” accurately measure that? Maybe not. People attend church for a variety of reasons and some religions are not organized on the basis of churches and congregations.

A subtopic in the field of political violence would be to examine the sources of homegrown radicalization: What are the conditions under which individuals in Canada move from a state of indifference or moderate concern with political issues to a state in which they are prepared to use violence to pursue political goals? The *reliability* of a study of radicalization reflects how well the social factors unearthed by the research apply to similar individuals who were not directly part of the research. Would another sociologist come up with the same results if they replicated the study? How well can the researcher extrapolate from the research subjects studied to individuals in the broader society? Does research on violent jihadi radicalization apply to violent neo-Nazi radicalization?

Validity ensures that the study's design accurately examined what it was designed to study. Do the concepts and measures of radicalization accurately represent the actual experience of political radicals? An exploration of an individual's propensity to plan or engage in violent acts or to go abroad to join a terrorist organization should address those specific issues and not confuse them with other topics such as why an individual adopts a particular faith or espouses radical political views. There is a key difference between religiosity, radicalization, and violent radicalization. As research from the UK and United States on jihadism has in fact shown, while jihadi terrorists typically identify with

an Islamic world view, a well-developed Islamic identity counteracts jihadism. Similarly, research has shown that while it intuitively makes sense that people with radical views would adopt radical means like violence to achieve them, there is in fact no consistent homegrown terrorist profile, meaning that it is not possible to predict whether someone who espouses radical views will move on to committing violent acts without taking into account the specific stages in the process (Patel, 2011).

To ensure validity, research on political violence should focus on individuals who engage in political violence and be able to distinguish between simply holding radical political beliefs and acting violently on radical political beliefs. Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) distinguishes between radical, radicalization, and violent radicalization as follows:

a radical is understood as a person harboring a deep-felt desire for fundamental sociopolitical changes and radicalization is understood as a growing readiness to pursue and support far reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to, the existing order. [V]iolent radicalization [is] a process in which radical ideas are accompanied by the development of a willingness to directly support or engage in violent acts.

The scientific method provides a systematic, organized series of steps that help ensure objectivity and consistency in exploring a social problem. These steps provide the means for accuracy, reliability, and validity. Typically, the scientific method starts with these steps, which are described below: 1) ask a question; 2) research existing sources; and 3) formulate a hypothesis.

Ask a Question

The first step of the scientific method is to ask a question, describe a problem, and identify the specific area of interest. The topic should be narrow enough to study within a specific geographical location and time frame. “Are societies capable of sustained happiness?” would be too vague. The question should also be broad enough to have universal merit. “What do personal hygiene habits reveal about the values of students at XYZ High School?” would be too narrow. That said, happiness and hygiene are worthy topics to study.




Figure 2.6 Karl Popper (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [No known copyright restrictions.](#)

Sociologists do not rule out any topic, but would strive to frame these questions in better research terms. That is why sociologists are careful to define their terms. Karl Popper (1902–1994) described the formulation of scientific propositions in terms of the concept of **falsifiability** (1963). He argued that the key demarcation between scientific and non-scientific propositions was not ultimately their factual truth, nor their verification, but simply whether or not they were *stated* in such a way as to be falsifiable; that is, whether a possible empirical observation could prove them wrong. If one claimed that evil spirits were the source of criminal behaviour, this would not be a scientific proposition because there is no possible way to definitively disprove it. Evil spirits cannot be observed. However, if one claimed that higher unemployment rates are the source of higher crime rates, this would be a scientific proposition because it is theoretically possible to find an instance where unemployment rates were not correlated to higher crime rates. As Popper

said, “statements or systems of statements, in order to be ranked as scientific, must be capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable, observations” (Popper, 1963).

Once a proposition is formulated in a way that would permit it to be falsified, the variables to be observed need to be operationalized. In a hygiene study, for instance, hygiene could be defined as “personal habits to maintain physical appearance (as opposed to health),” and a researcher might ask, “How do differing personal hygiene habits reflect the cultural value placed on appearance?” When forming these basic research questions, sociologists develop an **operational definition**; that is, they define the concept in terms of the physical or concrete steps it takes to objectively measure it. The concept is translated into an observable **variable**, a measure that has different values. The operational definition identifies an observable condition of the concept.

By operationalizing a variable of the concept, all researchers can collect data in a systematic or replicable manner. The operational definition must be **valid** in the sense that it is an appropriate and meaningful measure of the concept being studied. It must also be **reliable**, meaning that results will be close to uniform when tested on more than one person. For example, good drivers might be defined in many ways: Those who use their turn signals; those who do not speed; or those who courteously allow others to merge. But these driving behaviours could be interpreted differently by different researchers, so they could be difficult to measure. Alternatively, “a driver who has never received a traffic violation” is a specific description that will lead researchers to obtain the same information, so it is an effective operational definition. Asking the question, “how many traffic violations has a driver received?” turns the concepts of “good drivers” and “bad drivers” into variables which might be measured by the number of traffic violations a driver has received. Of course the sociologist has to be wary of the way the variables are operationalized. In this example we know that black drivers are subject to much higher levels of police scrutiny than white drivers, so the number of traffic violations a driver has received might reflect less on their driving ability and more on the crime of “driving while black.”

Research Existing Sources

The next step researchers undertake is to conduct background research through a **literature review**, which is a review of any existing similar or related studies. A visit to a university library and a thorough online search will uncover existing research about the topic of study. This step helps researchers gain a broad understanding of work previously conducted on the topic at hand and enables them to position their own research to build on prior knowledge. It allows them to sharpen the focus of their research question and avoid duplicating previous research. Researchers — including student researchers — are responsible for correctly citing existing sources they use in a study or sources that inform their work. While it is fine to build on previously published material (as long as it enhances a unique viewpoint), it must be referenced properly and never plagiarized. To study hygiene and its value in a particular society, a researcher might sort through existing research and unearth studies about childrearing, vanity, obsessive-compulsive behaviours, and cultural attitudes toward beauty. At the literature review stage it is important to sift through this information and determine what is relevant. Using existing sources educates a researcher by showing what others have found relevant about a topic, and helps refine and improve a study's design.

Formulate a Hypothesis

A **hypothesis** is an assumption about how two or more variables are related; it makes a conjectural statement about the relationship between those variables. It is an educated guess because it is not random but based on theory, observations, patterns of experience, or the existing literature. The hypothesis formulates this guess in the form of a testable or falsifiable proposition. However, how the hypothesis is handled differs between the positivist and interpretive approaches in sociology.

Hypothesis Formation in Positivist Research

Positivist methodologies are often referred to as **hypothetico-deductive methodologies**. A hypothesis is derived from a theoretical proposition. On the basis of the hypothesis, a prediction or generalization is logically deduced. If the prediction is confirmed by observation, the theoretical proposition is regarded as valid (at least provisionally). In

positivist sociology, the hypothesis predicts how one form of human behaviour influences another. How does being a black driver affect the number of times the police will pull the driver over?

Successful prediction will determine the adequacy of the hypothesis and thereby test the theoretical proposition. Typically positivist approaches operationalize variables as **quantitative data**; that is, by translating a social phenomenon like health into a quantifiable or numerically measurable variable like “number of visits to the hospital.” This permits sociologists to formulate their predictions using mathematical language, like regression formulas, to present research findings in graphs and tables, and to perform mathematical or statistical techniques to demonstrate the validity of relationships.

Variables are examined to see if there is a **correlation** between them. When a change in one variable coincides with a change in another variable there is a correlation. This does not necessarily indicate that changes in one variable *causes* a change in another variable, however — just that they are associated. A key distinction here is between independent and dependent variables. In research, **independent variables** are the cause of the change. The **dependent variable** is the effect, or thing that is changed. For example, in a basic study, the researcher would establish one form of human behaviour as the independent variable and observe the influence it has on a dependent variable. How does gender (the independent variable) affect rate of income (the dependent variable)? How does one’s religion (the independent variable) affect family size (the dependent variable)? How is social class (the dependent variable) affected by level of education (the independent variable)?

Table 2.2. Examples of Dependent and Independent Variables

Hypothesis	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable
The greater the availability of affordable housing, the lower the homeless rate.	Affordable Housing	Homeless Rate
The greater the availability of math tutoring, the higher the math grades.	Availability of Math Tutoring	Math Grades
The greater the police patrol presence, the safer the neighbourhood.	Police Patrol Presence	Safer Neighbourhood
The greater the factory lighting, the higher the productivity.	Amount of Factory Lighting	Productivity
The greater the amount of public auditing, the lower the amount of political dishonesty.	Amount of Public Auditing	Political Dishonesty
Note. Typically, the independent variable causes the dependent variable to change in some way.		

For it to become possible to speak about **causation**, three criteria must be satisfied:


1. There must be a relationship or correlation between the independent and dependent variables.
2. The independent variable must be prior to the dependent variable.
3. There must be no other **intervening variable** responsible for the causal relationship.

It is important to note that while there has to be a correlation between variables for there to be a causal relationship, correlation does not necessarily imply causation. The relationship between variables can be the product of a third **intervening variable** that is independently related to both. For example, there might be a positive relationship between wearing bikinis and eating ice cream, but wearing bikinis does not cause eating ice cream. It is more likely that the heat of summertime causes both an increase in bikini wearing and an increase in the consumption of ice cream.

The distinction between causation and correlation can have significant consequences. For example, Indigenous Canadians are overrepresented in prisons and arrest statistics. As noted in [Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology](#), in 2020 Indigenous people accounted for about 5% of the Canadian population, but they made up 30% of the federal penitentiary population (Correctional Investigator Canada, 2020). There is a positive correlation between being an Indigenous person in Canada and being in jail. Is this because Indigenous people are racially or biologically predisposed to crime? No. In fact there are at least four intervening variables that explain the higher incarceration of Indigenous

people (Hartnagel, 2004): Indigenous people are disproportionately poor and poverty is associated with higher arrest and incarceration rates; Indigenous lawbreakers tend to commit more detectable “street” crimes than the less detectable and actionable “white collar” crimes of other segments of the population; the criminal justice system disproportionately profiles and discriminates against Indigenous people; and the legacy of colonization has disrupted and weakened traditional sources of social control in Indigenous communities.

FIGURE 4 MISTAKING CORRELATION FOR CAUSATION



Source: Tyler Vigen

ALTIMETER

Figure 2.7 Correlation does not imply causation: Divorce rate in Maine by Per Capita Consumption of Margarine. (Image courtesy of AltimeterGroup/ Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/)

At this point, a researcher’s **operational definitions** help measure the variables. In a study asking how tutoring improves grades, for instance, one researcher might define “good” grades as a C or better, while another uses a B+ as a starting point for good. Another operational definition might describe “tutoring” as “one-on-one assistance by an expert in the field, hired by an educational institution.” Those definitions set limits and establish cut-off points, ensuring consistency and replicability in a study. As the chart shows, an independent variable is the one that causes a dependent variable to change. For example, a researcher might hypothesize that teaching children proper hygiene (the independent variable) will boost their sense of self-esteem (the dependent variable). Or rephrased, a child’s sense of self-esteem depends, in part, on the quality and availability of hygienic resources.

Of course, this hypothesis can also work the other way around. Perhaps a sociologist believes that increasing a child’s sense of self-esteem (the independent variable) will automatically increase or improve habits of hygiene (now the

dependent variable). Identifying the independent and dependent variables is very important. As the hygiene example shows, simply identifying two topics, or variables, is not enough: Their prospective relationship must be part of the hypothesis. Just because a sociologist forms an educated prediction of a study's outcome does not mean data contradicting the hypothesis are not welcome. Sociologists analyze general patterns in response to a study, but they are equally interested in exceptions to patterns.

In a study of education, a researcher might predict that high school dropouts have a hard time finding a rewarding career. While it has become at least a cultural assumption that the higher the education, the higher the salary and degree of career happiness, there are certainly exceptions. People with little education have had stunning careers, and people with advanced degrees have had trouble finding work. A sociologist prepares a hypothesis knowing that results will vary.

Hypothesis Formation in Qualitative Research

While many sociologists rely on the positivist hypothetico-deductive method in their research, others operate from an **interpretive approach**. While still systematic, this approach typically does not follow the hypothesis-testing model that seeks to make generalizable predictions from quantitative variables. Instead, an interpretive framework seeks to understand social worlds from the point of view of participants, leading to in-depth knowledge. It focuses on **qualitative data**, or the meanings that guide people's behaviour. Rather than relying on quantitative instruments, like fixed questionnaires or experiments, which can be artificial, the interpretive approach attempts to find ways to get closer to the informants' lived experience and perceptions.

Interpretive research is generally more descriptive or narrative in its findings than positivist research. It can begin from a deductive approach by deriving a hypothesis from theory and then seeking to confirm it through methodologies like in-depth interviews. However, it is ideally suited to an **inductive approach** in which the hypothesis emerges only after a substantial period of direct observation or interaction with subjects. This type of approach is exploratory in that the researcher also learns as they proceed, sometimes adjusting the research methods or processes midway to respond to new insights and findings as they evolve.

For example, Glaser and Strauss' (1967) classic elaboration of **grounded theory** proposed that qualitative researchers working with rich sources of qualitative data from interviews or ethnographic observations need to go through several stages of coding the data before a strong theory of the social phenomenon under investigation can emerge. In the initial stage, the researcher is simply trying to listen carefully and to tentatively categorize and sort the data. The researchers do not predetermine what the relevant categories of the social experience are, but analyze carefully what their subjects actually say. For example, what are the working definitions of health and illness that hospital patients use to describe their situation? In the first stage, the researcher tries to distinguish and succinctly code or label the numerous themes emerging from the data: different ways of describing the experience of health and illness. In the second stage, the researcher takes a more analytical approach by organizing the initial interview data into a few key reoccurring themes: Perhaps these are key assumptions that lay people make about the physiological mechanisms of the body, or the metaphors they use to describe their relationship to illness (e.g., a random occurrence, a battle, a punishment, a message, etc.). In the third stage, the researcher returns to the interview subjects with a new set of questions that would seek to either affirm, modify, or discard the analytical themes derived from the initial categorization of the interview material. This process can then be repeated back and forth until a thoroughly grounded theory is ready to be proposed. At every stage of the research, the researchers are obliged to follow the emerging data by revising their conceptions as new material is gathered, contradictions accounted for, commonalities categorized, and themes re-examined with further interviews.

Once the preliminary work is done and the hypothesis defined, it is time for the next research steps: choosing a research methodology, conducting a study, and drawing conclusions. These research steps are discussed below.

Making Connections: Classic Sociologists

Harriet Martineau: The First Woman Sociologist?

As was noted in [Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology](#), Harriet Martineau (1802–1876) was one of the first women sociologists in the 19th century. She was a British sociologist known at the time especially for her translation of August Comte's sociological works. Particularly innovative was her early work on sociological methodology, *How to Observe Manners and Morals* (1838). In this volume she developed the ground work for a systematic social-scientific approach to studying human behaviour. She recognized that the issues of the researcher-subject relationship would have to be addressed differently in a social science as opposed to a natural science.

The observer, or “traveler,” as she put it, needed to respect three criteria to obtain valid research: impartiality, critique, and sympathy. The impartial observer could not allow herself to be “perplexed or disgusted” by foreign practices that she could not personally reconcile herself with. Yet at the same time she saw the goal of sociology to be the fair but *critical* assessment of the moral status of a culture. In particular, the goal of sociology was to challenge forms of racial, sexual, or class domination in the name of autonomy: the right of every person to be a “self-directing moral being.” Finally, what distinguished the science of social observation from the natural sciences was that the researcher had to have unqualified sympathy for the subjects being studied (Lengermann & Niebrugge, 2007). This later became a central principle of Max Weber's interpretive sociology, although it is not clear whether Weber read Martineau's work.

A large part of her research in the United States analyzed the situations of contradiction between stated public morality and actual moral practices. For example, she was fascinated with the way that the formal democratic right to free speech enabled slavery abolitionists to hold public meetings, but when the meetings were violently attacked by mobs, the abolitionists and not the mobs were accused of inciting the violence (Zeitlin, 1997). This emphasis on studying contradictions followed from the distinction she drew between *morals* — society's collective ideas of permitted and forbidden behaviour — and *manners* — the actual patterns of social action and association in society. As she realized the difficulty in getting an accurate representation of an entire society based on a limited number of interviews, she developed the idea that one could identify key “Things” experienced by all people — age, gender, illness, death, etc. — and examine how they were experienced differently by a sample of people from different walks of life



Figure 2.8 Harriet Martineau. Painting by Richard Evans (1834). (Photo courtesy of National Portrait Gallery, London/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

(Lengermann & Niebrugge, 2007). Martineau's pioneering sociology, therefore, focused on surveying different attitudes toward "Things," and studying the anomalies that emerged when manners toward them contradicted a society's formal morals.

Critical Research Strategies

As Karl Marx (1977 /1845) said: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it." **Critical research strategies** build on positivist and interpretive methodologies but bring the focus of research to the problems of social transformation and emancipation. Critical sociologists emphasize that the social world is not simply given or natural. It is the ongoing product of human actions and is therefore transformable. Domination and injustice are not inevitable. In this context, critical sociologists note that in a world characterized by extreme inequities and injustices, knowledge and ways of knowing can be caught up and implicated in power relations. "In a socially unjust world, knowledge of the social that does not challenge injustice is likely to play a role in reproducing it" (Carroll, 2004). Critical research strategies are therefore approaches that utilize positivist, interpretive, and critical methods to produce knowledge that maximizes the human potential for freedom and equality.




Figure 2.9 Paulo Freire (1921-1997). (Image courtesy of Slobodan Dimitrov/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 3.0](#)

Paulo Freire's (1970) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* is a key reference point for critical research. Working with the illiterate poor in North-Eastern Brazil in the 1940s and 1950s, Freire recognized that effective education and knowledge were not simply *about* things, but were emancipatory practices themselves. Through the development of critical consciousness, people could understand the circumstances in which they were living and act effectively to change the conditions of oppression they experienced. This was the basis of **critical pedagogy**, an approach to teaching and learning based on fostering the agency of marginalized communities, and empowering learners to emancipate themselves from oppressive social structures.

Carroll (2004) describes three types of critical research strategy: *Oppositional* or activist strategies investigate and oppose visible structures and practices of domination by taking up the standpoint of the oppressed; *Radical* strategies focus on analyzing deeper systematic bases of domination at the roots of societal structures; *Subversive* strategies subvert or deconstruct received notions of reality/identity and everyday, common sense binary oppositions (man/woman, culture/nature, self/other, reason/emotion, Black/white, etc.), which opens the door to alternatives and new political spaces of contestation.

One contemporary application of critical research strategies is in the critique of colonial structures. **Decolonization**, or the process of dismantling colonial power structures, also involves a process of decolonizing knowledge and research methods. Eurocentric patterns of thinking are often embedded in the concepts and methods used in sociology and other disciplines. In the 19th century, for example, social hierarchies and evolutionary schemes were central to the understanding of Indigenous people in Canada as alternately "savage" and "childlike," in need of suppressing, civilizing and assimilating. Decolonizing research "means centering concerns and world views of non-Western individuals, and

respectfully knowing and understanding theory and research from previously ‘Other(ed)’ perspectives” (Thambinathan & Kinsella, 2021). Thambinathan & Kinsella (2021) outline four practices of decolonization:

1. **Exercising Critical Reflexivity:** Critical reflexivity in research is about the researcher’s awareness of their own methodological assumptions — what they consider valid knowledge and proper ways of knowing — as well as of their social position (often as privileged outsiders) with respect to the research and the research subjects.
2. **Reciprocity and Respect for Self-Determination:** Research should be practiced as an ongoing collaboration with research subjects to establish collective ownership over the entire research process, and to make accountable the researchers to the research subjects.
3. **Embracing Other(ed) Ways of Knowing:** Research methods should be expanded to integrate traditional knowledge, theories and frameworks used by the research subjects.
4. **Embodying a Transformative Praxis:** Along the lines of Freire’s critical pedagogy, the goal of the research is to enable research subjects to transform the colonial conditions of their existence, to bring to light historically silenced voices, and to build capacities and agency in colonized peoples.

Image Descriptions

Figure 2.5 Long Description: The Scientific Method has a series of steps which can form a repeating cycle.

1. Ask a question.
2. Research existing sources
3. Formulate a hypothesis.
4. Design and conduct a study
5. Draw conclusions.
6. Report results. [\[Return to Figure 2.5\]](#)

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2.2. Research Methods

Sociologists examine the world, see a problem or interesting pattern, and set out to study it. They use research methods to design a study — perhaps a positivist, quantitative method for conducting research and obtaining data, or perhaps an ethnographic study utilizing an interpretive framework. Planning the **research design** is a key step in any sociological study. When entering a particular social environment, a researcher must be careful. There are times to remain anonymous and times to be overt. There are times to conduct interviews and times to simply observe. Some participants need to be thoroughly informed; others should not know that they are being observed. A researcher would not stroll into a crime-ridden neighbourhood at midnight, calling out, “Any gang members around?” And if a researcher walked into a coffee shop and told the employees they would be observed as part of a study on work efficiency, the self-conscious, intimidated baristas might not behave naturally. The unique nature of human research subjects is that they can react to the researcher and change their behaviour under observation.

Making Connections: Sociological Research

The Hawthorne Effect



Figure 2.10 Hawthorne Works factory of the Western Electric Company, 1925. (Photo courtesy of Western Electric Company photo album/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

In the 1920s, leaders of a Chicago factory, called Hawthorne Works, commissioned a study to determine whether or not changing certain aspects of working conditions could increase or decrease worker productivity. Sociologists were interested in the increased productivity of a test group when the lighting of their workspace was improved. They were surprised however when productivity improved if the lighting of the workspace was dimmed, as well. In fact almost every change of

independent variable — lighting, work breaks, work hours — resulted in an improvement of productivity. But when the study was over, productivity dropped again.

Why did this happen? In 1953, Henry A. Landsberger analyzed the study results to answer this question. He realized that employees' productivity increased *because* sociologists were paying attention to them. The sociologists' presence influenced the study results. Worker behaviours were altered not by the lighting but by the study itself. From this, sociologists learned the importance of carefully planning their roles as part of their research design (Franke & Kaul, 1978). Landsberger called the workers' response the **Hawthorne effect** — people change their behaviour when they know they are being watched as part of a study.

The Hawthorne effect is unavoidable in some research. In many cases, sociologists have to make the purpose of the study known for ethical reasons. Subjects must be aware that they are being observed, and a certain amount of artificiality may result (Sonnenfeld, 1985). Making sociologists' presence invisible is not

always realistic for other reasons. That option is not available to a researcher studying prison behaviours, early education, or the Ku Klux Klan. Researchers cannot just stroll into prisons, kindergarten classrooms, or Ku Klux Klan conclaves and unobtrusively observe behaviours. In situations like these, other methods are needed. All studies shape the research design, while research design simultaneously shapes the studies' outcomes. Researchers choose methods that best suit their study topic and that fit with their overall goal for the research.

In planning a study's design, sociologists generally choose from four widely used methods of social investigation: survey, experiment, field research, and textual or secondary data analysis (or use of existing sources). Every research method comes with pluses and minuses, and the topic of study strongly influences which method or methods are put to use.

1. Surveys

As a research method, a **survey** collects data from subjects who respond to a series of questions about behaviours and opinions, often in the form of a written questionnaire. The survey is one of the most widely used sociological research methods. The standard survey format allows individuals a level of anonymity in which they can express personal ideas.



Figure 2.11 Questionnaires are a common research method. The Statistics Canada census is a well-known example. (Photo courtesy of Khosrow Ebrahimpour/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

At some point or another, everyone responds to some type of survey. The Statistics Canada census is an excellent example of a large-scale survey intended to gather sociological data. Customers also fill out questionnaires on-line and at stores or promotional events, responding to questions such as “How did you hear about the event?” and “Were the staff helpful?” Many people have probably picked up the phone and heard a caller ask them to participate in a political poll or similar type of survey: “Do you eat hot dogs? If yes, how many per month?” Not all surveys would be considered sociological research. Marketing polls help companies refine their marketing goals and strategies; they are generally not conducted as part of a scientific study, meaning they are not designed to test a hypothesis or to contribute knowledge to the field of sociology. The results are not published in a refereed scholarly journal where design, methodology, results, and analyses are vetted.

Often, polls on TV do not reflect a general population, but are merely answers from a specific show's audience. Polls conducted by programs such as *American Idol* or *Canadian Idol* represent the opinions of fans, but are not particularly scientific. A good contrast to these are the Bureau of Broadcast Measurement (BBM) (now called Numeris) ratings, which determine the popularity of radio and television programming in Canada through scientific market research. Their researchers ask a large random sample of Canadians, age 12 and over, to fill out a television or radio diary for one week, noting the times and the broadcasters they listened to or viewed. Based on this methodology they are able to generate an accurate account of media consumers preferences, which are used to provide broadcast ratings for radio and television stations and define the characteristics of their core audiences.

Sociologists conduct surveys under controlled conditions for specific purposes. Surveys gather different types of information from people. While surveys are not great at capturing the ways people really behave in social situations,

they are a great method for discovering how people feel and think — or at least how they say they feel and think. Surveys can track attitudes and opinions, political preferences, individual behaviours (e.g., sleeping, driving, dietary, or texting habits), or factual social background information (e.g., employment status, income, and education levels). A survey targets a specific **population**, people who are the focus of a study, such as Canadian citizens, university athletes, international students, or teenagers living with type 1 (juvenile-onset) diabetes.

Most researchers choose to survey a small sector of the population, or a **sample**: That is, a manageable number of subjects who represent a larger population. The success of a study depends on how well a population is represented by the sample. In a **random sample**, every person in a population has the same chance of being chosen for the study. According to the laws of probability, random samples can be used to represent the population as a whole. The larger the sample size, the more accurate the results will be in characterizing the population being studied. For practical purposes, however, a sample size of 1,500 people will give acceptably accurate results even if the population being researched was the entire adult population of Canada. For instance, an Ipsos Reid poll, if conducted as a nationwide random sampling, should be able to provide an accurate estimate of public opinion whether it contacts 1,500 or 10,000 people.

Typically surveys will include a figure that gives the margin of error of the survey results. This is a measure of **reliability**. Based on probabilities, this will give a range of values within which the true value of the population characteristic will be. This figure also depends on the size of a sample. For example, a political poll based on a sample of 1,500 respondents might state that if an election were called tomorrow the Conservative Party would get 30% of the vote plus or minus 2.5% based on a confidence interval of 95%. That is, there is a 5% chance that the true vote would fall outside of the range of 27.5% to 32.5%, or 1 time out of 20 if pollsters were to conduct the poll 20 times. If the poll was based on a sample of 1,000 respondents, the margin of error would be higher, plus or minus 3.1%. This is significant, of course, because if the Conservatives are polling at 30% and the Liberals are polling at 28% the poll would be inconclusive about which party is actually ahead with regard to actual voter preferences.

Problems with accuracy or *reliability* can result if sample sizes are too small because there is a stronger chance the sample size will not capture the actual distribution of characteristics of the whole population. In small samples the characteristics of specific individuals have a greater chance of influencing the results. The reliability of surveys can also be threatened when part of the population is inadvertently excluded from the sample (e.g., telephone surveys that rely on land lines exclude people that use only cell phones) or when there is a low response rate. There is also a question of what exactly is being measured by the survey. This is a question of **validity**. Does asking whether a voter would choose the Conservatives, Liberals, NDP, or Greens if an election was held today accurately measure their actual voting behaviour on election day? In the BC election of 2013, polls found that the NDP had the largest popular support but on election day many people who said they would vote NDP did not actually vote, which resulted in a Liberal majority government.

After selecting subjects, the researcher develops a specific plan to ask a list of standardized questions and record responses. It is important to inform subjects of the nature and purpose of the study upfront. If they agree to participate, researchers thank the subjects and offer them a chance to see the results of the study if they are interested. The researchers present the subjects with an instrument or means of gathering the information. A common instrument is a structured written questionnaire in which subjects answer a series of set questions. For some topics, the researcher might ask yes-or-no or multiple-choice questions, allowing subjects to choose possible responses to each question.

This kind of **quantitative data** — research collected in numerical form that can be counted — is easy to tabulate. Just count up the number of “yes” and “no” answers or tabulate the scales of “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” etc. responses, and chart them into percentages. This is also the chief drawback of questionnaires, however: their artificiality. The artificial nature of the questions affects their validity. In real life, there are rarely any unambiguously yes or no answers. Questionnaires can also ask more complex questions with more complex answers beyond yes, no, agree, strongly agree, or another option next to a check box. For example, How do you plan to use your university education? Why do you follow Justin Bieber on Twitter? In those cases, the answers are more nuanced, varying from person to person. Those types of survey questions require short essay responses, and participants willing to take the time to provide those answers will convey personal information about their beliefs, views, and attitudes that will need to be interpreted and coded by the researcher.

Some topics that reflect internal subjective perspectives are impossible to quantify simply. Sometimes they can be sensitive and difficult to discuss with a researcher straightforwardly. Sometimes they are nuanced and ambiguous. People might not know how to answer a question on a topic, but the *way* in which they formulate their response can be illuminating to sociologists. This type of information is **qualitative data** – results that are subjective and often based on what is experienced in a natural setting. Qualitative information is harder to organize and tabulate. The researcher will end up with a wide range of responses, some of which may be surprising and unpredictable in advance. Nevertheless, the responses are a richer source of primary data on a topic.

An **interview** is a one-on-one conversation between the researcher and the subject, and is another way of conducting surveys on a topic. Interviews are similar to the short answer questions on surveys in that the researcher asks subjects a series of questions. They can be quantitative if the questions are standardized and have numerically quantifiable answers: Are you employed? (Yes=0, No=1); On a scale of 1 to 5, how would you describe your level of optimism? They can also be qualitative if participants are free to respond as they wish, without being limited by predetermined choices. In the back-and-forth conversation of an interview, a researcher can ask for clarification, spend more time on a subtopic, or ask additional questions. In an interview, a subject will ideally feel free to open up and answer questions that are often complex. There are no right or wrong answers. The subject might not even know how to answer the questions honestly. Questions such as “How did society’s view of alcohol consumption influence your decision whether or not to take your first sip of alcohol?” or “Did you feel that the divorce of your parents would put a social stigma on your family?” involve so many factors that the answers are difficult to categorize. A researcher needs to avoid steering or prompting the subject to respond in a specific way; otherwise, the results will prove to be unreliable. Obviously, a sociological interview is also not supposed to be an interrogation. The researcher will benefit from gaining a subject’s trust by empathizing or commiserating with a subject, and by listening without judgement.

2. Experiments

People often test personal social theories. “If I study at night and review in the morning, I’ll improve my retention skills.” Or, “If I stop drinking soda, I’ll feel better.” Cause and effect. If this, then that. When one tests a theory, the results either prove or disprove a hypothesis. On an individual level these tests are often of dubious value, of course. If one fails a test once using a particular study technique, it is not likely that one will try the same method 100 more times to make sure. It is also not likely that one rigorously controls the experimental conditions to make sure that it is studying at night and not some other factor that produces the results. However the underlying idea is the same as that used in sociological experiments. One way sociological researchers test social theories is by conducting an **experiment**, meaning they test a hypothesis by introducing a variable to a control group and an experimental group under controlled circumstances and compare the outcomes – a scientific approach.

There are two main types of experiments in sociology: lab-based experiments, and natural or field experiments. In a lab setting the research can be controlled so that, perhaps, more data can be recorded in a certain amount of time. In a natural or field-based experiment, the generation of data cannot be controlled, but the information might be considered more accurate since it was collected without interference or intervention by the researcher. As a research method, either type of sociological experiment is useful for testing if-then statements: *if* a particular thing happens, *then* another particular thing will result.

To set up a lab-based experiment, sociologists create artificial situations that allow them to manipulate variables. Classically, the sociologist selects a set of people with similar characteristics, such as age, class, race, or education. Those people are divided into two groups. One is the **experimental group** and the other is the **control group**. The experimental group is exposed to the independent variable(s) and the control group is not. This is similar to pharmaceutical drug trials in which the experimental group is given the test drug and the control group is given a placebo or sugar pill.

Making Connections: Sociological Research

An Experiment in Action: Mincome



Figure 2.12 Mincome was a large-scale experiment conducted in Dauphin, Manitoba, between 1974 and 1979 to explore the effect of having a universal guaranteed annual income on the incentive to work and other social indicators. (Photo courtesy of Bobak Ha'Eri/Wikimedia commons.) [CC BY 3.0](#)

A real-life example will help illustrate the field experimental process in sociology. Between 1974 and 1979 an experiment was conducted in the small town of Dauphin, Manitoba (the “garden capital of Manitoba”). Each family received a modest monthly guaranteed income — a “mincome” — equivalent to a maximum of 60% of the “low-income cut-off figure” (a Statistics Canada measure of poverty, which varies with family size). The income was 50 cents per dollar less for families who had incomes from other sources. Families earning over a certain income level did not receive mincome. Families that were already collecting welfare or unemployment insurance were also excluded. The test families in Dauphin were compared with control groups in other rural Manitoba communities on a range of indicators such as number of hours worked per week, school performance, high school drop out rates, and hospital visits (Forget, 2011). A guaranteed annual income was seen at the time as a less costly, less bureaucratic public alternative for addressing poverty than the existing employment insurance and welfare programs. Today it is an active proposal being considered in Switzerland (Lowrey, 2013).

Intuitively, it seems logical that lack of income is the cause of poverty and poverty-related issues. One of the main concerns, however, was whether a guaranteed income would create a disincentive to work. The concept appears to challenge the principles of the Protestant work ethic (see the discussion of Max Weber in [Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology](#)). The study did find very small decreases in hours worked per week: about 1% for men, 3% for married women, and 5% for unmarried women. Forget (2011) argues this was

because the income provided an opportunity for people to spend more time with family and school, especially for young mothers and teenage girls. There were also significant social benefits from the experiment, including better test scores in school, lower high school drop out rates, fewer visits to hospital, fewer accidents and injuries, and fewer mental health issues.

Ironically, due to lack of guaranteed funding (and lack of political interest by the late 1970s), the data and results of the study were not analyzed or published until 2011. The data were archived and sat gathering dust in boxes. The mincome experiment demonstrated the benefits that even a modest guaranteed annual income supplement could have on health and social outcomes in communities. People seem to live healthier lives and get a better education when they do not need to worry about poverty. In her summary of the research, Forget notes that the impact of the income supplement was surprisingly large given that at any one time only about a third of the families were receiving the income and, for some families, the income amount would have been very small. The income benefit was largest for low-income working families, but the research showed that the entire community profited. The improvement in overall health outcomes for the community suggest that a guaranteed income would also result in savings for the public health system.

To test the benefits of tutoring, for example, the sociologist might expose the experimental group of students to tutoring while the control group does not receive tutoring. Then both groups would be tested for differences in performance to see if tutoring had an effect on the experimental group of students. In a case like this, the researcher would not want to jeopardize the accomplishments of either group of students, so the setting would be somewhat artificial. The test would not be for a grade reflected on their permanent record, for instance.

The Stanford Prison Experiment is perhaps one of the most famous sociological field experiments ever conducted. In 1971, 24 healthy, middle-class male university students were selected to take part in a simulated jail environment to examine the effects of social setting and social roles on individual psychology and behaviour. They were randomly divided into 12 guards and 12 prisoners. The prisoner subjects were arrested at home and transported, blindfolded, to the simulated prison in the basement of the psychology building on the campus of Stanford University. Within a day of arriving the prisoners and the guards began to display signs of trauma and sadism respectively. After some prisoners revolted by blockading themselves in their cells, the guards resorted to using increasingly humiliating and degrading tactics to control the prisoners through psychological manipulation. The experiment had to be abandoned after only six days because the abuse had grown out of hand (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973). While the insights into the social dynamics of authoritarianism it generated were fascinating, the Stanford Prison Experiment also serves as an example of the ethical issues that emerge when experimenting on human subjects. It was also not a true experiment in the sense that there was no comparison between a control group and the experimental group.

3. Field Research

The work of sociology rarely happens in limited, confined experimental spaces. Sociologists seldom study subjects in their own offices or laboratories. Rather, sociologists go out into the world. They meet subjects where they live, work, and play. **Field research** refers to gathering **primary data** from a natural environment without doing a lab experiment or a survey. It is a research method suited to an interpretive approach rather than to positivist approaches. To conduct field research, the sociologist must be willing to step into new environments and observe, participate, or experience those worlds. In fieldwork, the sociologists, rather than the subjects, are the ones out of their element. The researcher interacts with or observes a person or people, gathering data along the way. The key point in field research is that it takes place in the subject's natural environment, whether it is a coffee shop or tribal village, a homeless shelter or a boxing club, a hospital or an airport, a mall or a beach resort.

While field research often begins in a specific setting, the study's purpose is to observe specific behaviours in that setting. Fieldwork is optimal for observing *how* people behave. It is less useful, however, for developing causal explanations of *why* they behave that way. From the small size of the groups studied in fieldwork, it is difficult to make predictions or generalizations to a larger population. Similarly, there are difficulties in gaining an objective distance from research subjects. It is difficult to know whether another researcher would see the same things or record the same data. There are three types of field research: participant observation, ethnography, and the case study.



Figure 2.13 Sociological researchers travel across countries and cultures to interact with and observe subjects in their natural environments. (Photo courtesy of Patrick/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

When Is Sharing Not Such a Good Idea?

Choosing a research methodology depends on a number of factors, including the purpose of the research and the audience for whom the research is intended. The type of research that might go into producing a government policy document on the effectiveness of safe injection sites for reducing the public health risks of intravenous drug use, would be different than exploratory research into the meaning of drug use in specific subcultures. Public administrators likely want “hard” (i.e., quantitative) evidence of high reliability to help them make a policy decision. The most reliable data would come from an experimental research model in which a control group can be compared with an experimental group using quantitative measures.



Figure 2.14 Crack cocaine users in downtown Vancouver. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

This approach has been used by researchers studying InSite in Vancouver (Marshall et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2006). InSite is a supervised safe-injection site where heroin addicts and other intravenous drug users can go to inject drugs in a safe, clean, supervised environment. Clean needles are provided and health care professionals are on hand to intervene in the case of overdoses or other medical emergency. It is a controversial program both because heroin use is against the law (the facility operates through a federal ministerial exemption) and because the heroin users are not obliged to quit using or seek therapy. To assess the effectiveness of the program, researchers compared the risky usage of drugs in populations before and after the opening of the facility and geographically near and distant to the facility. The results from the studies have shown that InSite has reduced both deaths from overdose and risky behaviours, such as the sharing of needles, without increasing the levels of crime associated with drug use and addiction.

On the other hand, if the research question is more exploratory, the more nuanced approach of fieldwork is more appropriate. Graduate student Andrew Ivsins at the University of Victoria wanted to study the reasons why individuals in the crack smoking subculture engage in the risky activity of sharing pipes despite the known risks. The research needed to focus on the subcultural context, rituals, and meaning of sharing pipes, and why these phenomena override known health concerns. Ivsins studied the practice of sharing pipes among 13 habitual users of crack cocaine in Victoria, B.C. (Ivsins, 2010; Ivsins, Roth, Benoit, Fischer, 2013). He met crack smokers in their typical setting downtown, and used an unstructured interview method to try to draw out the informal norms that lead to sharing pipes. One factor he discovered was the bond that formed between friends or intimate partners when they shared a pipe. He also discovered that there was an elaborate subcultural etiquette of pipe use that revolved around the benefit of getting the crack

resin smokers left behind. Both of these motives tended to outweigh the recognized health risks of sharing pipes (such as hepatitis) in the decision making of the users. This type of research was valuable in illuminating the unknown subcultural norms of crack use that could still come into play in a harm reduction strategy, such as distributing safe crack kits to addicts.

Participant Observation

Loïc Wacquant is a French sociologist who grew up in Montpellier in the south of France, but when he came to the U.S. to study life in Chicago's south side ghetto he joined the Woodlawn boxing gym, as its only white member, "seeking an observation point from which to scrutinize, listen to, and touch up-close the everyday reality of the black American ghetto" (Wacquant, 2004). It was by accident then that he started his research into boxing. Over a period of three years of intensive practice he became an accomplished apprentice boxer, which also enabled him to participate in the lives of the club members, "accompany[ing] them in their everyday peregrinations outside of it, in search of a job or an apartment, hunting for bargains in ghetto stores, in their hassles with their wives, the local welfare office, or the police, as well as cruising with their "homies" from the fearsome housing projects nearby." What he discovered was the "highly codified nature of pugilistic violence," the various methods of building, risking, and protecting the boxer's "bodily capital," and the deeply embedded ways in which the boxing gym was integrated into the *habitus* of ghetto life. Wacquant coined the term **carnal sociology** to refer to a type of sociology that studies the social world from the point of view of the bodies and bodily practices of the participants (Wacquant, 2015).




Figure 2.15 Loïc Wacquant at the Woodlands Gym. (Image used by permission of Loïc Wacquant.)

Wacquant had conducted a form of study called **participant observation**, in which researchers join people and participate in a group's routine activities for the purpose of observing them within that context. This method lets researchers study a naturally occurring social activity without imposing artificial or intrusive research devices, like fixed questionnaire questions, onto the situation. A researcher might go to great lengths to get a firsthand look into a trend, institution, or behaviour. Researchers temporarily put themselves into "native" roles and record their observations. A researcher might work as a waitress in a diner, or live as a homeless person for several weeks, or ride along with police officers as they patrol their regular beat. Often, these researchers try to blend in seamlessly with the population they study, and they may not disclose their true identity or purpose if they feel it would compromise the results of their research.

At the beginning of a field study, researchers often have a question that cannot be answered from the secondary literature: "What really goes on in the kitchen of the most popular diner on campus?" "What is it like to be homeless?" or "What is hip hop subculture like in the 21st century?" Participant observation is a useful method if the researcher wants to explore a certain environment from the inside. Field researchers simply want to observe and learn. In such a setting, the researcher will be alert and open-minded to whatever happens, recording all

observations accurately. Soon, as patterns emerge, questions will become more specific, observations will lead to hypotheses, and hypotheses will guide the researcher in shaping data into results.

Loïc Wacquant was upfront about his mission. The boxers of the Woodland's club knew why he was in their midst. But some sociologists prefer not to alert people to their presence. The main advantage of covert participant observation is that it allows the researcher access to authentic, natural behaviours of a group's members. The challenge, however, is gaining access to a setting without disrupting the pattern of others' behaviour. Becoming an inside member of a group, organization, or subculture takes time and effort. Researchers must pretend to be something they are not. The process could involve role playing, making contacts, networking, or applying for a job. Once inside a group, some researchers spend months, or even years, pretending to be one of the people they are observing. However, as observers, they cannot get too involved. They must keep their purpose in mind and apply the sociological perspective. That way, they illuminate social patterns that are often unrecognized. Because information gathered during participant observation is mostly qualitative, rather than quantitative, the end results are often descriptive or interpretive. The researcher might present findings in an article or book, describing what they witnessed and experienced.

One of the most famous studies of this sort was Rosenhan's (1973), "On Being Sane in Insane Places." Unbeknownst to staff, Rosenhan and eight of his colleagues gained admission as patients into 12 different psychiatric hospitals. They wanted to test whether, and how, sanity could be distinguished from insanity in the institutions that had been created to make this distinction, and how people are treated on the basis of that distinction. As Rosenhan put it, although people generally believe they can tell the normal from the abnormal, "there are a great deal of conflicting data on the reliability, utility, and meaning of such terms as 'sanity,' 'insanity,' 'mental illness,' and 'schizophrenia.'" Despite their normal behaviour, the pseudo-patients were not detected. Rosenhan noted that when diagnoses had been made, it was

very difficult to reverse them. “Once a person is designated abnormal, all of his other behaviours and characteristics are coloured by that label.” Moreover, the psychological consequences for the pseudo-patients was distressing and far from therapeutic. All of the pseudo patients reported feelings of powerlessness, depersonalization, segregation, and mortification. “At times, depersonalization reached such proportions that pseudo-patients had the sense that they were invisible, or at least unworthy of account.” Rosenhan concluded that the outcome for the pseudo patients was not the result of personal failings or callousness of staff – the “overwhelming impression of them was of people who really cared, who were committed and who were uncommonly intelligent” – but of the environment and structure of the hospitals themselves.



Figure 2.16 Dormitory at Longue Pointe Asylum, Montreal, 1911. Field research happens in real locations. What type of environment do psychiatric hospitals foster? What would a sociologist discover after blending in? (Image courtesy of McCord Museum/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Ethnography

Ethnography is the extended observation of the social perspective and cultural values of an entire social setting. Researchers seek to immerse themselves in the life of a bounded group by living and working among them. Often

ethnography involves participant observation — Loïc Wacquant's research mentioned above is an ethnography — but the focus is the systematic observation of an entire community.

The heart of an ethnographic study focuses on how subjects view their own social standing and how they understand themselves in relation to a community. It aims at developing a **thick description** of people's behaviour that describes not only the behaviour itself but the layers of meaning that form the context of the behaviour (Geertz, 1973). An ethnographic study might observe, for example, a small Newfoundland fishing town, an Inuit community, a scientific research laboratory, a backpacker's hostel, a private boarding school, or Disney World. These places all have borders. People live, work, study, or vacation within those borders. People are there for a certain reason and therefore behave in certain unique ways and respect certain unique cultural norms. An ethnographer would commit to spending a determined amount of time studying every aspect of the chosen place, taking in as much as possible, and keeping careful notes on their observations. A sociologist studying ayahuasca ceremonies in the Amazon might learn the language, watch the way shaman and apprentices go about their daily lives, ask individuals about the meaning of different aspects of the activity, study the group's cosmology, and then write a paper about it. To observe a Buddhist retreat centre, an ethnographer might sign up for a retreat and attend as a guest for an extended stay, observe and record how people experience spirituality in this setting, and collate the material into results.

Latour and Woolgar's (1986) study of the Salk Institute Laboratory in California is an example of ethnography that detailed the social processes of science by following the paper trail involved in publishing articles of scientific research. How are the objective truths arrived at before they are stated in scientific papers? What do scientists actually do to produce objective science, especially when the factual "things" they seek to describe are complex, diffuse, and messy?

Latour and Woolgar watched the work of the Salk Institute scientists for two years as the scientists studied and isolated endocrinological (hormonal) processes in the body. They noted that the major product or focus of the lab was the creation of texts and that every activity, from the preparation of samples to the sweeping of the floors, was in some way involved in this process. In the end, each scientific paper cost approximately \$30,000 U.S. to produce — in 1979 dollars. Therefore, detailing each step in the process provided an overall picture of the culture of this tribe of scientists as they sought to provide accounts of reality.

From this vantage point, Latour and Woolgar were fascinated with the *processes of inscription* by which material substances, like the brain tissues of rats, were extracted, rendered as test tube samples and then turned into textual outputs like graphic arrays or numerical figures. On the basis of comparing mathematical curves of these textual "traces" of the original substances, scientists were able to say whether they had either isolated a "solid" substance or had been obliged to discard "elusive and transitory" substances as false artifacts of the inscription device. Latour and Woolgar concluded that the particular reality of hormones that the lab presented as an objective and factual reality "out there," was the product of particular inscription devices and practices. The particular realities do not exist without the particular inscription devices and practices that produced them. With the use of different inscription devices and practices, a different objective reality would have been created. They caution that this does not mean that science is simply "made up" like a fiction, but that it is dependent on a network of individuals, accepted practices, and technical devices which are more or less precarious and uncertain. Scientists are a tribe, much like the tribes that anthropological ethnologists have studied, who have a culture, beliefs, and practices, who gossip and share meals together, and who produce accounts of reality based on their own unique ethnographical circumstances.




Figure 2.17 Jonas Salk, founder of the Salk Institute — "a research complex for the investigation of biological phenomena 'from cell to society'" — surrounded by inscription devices and extracts. (Image courtesy of Sanofi Pasteur/ Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

Making Connections: Sociological Research

The Feminist Perspective: Institutional Ethnography

Dorothy Smith elaborated on traditional ethnography to develop what she calls institutional ethnography (2005). In modern society the practices of everyday life in any particular local setting are often organized at a level that goes beyond what an ethnographer might observe directly. Everyday life is structured by “extralocal,” institutional forms; that is, by the practices of institutions that act upon people from a distance. It might be possible to conduct ethnographic research on the experience of domestic abuse by living in a women’s shelter and directly observing and interviewing victims to see how they form an understanding of their situation. However, to the degree that the women are seeking redress through the criminal justice system, a crucial element of the situation would be missing. In order to activate a response from the police or the courts, a set of standard legal procedures must be followed, a case

file must be opened, legally actionable evidence must be established, forms filled out, etc. All of this allows criminal justice agencies to organize and coordinate the response. The urgent and immediate experience of the domestic abuse victims needs to be translated into an abstract format that enables distant authorities to take action. Often this is a frustrating and mysterious process in which the immediate needs of individuals are neglected so that the needs of institutional processes are met. Therefore, to research the situation of domestic abuse victims, an ethnography needs to somehow operate at two levels: the close examination of the local experience of particular women, and the simultaneous examination of the extralocal, institutional world through which their world is organized. In order to accomplish this, institutional ethnography focuses on the study of the way everyday life is coordinated through “textually mediated” practices: the use of written documents, standardized bureaucratic categories, and formalized relationships (Smith, 1990). Institutional paperwork translates the specific details of locally lived experience into a standardized format that enables institutions to apply the institution’s understandings, regulations, and operations in different local contexts. A study of these textual practices reveals otherwise inaccessible processes that formal organizations depend on: their formality, their organized character, their ongoing methods of coordination, etc. An institutional ethnography often begins by following the paper trail that emerges when people interact with institutions: How does a person formulate a narrative about what has happened to him or her in a way that the institution will recognize? How is it translated into the abstract categories on a form or



Figure 2.18 A sociology for women. (Photo courtesy of Zuleyka Zevallos/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#). [\[Image Description\]](#)

screen that enable an institutional response to be initiated? What is preserved in the translation to paperwork, and what is lost? Where do the forms go next? What series of “processing interchanges” take place between different departments or agencies through the circulation of paperwork? How is the paperwork modified and made actionable through this process (e.g., an incident report, warrant request, motion for continuance)? Smith’s insight is that the shift from the locally lived experience of individuals to the extralocal world of institutions is nothing short of a radical metaphysical shift in worldview. In institutional worlds, meanings are detached from directly lived processes and reconstituted in an organizational time, space, and consciousness that is fundamentally different from their original reference point. For example, the crisis that has led to a loss of employment becomes a set of anonymous criteria that determines one’s eligibility for Employment Insurance. The unique life of a child with a disability becomes a checklist that determines the content of an “individual education program” in the school system, which in turn determines whether funding will be provided for special aid assistants or therapeutic programs. Institutions put together a picture of what has occurred that is not at all the same as what was lived. The ubiquitous but obscure mechanism by which this is accomplished is textually mediated communication. The goal of institutional ethnography, therefore, is to make “documents or texts visible as constituents of social relations” (Smith, 1990). Institutional ethnography is very useful as a critical research strategy. It is an analysis that gives grassroots organizations, or those excluded from the circles of institutional power, a detailed knowledge of how the administrative apparatuses actually work. This type of research enables more effective actions and strategies for change to be pursued.

The Case Study

Sometimes a researcher wants to study one specific person, group or event. A **case study** is an in-depth analysis of a single event, situation, social setting, organization, group, or individual. To conduct a case study, a researcher examines existing sources like biographical documents and archival records, conducts interviews, and engages in direct observation and even participant observation, if possible.

Researchers might use this method to study a single case of, for example, a foster child, drug lord, cancer patient, criminal, or rape victim, with the idea that the individual case exemplifies something important about a larger topic or social phenomenon: the problems of “aging out” of foster care, the operation of power outside the law, the relation to rebellious bodies in the cancer patient, etc. Case studies also enable researchers to document particular social processes in action, such as the implementation of a social policy or the roll out of a dating app; they would explore, in detail, how they are interpreted by participants, how they develop step by step, and their effects in a particular socio-political context. However, a major criticism of the case study as a research method is that a developed study of a single case, while offering depth on a topic, does not provide enough evidence to form a generalized conclusion. In other words, it is difficult to make universal claims based on just one person or event, since one person or event does not verify a pattern.

However, case studies are especially useful when the single case is unique. Little (2012) used the autobiographical materials of ex-neo-Nazi leader, Ingo Hasselbach, to study the process and difficulties of leaving a tight-knit, neo-Nazi group, and a life of political violence. What were the stages of leaving and what were the various ways in which Hasselbach acted upon himself to transform himself into a “normal” democratic citizen? From the outside, the attraction to neo-Nazism, the thrills of street violence and the difficulties of leaving this political subculture behind might seem incomprehensible to most people. The difficulties that Hasselbach had in changing his identity, even after having

made the decision to “step out,” are therefore informative for thinking about the problems of responding to political extremism.

4. Secondary Data or Textual Analysis

While sociologists often engage in original research studies, they also contribute knowledge to the discipline through **secondary data** or **textual analysis**. Secondary data do not result from firsthand research collected from primary sources, but are drawn from the already-completed work of other researchers, as well as from sources like newspapers, social media, pop culture, archives, census statistics, sales records, letters, and so on.

One of the most famous studies in early American sociology was Znaniecki and Thomas' *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918-1920), which explored the formation of the immigrant Polish ethnic community in Chicago, in the early 20th century, by examining personal documents, letters, immigration brochures, newspaper articles, and church and court documents.

Using available information not only saves time and money, but it can add depth to a study. Sociologists often interpret findings in a new way — a way that was not part of an author's original purpose or intention. To study how women were encouraged to act and behave in the 1960s, for example, a researcher might review movies, television shows, pop psychology articles, and women's magazines from that period. Or, to research changes in behaviour and attitudes due to the emergence of social media, a sociologist would rely on texts, Facebook pages, Instagram accounts, Twitter trends, and the like.

One methodology that sociologists employ with secondary data is **content analysis**. The quantitative approach to content analysis is a form of textual research that selects an item of textual content (i.e., a variable) that can be reliably and consistently observed and coded, and surveys the prevalence of that item in a sample of textual output. For example, Gilens (1996) wanted to find out why survey research shows that the American public substantially exaggerates the percentage of African Americans among the poor. He examined whether media representations influence public perceptions, and did a content analysis of photographs of poor people in American news magazines. He coded and then systematically recorded incidences of three variables in the photos: (1) race: white, black, indeterminate; (2) employed: working, not working; and (3) age. Gilens discovered that not only were African Americans markedly overrepresented in news magazine photographs of poverty, but that the photos also tended to under represent “sympathetic” subgroups of the poor — the elderly and working poor — while over representing less sympathetic groups — unemployed, working age adults. Gilens (1996) concluded that by providing a distorted representation of poverty, U.S. news magazines “reinforce negative stereotypes of blacks as mired in poverty and contribute to the belief that poverty is primarily a ‘black problem.’”

Social scientists can also do statistical research by analyzing the data provided by a variety of agencies. Governmental departments, public interest research groups, and global organizations like Statistics Canada, the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, or the World Health Organization, publish studies with findings that are useful to sociologists. A public statistic that measures inequality of incomes might be useful for studying who benefited and who lost as a result of the 2008 recession; a demographic profile of different immigrant groups might be compared with data on unemployment to examine the reasons why immigration integration is more effective for some communities than for others.

One of the advantages of secondary data is that it is **non-reactive** (or unobtrusive) research, meaning that it does not include direct contact with subjects and will not alter or influence people's behaviours. Unlike studies requiring direct contact with people, using previously published data does not require entering a population and the investment and risks inherent in that research process.

Using available data does have its challenges. Public records are not always easy to access. A researcher needs to do some legwork to track them down and gain access to records. In some cases there is no way to verify the accuracy of

existing data. It is easy, for example, to count how many drunk drivers are pulled over by the police. But how many are not? While it is possible to discover the percentage of teenage students who drop out of high school, it might be more challenging to determine the number who return to school or get their high school diplomas later. Another problem arises when data are unavailable in the exact form needed, or do not address the precise question the researcher is asking. For example, the salaries paid to professors at universities are often published, but the figures do not necessarily reveal how long it took each professor to reach that salary range, what their educational backgrounds are, or how long they have been teaching.

In his qualitative research, sociologist Richard Sennett (2008) uses secondary data to shed light on current trends from contemporary urban life to material culture. In *The Craftsman*, he studied *homo faber* (the human as maker): the human desire to perform quality work, from carpentry to computer programming. “What [does] the process of making concrete things reveal to us about ourselves[?]” He studied the line between craftsmanship and skilled manual labour. He also studied changes in attitudes toward craftsmanship that occurred not only during and after the Industrial Revolution, but also in ancient times. Obviously, he could not have firsthand knowledge of periods of ancient history, so he had to rely on secondary data for his study. For example, Sennett describes *technique* as a key component of human life. It is a product of bodily practices, resistant materials, and powers of the imagination. However, specific techniques, like the “hand habits of striking a piano key or using a knife,” have disappeared and have to be reconstructed through close study of historical instruction manuals, descriptions, and the like. The research problem is to be able to go from historical texts about craftsmanship, and sometimes from the crafted artifacts themselves, to understand how the process of skills development occurs and why it was a prominent component of public status in some eras and not in others.

Reading Tables

Table 2.3 Firearm-Related Violent Crime, by Selected Offenses, in Canada and the United States, 2012.
 Note: (Adapted from Cotter, 2014)[\[Skip Table\]](#)

Country	Offence	Number	Per cent of total offenses (%)	Rate (per 100,000 pop).
Canada	Homicide	172	33	0.5
Canada	Major assault	1,459	4	5.5
Canada	Robbery	2,368	12	8.9
United States	Homicide	8,813	69	3.5
United States	Major assault	143,119	22	52.8
United States	Robbery	122,174	41	45.1

One of the common forms in which one encounters secondary data is the **contingency table**. A contingency table provides a frequency distribution of at least two variables that allows the researcher to see at a glance how the variables are related. Table 2.3 shows the frequency of different types of firearm crime for Canada and the United States. In this table, the independent variable (the causal variable) is the country, either Canada or the United States. The dependent

variable, displayed in the columns, is the frequency of offenses that involve firearms in the two countries. This is given as an absolute number (“Number”), as a percentage of the total number of crimes in that category (i.e., as a percentage of the total number of homicides, major assaults and robberies; “Percent of total offenses”), and as rate calculated per 100,000 population (“Rate”). To interpret the table, the researcher has to pay attention to what adds up to 100%. This table does not provide the complete information in each column, but it is straight forward to recognize that if 33% of the homicides in Canada involved the use of a firearm, another 67% of homicides did not. The table, for instance, does not say that 33% of all firearm crimes in Canada were homicides. From these figures one can also calculate the total number of homicides that took place in Canada in 2012 by a simple ratio: If the 172 homicides that involved firearms represents 33% or 1/3 of all the Canadian homicides, then there were (approximately) 516 homicides in Canada in 2012.

Table 2.3 suggests that there is a definite correlation between country and firearm-related violent crime. This is most clearly demonstrated by percentages and rates per capita rather than absolute numbers, because the United States has a population approximately 9 times the size of Canada’s. Comparisons of absolute numbers are difficult to interpret. Violent crime in the United States tends to involve firearms much more frequently than violent crime in Canada. With respect to homicides, there were 8,813 homicides involving firearms in the United States in 2012, accounting for 69% of all homicides, while in Canada, firearms accounted for 33% of homicides. The column that gives the rates of firearm violence per 100,000 population allows the researcher to identify a comparison figure that takes into account the different population sizes of the two countries. The rate of firearm-related homicide in the United States was about seven times higher than in Canada in 2012 (0.5 per 100,000 compared to 3.5 per 100,000), firearm-related major assault was about ten times higher (53 per 100,000 compared to 5 per 100,000), and firearm-related robbery was about five times higher (8.9 per 100,000 compared to 45.1 per 100,000).

The question that this data raises is about causation. Why are firearm-related violent crimes so much lower in Canada than in the United States? One key element are the legal restrictions on firearm possession in the two countries. Canadian law requires that an individual has a valid licence under the Firearms Act, in order to own or possess a firearm or to purchase ammunition. Until 2012, all firearms also had to be registered, but with the repeal of the national gun registry provisions for long guns (rifles and shot guns), currently only hand guns and prohibited weapons (assault weapons, fully automatic firearms, and sawed-off rifles or shotguns) have to be registered. In the United States firearm regulations are state-specific, and only a few states place restrictions on the possession of firearms. In 2007, there were 89 firearms for every 100 citizens in the United States, which is the highest rate of gun ownership of any country (Cotter, 2014). By contrast, figures from 1998 show that there 24 firearms for every 100 citizens in Canada (Department of Justice, 2015). Nevertheless, as Canada’s firearm-related homicide rate is higher than several peer countries, most notably Japan and the United Kingdom, variables other than gun control legislation might be a factor.

Research Methods Summary

As noted above, there is not only a variety of theoretical perspectives in sociology, but also a diversity of research methodologies that can be used in studying the social. In large part, the choice of research methodology follows from the choice of the research question. Of course, the choice of the research question itself depends on the same sort of underlying values and decisions about the nature of the world that divide the theoretical perspectives in sociology. In addition, the choice of the research question involves both the character of the social phenomenon being studied and the purpose of the research in the first place.

Research Methods: Summary




Figure 2.19 Research methods summary. (Source: William Little) [\[Image Description\]](#)

Again, it is useful to map out the different methodologies in a diagram. They can be positioned along two axes according to: (a) whether the subject matter or purpose of the research calls for highly reliable findings – consistent between research contexts (high reliability) – or for highly valid and nuanced findings true to the specific social situation under observation (unique observation), and (b) whether the nature of the object of research can be meaningfully operationalized and measured using quantitative techniques (quantitative data) or is better grasped in terms of the texture of social meanings that constitute it (qualitative data). The advantages and disadvantages of the different methodologies are summarized in Table 2.4 below.

Table 2.4. Main Sociological Research Methods [\[Skip Table\]](#)

Method	Implementation	Advantages	Challenges
Survey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Questionnaires • Interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yields many responses • Can survey a large sample • Data generalizable • Quantitative data are easy to chart 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can be time consuming • Can be difficult to encourage participant response • Captures what people think and believe, but not necessarily how they behave in real life
Field Work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Observation • Participant observation • Ethnography • Case study 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yields detailed, accurate, real-life information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Time consuming • Data are often descriptive and not conducive to generalization • Researcher bias is difficult to control for • Qualitative data are difficult to organize
Experiment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deliberate manipulation of social customs and mores 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tests cause and effect relationships 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hawthorne effect • Artificial conditions of research • Ethical concerns about people's well-being
Secondary Data Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of government data (census, health, crime statistics) • Research of historic documents • Content analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Makes good use of previous sociological information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data could be focused on a purpose other than the researchers' • Data can be hard to find • Taking into account the historical or cultural context of texts

Note. Sociological research methods have advantages and disadvantages.

Image Descriptions

Figure 2.18 Long Description: A sociology for women would offer a knowledge of the social organization and determinations of the properties and events of our directly experienced world. [\[Return to Figure 2.18\]](#)

Figure 2.19 Long description: Different Research Methods: Textual analysis uses qualitative data and is highly reliable. Participant observation uses qualitative data and is a unique observation. Experiments and survey research use

quantitative data and are highly reliable. Journalism uses quantitative data and is a unique observation. [\[Return to Figure 2.19\]](#)

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2.3. Ethical Concerns

Sociologists conduct studies to shed light on human behaviours. Knowledge is a powerful tool that can be used toward positive change. While a sociologist's goal is often simply to uncover knowledge rather than to spur action, authorities use sociological studies to make public policy decisions. In that sense, conducting a sociological study comes with a tremendous amount of responsibility. Like any researchers, sociologists must consider their ethical obligation to avoid harming subjects or groups while conducting their research.

The Canadian Sociological Association (CSA), is the major professional organization of sociologists in Canada. The CSA is a great resource for students of sociology as well. It maintains a **code of ethics** — formal guidelines for conducting sociological research — consisting of principles and ethical standards to be used in the discipline. It also describes procedures for filing, investigating, and resolving complaints of unethical conduct. These are in line with the *Tri-Council Policy Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans* (2010), which applies to any research with human subjects funded by one of the three federal research agencies — the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC), and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).

Practicing sociologists and sociology students have a lot to consider. Some of the guidelines state that researchers must try to be skillful and fair-minded in their work, especially as it relates to their human subjects. Researchers must obtain participants' informed consent, and they must inform subjects of the responsibilities and risks of research before they agree to participate. During a study, sociologists must ensure the safety of participants and immediately stop work if a subject becomes potentially endangered on any level. Researchers are required to protect the privacy of research participants whenever possible. Even if pressured by authorities, such as police or courts, researchers are not ethically allowed to release confidential information. Researchers must make results available to other sociologists, must make public all sources of financial support, and must not accept funding from any organization that might cause a conflict of interest or seek to influence the research results for its own purposes. The CSA's ethical considerations shape not only the study but also the publication of results.

Pioneer German sociologist Max Weber (1949) identified another crucial ethical concern. Weber understood that personal values could distort the framework for disclosing study results. While he accepted that some aspects of research design might be influenced by personal values, he declared it was entirely inappropriate to allow personal values to shape the interpretation of the responses. Sociologists, he stated, must establish **value neutrality**, a practice of remaining impartial, without bias or judgement, during the course of a study and in publishing results. Sociologists are obligated to disclose research findings without omitting or distorting significant data. Value neutrality does not mean having no opinions. It means striving to overcome personal biases, particularly subconscious biases, when analyzing data. It means avoiding skewing data in order to match a predetermined outcome that aligns with a particular agenda, such as a political or moral point of view. Investigators are ethically obligated to report results, even when they contradict personal views, predicted outcomes, or widely accepted beliefs.

Is value neutrality possible? Many sociologists believe it is impossible to set aside personal values and obtain complete objectivity. Individuals inevitably see the world from a partial perspective. Their interests are central to the types of topics they choose, the types of questions they ask, the way they frame their research, and the research methodologies they select to pursue it.

Moreover, facts, however objective, do not exist in a void. As was noted in [Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology](#), Jürgen Habermas (1972) argues that sociological research has built-in *interests* or values quite apart from the personal biases of individual researchers. Positivist sociology has an interest in pursuing types of knowledge that are useful for controlling and administering social life. Interpretive sociology has an interest in pursuing types of knowledge that promote greater mutual understanding and the possibility of consensus among members of society. Critical sociology has an interest in types of knowledge that enable emancipation from power relations and forms of domination in society. In Habermas' view, sociological knowledge is not disinterested knowledge. This does not discredit the results of

sociological research but allows readers to take into account the perspective of the research when judging the validity and applicability of its outcomes.

Chapter 2 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

Type your key takeaways here.

authoritative knowledge: Knowledge based on the accepted authority of the source.

case study: In-depth analysis of a single event, situation, or individual.

carnal sociology: A sociological research method that studies the social world from the point of view of the bodies and bodily practices of the participants.

casual observation: Knowledge based on observations without any systematic process for observing or assessing the accuracy of observations.

code of ethics: A set of guidelines established to foster ethical research and professionally responsible scholarship in sociology or other disciplines.

content analysis: A quantitative approach to textual research that selects an item of textual content that can be reliably and consistently observed and coded, and surveys the prevalence of that item in a sample of textual output.

contingency table: A statistical table that provides a frequency distribution of at least two variables.

control group: In an experiment, the subjects or comparison group who are *not* exposed to the independent variable.

correlation: When a change in one variable coincides with a change in another variable, but does not necessarily indicate causation.

critical research strategy: Research approach that utilizes positivist, interpretive and reflexive methods to produce knowledge that maximizes the human potential for freedom and equality.

critical pedagogy: An approach to teaching and learning based on fostering the agency of marginalized communities and empowering learners to emancipate themselves from oppressive social structures.

decolonization: The process of dismantling colonial power structures.

dependent variable: Variable changed by the impact of another variable.

empirical evidence: Evidence corroborated by direct sense experience and/or observation.

ethnography: The extended observation of the cultural practices, perspectives, beliefs and values of an entire social setting.

experiment: The testing of a hypothesis under controlled conditions.

experimental group: In an experiment, the subjects who are exposed to the independent variable.

field research: Gathering data from a natural environment without doing a lab experiment or a survey.

grounded theory: The generation of hypotheses and theories after the collecting and analysis of data.

Hawthorne effect: When study subjects behave in a certain manner due to their awareness of being observed by a researcher.

hypothesis: An educated guess that predicts outcomes with respect to the relationship between two or more variables.

hypothetico-deductive methodologies: Methodologies that test the validity of a hypothesis by whether it correctly predicts observations.

independent variable: Variable that causes change in a dependent variable.

inductive approach: Methodologies that derive a general statement from a series of empirical observations.

institutional ethnography: The study of the way everyday life is coordinated through institutional, textually mediated practices.

interpretive methodology (approach): Research approach based on systematic, in-depth understanding of the meaning, interpretation, or context of a social phenomenon for research subjects.

intervening variable: An underlying variable that explains the correlation between two other variables.

interview: A one-on-one conversation between a researcher and a subject.

literature review: A scholarly research step that entails identifying and studying all existing studies on a topic to create a basis for new research.

nonreactive research: Unobtrusive research that does not include direct contact with subjects and will not alter or influence people's behaviours.

operational definitions: Specific ways of rendering abstract concepts in terms of measurable and observable criteria.

overgeneralization: Knowledge that draws general conclusions from limited observations.

participant observation: Immersion by a researcher in a group or social setting in order to make observations from an "insider" perspective.

population: A defined group serving as the subject of a study.

positivist methodology (approach): Research approach based on a hypothetico-deductive formulation of the research question, systematic empirical observation, and quantitative data.

primary data: Data collected directly from firsthand experience.

qualitative data: Information based on systematic interpretations of meaning.

quantitative data: Information from research collected in numerical form that can be counted.

random sample: A representative subset of a population selected without bias. Every person in a population has the same chance of being chosen for the study.

research design: A detailed, systematic method for conducting research and obtaining data.

sample: Small, manageable number of subjects that represent the population.

scientific method: A systematic research method that involves asking a question, researching existing sources, forming a hypothesis, designing and conducting a study, and drawing conclusions.

secondary data analysis: Using data collected by others but applying new interpretations.

selective observation: Knowledge based on observations that only confirm what the observer expects or wants to see.

surveys: Data collections from subjects who respond to a series of questions about behaviours and opinions, often in the form of a questionnaire.

textually mediated communication: Institutional forms of communication that rely on written documents, texts, and paperwork.

thick description: A thorough ethnographic description which describes observed behaviour and the layers of meaning that form the social context of the behaviour.

traditional knowledge: Knowledge based on received beliefs or the way things have always been done.

validity: The degree to which a sociological measure accurately reflects the topic of study.

value neutrality: A practice of remaining impartial, without bias or judgment, during the course of a study and in publishing results.

variable: A characteristic or measure of a social phenomenon that can take different values.

Section Summary

[2.1 Approaches to Sociological Research](#)

Using the scientific method, a researcher conducts a study in five phases: asking a question, researching existing sources, formulating a hypothesis, conducting a study, and drawing conclusions. The scientific method is useful in that it provides a clear method of organizing a study. Some sociologists conduct scientific research through a positivist framework utilizing a hypothetico-deductive formulation of the research question. Other sociologists conduct scientific research by employing an interpretive framework that is often descriptive or inductive in nature. Critical research strategies utilize positivist, interpretive, and reflexive methods to produce knowledge that maximizes the human potential for freedom and equality.

[2.2 Research Methods](#)

The many methods of research available to sociological researchers — including experiments, surveys, field studies, and secondary data analysis — all come with advantages and disadvantages. The strength of a study depends on the choice and implementation of the appropriate method of gathering research, which in turn depends on the topic and the purposes of the research. Trade-offs occur based on available sources of data, reliability of methods, validity of methods, type of data (qualitative or quantitative), and the purposes of the research.

[2.3 Ethical Concerns](#)

Sociologists and sociology students must take ethical responsibility for any study they conduct. They must first and foremost guarantee the safety of their participants. Whenever possible, they must ensure that participants have been fully informed before consenting to be part of a study. The Canadian Sociological Association (CSA) maintains ethical guidelines that sociologists must take into account as they conduct research. The guidelines address conducting studies, properly using existing sources, accepting funding, and publishing results. Sociologists must try to maintain value neutrality. They must gather and analyze data objectively, setting aside their personal preferences, beliefs, and opinions. They must report findings accurately, even if they contradict personal convictions.

Questions

Quiz: Sociological Research

2.1 Approaches to Sociological Research

1. A measurement is considered _____ if it actually measures what it is intended to measure, according to the topic of the study.
 - a. reliable
 - b. sociological
 - c. valid
 - d. quantitative
2. Sociological studies test relationships in which change in one _____ causes change in another.
 - a. test subject
 - b. behaviour
 - c. variable
 - d. operational definition
3. In a study, a group of 10-year-old boys are fed doughnuts every morning for a week and then weighed to see how much weight they gained. Which factor is the dependent variable?
 - a. The doughnuts
 - b. The boys
 - c. The duration of a week
 - d. The weight gained
4. Which statement provides the **best** operational definition of “childhood obesity”?
 - a. Children who eat unhealthy foods and spend too much time watching television and playing video games.
 - b. A distressing trend that can lead to health issues, including type 2 diabetes and heart disease.
 - c. Body weight that is at least 20% higher than a healthy weight for a child of that height.
 - d. The tendency of children today to weigh more than children of earlier generations.

2.2 Research Methods

5. Which materials are considered secondary data?
 - a. Census information
 - b. Photos and letters
 - c. Information from previous sociological research
 - d. All of the above
6. What method did Andrew Ivsins use to study crack cocaine users in Victoria?

- a. Survey
 - b. Experiment
 - c. Field research
 - d. Content analysis
7. Why is choosing a random sample an effective way to select participants?
- a. Participants do not know they are part of a study.
 - b. The researcher has no control over who is in the study.
 - c. It is larger than an ordinary sample.
 - d. Everyone has the same chance of being part of the study.
8. What research method did Latour and Woolgar mainly use in their *Salk Institute* study?
- a. Secondary data
 - b. Survey
 - c. Ethnography
 - d. Experiment
9. Which research approach is **best** suited to the positivist approach?
- a. Questionnaire
 - b. Case study
 - c. Ethnography
 - d. Secondary data analysis
10. The main difference between ethnography and other types of field work is:
- a. Ethnography is based on the systematic observation of an entire community.
 - b. Ethnographic subjects are unaware they are being studied.
 - c. Ethnographic studies involve tribes, or tribe-like groupings.
 - d. There is no difference.
11. Which best describes the results of a case study?
- a. It produces more reliable results than other methods because of its depth.
 - b. Its results are not generally applicable.
 - c. It relies solely on secondary data analysis.
 - d. It demonstrates sociological principles from surveys of legal decisions.
12. Using secondary data is considered an unobtrusive or _____ research method.
- a. non-reactive
 - b. non-participatory
 - c. non-restrictive
 - d. non-confrontive

2.3 Ethical Concerns

13. Which statement illustrates value neutrality?

- a. Obesity in children is obviously a result of parental neglect; therefore, schools should take a greater role in preventing it.
 - b. In 2003, states like Arkansas adopted laws requiring elementary schools to remove soft drink vending machines from schools.
 - c. Merely restricting children's access to junk food at school is not enough to prevent obesity.
 - d. Physical activity and healthy eating are proper parts of a child's education.
14. Which sociologist defined the concept of value neutrality?
- a. Karl Marx
 - b. Dorothy Smith
 - c. Plato
 - d. Max Weber
15. To study the effects of fast food on lifestyle, health, and culture, from which group would a researcher ethically be **unable** to accept funding?
- a. A fast-food restaurant
 - b. A nonprofit health organization
 - c. A private hospital
 - d. A governmental agency like Health and Social Services

[\[Quiz answers at the end of the chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

[2.1 Approaches to Sociological Research](#)

1. Write down the first three steps of the scientific method. Think of a broad topic that you are interested in and which would make a good sociological study; for example, ethnic diversity of university professors, eating rituals, decolonization, or teen driving. Now, take that topic through the first steps of the process. For each step, write a few sentences or a paragraph: 1) Ask a question about the topic. 2) Do some research and write down the titles of some academic articles or books you would want to read about the topic. 3) Formulate a hypothesis.

[2.2 Research Methods](#)

2. What type of data do surveys gather? For what topics would surveys be the best research method? What drawbacks might you expect to encounter when using a survey? To explore further, ask a research question and write a hypothesis. Then create a survey of about six questions relevant to the topic. Provide a rationale for each question. Now define your population and create a plan for recruiting a random sample and administering the survey.
3. Imagine you are about to do field research in a specific place for a set time. Instead of thinking about

the topic of study itself, consider how you, as the researcher, will have to prepare for the study. What personal, social, and physical sacrifices will you have to make? How will you make contact with the subjects? What means of recording, writing down, transcribing, reviewing, or organizing the data will you use?

4. Choose a research question that interests you. Which of the four types of sociological method would be best suited for the topic? What are the strengths and limitations of each of the four types of method for this topic? How does choice of method affect the types of question you can ask?

2.3 Ethical Concerns

5. See the [Canadian Sociological Association: Statement of Professional Ethics](https://www.csa-scs.ca/statement-of-professional-ethics) (https://www.csa-scs.ca/statement-of-professional-ethics). Why do you think the CSA crafted such a detailed set of ethical principles? What type of study could put human participants at risk? Think of some examples of studies that might be harmful. Do you think that, in the name of sociology, some researchers might be tempted to cross boundaries that threaten human rights? Why?
6. Would you willingly participate in a sociological study that could potentially put your health and safety at risk, but had the potential to explain an important, but previously unresearched phenomenon?

Further Research

2.1 Approaches to Sociological Research

For a historical perspective on the scientific method in sociology, read “[The Elements of Scientific Method in Sociology](#)” by F. Stuart Chapin (1914) in the *American Journal of Sociology*.

2.2 Research Methods

Information on current real-world sociology experiments, [Seven Examples of Field Experiments for Sociology](#) by Karl Thompson (2016) from the Revise Sociology website.

2.3 Ethical Concerns

The Social Sciences and Humanities Council criteria for ethical conduct in research involving humans are outlined in Chapter 1 of the [Tri-Council Policy Statement-Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans \(TCPS-2\) 2018 \[PDF\]](#), which can be found on the Government of Canada website.

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2.3 Ethical Concerns

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Solutions to Quiz: Sociological Research

1 C, | 2 C, | 3 D, | 4 C, | 5 D, | 6 C, | 7 D, | 8 C, | 9 A, | 10 A, | 11 B, | 12 A, | 13 B, | 14 D, | 15 A, [\[Return to Quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 3. CULTURE



Figure 3.1 Graffiti's mix of colourful drawings, words, and symbols is a vibrant expression of culture—or, depending on one's viewpoint, a disturbing expression of the creator's lack of respect for a community's shared space. (Photo courtesy of aikijuanma/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Learning Objectives

3.1. What Is Culture?

- Differentiate between the concepts 'culture' and 'society.'
- Compare biological and cultural explanations of human behaviour.
- Contrast the concepts cultural universalism, cultural relativism, ethnocentrism, and androcentrism.
- Examine the policy of multiculturalism as a solution to the problem of cultural diversity and conflict.

3.2. Elements of Culture

- Define the basic elements of culture: values, beliefs, attitudes, norms and practices.
- Explain the significance of symbols and language to a culture.
- Describe the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.
- Distinguish material and non-material culture.

3.3. Culture as Innovation: Pop Culture, Subculture, and Global Culture

- Distinguish two modes of culture: innovation and restriction.
- Describe the distinction between high culture, pop culture, and postmodern culture.
- Differentiate between subculture and counterculture.
- Understand the role of globalization in cultural change and local lived experience.

3.4. Culture as Restriction: Rationalization and Commodification

- Describe the ways culture restricts social life.
- Explain the implications of rationalization and consumerism.

3.5. Theoretical Perspectives on Culture

- Discuss the major theoretical approaches to cultural interpretation.

Introduction to Culture



Figure 3.2 Fast food nation. (Photo courtesy of Alan Boar/Flickr.)
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Are there rules for eating at McDonald's? Generally, people do not think about rules in a fast food restaurant because they are designed to be casual, quick, and convenient. In fact it is a tightly scripted activity. If one looks around a fast food restaurant on a typical weekday, they will see people acting as if they were trained for the role of fast food customer. They stand in line, pick their items from overhead menus before they order, swipe debit cards to pay, and stand to one side to collect trays of food. After a quick meal, customers wad up their paper wrappers and toss them into garbage cans. This is a food system or **culture** that has become highly **rationalized** in Max Weber's terms, so much so that the sociologist George Ritzer (2009) uses it to describe the *McDonaldization* of society (See [Chapter 7. Groups and Organizations](#)). Customers' movement through this fast food routine is

orderly and predictable, even if no rules are posted and no officials are there to direct the process.

To gain insight into these unwritten rules, think about what would happen if you suddenly behaved according to some other standards. This would be doing what ethnomethodologists call a **breaching experiment**: deliberately disrupting social norms in order to learn about them. For example: call ahead for reservations; ask the cashier detailed questions about the food's ingredients or how it is prepared; barter over the price of the burgers; ask to have your meal served to you at your table; or throw your trash on the ground as you leave. Chances are you will elicit hostile responses from the restaurant employees and your fellow customers. Although the rules are not written down, you will have violated deep-seated tacit norms that govern behaviour in fast food restaurants.

This example reflects a broader theme in the *culture* of food and diet. What are the rules that govern what, when, and how we eat? Michael Pollan (2006), for example, contrasts the North American culture of fast food with the intact traditions of eating sit-down, family meals that still dominate in France and other European nations. Despite eating

foods that many North Americans think of as unhealthy — butter, wheat, triple-cream cheese, foie gras, wine, etc. — the French, as a whole, remain healthier and less overweight than North Americans.

The French eat all sorts of supposedly unhealthy foods, but they do it according to a strict and stable set of rules: They eat small portions and don't go back for seconds; they don't snack; they seldom eat alone; and communal meals are long, leisurely affairs (Pollan, 2006).

Their cultural rules fix and constrain what people consider as food and how people consume food. The national cuisine and eating habits of France are well established, oriented to pleasure and tradition, and as Pollan argues, well integrated into French cultural life as a whole.

In North America, on the other hand, fast food is just the tip of an iceberg with respect to a larger crisis of diet. Increasing levels of obesity and eating disorders are coupled with an increasing profusion of health diets, weight reducing diets, and food fads. While an alarming number of North American meals are eaten in cars (19%, according to Pollan), the counter-trend is the obsession with nutritional science. Instead of an orientation to food based on cultural tradition and pleasure, people are oriented to food in terms of its biochemical constituents (calories, proteins, fibers, carbohydrates, vitamins, omega fatty acids, saturated and unsaturated fats, etc.). There are Atkins diets, keto diets, zone diets, Mediterranean diets, paleolithic diets, vegan diets, gluten free diets, Weight Watchers diets, raw food diets, etc.; an endless proliferation that Pollan attributes to a fundamental anxiety that North Americans have about food and health. While each type of diet claims scientific evidence to support its health and other claims — evidence which is disturbingly contradictory — essentially the choice of diet revolves around the *cultural meanings* attributed to food and its nutritional components:

...that taste is not a true guide to what should be eaten; that one should not simply eat what one enjoys; that the important components of food cannot be seen or tasted, but are discernible only in scientific laboratories; and that experimental science has produced rules of nutrition that will prevent illness and encourage longevity (Levenstein as cited in Pollan, 2006).

It is important to note that food culture and diet are not infinitely malleable, however. There is an underlying biological reality of nutrition that defines the parameters of dietary choice. In his documentary *Super Size Me* (2004), Morgan Spurlock conducted a version of sociological field experiment by committing himself to eating only McDonald's food for 30 days. As a result, he gained 24 pounds, increased his cholesterol and fat accumulation in his liver, and experienced mood swings and sexual dysfunction. It is clear that one cannot survive on fast food alone; although many teenagers and university students have been known to try.



Figure 3.3 French dessert of raspberry crème brûlée. Does a nation's cuisine represent a rule-bound tradition, an innovative art, or both? (Photo courtesy of Йоана Петрова/ Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)



Figure 3.4 Kentucky Fried Chicken instant mashed potato, 1974. (Photo courtesy of Roadsidepictures/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

Sociologists would argue that everything about fast food restaurants, choice of diet, and habits of food consumption reflects **culture**, the beliefs and behaviours that a social group shares. Diet is a product of culture. It is a product of the different meanings we attribute to food and to the relationship we have with our bodies. The significant point is that while diet is a functional response to the fundamental conditions of biological life, diet is also a tremendous site of innovation and diversity. Culture in general is a site of two opposing tendencies: one is the way that cultures around the world lay down sets of rules or norms which constrain, restrict, habitualize, and fix forms of life, allowing traditions and cultural ways to persist through time; the other is the way that cultures produce endlessly innovative and diverse solutions to problems like nutrition. Cultures both constrain social life and continually open up paths beyond constraints.

This raises the distinction between the terms “culture” and “society” and how sociologists conceptualize the relationship between them. In everyday conversation, people rarely distinguish between these terms, but they have different meanings, and the distinction is important to how sociologists examine culture. **Culture** refers to the beliefs, artifacts, and ways of life that a social group shares, whereas **society** is a group that interacts within a common bounded territory or region. To clarify, a culture represents the beliefs, practices, and material artifacts of a group — in other words, *meaningful or meaning-laden* components of group interaction — while a society represents the social structures, processes, and organization of the people who share those beliefs, practices, and material artifacts. Neither society nor culture could exist without the other, but sociologists can separate them analytically to gain insight into social life.

In this chapter, the relationship between culture and society is examined in greater detail, paying special attention to the elements and forces that shape culture, including cultural diversity and cultural changes. A final discussion touches on the different theoretical perspectives from which sociologists research culture.

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3.1. What Is Culture?



Figure 3.5 What is culture? (Image courtesy of Alex-David Baldi/ Flickr.) [CC BY NC-SA 2.0](#)

Humans are social creatures. Since the dawn of *Homo sapiens*, nearly 200,000 years ago, people have grouped together into communities in order to survive. Living together, people developed forms of cooperation which created the common habits, behaviours, and ways of life known as culture – from specific methods of childrearing to preferred techniques for obtaining food. Peter Berger (b. 1929) argued that culture is the product of a fundamental human predicament (1967). Unlike other animals, humans lack the biological programming to live on their own. They require an extended period of dependency in order to survive in the environment. The creation of culture makes this possible by providing a kind of protective shield against the harsh impositions of nature. Culture provides the ongoing transmission of knowledge and stability that enables human existence. It allows humans to know that one plant is poisonous and another plant is edible, and so on. This means, however, that the human environment is not nature per se but culture itself. Humans live in a world defined by culture.

Over the history of humanity, this has led to an incredible diversity in how humans have imagined and lived life on Earth, the sum total of which Wade Davis (b. 1953) has called the **ethnosphere**. The ethnosphere is the entirety of all cultures’ “ways of thinking, ways of being, and ways of orienting oneself on the Earth” (Davis, 2007). It is the collective cultural heritage of the human species. A single culture, as the sphere of meanings shared by a single social group, is the means by which that group makes sense of the world and of each other. But there are many cultures and many ways of making sense of the world. Through a multiplicity of cultural inventions, human societies have adapted to the environmental and biological conditions of human existence in many different ways. What do we learn from this?

First, almost every human behaviour, from shopping to marriage to expressions of feelings, is learned. In Canada, people tend to view marriage as a choice between two people based on mutual feelings of love. In other nations and in other times, marriages have been arranged through an intricate process of interviews and negotiations between entire families, or in other cases, through a direct system such as a mail-order bride. To someone raised in Winnipeg, the marriage customs of a family from Nigeria may seem strange or even wrong. Conversely, someone from a traditional Kolkata family might be perplexed with the idea of romantic love as the foundation for the lifelong commitment of marriage. In other words, the way in which people view marriage depends largely on what they have been taught. Being familiar with these written and unwritten rules of culture helps people feel secure and “normal.” Most people want to live their daily lives confident that their behaviours will not be challenged or disrupted. Behaviour based on learned customs is, therefore, a good thing, but it does raise the problem of how to respond to cultural differences.



Figure 3.6 The cultural norms governing public transportation vary in Canada, Austria, Mumbai, and Tokyo. How would a visitor from a rural Canadian town act and feel on this crowded Tokyo train? (Photo courtesy of Tokyoform/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

Second, culture is innovative. The existence of different cultural practices reveals the way in which societies find different solutions to real life problems. The different forms of marriage are various solutions to a common problem, the problem of organizing families in order to raise children and reproduce the species. As structural functionalists argue, the basic problem is shared by the different societies, but the solutions are different. This illustrates the point that culture in general is a means of solving problems. It is a tool composed of the capacity to abstract and conceptualize, to cooperate and coordinate complex collective endeavours, and to modify and construct the world to suit human purposes. It is the repository of creative solutions, techniques, and technologies humans draw on when confronting the basic shared problems of human existence. Culture is, therefore, key to the way humans, as a species, have successfully adapted to the environment. The existence of different cultures refers to the different means by which humans use innovation to free themselves from biological and environmental constraints.

Third, culture is also restraining. Cultures retain their distinctive patterns through time and impose them on their members. In contemporary life, global capitalism increasingly imposes a common cultural playing field on the cultures of the world. As a result, Canadian culture, French culture, Malaysian culture, and Kazakhstani culture will share certain features like rationalization and commodification, even if they also differ in terms of languages, beliefs, dietary practices, and other ways of life. There are two sides to the response of local cultures to global culture. Different cultures adapt and respond to capitalism in unique manners according to their specific shared heritages. Local cultural forms have the capacity to restrain the changes produced by globalization. Moreover, unique local cultures are transported around the world due to global migration, diasporas and media, leading to the diversification of cultural practices in countries like Canada, as well as to innovative forms of cultural blending and hybridization. On the other hand, the diversity

of local cultures is increasingly limited by the homogenizing pressures of globalization. Economic practices that prove inefficient or uncompetitive in the global market disappear. The meanings of cultural practices and knowledges change as they are turned into commodities for tourist consumption or are patented by pharmaceutical companies. Globalization also increasingly restrains cultural forms, practices, and possibilities.

There is therefore a dynamic within culture of innovation and restriction. The cultural fabric of shared meanings and orientations that allows individuals to make sense of the world and their place within it can change with contact with other cultures and changes in the socioeconomic formation, allowing people to reinvision and reinvent themselves. Or, it can remain stable, even rigid, and restrict change. Many contemporary issues to do with identity and belonging, from multiculturalism and hybrid identities to religious fundamentalism and white nationalist movements, can be understood within this dynamic of innovation and restriction. Similarly, the effects of social change on ways of life, from new modes of electronic communication to societal responses to climate change and global pandemics, involve a tension between innovation and restriction.

Making Connections: Big Picture

“Yes, but what does it mean?”



Figure 3.7 In the teaching of traditional Chinese acupuncture, meanings are literally written on the human body. (Photo courtesy of Jenni C/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

When asked how to diagnosis illness by observing external signs, Qi Bo replied: “You can determine the form of the illness by examining the chi to see if it is relaxed or tense, small or large, slippery or rough, and by feeling whether the flesh is firm or flabby.... If the skin of the chi is slippery, lustrous, oily, you are dealing with wind. If the skin of the chi is rough, you are dealing with wind induced paralysis” (cited in Kuriyama, 1999).

A doctor trained in Western biomedicine would probably not have a clue what Qi Bo was talking about. Even though the operation of the human body would seem universally the same no matter the cultural context, “accounts of the body in diverse medical traditions frequently appear to describe mutually alien, almost unrelated worlds” (Kuriyama, 1999). Why?

The sociology of culture is concerned with the study of how things and actions assume meanings, how these meanings orient human behaviour, and how social life is organized around and through meaning. It proposes that the human world, unlike the natural world, cannot be understood unless its *meaningfulness* for social actors is taken into account. Human social life is necessarily conducted through the meanings

humans attribute to things, actions, others, and themselves. Human experience is essentially meaningful, and culture is the source of the meanings that humans share.

What this implies is that *people do not live in direct, immediate contact with the world and each other*. Their lives are not governed by the effects of physical stimuli or genetic programming. Instead, they live only *indirectly* through the medium of the shared meanings provided by culture. This mediated experience is the experience of culture. As the philosopher Martin Heidegger (1995 /1929–1930) put it, humans uniquely live in an “openness” to the world granted by language and by their ability to respond to the meaningfulness of things in a way that other living beings do not.

Max Weber (1968) notes that it is possible to imagine situations in which human experience appears direct and unmediated; for example, a doctor taps a patient's knee and their leg jerks forward, or a bicyclist is riding their bike and gets hit by a car. In these situations, experience seems purely physical, unmediated. Yet when people assimilate these experiences into their lives, they do so by making them meaningful events. By tapping a person's knee, the doctor is interpreting signs that indicate the functioning of their nervous system. She or he is literally *reading* the reactions as symbolic events and assigning them meaning within the context of an elaborate cultural map of meaning: the modern biomedical understanding of the body. It is quite possible that if the bicyclist was flying through the air after being hit by a car, they would not be thinking or attributing meaning to the event. They would simply be a physical projectile. But afterwards, when they reconstruct the story for their friends, the police, or the insurance company, the event becomes part of their life through the way they put what happened into a narrative.

Equally important to note here is that the meaning of these events changes depending on the cultural context. A doctor of traditional Chinese medicine would read the knee reflex differently than a graduate of the UBC medical program. The story and meaning of the car accident changes if it is told to a friend as opposed to a policeman or an insurance adjuster.

The problem of meaning in sociological analysis, then, is to determine how events or things acquire meaning (e.g., through the reading of symptoms or the telling of stories); how the true or right meanings are determined (e.g., through pulse diagnosis, biomedical tests, or legal procedures of determining responsibility); how meaning works in the organization of social life (e.g., through the medicalized relation individuals have to their bodies or the rules governing traffic circulation); and how humans gain the capacity to interpret and share meanings in the first place (e.g., through the process of socialization into medical, legal, insurance, and traffic systems). Sociological research into culture studies all of these problems of meaning.

Culture and Biology

The central argument put forward in this chapter is that human social life is essentially meaningful and, therefore, has to be understood first through an analysis of the cultural practices and institutions that produce meaning. Nevertheless, a fascination in contemporary culture persists for finding biological or genetic explanations for complex human behaviours that would seem to contradict the emphasis on culture.

In one study, Swiss researchers had a group of women smell unwashed T-shirts worn by different men. The researchers argued that sexual attraction had a biochemical basis in the histo-compatibility signature that the women detected in the male pheromones left behind on the T-shirts. Women were attracted to the T-shirts of the men whose

immune systems differed from their own (Wedekind et al., 1995). In another study, Dean Hamer and his colleagues discovered that some homosexual men possessed the same region of DNA on their X chromosome, which led them to argue that homosexuality was determined genetically by a “gay gene” (Hamer et al., 1993). Another study found that the corpus callosum, the region of nerve fibres that connect the left and right brain hemispheres, was larger in women’s brains than in men’s (De Lacoste-Utamsing & Holloway, 1982). Therefore, women were thought to be able to use both sides of their brains simultaneously when processing visuo-spatial information, whereas men used only their left hemisphere. This finding was said to account for gender differences that ranged from women’s supposedly greater emotional intuition to men’s supposedly greater abilities in math, science, and parallel parking. In each of these three cases, the authors reduced a complex cultural behaviour – sexual attraction, homosexuality, cognitive ability – to a simple biological determination.

In each of these studies, the scientists’ claims were quite narrow and restricted in comparison to the conclusions drawn from them in the popular media. Nevertheless, they follow a logic of explanation known as **biological determinism**, which argues that the forms of human society and human behaviour are determined by biological mechanisms like genetics, instinctual behaviours, or evolutionary advantages. Within sociology, this type of framework underlies the paradigm of **sociobiology**, which provides biological explanations for the evolution of human behaviour and social organization.

Sociobiological propositions are constructed in three steps (Lewontin, 1991). First, they identify an aspect of human behaviour which appears to be universal, common to all people in all times and places. In all cultures the laws of sexual attraction – who is attracted to whom – are mysterious, for example. Second, they assume that this universal trait must be coded in the DNA of the species. There is a gene for detecting histo-compatibility that leads instinctively to mate selection. Third, they make an argument for why this behaviour or characteristic increases the chances of survival for individuals and, therefore, creates reproductive advantage. Mating with partners whose immune systems complement your own leads to healthier offspring who survive to reproduce your genes. The implication of the sociobiological analysis is that these traits and behaviours are fixed or “hard wired” into the biological structure of the species and are, therefore, very difficult to change. People will continue to be attracted to people who are not “right” for them in all the ways we would deem culturally appropriate – psychologically, emotionally, socially compatible, etc. – because they are biologically compatible.



Figure 3.8 Is male aggression innate? (Image courtesy of Riccardo Cuppini/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

Despite the popularity of this sort of reason, it is misguided from a sociological perspective for a number of reasons. For example, Konrad Lorenz’s (1903-1989) arguments that human males have an innate biological aggressive tendency to fight for scarce resources, protect territories and secure access to sexual reproduction were very popular in the 1960s (Lorenz, 1966). Young males of reproductive age commit the most violence, so the argument is that male aggression is an inborn biological tendency selected by evolutionary pressures as a result of struggles for reproductive dominance (Daly and Wilson, 1988). The pessimistic dilemma Lorenz posed was that males’ innate tendency towards aggression as a response to external threats might be a useful trait on an evolutionary scale, but in a contemporary society that includes the development of weapons of mass destruction, it is a threat to human survival. Another implication of his argument was that if aggression is instinctual, then the idea that individuals, militant groups, or states could be held responsible for acts of violence or war loses its validity. Ultimately, the evolutionary explanation of violence

means that there is no point in trying change it, despite the sociological and historical evidence that aggression in individuals and societies can be changed. (Note here that Lorenz’s basic claim about aggression runs counter to the

stronger argument that, if anything, the tendency toward co-operation has been central to the survival of human social life from its origins to the present).

However, a central problem of sociobiology as a type of sociological explanation is that while human biology does not vary greatly throughout history or between cultures, the forms of human association do vary extensively. It is difficult to account for the variability of social phenomena by using a universal biological mechanism to explain them. Even something like the aggressive tendency in young males, which on the surface has an intuitive appeal, does not account for the multitude of different forms and practices of aggression, let alone the different social circumstances in which aggression is manifested or provoked. Aggression is, of course, not exclusive to young males. It does not account for why some men are aggressive sometimes and not at other times, or why some men are not aggressive at all. It does not account for women's aggression and the forms in which this typically manifests, which tend to be more indirect, social, and verbal forms of aggression (gossip, exclusion, character defamation, etc.). In fact, evidence suggests that violence between children (prior to reproductive age) is greater than at any other age, and often involves the aggressiveness of young girls, even if girls' aggression is gradually restricted through socialization as they age (Tremblay et al., 2004). If production of testosterone is the key mechanism of male aggression, it does not account for the fact that both men and women generate testosterone. Nor does it explain the universal tendencies of all societies to develop sanctions and norms to curtail violence.

To suggest that aggression is an innate biological characteristic means that it does not vary greatly throughout history, nor between cultures, and is impervious to the social rules that restrict it in all societies. Yet as Randall Collins (2008) notes from a micro-sociological perspective, the factor that needs to be explained is not the natural tendency to aggression by young men, but the unique social circumstances required for them to be able to overcome the barriers of “confrontational tension and fear” that make aggression and violence difficult. The evolutionary argument suggests that violence should be easy for young men, whereas the research indicates that it is very hard and attempts to be violent often end in failure.

The main consideration to make here is not that biology has no impact on human behaviour, but that the biological explanation is limited with respect to what it can explain about complex cultural behaviours and practices. For example, research has shown that newborns and fetuses as young as 26 weeks have a simple smile: “the face relaxes while the sides of the mouth stretch outward and up” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). This observation about a seemingly straightforward biological behaviour suggests that smiling is inborn, a muscular reflex based on neurological connections. However, the smile of the newborn is not used to convey emotions. It occurs spontaneously during rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. Only when the baby matures and begins to interact with their environment and caretakers does the smile begin to represent a response to external stimuli. By age one, the baby's smile conveys a variety of meanings, depending on the social context, including flirting and mischief. Moreover, from the age of 6 months to 2 years, the smile itself changes physically: Different muscle groups are used, and different facial expressions are blended with it (surprise, anger, excitement). The smile becomes more complex and individualized. The point here, as Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000) points out, is that “the child uses smiling as part of a complex system of communication,” which is learned. Not only is the meaning of the smile defined in interaction with the social context, but the physiological components of smiling (the nerves, muscles, and stimuli) also are modified and “socialized” according to culture.

Therefore, social scientists see explanations of human behaviour based on biological determinants as extremely limited in scope and value. The physiological “human package” — bipedalism, omnivorous diet, language ability, brain size, capacity for empathy, lack of an estrous cycle (Naiman, 2012) — is more or less constant across cultures; whereas,



Figure 3.9 The baby's smile: instinctive or learned? (Photo courtesy of Llee Wu/Flickr.) [CC BY-ND 2.0](#)

the range of cultural behaviours and beliefs is extremely broad. These occasionally radical differences between cultures have to be accounted for instead by the distinct processes of socialization through which individuals learn how to participate in their societies. From this point of view, as the anthropologist Margaret Mead (1901-1978) put it:

We are forced to conclude that human nature is almost unbelievably malleable, responding accurately and contrastingly to contrasting cultural conditions. The differences between individuals who are members of different cultures, like the differences between individuals within a culture, are almost entirely to be laid to differences in conditioning, especially during early childhood, and the form of this conditioning is culturally determined (1935).



Figure 3.10 Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, was the founder of eugenics. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Aside from the explanatory problems of biological determinism, it is important to bear in mind the social consequences of biological determinism, as these ideas have been used to support rigid cultural ideas concerning race, gender, disabilities, etc. that have their legacy in slavery, racism, gender inequality, eugenics programs, and the sterilization of “the unfit.” **Eugenics**, meaning “well born” in ancient Greek, was a social movement that sought to improve the human “stock” through selective breeding and sterilization. Its founder, Francis Galton (1822-1911) defined eugenics in 1883 as “the study of the agencies under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally” (Galton as cited in McLaren, 1990). In Canada, eugenics boards were established by the governments of Alberta and British Columbia to enable the sterilization of the “feeble-minded.” Based on a rigid cultural concept of what a proper human was, and grounded in the biological determinist framework of evolutionary science, 4,725 individuals were proposed for sterilization in Alberta and 2,822 of them were sterilized between 1928 and 1971. The racial component of the program is evident in the fact that while First Nations and Métis peoples made up only 2.5% of the population of Alberta, they accounted for 25% of the sterilizations. Several hundred individuals were also sterilized in British Columbia between 1933 and 1979 (McLaren, 1990).

The interesting question that these biological explanations of complex human behaviour raise is: Why are they so popular? What is it about our culture that makes the biological explanation of behaviours or experiences like sexual attraction, which we know from personal experience to be extremely complicated and nuanced, so appealing? As micro-biological technologies like genetic engineering and neuro-pharmaceuticals advance, the very real prospect of altering the human body at a fundamental level to produce culturally desirable qualities (health, ability, intelligence, beauty, etc.) becomes possible, and, therefore, these questions become more urgent.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

The Pop Gene




Figure 3.11 Coding region in a segment of eukaryotic DNA. (Image courtesy of National Human Genome Research Institute/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

The concept of the gene and the idea of genetic engineering have entered into popular consciousness in a number of strange and interesting ways, which speak to our enduring fascination with biological explanations of human behaviour. Some sociologists have begun to speak of a **new eugenics movement** in reference to the way the mapping and testing of the genome makes it possible, as a matter of consumer choice, to manipulate the genes of a foetus or an egg — to eliminate what are considered birth “defects” or to produce what are considered desired qualities in a child (Rose, 2007). If the old eugenics movement promoted selective breeding and forced sterilization in order to improve the biological qualities and, in particular, the racial qualities of whole populations, the new eugenics is focused on calculations of individual risk or individual self-improvement and self-realization. In the new eugenics, individuals choose to act upon the genetic information provided by doctors, geneticists, and counselors to make decisions for their children or themselves.

This movement is based both on the commercial aspirations of biotechnology companies and the logic of a new biological determinism or **geneticism**, which suggests that the qualities of human life are caused by genes (Rose, 2007). The concept of the gene is a relatively recent addition to the way in which people begin to think about themselves in relationship to their bodies. The German historians Barbara Duden and Silja Samerski argue that the gene has become a kind of primordial reference point for the fundamental questions people ask about themselves (2007): Where do I come from? Who am I? What will happen to me in the future? The gene has shifted from its specific place within the parameters of medical science to become a source of popular understanding and speculation: a “pop gene.” Most tellingly, the gene has become a Trojan horse through which “risk consciousness” is implanted in people’s bodies. People begin to worry and make decisions about their lives and medical care based on the perceived risks embedded in their genetic make-up. The popularization of the idea of the gene entails the development of a new relationship to the human body, health, and the genetic predispositions to health risks as people age.

In 2013, the movie star Angelina Jolie underwent a double mastectomy, not because she had breast cancer but because doctors estimated she had an 87% chance of developing breast cancer due to a mutation in the BRCA1 gene (Jolie, 2013). On the basis of what might happen to her based on probabilities of risk from genetic models, she decided to take drastic measures to avoid the breast cancer that caused her mother’s death. Her very public stance on her surgery was to raise public awareness of the genetic risks of cancers

that run in families and to normalize a medical procedure that many would be hesitant to take. At the same time she further solidified a notion of the gene as a site of invisible risk in peoples lives, encouraging more people to think about themselves in terms of their hidden dispositions to genetically programmed diseases.



Figure 3.12 Angelina Jolie (2013): “My doctors estimated that I had an 87% risk of breast cancer and a 50% risk of ovarian cancer, although the risk is different in the case of each woman.” (Photo courtesy of Georges Biard/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 3.0](#)

Many misconceptions exist in popular culture about what a gene actually is or what it can do. Some of these misconceptions are funny — Duden and Samerski cite a hairdresser they interviewed as saying that her nail biting habit was part of the genetic programming she was born with — but some of them have serious consequences that can lead to the impossible decisions some individuals, including couples who are having a child, are forced to make. Informed decision making in genetic counseling often works with statistical probabilities of “defects” based on population data (e.g., “With your family history, you have a 1 in 10 chance of having a child with the genetic mutation for Down’s syndrome”), but what does this mean to a particular individual? The actual *causal* mechanism for that particular individual is unknown and it is unlikely that they will actually have 10 children, one of whom might have Down’s syndrome; therefore, what does this probability figure mean to someone who is pregnant? In this sense, the gene defines a set of cultural parameters by which people in the age of genetics make sense of themselves in relationship to their bodies. Like biological determinism in general, the gene introduces a kind of fatalism into the understanding of human life and human possibility.

Cultural Universals

Often, a comparison of one culture to another will reveal obvious differences. But all cultures share common elements. **Cultural universals** are patterns or traits that are globally common to all societies. One example of a cultural universal is the kinship system: Every human society recognizes a family structure that regulates sexual reproduction and the care of children (See [Chapter 14. Marriage and Family](#)). In comparison to primate kinship however, human kinship

configurations recognize a far wider range of recognized kin including matrilineal and patrilineal members (mother's and father's side relatives), several generations of family members, and members who live together as well as those who do not (Chapais, 2014). So what exactly is universal about kinship?

The significance of different types of relative varies and can be extremely complex — traditional Chinese kinship nomenclature has separate names for maternal and paternal lineages, relative age of siblings, gender of relatives, and nine generations of relative — but all human societies recognize a similar range of relations as kin. Four universal features of kinship systems include:

1. A lengthy childhood maturation process that requires at least one adult to commit to prolonged child nurturing and educating;
2. The presence of a socially recognized bond between two (or more) people that regulates their sexual and domestic relationship through time;
3. A gender based division of labour within the household; and
4. An incest taboo that prohibits sexual intercourse between close kin.

Even so, there are many variations within these universals and each of the four are regularly broken in individual cases within societies. How the family unit is defined and how it functions vary. In many Asian cultures, for example, family members from all generations commonly live together in one household. In these cultures, young adults will continue to live in the extended household family structure until they marry and join their spouse's household, or they may remain and raise their nuclear family within the extended family's homestead. In Canada, by contrast, individuals are expected to leave home and live independently for a period before forming a family unit consisting of parents and their offspring.

Anthropologist George Murdock (1897-1985) first recognized the existence of cultural universals while studying systems of kinship around the world. As a structural functionalist, Murdock found that cultural universals often revolve around the functional requisites all societies need to satisfy to ensure human survival, such as finding food, clothing, and shelter. They also form around universally shared human experiences, such as birth and death, or illness and healing. Through his research, Murdock identified other universals including language, the concept of personal names, and, interestingly, jokes. Humour seems to be a universal way to release tensions and create a sense of unity among people (Murdock, 1949). Sociologists consider humour necessary to human interaction because it helps individuals navigate otherwise tense situations.

Making Connections: Sociological Research

Is Music a Cultural Universal?



Figure 3.13 Queenscliff Music Festival 2013. (Image courtesy of Tony Proudfoot/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

Imagine an audience sitting in a theatre, watching a film. The movie opens with the hero sitting on a park bench with a grim expression on her face. Cue the music. The first slow and mournful notes are played in a minor key. As the melody continues, the hero turns her head and sees a man walking toward her. The music slowly gets louder, and the dissonance of the chords sends a prickle of fear running down the audience's spine. They sense that she is in danger.

Now imagine that the audience is watching the same movie, but with a different soundtrack. As the scene opens, the music is soft and soothing with a hint of sadness. They see the hero sitting on the park bench and sense her loneliness. Suddenly, the music swells. The woman looks up and sees a man walking toward her. The music grows fuller, and the pace picks up. The audience feels their hearts rise in their chests. This is a happy moment.

Music has the ability to evoke emotional responses. In television shows, movies, and even commercials, music elicits laughter, sadness, or fear. Are these types of musical cues cultural universals? Henry Wadsworth Longfellow declared in 1835 that “music is the universal language of mankind” (Longfellow, 1835). Is music a universal language?

This is a matter of debate. From the perspective of sociobiology or evolutionary psychology, if music is universal then it must have a basis in the genetics of the human species. Ethnomusicologists point out, however, that even though music is widespread cross-culturally, the meanings, uses, behavioural functions and forms of music vary so widely as to be difficult to tie to any specific biological mechanism, adaptive function, or reproductive advantage.

On the other hand, the Harvard Data Science Initiative conducted a comprehensive examination of every culture in the ethnographic record, 5000 detailed descriptions of song performances, and a random sample of field recordings (Mehr et al., 2019). They determined that music is universal, occurring in every society observed. Moreover, while music did vary between cultures, it varied along three variables of social context that were common to all cultures (degree of formality, degree of arousal, and degree of religiosity) and was associated with common behavioural contexts shared by all cultures such as lullabies, healing practices, dance and love.

To understand what exactly is universal about music, they proposed that while a fixed biological response

could not account for the cross-cultural variability in musical expression, the variability concealed regularities emerging from common underlying psychological mechanisms. Songs with similar behavioural functions in different societies, like infant care and healing, tended to have similar musical features (accent, tempo, pitch range, etc.). A lullaby or healing song in one culture was very similar to a lullaby or healing song in another culture. All cultures put words to their songs, all cultures danced to songs, all songs had tonal centers, and all melodies and rhythms found balance between monotony and chaos (Mehr et al., 2019).

Similarly, in 2009, a team of psychologists, led by Thomas Fritz of the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences in Leipzig, Germany, studied people's reactions to music they had never heard (Fritz et al., 2009). The research team traveled to Cameroon, Africa, and asked Mafa tribal members to listen to Western music and compared their reactions to Canadian interpretations of the same music. The tribe, isolated from Western culture, had never been exposed to Western culture and had no context or experience within which to interpret its music. Even so, as the tribal members listened to a Western piano piece, they were able to recognize three basic emotions: happiness, sadness, and fear. They rated the music as happy, sad and fearful similarly to Canadian listeners. Music, it turns out, is a sort of universal language.

Researchers also found that music can foster a sense of wholeness within a group. In fact, scientists who study the evolution of language have concluded that originally language (an established component of group identity) and music were one (Darwin, 1871). Additionally, since music is largely nonverbal, the sounds of music can cross societal boundaries more easily than words. Music allows people to make connections where language might be a more difficult barricade. As Fritz and his team found, music and the emotions it conveys can be cultural universals.

Ethnocentrism and Cultural Relativism

Despite how much humans have in common, cultural differences are far more prevalent than cultural universals. For example, while all cultures have language, analysis of particular language structures and conversational etiquette reveals tremendous differences. In some Middle Eastern cultures, it is common to stand close to others in conversation. North Americans keep more distance, maintaining a large personal space. Even something as simple as eating and drinking varies greatly from culture to culture. If a professor comes into an early morning class holding a mug of liquid, what do students assume she is drinking? In Canada, it is most likely filled with coffee, not black tea, a favourite in England, or yak butter tea, a staple in Tibet.

The way cuisines vary across cultures fascinates many people. Some travelers, like celebrated food writer Anthony Bourdain, pride themselves on their willingness to try unfamiliar foods, while others return home expressing gratitude for their native culture's fare. Canadians might express disgust at other cultures' cuisine, thinking it is gross to eat meat from a dog or guinea pig for example, while they do not question their own habit of eating cows or pigs. Such attitudes are an example of **ethnocentrism**, or evaluating and judging another culture based on how it compares to one's own cultural norms. Ethnocentrism, as sociologist William Graham Sumner (1840-1910) described the term, involves a belief or attitude that one's own culture is better than all others (1906). Almost everyone is a little bit ethnocentric. For example, Canadians tend to say that people from England drive on the "wrong" side of the road, rather than the "other" side. Someone from a country where dogs are considered dirty and unhygienic might find it off-putting to see a dog in a French restaurant.

A high level of appreciation for one's own culture can be healthy; a shared sense of community pride, for example,

connects people in a society. But ethnocentrism can lead to disdain or dislike for other cultures, causing misunderstanding and conflict. This is even more significant when ethnocentrism works its way into social scientific perspectives and public policy decision making. Social scientists with the best intentions sometimes travel to another society to “help” its people, seeing them as uneducated or backward, essentially inferior. In reality, these scientists are guilty of cultural imperialism — the deliberate imposition of one’s own cultural values on another culture.

Europe’s colonial expansion, begun in the 16th century, was often accompanied by a severe cultural imperialism. European colonizers often viewed the people in the lands they colonized as uncultured savages who were in need of European governance, dress, religion, and other cultural practices. On the Northwest coast of Canada, the various First Nations’ *potlatch* (gift-giving) ceremony was made illegal in 1885 because it was thought to prevent Indigenous peoples from acquiring the proper industriousness and respect for material goods required by civilization. A more modern example of **cultural imperialism** was the Green Revolution of the 1950s and 1960s in which international aid agencies introduced technologically intensive agricultural methods and hybrid crop strains from developed countries to improve agricultural output in Mexico, India, the Philippines, and Africa, while overlooking indigenous varieties and agricultural approaches that were better suited to the particular region.

Ethnocentrism can be so strong that when confronted with all the differences of a new culture, one may experience disorientation and frustration. Sociologists call this **culture shock**. A traveler from B.C. might find the established “center of Canada” urban culture of Toronto restrictive. An exchange student from China might be annoyed by the constant interruptions in class as other students ask questions — a practice that can be considered rude in China. Perhaps the B.C. traveler was initially captivated with Toronto’s centrality to intellectual and cultural life in Canada, and the Chinese student was originally excited to see a Canadian-style classroom firsthand. But as they experience unanticipated differences from their own culture, their excitement gives way to discomfort and doubts about how to behave appropriately in the new situation. Eventually, as people learn more about a culture, they recover from culture shock.

Culture shock can occur when people do not expect to find cultural differences. Anthropologist Ken Barger (1971) discovered this when conducting participatory observation in an Inuit community in the Canadian Arctic. Originally from Indiana, Barger hesitated when invited to join a local snowshoe race. He knew he would never hold his own against these experts. Sure enough, he finished last, to his mortification. But the tribal members congratulated him, saying, “You really tried!” In Barger’s own culture, he had learned to value victory. It was not worth participating if there was no chance of winning. To the Inuit people winning was enjoyable, but their culture valued survival skills essential to their environment: How hard someone tried could mean the difference between life and death. Over the course of his stay, Barger participated in caribou hunts, learned how to take shelter in winter storms, and sometimes went days with little or no food to share among tribal members. Trying hard and working together, two nonmaterial values, were indeed much more important than winning.



Figure 3.14 American anthropologist Ruth Benedict: “The purpose of anthropology is to make the world safe for human differences.” (Photo courtesy of Library of Congress/Wikipedia.) No copyright restriction known (gift from WT staff photographer.) [Public Domain](#)

During his time with the Inuit, Barger learned to engage in cultural relativism. **Cultural relativism** is the practice of assessing a culture by its own standards rather than viewing it through the lens of one’s own culture. The anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1887–1948) argued that each culture has an internally consistent pattern of thought and action, which alone could be the basis for judging the merits and morality of the culture’s practices. In sociological research, cultural relativism requires an open mind and a willingness to consider new values and norms. Insight into unfamiliar sociological phenomena requires the abandonment of preconceptions and prejudgements.

The logic of cultural relativism is at the basis of contemporary policies of multiculturalism. However, indiscriminately embracing everything about a new culture is not always possible. Even the most culturally relativist people from egalitarian societies, such as Canada — societies in which women have political rights and control over their own bodies — would question whether the widespread practice of female genital circumcision in countries such as Ethiopia and Sudan should be accepted just because it has been a part of a cultural tradition.

Sociologists attempting to engage in cultural relativism may struggle to reconcile aspects of their own culture with aspects of a culture they are studying. Pride in one’s own culture does not have to lead to imposing its values on others or using them

to evaluate another culture’s practices; A great deal of important information and insight can be overlooked or missed in this way. But nor does an appreciation for another culture preclude individuals from studying it with a critical eye. In the case of female genital circumcision, a *universal* right to life and liberty of the person conflicts with the neutral stance of cultural relativism. It is not necessarily ethnocentric to be critical of practices that violate universal standards of human dignity because these standards are *cultural universals*, contained in the cultural codes of all cultures, (even if they are not necessarily followed in practice). Not every practice can be regarded as culturally relative. Cultural traditions are not immune from power imbalances, disagreements, and emancipatory movements that seek to correct them. Research on female genital mutilation (FGM), for example, shows that when practicing communities themselves decide to abandon FGM, the practice can be eliminated very rapidly (WHO, 2020).

Feminist sociology is particularly attuned to the way that most cultures present a male-dominated view of the world as if it were simply *the* view of the world. **Androcentrism** is a perspective in which male concerns, male attitudes, and male practices are presented as “normal” or define what is significant and valued in a culture. Women’s experiences, activities, and contributions to society and history are ignored, devalued, or marginalized.

As a result the perspectives, concerns, and interests of only one sex and class are represented as general. Only one sex and class are directly and actively involved in producing, debating, and developing its ideas, in creating its art, in forming its medical and psychological conceptions, in framing its laws, its political principles, its educational values and objectives. Thus a one-sided standpoint comes to be seen as natural, obvious, and general, and a one-sided set of interests preoccupy intellectual and creative work (Smith, 1987).

In part, this is simply a question of the bias of those who have the power to define cultural values, and in part, it is the result of a process in which women have been actively excluded from the culture-creating process. It is still common, for example, to read writing that uses the personal pronoun “he” or the word “man” to represent people in general or

humanity as a whole. The overall effect is to establish masculine values and imagery as normal. A “policeman” brings to mind a man who is doing a “man’s job,” when in fact, women have been involved in policing for several decades now.

Making Connections: Social Policy and Debate

Multiculturalism in Canada



Figure 3.15 Multiculturalism tree planted in Stanley Park to bring B.C.’s 2012 Multiculturalism Week to a close. The gesture of planting the tree is meant to “symbolize the deep roots and flourishing growth of B.C.’s diverse communities.” Is multiculturalism just a gesture or is it an effective means of recognizing and supporting Canadian diversity? (Image courtesy of the Province of British Columbia/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

One prominent aspect of contemporary Canadian cultural identity is the idea of **multiculturalism**.

Canada was the first officially declared multicultural society in which, as Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau declared in 1971, no culture would take precedence over any other. As he put it, “What could be more absurd than the concept of an ‘all-Canadian’ boy or girl?” (Trudeau cited in Graham, 1998).

Multiculturalism refers to both the existence of a diversity of cultures within one territory, and to a way of conceptualizing and managing cultural diversity through social policy. As a policy, multiculturalism seeks to both promote and recognize cultural differences while addressing the inevitability of cultural tensions. In the 1988

Multiculturalism Act, the federal government

officially acknowledged its role “in bringing about equal access and participation for all Canadians in the economic, social, cultural, and political life of the nation” (Government of Canada, as cited in Angelini & Broderick, 2012).

However, the focus on multiculturalism and culture per se has not always been so central to Canadian public discourse. Multiculturalism represents a relatively recent cultural development. Prior to the end of World War II, Canadian authorities used the concept of biological race to differentiate the various types of immigrants and Indigenous peoples in Canada. This focus on biology led to corresponding fears about the quality of immigrant “stock” and the problems of how to manage the mixture of races. In this context, three different models for how to manage diversity were in contention: (1) the American “melting pot” paradigm in which the mingling of races was thought to be able to produce a super race with the best qualities of all races intermingled, (2) strict exclusion or deportation of races seen to be “unsuited” to Canadian social and environmental conditions, or (3) the Canadian “mosaic” that advocated for the separation and compartmentalization of races (Day, 2000).

After World War II, the category of race was replaced by culture and ethnicity in the public discourse, but the mosaic model was retained. Culture came to be understood in terms of the new anthropological definitions of culture as a deep-seated emotional-psychological phenomenon essential to social well-being and belonging. In this conceptualization, to be deprived of culture through coercive assimilation would be a

type of cultural genocide. As a result, alternatives to cultural assimilation into the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture were debated, and the Canadian mosaic model for managing a diverse population was redefined as multiculturalism. Based on a new appreciation of the importance of culture, and with increased immigration from non-European countries, Canadian identity was re-imagined in the 1960s and 1970s as a happy cohabitation of cultures, each of which was encouraged to maintain their cultural distinctiveness. So while the cultural identities of Canadians are diverse, the cultural paradigm in which their coexistence is conceptualized – multiculturalism – has come to be equated with Canadian cultural identity.

However, these developments have not alleviated the problems of cultural difference with which sociologists are concerned. Multicultural policy has sparked numerous, remarkably contentious issues ranging from whether Sikh RCMP officers can wear turbans to whether Mormon sects can have legal polygamous marriages. In 2014, the Parti Québécois in Quebec proposed a controversial Charter of Quebec Values that would, to reinforce the neutrality of the state, ban public employees from wearing “overt and conspicuous” religious symbols and headgear. In 2019, the Quebec ban on religious symbols was enacted by governing Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) Party as Bill 21. This position represented a unique Quebec-based concept of multiculturalism known as **interculturalism**. Whereas multiculturalism begins with the premise that there is no dominant culture in Canada, interculturalism begins with the premise that in Quebec, francophone culture is dominant but also precarious in the North American context. It cannot risk further fragmentation. Therefore the intercultural model of managing diversity is to recognize and respect the diversity of immigrants who seek to integrate into Quebec society but also to make clear to immigrants that they must recognize and respect Quebec’s common or “fundamental” values.

Critics of multiculturalism identify four related problems:

- Multiculturalism only superficially accepts the equality of all cultures while continuing to limit and prohibit actual equality, participation, and cultural expression. One key element of this criticism is that there are only two official languages in Canada – English and French – which limits the full participation of non-anglophone/francophone groups.
- Multiculturalism obliges minority individuals to assume the limited cultural identities of their ethnic group of origin, which leads to stereotyping minority groups, ghettoization, and feeling isolated from the national culture.
- Multiculturalism causes fragmentation and disunity in Canadian society. Minorities do not integrate into existing Canadian society but demand that Canadians adopt or accommodate their way of life, even when they espouse controversial values, laws, and customs (like polygamy or Sharia Law).
- Multiculturalism is based on recognizing group rights which undermines constitutional protections of individual rights.

On the other hand, proponents of multiculturalism like Will Kymlicka (2012) describe the Canadian experience with multiculturalism as a success story. Kymlicka argues that the evidence shows:

Immigrants in Canada are more likely to become citizens, to vote and to run for office, and to be elected to office than immigrants in other Western democracies, in part because voters in Canada do not discriminate against such candidates. Compared to their counterparts in other Western democracies, the children of immigrants have better educational outcomes, and while immigrants in all Western societies suffer from an “ethnic penalty” in translating their skills into jobs, the size of this ethnic penalty is lowest in Canada. Compared to residents of other Western democracies, Canadians are more likely to say that immigration is beneficial and less likely to have prejudiced

views of Muslims. And whereas ethnic diversity has been shown to erode levels of trust and social capital in other countries, there appears to be a “Canadian exceptionalism” in this regard (Kymlicka, 2012).

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3.2. Elements of Culture

Values and Beliefs

Two crucial elements that define the variability between cultures are values and beliefs. **Values** are a culture's standard for discerning desirable states in society (what is true, good, just, or beautiful). They are “culturally defined goals, purposes, and interests,” which comprise “a frame of aspirational reference” as Robert Merton put it (Merton, 1938). Values are deeply embedded and critical for transmitting and teaching a culture's beliefs. **Beliefs** are tenets or convictions that people hold to be true. Individuals in a society have specific beliefs, but they also share collective values.

To illustrate the difference, North Americans commonly *believe* that anyone who works hard enough will be successful and wealthy. Underlying this belief is the *value* that both work and wealth are good and desirable. In contrast, the Chinese Taoist concept of *wu wei* (not-doing or not-making) is based on the *belief* that “the way of things in the world” (the Tao) unfolds spontaneously. Therefore learning how to “not-work” and to allow life to unfold in the integrated and spontaneous way natural to it, without deliberate effort, is seen as a virtue (*te*) and is a shared, collective value.

Values help shape a society by suggesting what is good and bad, beautiful and ugly, and what should be sought or avoided. Consider the value that North American culture places upon youth. Children represent innocence and purity, while a youthful adult appearance signifies liveliness and sexuality. Shaped by this value, North Americans spend millions of dollars each year on cosmetic products and surgeries to look young and beautiful.

Sometimes the values of Canada and the United States are contrasted. Americans are said to have an individualistic culture, meaning people place a high value on individuality and independence. In contrast, Canadian culture is said to be more collectivist, meaning the welfare of the group and group relationships are primary values. As described below, Seymour Martin Lipset used these contrasts of values to explain why the two societies, which have common roots as British colonies, developed such different political institutions and cultures (Lipset, 1990).

Values are not static; they vary across time and between groups as people evaluate, debate, and change collective societal beliefs. For example, the change in the laws (the *Cannabis Act*) governing cannabis use in Canada shifted from prohibition to legalization and regulation in October, 2018, largely because of a change in the underlying values of Canadians. Where cannabis consumption had been presented as a sign of immoral character in the early 20th century campaigns to prohibit it, law makers in the 21st century recognized that a majority of the population disagreed. Many in fact regarded it as medicinal, as a means to attain the positive value of health and well-being. Others regarded it as matter of personal choice or right within a sphere of personal autonomy that should not be interfered with by moral authorities or states. It appears that Canadian values changed priority: from the virtue of abstinence to the virtues of health or personal autonomy.

Sociology is interested in the role values play in social life. Practically speaking, values influence or guide choices of action. A person will choose to act in one way rather than another because of their values. However, as described in [Chapter 2. Sociological Research](#), the classical sociologist Harriet Martineau (1838) made a basic distinction between what people say they believe in or value and what they actually do, which are often at odds. Values often suggest how people *should* behave, but they do not accurately reflect how people *do* behave. It is easy to value good health, but it is hard to quit eating chips. Marital monogamy is valued, but many spouses engage in infidelity. Regardless, values (1) affect how one perceives or feels towards things (i.e., they have a significant emotional content); (2) provide a “vocabulary of motives” that allows one to interpret and explain one's own and other's behaviour; and (3) create a basis for shared commonalities and trust — Durkheim's “collective conscience” — that allow cooperation to take place through time. When values are not shared, there is mistrust, which makes collective concerted action more difficult (Thome, 2015).

Norms

So far, the examples in this chapter have often described how people are expected to behave in certain situations — for example, when buying food or boarding a bus. These examples describe the visible and invisible rules of conduct through which societies are structured, or what sociologists call **norms**. As opposed to values and beliefs which identify desirable states and convictions about how things *are*, a norm is a generally accepted way of *doing* things. Norms define how to behave in accordance with what a society values and has defined as good, right, and important. They define the rules that govern behaviour.

Just as values vary from culture to culture, so do norms. For example, cultures differ in their norms about what kinds of physical closeness are appropriate in public. It is rare to see two male friends or coworkers holding hands in Canada where that behaviour often symbolizes romantic feelings. But in many nations, masculine physical intimacy is considered natural in public. A simple gesture, such as hand-holding, carries great symbolic differences across cultures.



Figure 3.16 In many parts of Africa and the Middle East, it is considered normal for men to hold hands in friendship. How would Canadians react to these two soldiers? (Photo courtesy of Geordie Mott/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Most members of the society adhere to norms because their violation invokes some degree of sanction. **Sanctions** are a form of **social control**, a way to encourage conformity to cultural norms. They define the punishments and rewards that govern behaviour. These can be understood to operate at various levels of formality.

Formal norms are established, written rules. They are behaviours worked out and agreed upon in order to suit and serve most people. Laws are formal norms, but so are employee manuals, college entrance exam requirements, and the “no running” rule at swimming pools. Formal norms are the most specific and clearly stated of the various types of norms, and the most strictly enforced. But even formal norms are enforced to varying degrees, reflected in cultural values.

For example, money is highly valued in North America, so monetary crimes are punished. It is against the law to rob a bank, and banks go to great lengths to prevent such crimes. People safeguard valuable possessions and install anti-theft devices to protect homes and cars. Until recently, a less strictly enforced social norm was driving while intoxicated. While it is against the law to drive drunk, drinking is for the most part an acceptable social behaviour. Though there have been laws in Canada to punish drunk driving since 1921, there were few systems in place to prevent the crime until quite recently. These examples show a range of enforcement in formal norms.

There are plenty of formal norms, but the list of **informal norms** — casual behaviours that are generally and widely conformed to — is longer. People learn informal norms by observation, imitation, and general socialization. Some informal norms are taught directly — “kiss your Aunt Edna” or “use your napkin” — while others are learned by observation, including observations of the consequences when someone else violates a norm. Children learn quickly that picking their nose is subject to ridicule when they see someone shamed by others **for doing it**. Although informal norms define personal interactions, they extend into other systems as well. Think back to the discussion of fast food restaurants at the beginning of this chapter. In Canada, there are informal norms regarding behaviour at these restaurants. Customers line up to order their food, and leave when they are done. They do not sit down at a table with strangers, sing loudly as they prepare their condiments, or nap in a booth. Most people do not commit even benign breaches of informal norms. Informal norms dictate appropriate behaviours without the need of written rules.

Robert Merton's (1938) famous essay "Social Structure and Anomie" illustrates the difference and also some of the contradictions between values and norms. He argues that, in North American society, a common *value* is the accumulation of wealth as a sign of success. Success through possession of wealth is a value that "comprises a frame of aspirational reference." However at the same time he notes that, in a class and racially divided society, access to legitimate means of accumulating wealth is not equally distributed. "Social structure defines, regulates, and controls the acceptable modes of achieving these goals." These "acceptable modes" are defined by *norms*, the "permissible and required procedures for attaining these ends," and backed up with moral and institutional regulations. As a result, Merton argued that a social *strain* is built in to the structure of society in which people without access to inheritance, higher education, good jobs, stable living conditions, etc. are forced to either abandon the goal of success or choose illegitimate means like crime to attain it (see Robert Merton: Strain Theory in [Chapter 6. Social Interaction](#)). Crime is therefore the natural outcome of the contradiction between the value of success and the norms to achieve it.

The extreme emphasis upon the accumulation of wealth as a symbol of success in our own society militates against the completely effective control of institutionally regulated modes of acquiring a fortune. Fraud, corruption, vice, crime, in short, the entire catalogue of proscribed behavior, becomes increasingly common when the emphasis on the culturally induced success-goal becomes divorced from a coordinated institutional emphasis (Merton, 1938).

Making Connections: Sociological Research

Breaching Experiments



Figure 3.17 Harold Garfinkel, founder of ethnomethodology in sociology. (Image courtesy of Arlene Garfinkel/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 3.0](#)

Sociologist Harold Garfinkel (1917–2011) studied people’s everyday interactions in order to find out how tacit and often unconscious societal rules and norms not only influenced behaviour but enabled the social order to exist (Weber, 2011). Like the symbolic interactionists, he believed that members of society together create a working consensus in different situations which produces social order. He noted, however, that people often draw on inferred knowledge and unspoken agreements to do so. His resulting book, *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (1967), discusses the underlying assumptions and tacit knowledges that people rely on to navigate and make sense of the world. **Ethnomethodology** is a paradigm of interpretive sociology that studies “the body of common-sense knowledge and the range of

procedures and considerations by means of which ordinary members of society make sense of, find their way about in, and act on the circumstances in which they find themselves” (Heritage, 1984).

One of his research methods was known as a **breaching experiment**. His breaching experiments tested sociological concepts of social norms and conformity. In a breaching experiment, the researcher purposely breaks a social norm or behaves in a socially awkward manner. The participants are not aware an experiment is in progress. If the breach is successful, however, these innocent bystanders will respond in some way. For example, he had his students go into local shops and begin to barter with the sales clerks for fixed price goods. “This says \$14.99, but I’ll give you \$10 for it.” Often the clerks were shocked or flustered because the common sense norms of shopping had been broken. This breach reveals the unspoken convention in North America that the amount given on the price tag is the price. It also breaks a number of other unspoken conventions which seek to make commercial transactions as efficient and impersonal as possible. How people respond to restore order or to provide an account of the norm violation that makes the situation “make sense” was a focus of these experiments.

In another example, he had his students engage an acquaintance in conversation, but insist that the acquaintance clarify commonplace remarks. So in response to the question, “How is your girlfriend feeling?” one student experimenter responded “What do you mean, ‘How is she feeling?’ Do you mean physical or mental?” and so on. The exchange ended with the acquaintance feeling flustered, “What’s the matter with you? Are you sick?” In this case, the unspoken norm was the rule that people should not have to explain themselves in ordinary conversation. “What they are saying is understandable and ought to be understood”

(Garfinkel, 1967). Certain things ‘go without saying,’ but what things, and why? How are things that “go without saying” communicated or known?

Even though ordinary conversation is often ambiguous and full of gaps the norm is that each participant should go along with the understanding that everything is perfectly understood. If they do not go along they face consequences. The unspoken rules of common sense knowledge are very real in this sense. Moreover they have the character of a “self-fulfilling prophecy” to the degree that they are reinforced over and over again by “persons’ motivated compliance with these background expectancies” (Garfinkel, 1967). One has to “go along to get along.”

The point of the experiments was not that the experimenter would simply act obnoxiously or weird in public. Rather, the point is to deviate from a specific social norm in a small way, to subtly break some form of social etiquette or common speech, and see what happens. Garfinkel suspected that odd behaviours would shatter conventional expectations, but he was not sure how. The reactions of outrage, anger, puzzlement, or other emotions to the breaking of relatively trivial norms, illustrated the deep level of unconscious investment people have in keeping this web of tacit conventions intact. They are essential in maintaining a common, shared sense of the orderliness and predictability of the world. Without them subjects were often flustered. The social situation threatened to become completely senseless unless the breach was rectified. To challenge the known-in-common background — “what should be plain for everyone to see” — leads to bewilderment. The take away is that society itself is only possible to the degree that bewilderment is kept at bay.

There are many rules about speaking with strangers in public. It is okay to tell a woman you like her shoes. It is not okay to ask if you can try them on. It is okay to stand in line behind someone at the ATM. It is not okay to look over their shoulder as they make the transaction. It is okay to sit beside someone on a crowded bus. It is weird to sit beside a stranger in a half-empty bus. These cultural norms play an important role. They let people know how to behave around each other and how to feel comfortable in our community, but they are not necessarily rational. Why should we not talk to someone in a public bathroom, or haggle over the price of a good in a store? Breaching experiments uncover and explore the many unwritten social rules people live by. They indicate the degree to which the world people live in is fragile, arbitrary, and ritualistic; socially structured by deep, silent, tacit agreements with others of which people are frequently only dimly aware.

Folkways, Mores, and Taboos

Norms may be further classified as mores, folkways, or taboos. **Mores** (pronounced *mor-ays*) are norms that embody the moral views and principles of a group. They are based on social requirements. Violating them can have serious consequences. The strongest mores are legally protected with laws or other formal norms. In Canada, for instance, murder is considered immoral, and it is punishable by law (a formal norm). More often, mores are judged and guarded by public sentiment (an informal norm). People who violate mores are seen as shameful. They can even be shunned or banned from some groups. The mores of the Canadian school system require that a student’s writing be in the student’s own words or else the student should use special stylistic forms such as quotation marks and a system of citation, like APA (American Psychological Association) or MLA (Modern Language Association) style, for crediting the words to other

writers. Writing another person's words as if they are one's own has a name: plagiarism. The consequences for violating this norm are severe, and can even result in expulsion.

Unlike mores, **folkways** are norms without any moral underpinnings. They are based on social preferences. Folkways direct appropriate behaviour in the day-to-day practices and expressions of a culture. Folkways indicate whether to shake hands or kiss on the cheek when greeting another person. They specify whether to wear a tie and a blazer or a T-shirt and sandals to an event. In Canada, women can smile and say hello to men on the street. In Egypt, it is not acceptable. In northern Europe, it is fine for people to go into a sauna or hot tub naked. Often in North America, it is not. An opinion poll that asked Canadian women what they felt would end a relationship after a first date showed that women in British Columbia were pickier than women in the rest of the country (*Times Colonist*, 2014). First date deal breakers included poor hygiene (82%), being distracted by a mobile device (74%), talking about sexual history and being rude to waiters (72%), and eating with one's mouth open (60%). All of these examples illustrate breaking informal rules, which are not serious enough to be called mores, but are serious enough to terminate a relationship before it has begun. Folkways might be small manners, but they are by no means trivial.

Taboos refer to actions which are strongly forbidden by deeply held sacred or moral beliefs. They are the strongest and most deeply held norms. Their transgression evokes revulsion and severe punishment. In its original use taboo referred to being "consecrated, inviolable, forbidden, unclean, or cursed" (Cook & King, 1784). There was a clear supernatural context for the prohibition; the act offended the gods or ancestors, and evoked their retribution. In secular contexts, taboos refer to powerful, moral prohibitions that protect what are regarded as inviolable bonds between people. Incest, pedophilia, and patricide or matricide are taboos.

Many mores, folkways, and taboos are taken for granted in everyday life. People need to act without thinking to get seamlessly through daily routines; they can not stop and analyze every action (Sumner, 1906). They become part of routines, or cultural practices. As Dorothy Smith (1999) put it, the different levels of norm enable the "ongoing concerting and coordinating of individuals' activities." These different levels of norm help people negotiate their daily life within a given culture, and as such their study is crucial for understanding the distinctions between different cultures.

Practices

Even an action as seemingly simple as commuting to work evidences a great deal of cultural propriety. Take the case of going to work on public transportation. Whether commuting in Dublin, Cairo, Mumbai, or Vancouver, many behaviours will be the same in all locations, but significant differences also arise between cultures. Typically in Canada, a passenger finds a marked bus stop or station, waits for the bus or train, pays an agent before or after boarding, and quietly takes a seat if one is available. But when boarding a bus in Cairo, passengers might have to run, because buses there often do not come to a full stop to take on patrons. Dublin bus riders are expected to extend an arm to indicate that they want the bus to stop for them. When boarding a commuter train in Mumbai, passengers must squeeze into overstuffed cars amid a lot of pushing and shoving on the crowded platforms. That kind of behaviour would be considered the height of rudeness in Canada, but in Mumbai it reflects the daily challenges of getting around on a train system that is taxed to capacity.

In this example of commuting, the different cultural practices are seen as various solutions to a common problem, the problem of public transportation by bus. The problem is shared, but the solutions are different. Practices in general are simply ways of doing things. The idea of a **cultural practice** indicates that a way of doing things is embedded in a particular culture. They express a particular way of seeing and interpreting the world, a particular type of know-how or practical knowledge, a particular set of social expectations and constraints, and a particular set of customs or traditions.

Symbols and Language




Figure 3.18 Some road signs are universal. But how would you interpret sign (b)?
(Photo (a) courtesy of Taber Andrew Bain/Flickr, ; photo (b) courtesy of HonzaSoukup/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Humans, consciously and subconsciously, are always striving to make sense of their surrounding world. **Symbols** — such as gestures, signs, objects, signals, and words — are tangible marks that stand in for, or represent, something else in an act of communication. Through symbols an understanding of underlying experiences, statuses, states, and ideas is expressed and can be passed from one person to another. They *symbolize* these underlying contents and convey them as recognizable markers of meaning shared by societies. They are therefore *necessarily* social, otherwise they could not be used to communicate. In the words of George Herbert Mead (1934):

Our symbols are universal. You cannot say anything that is absolutely particular, anything you say that has any meaning at all is universal.

The social world is filled with symbols. Sports uniforms, company logos, and traffic signs are symbols. In North America, a gold ring on the fourth finger of the left hand is a symbol of marriage. In many European countries the wedding ring is worn on the right hand. Some symbols are highly functional; stop signs, for instance, provide useful instruction. A police officer's badge and uniform are symbols of authority and law enforcement. The sight of a police officer in uniform or in a police car triggers reassurance in some citizens, but annoyance, fear, or anger in others. Some symbols are only valuable in what they represent. Trophies, blue ribbons, or gold medals, for example, serve no purpose other than to represent accomplishments.



Figure 3.19 Unisex toilet. Symbols are not free of the tensions, conflicts, and power structures of the wider society. (Image courtesy of Bart Maguire/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

It is easy to take symbols for granted. Few people challenge or even think about the signs on the doors of public restrooms, but the figures on the signs are more than just symbols that tell men and women which restroom to use. They also uphold the value, in North America, that public restrooms should be gender exclusive. Even though stalls are relatively private, it is still somewhat uncommon to encounter unisex bathrooms.

Symbols often get noticed when they are used out of context. Used unconventionally, symbols convey strong messages. A stop sign on the door of a corporation makes a political statement, as does a semi-truck used as a barricade in a protest. Together, the semaphore signals for “N” and “D”



Figure 3.20 An exercise in *detournement* in Barcelona transforms the symbol for “do not enter” into a hand holding a brick, a symbol for insurrection. (Image courtesy of ach/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

represent nuclear disarmament and form the well-known peace sign (Westcott, 2008). Internet memes — images that spread from person to person through reposting — often adopt the tactics of **detournement** or misappropriation used by the French Situationists of the 1950s and 1960s. The Situationists sought to subvert media and political messages by altering them slightly — “detouring” or hijacking them — in order to defamiliarize familiar messages, signs, and symbols. An ordinary image of a cat combined with the grammatically-challenged caption “I Can Has Cheezburger?” spawned the internet phenomenon “lolcats” because of the funny, nonsensical nature of its non sequitur message.

Even the destruction of symbols is symbolic. Effigies representing public figures are beaten or burned to demonstrate anger at certain leaders. In 1989, crowds tore down the Berlin Wall, a decades-old symbol of the division between East and West Germany, that was itself a symbol of the “Cold War” between communist and capitalist political blocs.

Language

While different cultures have varying systems of symbols, there is one that is common to all: the use of language. **Language** is a symbolic system through which people communicate and through which culture is transmitted. Some languages contain a system of symbols used for written communication, while others rely only on spoken communication and nonverbal actions.

For Emile Durkheim (1938), language is a prime example of a **social fact**. It exists only in people’s heads or in their usage of it, yet it exists externally to them “in its own right.” Language acts as an external constraint, it operates throughout a whole society and exists as an entity independent of its individual manifestations. Languages in a strange way are not created by individuals. They precede the individual and continue to exist after the individual is gone. They frequently impose detailed obligations on the individual that they are unaware of (vocabulary or the rules of correct word usage and grammar, for example). They operate independently of people’s wills as if endowed with an external coercive power that controls them (determining what can and cannot be said, or even what can and cannot be thought, for example),

rather than the other way around. By entering into language, a child enters into a whole conceptual order in which a place — that of the “child” and the meanings of “child” — is already laid out for them.

Some elements of language are fixed by **codes**. A code is a set of cultural conventions, instructions, or rules used to combine symbols to communicate meaning. Like the codes used in ciphers to encode secret messages, the sender of a message and the receiver of a message have to share the same instructions for how to encode and decode a message correctly or else communication cannot occur. Codes therefore govern combinations of symbols that are permitted (and thereby make sense) and combinations which are forbidden (and thereby produce nonsense).



Figure 3.21 Panzani ad from Barthes’ *Rhetoric of the Image*. What is the ad trying to convince the viewer of? (Image from Barthes, 1977.) [Fair Dealing](#)/ Canadian Copyright Act

Grammatical codes for example are sets of instructions that structure the choice of words — nouns, verbs, adjectives, prepositions, pronouns, adverbs, conjunctions, etc. — that can be combined to make a meaningful sentence. “The boy cried” is coded correctly and conveys a clear image. “Boy the cried” is incorrectly coded and conveys no image. But codes are often more culturally complex than this in the sense that communication depends on being able to combine and interpret numerous cultural conventions, meanings, symbols, and connotations. For example, in a famous analysis of a Panzani pasta ad, Roland Barthes (1977) noted that in order to “get” the ad one had to be able to read the codes that signified the product’s “Italianness” and associate the product with the freshness of ripe tomatoes and the freedom of shopping in outdoor markets. People competently decode these types of message everyday. But how do they do it? How do they know the instructions that let them decode the messages?

One type of deep cultural code that fixes the meaning of language is the **binary opposition**. A binary opposition is a set of paired terms, considered as mutually exclusive and logical

opposites, which structure a whole set or system of meanings. “Male/female” structures how people think about gender. “Culture/nature” structures how people think about their relationship to nature. “Us/them” structures how people think about politics. Usually in a society one term in the binary opposition is privileged over another in a way that makes the inequalities that structure institutional organization seem natural. However, there are no binary oppositions in nature. They are products of a *cultural distinction*.

Durkheim already noted how the opposition between sacred/profane — things that were holy and things that were ordinary — was the central organizing structure or code that defined all religion (see [Chapter 15. Religion](#)). The anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss (1978) expanded on this to argue that irreconcilable opposites were at the heart of all cultural systems. They were “the invariant elements among superficial differences” (Levi-Strauss, 1978). This explained the underlying similarities in myths observed in the ethnographic record between vastly divergent groups. Levi-Strauss argued that myths use stories to resolve problems of binary opposition that are common to the human condition: How are animals and gods different than humans? Why are some people heroes and other people villains? How can humans survive in a harsh and unpredictable nature? The analysis of deep structures of meaning like binary oppositions behind the manifestations of culture — stories, belief systems, values, practices, etc. — became known as **structuralism**.



Figure 3.22 Light switch as binary opposition with two options: On/off. (Image courtesy of Jeff Golden.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

Language is also constantly evolving. Rules for speaking and writing vary even within cultures, most notably by region and level of formality. Does one refer to a can of carbonated liquid as a soda, pop, or soft drink? When leaving a restaurant, does one ask the server for the cheque, the ticket, l'addition, or the bill? Language also changes as societies create new ideas. In this age of social media technology, people have adapted almost instantly to new nouns such as email, internet and cyberspace, and verbs such as download, text, tweet, google, and blog. Thirty years ago, the general public would have considered these words gibberish.




Figure 3.23 Elevator in Thailand missing buttons 4, 13, 14, 24, 34. In Vancouver, the chief building officer for the city had to issue a bulletin to stop the superstitious practice of skipping floors because this proved confusing to emergency services (Lee, 2015). (Image courtesy of Dushan Hanuska/Flickr.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

Even while it constantly evolves, language continues to act as a “social fact” to shape social reality. This insight was established in the 1920s by two linguists, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf. They believed that reality is culturally determined, and that any interpretation of reality is based on a society’s language. To prove this point, the sociologists argued that every language has words or expressions specific to that language. In Western societies, for example, the number 13 is associated with bad luck. Fear of Friday the 13th is referred to as *paraskevidekatriaphobia*, high rise buildings often do not have 13th floors, and some evidence even indicates that hospital admissions due to traffic accidents increase on Friday the 13th (Scanlon et al., 1993). In many Asian societies, however, the number four is considered unlucky, since it is pronounced similarly to the word for death in many Asian languages. Consequently, buildings often do not have a fourth floor, it is difficult to buy things in sets of four and some research indicates that Asian people are more likely to have heart attacks on the 4th of the month (Phillips et al., 2001).

The **Sapir-Whorf hypothesis** is based on the idea that people experience their world through their language and that they, therefore, understand the world through the culture embedded in their language. The hypothesis, which has also been called linguistic relativity, states that people initially develop language to express concepts that emerge from their direct experience of the world, but afterwards language as a system of meaning comes back to shape their experience of the world (Swoyer, 2003). Studies

have shown, for instance, that unless people have access to the word “ambivalent,” they do not recognize an experience of ambivalence due to conflicting positive and negative feelings about one issue. If a person cannot describe the experience, the person cannot have the experience.

Similarly, at the beginning of this chapter, in Wade Davis’ (2007) discussion about the ethnosphere — the sum total of “ways of thinking, ways of being, and ways of orienting oneself on the earth” — each language is understood to be more than just a set of symbols and linguistic rules. Each language is an archive of a culture’s unique cosmology, wisdom, ecological knowledge, rituals, beliefs and norms. Each contributes a unique solution to the question of what it means to be human.

The compilers of *Ethnologue* estimate that currently 7,105 languages are used in the world (Lewis et al., 2013). This would suggest that there are at least 7,105 distinct cultural contexts through which humans interpret and experience the world. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis would suggest that their worlds differ to the degree that their languages differ. However Davis notes that today half of the world’s languages are no longer being passed down to children. When languages die out or fail to be passed on to subsequent

generations, whole ways of knowing and being in the world die out with them and the ethnosphere is diminished. Norris (2007) reports that at least 10 once flourishing Indigenous languages have become extinct in Canada over the past 100 years. Of the 11 remaining Indigenous language families, 7 were listed as endangered, mostly endangered or uncertain.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

Is Canada Bilingual?



Figure 3.24 Starbucks on Rue University, Montreal. (Image courtesy of 12th St David/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

In the 1960s it became clear that the federal government needed to develop a bilingual language policy to integrate French Canadians into the national identity and prevent their further alienation. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1965) recommended establishing official bilingualism within the federal government. As a result, the *Official Languages Act* became law in 1969 and established both English and French as the official languages of the federal government and federal institutions such as the courts. Pierre Elliott Trudeau's governments of the late 1960s and early 1970s had an even broader ambition: to make Canada itself bilingual. Not only would Canadians be able to access government services in either French

or English, no matter where they were in the country, but also receive French or English education. The entire country would be home for both French or English speakers (McRoberts, 1997).

However, in the 1971 census 67% of Canadians spoke English most often at home, while only 26% spoke French at home and most of those were in Quebec. Approximately 13% of Canadians could maintain a conversation in both languages (Statistics Canada, 2007). Outside Quebec, the province with the highest proportion of people who spoke French at home was New Brunswick at 31.4%. The next highest were Ontario at 4.6% and Manitoba at 4%. In British Columbia, only 0.5% of the population spoke French at home. French speakers had widely settled Canada, but French speaking outside Quebec had lost ground since Confederation because of the higher rates of anglophone immigrants, the assimilation of Francophones, and the lack of French-speaking institutions outside Quebec (McRoberts, 1997). It seemed even in 1971 that the ideal of creating a bilingual nation was unlikely and unrealistic.

What has happened to the concept of bilingualism over the last 50 years? According to the 2011 census, 58% of the Canadian population spoke English at home, while only 18.2% spoke French at home. Proportionately the number of both English and French speakers has actually decreased since the

introduction of the *Official Languages Act* in 1969. On the other hand, the number of people who can maintain a conversation in both official languages has increased to 17.5% from 13% (Statistics Canada, 2007). However, the most significant linguistic change in Canada has not been French-English bilingualism, but the growth in the use of languages other than French and English. In a sense, what has happened is that the shifting cultural composition of Canada has rendered the goal of a bilingual nation anachronistic.

Today it would be more accurate to speak of Canada as a multilingual nation. One-fifth of Canadians speak a language other than French or English at home; 11.5% report speaking English and a language other than French, and 1.3% report speaking French and a language other than English. In Toronto, 32.2% of the population speak a language other than French and English at home: 8.8% speak Cantonese, 8% speak Punjabi, 7% speak an unspecified dialect of Chinese, 5.9% speak Urdu, and 5.7% speak Tamil. In Greater Vancouver, 31% of the population speak a language other than French and English at home: 17.7% of whom speak Punjabi, followed by 16.0% who speak Cantonese, 12.2% who speak an unspecified dialect of Chinese, 11.8% who speak Mandarin, and 6.7% who speak Philippine Tagalog.

Today, the government of Canada still conducts business in both official languages. French and English are the dominant languages in the workplace and schools. Labels on products are required to be in both French and English. But increasingly a lot of product information is also made available in multiple languages. In Vancouver and Toronto, and to a lesser extent Montreal, linguistic diversity has become increasingly prevalent. French and English are still the central languages of convergence and integration for immigrant communities who speak other languages — only 1.8% of the population were unable to conduct a conversation in either English or French in 2011 — but increasingly Canada is linguistically diverse rather than bilingual in the two official languages.



Figure 3.25 Nowadays, many signs — on streets and in stores — are multilingual. Is this just a more effective way to communicate information or does it signal a shift to a multilingual society? What effect does it have on our culture? (Photo courtesy of Michael Gil/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

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3.3. Culture as Innovation: Pop Culture, Subculture, Global Culture

CONTENTS COPYRIGHTED 1936

JUNE 1936

ASTOUNDING

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STORIES



*The Shadow
Out of Time*
H. P. Lovecraft

also: Schachner, Van Lorne,
Coblentz, Corbett, Williamson

Figure 3.26 Pop culture heroes from the early days of pulp fiction. The term “pulp” refers to the cheap and disposable wood-pulp paper the books and magazines were published on. (Image painted by Howard V. Brown, courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

In the introduction to this chapter, culture was defined as the source of the shared meanings through which people interpret and orient themselves to the world. While cultural practices are in some respects always a response to biological givens or to the structure of the socioeconomic formation, they are not determined by these factors. Culture is innovative. It expresses the human imagination in its capacity to go beyond what is given, to solve problems, to produce **innovations** — new objects, ideas, or ways of being introduced to culture for the first time. At the same time, people are born into cultures that pre-exist them and shape them. Languages, ways of thinking, ways of doing things, and artifacts are elements of culture people do not invent but inherit. They are ready-made forms of life that people fit themselves into. Culture can, therefore, also be restrictive, imposing ways of life, beliefs, and practices on people, and limiting the possibilities of what they can think and do. As Karl Marx (1852) said, “the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.”

The next two sections of this chapter will examine aspects of culture which are innovative — high culture and popular culture, subcultures, and global culture — and aspects of culture which are restrictive — rationalization and consumerism.

High Culture and Popular Culture

Does a person prefer listening to opera or hip hop music? Do they like watching horse jumping or NASCAR? Do they read books of poetry or magazines about celebrities? In each of these choices, one type of entertainment is considered high culture and the other low culture. Sociologists use the term **high culture** to describe forms of cultural experience that are meant to *cultivate* and refine people’s sensibility: their ability to appreciate and respond to complex emotional, intellectual, or aesthetic influences. High cultural forms are characterized by formal complexity, eternal values, originality, and authenticity such as is provided by Beethoven’s string quartets, Picasso’s paintings, Sergei Diaghilev’s ballets, or James Joyce’s *Ulysses*. People often associate high culture with intellectualism, aesthetic taste, elitism, wealth, and prestige because it is not immediately accessible and requires cultivation or education to appreciate.

Pierre Bourdieu (1984) argues further that high culture is not only a symbol of cultural distinction, but a means of maintaining status and power distinctions through the transfer of **cultural capital**: the knowledge, skills, tastes, mannerisms, speaking style, posture, material possessions, credentials, etc. that a person acquires from their family and class background. Events considered high culture can be expensive and formal — attending a ballet, seeing a play, or listening to a live symphony performance — and the people who are in a position to appreciate these events are often those who have enjoyed the benefits of an enriched and exclusive educational background. Their sophistication is the product of an investment in cultural refinement that serves as the basis of status distinctions in society. Nevertheless, high culture itself is a product of focused and intensive cultural innovation and creativity.

The term **popular culture** refers to forms of cultural experience and attitude that circulate in mainstream society: cultural experiences that are well-liked by “the people.” Popular culture events might include folk music, hip hop, parades, hockey games, or rock concerts. Some popular culture originated in folk traditions like quilting, carnival festivities, fiddle music, spirit dancing, *commedia dell’arte* and religious festivals. Other pop culture is considered popular because it is commercialized and marketed to a wide audience. Rock and pop music — “pop” is short for “popular” — are part of modern popular culture that developed first with the publication of sheet music and then with recordings. In modern times, popular culture is often expressed and spread via commercial media such as radio, television, movies, the music industry, bestseller publishers, and corporate-run websites. Unlike high culture, popular culture is known and accessible to most people. One can expect to be able to share a discussion of favourite hockey

teams with a new coworker, or comment on a current TV show when making small talk in the check-out line at the grocery store. But if you tried to launch into a deep discussion on the classical Greek play *Antigone*, few members of Canadian society today would be familiar with it.

Although high culture may be viewed as artistically superior to popular culture, the labels of high culture and popular culture vary over time and place. Shakespearean plays, considered pop culture when they were written, are now among Canadian society's high culture. In the current "Second Golden Age of Television" (2000s to the present, the first Golden Age was in the 1950s and 1960s), television programming has gone from mass audience situation comedies, soap operas, and crime dramas to the development of "high-quality" series with increasingly sophisticated characters, narratives, and themes that require full attention and cultural capital to follow (e.g., *The Sopranos*, *Breaking Bad*, *Game of Thrones*, *The Crown*).



Figure 3.27 Celebration Town Hall in the Walt Disney town of Celebration, Florida, is an example of postmodern architecture that playfully borrows and blends elements from historical styles (Greek stoa left, grain silo right) instead of inventing new styles in the modern tradition. The Town Hall is also, perhaps unintentionally, ironic because the town has no mayor or local municipal government. Disney Corporation directly administers the town, which is modelled on Walt Disney World resort's nostalgic image of small-town America. (Image courtesy of trevor.patt/Flickr) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

Contemporary popular culture is frequently referred to as a *postmodern* culture. This is often presented in contrast to *modern* culture, or *modernity*. The term **modernity** refers to the culture associated with the rise of capitalism in which the world came to be experienced as a place of constant change and transformation, and culture as a sequence of new or contemporary "nows" in which the things of today are "modern" and those of yesterday old and no longer relevant (Sayer, 1991).

In the era of modern culture, or *modernity*, the distinction between high culture and popular culture framed the experience of culture in a more or less a clear way. One side of high culture in the 19th and 20th century was experimental and avant-garde, seeking new and original forms in literature, art, and music to authentically express the elusive, transient, ever-changing experiences

of modern life. The other side of high culture was the tradition of conserving and passing down the highest and most refined expressions of human cultural possibility: the eternal values and noble sensibilities contained in the "great works" of culture. High culture had a civilizing mission to either capture and articulate new forms of experiencing the world, or to preserve, pass down and renew what was eternal in the tradition. In both forms, high culture appealed to a limited but sophisticated audience.

Popular culture, on the other hand, was simply the culture of the people; it was immediately accessible and easily digestible, either in the form of folk traditions or commercialized mass culture. It had no pretension to be more than entertainment and the site of momentary enthusiasms and fads — hit songs, bestsellers, popular film stars, fashion trends, house decor styles, dance crazes, etc.

In **postmodern culture** — the form of culture that comes after or 'post' modern culture — this distinction begins to break down, and it becomes more common to find various sorts of mash-ups of high and low: Serious literature combined with themes from zombie movies; pop music constructed from recycled samples of original hooks and melodies; symphony orchestras performing the soundtracks of cartoons; architecture that playfully borrows and blends historical styles instead of inventing new ones; etc. Rock music is now the subject of many high brow histories and academic analyses, just as the common objects of popular culture are transformed into symbols with depth of meaning as high art (e.g., Andy Warhol's *Campbell's Soup Cans* or Marvel Studios epics based on kid's comic books of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s). The dominant sensibility of postmodern popular culture is both playful and ironic, as if the blending and mixing of cultural sources, like in the television show *The Simpsons*, is one big in-joke based on references that only people 'in the know' will get. Postmodern culture has therefore been referred to as a "culture of quotations" (Jameson, 1985) in the sense that instead of searching for new, authentic forms, as in avant-garde modernism, or preserving and revering high cultural sensibilities, as in the classics, it recycles and remixes (i.e., quotes) elements of previous cultural production, often with a tongue in cheek ironic attitude.

Frederic Jameson (1985) argues that the mixing and blending of postmodern culture is not just a cultural trend or fashion, but reflects an underlying shift in the nature of culture itself. From a historical materialist perspective, if the culture of modernity was tied to the rise of industrial capitalism, the culture of postmodernity is tied to *late capitalism*. The culture of modernity was focused on the new, just as capitalism has to constantly innovate in the pursuit of markets and profitability. But the categories of high and low remained stable, just as the commodities of industrial capitalism remained concrete: resources, appliances, automobiles, etc. However, late capitalism is much less concrete. The commodities of late capitalism are frequently images, brands, services and knowledge rather than tangible industrial products. The dominant technologies are computer codes and instantaneous communication networks rather than railroads and industrial machinery. Flows of capital investment are globalized rather than centered in particular national economies and cultures. Jameson argues that under these circumstances it becomes increasingly difficult to “cognitively map” one’s location in this complex global space, although this is what a culture is supposed to do.

The outcome is the emergence of a postmodern culture, which is seen to challenge modern culture in a number of key ways. The postmodern eclectic mix of elements from different times and places challenges the modernist concepts of authentic expression and progress. The idea that cultural creations can and should seek new and innovative ways to express the truths and deep meanings of life was linked to a belief in social progress. The playfulness and irony of postmodern culture seem to undermine the core values of modernity, especially the idea that cultural critique or innovations in architecture, art, and literature, etc. have an important role in, not just entertaining people, but improving the quality of social life. In postmodernity, nothing is to be taken very seriously, even people themselves. Moreover, in postmodernity everyone with access to a computer and some editing software is seen to be a cultural producer; everyone has a voice and with enough “likes” any voice can be important and influential. Access to knowledge does not require arduous and careful research but is simply a matter of crowd-sourcing. The modernist myth of the great creator or genius is rejected in favour of populism and a plurality of voices.

Jean Francois Lyotard (1984) defines postmodern culture as “incredulity towards metanarratives” meaning that postmoderns no longer really believe in the big (i.e., meta) stories and social projects of modernity: progress towards universalization, rationalization, and systemization. Postmoderns are skeptical of the claims that scientific knowledge leads to progress, that political change creates human emancipation, that *Truth* sets people free.

Some argue pessimistically that the outcome of this erosion of authority and decline in consensus around core values is a thorough relativism of values in which no standard exists to judge one thing to be more significant than another. Everyone makes up their own little stories, each as valid as the next — as sociologists have observed with regard to conspiracy theories, or people “doing their own research” on the science of climate change or vaccines. The outcome of the postmodern condition is a culture without a consensus on common, shared standards of truth, value or even a shared reality.

Others argue optimistically that the outcome leads to pluralization, an emancipation from centralized institutions of authority, and a weakening of attachments to the dominant culture. It brings a loosening of social bonds and increased freedom. Postmodernism enables a necessary critique of the unexamined assumptions of power and authority in modern culture — the rhetoric of patriotism, “family values,” or “scientific progress” lampooned in *The Simpsons*, for example. Instead of the privileged truths of elites and authorities, postmodernity witnesses the emergence of a plurality of different voices that had been relegated to the margins. Culture moves away from homogeneous sameness and uniformity to heterogeneous diversity.

Subculture and Counterculture



Figure 3.28 Skinhead style consists of “cropped hair, braces, short, wide Levi jeans or functional Sta-Prest trousers, plain or button-down Ben Sherman shirts, and highly polished Doctor Marten boots” (Hebdige, 1979). (Image courtesy of Flavia/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

A **subculture** is just as it sounds — a smaller cultural group within a larger parent culture. People of a subculture are part of the parent culture, but also share a specific identity within a smaller group that distinguishes them. Many subcultures exist within Canada. Within larger ethnic groups, who share the language, food, and customs of their heritage, are subcultures like Rastafarianism, Bhangra, or Chadō. Other subcultures are united by shared pastimes. For example, biker culture revolves around a dedication to motorcycles. Some subcultures are formed by members who possess traits or preferences that differ from the majority of a society’s population. The body modification community embraces aesthetic additions to the human body, such as tattoos, piercings, and certain forms of plastic surgery. But even as members of a subculture band together around a distinct identity, they still identify with and hold many things in common with their larger parent culture.

As Hall, Jefferson and Roberts (1975) point out with respect to bohemian subculture for example:

The bohemian sub-culture of the avant-garde which has arisen from time to time in the modern city, is both distinct from its ‘parent’ culture (the urban culture of the middle class intelligentsia) and yet also a part of it (sharing with it a modernising outlook, standards of education, a privileged position vis-a-vis productive labour, and so on).

Sociologists distinguish subcultures from **countercultures**, which are a type of subculture that explicitly reject the larger culture’s norms and values. In contrast to subcultures, which operate relatively smoothly within the larger society, countercultures actively defy larger society by developing their own set of rules and norms to live by, sometimes even creating alternative communities that operate outside of the greater society. Vegans who choose to not eat meat, fish or dairy products because they like the health benefits, cuisine or lifestyle of the vegan diet would be an example of a subculture. Although this dietary choice is distinct from the dominant culture, dietary health, pleasure in good food and making lifestyle choices are consistent with dominant cultural values. However, vegans who reject the industrial food system and the harvesting of animals for human consumption entirely have to take more radical steps to build a life which is consistent in itself and outside or counter to the dominant norms and structures of society.

The post-World War II period was characterized by a series of “spectacular” youth cultures — teddy boys, beatniks, mods, hippies, bikers, skinheads, Rastas, punks, new wavers, ravers, hip-hoppers, and hipsters — who in various ways sought to reject the values of their parents’ generation. For some, joining these groups was just for the music, clothing or style of life. But for others, the rejection of the dominant culture had more radical implications. The hippies, for example, were a subculture that became a counterculture, blending protest against the Vietnam War, industrial technology, and consumer culture with a back to the land movement, non-Western forms of spirituality, and the practice of voluntary simplicity. They “explored ‘alternative institutions’ to the central institutions of the dominant culture: new patterns of living, of family-life, of work or even ‘un-careers’” (Hall, Jefferson and Roberts, 1975). Counterculture, in this example, refers to the culture or way of life taken by a political and social protest movement.

Cults, a word derived from *cultus* or the “care” owed to the observance of spiritual rituals, are also considered countercultural groups. They are usually informal, transient, religious groups or movements that deviate from orthodox beliefs and often, but not always, involve an intense emotional commitment to the group and allegiance to a charismatic leader. In pluralistic societies like Canada, they represent quasi-legitimate forms of social experimentation with

alternate forms of religious practice, community, sexuality and gender relations, proselytizing, economic organization, healing, and therapy (Dawson and Thiessen, 2014). However, sometimes their challenge to conventional laws and norms is regarded as going too far by the dominant society. For example, the group Yearning for Zion (YFZ) in Eldorado, Texas existed outside the mainstream, and the limelight, until its leader was accused of statutory rape and underage marriage. The sect's formal norms clashed too severely to be tolerated by U.S. law, and in 2008 authorities raided the compound, removing more than 200 women and children from the property (Oprah.com, 2009).

The degree to which countercultures reject the larger culture's norms and values is questionable, however. In the analysis of spectacular, British working class youth subcultures like the teddy boys, mods, and skinheads, Phil Cohen (1972) noted that the style and the focal concerns of the groups could be seen as a "compromise solution between two contradictory needs: the need to create and express autonomy and difference from parents...and the need to maintain parental identifications" (as cited in Hebdige, 1979). In the 1960s and 70s, for example, skinheads shaved their heads, listened to ska music from Jamaica, participated in racist chants at soccer games, and wore highly polished Doctor Marten boots ("Doc Martens") in a manner that deliberately alienated their working class parents while expressing their own adherence to blue collar working class imagery. At the same time, noted Cohen, their subcultural outfit was more or less a "caricature of the model worker" their parents aspired to, and their attitude simply exaggerated the proletarian, puritanical, and chauvinist traits of their parents' generation. On one hand, the invention of skinhead culture was an innovative cultural creation that seemed to reject the dominant culture; on the other hand, it just exaggerated and reproduced the already existing contradictions of the skinheads' class position and that of their parents.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

The Evolution of North American Hipster Subculture



Figure 3.29 Intellectual and trendy, today's hipsters define themselves through cultural irony. (Photo courtesy of Lorena Cupcake/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Skinny jeans, chunky glasses, ironic moustaches, retro-style single speed bicycles, and T-shirts with vintage logos — the hipster is a recognizable figure in contemporary North American culture. Predominantly based in metropolitan areas, hipsters seek to define themselves by a rejection of mainstream norms and fashion styles. As a subculture, hipsters spurn many values and beliefs of North American society, tending to prefer a bohemian lifestyle over one defined by the accumulation of power and wealth. At the same time they evince a concern that borders on a fetish with the pedigree of the music, styles, and objects that identify their focal concerns.

When did hipster subculture begin? While commonly viewed as a recent trend among middle-class youth, the history of the group stretches back to the early decades of the 1900s. In the 1940s, black American jazz music was on the rise in the United States. Musicians were known as hepcats and had a smooth, relaxed style that contrasted with more conservative and mainstream expressions of cultural taste. Norman Mailer (1923 – 2007), in his essay *The White Negro: Superficial Reflections on the Hipster* (1957), defined those who were “hep” or “hip” as largely white youth living by a black jazz-inspired code of resistance, while those who

were “square” lived according to society’s rules and conventions. As hipster attitudes spread and young people were increasingly drawn to alternative music and fashion, attitudes and language derived from the culture of jazz were adopted. Unlike the vernacular of the day, hipster slang was purposefully ambiguous. When hipsters said, “It’s cool, man,” they meant not that everything was good, but that it was the way it was.



Figure 3.30 In the 1940s, American hipsters were associated with the “cool” culture of jazz. (Photo courtesy of William P. Gottlieb/Ira and Leonore S. Gershwin Fund Collection, Music Division, Library of Congress.) [Public Domain](#)

By the 1950s, another variation on the subculture was on the rise. The beat generation, a title coined by Quebecois-American writer Jack Kerouac (1922-1969), was defined as a generation that was nonconformist and anti-materialistic. Prominent in this movement were writers and poets who listened to jazz, studied Eastern religions, experimented with different states of experience, and embraced radical politics of personal liberation. They “bummed around,” hitchhiked the country, sought experience, and lived marginally. Even in the early stages of the development of the subculture there was a difference between the emphasis in beat and hipster styles:

... the hipster was ... [a] typical lower-class dandy, dressed up like a pimp, affecting a very cool, cerebral tone — to distinguish him from the gross, impulsive types that surrounded him in the ghetto — and aspiring to the finer things in life, like very good “tea,” the finest of sounds — jazz or Afro-Cuban ... [whereas] ... the Beat was originally some earnest middle-class college boy like Kerouac, who was stifled by the cities and the culture he had inherited and who wanted to cut out for distant and exotic places, where he could live like the “people,” write, smoke and meditate (Goldman as cited in Hebdige, 1979)

While the beat was focused on inner experience, the hipster was focused on the external style.

By the end of the 1950s, the influence of jazz was winding down and many traits of hepcat culture were

becoming mainstream. College students, questioning the relevance and vitality of the American dream in the face of post-war skepticism, clutched copies of Kerouac's *On the Road*, dressed in berets, black turtlenecks, and black-rimmed glasses. Women wore black leotards and grew their hair long. The subculture became visible and was covered in *Life* magazine, *Esquire*, *Playboy*, and other mainstream media. Herb Caen (1916-1997), a San Francisco journalist, used the suffix from *Sputnik 1*, the Russian satellite that orbited Earth in 1957, to dub the movement's followers as "beatniks." They were subsequently lampooned as lazy layabouts in television shows like *The Many Loves of Dobie Gillis* (1959-1963) or dangerous, drug-abusing delinquents in movies like *High School Confidential* (1958).



Figure 3.31 By the late 1950s and early 1960s beatnik subculture was being parodied. (Image courtesy of Sarah/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

As the beat generation faded, a new related movement began. It too focused on breaking social boundaries, but also advocated freedom of expression, philosophy, and love. It took its name from the generations before; in fact, some theorists claim that the beats themselves coined the term to describe their children. Over time, the "little hipsters" of the 1960s and 70s became known simply as hippies. Others note that hippie was a derogatory label invented by the mainstream press to discredit and stereotype the movement and its non-materialist aspirations.

Contemporary expressions of the hipster rose out of the hippie movement in the same way that hippies evolved from the beats and beats from hepcats. Although today's hipster may not seem to have much in common with the jazz-inspired youth of the 1940s, or the long-haired, back-to-the-land movement of the 1960s, an emphasis on nonconformity persists. The sociologist Mark Greif set about investigating the hipster subculture of the United States and found that much of what tied the group together was not a specific set of fashion or music choices, nor a specific point of contention with the mainstream. What has emerged, rather, is an appropriation of consumer capitalism that seeks authenticity in and of itself. In his *New York Times* article "The Hipster in the Mirror" Greif wrote, "All hipsters play at being the inventors or

first adopters of novelties: pride comes from knowing, and deciding, what's cool in advance of the rest of the world" (2010). What tends to be cool is an ironic pastiche of borrowed styles or tastes that signify other identities or histories: alternative music (sometimes very obscure), used vintage clothing, organic and artisanal foods and products, single gear bikes, and countercultural values and lifestyles.

Young people are often drawn to oppose mainstream conventions. Much as the hepcats of the jazz era opposed common culture with carefully crafted appearances of coolness and relaxation, modern hipsters reject mainstream values with a purposeful apathy, while embracing their particular enthusiasms with what seems to others like excessive intensity and attention to detail. Ironic, cool to the point of non-caring, and intellectual, hipsters continue to embody a subculture while simultaneously impacting mainstream culture.

Global Culture

The integration of world markets, technological advances, global media communications, and international migration of the last decades have allowed for greater exchange between cultures through the processes of **globalization** and **diffusion**. As noted in [Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology](#), globalization refers to the ways in which people no longer "live and act in the self-enclosed spaces of national states and their respective national societies" (Beck, 2000). Globalization is the process by which "a supraterritorial dimension of social relations" emerges and spreads (Scholte, 2000). The world is becoming one place, like a "global village," as Canadian media theorist, Marshall McLuhan (1962) described. In this context, culture itself has become increasingly globalized. Life styles, activities, cuisines, clothing styles, cultural references, religions, music preferences, images, news reports and many other facets of contemporary cultural life are no longer pinned to the location where people live or grew up.

Globalization has been a process underway for 500 years but it has intensified over the last 30 years. Arjun Appadurai (1996) describes five dimensions of global cultural "flow" that have reshaped the landscape of culture in the 21st century.

- First is the increased movement or flow of people who bring their local cultures with them. He refers to this process as the creation of a new global *ethnoscape*: "tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and individuals constitute an essential feature of the world and appear to affect the politics of (and between) nations to a hitherto unprecedented degree."
- Second is the spread of technologies across borders, from electric toothbrushes and automobile parts to smart phones and biotech, which creates a global technological configuration or *technoscape*. Among other things, the global spread of technologies requires an immense amount of global cooperation to define the 22,000 international standards that allow technical components to work together (Frost, 2018).
- Third is the creation of new *financescapes*. Beginning in the 1970s, Western governments began to deregulate social services while granting greater liberties to private businesses. As a result of this process of neoliberalization, world markets became dominated by unregulated, international flows of capital investment and new multinational networks of corporations. A global economy emerged to surpass nationally-based economies.
- Finally Appadurai describes the new *mediascapes* and *ideoscapes* that emerge as people consume media content and political or religious discourses from different locations through global film and TV distribution, social media platforms like Google, Facebook and Twitter, and other electronic means of news and personal communication. These create "large and complex repertoires of images, narratives, and ethnoscapes to viewers throughout the world, in which the world of commodities and the world of news and politics are profoundly mixed" (Appadurai, 1996). The world shares a common information (and disinformation) space.

These processes of cultural globalization can be summed up by the term **diffusion**, which refers to the spread of material and non-material culture. Middle-class North Americans can fly overseas and return with a new appreciation of Thai noodles or Italian gelato. Access to television and the internet has brought the lifestyles and values portrayed in Hollywood sitcoms and “reality” TV series into homes around the globe. Twitter feeds from public demonstrations in one nation have encouraged political protesters in other countries. When this kind of diffusion occurs, material objects and ideas from one culture are introduced into another creating new and complex landscapes of cultural diversity.

Diaspora and Hybridity

One aspect of this complex landscape of cultural diversity is the creation of **diasporas**. The increasing flows of global migrants, temporary foreign workers, and political or economic refugees create globalized and displaced local communities as people from around the world spread out into global diasporas: the communities that emerge through resettlement of a people from their original homeland to new locations. As Arjun Appadurai (1996) suggests, “More people than ever before seem to imagine routinely the possibility that they or their children will live and work in places other than where they were born: this is the wellspring of the increased rates of migration at every level of social, national, and global life.” This likelihood of movement, whether actual or imagined, changes the cultural coordinates of how people see themselves in the world.




Figure 3.32 Officially patented in 1893 as the “clasp locker” (figure a), the zipper was a technology that did not diffuse through society for many decades. Today (figure b), it is an immediately recognizable feature of the global technoscape. (Photo (a) courtesy of U.S. Patent Office/Wikimedia Commons; Photo (b) courtesy of Rabensteiner/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

All migrants, refugees, temporary foreign workers, or travelers bring their beliefs, attitudes, languages, cuisines, music, religious practices, and other elements of local ways of life with them when they move, and they encounter new ones in the places where they arrive. What would appear to be different in the contemporary era of global migration is the way in which electronic media make it possible for migrants and travelers to keep in touch daily with not only friends and family, but also favourite TV shows, current events, sports, music, and other elements of culture from home. In the same way, electronic media give migrants access to the culture of their new homes just as they allow local residents to imagine future homes elsewhere in the world. In the era of globalization, the experience of culture is increasingly disembedded from location. The ways people imagine themselves and define their individual attachments, interests, and aspirations criss-cross and intertwine the divisions between cultures formerly established by the

territorial boundaries of societies.

Hybridity in cultures is one of the consequences of the increased global flows of capital, people, culture, and entertainment. Hybrid cultures refer to new forms of culture that arise from cross-cultural exchange, especially in the aftermath of the colonial era. On one hand, there are blendings of different cultural elements that had at one time been distinct and locally based: fusion cuisines, mixed martial arts, and New Age shamanism. On the other hand, there are processes of Indigenization and appropriation in which local cultures adopt and redefine foreign cultural forms. The classic examples are the cargo cults of Melanesia in which isolated Indigenous peoples “re-purposed” Western goods (cargo) within their own ritualistic practices in order to make sense of Westerners’ material wealth. Other examples include Arjun Appadurai’s (1996) discussion of how the colonial Victorian game of cricket has been taken over and

absorbed as a national passion into the culture of the Indian subcontinent. Similarly, Chinese “duplitecture” reconstructs famous European and North American buildings, or in the case of Hallstatt, Austria, entire villages, in Chinese housing developments (Bosker, 2013). As cultural diasporas or emigrant communities begin to introduce their cultural traditions to new homelands and absorb the cultural traditions they find there, opportunities for new and unpredictable forms of hybrid culture emerge.

Making Connections: Big Picture

Is There a Canadian Identity?



Figure 3.33 To what degree does Tim Hortons represent Canadian culture? Is it a cultural icon endangered by its sale to the international consortium 3G Capital, or does it already commodify Canadians' desire to identify with their national culture in order to sell a product? (Image courtesy of Caribb/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

The 2014 purchase of the Canadian coffee and donut chain Tim Hortons by 3G Capital, the American-Brazilian consortium that owns Burger King, raised questions about Canadian identity that never seem far from the surface in discussions of Canadian culture. For example, an article by Joe Friesen (2014) in *The Globe and Mail* emphasized the potential loss to Canadian culture by the sale to foreign owners of a successful Canadian-owned business that is also a kind of Canadian institution. Tim Hortons's self-promotion has always emphasized its Canadianness: from its original ownership partner, Tim Horton (1930–1974), who was a Toronto Maple Leafs defenceman, to being a kind of “anti-Starbucks,” the place where “ordinary Canadians” go. Friesen's article reads a number of Canadian characteristics into the brand image of Tim Hortons. For example, the personality of Tim Horton himself is equated with Canadianness of the chain: “He wasn't a flashy player, but he was strong and reliable, traits in keeping with Canadian narratives of solidity and self-effacement” (Friesen).

How do we understand Canadian culture and Canadian identity in this example? Earlier in the chapter, we

described culture as a product of the socioeconomic formation. Therefore, if we ask the question of whether a specific Canadian culture or Canadian identity exists, we would begin by listing a set of distinctive Canadian cultural characteristics and then attempt to explain their distinctiveness in terms of the way the Canadian socioeconomic formation developed.

Seymour Martin Lipset (1990) famously described several characteristics that distinguished Canadians from Americans:

- Canadians are less self-reliant and more dependent on state programs than Americans to provide for everyday needs of citizens.
- Canadians are more “elitist” than Americans in the sense that they are more respectful and deferential towards authorities.
- Canadians are less individualistic and more collectivistic than Americans, especially in instances where personal liberties conflict with the collective good.
- Overall, Canadians are more conservative than Americans, and less likely to embrace a belief in progress or a forward looking, liberal outlook on political or economic issues.

Lipset’s explanation for these differences is that while both Canada and the United States retain elements from their British colonial experiences, like their language and legal systems, their founding historical events were opposite: the United States was created through violent revolution against British rule (1775–1783); whereas, Canada’s origins were counter revolutionary. Canada was settled in part by United Empire Loyalists who fled America to remain loyal to Britain, and it did not become an independent nation state until it was created by an act of the British Parliament (the *British North America Act* of 1867). While Lipset’s analysis is disputed, especially by those who do not see American and Canadian cultural differences as being so great (Baer et al., 1990), the logic of his analysis is to see the cultural difference between the nations as a variable dependent on their different socioeconomic formations. (Note: The idea that Canada — with its influential socialist tradition responsible for Canada’s universal health care, welfare and employment insurance, strong union movement, culture of collective responsibility, etc. — is more conservative than the United States may strike the reader as strange. Lipset’s assessment is based on uniquely American cultural definitions of conservatism and liberalism.)

In this analysis, the national characteristics that Friesen argues are embodied by Tim Hortons — modesty, unpretentiousness, politeness, respect, etc. — would be seen as qualities that emerged as a result of a uniquely Canadian historical socioeconomic development. However, how well do they actually represent Canadian culture? As we saw earlier in the chapter, one prominent aspect of contemporary Canadian cultural identity is the idea of multiculturalism. The impact of globalization on Canada has been an increased cultural diversity (see [Chapter 11. Race and Ethnicity](#)). The 2011 census noted that visible minorities made up 19.1% of the Canadian population, or almost one out of every five Canadians. In Toronto and Vancouver, almost half the population are visible minorities. In a certain way, the existence of diverse cultures in Canada undermines the notion that a unified Canadian identity exists. Canada would appear to be a fragmented nation of hyphenated identities — British-Canadians, French-Canadians, Chinese-Canadians, South Asian-Canadians, Caribbean-Canadians, Indigenous-Canadians, etc. — each with its unique cultural traditions, languages, and viewpoints. In what way are we still able to speak about a Canadian identity except insofar as it is defined by multiculturalism — essentially, many identities?

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3.4. Culture as Restriction: Rationalization and Commodification

The previous section examined culture in its innovative guise. Culture, as a source of innovation, is the site of “all thoughts, dreams, ideas, beliefs, myths, intuitions, and inspirations brought into being by the human imagination since the dawn of consciousness” as Wade Davis (2002) put it. Culture provides the imaginative capacity that enables humans to go beyond the “given” of their biological and social reality. The innovations of high culture in expanding the range of human sensibility and the inventiveness of pop culture, subculture, and globally hybrid culture in creating and diffusing new cultural forms attests to the innovative side of culture. However, culture can also be examined in its restrictive guise, as a dimension of social life that confines human possibilities. Two contemporary modes of culture as restriction can be seen in the processes of rationalization and consumerism.

Rationalization



Figure 3.34 Harold Lloyd in *Safety Last* (1923). What is the relationship between time and stress? (Image courtesy of Harold Lloyd and Wesley Stout, *An American Comedy*/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Max Weber’s analysis of modern society centers on the concept of **rationalization**. Arguably, the primary focus of Weber’s entire sociological oeuvre was to determine how and why Western civilization and capitalism developed where and when they did. Why was the West the West? Why did the Western world modernize and develop modern science, industry, military, and democracy first when, for centuries, Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and the Middle East were technically, scientifically, and culturally more advanced than the West?

Weber argued that the modern forms of society developed in the West because of the process of rationalization: the general tendency of modern institutions and most areas of life to be transformed by the application of **instrumental reason** — choosing the most efficient means to achieve defined goals — and the overcoming of “magical” thinking (which in [Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology](#) was referred to as the “disenchantment of the world”). In modernity, everything is subject to the cold and rational gaze of the scientist, the technician, the bureaucrat, and the business person. “There are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play... rather... one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted” (Weber, 1919). As impediments toward rationalization like religious belief and tradition were removed, organizations and institutions were restructured on the principle of maximum efficiency and specialization. Older, traditional (inefficient) types of organization were gradually eliminated.

Weber’s question was, what are the consequences of rationality for everyday life, for the social order, and for the spiritual fate of humanity?

Through rationalization, all of the institutional structures of modern society are reorganized on the principles of efficiency, calculability, and predictability. These are the bases of the “technical and economic conditions of machine production” that Weber refers to in *The Protestant Ethic* (1904). See the discussion in [Chapter 15. Religion](#). As rationalization transforms the institutional and organizational life of modernity, other forms of social organization are eliminated and other purposes of life — spiritual, moral, emotional, traditional, etc.—become irrelevant or sidelined. Life

becomes irrevocably narrower in its focus, and other values are lost. People's attitude towards their own lives becomes oriented to maximizing their own efficiency, and eliminating non-productive pursuits and downtime.

This is the key to Weber's metaphor of the **iron cage** in which human are trapped by their own systems of efficiency. Other ways and possibilities of life are abandoned because they are "inefficient" and cannot compete with rationalized organizational structures. Weber argues that the combination of new powers of production and organizational effectiveness and the increasingly narrow specialization of tasks lead to the loss of the Enlightenment ideal of reason: a well-rounded individual and a "full and beautiful humanity." Having forgotten its spiritual or other purposes of life, humanity succumbed to an order "now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production" (Weber, 1904). The modern subject in the iron cage is essentially a narrow specialist or bureaucrat, "only a single cog in an ever-moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march" (Weber, 1922).

One of the consequences of the rationalization of everyday life is stress. In 2010, 27% of working adults in Canada described their day-to-day lives as highly stressful (Crompton, 2011). Twenty-three per cent of all Canadians, aged 15 and older, reported that most days were highly stressful in 2013 (Statistics Canada, 2014). In the case of stress, rationalization is a double-edged sword in that it allows people to get more things done per unit of time more efficiently in order to "save time," but ironically efficiency — as a means to an end — tends to replace other goals in life and becomes an end in itself. The focus on efficiency means that people regard time as a kind of limited resource in which to achieve a maximum number of activities. The *irrationality* of rationalization is: Saving time for what? Are people able to take time for activities (including sleep) which replenish them or enrich them? Even the notions of "taking time" or "spending quality time" with someone use the metaphor of time as a kind of expenditure in which people use up a limited resource. Stress is in many respects a product of the modern "rational" relationship to time. As seen in the table below, for a significant number of people, there is simply not enough time in the day to accomplish what they set out to do. This is an outcome of the restrictive quality of the rationalization of culture.

Table 3.1. Perceptions of time for the population aged 15 and over, by age group, Canada, 2010 [\[Skip Table\]](#)

Perceptions of time	15 and over	15 to 24	25 to 34	35 to 44	45 to 54	55 to 64	65 to 74	75 and over
Do you plan to slow down in the coming year?	19%	13%	16%	21%	22%	23%	16%	20%
Do you consider yourself a workaholic?	25%	22%	29%	31%	28%	23%	18%	14%
When you need more time, do you tend to cut back on your sleep?	46%	63%	60%	59%	45%	31%	20%	15%
At the end of the day, do you often feel that you have not accomplished what you had set out to do?	41%	34%	46%	48%	46%	40%	29%	35%
Do you worry that you don't spend enough time with your family or friends?	36%	34%	47%	53%	41%	27%	14%	10%
Do you feel that you're constantly under stress trying to accomplish more than you can handle?	34%	35%	41%	47%	40%	27%	15%	10%
Do you feel trapped in a daily routine?	34%	33%	41%	46%	40%	28%	15%	15%
Do you feel that you just don't have time for fun any more?	29%	20%	36%	43%	38%	23%	11%	11%
Do you often feel under stress when you don't have enough time?	54%	65%	66%	69%	59%	41%	22%	16%

Perceptions of time	15 and over	15 to 24	25 to 34	35 to 44	45 to 54	55 to 64	65 to 74	75 and over
Would you like to spend more time alone?	22%	19%	30%	35%	24%	15%	9%	7%

Note. The percentages represent the proportion of persons who answered “yes” to the questions on perceptions of time.
Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2010 (Statistics Canada, 2011).

Commodity, Commodification, and Consumerism as a Way of Life



Figure 3.35 Barbara Kruger’s subversive billboard art piece “I shop therefore I am” is here revised as an actual advertising slogan in a Selfridges department store in Birmingham, England. Is this the ultimate in cynical advertising or simply a fact of life in the age of consumerism? (Photo courtesy of Mark Hillary/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

A **commodity** is an object, service, or a “good” that has been produced for sale on the market. **Commodification** is the process through which objects, services, or goods are increasingly turned into commodities. Through commodification, they become defined more in terms of their marketability and profitability than by their intrinsic characteristics. Prior to the invention of the commodity market, economic life revolved around bartering or producing for immediate consumption. Real objects like wool or food were exchanged for other real objects or were produced for immediate consumption according to need. The development of commodity exchange with the rise of capitalism introduced a strange factor into this equation because, in the marketplace, objects are exchanged for money. Money can be used to buy other objects or services, or it can be accumulated and used later, but its unique quality is that it is *indifferent* to where it is used and what it is used for (Simmel, 1978/1900). In commodity exchange, commodities are produced in order to be sold in the market for money. Their value is determined not just in regard to their unique qualities, their purpose, or their ability to satisfy a need (i.e., their “use value”), but also their monetary value or “exchange value” (i.e., their price). When someone asks what something is worth today, they are usually referring to its price.

This monetization of value has a number of strange qualities. In the first place, the medium of money allows for incomparable, concrete things or use values to be quantified and compared. Twenty dollars will get the consumer a chicken, a novel, or a hammer; these fundamentally different things all

become equivalent from the point of view of money. It is strange in the second place because the use of money to define the value of commodities makes the commodity appear to stand alone, as if its value was independent of the context in which it was created, the labour that produced it, or the needs it was designed to satisfy. Commodities seem to have a life of their own. In the third place, people see the object and imagine the qualities it will endow them with: a style, a fashionability, a street credibility, a personality type, or a tribal affiliation (e.g., are you a PC person or a Mac person?). They do not recognize the labour and the social relationships of work that produced it, nor the social relationship that ties them to its producers when they purchase it. Instead the commodity has an agency of its own. It will make the consumer smarter, sharper, sexier, or snazzier.

Karl Marx (1818–1883) called this phenomenon **commodity fetishism** (1867), the mistaken belief that commodities themselves hold or create values or give valuable attributes to their possessors, instead of recognizing that it is humans

and human social processes that give value to things. Why are diamonds more valuable than water for example? They might be rarer than fresh water but they do not serve any practical function like water does. They are given value purely by human choice or agreement.

With the increased importance of maintaining high levels of commodity turn over and consumption that emerged with the system of late capitalism, commodity fetishism plays a powerful role in producing ever-new wants and desires. **Consumerism** becomes a way of life. Consumerism refers to the way in which people define themselves in terms of the commodities they purchase. To the degree that people's identities become defined by the pattern of their consumer preferences, the commodity no longer exists to serve their needs but to *define* their needs. As a form of cultural practice, consumerism ties people's identities to the circuits of capital accumulation and restricts the possibilities of individuation and personal expression. As Barbara Kruger put it, the motto of consumer culture is not "I think therefore I am" but "I shop therefore I am." Thinking is precisely what consumerism entices people not to do, except insofar as they calculate the prices of things.



Figure 3.36 The Mac vs. PC ad campaign plays on the idea that the computer you purchase defines your style of life, or vice versa. In this way commodities and their branding strategies insinuate themselves into our self-definitions (Image courtesy of Jose Antonio Gelado/Flickr) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

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3.5. Theoretical Perspectives on Culture

Music, fashion, technology, norms, and values — all are products of culture. How do sociologists interpret them within the context of the social organization of life? [Chapter 3. Culture](#) ends with a review of the analysis of culture in three theoretical paradigms in sociology: functionalism, symbolic interactionism, and critical sociology.

Structural Functionalism

Functionalists view society as a system in which all parts work — or function — together to create society as a whole. In this way, societies need culture to exist. Cultural norms function to support the fluid operation of society, and cultural values guide people in making choices. Talcott Parsons (1902-1979) referred to the function of culture as “latent pattern maintenance,” meaning that the cultural practices that reproduce and circulate symbolic meanings and codes serve the function of maintaining social patterns of behaviour and facilitating orderly change. Culture ensures that people continue to understand one another, share common values and norms, and find security in stable definitions of the “meaning of life.” If cultural systems fail to perform their function within society, people succumb to anomie or normlessness, and life threatens to become meaningless or incomprehensible.

By focusing on the function that culture plays in maintaining the stable equilibrium of society as a whole, functionalists also provide interesting insights into cultural activities that might seem irrational or bizarre on the surface. Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942) described the way that the Trobriand Islanders of New Guinea used magic at each stage of preparation for fishing (1925). From a rationalized, calculative point of view, magic ritual has nothing to do with the ability to catch fish. Fishing is a practical activity. However, as Malinowski pointed out, fishing for the Trobriand Islanders was also a risky and uncertain activity. It was dangerous, weather was unpredictable and the whereabouts of fish variable. Magic provided the fishermen with a sense of control over their environment and a sense of confidence that enabled them to venture out into the dangerous waters day after day. Whether the magic rituals “worked” or not, they performed an important and rational function in the economic life of the Islanders. It provided a stable pattern of meaning that empowered the fishermen to risk their lives to bring back an essential food resource.

Functionalists argue that cultural practices play a similar role in modern societies. The game of hockey, for example, in which highly-skilled men and women chase a disk of rubber around a frozen sheet of ice, risking injury and expending energy for nonproductive purposes, could be regarded an irrational and crazy activity. Yet millions of people watch hockey, millions of dollars are spent on it, millions of people’s identities are defined by their fandom, and millions of people’s collective sense of self-worth can hang on the fortunes and failures of their favourite hockey teams. Hockey is both, practically speaking, useless and yet clearly a highly valued activity. Why? As Durkheim argued with respect to religious rituals and totems, when people come together and focus their attention on a common object — in this case, the fortunes of a disk of rubber on a sheet of ice — thoughts and feelings pass back and forth between them until they take on a supra-individual force, detached from the individuals themselves. A pre-rational collective consciousness emerges that provides the basis for group solidarity or a moral sense of group togetherness. Hockey functions as a site of collective convergence in a society that otherwise threatens to dissolve into incoherence as people’s everyday lives diverge in pursuit of individual self-interests.

In addition, many people point to the latent functions of hockey, in that playing hockey provides an outlet for energies that might otherwise be directed to negative activities. It provides the basis for the cultivation of the self in the pursuit of excellence, it provides important lessons on the value of team play and it provides an exercise activity that contributes to the health of the population. As many Canadians know, it is often easier to get a good physical workout when you are chasing a puck or a hockey ball than it is to convince themselves to go jogging in the cold or to do another repetition down at the gym.



Figure 3.37 *The Spirit of Haida Gwaii: The Jade Canoe* (1994) by Haida artist Bill Reid stands in the center of the Vancouver airport. How would a sociologist interpret this statue? What stories does it tell and what does it represent in North American culture? (Photo Courtesy of Caribb/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/)

Symbolic Interactionism

Symbolic interactionism is a sociological paradigm that is most concerned with the face-to-face interactions between members of society. Interactionists see culture as being created and maintained by the ways people interact, interpret each other's actions and create common meanings. Proponents of this paradigm conceptualize culture as the product of a continuous chain of interactions in which meaning is given to both objects in the environment and the attributes and actions of others. This is where the term “symbolic” comes into play. Every object and action has a symbolic meaning. Language, as a repository of symbolic meanings, serves as a means for people to represent and communicate their meanings, motives and understandings to others. Symbolic interactionists perceive culture as highly dynamic and fluid because it is dependent on how meaning is created and recreated over and over again through the personal face to face encounters that constitute social life.

A symbolic interactionist approach to fashion, for example, would emphasize that fashion is a language or code that people use to interpret who others are and communicate who they themselves are. It also involves determining what the present moment in time is. People distinguish between what is “old-fashioned” and what is “hip” with an acute sensibility of what it means to “be with the times.” Clothing fashions in particular represent an extremely intricate language of interpersonal communication, as anyone who has gone shopping for clothes with a picky friend is well aware. What variables are involved in the question, “Does this look good on me?” Clothes are never simply “functional,” because

even the most functional and practical Mountain Equipment Co-op style clothing makes a statement about the wearer. Georg Simmel (1858-1918) noted that, while extremely transitory, the establishment of fashions always has to contend with two seemingly contradictory tendencies — the desire of individuals to fit in and conform to what is current and fashionable, and the desire of individuals to stand out as unique individuals (1904). Being fashionable involves a highly nuanced negotiation between these two poles.

Critical Sociology

Critical sociologists view social structure as inherently unequal and based on power differentials related to issues like class, gender, race, and age. For a critical sociologist, culture is not a unified tradition that is experienced the same way by all people in a society. As discussed earlier in the chapter, female genital mutilation practiced by several social groups in Africa and Asia is a cultural practice that is rooted in gender inequality. It is a “tradition” but it is also an example of a cultural practice that reinforces and perpetuates gender inequalities and differences in power. Unlike the functionalists, who examine culture in terms of its function in social cohesion, or symbolic interactionists, who emphasize how people come to mutual understandings through cultural practices and interactions, critical sociologists examine how inequalities and power relationships are maintained by a culture’s value system.

Some norms, formal and informal, are practiced at the expense of others. Following Confederation in 1867, women (of European ancestry) were not allowed to vote in federal elections in Canada until 1919, and it was not until 1940 that they could vote in provincial elections in Quebec. (Women property owners had been able to vote prior to Confederation.) It was not until 1948 that Canadians of Japanese, Chinese, and South Asian origins were permitted to vote. Inuit Canadians had their right to vote revoked in 1934 and returned in 1950. Indigenous Canadians, who had been able to vote in some regions up until 1898, had their rights revoked and were not permitted to vote federally again until 1960. In each case of discrimination, it was the dominant culture’s attitudes toward the subordinate groups that served as the rationale for refusing them the franchise. For example, in 1898 the Member of Parliament for Saint John argued that “Indians [sic] knew no more of politics ‘than a child two years old’” (Elections Canada, 2014). Because of prevailing paternalistic and racist attitudes, it was argued that Indigenous people would somehow be more susceptible to manipulation by politicians than other Canadians.



Figure 3.38 Women serving in the armed forces during World War I, including nurses, were the only women who were allowed to vote in federal elections. It was not until 1919 that the majority of women in Canada could vote federally. Asian-Canadian, Inuit and First Nation women could not vote until 1948, 1950 and 1960 respectively (Photo courtesy of William Rider-Rider/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Culture as a Source of Innovation and Constraint



Figure 3.39 This child's clothing may be culturally specific, but her facial expression seems universal. (Photo courtesy of Beth Rankin/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Culture in general is a site of two opposing tendencies: One is the way that cultures around the world lay down sets of rules or norms which constrain, restrict, habitualize, and fix forms of life; the other is the way that cultures produce endlessly innovative and diverse solutions to common human conditions, like birth and death, or the need for nutrition and shelter. Cultures both constrain and continually go beyond constraints.

This chapter began by asking, “what is culture?” Culture comprises all the beliefs, values, norms and ways of life of a society. It is the totality of a group’s material and non-material products. Because culture is learned, it includes how people think and express themselves. While people may like to consider themselves unique individuals, they must acknowledge the impact of shared culture; they inherit thought

and language that shapes their perceptions and patterns their behaviour, including their relations to family and friends, and faith and politics. In this sense, culture defines the normative patterns that constrain people to live according to the given rules. On the other hand, the incredible variety of ways of thinking, ways of being, and ways of orienting oneself on the Earth, which Wade Davis (2002) calls the **ethnosphere**, attests to the endlessly innovative responses to the human condition that culture affords. Human possibilities are not determined by history, society or biology. Culture reflects the imaginative capacity of human beings to go beyond what is given.

To an extent, culture is an artifact that humans create to survive and adapt. As Thomas Berger (1969) puts it, “Its fundamental purpose is to provide the firm structures for human life that are lacking biologically.” In the absence of biological programming, humans have culture. Sharing a similar culture with others is precisely what defines societies and societal identities. Nations and societies would not exist if people did not coexist culturally. There could be no societies if people did not share heritage and language, and civilization would cease to function if people did not agree to similar values and systems of social control. Culture is preserved through transmission from one generation to the next, but it also evolves through processes of innovation, discovery, and cultural diffusion. People may be restricted by the confines of their own culture, but also have the ability to question values and make conscious decisions. Because each iteration of culture “must be continuously produced and reproduced... [i]ts structures are, therefore, inherently precarious and predestined to change” (Berger, 1969). No better evidence of this change exists than the amount of cultural diversity within Canadian society and around the world. How people manage cultural diversity in the global context of this era, as a source of mutual understanding and innovation, or as a source of troubling difference and threat, will determine their response to culture’s inherent precarity and mutability.

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Chapter 3 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

androcentrism: A perspective in which male concerns, male attitudes, and male practices are presented as “normal” or define what is significant and valued in a culture.

beliefs: Tenets or convictions that people hold to be true.

binary opposition: A set of paired terms, considered as mutually exclusive and logical opposites, which structure a whole set or system of associated meanings.

breaching experiment: An experiment in which researchers purposely break a commonly accepted social norm or behave in a socially awkward manner to examine people's reactions.

code: A set of cultural conventions, instructions, or rules used to combine symbols to communicate or interpret meaning.

commodity: An object, service, or good that has been produced for sale on the market.

commodity fetishism: Regarding commodities as objects with inherent qualities independent of their human creators and the social context of their production.

commodification: The process through which objects, services, or goods are turned into commodities.

consumerism: The tendency for people to define themselves in terms of the commodities they purchase.

counterculture: A group that rejects and opposes society's widely accepted cultural patterns.

cultural imperialism: The deliberate imposition of one's own cultural values on another culture.

cultural relativism: The practice of assessing beliefs or practices within a culture by its own standards.

cultural universals: Patterns or traits that are common to all societies.

culture: Shared beliefs, values, and practices in a whole way of life.

culture shock: An experience of personal disorientation when confronted with an unfamiliar way of life.

cultural practice: A way of doing things that expresses the customs and know-how of a particular culture.

detournement: The conscious subversion of messages, signs, and symbols by altering them slightly.

diaspora: The dispersion of a people from their original homeland.

diffusion: The spread of material and nonmaterial culture from one culture to another.

ethnocentrism: Evaluating another culture according to the standards of one's own culture.

ethnomethodology: The study of tacit knowledges, methods and practical procedures people use to make sense of and orient action in everyday life.

folkways: Norms without any particular moral underpinnings.

formal norms: Established, written rules.

geneticism: A form of biological determinism that suggests the qualities of human life are caused by genes.

globalization: The process by which a global dimension of social relations emerges and spreads.

high culture: Forms of cultural experience characterized by formal complexity, eternal values, or creative authenticity.

hybridity: New forms of culture that arise from cross-cultural exchange and cultural blending.

informal norms: Rules of behaviour that are generally and widely followed but not codified in law or institutional policy.

iron cage: Max Weber's metaphor for the modern condition of life circumscribed by the demand for maximum efficiency.

language: A symbolic system of communication.

modernity: The culture of constant change and transformation associated with the rise of capitalism.

mores: Norms based on social requirements which are based on the moral views and principles of a group.

new eugenics movement: Promotion of making new reproductive technologies and human genetic engineering available to consumers to enhance human characteristics and capacities.

norms: Rules of behaviour or conduct.

popular culture: Cultural experiences, practices and products that are widely circulated, produced by or well-liked by "the people."

postmodern culture: Forms of contemporary culture characterized by a playful mixture of forms, pluralism, and the breakdown of centralized, modern culture.

Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: The idea that people understand the world based on their form of language.

sanctions: A way to authorize or formally disapprove of certain behaviours.

social control: A way to encourage conformity to cultural norms.

social facts: The external laws, morals, values, religious beliefs, customs, fashions, rituals, and cultural rules that govern social life.

society: The structures of a social group of people who interact within a definable territory and who share a culture.

socioeconomic formation: The concrete set of social structures that form around a specific mode of production or economic system.

structuralism: The study of deep unconscious rules or codes that govern cultural activities and constrain possibilities in different domains of social life.

subculture: A group that shares a specific identity apart from a parent culture, even as the members hold features in common with the parent culture.

symbol: Gesture, object, or component of language that represents a meaning recognized by people who share a culture.

taboos: Strong prohibitions based on deeply held sacred or moral beliefs.

values: A culture's standard for discerning desirable states in society.

Section Summary

[3.1 What Is Culture?](#)

Though “society” and “culture” are often used interchangeably, they have different meanings. A society is a group of people sharing a community and culture, whereas culture generally describes the shared practices and beliefs of these people as a whole way of life. Culture exists in human societies because humans lack the biological programming of other species. The combined diversity of cultural practices and knowledges in the world is referred to as the ethnosphere. Experience of cultural difference is influenced by colonialism, ethnocentrism, androcentrism, and cultural relativism.

[3.2 Elements of Culture](#)

A culture consists of many elements, including the values, beliefs, norms, and practices of its society. Norms can be categorized into laws, taboos, mores, folkways. The symbols and language of a society are social facts that exist independently of individuals. They are key to developing and conveying culture.

[3.3 Pop Culture, Subculture, and Cultural Change](#)

Sociologists recognize a division between high culture and popular culture within societies, although this division tends to break down in postmodernity. Societies also comprise many subcultures — smaller groups that share an identity. Countercultures are subcultures which reject mainstream values and create their own cultural rules and norms.

[3.4 Culture as Restriction: Rationalization and Commodification](#)

Culture can be both innovative and restrictive. High culture, pop culture, subculture, and the globalization of culture are examples of how culture is innovative. Rationalization and commodification are examples of how culture can be restrictive.

[3.5 Theoretical Perspectives on Culture](#)

Three major theoretical approaches toward the interpretation of culture include structural functionalism, symbolic interactionism, and critical sociology. Functionalists view cultural processes in terms of the function they perform in reproducing shared values, norms and meanings. Symbolic interactionists are primarily interested in the ways symbols acquire meanings in say to day interactions. Critical sociologists examine the ways in which culture expresses inequalities and power relationships in societies based on factors like gender, class, race, and age. Debate between sociologists who seek to explain or interpret various cultural occurrences often returns to these foundational views in the discipline.

Questions

Quiz: Culture

[3.1 What Is Culture?](#)

1. The terms _____ and _____ are often used interchangeably, but have nuances that differentiate them.
 - a. Ethnocentrism and cultural relativism

- b. Culture and society
 - c. Innovation and restriction
 - d. Hybridity and subculture
2. The Canadian flag is a material object that represents Canada; however, there are certain connotations that many associate with the flag, like patriotism and democracy. In this example, what is the flag?
- a. A symbol
 - b. An element of language
 - c. A deep structure
 - d. A commodity
3. The belief that one's culture is the standard used to assess another culture is called?
- a. Universalism
 - b. Cultural relativism
 - c. Ethnocentrism
 - d. Xenocentrism
4. Rodney and Elise are students studying abroad in Italy. When they are introduced to their host families, the families kiss them on both cheeks. When Rodney's host brother introduces himself and kisses Rodney on both cheeks, Rodney pulls back in surprise. Where he is from, unless they are romantically involved, men do not kiss one another. This is an example of _____.
- a. Culture shock.
 - b. Homophobia.
 - c. Cultural relativism.
 - d. Xenophilia.
5. Most cultures have been found to identify laughter as a sign of humour, joy, or pleasure. Likewise, most cultures recognize music in some form. Music and laughter are examples of _____.
- a. Cultural relativism.
 - b. Biological determinism.
 - c. Cultural practices.
 - d. Cultural universals.

3.2 Elements of Culture

6. Not bargaining for a better price in a shopping mall is a _____.
- a. Folkway.
 - b. Breaching experiment.
 - c. Belief.
 - d. Value.
7. The existence of social norms, both formal and informal, is one of the main things that inform _____, otherwise known as a way to encourage social conformity.
- a. Values

- b. Sanctions
 - c. Social control
 - d. Mores
8. The biggest difference between mores and folkways is that _____.
- a. Mores are primarily linked to morality, whereas folkways are more informal cultural patterns.
 - b. Mores are permanent, whereas folkways are temporary.
 - c. Mores refer to acts that are absolutely forbidden, whereas folkways refer to unspoken or tacit agreements.
 - d. Mores refer to eating eels, whereas folkways refer to traditional dance patterns.
9. The notion that people cannot feel or experience something that they do not have a word for can be explained by _____.
- a. Structuralism.
 - b. Sapir-Whorf.
 - c. Biological programming.
 - d. Cultural frames.
10. Cultural sanctions can also be viewed as ways that society _____.
- a. Praises accomplishments.
 - b. Codifies language.
 - c. Regulates behaviour.
 - d. Determines laws.

3.3 Pop Culture, Subculture, and Cultural Change

11. An example of high culture is _____, whereas an example of popular culture would be _____.
- a. Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*; *American Idol* winners.
 - b. Medical marijuana; Catholic liturgy.
 - c. Folk music; hip hop music.
 - d. Postmodernism; modernism.
12. The Ku Klux Klan is an example of what part of culture?
- a. Counterculture
 - b. Ethnicity
 - c. Post-multiculturalism
 - d. Postmodernity
13. Modern-day hipsters are an example of _____.
- a. Ethnocentricity.
 - b. Counterculture.
 - c. Subculture.
 - d. High culture.

14. Bhangra was originally a type of traditional folk dance in Punjab. In contemporary Canada it would be seen as an example of _____.
- a. A folk culture.
 - b. A subculture.
 - c. Hybridity.
 - d. All of the above.
15. Some jobs today advertise in multinational markets and permit telecommuting in lieu of working from a primary location. This broadening of the job market and the way that jobs are performed can be attributed to _____.
- a. Cultural lag.
 - b. Innovation.
 - c. Discovery.
 - d. Globalization.
16. That people follow Indian cricket in almost every country around the world is an example of _____.
- a. Technoscapes.
 - b. Mediascapes.
 - c. Financescapes.
 - d. Ideoscapes.

3.4 Culture as Restriction: Rationalization and Commodification

17. A major difference between rationalization and consumerism is _____.
- a. Rationalization is based on technology, whereas consumerism is based on efficiency.
 - b. Rationalization produces stress, whereas consumerism produces identity.
 - c. Rationalization refers to the perception of underlying forms, whereas consumerism refers to the perception of fashionability.
 - d. Rationalization is typically used to explain away lapses in behaviour, whereas consumerism is a lapse of behaviour.

3.5 Theoretical Perspectives on Culture

18. A sociologist conducts research into the ways that Indigenous cultures were suppressed under colonial rule. What theoretical approach is the sociologist probably using?
- a. Symbolic interactionism
 - b. Functionalism
 - c. Critical sociology
 - d. Ethnomethodology
19. The office culture in a downtown office building is cold and formal, whereas the office culture in a suburban office complex is much more informal and personable. A sociologist who studies the difference between the cultures of these two settings would most likely use what theoretical approach?

- a. Symbolic interactionism
 - b. Breaching experiments
 - c. Structural functionalism
 - d. Ethnomethodology
20. What theoretical perspective views the role of culture in society as “latent pattern maintenance”?
- a. Sociobiology
 - b. Functionalism
 - c. Conflict theory
 - d. Structuralism
21. Malinowski’s analysis of the importance of magic rituals among Trobriand Islander fishermen was based on which theoretical paradigm?
- a. Ethical relativism
 - b. Functionalism
 - c. Spiritualism
 - d. Ethnocentrism

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

3. What Is Culture?

1. Consider your eating patterns. Identify the elements which you would consider cultural. How do they compare with eating patterns from someone from another culture?
2. Do you feel that attitudes of ethnocentricity or multiculturalism are more prevalent in Canadian culture? Why do you believe this? What issues or events inform your opinion?

3.2 Elements of Culture

3. What do you think of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis? Do you agree or disagree with it? Are there elements of experience which are non-linguistic?
4. Why do you think Garfinkel’s breaching experiments were upsetting for people, even if the norms that were violated were relatively trivial? What is the role of unspoken or tacit norms in everyday life do you think?

3.3 Pop Culture, Subculture, and Cultural Change

5. Identify several examples of popular culture and describe how they inform the larger culture. How central are these examples in your everyday life?
6. Consider some of the specific issues or concerns of your generation. Are any ideas countercultural?

What subcultures have emerged from your generation? How have the issues of your generation expressed themselves culturally? How has your generation made its mark on society's collective culture?

7. What are some examples of cultural diffusion that are present in your life? Do you think they are positive or negative? Explain.

3.4 Culture as Restriction: Rationalization and Commodification

8. Contrast the issues involved in the “rationalization” of culture and “consumerism” and apply the sociological imagination (see Chapter 1). Which issue seems more significant in your personal life? Which issue seems more significant in Western society or global culture as a whole?

3.5 Theoretical Perspectives on Culture

9. Consider a social issue that you have witnessed in Canadian society, perhaps situated around family, politics, health practices, or Indigenous culture. Can you identify cultural differences that inform the issue? For example, consider different interpretations of public health measures during the Covid-19 pandemic. Do the responses represent differences in culture? Choose a sociological approach—functionalism, critical sociology, or symbolic interactionism—to describe, explain, and analyze the social issue you choose. Which paradigm is the best for illuminating the social issue?

Further Research

3.1 What Is Culture?

Getting your genome mapped is becoming increasingly popular. But why? What do people hope to understand about themselves this way? From CBC's *How to Think about Science – Part 15*, [listen to Barbara Duden and Silya Samerski](#) discuss the “pop gene” and other aspects of the turn to genetics in popular understandings of self and society.

3.2 Elements of Culture

The science-fiction novel, *Babel-17*, by Samuel R. Delaney was based upon the principles of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Read an excerpt from [Babel-17](#).

3.3 Pop Culture, Subculture, and Cultural Change

The Beats were a counterculture that birthed an entire movement of art, music, and literature—much of which is still highly regarded and studied today. The author responsible for naming the generation was Jack Kerouac; however, the man responsible for introducing the world to that generation was John Clellon Holmes, a writer and friend of Kerouac's. In 1952, he penned an article for the *New York Times Magazine* titled [“This Is the Beat Generation”](#). Read that article and learn more about the Beat subculture.

Popular culture meets counterculture as [Oprah Winfrey interacts with members of the Yearning for Zion cult](#).

3.4 Culture as Restriction: Rationalization and Commodification

Review the history of consumerism in this School of Life video: [History of ideas – Consumerism](#)

Max Weber's concept of rationalization was based on the observation that modern society differed from traditional society in its integration of rationality into social organization and everyday life, specifically with respect to calculability, methodical behaviour and reflexivity. See this Crash Course video summary: [Max Weber & Modernity: Crash Course Sociology #9](#)

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Solutions to Quiz: Culture

1 B, | 2 D, | 3 C, | 4 A, | 5 D, | 6 A, | 7 C, | 8 A, | 9 B, | 10 C, | 11 A, | 12 A, | 13 C, | 14 D, | 15 D, | 16 B, | 17 B, | 18 C, | 19 A, | 20 B, | 21 C,
[\[Return to Quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 4. SOCIETY AND MODERN LIFE



Figure 4.1 Effigy of a Shaman from Haida Tribe, late 19th century. (Image courtesy of Wellcome Library, London.) [CC BY 4.0](#)

Learning Objectives

[4.1. Types of Societies](#)

- Compare ways of understanding the evolution of human societies.
- Describe the difference between preindustrial, industrial, postindustrial and postnatural societies.
- Understand how a society's relationship to the environment impacts societal development.

[4.2. Theoretical Perspectives on the Formation of Modern Society](#)

- Compare Durkheim's functionalist view of modern society with Marx's critical view and Weber's interpretive view.
- Explain the difference between Durkheim's concept of anomie, Marx's concept of alienation and Weber's concept of rationalization.
- Contrast androcentric perspectives with how feminists analyze the development of society.

[4.3. Living in Contemporary Society](#)

- Describe how Durkheim's, Marx's and Weber's analyses can be updated and applied to social life in the

Introduction to Society

In 1900, a young anthropologist, John Swanton, transcribed a series of myths and tales — known as *qqaygaang* in the Haida language — told by the master Haida storyteller Ghandl. The tales tell stories of animal and human transformations, of heroes who marry birds, of birds who take off their skins and become women, of mussels who manifest the spirit form of whales, and of people who climb poles to the sky.

After she'd offered him something to eat, Mouse Woman said to him, "When I was bringing a bit of cranberry back from my berry patch, you helped me. I intend to lend you something I wore for stalking prey when I was younger."

She brought out a box. She pulled out four more boxes within boxes. In the innermost box was the skin of a mouse with small bent claws. She said to him, "Put this on."

Small though it was, he got into it. It was easy. He went up the wall and onto the roof of the house. And Mouse Woman said to him, "You know what to do when you wear it. Be on your way" (Ghandl, quoted in Bringhurst, 2011).

To the ear of contemporary Canadians, these types of tales often seem confusing. They lack the familiar inner psychological characterization of protagonists and antagonists, the “realism” of natural settings and chronological time sequences, or the standard plot devices of man against man, man against himself, and man against nature. However, as Robert Bringhurst (2011) argues, this is not because the tales are not great literature or have not completely “evolved.” In his estimation, Ghandl should be recognized as one of the most brilliant storytellers who has ever lived in Canada. Rather, it is because the stories speak to, and from, a fundamentally different experience of the world: the experience of nomadic hunting and gathering people as compared to the sedentary people of modern capitalist societies. How does the way we tell stories reflect the organization and social structures of the societies we live in?

Ghandl's tales are told within an oral tradition rather than a written or literary tradition. They are meant to be listened to, not read, and as such the storytelling skill involves weaving in subtle repetitions and numerical patterns, and plays on Haida words and well-known mythological images rather than creating page-turning dramas of psychological or conflictual suspense. Bringhurst suggests that even compared to the Indo-European oral tradition going back to Homer or the Vedas, the Haida tales do not rely on the auditory conventions of verse. Whereas verse relies on acoustic devices like alliteration and rhyming, Haida mythic storytelling was a form of *noetic prosody*, relying on patterns of ideas and images. The Haida, as a non-agricultural people, did not see a reason to add overt musical qualities to their use of language. “[V]erse in the strictly acoustic sense of the word does not play the same role in preagricultural societies. Humans, as a rule, do not begin to farm their language until they have begun to till the earth and to manipulate the growth of plants and animals.” As Bringhurst puts it, “*myth is that form of language in which poetry and music have not as yet diverged*”(Bringhurst, 2011, italics in original).

Perhaps more significantly for sociologists, the hunting and gathering lifestyle of the Haida also produces a very different relationship to the natural world and to the non-human creatures and plants with which they coexisted. This is manifest in the tales of animal-human-spirit transformations and in their moral lessons, which caution against treating the world with disrespect. With regard to understanding Haida storytelling, Bringhurst argues:

following the poetry they [hunting gathering peoples] make is more like moving through a forest or a canyon, or waiting in a blind, than moving through an orchard or field. The language is often highly ordered, rich, compact — but it is not arranged in neat, symmetrical rows (2011).




Figure 4.2 A Haida ceremonial rattle in the form of the mythical thunder bird. (Photo courtesy of British Museum/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

In other words, for the hunter who follows animal traces through the woods, or waits patiently for hours in a hunting blind or fishing spot for wild prey to appear, the relationship to the prey is much more akin to “putting on their skins” or spiritually “becoming-animal” than to be a shepherd raising and caring for livestock. A successful hunting and gathering people would be inclined to study how animals think from the inside, rather than controlling or manipulating them from the outside. For the Haida, tales of animal transformations would not seem so fantastic or incomprehensible as they do to modern people who spend most of their life indoors. They would be part of their “acutely personal relations with the wild” (Bringhurst, 2011).

Similarly, the Haida ethics, embodied in their tales and myths, acknowledge a complex web of unwritten contracts between humans, animal species, and spirit-beings.

The culture as Ghandl describes it depends — like every hunting culture — not on control of the land as such but on control of the human demands that are placed upon it (Bringhurst, 2011).

In the Haida tales, humans continually confront a world of living beings and forces that are much more powerful and intelligent than they are, and who are quick to take offense at human stupidity and hubris.

What sociologists learn from the detailed studies of the Haida and their literature is how a fundamentally different social relationship to the environment affects the way people think and how they see their place in the world. Nevertheless, although the traditional Haida society of Haida Gwaii in the Pacific Northwest is very different from contemporary post-industrial Canada, both can be seen as different ways of expressing the human need to cooperate and live together to survive. For the sociologist, this is a lesson in how the type of society one lives in — its scale and social structure — impacts one’s experience of the world at a fundamental, even perceptual level.

Media Attributions

- **Figure 4.1** [Effigy of a Shaman from Haida Tribe, late 19th century](#) from Wellcome Library, is used under a [CC BY 4.0](#) licence.
- **Figure 4.2** [Ceremonial rattle in the form of the mythical thunder-bird](#) from page 313 of the British Museum *Handbook to the Ethnographical Collections* (1910) by Internet Archive Book Images, via Flickr, is in the [public domain](#).

4.1. Types of Societies



Figure 4.3 Maasai men are hunting with shepherd's staves and spears. How does technology influence a society's daily occupations? (Photo courtesy of Abir Anwar/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Haida, Maasai, modern Canadians — each is a society. But what does this mean? Exactly what is a society? In sociological terms, a *society* refers to a group of people who interact within a definable territory and share the same culture. In practical, everyday terms, societies consist of various types of institutional constraint and coordination exercised over our choices and actions. The type of society we live in determines the nature of these types of constraint and coordination. The nature of our social institutions, the type of work we do, the way we think about ourselves, and the structures of power and social inequality that order our life chances are all products of the type of society we live in, and thus vary globally and historically.

The founder of sociology, August Comte (1798–1857), provided the first sociological theory of the evolution of

human societies. His best known sociological theory was the **law of three stages**, which held that all human societies and all forms of human knowledge evolve through three distinct stages from primitive to advanced: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. The key variable in defining these stages was the way a people conceptualized *causation* or how they *understood* their place in the world.

In the **theological stage**, humans explain causes in terms of the will of anthropocentric gods (i.e., the gods cause things to happen). In the **metaphysical stage**, humans explain causes in terms of abstract, “speculative” ideas like nature, natural rights, social contracts, or “self-evident” truths (human nature causes society to take specific forms). This was the basis of Comte’s critique of the Enlightenment philosophers, whose ideas about natural rights and freedoms had led to the French Revolution, but also, in his opinion, to the chaos of its aftermath. In his view, the “negative” or metaphysical knowledge of the philosophers was based on dogmatic ideas that could not be proven empirically, nor reconciled when they were in contradiction. This led to inevitable conflict and moral anarchy. Finally, in the **positive stage**, humans explain causes in terms of positivist, scientific observations and laws. That is, law-like relationships between empirically observable variables predict empirically observable outcomes (e.g., if *this*, then *that*). Comte believed this would be the final stage of human social evolution, because positivist science could empirically determine how society should be best organized. Science could reconcile the division between political factions of order and progress by eliminating the basis for moral and intellectual anarchy. The application of positive philosophy would lead to the unification of society and of the sciences (Comte, 1830/1975).

Karl Marx offered an alternate model for understanding the evolution of types of society. Marx argued that the evolution of societies from primitive to advanced was not a product of the way people *thought*, as Comte proposed, but a product of the power struggles in each epoch between different social classes over control of property. The key variable in his analysis was the different modes of production or “material bases” that characterized different forms of society: from hunting and gathering, to agriculture, to industrial production. This **historical materialist** approach to understanding society explains both social change and the development of human ideas in terms of underlying changes in the mode of production. In other words, the type of society and its level of economic and technical development is determined principally by *how* a people produces the material goods needed to meet its needs. A society’s world view, including the concepts of causality described by Comte, followed from the way of thinking involved in the society’s mode of production.

On this basis, Marx categorized the historical types of society into primitive communism, agrarian/slave societies,

feudalism, and capitalism. Primitive communists, for example, are hunter gatherers like the Haida, whose social institutions and world view develop in sync with their hunting and gathering relationship to the environment and its resources. They are defined by their hunter-gatherer mode of production, in which the necessities of life are shared equally or distributed through potlatch.

Marx went on to argue that the *historical* transformations from one type of society to the next are generated by the society's capacity to generate economic surpluses, and the conflicts and tensions that develop when one class monopolizes economic power or property: land owners over agricultural workers, slave owners over slaves, feudal lords over serfs, or capitalists over labourers. These class dynamics are inherently unstable and eventually lead to revolutionary transformations from one mode of production to the next.

To simplify Comte's and Marx's schemas, we might examine how different types of society are structured around their relationship to nature. Sociologist Gerhard Lenski (1924–2015) defined societies in terms of their technological sophistication. With each advance in technology, the relationship between humans and nature is altered. Societies with rudimentary technology are at the mercy of the fluctuations of their environment, while societies with industrial technology have more control over their environment, and thus develop different cultural and social features. On the other hand, societies with rudimentary technology have relatively little impact on their environment, while industrial societies transform it radically. The changes in the relationship between humans and their environment exceed the differences in technology to encompass all aspects of social life, including its mental life (Comte) and material life (Marx). Distinctions based on the changing nature of this relationship enable sociologists to describe societies along a spectrum: from the foraging societies that characterized the first 300,000 years of homo sapiens existence to the contemporary postnatural, anthropocene societies in which human activity has had a substantial impact on the global ecosystem.

Preindustrial Societies

Before the Industrial Revolution (1760–1840) and widespread use of machines, societies were small, rural, and dependent largely on local resources. Economic production was limited to the amount of labour a human being could provide, and there were few specialized occupations. Production was (mostly) for immediate consumption, although evidence of trade between groups also dates back to the earliest archaeological records. The very first occupation was that of hunter-gatherer.

Hunter-Gatherer Societies



Figure 4.4 The Blackfoot or Siksika were traditionally nomadic hunter-gatherers who moved camp frequently during the summer months to follow the buffalo herds. (Image courtesy of Library and Archives Canada/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Of the various types of preindustrial societies, **Hunter-gatherer societies** demonstrate the strongest dependence on the environment. As the basic structure of all human society until about 10,000–12,000 years ago, these groups were based around kinship or tribal affiliations. Hunter-gatherers relied on their surroundings for survival – they hunted wild animals and foraged for uncultivated plants for food. They survived on what nature provided and immediately consumed what they obtained – they produced no surpluses. When resources became scarce, the group moved to a new area to find sustenance, meaning they were nomadic. The plains Indians of North America moved frequently to follow their main source of food. Some groups, like the Haida, lived off abundant, non-depleting resources, like fish, which enabled them to establish permanent villages where they could dwell for long periods of the year before dispersing to summer camps. (See “Making Connections: Big Picture, People of the Far Northwest” below).

Most of the caloric intake of hunters and gatherers came from foraging for edible plants, fruits, nuts, berries, and roots. The largely meat-based diet of the Inuit is a notable exception. Richard Lee (1978) estimated that approximately 65% of the hunter-gatherer diet came from plant sources, which had implications for the gender egalitarianism of these societies. With the earliest economic division of labour being between male hunters and women gatherers, the fact that women accounted for the largest portion of the food consumed by the community ensured the importance of their status within the group. On the other hand, early reports of missionaries among the Algonquins of the north shore of Lake Superior observed women with their noses cut off and small parts of their scalp removed as punishment for adultery, suggesting that (at least among some groups) female subordination was common. Male Algonquins often had seven or eight wives (Kenton, 1954).

As a result of their unique relationship and dependence on the environment for sustenance, the ideal type or model that characterized hunter-gatherer societies includes several common features (Diamond, 1974):

1. The distribution of economic surplus is organized on a communalistic, shared basis, in which there is little private property, work is cooperative, and gift giving is extensive. The use of resources was governed by the practice of **usufruct**, the distribution of resources according to need (Bookchin, 1982).
2. Power is dispersed, either shared equally within the community, or shifting between individual members based on individual skills and talents.

3. Social control over members of society is exercised through shared customs and sentiment, rather than through the development of formal law or institutions of law enforcement.
4. Society is organized on the basis of kinship and kinship ties, so there are few, if any, social functions or activities separate from family life.
5. There is little separation between the spheres of intimate, private life and public life. Everything is a matter of collective concern.
6. The life of the community is all “personal” and emotionally charged. There is little division of labour so there is no social isolation.
7. Art, story telling, ethics, religious ritual and spirituality are all fused together in daily life and experience. They provide a common means of expressing imagination, inspiration, anxiety, need, and purpose.

One interesting aspect of hunter-gatherer societies that runs counter to modern prejudices about “primitive” society, is how they developed mechanisms to prevent their evolution into more “advanced” sedentary, agricultural types of society. For example, in the “headman” structure, the authority of the headman or “titular chief” rests entirely on the ongoing support and confidence of community members, rather than permanent institutional structures. This is a mechanism that actively wards off the formation of permanent, institutionalized power (Clastres, 1987). The headman’s main role is as a diplomatic peacemaker and dispute settler, and he held sway only so long as he maintained the confidence of the tribe. Beyond a headman’s personal prestige, fairness in judgement and verbal ability, there was no social apparatus to enable a permanent institutional power or force to emerge.

Similarly, the Pacific Northwest peoples’ practice of the *potlatch*, in which goods, food, and other material wealth were regularly given away to neighbouring bands, provided a means of redistributing wealth and preventing permanent inequality from developing. Evidence also shows that even when hunter-gatherers lived in close proximity with agriculturalists they were not motivated to adopt the agricultural mode of production, because the diet of early agricultural societies was significantly poorer in nutrition (Stavrianos, 1990; Diamond, 1999). Recent evidence from archaeological sites in the British Isles suggests, for example, that early British hunter-gatherers traded for wheat with continental agriculturalists 2,000 years before agricultural economies were adopted in ancient Britain (Smith et al., 2015; Larson, 2015). They had close contact with agriculturalists, but were not inclined to adopt their sedentary societal forms, presumably because there was nothing appealing about them.

These societies were common until several hundred years ago, but today only a few hundred remain, such as the Indigenous Australian tribes sometimes referred to as “Aborigines,” or the Bambuti, a group of pygmy hunter-gatherers residing in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Still, in 2014, members of the Amazonian Mashco-Piro clan emerged out of their voluntary isolation at the border of Peru and Brasil to make “first contact” with the Brazilian government’s Indigenous people’s authority (Funai) to seek protection from suspected drug-traffickers (Collins, 2014). Hunter-gatherer groups largely disappeared under the impact of colonization and European diseases, but it is estimated that another 75 uncontacted tribes still inhabit the Amazonian rainforest.

Making Connections: Big Picture

People of the Far Northwest



Figure 4.5 The Salish Sea (as Georgia Strait is now widely known) was an ecologically and culturally rich zone occupied by related but unallied peoples. (Image courtesy of Noahedits/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

The Pacific Northwest region was utterly separate from the plains and other cultural zones. Its peoples were many and they shared several cultural features that were unique to the region.

By the 1400s there were at least five distinct language groups on the West Coast, including Tlingit, Haida, Tsimshian, Wakashan, and Salishan, all of which divide into many more dialects. However, these differences (and there are many others) are overshadowed by cultural similarities across the region. An abundance of food from the sea meant that coastal populations enjoyed comparatively high fertility rates and life expectancy. Population densities were, as a consequence, among the highest in the Americas.

The people of the Pacific Northwest do not share the agricultural traditions that existed east of the Rockies, nor did they influence Plains and other cultures. There was, however, a long and important relationship of trade and culture between the coastal and interior peoples. In some respects it is appropriate to consider the mainland cultures as inlet-and-river societies. The Salish-speaking peoples of the Strait of Georgia (Salish Sea) share many features with the Interior Salish (Okanagan, Secwepemc, Nlaka'pamux, Stl'atl'imx), though they are not as closely bound as the peoples of the Skeena and Stikine Valleys (which include the Tsimshian, the Gitksan, and the Nisga'a). Running north of the Interior Salish nations through the Cariboo Plateau, and flanked on the west by the Coast Mountain Range, are societies associated with the Athabaskan language group. Some of these peoples took on cultural habits and practices more typically associated with the Pacific Northwest coastal traditions than with the northern Athabaskan peoples who cover a swath of territory from Alaska to northern Manitoba. In what is now British Columbia, the Tsilhqot'in, the Dakelh, Wet'suwet'en, and Sekani were part of an expansive, southward-bound population that sent offshoots into the Nicola Valley and deep into the southwest of what is now the United States.

Most coastal and interior groups lived in large, permanent towns in the winter, and these villages reflected local political structures. Society in Pacific Northwest groups was generally highly stratified and included, in many instances, an elite, a commoner class, and a slave class. The Kwakwaka'wakw, whose domain extended in pre-contact times from the northern tip of Vancouver Island south along its east coast to Quadra Island and possibly farther, assembled kin groups (*numayms*) as part of a system of social rank in which all groups were ranked in relation to others. Additionally, each kin group "owned" names or positions that were also ranked. An individual could hold more than one name; some names were inherited and others were acquired through marriage. In this way, an individual could acquire rank through kin associations, although kin groups themselves had ascribed ranks. Movement in and out of slavery was even possible.

The fact that slavery existed points to the competition that existed between coastal rivals. The Haida, Tsimshian, Haisla, Nuxalk, Heiltsuk, Wuikinuxv (Oowekeeno), Kwakwaka'wakw, Pentlatch/K'ómoks, and Nuuchah-nulth regularly raided one another and their Stó:lō neighbours. Many winter towns were in some way fortified, and indeed, small stone defensive sniper blinds can still be discerned in the Fraser Canyon. The large number of oral traditions that arise from this era regularly reference conflict and the severe loss of personnel. Natural disasters are also part of the oral tradition: they tell of massive and apocalyptic floods

as well as volcanic explosions and other seismic (and tidal) events that had tremendous impacts on local populations.

The practice of *potlatch* (a public feast held to mark important community events, deaths, ascensions, etc.) is a further commonality. It involved giving away property and thus redistributing wealth as a means for the host to maintain, reinforce, and even advance through the complex hierarchical structure. In receiving property at a potlatch, an attendee was committing to act as a witness to the legitimacy of the event being celebrated. The size of potlatching varied radically and would evolve along new lines in the post-contact period, but the outlines and protocols of this cultural trademark were well-elaborated centuries before the contact moment. Potlatching was universal among the coastal peoples and could also be found among more inland, upriver societies as well.

Horticulture — the domestication of some plants — was another important source of food. West Coast peoples and the nations of the Columbia Plateau (which covers much of southern inland British Columbia), like many eastern groups, applied controlled burning to eliminate underbrush and open up landscape to berry patches and meadows of camas plants that were gathered for their potato-like roots. This required somewhat less labour than farming (although harvesting root plants is never light work), and it functioned within a strategy of seasonal camps. Communities moved from one food crop location to another for preparation and then, later, harvest. A great deal of the land seized upon by early European settlers in the Pacific Northwest included these berry patches and meadows. These were attractive sites because they were cleared of huge trees and consisted of mostly open and well-drained pasture. Europeans would see these spaces as pastoral, natural, and available, rather than *anthropogenic* (human-made) landscapes — the product of centuries of horticultural experimentation.

“People of the Far Northwest” excerpted from John Belshaw, 2015, [Canadian History: Pre-Confederation](#), (Vancouver: BCCampus). Used under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Licence.

Horticultural and Pastoral Societies



Figure 4.6 Teocinte (top) is the undomesticated ancestor of modern corn (bottom). Teocintes were the natural source of one of the most important food crops cultivated by the horticultural societies of Mesoamerica. (Image courtesy of John Doebley/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 3.0](#)

Around 10,200 BCE, another type of society developed in ancient Anatolia, (now part of Turkey), based on the newly developed capacity for people to grow and cultivate plants. Previously, the depletion of a region's crops or water supply forced hunter-gatherer societies to relocate in search of food sources. **Horticultural societies** formed in areas where rainfall and other conditions provided fertile soils to grow stable crops with simple hand tools. Their increasing degree of control over nature decreased their dependence on shifting environmental conditions for survival. They no longer had to abandon their location to follow resources and found permanent settlements. The new horticultural technology created more stability and dependability, produced more material goods, and provided the basis for the first revolution in human survival: the **neolithic revolution**.

Changing conditions and adaptations also led some societies to rely on the domestication of animals where circumstances permitted. Roughly 8,000 BCE, human societies began to recognize their ability to tame and breed animals. **Pastoral societies** rely on the domestication of animals as a resource for survival. Unlike earlier hunter-gatherers who depended entirely on existing resources to stay alive, pastoral groups were able to breed livestock for food, clothing, and transportation, creating a surplus of goods. Herding, or pastoral, societies remained nomadic because they were forced to follow their animals to fresh feeding grounds.

With the emergence of horticultural and pastoral societies during the neolithic revolution, stable agricultural surpluses began to be generated, population densities increased, specialized occupations developed, and societies commenced sustained trading with other local groups. Feuding and warfare also grew with the accumulation of wealth. One of the key inventions of the neolithic revolution therefore was structured social inequality: the development of a class structure based on the appropriation of surpluses. A **social class** can be defined as a group that has a distinct relationship to the means of production. In neolithic societies, based on horticulture or animal husbandry as their means of production, *control of land or livestock* became the first form of private property that enabled one relatively small group to take the surpluses, while another much larger group produced them. For the first time in history, societies were divided between producing classes and owning classes. Moreover, as control of land was the source of power in neolithic societies, ways of organizing and defending it became a more central preoccupation. The development of permanent administrative and military structures, taxation, as well as the formation of specialized priestly classes to spiritually unite society originated on the basis of the horticultural and pastoral relationship to nature.

Agricultural Societies

While pastoral and horticultural societies used small, temporary tools, such as digging sticks or hoes, *agricultural societies* relied on permanent tools for survival. Around 3,000 BCE, an explosion of new technology known as the agricultural revolution made farming possible — and profitable. Farmers learned to rotate the types of crops grown on their fields and reuse waste products, such as fertilizer, which led to better harvests and bigger surpluses of food. New tools for digging and harvesting were made of metal, making them more effective and longer lasting. Human settlements grew into towns and cities, and particularly bountiful regions became centres of trade and commerce.

This era in which some classes of people had the time and comfort to engage in more contemplative and thoughtful activities, such as music, poetry, and philosophy, became referred to as the “dawn of civilization” by some because of the development of leisure and arts. Craftspeople were able to support themselves through the production of creative, decorative, or thought-provoking aesthetic objects and writings.

As agricultural techniques made the production of surpluses possible, social classes and power structures became further entrenched. Kinship ties became secondary to other forms of social allegiance and power. Those with the power to appropriate the surpluses were able to dominate society on a wider scale than ever before. Classes of nobility and religious elites developed. As cities expanded, ownership and protection of resources became an ever-pressing concern, and the militarization of society became more prominent. Difference in social standing between men and women, already initiated in neolithic societies, became more pronounced and institutionalized. **Slavery** — the ownership and control of humans as property — was also institutionalized as a large scale source of labour. In the agricultural empires of



Figure 4.7 Roman collared slaves depicted in a marble relief from Smyrna (modern Turkey) in 200 CE. (Image courtesy of Jun/ Ashmolean Museum in Oxford, 2010/ Flickr.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

Greece and Rome, slavery was the dominant form of class exploitation. However, as slaves were largely acquired through military acquisition, ancient slavery as an institution was inherently unstable and inefficient.

Making Connections: Sociological Concepts

The *Dialectic of Culture*, the Monuments of Easter Island and the Cult of Progress



Figure 4.8 A group of Moais on Easter Island. (Image courtesy of Alberto Beaudroit/ Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

The mystery of the monuments of *moai* on Easter Island speaks to a key puzzle in the analysis of society and societal change. This mystery has to do with the way that cultural attitudes and beliefs can become rigid and inflexible, sometimes to the degree that they become independent of the material reality they are intended to interpret or give meaning to. Cultural beliefs can take on a life of their own, regardless of whether they have relevance to the survival of a people. The idea of a **dialectic of culture** refers to the way in which the creation of culture — beliefs, practices, ways of life, technologies, and material artifacts, etc. — is both constrained by environmental limits, and is a means

to go beyond these natural limits, to adapt and modify the environment to suit human purposes and needs. This dialectic provides a model for understanding how societies evolve and change, but also reveals the precarious nature of the human/environment relationship.

The anthropologist Ronald Wright (2004) described this phenomenon with regard to the history of the Indigenous people of Easter Island in the South Pacific. The archaeological record shows that Easter Island, or Rapa Nui, once had a lush, richly soiled, and densely treed ecosystem that sustained a population of approximately 10,000 people. However, by the time the Dutch arrived in the early 18th century, the ecosystem of the island was barren, and only 2,000 poorly nourished inhabitants lived there. At the same time, approximately 1,000 massive, 30-foot high monuments, or “moai,” the height of 3-story buildings, were there — one for every 10 inhabitants at the height of the island’s population. The origins of the moai struck European observers as mysterious, because the means of their construction had long vanished. Commentators as late as the 1970s claimed these must have been the work of some vanished ancient civilization, or even visitors from outer space (e.g., von Daniken, 1969).

However, as archeologists discovered, the monuments were erected through concerted human labour to honour the ancestors of rival island clans when the islands were more populated and forested. As the rivalry between clans became more intense around the time of the European Middle Ages, the stone images became increasingly extravagant. Each generation built larger and larger moai by using up valuable resources, especially timber. By 1400, the island was treeless. As Wright (2004) puts it, the compulsion of the

statue cults to build more and larger moai to honour the ancestors was an “ideological pathology,” a fixed cultural idea that so defied practical sense that it undermined the ability of a people to survive.

Wright makes the analogy between the statue cults of Easter Island and the contemporary North American “cult of progress” in which an increasing exploitation of resources and accumulation of wealth are valued in themselves. As a modern version of ideological pathology, the cult of progress has no regard for social and environmental sustainability. He cites Bahn and Flenley:

[The islanders] carried out for us the experiment of permitting unrestricted population growth, profligate use of resources, destruction of the environment, and boundless confidence in their religion to take care of the future. The result was an ecological disaster leading to a population crash. Do we have to repeat the experiment on a grand scale? Is the human personality always the same as that of the person who felled the last tree? (Wright, 2004, p. 63)

To understand this dynamic, it is important to attend to the dialectic of culture. As we saw in [Chapter 3. Culture](#), culture is the means a society uses to make sense of the world. It responds to changes in the mode of production or economy of a society. As new types of production are created, the relationship to the world is modified, and new cultural understandings emerge. People begin to see the world in a different way because they are interacting with it in a different way. These understandings are of course influenced by the corresponding relations of power in society, which determine whose perspectives on the world become “truths” and whose do not.

In this dialectical model, it is important to point out that changes in the mode of production do not *determine* or cause cultural beliefs in some sort of mechanical relationship, just as the invention of the piano did not cause Mozart’s piano concertos to be written. As Marx puts it:

Mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the task itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation” (Marx, 1977/1859).

To this, we might add that the “tasks” or cultural possibilities set by the material conditions of a society can be taken up in many different ways, or not at all. On the other hand, as Wright’s examples show, cultural beliefs, practices, and tasks can become rigid and unresponsive to material reality, unhinged from the ability of the environment or the economy to sustain them. Therefore, it is appropriate to view culture as being in a fluid and dialectical relationship with the mode of production. One does not cause the other in a deterministic manner; rather, both provide the limits or parameters within which the other develops. If a culturally driven process exceeds the capacity of material reality to sustain it, the culture is in danger of no longer being viable.

Feudal Societies

In Europe, the 9th century gave rise to **feudal societies**. Feudal societies were still agriculturally based, but organized according to a strict hierarchical system of power founded on land ownership, military protection, and duties or *mutual obligations* between the different classes. Feudalism is usually used in a restricted sense by historians to describe the societies of post-Roman Europe, from roughly the 9th to the 15th centuries (the “middle ages”), although these societies

bear striking resemblance to the hierarchical, agricultural-based societies of Japan, China, and pre-contact America (e.g., Aztec, Inca) of the same period.



Figure 4.9 Tapestry from the 1070s in which King Harold swears an oath to become the vassal of Duke William of Normandy. (Photo courtesy of Myrabella/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

In Europe the class system of feudalism was organized around the parceling out of manors or estates by the aristocracy to vassals and knights in return for their military service. The nobility, known as lords, rewarded knights or vassals by granting them pieces of land. In return for the resources that the land provided, vassals promised to fight for their lords. These individual pieces of land, known as fiefdoms, were cultivated by the lower class of serfs. Serfs were not slaves, in that they were at least nominally free men and women, but they produced agricultural surpluses for lords primarily through forced agricultural service. In return for maintaining and working the land, serfs were guaranteed a place to live and military protection from outside enemies. They were able to produce food and goods for their own consumption on private land allotments, or on common allotments shared by the community. Power in feudal society was handed down through family lines, with serf families serving lords for generations and generations.

In later forms of feudalism, the forced labour of the serfs was gradually replaced by a system of rents and taxation. Serfs worked their own plots of land, but gave their lords a portion of what they produced. Gradually payment in the form of goods and agricultural surplus was replaced by payment in the form of money. This prompted the development of markets in which the exchange of goods through *bartering* was replaced by the exchange of goods for money. This was the origin of the money economy. In bartering, the buyer and the seller have to *need* each other's goods. In a market economy, goods are exchanged into a common medium of value — money — which can then be exchanged for goods of any nature. Markets therefore enabled goods and services to be bought and sold on a much larger scale and in a much more systematic and efficient way. Money also enabled land to be bought and sold instead of handed down through hereditary right. Money could be accumulated and financial debts could be incurred.

Ultimately, the social and economic system of feudalism was surpassed by the rise of capitalism and the technological advances of the industrial era, because money allowed economic transactions to be conceived and conducted in an entirely new way. In particular, the demise of feudalism was initiated by the increasing need to intensify labour and improve productivity, as markets became more competitive and the economy less dependent on agriculture.

Industrial Societies



Figure 4.10 Wrapping bars of soap at the Colgate-Palmolive Canada plant, Toronto, 1919. (Image courtesy of the Toronto Public Library/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

In the 18th century, Europe experienced a dramatic rise in technological invention, ushering in an era known as the Industrial Revolution. What made this period remarkable was the number of new inventions that influenced people's daily lives. Within a generation, tasks that had until this point required months of labour became achievable in a matter of days. Before the Industrial Revolution, work was largely person- or animal-based, relying on human workers or horses to power mills and drive pumps. In 1782, James Watt and Matthew Boulton created a steam engine that could do the work of 12 horses by itself.

Steam power began appearing everywhere. Instead of paying artisans to painstakingly spin wool and weave it into cloth, people turned to textile mills that produced fabric quickly at a better price, and often with better quality. Rather than planting and harvesting fields by hand, farmers were able to purchase mechanical seeders and threshing machines that caused agricultural productivity to soar. Products such as paper and glass became available to the average person, and the quality and accessibility of education and health care rise dramatically. Gas lights allowed increased visibility in the dark, and towns and cities developed a nightlife.

One of the results of increased wealth, productivity, and technology was the rise of urban centres. Serfs and peasants, expelled from their ancestral lands, flocked to cities in search of factory jobs, and the populations of cities became increasingly diverse. The new generation became less preoccupied with maintaining family land and traditions, and more focused on survival in the precarious new wage labour market. Some were successful in acquiring wealth and achieving upward mobility for themselves and their family. Others lived in devastating poverty and squalor. The class system of feudalism had been rigid, and resources for all but the highest nobility and clergy were scarce. Under capitalism, social mobility (both upward and downward) became possible.

It was during the 18th and 19th centuries of the Industrial Revolution that sociology was born. Life was changing quickly, and the long-established traditions of the agricultural eras did not apply to life in the larger cities. Masses of people moved to new environments, and often faced horrendous conditions of filth, overcrowding, and poverty. As we noted in [Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology](#), sociology was born in the 19th century in response to the unprecedented scale of the social problems of modern society.

It was during this time that power moved from the hands of the aristocracy and “old money” to the new class of rising bourgeoisie, who were able to amass fortunes in their lifetimes. In Canada, a new cadre of financiers and industrialists like Donald Smith (1st Baron Strathcona and Mount Royal) and George Stephen (1st Baron Mount Stephen) became the new power players, using their influence in business to control aspects of government. Eventually, concerns about the exploitation of workers led to the formation of labour unions and laws that set mandatory conditions for employees. Although the introduction of new “postindustrial” technologies (like computers) at the end of the 20th century ended the industrial age, much of our social structure and social ideas — such as the nuclear family, left-right political divisions, and time standardization — have a basis in industrial society.



Figure 4.11 George Stephen, one of the Montreal consortium who financed and built the Canadian Pacific Railway, grew up the son of a carpenter in Scotland. He was titled 1st Baron Mount Stephen in 1891. The Canadian Pacific Railway was a risky financial venture but as Canada’s first transcontinental railroad, it played a fundamental role in the settlement and development of the West. (Photo courtesy of McCord Museum, File no. I-14179.1/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Postindustrial Societies



Figure 4.12 The ubiquitous e-work place of the 21st century. (Image courtesy of Charlie Styr/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

Information societies,

sometimes known as postindustrial or digital societies, are a recent development. Unlike **industrial societies** that are rooted in the production of material goods (resources, automobiles, chemicals, electrical goods, steel, etc.), information societies are based on the production of information, knowledge, and services. Companies, regions, and countries depend more and more on knowledge, information, and information processing technology as sources of productivity and competitiveness (Castells, 2010).

Lash and Urry (1994) describe this as a shift to the production of ephemeral “signs” as opposed to durable “things.” The products of information societies are abstract and mobile,

rather than tangible and stable. Of principle importance are informational products with *cognitive* content (such as scientific research and development, biotechnologies, financial products, marketing surveillance, software apps and social media platforms), and media, image, and design products with *aesthetic* content (such as advertising, fashion, pop music, cinema, leisure, and digital streaming). An increasing component of the value of commodities comes from branding and lifestyle marketing, which advertisers and marketers use to attach images and *meaning* to goods.

Digital technology is the steam engine of information societies, and high tech, e-commerce, and social media companies such as Apple, Microsoft, Facebook (Meta), Google (Alphabet Inc.), and Amazon are its version of railroad and

steel manufacturing corporations. The new core of post-industrial society is clustered around financial services (such as banking and insurance), global information and communications services, as well as other services like transportation, airlines, tourism, and leisure. All of these depend in a fundamental way on the revolution in informational and communication technologies.



Figure 4.13 Mobile phone technology links digital districts in cities in Nigeria, Benin, Tanzania, Brazil and China to the global information society. (Image courtesy of Emo de Medeiros/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

Since the economy of information societies is driven by knowledge and not material goods, power lies with those in control of creating, storing, and distributing information. The core occupations of a postindustrial society are likely to be sellers of informational services — designers, software programmers, or business consultants, for example — instead of producers of goods. Social classes are divided by access to education, since without technical and communication skills, people in an information society lack the means for success. The **digital divide** refers to the gap between those able to access and make effective use of information technology and those who cannot (Menzies, 1996). In Canada, this disproportionately marginalizes racialized groups, and especially Indigenous communities (Bredin, 2001). The COVID-19 pandemic and shift to accessing work, education, and services from home illustrated stark divides between access to broadband between rural and urban areas. In 2021, 87% of all households in Canada had access to broadband with sufficient bandwidth, but only 46% of rural households had access (CRTC, 2021).

Information and knowledge based societies tend to privilege reflexive forms of subject and subjectivity (Giddens, 1991). The freedom-oriented countercultural movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s, including the civil rights movement, the feminist movement, and the environmental movement, instigated a shift to **reflexive subjectivity**. Tradition, established social roles, or modern institutions no longer confined people's self-identity. Rather, people began to take an increasingly critical and reflexive distance with respect to these institutions. Knowledge, self-reflection, and self-awareness provide individuals with the opportunity to disembed themselves from prescribed roles and construct their own identities. In the knowledge economy, work tasks often require the ability to reflect on and recreate work materials, rather than simply follow the structured work patterns of the industrial labour process. Workers must self-reflect and self-monitor their work process independently of direct supervision. Similarly, in information societies, a

reflexively individualized public tends to question “what they are told” by authorities, science and expert systems, and increasingly seek to monitor and organize their own individual life-narratives (Lash and Urry, 1994).

Globally, information and communication structures are transforming national economies and societies. For the first time, a truly global society can be said to have emerged. On the basis of information technologies, the dominant economic activities that link societies, such as financial markets, currency exchanges, business services, technological development, and media communication, operate as a single unit in real time on a planetary scale (Castells, 2010). However, the distribution of this economic activity is uneven. Information and communication networks cover the entire globe, connecting valuable production, markets, and workers, but exclude large sections of the global population who are unskilled, unprofitable, and “structurally irrelevant.”

Castells (2010) describes the characteristic form of organization in this global structure as the **network enterprise**. The network enterprise model links autonomous agents (companies, segments of companies, producers and suppliers, etc.), which are often geographically disperse, and organizes them temporarily for specific projects or tasks. Once the task is completed the network dissolves or reforms to begin a new project. Through the network enterprise, hubs of economic activity or “**global cities**” like Vancouver, Tokyo, and Hong Kong, or Toronto, San Jose, and Osaka, might be more closely linked to each other than to their surrounding hinterlands. Thus, for Castells (2004), the postindustrial information society is also a **network society**: “a society whose social structure is made up of networks powered by micro-electronics-based information and communications technologies.”

Postnatural Society: The Anthropocene

Recent scientific and technological developments transform our relationship to nature to such a degree that it is possible to talk about a new **postnatural society**. Advances in computing, genetics, nano-technology, and quantum mechanics create the conditions for society in which the limits imposed by nature are overcome by technological interventions at the molecular level of life and matter. Donna Haraway (1991) describes the new “cyborg” reality that becomes possible when the capacities of the body and mind are enhanced by various prosthetic devices like artificial organs or body parts. When these artificial prosthetics do not simply replace defective anatomy but improve upon it, one can argue that the conditions of life have become *postnatural*. In his science fiction novel *Holy Fire* (1996), Bruce Sterling extrapolates from recent developments in medical knowledge to imagine a future epoch of *posthumanity*; i.e., a period in which the mortality that defined the human condition for millennia has effectively been eliminated through the technologies of life preservation. Under these conditions, humans transcend the human condition and become posthuman.

Through genetic engineering, scientists have been able to create new life forms since the early 1970s. This research is fueled by the prospect of using genetic technologies to solve problems, like disease and aging, at the level of the DNA molecule that contains the “blueprint” of life. Food crops can be designed that are pest-resistant, drought-resistant, or more productive. These technologies are therefore theoretically capable of solving environmentally imposed restrictions on our collective ability to feed the hungry. Similarly, nanotechnologies, which allow the physical properties of materials to be engineered at the atomic and subatomic level, pose the possibility of an infinitely manipulable universe. The futurologist Ray Kurzweil (2009) suggests that on the basis of nanotechnology “we’ll be able to create just about anything we need in the physical world from information files with very inexpensive input materials.” Others




Figure 4.14 Advances in micro-biochemistry make it possible to manipulate the body at the molecular level. (Image courtesy of Sanofi Pasteur/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

caution that the complexity of risks posed by the introduction of these molecular technologies into the environment makes their use decidedly dangerous and their consequences incalculable. This is a very postnatural society dilemma — one that would not have occurred to people as a realistic problem in the earlier types of society described above.

What are the effects of postnatural technologies on the structure and forms of social life and society? At present, these technologies are extremely capital-intensive to develop, which suggests that they will have implications for social inequality — both within societies and globally. Wealthy nations and wealthy individuals will be the most likely beneficiaries. Moreover, as the development of postnatural technologies do not impact the basic structures of capitalism, for the foreseeable future decisions on which avenues of research are to be pursued will be decided solely by private corporations on the basis of profitable returns. Many competing questions concerning the global risks of the technologies and the ethics of their implementation are secondary to the profit motives of the corporations that own the knowledge.

In terms of the emergent *life technologies* like genetic engineering or micro-biochemical research, Nikolas Rose (2007) suggests that we are already experiencing five distinct lines of social transformation:

1. The “molecularization” of our perspective on the human body, or life in general, implies that we now visualize the body and intervene in its processes at the molecular level. We are “no longer constrained by the normativity of a given order.” From growing skin in a petri dish to the repurposing of viruses, the body can be reconstructed in new, as yet unknown forms because of the pliability of life at the molecular level.
2. The technologies shift our attention to the *optimization* of the body’s capacities rather than simply curing illness. It becomes possible to address our risk and *susceptibility* to future illnesses or aging processes, just as it becomes feasible to *enhance* the body’s existing capacities (e.g., strength, cognitive ability, beauty, etc.).
3. The relationship between bodies and political life changes to create new forms of biological citizenship or *biosociality*. We increasingly construct our identities according to the specific genetic markers that define us, (e.g., “we are the people with Leber’s Amaurosis”), and on this basis advocate for policy changes, accommodations, resources, and research funding, etc.
4. The complexity of the knowledge in this field increasingly forces us to submit ourselves to the authority of a group of new somatic specialists and medical authorities, from neurologists to genetics counselors.
5. As the flows of capital investment in biotechnology and biomedicine shift towards the creation of a new “bioeconomy,” the fundamental processes of life are turned into potential sources of profit and “biovalue.”

Some have described the postnatural period that we are currently living in as the **Anthropocene**. The anthropocene is defined as the geological epoch following the Pleistocene and Holocene in which human activities significantly impact and transform the global ecosystem (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000). Climate change is the primary example of anthropogenic effect, but it includes a number of other well-known examples, from soil erosion and species extinction to the acidification of the oceans. Of course this impact began at least as early as the 19th century with the effects on the environment caused by the Industrial Revolution. Arguably, however, it is the recently established knowledge and scientific evidence of these effects which constitutes the current era self-consciously as the anthropocene. In the anthropocene we become aware of the global nature of the catastrophic risks that human activities pose to the environment. It is also this knowledge that enables the possibility of institutional, economic, and political change to address these issues. Current developments like the use of cap and trade or carbon pricing to factor in the cost the environmental impact into economic calculations, the shift to “green” technologies like solar and wind power, or even curbside recycling, have both global implications and direct repercussions for the organization of daily life.

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4.2. Theoretical Perspectives on the Formation of Modern Society



Figure 4.15 Image of the T. Eaton Co. department store in Toronto, Canada from the back cover of the 1901 Eaton's catalogue. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

While many sociologists have contributed to research on society and social interaction, three thinkers provide the basis of the modern understanding of society. Émile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and Max Weber developed different theoretical approaches to help understand the development of capitalist society and modernity. [Chapter 3. Culture](#) discusses how the members of a society come to share common norms and values: a way of life or *culture*. In the following discussion of modern society, Durkheim, Marx and Weber provide an analytical focus on another foundational sociological concept: **social structure**.

In [Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology](#), social structures are defined as general patterns of social behaviour and organization that persist through time. Durkheim's analysis of the growing division of labour, Marx's analysis of the economic structures of capitalism (private property, class, markets), and Weber's analysis of the rationalized structures of modern organization reveal the emergence of uniquely modern societal structures. While the aspect of modern structure that Durkheim, Marx, and Weber emphasize differs, their common approach is to stress the impact of social structure on culture and ways of life rather than the other way around. This remains a key element of sociological explanation today.

Émile Durkheim and Functionalism

Émile Durkheim's (1858–1917) key focus in studying modern society was to understand the conditions under which social and moral cohesion could be reestablished. He observed that European societies of the 19th century had undergone

an unprecedented and fractious period of social change that threatened to dissolve society altogether. In his book *The Division of Labour in Society* (1960/1893), Durkheim argued that as modern societies grew more populated, more complex, and more difficult to regulate, the underlying basis of solidarity or unity within the social order needed to evolve. His primary concern was that the social glue that held society together was failing, and that the divisions between people were becoming more conflictual and unmanageable. Therefore Durkheim developed his school of sociology to explain the principles of cohesiveness of societies – their forms of *social solidarity* – and how they change and survive over time. He thereby addressed one of the fundamental sociological questions: Why do societies hold together rather than fall apart?

Two central components of social solidarity in traditional, premodern societies were a common **collective conscience**: the communal beliefs, morals, and attitudes of a society shared by all; and high levels of **social integration**: the number and strength of ties that people have to their social groups. These societies were held together because most people performed similar tasks and shared values, language, and symbols. There was a low **division of labour**, and a common religious system of social beliefs. Society was held together on the basis of what Durkheim called **mechanical solidarity**: a minimal division of labour and a shared collective consciousness with harsh punishment for deviation from the norms. Such societies permitted a low degree of individual autonomy. Essentially there was no distinction between the individual conscience and the collective conscience.

Societies with mechanical solidarity act in a mechanical fashion; things are done mostly because they have always been done that way. If anyone violated the collective conscience embodied in laws and taboos, punishment was swift and *retributive*. This type of thinking was common in preindustrial societies where strong bonds of kinship and a low division of labour created shared morals and values among people, such as among the feudal serfs. When people do the same type of work, Durkheim argued, they tend to think and act alike.

Modern societies, according to Durkheim, were more complex. They were larger and impersonal. Collective consciousness was increasingly weak in individuals, and the ties of social integration that bound individuals to others were increasingly few. Modern societies were characterized by an increasing diversity of experience and an increasing division of people into different occupations and specializations. They shared less and less commonalities that could bind them together. However, as Durkheim observed, their ability to carry out their specific functions depended upon others being able to carry out theirs. Modern society was increasingly held together on the basis of a complex division of labour or what he called **organic solidarity**: a complex system of interrelated parts, working together to maintain stability. It was organic in the sense of the system of organs that make up an organism (Durkheim, 1893/1960).

According to Durkheim's theory, as individual roles in the division of labour become more specialized and unique, and people increasingly have less in common with one another, they also become increasingly interdependent on one another. Even though there is an increased level of individual autonomy – the development of unique personalities and the opportunity to pursue individualized interests – society has a tendency to cohere because everyone depends on everyone else. The academic relies on the mechanic for the specialized skills required to fix their car, the mechanic sends their children to university to learn from the academic, and both rely on the baker to provide them with bread for their morning toast. Each member of society relies on the others, even if they do not share a common collective conscience. In premodern societies, the structures like religious practice that produce shared consciousness and harsh retribution for transgressions *function* to maintain the solidarity of society as a whole; whereas in modern societies, the occupational structure and its complex division of labour *functions* to maintain solidarity through the creation of mutual interdependence.

While the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity is, in the long run, advantageous for a society, Durkheim noted that it creates periods of crisis, chaos, and “normlessness.” One of the outcomes of the transition is social **anomie**. Anomie – literally, “without norms” – is a situation in which society no longer has the support of a firm collective consciousness. There are no clear norms or shared values to guide and regulate behaviour. People are uncertain what the rules are. Anomie was associated with the rise of industrial society, which removed ties to the land and shared labour; the rise of individualism, which removed limits on what individuals could desire; and the rise of secularism, which removed supernatural beliefs, rituals, or symbolic foci, and traditional modes of moral regulation. During times of war or rapid economic development, the normative basis of society was also challenged. People isolated in their specialized

tasks tend to become alienated from one another and from a sense of collective conscience and duty. However, Durkheim felt that as societies reach an advanced stage of organic solidarity, they avoid anomie by redeveloping a set of shared norms based on social diversity and interdependence. Harsh collective retributions for transgressions are replaced by individual contractual relationships and forms of restorative justice, for example. According to Durkheim, once a society achieves organic solidarity, it has finished its development.

Karl Marx and Critical Sociology

For Marx, the creation of modern society was tied to the emergence of capitalism as a global economic system. In the mid-19th century, as industrialization was expanding, Karl Marx (1818–1883) observed that the conditions of labour became more and more exploitative. The large manufacturers of steel were particularly ruthless, and their facilities became popularly dubbed “satanic mills” based on a poem by William Blake. Marx’s colleague and friend, Frederick Engels (1820–1895) wrote *The Condition of the Working-Class in England* in 1844, which described in detail the horrid conditions.

Such is the Old Town of Manchester, and on re-reading my description, I am forced to admit that instead of being exaggerated, it is far from black enough to convey a true impression of the filth, ruin, and uninhabitableness, the defiance of all considerations of cleanliness, ventilation, and health which characterise the construction of this single district, containing at least twenty to thirty thousand inhabitants. And such a district exists in the heart of the second city of England, the first manufacturing city of the world (1892).




Figure 4.16 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels analyzed differences in social power between “have” and “have-not” groups. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)



Figure 4.17 Friedrich Engels. (Photo courtesy of George Lester/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Add to Engels' description above the long hours, the use of child labour, and exposure to extreme conditions of heat, cold, and toxic chemicals, and it is no wonder that Marx (1867/1995) referred to capital as “dead labour, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks.”

As described at the beginning of the chapter, Marx's explanation of the exploitative nature of industrial society draws on a more comprehensive theory of the development of human societies from the earliest hunter-gatherers to the modern era: **historical materialism**. For Marx, the underlying structure of societies and the forces of historical change were defined by the relationship between the **base and superstructure** of societies. In this architecture-like model, society's economic structure forms its foundation or *base*, on which the culture and other social institutions rest, forming its *superstructure*. For Marx, it is the base — the economic *mode of production* — that shapes what a society's culture, law, political system, family form, and, most importantly, what its typical form of struggle or conflict will be like. Each type of society — hunter-gatherer, pastoral, agrarian, feudal, capitalist — could be characterized as the total way of life that forms around different economic bases.




Figure 4.18 Karl Marx asserted that all elements of a society's structure depend on its economic structure. (Courtesy of OpenStax CNX.) [CC BY 4.0](#)

In his **dialectical** model of history, Marx saw economic conflict in society as the primary means of change. The base of each type of society in history — its economic mode of production — had its own characteristic form of economic struggle. This was because a mode of production is essentially two things: the **means of production** of a society — anything that is used in production to satisfy needs and maintain existence (e.g., land, animals, crop production, technology, factories, etc.) — and the **relations of production** of a society — the division of society into economic *classes* (the social roles allotted to individuals by virtue of their position in a system of production). Marx observed historically that in each epoch or type of society since the early “primitive communist” foraging societies, one class of persons has owned or controlled the means of production and another class has produced the goods typical of that society. This is a power relationship based on who controls the surpluses of production and who is compelled to produce them. Different epochs are characterized by different forms of ownership and different class structures: hunter-gatherer (classless/common ownership), agricultural (citizens/slaves), feudal (lords/peasants), and capitalism (capitalists/“free” labourers). These *relations of production* have been characterized by relations of domination since the emergence of property ownership (i.e., control over the surpluses produced by labourers) in the early Agrarian societies. Throughout history, societies have been divided into classes with opposed or contradictory interests. These “class antagonisms,” as Marx called them, periodically lead to periods of social revolution in which it becomes possible for one type of society to replace another.

The most recent revolutionary transformation resulted in the end of feudalism. A new revolutionary class emerged from among the freemen, small property owners, and middle-class burghers of the medieval period to challenge and

overthrow the privilege and power of the feudal aristocracy. The members of the **bourgeoisie** or capitalist class were revolutionary in the sense that they represented a radical change and redistribution of power in European society. Their power was based on the private ownership of industrial property and finances (i.e., capital), which they sought to protect from the power of the aristocracy through the struggle for property rights, notably in the English Civil War (1642–1651) and the French Revolution (1789–1799). The development of capitalism inaugurated a period of world transformation and incessant change through the destruction of the previous feudal class structure, the dispossession of peasants from their feudal estates, the ruthless competition for markets, the introduction of new industrial technologies, and the globalization of economic activity.

As Marx and Engels (1848/1977) put it in *The Communist Manifesto*:

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors,” and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash payment.” It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation... . The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society.

However, the rise of the bourgeoisie and the development of capitalism also brought into existence the class of “free” wage labourers, or the **proletariat**. The proletariat were made up largely of guild workers and serfs who were freed or expelled from their indentured labour in feudal guild and agricultural production, and migrated to the emerging cities where industrial production was centred. They were “free” labour in the sense that they were no longer bound to feudal lords or guildmasters. The new labour relationship was based on a contract. However, as Marx pointed out, this meant in effect that free labour was labour that workers could sell as a commodity to whomever they wanted, but if they did not sell their labour they would starve. The capitalist had no obligations to provide them with security, livelihood, or a place to live as the feudal lords had done for their serfs. The source of a new class antagonism developed based on the contradiction of fundamental interests between the bourgeois owners and the wage labourers: where the owners sought to reduce the wages of labourers as far as possible to reduce the costs of production and remain competitive, the workers sought to retain a living wage that could provide for a family and secure living conditions. The outcome, in Marx and Engel’s words, was that “society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other — Bourgeoisie and Proletariat” (1848/1977).

Making Connections: Sociological Concepts

Marx and the Theory of Alienation



Figure 4.19 Assembly of notebook hard drives in Seagate's "clean room," Wuxi China. (Photo courtesy of Robert Scoble/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

For Marx, what we do defines who we are. What it is to be “human” is defined by the capacity we have as a species to creatively transform the world in which we live to meet our needs for survival. Humanity at its core is *homo faber* (the human as creator). In historical terms, in spite of the persistent nature of one class dominating another, the element of humanity as creator existed. There was at least some connection between the worker and the product, augmented by the natural conditions of seasons and the rising and setting of the sun, such as we see in an agricultural society. But with the bourgeois revolution and the rise of industry and capitalism, workers now worked for wages alone. The essential elements of creativity and self-affirmation in the largely unregulated use of their labour was replaced by compulsion in industrial settings. The relationship of workers to their efforts was no longer based on human creativity, but purely on satisfying animal needs. As Marx put it, the worker “only feels himself freely active in his animal functions of eating, drinking, and procreating, at most also in his dwelling and dress, and feels himself an animal in his human functions” (1932/1977).

Marx described the economic conditions of production under capitalism in terms of alienation. **Alienation** refers to the condition in which the individual is isolated and divorced from their society, work, or the sense of self and common humanity. Marx defined four specific types of alienation that arose with the development of wage labour under capitalism.

Alienation from the product of one's labour. An industrial worker does not have the opportunity to relate to the product they are labouring on. The worker produces commodities, but at the end of the day the commodities not only belong to the capitalist, but serve to enrich the capitalist at the worker's expense. In

Marx's language, the worker relates to the product of their labour "as an alien object that has power over him [or her]" (1932/1977). Workers do not care if they are making watches or cars; they care only that their jobs exist. Workers may not even know or care what products they are contributing to. A worker on a Ford assembly line may spend all day installing windows on car doors without ever seeing the rest of the car. A cannery worker can spend a lifetime cleaning fish without ever knowing what product they are used for.

Alienation from the process of one's labour. Workers do not control the conditions of their jobs because they do not own the means of production. If someone is hired to work in a fast food restaurant, that person is expected to make the food exactly the way they are taught. All ingredients must be combined in a particular order and in a particular quantity; there is no room for creativity or change. An employee at Burger King cannot decide to change the spices used in the beef patty in the same way that an employee on a Ford assembly line cannot decide to place a car's headlights in a different position. Everything is decided by the owners who then dictate orders to the workers. The workers relate to their own labour as an activity that they do not control and that does not belong to them.

Alienation from others. Workers compete, rather than cooperate. Employees vie for raises, time slots, bonuses, and job security. Different industries and different geographical regions compete against each other for investment and jobs. Even when a worker clocks out at night and goes home, the competition does not end. As Marx commented in *The Communist Manifesto*, "No sooner is the exploitation of the labourer by the manufacturer, so far at an end, that he receives his wages in cash, than he is set upon by the other portion of the bourgeoisie, the landlord, the shopkeeper, the pawnbroker" (1848/1977).

Alienation from one's humanity. A final outcome of industrialization is a loss of connectivity between a worker and what makes humans truly human. Humanity is defined for Marx by "conscious life-activity," but under conditions of wage labour this is taken not as an end in itself — only a means of satisfying the most base, animal-like needs. The "species being" (i.e., conscious creative activity that defines the human species) is only confirmed when individuals can create and produce freely, not simply when they work to reproduce their biological existence and satisfy immediate needs like animals.

Taken as a whole, then, alienation in modern society means that individuals have no control over their lives. There is nothing that ties workers to their occupations. Instead of being able to take pride in an identity such as being a watchmaker, automobile builder, or chef, a person is simply a cog in the machine. Even in feudal societies, people had more control over the manner of their labour and when or how it was carried out. But why, then, does the modern working class not rise up and rebel?

In response to this problem, Marx developed the concept of **false consciousness**. False consciousness is a condition in which the beliefs, self-understanding, or ideology of a person conceal or mask the truth of their social conditions and of their own best interests. In fact, it is the ideology of the dominant class (here, the bourgeoisie capitalists) that is imposed upon the proletariat. Ideas such as the virtues of competition over cooperation, of hard work being its own reward, of "the individual" as master of their own destinies, fortunes or ruins, etc. clearly benefit the owners of industry because they conceal the class nature of power. Therefore, to the degree that workers live in a state of false consciousness, they are less likely to question their subordinate place in society or assume responsibility for addressing social inequality.

Like other elements of the superstructure, "consciousness," is a product of the underlying economic base. But Marx proposed that the workers' false consciousness would eventually be replaced with **class consciousness** — the awareness of their *actual* material and political interests as members of a unified class. Inequality, exploitation, and precarious employment, etc. would become impossible to ignore because they

were not random or accidental. They were structured into the economic system itself. In *The Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels wrote,

The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself. But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons – the modern working class – the proletarians (1848/1977).

Capitalism developed the industrial means by which the problems of economic scarcity could be resolved and, at the same time, intensified the conditions of exploitation due to competition for markets and profits. Thus emerged the conditions for a successful working class revolution. Instead of existing as an unconscious “class in itself,” the proletariat would become conscious of itself as a “class for itself” and act collectively to produce social change (Marx and Engels, 1848/1977). Instead of just being an inert strata of society, the class could become an advocate for radical social change. Only once society entered this state of political consciousness would it be ready for a social revolution. Indeed, Marx predicted that the collapse of capitalism would be its ultimate outcome.

To summarize, for Marx, the development of capitalism in the 18th and 19th centuries was utterly revolutionary and unprecedented in the scope and scale of the societal transformation it brought about. In his analysis, capitalism is defined by a unique set of features that distinguish it from previous modes of production like feudalism or agrarianism:

- The means of production (i.e., productive property or capital) are privately owned and controlled.
- Capitalists purchase labour power from workers for a wage or salary.
- The goal of production is to profit from selling commodities in a competitive-free market.
- Profit from the sale of commodities is appropriated by the owners of capital. Part of this profit is reinvested as capital in the business enterprise to expand its profitability.
- The competitive accumulation of capital and profit leads to capitalism’s dynamic qualities: constant expansion of markets, globalization of investment, growth and centralization of capital, boom and bust cycles, economic crises, class conflict, etc.

These features are structural, meaning that they are built-into, and reinforced by, the institutional organization of the economy. They are structures, or persistent patterns of social relationship that exist, in a sense, independently of individuals’ personal or voluntary choices and motives. As structures, they can be said to define the rules or internal logic that underlie the surface or observable characteristics of a capitalist society: its political, social, economic, and ideological formations. Some isolated cases may exist where some of these features do not apply, but they define the overall system that has come to govern the contemporary global economy.

Marx’s analysis of the transition from feudalism to capitalism is *historical* and *materialist* because it focuses on the changes in the economic mode of production to explain the transformation of the social order. The expansion of the use of money, the development of commodity markets, the introduction of rents, the accumulation and investment of capital, the creation of new technologies of production, and the early stages of the manufactory system, etc. led to the formation of a new class structure (the bourgeoisie and the proletariat), a new political structure (the democratic nation state), and a new ideological structure (science, human rights, individualism, rationalization, the belief in progress, etc.). The unprecedented transformations that created the modern era – urbanization, colonization, population growth, resource exploitation, social and geographical mobility, etc. – originated in the transformation of the mode of production from feudalism to capitalism. “Only the capitalist production of commodities revolutionizes ... the entire economic structure of society in a manner eclipsing all previous epochs” (Marx, 1878). In the space of a couple

of hundred years, human life on the planet was irremediably and radically altered. As Marx and Engels put it, capitalism had “create[d] a world after its own image” (1848/1977).

Max Weber and Interpretive Sociology

Like the other social thinkers discussed here, Max Weber (1864–1920) was concerned with the important changes taking place in Western society with the advent of capitalism. Arguably, the primary focus of Weber’s entire sociological *oeuvre* was to determine how and why Western civilization and capitalism developed, and where and when they developed. Why was the West the West? Why did the capitalist system develop in Europe and not elsewhere? Like Marx and Durkheim, he feared that capitalist industrialization would have negative effects on individuals but his analysis differed from theirs in significant respects. Key to the answer to his questions was the concept of *rationalization* (see [Chapter 3. Culture](#)). If other societies had failed to develop modern capitalist enterprise, modern science, and contemporary, efficient organizational structures, it was because in various ways they had impeded the development of rationalization. Weber’s question was: what are the consequences of instrumental rationality for everyday life, for the social order, and for the spiritual fate of humanity?

Unlike Durkheim’s functionalist emphasis on the sources of social solidarity and Marx’s critical emphasis on the materialist basis of class conflict, Weber’s interpretive perspective on modern society emphasizes the development of a rationalized *world view*, which he referred to as the **disenchantment of the world**. “Principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather one can, in principle, master all things by calculation” (Weber, 1919/1969). In other words, the processes of rationalization and disenchantment refer principally to the mode in which modern individuals and institutions *interpret* or analyze the world and the problems that confront them. As discussed in [Chapter 3. Culture](#), **rationalization** refers to the general tendency in modern society for all institutions and most areas of life to be transformed by the application of rational principles of efficiency and calculation. It overcomes forms of magical thinking and replaces them with cold, objective calculations based on principles of technical efficiency. Older styles of social organization, based on traditional principles of religion, morality, or custom, cannot compete with the efficiency of rational styles of organization and are gradually replaced or destroyed.

To Weber, capitalism itself became possible through the processes of rationalization. The emergence of capitalism in the West required the prior invention of rational, calculable procedures like double-entry bookkeeping, free labour contracts, free market exchange, and predictable application of law so that economic activity could operate as a form of rational enterprise. Unlike Marx who defined capitalism in terms of power relationships and the ownership of private property, Weber defined it in terms of its rational processes. For Weber, capitalism is a form of continuous, calculated economic action in which every element is examined with respect to the logic of investment and return. As opposed to previous types of economic action in which wealth was acquired by force and spent on luxuries, capitalism rested “on the expectation of profit by the utilization of opportunities for exchange, that is, on (formally) peaceful chances for profit.” This implied a continual rationalization of commercial procedures in terms of the logic of capital accumulation. “Where capitalist



Figure 4.20 Charlie Chaplin in *Modern Times* (1936). Has technology made this type of labour more or less alienating? (Photo courtesy of [Insomnia Cured Here/ Flickr](#)) [CC BY SA 2.0](#)

acquisition is rationally pursued, the corresponding action is adjusted to calculations in terms of capital” (Weber, 1904/1958).

Weber’s analysis of rationalization did not exclusively focus on the conditions for the rise of capitalism, however. Capitalism’s “rational” reorganization of economic activity was only one aspect of the broader process of rationalization and disenchantment. Modern science, law, music, art, bureaucracy, politics, and even spiritual life could only have become possible, according to Weber, through the systematic development of precise calculations and planning, technical procedures, and the dominance of “quantitative reckoning.” He felt that other non-Western societies, however highly advanced and sophisticated, had impeded these developments by either missing some crucial element of rationality or by holding on to non-rational organizational principles or elements of magical thinking. For example, Babylonian astronomy lacked mathematical foundations, Indian geometry lacked rational proofs, Mandarin bureaucracy remained tied to Confucian traditionalism, and the Indian caste system lacked the common “brotherhood” necessary for modern citizenship.

Weber argued however that although the process of rationalization leads to efficiency and effective, calculated decision making, it is in the end an *irrational* system. The emphasis on rationality and efficiency ultimately has negative effects when taken to its conclusion. In modern societies, this is seen when rigid routines and strict adherence to performance-related goals lead to a mechanized work environment and a focus on efficiency for its own sake. To the degree that rational efficiency begins to undermine the substantial human values it was designed to serve (i.e., the creation of the good life, ethical values, the integrity of human relationships, the enjoyment of beauty and relaxation), rationalization becomes irrational.

An illustration of the extreme conditions of rationality can be found in Charlie Chaplin’s classic film *Modern Times* (1936) (Figure 4.20). Chaplin’s character works on an assembly line twisting bolts into place over and over again. The work is paced by the unceasing rotation of the conveyor belt and the technical efficiency of the division of labour. When he has to stop to swat a fly on his nose all the tasks down the line from him are thrown into disarray. He performs his routine task repetitively to the point where he cannot stop his bolt tightening motions even after the whistle blows for lunch. Today we even have a recognized medical condition that results from such routinized tasks, known as “repetitive stress syndrome.”



Figure 4.21 Cubicles are used to maximize individual work space in an office. Such structures may be rational, but they are also isolating and dehumanizing. (Photo courtesy of Tim Patterson/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

For Weber, the culmination of industrialization and rationalization results in the conundrum of what he referred to as the **iron cage**. In the iron cage the individual is trapped by the systems of efficiency that were designed to enhance the well-being of humanity. People are trapped in a cage, or literally a “steel housing” (*stahlhartes Gehäuse*), of efficiently organized processes because rational forms of organization and life management have become indispensable. People must continuously hurry and be efficient because there is no time to “waste.” Weber argued that even if there was a social revolution of the type that Marx envisioned, the bureaucratic and rational organizational structures would remain. Even Marx’s communist society would have to be efficient. There appears to be no alternative. The modern economic order “is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which today determine the lives of all individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with

economic acquisition, with irresistible force” (Weber, 1904/1958).

Making Connections: Sociological Concepts

Max Weber and the Protestant Work Ethic



Figure 4.22 Puritan soap flakes. (Image courtesy of Paul Townsend/Twitter.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

If Marx's analysis is central to the sociological understanding of the structures that emerged with the rise of capitalism, Max Weber is a central figure in the sociological understanding of the effects of capitalism on modern subjectivity: How has people's basic sense of who they are and what they might aspire to be defined by the culture and belief system of capitalism? The key work here is Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905/1958) in which he lays out the characteristics of the modern *ethos* of work. Why do people feel compelled to work so hard?

An ethic or **ethos** refers to a way of life or a way of conducting oneself in life. For Weber, the **Protestant work ethic** was at the core of the modern ethos. It prescribes a mode of self-conduct in which discipline,

work, accumulation of wealth, self-restraint, postponement of enjoyment, and sobriety are the focus of an individual life.

In Weber's analysis, the ethic was indebted to the religious beliefs and practices of certain Protestant sects like the Lutherans, Calvinists, and Baptists who emerged with the Protestant Reformation (1517–1648). The Protestant theologian Richard Baxter proclaimed that the individual was “called” to their occupation by God, and therefore, they had a *duty* to “work hard in their calling.” “He who will not work shall not eat” (Baxter, as cited in Weber, 1958). This ethic subsequently worked its way into many of the famous dictums popularized by the American Benjamin Franklin, like “time is money” and “a penny saved is two pence dear” (i.e., “a penny saved is a penny earned”).

In Weber's estimation, the Protestant ethic was fundamentally important to the emergence of capitalism, and a basic answer to the question of how and why it could emerge in Europe but not elsewhere. Throughout the period of feudalism and the domination of the Catholic Church, an ethic of poverty and non-materialist values was central to the subjectivity and world view of the Christian population. From the earliest desert monks and followers of St. Anthony to the great Vatican orders of the Franciscans and Dominicans, the image of Jesus was of a son of God who renounced wealth, possessions, and the material world. “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God” (ESV, 2001, Mark 10:25). People are, of course, well aware of the hypocrisy with which these beliefs were often practiced, but even in these cases, wealth was regarded in a different manner prior to the modern era. One worked only as much as was required. As Thomas Aquinas put it “labour [is] only necessary ... for the maintenance of individual and community. Where this end is achieved, the precept ceases to have any meaning” (Aquinas, as cited in Weber, 1958). Wealth was not “put to work” in the form of a gradual return on investments as it is under capitalism. How was this medieval belief system reversed? How did capitalism become possible?

The key for Weber was the Protestant sects' doctrines of predestination, the idea of the personal calling, and the individual's direct, unmediated relationship to God. In the practice of the Protestant sects, no intermediary or priest interpreted God's will or granted absolution. God's will was essentially unknown. The individual could only be recognized as one of the predestined “elect” — one of the saved — through outward signs of grace: through the continuous display of moral self-discipline and, significantly, through the accumulation of earthly rewards that tangibly demonstrated God's favour. In the absence of any way to know with certainty whether one was destined for salvation, the accumulation of wealth and material success became a sign of spiritual grace rather than a sign of sinful, earthly concerns. For the individual, material success assuaged the existential anxiety concerning the salvation of their soul. For the community, material success conferred status.

Weber argues that gradually the practice of working hard in one's calling lost its religious focus, and the ethic of “sober bourgeois capitalism” (Weber, 1905/1958) became grounded in work discipline alone: work and self-improvement *for their own sake*. This discipline produces the rational, predictable, reliable, and industrious personality type ideally suited for the capitalist economy. For Weber, the consequence of this, however, is that the modern individual feels compelled to work hard and to live a highly methodical, efficient, and disciplined life to demonstrate their self-worth to themselves as much as anyone. The original goal of all this activity — namely religious salvation — no longer existed. It is a highly rational conduct of life in terms of *how* one lives, but is simultaneously irrational in terms of *why* one lives. Weber calls this conundrum of modernity the **iron cage**. Life in modern society is ordered on the basis of efficiency, rationality, and predictability, and other inefficient or traditional modes of organization are eliminated.

Once people are locked into the “technical and economic conditions of machine production” it is difficult to get out or to imagine another way of living, despite the fact that one is renouncing all of the qualities that make life worth living, such as spending time with friends and family, enjoying the pleasures of a sensual and aesthetic life, and/or finding a deeper meaning or purpose of existence. As Weber pessimistically concluded, people might be obliged to remain in this iron cage “until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt” (Weber, 1958/1905).

Her-story: The History of Gender Inequality

Missing in the classical theoretical accounts of modernity is an explanation of how the developments of modern society, industrialization, and capitalism have affected women differently from men. Despite the differences in Durkheim’s, Marx’s, and Weber’s main themes of analysis, they are equally *androcentric* to the degree that they cannot account for why women’s experience of modern society is structured differently from men’s, or why the implications of modernity are different for women than they are for men. They tell his-story but neglect her-story.

Recall from [Chapter 3. Culture](#), **androcentrism** is a perspective in which male concerns, male attitudes, and male practices are presented as “normal” or define what is significant and valued in a culture. Women’s experiences, activities, and contributions to society and history are ignored, devalued, or marginalized.

For most of human history, men and women held more or less equal status in society. In hunter-gatherer societies gender inequality was minimal as these societies did not sustain institutionalized power differences. They were based on cooperation, sharing, and mutual support. There was often a gendered division of labour in that men are most frequently the hunters and women the gatherers and child care providers (although this division is not necessarily strict), but as women’s gathering accounted for up to 80% of the food, their economic power in the society was assured. Where headmen lead tribal life, their leadership is informal, based on influence rather than institutional power (Endicott, 1999). In prehistoric Europe from 7000 to 3500 BCE, archaeological evidence indicates that religious life was in fact focused on female deities and fertility, while family kinship was traced through matrilineal (female) descent (Lerner, 1986).



Figure 4.23 The Venus of Willendorf discovered in Willendorf, Austria, is thought to be 25,000 years old. It is widely assumed to be a fertility goddess and indicative of the central role of women in Paleolithic society. (Photo courtesy of Matthias Kabel, Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY SA 3.0](#)

It was not until about 6,000 years ago that gender inequality emerged. With the transition to early agrarian and pastoral types of societies, food surpluses created the conditions for class divisions and power structures to develop. Property and resources passed from collective ownership to family ownership with a corresponding shift in the development of the monogamous, patriarchal (rule by the father) family structure. Women and children also became the property of the patriarch of the family. The invasions of old Europe by the Semites to the south, and the Kurgans to the northeast, led to the imposition of male-dominated hierarchical social structures and the worship of male warrior gods. As agricultural societies developed, so did the practice of slavery. Lerner (1986) argues that the first slaves were women and children.

The development of modern, industrial society has been a two-edged sword in terms of the status of women in society. Marx's collaborator Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) argued in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* (1884/1972) that the historical development of the male-dominated monogamous family originated with the development of private property. The family became the means through which property was inherited through the male line. This also led to the separation of a private domestic sphere and a public social sphere. "Household management lost its public character. It no longer concerned society. It became a private service; the wife became the head servant, excluded from all participation in social production" (Engels, 1884/1972). Under the system of capitalist wage labour, women were doubly exploited. When they worked outside the home as wage labourers they were exploited in the

workplace, often as cheaper labour than men. When they worked within the home, they were exploited as the unpaid source of labour needed to reproduce the capitalist workforce. The role of the proletarian housewife was tantamount to “open or concealed domestic slavery” as she had no independent source of income herself (Engels, 1884/1972). Early Canadian law, for example, was based on the idea that the wife’s labour belonged to the husband. This was the case even up to the famous divorce case of Irene Murdoch in 1973, who had worked the family farm in the Turner Valley, Alberta, side by side with her husband for 25 years. When she claimed 50% of the farm assets in the divorce, the judge ruled that the farm belonged to her husband, and she was awarded only \$200 a month for a lifetime of work (Murdoch v. Murdoch, 1973; CBC, 2001).

On the other hand, feminists note that gender inequality was more pronounced and permanent in the feudal and agrarian societies that preceded capitalism. Women were more or less owned as property, and were kept ignorant and isolated within the domestic sphere. These conditions still exist in the world today. The World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report (2014) shows that in a significant number of countries women are severely restricted with respect to economic participation, educational attainment, political empowerment, and basic health outcomes. Yemen, Pakistan, Chad, Syria, and Mali were the five worst countries in the world in terms of women’s inequality.

Yemen is the world’s worst country for women in 2014, according to the WEF. In addition to being one of the worst countries in women’s economic participation and opportunity, Yemen received some of the world’s worst scores in relative educational attainment and political participation for females. Just half of women in the country could read, versus 83% of men. Further, women accounted for just 9% of ministerial positions and for none of the positions in parliament. Child marriage is a huge problem in Yemen. According to Human Rights Watch, as of 2006, 52% of Yemeni girls were married before they reached 18, and 14% were married before they reached 15 years of age (Hess, 2014).

With the rise of capitalism, Engels noted that there was an improvement in women’s status when they began to work outside the home. Writers like Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797) in her *Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1792/1997) were also able to see, in the discourses of rights and freedoms of the bourgeois revolutions and the Enlightenment, a general “promise” of *universal emancipation* that could be extended to include the rights of women. The focus of the *Vindication of the Rights of Women* was on the right of women to have an education, which would put them on the same footing as men with regard to the knowledge and rationality required for “enlightened” political participation and skilled work outside the home. Whereas property rights, the role of wage labour, and the law of modern society continued to be a source for gender inequality, the principles of universal rights became a powerful resource for women to use in order to press their claims for equality.

As the World Economic Forum (2014) study reports, “good progress has been made over the last years on gender equality, and in some cases, in a relatively short time.” Between 2006 and 2014, the gender gap in the measures of economic participation, education, political power, and health narrowed for 95% of the 111 countries surveyed. In the top five countries in the world for women’s equality — Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark — the global gender gap index had closed to 80% or better. Canada was 19th with a global gender gap index of 75%.

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4.3. Living in Contemporary Society

The reason why Durkheim, Marx and Weber are still read by sociologists is that they provided key insights into the formation of modern society that remain relevant today. Nevertheless, life in modern society is subject to constant change. How can Durkheim's, Marx's, and Weber's analyses be updated to describe the key features of 21st century life?

Updating Durkheim: Postmodern Society and Neo-Tribalism

Durkheim predicted that there would be periods of **anomie** — normlessness, or a lack of common norms — as the small, isolated societies of **mechanical solidarity** were replaced by modern mass societies of **organic solidarity**. In the absence of a collective conscience and shared rituals, the complex division of labour in society would lead it to become increasingly divergent, heterogeneous and atomized. However, this anomie would be short-lived and temporary as the complex division of labour of organic societies stabilized. Eventually societies would emerge as cohesive, self-regulating systems of interdependent components and a new basis of social solidarity and social equilibrium would be established.

In the late 20th century, Jean Francois Lyotard (1924–1998), observing that the model of a unified, functionally cohesive society no longer described the way people actually connected with each other, suggested that Durkheim was right about anomie and the fragmentation of society but wrong about the nature of the social bond that was emerging (Lyotard, 1980). Rather than society operating as a cohesive interdependent whole, societies were discontinuous and institutions operated “in patches.” He described this tendency as *postmodern*. **Postmodern society** had to be conceived as social heterogeneity without social solidarity.

New forms of social bond emerge in this context. While the division of labour into occupational specializations produces interdependence, such as the complex chains of social relationship in global supply chains, there is a parallel division of identities which produces fragmentation. In line with Durkheim's analysis of premodern tribal affiliations, Maffesoli (1996) describes the formation of contemporary **neo-tribes**, groups of people bound together in communities of feeling who gather at particular times and places for specific reasons and then disband. These are **communities of feeling** in the sense that, instead of being based on ideologies or traditional sources of identity like class, locality, religion, occupation, education, or ethnicity, etc., otherwise geographically or socially disperse people come together in a bounded, usually public, space for a discrete time period to express emotional energies. They create a temporary haven based on shared feeling, ambience, sensibility, taste, or atmosphere. However, rather than forming a new, permanent basis of social solidarity, neo-tribal gatherings — “huge rallies, crowds of all kinds, collective trances, fusion through sport, ecstasy through music, religious or cultural effervescences” (Maffesoli, 2004) — represent only episodic, if intense, social attachments. They satisfy a desire for belonging, but only temporarily or as needed.

On the other hand, the contemporary experience of **silozation** through social media — the process by which groups become isolated in communication “silos” in ways that hinder their communication and cooperation with others — indicates the way in which social identities become fragmented, and societies themselves no longer share common universes of meaning or definitions of reality. The algorithms and social networking functions of social media



Figure 4.24 The Burning Man festival held annually in Black Rock City, a temporary city built in northwestern Nevada. This event has many qualities of neo-tribalism, focused on a brief, intense gathering of a disperse community to celebrate artistic creation, self-expression, and self-reliance. (Image courtesy of Julia Wold/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

platforms like Facebook enable the spread of conspiracy theories and alternate realities by creating “echo chambers” and conditions of confirmation bias that create strong in-group identities unhinged from outside input (Theocharis et al., 2021).

Part of Lyotard's (1984) analysis of the postmodern condition is people's “incredulity toward meta-narratives” as noted in [Chapter 3. Culture](#). People become disaffected with modernity's big unifying (meta) stories of social progress through scientific knowledge, enlightened morality, social emancipation, national destiny, etc. These present an image of modern society as having a historical direction, a systematicity and universality. Bauman (1991) argues instead that “the postmodern condition is a site of constant mobility and change, but no clear direction of development.” He suggests Durkheim's anomie is a permanent condition of contemporary life. But rather than the breakdown of society into an aggregate of isolated individuals each pursuing their narrow self interest, as the term anomie sometimes suggests, the underlying desire of people to be together leads to the creation of new subcultures, communities of feeling and sources of identification and self-construction.

Updating Marx: Neoliberalism and the Post-Fordist Economy

One of the key arguments that sociologists draw from Marx's analysis is to show that capitalism is not simply an economic system but a social system. The dynamics of capitalism are not a set of obscure economic concerns to be relegated to the business section of the newspaper, but the architecture that underlies the newspaper's front page headlines; in fact, every headline in the paper. At the time when Marx was developing his analysis, **capitalism** was still a relatively new economic system, an economic system characterized by private or corporate ownership of goods and the means to produce them. It was also a system that was inherently unstable and prone to crisis, yet increasingly global in its reach. Today capitalism has left no place on earth and no aspect of daily life untouched.

As a social system, one of the main characteristics of capitalism is incessant change, which is why the culture of capitalism is often referred to as **modernity**. The cultural life of capitalist society can be described as a series of successive “presents,” each of which defines what is modern, new, or fashionable for a brief time before fading away into obscurity like the 78 rpm record, the 8-track tape, the CD, and even the DVD. As Marx and Engels put it, “Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty, and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fast-frozen relations ... are swept away, all new ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air...” (1977/1848). From the ghost towns that dot the Canadian landscape to the expectation of having a lifetime career, every element of social life under capitalism has a limited duration.

Many of the aspects of social life that have been changing over the late 20th and early 21st centuries have been due to a change in the **mode of regulation** of capitalism (Lipietz, 1987). The mode of regulation refers to the ensemble of policies, rules, patterns of conduct, organizational forms, and institutions which stabilize capitalist accumulation of profits. Marx's analysis can be updated to examine how the growth in inequality and the housing crisis, for example, are products of a shift in governmental policy from a **welfare state** model of redistribution of resources to a **neoliberal** model of free market distribution of resources (see [Chapter 9. Social Inequality in Canada](#)). This transition does not take place in a vacuum. Just as global capitalism is an economic system characterized by constant change, so too is the relationship between global capitalism and national modes of regulation and state policy.

Throughout the 19th and first half of the 20th century, the role of the state in the wealthy countries of the global north was typically limited to providing the legal mechanisms and enforcement to protect private property. Industrial capitalism itself was for the most part regulated solely by free market competition until stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s. It was recognized that the capacity for producing commodities had far exceeded the ability of people earning low wages to buy them (Harvey, 1989).

The economic model of **Fordism**, adopted in the wealthy Northern countries, offered a solution to the crisis by creating a system of intensive mass production (maximum use of machinery and minute divisions of labour), cheap standardized products, high wages, and mass consumption. This system required a disciplined work force and labour peace, however, because labour disruptions became increasingly costly. This is one reason why states began to take a different role in the economy.

The Post-World War II labour-management compromise or “accord” involved the recognition and institutionalization of labour unions, the mediation of the state in capital/labour disputes, the use of taxes and Keynesian economic policy to address economic recessions, and the gradual roll out of social safety net provisions. This set of policies collectively became known as the **welfare state**. In a high wage/high consumption

economy, the ability of individuals to continue to consume even when misfortune struck was paramount, so unemployment insurance, pensions, health care, and disability provisions were important components of the new accord. The accord also reaffirmed the rights of private property or capital to introduce new technology, to reorganize production as they saw fit, and to invest wherever they pleased. Therefore, it was not a system of economic democracy or socialism. Nevertheless, the claims of full employment, continued prosperity, and the creation of a “just society” appeared plausible within the confines of the capitalist economic system of the global North.



Figure 4.25 Today, the jobs of these assembly-line workers are increasingly being eliminated as new technology are introduced. (Photo courtesy of John Lloyd/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)



Figure 4.26 Pierre Trudeau (shown here in a photo from 1975) was elected leader of the Liberal Party at the 1968 convention, where he stated, “Canada must be a just society” (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [CC0 1.0](#)

When Fordism and the welfare state system began to break down due to declining corporate productivity and profitability in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the relationship between the state and the economy started to change again. A new economic regime based on **flexible accumulation** began to emerge (Harvey, 1989). Flexible accumulation refers to the abandonment of large scale mass production to **lean production** and just-in-time inventory delivery systems which reduce times within the production system as well as response times from suppliers to customers. It replaced the focus on full-time, high wage, often unionized employment with full benefits to a system reliant on **precarious employment**, based on subcontracting, temporary contracts, outsourcing, and involuntary part-time work. With the globalization of production, workers in the Fordist economies of the 1st World also found themselves competing with low wage workers in the 3rd World. This led to more flexibility for employers but a decline in job security, benefits, and real wages for the majority of workers.

Flexible accumulation also changed the model of mass production for mass markets by shifting to small batch production of consumer goods for niche markets. **Niche market consumption** replaced the one-size-fits-all model of consumer product in Fordism. Describing the production of Model-T cars, Henry Ford was quoted as saying “Any customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants, so long as it is black.” Instead of mass market products,

with niche market consumption specialized products are increasingly tailored for specific market segments, product innovation accelerates and turn-over times for products decrease, and manufacturing becomes more responsive to quick-changing trends and fashions mobilized through the devices of focused advertising and marketing.

In step with the development of the post-Fordist economy of lean production, precarious employment, and niche market consumption, the state began to withdraw from its guarantee of providing universal social services and social

security. **Neoliberalism** is the term used to define the new rationality of government, which abandons the interventionist model of the welfare state to emphasize the use of “free market” mechanisms to regulate society. As a global system, neoliberalism also involved the creation of free trade agreements and international organizations (like the G7, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) that imposed open “free” markets across national borders, the deregulation of trade and investment, and the privatization of public goods and services. Since the 1970s, capital accumulation has taken place less and less in the context of national economies, and more in the context of international flows of capital investment and disinvestment in an increasingly integrated world market. The globalization of investment and production means that capital is increasingly able to shift production around the world to where labour costs are cheapest and profit greatest.

Thus, **neoliberalism** is a mode of regulation or set of policies in which the state reduces its role in providing public services, regulating industry, redistributing wealth, and protecting “the commons” — i.e., the collective resources that exist for everyone to share (the environment, public infrastructure, public spaces, community facilities, airwaves, etc.). These policies are promoted by advocates as ways of addressing the “inefficiency of big government,” the “burden on the taxpayer,” the “need to cut red tape,” and the “culture of entitlement and welfare dependency.” In the place of “big” government, the virtues of the competitive marketplace are extolled. The market is said to promote more efficiency, lower costs, pragmatic decision making, non-favouritism, and a disciplined work ethic, etc.

Of course the facts often tell a different story. For example, government-funded health care in Canada costs far less per person than private health care in the United States (OECD, 2015). A country like Norway, which has a much higher rate of taxation than Canada, also has much lower unemployment, lower income inequality, lower inflation, better public services, a higher standard of living — and yet nevertheless has a globally competitive corporate sector with substantial state ownership and control, especially in the areas of oil and gas production which is 80% owned by the Norwegian state (Campbell, 2013). The policies of deregulation that caused the financial crisis of 2008, led even Alan Greenspan (b. 1926), the neoliberal economist and former Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve, to acknowledge that the model of free market “rationality” was flawed (CBC News, 2013). Since the financial crisis was a product of Greenspan’s tenure at the Federal Reserve, and a result of the neoliberal policy of tax cuts and market deregulation that he advocated, his acknowledgment of the failure of free market rationality is significant.

Updating Weber: Algorithmic Rationality, Digital Capitalism, and Technopopulism

Weber described **rationalization** as a key process in the formation of modern societies. Rationalization meant that every aspect of social organization was subject to calculation, technical innovation and ways of increasing efficiency. In the development of the **information society**, discussed earlier in the chapter, these processes have intensified. A premium is placed on ‘smart,’ innovative and responsive solutions to problems, aided by swift, decisive, and well-informed decision-making. But in many respects, as Weber proposed at the beginning of the 20th century, efficient systems and technologies meant to liberate humans end up creating new **iron cages**. Humans themselves become resources and tools within the systems they created.

One key site of 21st century rationalization has been the introduction of algorithms and artificial intelligence into decision making processes from social media search functions to financial transactions. **Algorithms** are sets of instructions used to solve a problem or perform a task (Milner and Traub, 2021).

They are used to aggregate data from different sources to build an increasingly detailed picture of personal habits and preferences, which companies feed into predictive tools that model future outcomes and produce categorizations, scores, and rankings. Big data is used not only to sell targeted advertising, but also to make an increasing array of high-stakes automated decisions around employment, investment, lending, and pricing in

the private sphere and consequential government decisions in areas including criminal justice, education, and access to public benefits (Milner and Traub, 2021).

Advocates of algorithmic rationality present it as faster, technically superior, and more impartial than human decision making, in the same way Weber described the rationalized organization model of bureaucracy. For example, Johnson et al. (2013) described the transition to automated decision making in high frequency stock trading after 2006. This creates a new digital environment for trading in which algorithmic agents and automated cognition can make massive numbers of decisions more quickly than humans can comprehend. An investment analyst is quoted as saying “11% of all 2014 observable orders in the Canadian marketplace lasted less than one millisecond” (Peters, 2017).




Figure 4.27 Images of a robotic future are common in science fiction. To what degree do algorithms and “deep learning” technologies allow human behaviour to become predictable and programmable? (Image courtesy of Cristian Eslava/Flickr.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

However, as critics point out, the algorithmic decisions can only be as good as the input data they draw on and the assumptions made in the coding. Johnson et al. (2013) correlated the use of millisecond-scale stock market decision making with the financial collapse of 2008. In other applications such as credit assessments, insurance, policing, and public services delivery, algorithms are used in actuarial reasoning. **Actuarialism** is the use of historical data about social groups to calculate risk assessments about unknown individuals. What is new in this is the application of computing power to the huge quantity of behavioral trace data collected from things users do on their “smart” devices (phones, fitbits, smart appliances, etc.). Choices people make on social media and digital services, such as clicking on links or “like,” and information collected about people by devices in the environment are captured, accumulated and analysed to build profiles of people’s behaviour. However, the key premise of actuarial decision-making is “the belief that patterns observed in the past provide useful information about activities and events that may take place in the future” (Gandy, 2016, cited in Burrell and Fourcade, 2021). Due to the unevenness of data collection and a context of historical social inequalities, even the most impartial automatic decision making to assess the credit, medical, or criminal risk of a

particular individual threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, reproducing existing inequalities of treatment by institutions.

Algorithmic reason is one component of a broader array of issues posed by intensified processes of rationalization in the 21st century. **Surveillance capitalism** is based on surveilling, extracting, and commodifying the exchange of digital information over data networks including intimate personal details. Zuboff (2019) argues that the goal of surveillance capitalism is to extract behavioural detail from people's use of free services like Google and Facebook to create predictions that effectively anticipate future behaviour. These can be used to automate behaviour by providing the knowledge to engineer the parameters or context around a particular activity or choice and direct change toward a desired outcome. Similarly, **data colonialism** is the transformation of social life through apps, software platforms, and smart objects into the raw material of data as a new stage in the centuries long colonial process of seizing territory and extracting resources. All of social life around the globe is potentially dispossessed from its "owners" and datified through the daily processes and interactions that use or require digital technologies (Couldry and Mejjias, 2019). Finally, **technopopulism** represents a potentially new form of post-democratic political reconfiguration in which populist movements abandon "unresponsive" democratic procedures to unite "the people" against elites and common enemies. Governance is taken over by "problem-solving" technical elites who dispense with the perceived technical incompetence and social divisions of parliamentary democracy (Bickerton and Accetti, 2021). Indications of this model can be seen in the "New Labour" governments in the UK, the Macron government in France, the Five Star Movement in Italy and Donald Trump's attempts to use business strategies — "the art of the deal" — in domestic conflicts and international diplomacy in the U.S.

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Chapter 4 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

actuarialism: The use of historical data about social groups to calculate risk assessments about unknown individuals.**algorithm:** A set of instructions used to solve a problem or perform a task.

alienation: The condition in which an individual is isolated from their society, work, sense of self, and/or common humanity.

anomie: A situation of uncertain norms and regulations in which society no longer has the support of a firm collective consciousness.

anthropocene: The geological epoch defined by the impact of human activities on the global ecosystem.

base and superstructure: A historical materialist model of society in which the economic structure forms the *base* of a society, which shapes its culture and other social institutions, or *superstructure*.

bourgeoisie: The owners of the means of production in a society.

class consciousness: Awareness of one's class position and interests.

collective conscience: The communal beliefs, morals, and attitudes of a society.

community of feeling: A collectivity based on shared emotional bonds, ambience, feeling, sensibility, or atmosphere.

data colonialism: The transformation of social life into the raw material of data as a new stage of global colonization.

dialectics: A type of analysis that proposes that social contradiction, opposition, and struggle in society drive processes of social change and transformation.

dialectic of culture: The way in which the creation of culture is both constrained by limits given by the environment, and a means to go beyond these natural limits.

digital divide: The gap between those who are able to access and make effective use of information technology and those who cannot.

disenchantment of the world: The replacement of magical thinking by technological rationality and calculation.

division of labour: The division of people into different occupations and specializations.

ethos: A way of life or a way of conducting oneself in life.

false consciousness: When a person's beliefs and ideology are in conflict with their best interests.

feudal societies: Agricultural societies that operate on a strict hierarchical system of power based around land ownership, protection, and mutual obligations.

flexible accumulation: A model of capital accumulation based on lean production, precarious employment, and niche market consumption.

Fordism: A model of capital accumulation based on mass production, cheap standardized products, high wages, and mass consumption.

global city: A city which has become a central node in a global economic network.

historical materialism: An approach to understanding society that explains social change, human ideas, and social organization in terms of underlying changes in the economic (or material) structure of society.

horticultural societies: Societies based around the cultivation of plants.

hunter-gatherer societies: Societies that depend on hunting wild animals and gathering uncultivated plants for survival.

industrial societies: Societies characterized by a reliance on mechanized labour to create material goods.

information societies: Societies based on the production of nonmaterial goods and services.

iron cage: A situation in which an individual is trapped by the rational and efficient processes of social institutions.

law of three stages: The three stages of evolution that societies develop through: theological, metaphysical, and positive.

lean production: Systems of production which reduce the time required to manufacture goods as well as response times from suppliers to customers.

means of production: Anything that is used in economic production in a society to produce goods, satisfy needs and maintain existence (e.g., land, animals, crop production, technology, factories, etc.).

mechanical solidarity: Social solidarity or cohesion through a shared collective consciousness with harsh punishment for deviation from the norms.

metaphysical stage: A stage of social evolution in which people explain events in terms of abstract or speculative ideas.

mode of regulation: The ensemble of policies, rules, patterns of conduct, organizational forms and institutions which stabilize capitalist accumulation.

neoliberalism (neoliberal model): A set of policies in which the state reduces its role in providing public services, regulating industry, redistributing wealth, and protecting the commons while advocating the use of free market mechanisms to regulate society.

neolithic revolution: The economic transition to sedentary, agriculture based societies beginning approximately 10,200 years.

neo-tribes: Groups of people bound together in communities of feeling who gather at particular times and places for specific reasons and then disband.

network enterprise: A linkage of autonomous companies, or segments of companies, often geographically disperse, organized temporarily for specific projects or tasks and characteristic of global information societies.

network society: A society whose social structure is made up of networks organized through digital information and communications technologies.

niche market consumption: A consumption model based on small batch production of specialized goods tailored for specific market segments or “niches.”

organic solidarity: Social solidarity or cohesion through a complex division of labour, mutual interdependence, and restitutive law.

pastoral societies: Societies based around the domestication of animals.

post-industrial societies: See information societies.

postmodern society: A form of society characterized by irreducible social heterogeneity, contingent social relationships, and ephemeral organizational structures.

precarious employment: Insecure employment based on subcontracting, temporary contracts, outsourcing and involuntary part-time work.

proletariat: The wage labourers in capitalist society.

Protestant work ethic: The duty to work hard in one's calling.

rationalization: The general tendency in modern society for all institutions and most areas of life to be transformed by the application of rationality and efficiency.

reflexive subjectivity: A practice of self-awareness, self-reflection, and self-monitoring in which people distance themselves from traditions and institutional roles to construct their own identities.

relations of production: The division of society into economic *classes* (the social roles allotted to individuals by virtue of their position in an economic system of production).

siloization: The process by which groups become isolated in ways that hinder their communication and cooperation with others.

social class: A group defined by a distinct relationship to the means of production.

social integration: How strongly a person is connected to their social group.

social structure: General patterns of social behaviour and organization that persist through time.

surveillance capitalism: A form of capitalism based on surveilling, extracting, and commodifying digital information about people.

technopopulism: A political configuration that combines populist politics with governance by problem-solving technical elites.

theological stage: A stage of social evolution in which people explain events with respect to the will of God or gods.

welfare state: A system of social security whereby the government intervenes in the economy to redistribute resources and protect the health and well-being of its citizens.

Section Summary

4.1 Types of Societies

Societies are classified according to their social development and use of technology. A society's technology provides a useful way to characterize the evolving nature of the relationship between humans and the natural world. For most of human history, people lived in preindustrial societies characterized by limited technology and low production of goods. After the Industrial Revolution, many societies based their economies around mechanized labour, leading to unprecedented levels of exploitation of natural resources, greater surpluses, and a class system based on the accumulation of privately owned capital. At the turn of the new millennium, a new type of society emerged. This

postindustrial, or information, society is built on digital technology and nonmaterial goods. Postnatural societies are based on technologies that are capable of overcoming the limits imposed by nature.

[4.2 Theoretical Perspectives on the Formation of Modern Society](#)

Émile Durkheim believed that as societies advance, they make the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity. For Karl Marx, societal transformation occurs as a consequence of class conflict. With the rise of capitalism, workers become alienated from themselves and others in society. Sociologist Max Weber noted that the rationalization of society leads to a focus on efficiency in social organization that gradually marginalizes or eliminates other sources of value. Feminists note that the androcentric point of view of the classical theorists does not provide an adequate account of the difference in the way the genders experience modern society.

[4.3 Living in Contemporary Society](#)

The insights of the classical sociologists into the macro-level social processes that structure society can be updated to analyze the experiences common to living in the 21st century. Durkheim's concepts of the increasing division of labour and anomie provide insight into the heterogeneity and fluidity of postmodern societies. Marx's analysis of the dynamics of capitalism provide insight into the conditions of contemporary precarious employment and global neoliberalism. Weber's theory of rationalization can be extended to describe the effects of algorithms on contemporary life.

Questions

Quiz: Society and Modern Life

[4.1 Types of Societies](#)

1. Which of the following societies is an example of a pastoral society?
 - a. Society A, who live in small tribes and base their economy on the production and trade of textiles.
 - b. Society B, a small community of farmers who have lived on their family's land for centuries.
 - c. Society C, a wandering group of nomads who specialize in breeding and training horses.
 - d. Society D, an extended family of warriors who serve a single noble family.
2. Which of the following occupations is a core activity in an information society?
 - a. Software engineer
 - b. Sales clerk
 - c. Librarian
 - d. Stock broker
3. Which of the following societies were the first to have permanent settlements?
 - a. Industrial
 - b. Hunter-gatherer
 - c. Horticultural
 - d. Feudal

4.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Society

4. Organic solidarity is most likely to exist in which of the following types of societies?
 - a. Hunter-gatherer
 - b. Industrial
 - c. Horticultural
 - d. Feudal
5. According to Marx, the _____ own the means of production in a society.
 - A. proletariat
 - B. vassals
 - C. bourgeoisie
 - D. petit-bourgeoisie
6. Which of the following best depicts Marx's concept of alienation from the process of one's labour?
 - a. A supermarket cashier always scans store coupons before company coupons because she was taught to do it that way.
 - b. A businessman feels that he deserves a raise, but is nervous to ask his manager for one; instead, he comforts himself with the idea that hard work is its own reward.
 - c. An associate professor is afraid that she won't be given tenure and starts spreading rumours about one of her associates to make herself look better.
 - d. A construction worker is laid off and takes a job at a fast food restaurant temporarily, although he has never had an interest in preparing food before.
7. The Protestant work ethic is based on the concept of predestination, which states that _____.
 - a. Performing good deeds in life is the only way to secure a spot in Heaven.
 - b. Salvation is only achievable through obedience to God.
 - c. No person can be saved before they accept Jesus Christ as their saviour.
 - d. God has already chosen those who will be saved and those who will be damned.
8. The concept of the iron cage was popularized by which of the following sociological thinkers?
 - a. Max Weber
 - b. Karl Marx
 - c. Émile Durkheim
 - d. Friedrich Engels
9. Émile Durkheim's ideas about society can best be described as _____.
 - a. Functionalist.
 - b. Critical sociology.
 - c. Symbolic interactionist.
 - d. Postmodernist.

4.3 Living in Contemporary Society

10. Postmodern society describes Durkheim's concept of the division of labour without _____.

- a. Anomie.
 - b. Solidarity.
 - c. Tears.
 - d. Industrialization.
11. Flexible accumulation describes Marx's concept of capitalism without _____.
- a. Capitalists.
 - b. Labour.
 - c. National borders.
 - d. Niche marketing.
12. The use of algorithms describes Weber's concept of rationalization without _____.
- a. Digital technology.
 - b. Humans.
 - c. Technopopulists.
 - d. Impersonal rules.

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

4.1 Types of Societies

1. How can the difference in the way societies relate to the environment be used to describe the different types of societies that have existed in world history?
2. Is Gerhard Lenski right in classifying societies based on technological advances? What other criteria might be appropriate, based on what you have read?

4.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Society

3. How might Durkheim, Marx, and Weber be used to explain a current social event such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Do their theories hold up under modern scrutiny? Are their theories necessarily androcentric?
4. What are some reasons why people choose or are compelled to participate in social activities beyond their immediate milieu or family? Are these sufficient to explain why societies hold together rather than fall apart?
5. Think of the ways workers are alienated from the product and process of their jobs. How can these concepts be applied to students and their educations?
6. People often say they feel better after working hard on a project or at their work than they do if they have too much time on their hands. Is this because of the Protestant Work Ethic? Are there other reasons? What motivates people to work hard today?

4.3 Living in Contemporary Society

7. How do the concepts of postmodern society, neo-tribalism, and siloization update Durkheim's analysis of modern society? Can you find examples of the impact of each on everyday life?
8. How do the concepts of flexible accumulation and neoliberalism update Marx's analysis of capitalism? Can you find examples of the impact of each on everyday life?
9. How do the concepts of algorithmic reason and actuarialism update Weber's analysis of rationalization? Can you find examples of the impact of each on everyday life?

Further Research

4.1 Types of Societies

The Maasai are a modern pastoral society with an economy largely structured around herds of cattle. [Read more about the Maasai people](#) and see pictures of their daily lives.

On the theme of the global networks of information society: Filmed in Nigeria, Benin, Tanzania, Brazil, and China, [Handroid City](#), by artist Emo de Medeiros, is a fascinating visual documentary which investigates how mobile phone technology choreographs contemporary life. The film is a series of close-ups of human hands using, fixing, or selling mobile phones, déambulations in “digital districts,” as well as drone shots pointing at the homogenization of urban space triggered by technological capitalism.

4.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Society

One of the most influential pieces of writing in modern history was Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels' [The Communist Manifesto](#). Visit this OpenStax site to read the original document that spurred revolutions around the world.

4.3 Living in Contemporary Society

Nick Couldry argues that the datafication of society not only brings about another iteration of capitalism, but also a new form of colonialism. The emergence of a new data colonialism, based on the appropriation of human life through data, will pave the way for a new capitalism. See his 2019 lecture: [In a nutshell: Nick Couldry on Data colonialism](#).

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Solutions to Quiz: Society and Modern Life

1 C, | 2 A, | 3 C, | 4 B, | 5 C, | 6 A, | 7 D, | 8 A, | 9 A | 10 B | 11 C | 12 B | [\[Return to quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 5. SOCIALIZATION



Figure 5.1 Doing gender and role play are processes of childhood socialization, whereby children learn to become gendered members of society. (Photo courtesy of Roman Boldyrev/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

Learning Objectives

5.1. Theories of Self Development

- Describe what is meant by the self as a “social structure.”
- Compare different models of self-development.
- Explain Mead’s four stages of child socialization.
- Analyze the formation of a gender schema in the socialization of gender roles.

5.2. Why Socialization Matters

- Analyze the importance of socialization for individuals and society.
- Outline the nature versus nurture debate.
- Analyze how conformity of behaviour in society can coincide with the existence of individual uniqueness.

5.3. Agents of Socialization

- Learn the roles of families and peer groups in socialization.
- Understand how people are socialized through formal institutions like schools and workplaces, and through exposure to mass media.

5.4. Socialization Across the Life Course

- Explain how people are socialized into new roles at age-related transition points.
- Describe when and how resocialization occurs.
- Outline the features of total institutions.

Introduction to Socialization



Figure 5.2 Victor, the wild boy or “feral child” of Aveyron, France grew up alone in the woods until age 12. He was only able to learn rudimentary language and social skills. Victor was the subject of the Francois Truffault film *L’Enfant Sauvage* (1970). (Image courtesy of Unknown Author/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

In the summer of 2005, police detective Mark Holste followed an investigator from the Department of Children and Families to a home in Plant City, Florida. They were there to look into a statement from the neighbour concerning a shabby house on Old Sydney Road. A small girl was reported peering from one of its broken windows. This seemed odd because no one in the neighbourhood had seen a young child in or around the home, which had been inhabited for the past three years by a woman, her boyfriend, and two adult sons.

Who Was the Mysterious Girl in the Window?

Entering the house, Detective Holste and his team were shocked. It was the worst mess they had ever seen: infested with cockroaches, smeared with feces and urine from both people and pets, and filled with dilapidated furniture and ragged window coverings.

Detective Holste headed down a hallway and entered a small room. That is where he found a little girl with big, vacant eyes staring into the darkness. A newspaper report later described the detective’s first encounter with the child:

She lay on a torn, moldy mattress on the floor. She was curled on her side ... her ribs and collarbone jutted out ... her black hair was matted, crawling with lice. Insect bites, rashes and sores pocked her skin.... She was naked — except for a swollen diaper.... Her name, her mother said, was Danielle. She was almost seven years old. (DeGregory, 2008)

Detective Holste immediately carried Danielle out of the home. She was taken to a hospital for medical treatment and evaluation. Through extensive testing, doctors determined that, although she was severely malnourished, Danielle was able to see, hear, and vocalize normally. Still, she would not look anyone in the eyes, did not know how to chew or swallow solid food, did not cry, did not respond to stimuli that would typically cause pain, and did not know how to communicate either with words or simple gestures, such as nodding “yes” or “no.” Likewise, although tests showed she had no chronic diseases or genetic abnormalities, the only way she could stand was with someone holding onto her hands, and she “walked sideways on her toes, like a crab” (DeGregory, 2008).

What had happened to Danielle? Put simply: beyond the basic requirements for survival, she had been neglected. Based on their investigation, social workers concluded that she was left almost entirely alone in rooms like the one where she was found. Without regular interaction — the holding, hugging, talking, the explanations and demonstrations given to most young children — she had not learned to walk or eat, speak or interact, play, or even understand the world around her. From a sociological point of view, Danielle had not been socialized.

Socialization is the process through which people are taught to be proficient members of a society. It describes how people come to understand and internalize societal norms and expectations, accept society’s beliefs, and be aware of societal values. It also describes the way people come to be aware of themselves and to reflect on the suitability of their behaviour in their interactions with others.

Socialization occurs as people engage and disengage in a series of roles throughout life. Each **social role**, like the role of son or daughter, student, friend, employee, etc., is defined by the behaviour expected of a person who occupies a particular position. Roles are defined by **social expectations** and internalized social norms that define what people

should do when they occupy a social role in society. People expect a father to act like a father and will often have very specific criteria for determining how a proper father acts.

Socialization is not the same as socializing (interacting with others, like family, friends, and coworkers); to be precise, it is a sociological process that occurs through socializing. As Danielle's story illustrates, even the most basic human activities are learned through interactions with others. Even physical tasks like sitting, standing, and walking did not automatically develop for Danielle as she grew. Without socialization, Danielle had not learned about the material culture of her society (the tangible objects a culture uses). For example, she could not hold a spoon, bounce a ball, or use a chair for sitting. She also had not learned its nonmaterial culture, such as its beliefs, values, and norms. She had no understanding of the concept of family, did not know cultural expectations for using a bathroom for elimination, and had no sense of modesty. Most importantly, she had not learned to use the symbols that make up language — through which people learn about who they are, how they fit with other people, and the natural and social worlds in which they live.

In the following sections, the importance of the complex process of socialization and how it takes place through interaction with many individuals, groups, and social institutions will be examined. Socialization is not only critical to children as they develop, it is a lifelong process through which people become prepared for new social environments and expectations in every stage of their lives. Self development is the process of coming to recognize a stable sense of a “self” through socialization.

Media Attributions

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5.1. Theories of Self Development

Danielle's case underlines an important point that sociologists make about socialization, namely that the human self does not emerge “naturally” as a process driven by biological mechanisms. What is a self? What does it mean to have a self?

The **self** refers to a person's distinct sense of identity. It is who a person is for themselves and who they are for others. It has consistency and continuity through time, and an internal coherence that distinguishes people as unique persons. However, there is always something precarious and incomplete about the self. Selves change through the different stages of life. Sometimes they do not measure up to the ideals people hold for themselves or others, and sometimes they can be wounded by people's interactions with others or thrown into crisis. As Zygmunt Bauman (2004) puts it, one's distinct sense of identity is a projection or a “postulated self,” a “horizon towards which I strive and by which I assess, censure and correct my moves.” It is not only what a person has done in their lives, but how they *imagine* themselves to be. Clearly, the self does not develop in the absence of socialization. For sociologists, the self is a social product.

The American sociologist George Herbert Mead is often seen as the founder of the school of **symbolic interactionism** in sociology, although he referred to himself as a social behaviourist. His conceptualization of the self has been very influential. Mead (1934) defines the emergence of the self as a thoroughly social process: “The self, as that which can be an object to itself, is essentially a social structure, and it arises in social experience.” In what sense is the self a “social structure”?

The key quality of the self that Mead is concerned with is its ability to be reflexive or self-aware (i.e., to be an “object” to oneself). One can think *about* oneself, or feel how one is feeling. This key quality of the self can only arise in a social context through social interactions with others. In Charles Horton Cooley's (1902) concept of the “looking glass self,” others, and their attitudes towards the self, are like mirrors in which the self is able to see itself and formulate an idea of who they are. Without others, or without society, the self could not exist: “[I]t is impossible to conceive of a self arising outside of social experience” (Mead, 1934, p. 293).

Even when the self is alone for extended periods of time (hermits, prisoners in isolation, etc.), an internal conversation goes on that would not be possible if the individual had not been socialized already. The examples of feral children like Victor of Aveyron or children like Danielle who have been raised under conditions of extreme social deprivation attest to the difficulties these individuals confront when trying to develop this reflexive quality of humanity. They often cannot use language, form intimate relationships, or play games. Socialization is not simply the process through which people learn the norms and rules of a society; it is also the process by which people become aware of themselves as they interact with others. It is the process through which people are able to become people in the first place.

The necessity for early social contact was demonstrated by the research of Harry and Margaret Harlow. From 1957–1963, the Harlows conducted a series of experiments studying how rhesus monkeys, who behave a lot like people, are affected by isolation as babies. They studied monkeys raised under two types of “substitute” mothering circumstances: a mesh and wire sculpture, or a soft terry cloth “mother.” The monkeys systematically preferred the company of a soft, terry cloth



Figure 5.3 “What iss he, my precious?” Gollum in J.R.R. Tolkien's *The Hobbit* lived in isolation under the Misty Mountains for 500 years. To the extent that he had a coherent self, it was because he still had a robust and ongoing internalized conversation with the ring of power, his “precious.” (Image courtesy of Brenda Clarke/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

substitute mother (closely resembling a rhesus monkey) that was unable to feed them, to a mesh and wire mother that provided sustenance via a feeding tube. This demonstrated that while food was important, social comfort was of greater value (Harlow & Harlow, 1962; Harlow, 1971). Later experiments testing more severe isolation revealed that such deprivation of social contact led to significant developmental and social challenges later in life.



Figure 5.4 Harry and Margaret Harlows' experiments showed rhesus monkey babies, like humans, need to be raised with social contact for healthy development. (Photo courtesy of Harry Harlow/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Theories of Self Development

When a person is born, they have a genetic makeup and biological traits. However, who they are as human beings develops through social interaction. Many scholars, in both psychology and sociology, have described the process of self development as a means of understanding how that “self” becomes socialized through progressive stages.

Sigmund Freud




Figure 5.5 The Austrian Sigmund Freud was the founder of psychoanalysis. (Photo courtesy of Max Max Halberstadt/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) was one of the most influential modern scientists to put forth a theory about how people develop a sense of **self**. He believed personality and sexual development were closely linked, and divided the maturation process into universal psychosexual stages: oral, anal, phallic, latency, and genital. Each stage involves the child's discovery and passage through the bodily pleasures linked to breastfeeding, toilet training, and sexual awareness (Freud, 1905).

Key to Freud's approach to child development was his emphasis on tracing the formations of desire and pleasure in a child's life. The child is at the centre of a tricky negotiation between internal, pleasure-oriented drives for gratification or wish fulfillment (the pleasure principle) and external, social demands that the child repress those drives to conform to the rules and regulations of civilization (the reality principle). Failure to resolve the traumatic tensions and impasses of childhood psychosexual development causes emotional and psychological consequences throughout adulthood. For example, according to Freud, the failure of a child to properly engage in or disengage from a specific stage of development results in predictable outcomes later in life in the form of neuroses, fixations, and psychological distress. An adult with an oral fixation may indulge in overeating or binge drinking. An anal fixation may produce a neat freak (hence the term “anal retentive”), while a person stuck in the phallic stage may be promiscuous or emotionally immature.

Psychologist Erik Erikson (1902–1994) created a theory of personality development based on the work of Freud. However, Erikson (1963) was more interested in the social and cultural dimensions of Freud's child development schema. Following Freud, he noted that each stage of psychosexual child development was associated with the formation of basic emotional structures in adulthood. The outcome of the oral stage will determine whether someone is trustful or distrustful as an adult; the outcome of the anal stage, whether they will be confident and generous or ashamed and doubtful; the outcome of the genital stage, whether they will be full of initiative or guilt.

Erikson retained Freud's idea that the stages of child development were universal, but he believed that different cultures handled them differently. Child-raising techniques varied in line with the dominant social formation of their societies. So, for example, the tradition in the communally-based Sioux First Nation was not to wean infants but to breastfeed until the infant lost interest. This tradition created trust between the infant and their mother, and eventually trust between the child and the tribal group as a whole. On the other hand, modern industrial societies practice early weaning of children, which leads to a more distrustful character structure. Children develop a possessive disposition toward objects that carries with them through to adulthood. The result of early weaning is that the child is eager to get things and grab hold of things in lieu of the experience of generosity and comfort in being held.

Societies like the Sioux, in which individuals rely heavily on each other and on the group to survive in a hostile environment, will handle child training in a different manner and with different outcomes than societies based on individualism, competition, self-reliance, and self-control (Erikson, 1963).

Making Connections: Sociological Concepts

Sociology or Psychology: What's the Difference?




Figure 5.6 Social Psychology (SP): The overlap between sociological social psychology (SSP) and psychological social psychology (PSP). (Image courtesy of lucidish/ Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 3.0](#) [\[Image Description\]](#)

If sociologists and psychologists are both interested in people and their behaviour, how are these two disciplines different? What do they agree on, and where do their ideas diverge? The answers are complicated, but the distinction is important to scholars in both fields. While both disciplines are interested in human behaviour, psychologists are focused on how the mind influences that behaviour, while sociologists study the role of society in shaping both behaviour and the mind. Psychologists are interested in people's mental development and how their minds process their world and influence their actions. Sociologists are more likely to focus on how different aspects of social life structure an individual's relationship with the world. Another way to think of the difference is that psychologists tend to look inward at qualities of individuals' internal life (mental health, emotional processes, cognitive processing), while sociologists tend to look outward to qualities of individuals' social context (social institutions, cultural norms, interactions with others) to understand human behaviour. As described in [Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology](#), Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) was one of the first to emphasize this distinction in sociological research, when he attributed differences in suicide rates among people to social causes (degree of social integration) rather than to psychological causes (psychopathology, mental health) (Durkheim, 1897). This

same approach applies today. For example, a sociologist studying how a couple gets to the point of their first kiss on a date might focus the research on cultural norms of dating, social patterns of romantic activity in history, or the influence of social background on romantic partner selection. How is this process different for seniors than for teens, for example? A psychologist would more likely be interested in the person's romantic history, psychological type, or the mental processing of erotic desire. The point that sociologists like Durkheim would make is that an analysis of individuals at the psychological level cannot adequately account for social variability of behaviours. The difference in suicide rates of Catholics and Protestants, or the difference in dating scripts across cultures or historical periods, can not be explained at the level of individual psychology. Sometimes sociology and psychology can combine in interesting ways, however. Christopher Lasch's *The Culture of Narcissism* (1979) argued that the neurotic personality was a product of an earlier Protestant ethic style of competitive capitalism; whereas, late postindustrial consumer capitalism is conducive to narcissistic personality structures (the "me" society). Theodore Adorno and his colleagues described the features of an authoritarian personality that was susceptible to the appeals of fascistic political formations (Adorno et al., 1950). More recently the "dark triad" personality traits – *narcissism* (entitled self-importance), *Machiavellianism* (strategic exploitation and deceit), and *psychopathy* (callousness and cynicism) – have been shown to predict white nationalist ("alt-right") political beliefs and behaviours (Moss & O'Connor, 2020).

Charles Horton Cooley

One of the pioneering contributors to sociological perspectives on self-development was the American sociologist Charles Horton Cooley (1864–1929). Cooley asserted that people's self understanding is constructed, in part, by their perception of how others view them – a process termed "**the looking glass self**" (Cooley, 1902). According to Cooley, people base their self-image on what they think other people see. People imagine or project how they must appear to others, then react to this speculation. They don certain clothes, prepare their hair in a particular manner, wear makeup, use cologne, and the like – all with the notion that their presentation of themselves is going to affect how others perceive them. They anticipate a certain reaction, and, if lucky, they get the one they desire and feel good about it. Cooley believed that the sense of self is not based on an internal source of individuality therefore. Rather, people imagine how they look to others, draw conclusions based on others' reactions, and then develop their personal sense of self. In other words, other people's reactions are like a mirror in which the self is reflected. People live a mirror image of themselves. As he put it, "The imaginations people have of one another are the solid facts of society" (Cooley, 1902). The self or "self idea" is thoroughly social. It is not an expression of the internal essence of the individual, or of the individual's unique psychology which emerges as the individual matures. It is based on how people imagine



Figure 5.7 Do contemporary social media like Facebook present a new forum for the "looking glass self"? (Image courtesy of Joelle L/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#) [\[Image Description\]](#)

they appear to others. It is not how the self actually appear to others but the self's projection of what others think or feel towards it. This projection defines how people feel about themselves and who they feel themselves to be. The development of a self, therefore, involves three elements in Cooley's analysis: "the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgement of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification" (Cooley, 1902).

George Herbert Mead




Figure 5.8 George Herbert Mead, along with Cooley, is considered the founder of the symbolic interactionist tradition in sociology. (Photo courtesy of Moffett Studio/University of Chicago Library, Special Collections Research Center/Store Norske Leksikon) [Public Domain](#)

Later, George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) advanced a more detailed sociological approach to the self. He agreed that the self, as a person's distinct identity, is only developed through social interaction. As noted above, he argued that the defining component of the self is its capacity for self reflection, its capacity to be "an object to itself" (Mead, 1934). Somebody locks their keys in the car and thinks, "What a dummy I am!" Or, somebody thinks to themselves, "I'm tired but I'm going make myself stay up and finish this assignment before I go to bed." Addressing oneself in this manner are examples of "being an object to oneself."

Mead broke the self-reflective self down into two components or "phases:" the "**I**" and the "**me**." The "me" represents the part of the self in which one recognizes the "organized sets of attitudes" of others toward the self. It is who the self is in others' eyes: a social role, a "personality," or a public persona. The "I," on the other hand, represents the part of the self that acts on its own initiative or responds to the organized attitudes and expectations of others. It is the novel, spontaneous, unpredictable part of the self: the part of the self that embodies the possibility of change or undetermined action. The self is always caught up in a social process in which it flips back and forth between two distinguishable phases: the I and the me, the reflexive self and the self as social 'object.' In acting, the self oscillates between its own individual responses to various social situations and the

attitudes of the community.

This flipping back and forth is the condition of the human ability to be social. It is not an ability that humans are born with (Mead, 1934). The case of Danielle, for example, illustrates what happens when social interaction is absent from early experience: She had no ability to see herself as others would see her. From Mead's point of view, she had no "self." Without others, or without society, the reflexive self cannot exist. As Mead put it, "[I]t is impossible to conceive of a self arising outside of social experience" (Mead, 1934).

How does one get from being a newborn to being a human with a "self"? In Mead's theory of childhood development, the child develops through stages in which the child's increasing ability to play social roles attests to their increasing solidification of a social sense of self. It is interesting here to contrast Mead's sociological model of child development, which emphasizes the progressive ability to grasp and participate in social interaction, with psychological models, like Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget's, which emphasize stages of psychological or cognitive capacity. For Mead, learning how to play **social roles** — the set of behaviours expected of a person who occupies a particular social status or position in society — requires learning how to put oneself in the place of another, to see through another's eyes. At one point in their life, a child simply cannot play a game like baseball; they do not "get it" because they cannot insert themselves into the complex role of the player. They cannot see themselves from the point of view of all the other players on the field or figure out their place within a rule bound sequence of activities. At another point in their life, a child becomes able to learn how to play. Mead developed a specifically sociological theory of the path of development that all people go

through by focusing on the developing capacity to put oneself in the place of another, or *role play*: the four **stages of child socialization**.

Four Stages of Child Socialization

During the **preparatory stage**, children are only capable of imitation: They have no ability to imagine how others see things. They copy the actions of people with whom they regularly interact, such as their mothers and fathers. A child's baby talk is a reflection of its inability to make an object of themselves. The separation of I and me does not yet exist in an organized manner to enable the child to relate to themselves.

This is followed by the **play stage**, during which children begin to imitate and take on roles that another person might have. Thus, children might try on a parent's point of view by acting out "grownup" behaviour, like playing dress up and acting out the mom role, or talking on a toy cell phone the way they see their father do.

He plays that he is, for instance, offering himself something, and he buys it; he gives a letter to himself and takes it away; he addresses himself as a parent, as a teacher; he arrests himself as a policeman.... The child says something in one character and responds in another character, and then his responding in another character is a stimulus to himself in the first character, and so the conversation goes on (Mead, 1934).

However, children are still not able to take on roles in a consistent and coherent manner. Role play is very fluid and transitory in this stage, and children flip in and out of roles easily. They "pass[...]" from one role to another just as a whim takes [them]" (Mead, 1934).

During the **game stage**, children learn to consider several specific roles at the same time and how those roles interact with each other. They learn to understand interactions involving different people with a variety of purposes. They understand that role play in each situation involves responding to other people's cues and following a consistent set of rules and expectations. For example, a child at this stage is likely to be aware of how their own behaviour in a restaurant is linked to, and constrained by, the different responsibilities of the other people there: someone seats them, another takes their order, someone else cooks the food, another person clears away dirty dishes, other diners (mostly) mind their own business, mom or dad pays the bill, etc. A smooth dining experience depends on the "good behaviour" of everyone playing their role.



Figure 5.9 In the game of baseball each player "must know what everyone else is going to do in order to carry out his [or her] own play" (Mead, 1934). (Image courtesy of Jay Kleeman/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

Mead uses the example of a baseball game. "If we contrast play [i.e., the play stage] with the situation in an organized game, we note the essential difference that the child who plays in a game must be ready to take the attitude of everyone else involved in that game, and that these different roles must have a definite relationship to each other" (Mead, 1934). At one point in learning to play baseball, children do not understand that when they hit the ball they need to run, or that after their turn someone else gets a turn to bat. In order for baseball to work, the players not only have to know what the rules of the game are, and what their specific role in the game is (batter, catcher, first base, etc.), but know simultaneously the role of every other player on the field. They have to see the game from the perspective of others.

"What he does is controlled by his being everyone else on that team, at least in so far as those attitudes affect his own particular response" (Mead, 1934). The players have to be able to anticipate the actions of others and adjust or orient their behaviour accordingly. Role play in games like baseball involves

the understanding that one's own role is tied to the roles of several people simultaneously and that these roles are governed by fixed, or at least mutually recognized, rules and expectations.

Finally, children develop, understand, and learn the idea of the **generalized other**, the common behavioural expectations of general society. The generalized other is no one in particular, but a composite of "society's" perspective. By this stage of development, an individual is able to internalize how they are viewed, not simply from the perspective of several particular others (like in a baseball game), but from the perspective of the generalized other or "organized community." What would "the community" think if I did this or that? Being able to guide one's actions according to the attitudes of the generalized other provides the basis of having a stable "self" in the sociological sense. "[O]nly in so far as he takes the attitudes of the organized social group to which he belongs toward the organized, cooperative social activity or set of such activities in which that group as such is engaged, does he develop a complete self" (Mead, 1934).

This capacity to see the self through the eyes of the generalized other defines the conditions of thinking, of language use, and of society itself as the organization of complex co-operative processes and activities.

It is in the form of the generalized other that the social process influences the behavior of the individuals involved in it and carrying it on, that is, that the community exercises control over the conduct of its individual members; for it is in this form that the social process or community enters as a determining factor into the individual's thinking. In abstract thought the individual takes the attitude of the generalized other toward himself, without reference to its expression in any particular other individuals; and in concrete thought he takes that attitude in so far as it is expressed in the attitudes toward his behavior of those other individuals with whom he is involved in the given social situation or act. But only by taking the attitude of the generalized other toward himself, in one or another of these ways, can he think at all; for only thus can thinking — or the internalized conversation of gestures which constitutes thinking — occur. And only through the taking by individuals of the attitude or attitudes of the generalized other toward themselves is the existence of a universe of discourse, as that system of common or social meanings which thinking presupposes at its context, rendered possible (Mead, 1934).

Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development and Gilligan's Theory of Gender Differences

Moral development is an important part of the socialization process. The term refers to the way people learn what society considers to be "good" and "bad," which is important for a smoothly functioning society. Moral development prevents people from acting on unchecked urges, instead considering what is right for society and good for others. Lawrence Kohlberg (1927–1987) was interested in how people learn to decide what is right and what is wrong. To understand this topic, he developed a theory of moral development that includes three levels: preconventional, conventional, and postconventional.

In the preconventional stage, young children, who lack a higher level of cognitive ability, experience the world around them only through their senses. It is not until the teen years that the conventional stage develops, when youngsters become increasingly aware of others' feelings and take those into consideration when determining what is good and bad. The final stage, called postconventional, is when people begin to think of morality in abstract terms, such as North Americans believing that everyone has equal rights and freedoms. At this stage, people also recognize that legality and morality do not always match up evenly (Kohlberg, 1981). When hundreds of thousands of Egyptians turned out in 2011 to protest government autocracy, they were using postconventional morality. They understood that although their government was legal, it was not morally correct.

Carol Gilligan (b. 1936), recognized that Kohlberg's theory might show gender bias since his research was conducted only on male subjects. Would female study subjects have responded differently? Would a female social scientist notice

different patterns when analyzing the research? To answer the first question, she set out to study differences between how boys and girls developed morality. Gilligan's research demonstrated that boys and girls do, in fact, have different understandings of morality. Boys tend to have a justice perspective, placing emphasis on rules, laws, and individual rights. They learn to morally view the world in terms of categorization and separation. Girls, on the other hand, have a care and responsibility perspective; they are concerned with responsibilities to others and consider people's reasons behind behaviour that seems morally wrong. They learn to morally view the world in terms of connectedness.

Gilligan also recognized that Kohlberg's theory rested on the assumption that the justice perspective was the right, or better, perspective. Gilligan, in contrast, theorized that neither perspective was "better": The two norms of justice served different purposes. Ultimately, she explained that boys are socialized for a work environment where rules make operations run smoothly, while girls are socialized for a home environment where flexibility and empathy allow for harmony in caretaking and nurturing (Gilligan, 1982, 1990).

The Socialization of Gender



Figure 5.10 Royal Style Cinderella Disney Princess. (Image courtesy of Mike Mozart/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

How do girls and boys learn different gender roles? Gender differences in the ways boys and girls play and interact develop from a very early age, sometimes despite the efforts of parents to raise them in a gender neutral way. Little boys seem inevitably to enjoy running around playing with guns and projectiles, while little girls like to study the effects of different costumes on toy dolls. Peggy Orenstein (2012) describes how her two-year-old daughter happily wore her engineer outfit and took her Thomas the Tank Engine lunchbox to the first day of preschool. It only took one little boy to say to her that “girls don’t like trains!” for her to ditch Thomas and move on to more gender “appropriate” concerns like princesses. If gender preferences are not inborn or biologically hard-wired, how do sociologists explain them?

As the Thomas the Tank Engine example suggests, **doing gender** – performing tasks based upon the gender assigned by society – is learned through interaction with others in much the same way that Mead and Cooley described for socialization in general. Children learn how to do gender through direct feedback from others, particularly when they are censured for violating gender norms. Gender is in this sense a *social performance* and an *accomplishment* rather than an innate trait (West and Zimmerman, 1987). If a child successfully performs an activity like a boy or a girl “should,” they are accepted or rewarded, but if they fail, they are often corrected or get disapproving feedback. Doing gender therefore takes place through the child’s developing awareness of self through their interaction with others. In the Freudian model of gender development, children become aware of their own genitals, and spontaneously generate erotic fantasies and speculations whose resolution leads them to identify with their mother or father. Whereas in the sociological model, it is adults’ awareness of, and gendered interpretation of the meaning of, a child’s genitals that leads to gender labeling and reinforcement of gender roles.

West and Zimmerman (1987) emphasize that *doing gender*, whether as children or adults, involves ongoing, routinized *work* to present a credible and accepted performance. This is an interactive process that could be discredited if not performed well or unambiguously. Successful displays of endurance, strength, and competitive spirit in sport provide a typical demonstration of masculinity. In contrast, successful displays of courtesy, modesty, and empathy in hosting social gatherings provide a typical demonstration of femininity. It is through these *performances* that concepts of gender difference are solidified and made to seem like the natural expression of underlying biological differences. Through their

repetition, they “cast particular pursuits as expressions of masculine and feminine ‘natures’” (West and Zimmerman, 1987). Learning gender is therefore not so much about being socialized into fixed gender roles established by society. It is learning how to generate or perform acceptable gender performances in different social situations.

A child who learns to *do* gender therefore learns how to successfully display gender. Cahill (1986) observes that one of the first key social distinctions young children recognize and wish to demonstrate to parents or others is to distinguish themselves from “babies” who are unable to control themselves and require close supervision. But being told to “stop being a baby” subtly reinforces a distinction between two social identities that are routinely available to them: the discredited identity of “being a baby” on one hand or the approved identity of being either a “big boy” or “big girl” on the other.

Subsequently, little boys appropriate the gender ideal of “efficaciousness,” that is, being able to affect the physical and social environment through the exercise of physical strength or appropriate skills. In contrast, little girls learn to value “appearance,” that is, managing themselves as ornamental objects. Both classes of children learn that the recognition and use of sex categorization in interaction are not optional, but mandatory (West and Zimmerman, 1987).

It is not until they recognize that the social expectations of the “generalized other” are often divided and variable that children can go back and *undo* how they have learned to do gender. Nevertheless, as West and Zimmerman emphasize, this undoing often requires making explanations to others to account for differences in gender performance. Children are often acutely aware of the situations in which such explanations will “go over” and the situations in which they will not.

From a very early age, children develop a **gender schema**, a rudimentary image of gender differences, that enables them to make decisions about appropriate styles of play and behaviour (Fagot & Leinbach, 1989). By the time children enter kindergarten, they are able to “readily differentiate between masculine and feminine roles” while having a “firm understanding of the types of behaviour ‘deemed appropriate’ for males and females” (Crisp & Hiller, 2011). As they integrate their sense of self into this developing schema, they gradually adopt consistent and stable gender roles. Consistency and stability do not mean that the learned gender roles are permanent, however, as would be suggested by a biological or hard-wired model of gender. Physical expressions of gender, such as “throwing like a girl,” can be transformed into a new stable gender schema when the little girl joins a softball league.

Fagot and Leinbach’s (1986, 1989) research into the development of gender schemata showed that very young children, averaging about two years old, could not correctly classify photographs of adults and children by their gender; whereas, slightly older children, averaging 2.5 years old, could. They concluded that the younger children had not yet developed a gender schema. They also observed that older children who could correctly classify the photos by gender demonstrated gender specific play; they tended to choose same-gender play groups and girls were less aggressive in their play. The older children were integrating their sense of self into their gender schema and behaving accordingly.

Similarly, when they studied children at home, they found that children at age 1.5 years could not assign gender to photographs correctly and did not engage in gender-typed play. However, by age 2.25 years about half of the children could classify the photos and were engaging in gender-specific play. These “early labellers” were distinguished from those who could not classify photos by the way their parents interacted with them. Parents of early adopters were more likely to use differential reinforcement in the form of positive and negative responses to gender-typed toy play.

It is interesting, with respect to the difference between the Freudian and sociological models of gender socialization, that the gender schemata of young children develops with respect to external cultural signs of gender, rather than biological markers of genital differences. Sandra Bem (1989) showed young children photos of either a naked child or a child dressed in boys or girls clothing. The younger children had difficulty classifying the naked photos, but could classify the clothed photos. They did not have an understanding of biological sex constancy — i.e., the ability to determine sex based on anatomy regardless of gender signs — but used cultural signs of gender like clothing or hairstyle to determine gender. Moreover, it was the gender schema, not the recognition of anatomical differences, that first determined their choice of gender-typed toys and gender-typed play groups. Bem (1989) suggested that “children who

can label the sexes but do not understand anatomical stability are not yet confident that they will always remain in one gender group.”

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

What a Pretty Little Lady!



Figure 5.11 Peggy Orenstein on “princess culture.” “Within a month [of starting preschool], Daisy threw a tantrum when I tried to wrestle her into pants. As if by osmosis she had learned the names and gown colors of every Disney Princess – I didn’t even know what a Disney Princess was. She gazed longingly into the tulle-draped windows of the local toy stores and for her third birthday begged for a “real princess dress with matching plastic high heels” (Orenstein, 2012). (Image courtesy of Dave Jacquin/Flickr) [CC BY-ND 2.0](#)

“What a cute dress!” “I like the ribbons in your hair.” “Wow, you look so pretty today.” According to Lisa Bloom, author of *Think: Straight Talk for Women to Stay Smart in a Dumbed Down World*, most people use pleasantries like these when they first meet little girls. “So what?” one might ask. Bloom (2011) asserts that people are too focused on the appearance of young girls, and as a result North American society is socializing them to believe that how they look is of vital importance.

Bloom may be on to something. How often does one tell a little boy how attractive his outfit is, how nice looking his shoes are, or how handsome he looks today? To support her assertions, Bloom cites, as one example, that about 50% of girls ages three to six worry about being fat (Bloom, 2011). She is talking about kindergarteners who are concerned about their body image. Sociologists are acutely

interested in this type of gender socialization, where societal expectations of how boys and girls should be – how they should behave, what toys and colours they should like, and how important their attire is – are reinforced. One solution to this type of gender socialization is being experimented with at the Egalia preschool in Sweden, where children develop in a genderless environment. All of the children at Egalia are referred to with neutral terms like “friend” or a gender-neutral pronoun “hen” instead of he or she. Books are chosen that avoid traditional gender roles and gendered characters. Traditional toys are present, but consciously set up side by side so that children can play with whatever toy they want to eliminate any reinforcement of gender expectations. Egalia strives to eliminate any reinforcement of gender expectations by teachers as well as children (Haney, 2011).

Research on Sweden’s gender neutral pre-schools shows that children were more likely than their traditionally educated peers to be interested in playing with unfamiliar other-gender children, and were less likely to use gender stereotypes. They were no less likely to automatically encode other’s genders, however (Schutt’s et al., 2017). It is difficult to know what impact gender neutral education might have in a society that remains gendered outside of school. Bloom suggests people start with simple steps. For example, when

introduced to a young girl, ask about her favourite book or what she likes. In short, engage her mind, not her outward appearance (Bloom, 2011).

Image Descriptions

Figure 5.6 long description: Psychology and sociology have some overlap. Sociological Social Psychology (SSP) emphasizes a subject's location in social order, their socialized roles, and historical social context. Psychological Social Psychology (PSP) emphasizes a subject's mental processes, dispositions, experiences, and immediate social situation. [\[Return to Figure 5.6\]](#).

Figure 5.7 long description: A girl wears a sweater and jeans and looks into a mirror. The mirror represents Facebook and shows her reflection wearing a long, professional dress. [\[Return to Figure 5.7\]](#).

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5.2. Why Socialization Matters

Socialization is critical both to individuals and to the societies in which they live. It illustrates how completely intertwined human beings and their social worlds are. First, it is through teaching culture to new members that a society perpetuates itself. If new generations of a society do not learn its way of life, it ceases to exist. Whatever is distinctive about a culture must be transmitted to those who join it, in order for a society to survive. For Canadian culture to continue, for example, children in Canada must learn about cultural values related to democracy: They have to learn the norms of voting, as well as how to use material objects such as a ballot. Of course, some would argue that it is just as important in Canadian culture for the younger generation to learn the etiquette of eating in a restaurant or the rituals of tailgate parties after baseball games. In fact, there are many ideas and objects that Canadians teach children in hopes of keeping the society's way of life going through another generation.



Figure 5.12 Socialization teaches us our society's expectations for dining out. The manners and customs of different cultures (When can you use your hands to eat? How should you compliment the cook? Who is the "head" of the table?) are learned through socialization. (Photo courtesy of Niyam Bhushan/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Socialization is just as essential to individuals. Social interaction provides the means by which people gradually become able to see themselves through the eyes of others, learning who they are and how they fit into the world around them. In addition, to function successfully in society, people must learn the basics of their culture, everything from how to dress themselves to what is suitable attire for a specific occasion; from when to sleep to what to sleep on; and from what is considered appropriate to eat for dinner to how to use the stove to prepare it. Most importantly, people have to learn language — whether it is the dominant language or a minority language, whether it is verbal or through signs — in order to communicate and to think. As discussed earlier with the case of Danielle, without socialization, an individual would literally have no self. An individual would be unable to function socially.

Nature versus Nurture

Some experts assert that *who* people are is the result of **nurture** — the relationships and caring that surround them. Others argue that *who* people are is based on genetics. According to this belief, a person's temperaments, interests, and talents are set before birth. From this perspective, then, *who* people are depends on **nature**.

One way researchers attempt to prove the impact of nature is by studying twins. Some studies followed identical twins (i.e., monozygotic twins) who were raised separately. The pairs shared the same genetics, but in some cases were socialized in different ways. Instances of this type of situation are rare, but studying the degree to which identical twins raised apart are the same or different can give researchers insight into how temperaments, preferences, and abilities are shaped by our genetic makeup versus our social environment.

For example, in 1968, twin girls born to a mentally ill mother were put up for adoption. However, they were also separated from each other and raised in different households. The parents, and certainly the babies, did not realize they were one of five pairs of twins who were made subjects of a scientific study (Flam, 2007). In 2003, the two women, by then age 35 years, were reunited. Elyse Schein and Paula Bernstein sat together in awe, feeling like they were looking into a mirror. Not only did they look alike, but they behaved alike, using the same hand gestures and facial expressions (Spratling, 2007).

Studies like this point to the genetic roots of temperament and behaviour. The Minnesota Study of Twins Raised Apart (MISTRA) included 81 identical (or monozygotic) twin pairs and 56 fraternal (or dizygotic) twin pairs who were raised apart (Segal, 2017). One study based on this data set compared twins using 11 personality scales. It showed that the median correlations of the test results were 0.49 for identical twins raised apart versus 0.51 for identical twins raised together, whereas the correlations for fraternal twins raised apart and together were 0.21 and 0.23 respectively. This seems to show the strong impact of shared genes, as the identical twins raised apart were much more similar than fraternal twins raised together. Another study based on the data set compared IQ tests of identical twins raised apart and discovered that the measures correlated on average 0.73, suggesting that 73% of the difference in general intelligence measured by the tests was genetically influenced.

On the other hand, parents of identical twins start noticing behavioural differences from a very young age.

It is not as hard to tell my sons apart now, but we often recognize them more based on personality differences than looks. One is adventurous, daring – the first to nosedive off a sofa, the first to fall down stairs. He also crawled, stood, cruised, and walked first. He hollers and cries when we leave the room. Our other boy is an observer. He can be laser-focused, able to spend 30 minutes trying to click together a buckle as his brother marches around with his chest puffed, in need of constant movement and entertainment (Hayasaki, 2018).

Studies of identical twins also have difficulty accounting for divergences in the development of inherited diseases. In the case of schizophrenia, epidemiological studies show that there is a strong biological component to the disease. The closer one's familial connection to someone with the condition, the more likely one will develop it. However, even if an identical twin develops schizophrenia the other twin is less than 50 per cent likely to develop it themselves (Carey, 2012). Why is it not 100 per cent likely? What occurs to produce the divergence between genetically identical twins?

One explanation combines sociology and genetics. This is the field of **epigenetics**, the study of social or environmental impacts on the expression of genes (Segal et al., 2017). Cellular variations in gene expression between identical twins can lead to large differences in health, personality, and even physical appearance. For example, the impact of astronaut Scott Kelly's stay on the International Space Station meant that 7 per cent of his genes changed their expression, even months after his return to earth, although his genes themselves remained the same as his identical twin Mark (also an astronaut). With epigenetics, gene activity reacts in response to environmental stimuli at a cellular level. In other words, environment and lifestyle influence how genes are expressed.

Though genetics and hormones play an important role in individual human characteristics, biological explanations



Figure 5.13 Identical twins may look alike, but their differences can give us clues to the effects of socialization. (Image by John Everett Millais (1829-1896), Fitzwilliam Museum PD.36-2005/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

of social behaviour have serious deficiencies from a sociological point of view, especially when they are used to try to explain complex aspects of human social life like homosexuality, male aggressiveness, female spatial skills, and the like. As noted in [Chapter 3. Culture](#), the logic of biological explanation usually involves three components: the identification of a supposedly *universal* quality or trait of human behaviour, an attribution of a *genetic* source of the behavioural trait, and an evolutionary fitness argument why this behaviour makes it more likely that the genes that code for it will be passed successfully to descendants. The conclusion of this reasoning is that this behaviour or quality is hard-wired or difficult to change (Lewontin, 1991).

However, an argument, for example that males are naturally aggressive because of their hormonal structure or other biological mechanisms, does not take into account the huge variations in the meaning or practice of aggression between cultures, nor the huge variations in what counts as aggressive in different situations — let alone the fact that many men are not aggressive by any definition, and that men *and* women both have “male” hormones like testosterone. More interesting for the sociologist in this example is that men who are not aggressive often get called “sissies.” This indicates that male aggression has to do more with a normative structure within male culture than with a genetic or hormonal structure that explains aggressive behaviour.

Sociology’s larger concern is the effect that society has on human behaviour, the nurture side of the *nature versus nurture* debate. To what degree are processes of identification and “self-fulfilling prophecy” at work in the lives of the twins Elyse Schein and Paula Bernstein? Despite growing up apart, do they share common racial, class, or religious characteristics? Aside from the environmental or epigenetic factors that lead to the divergence of twins with regard to schizophrenia, what happens to the social standing and social relationships of a person when the condition develops? What happens to people who are living with schizophrenia in different societies? How does the social role of a person living with schizophrenia integrate them into a society (or not)? Whatever the role of genes or biology in people’s lives, genes are never expressed in a vacuum. Environmental influence always matters.

Making Connections: Case Study

The Life of Chris Langan, the Smartest Man You've Never Heard Of



Figure 5.14 Christopher Michael Langan (left), stands with a relative during the 1950's, in San Francisco, CA. (Photo courtesy of Darien Long/ Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Bouncer. Firefighter. Factory worker. Cowboy. Chris Langan (b. 1952) has spent the majority of his adult life just getting by with jobs like these. He has no college degree, few resources, and a past filled with much disappointment. Chris Langan also has an IQ of over 195, nearly 100 points higher than the average person (Brabham, 2001). So why didn't Chris become a neurosurgeon, professor, or aeronautical engineer? According to Macolm Gladwell in his book *Outliers: The Story of Success* (2008), Chris didn't possess the set of social skills necessary to succeed on such a high level — skills that aren't innate, but learned.

Gladwell (2008) looked to a recent study conducted by sociologist Annette Lareau in which she closely shadowed 12 families from various

economic backgrounds and examined their parenting techniques. Parents from lower-income families followed a strategy of “accomplishment of natural growth,” which is to say they let their children develop on their own with a large amount of independence; parents from higher-income families, however, “actively fostered and accessed a child's talents, opinions, and skills” (Gladwell, 2008). These parents were more likely to engage in analytical conversation, encourage active questioning of the establishment, and foster development of negotiation skills. The parents were also able to introduce their children to a wider range of activities, from sports to music to accelerated academic programs. When one middle class child was denied entry to a gifted and talented program, the mother petitioned the school and arranged additional testing until her daughter was admitted. Lower-income parents, however, were more likely to unquestioningly obey authorities such as school boards. Their children were not being socialized to comfortably confront the system and speak up.

What does this have to do with Chris Langan, deemed by some as the smartest man in the world (Brabham, 2001)? Chris was born in severe poverty, and he was moved across the country with an abusive and alcoholic stepfather. Chris's genius went greatly unnoticed. After accepting a full scholarship to Reed College, his funding was revoked after his mother failed to fill out necessary paperwork. Unable to successfully make his case to the administration, Chris, who had received straight A's the previous semester, was given F's on his transcript and forced to drop out. After enrolling in Montana State University, an administrator's refusal to rearrange his class schedule left him unable to find the means necessary to travel the 16 miles to attend classes. What Chris has in brilliance, he lacks in practical intelligence, or what

psychologist Robert Sternberg defines as “knowing what to say to whom, knowing when to say it, and knowing how to say it for maximum effect” (Sternberg et al., 2000). Such knowledge was never part of his socialization.

Chris gave up on school and began working an array of blue-collar jobs, pursuing his intellectual interests on the side. Though he’s recently garnered attention from work on his “Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe,” he remains weary and resistant of the educational system.

As Gladwell (2008) concluded, “He’d had to make his way alone, and no one — not rock stars, not professional athletes, not software billionaires, and not even geniuses — ever makes it alone.”

Individual and Society

How do sociologists explain both the conformity of behaviour in society and the existence of individual uniqueness? The concept of socialization raises a classic problem of sociological analysis: the problem of **individual agency**. As described in [Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology](#), individual agency is the capacity of individuals to act and make decisions independently. However socialization is about conformity: learning how to conform to social expectations and norms. How is it possible for there to be individual differences, individual choice, or individuality at all if human development is about assuming socially-defined roles? How can an individual have agency, the ability to choose and act independently of external constraints?

Erving Goffman described this paradox in *Asylums: Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates* (1961). As discussed at the end of this chapter, in a **total institution**, like an asylum, a prison, or an Indian residential school, individuals are typically stripped of anything that identifies them as individuals and then resocialized to conform to rigid expectations of appearance and behaviour. There is very little space provided for unique individuality. Yet, as Goffman (1961) puts it, there is a dynamic that pits the status, the need to belong, and stable “sense of being a person” against a more intimate, individual “sense of selfhood”:

it is . . . against something that the self can emerge . . . Without something to belong to, we have no stable self, and yet total commitment and attachment to any social unit implies a kind of selflessness. Our sense of being a person can come from being drawn into a wider social unit; our sense of selfhood can arise through the little ways in which we resist the pull. Our status is backed by the solid buildings of the world, while our sense of personal identity often resides in the cracks (Goffman, 1961).

Since Western society places such value on individuality, in being oneself or in resisting peer pressure and other pressures to conform, the question of where society ends and where the individual begins often is foremost in the minds of students of sociology. Numerous debates in the discipline focus on this question.

However, from the point of view emphasized in this chapter, it is a false question. As noted previously, for Mead the individual “agent” is already a “social structure.” No separation exists between the individual and society; the individual is thoroughly social from the inside out and vice versa.



Figure 5.15 If socialization implies conformity, how do sociologists explain individual uniqueness? (Image courtesy of PxHere.) [CC0 1.0](#)

Mead addressed the question of agency at the level of the relationship between the “I” and the “me” as two “phases” that flip back and forth in the life of the self. The “me” is the part of the self in which one recognizes and assumes the expectations or “organized sets of attitudes” of others: one’s social roles, one’s designations, one’s personalities (as they appear to others), and so on. On the basis of the “me” people know what is expected of them in a social situation and what the consequences of following or breaking a norm will be. The “I” represents the part of the self which acts or responds to the organized attitudes of others. It is the unpredictable part of the self. It has the capacity to step outside of social role and expectations. As part of the self, it embodies the principles of novelty, spontaneity, freedom, initiative (and the possibility of change) in social action. Even the individual can never be sure in advance how they will act in a situation, nor be certain of the outcome of their actions. “Exactly how we will act never gets into experience until after the action takes place” (Mead, 1934). Both phases are thoroughly social – the individual only ever experiences themselves “indirectly” from the standpoint of others – but without the two phases “there could be no conscious responsibility, and there would be nothing novel in experience” (Mead, 1934).

In a similar manner, sociologists argue that individuals vary because the social environments to which they adapt vary. The socialization process occurs in different social environments – i.e., environments made up of the responses of others – each of which impose distinctive and unique requirements. In one family, children are permitted unlimited access to TV and video games; in another, there are no TV or video games, for example. Even within the same family, children’s upbringing varies. When they are growing up, children adapt and develop different strategies of play and recreation. Their parents and others respond to the child’s choices, either by reinforcing them or encouraging different choices. They are older, younger, or middle siblings with different responsibilities and roles within the family. Along a whole range of social environmental differences and responses, support and resistance, children gradually develop stable and consistent orientations to the world, each to some degree unique because each is formed from a vantage point unique to the place in society the child occupies. Individual variation and individual agency are possible

because society itself varies in each social situation. Indeed, the configuration of society itself differs according to each individual's contribution to each social situation.

Structural Functionalism, Critical Sociology, and Symbolic Interactionism

Sociologists all recognize the importance of socialization for healthy individual and societal development. But how do scholars working in the theoretical paradigms of structural functionalism, critical sociology, and symbolic interactionism approach this topic?

Structural functionalists would say that socialization is an essential function in society, both because it trains members to operate successfully within it and because it perpetuates culture by transmitting it to new generations. Individuals learn and assume different social roles as they age because different responsibilities and tasks are expected of them. These roles come with relatively fixed norms and social expectations attached, which allow for predictable interactions between people. Nevertheless, how the individual lives and balances their roles is subject to variation. There can also be **role conflict** when the expectations or functions of different roles conflict. During the COVID-19 pandemic for example, working remotely from home often involved a careful negotiation between meeting an employer's expectations while also being available as a parent for children unable to go to school.

A critical sociologist might argue that socialization reproduces inequality from generation to generation by conveying different expectations and norms to those with different social characteristics. For example, individuals are socialized with different expectations about their place in society according to their gender, social class, and race. As in the life of Chris Langan, this creates different and unequal opportunities and, therefore, socialization is a process that can perpetuate and naturalize power relationships in society.

A symbolic interactionist studying socialization is concerned with face-to-face exchanges and symbolic communication. For example, dressing baby boys in blue and baby girls in pink is one small way that messages are conveyed about differences in gender roles. The idea that "the self is a social structure" encapsulates the symbolic interactionist position. Even that which seems most "one's own" — one's private thoughts, self-feelings, bodily experiences, agency — is a product of social messages that continually mirror the self back to the self. For the symbolic interactionist, though, how these messages are formulated and how they are interpreted are always situational, always renewed, and defined by the specific interactions in which the communication occurs. The identity of the self is not fixed, it is an ongoing process.

Media Attributions

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5.3. Agents of Socialization

Socialization helps people learn to function successfully in their social worlds. How does the process of socialization occur? How do people learn to use the objects of their society's material culture? How do they come to adopt the beliefs, values, and norms that represent its nonmaterial culture? This learning takes place through interaction with various agents of socialization, like peer groups and families, plus both formal and informal social institutions.

Social Group Agents

Families, and later peer groups, often provide the first experiences of socialization. They communicate expectations and reinforce norms. People first learn to use the tangible objects of material culture in these settings, as well as being introduced to the beliefs and values of society.

Family

Family is the first agent of socialization. Mothers and fathers, siblings and grandparents, plus members of an extended family all teach a child what they need to know. For example, they show the child how to use objects (such as clothes, computers, eating utensils, books, bikes); how to relate to others (some as “family,” others as “friends,” still others as “strangers” or “teachers” or “neighbours”); and how the world works (what is “real” and what is “imagined”).

It is important to keep in mind, however, that families do not socialize children in a vacuum. Many social factors impact how a family raises its children. For example, students can use sociological imagination to recognize that individual behaviours are affected by the historical period in which they take place. Sixty years ago, it would not have been considered especially strict for a father to hit his son with a wooden stick or a belt if the child misbehaved, but today that same action might be considered child abuse.

Sociologists recognize that race, social class, religion, and other societal factors play an important role in socialization. For example, poor families usually emphasize obedience and conformity when raising their children, while wealthy families emphasize judgment and creativity (National Opinion Research Center, 2008). This may be because working-class parents have less education and more repetitive-task jobs for which the ability to follow rules and to conform helps. Wealthy parents tend to have better education and often work in managerial positions or in careers that require creative problem solving, so they teach their children behaviours that would be beneficial in these positions. This means that children are effectively socialized and raised to take the types of jobs that their parents already have, thus reproducing the class system (Kohn, 1977). Likewise, children are socialized to abide by gender norms, perceptions of race, and class-related behaviours.

In Sweden, for instance, stay-at-home fathers are an accepted part of the social landscape. A government policy provides subsidized time off work — 68 weeks for families with newborns at 80 per cent of regular earnings — with the option of 52 of those weeks of paid leave being shared between both mothers and fathers, and eight weeks each in addition allocated for the father and the mother. This encourages fathers to spend at least eight weeks at home with their newborns (Marshall, 2008). As one stay-at-home dad said, being home to take care of his baby son “is a real fatherly thing to do. I think that’s very masculine” (Associated Press, 2011). Overall, 90 per cent of Swedish men participate in the paid leave program.

In Canada on the other hand, outside of Quebec, parents can share 40 weeks of paid parental leave at 55% of their regular earnings (or 69 weeks at 33% of their regular earnings). Across Canada (including Quebec), between 2012 and

2017, 88% of mothers took maternity leave compared with 42% of fathers (Statistics Canada, 2021). In Quebec, where in addition to 32 weeks of shared parental leave, men also receive five weeks of paid leave, the participation rate of men is 93% (compared to 24% of fathers outside of Quebec). In Canada overall, the participation of men in paid parental leave increased from 34% from 2001–2006 to 42% in 2006. This does not include fathers who take sick leave, annual vacation leave, or benefits from an employer program to stay home with newborns, which is more common outside of Quebec. Researchers note that a father's involvement in child raising has a positive effect on the parents' relationship, the father's personal growth, and the social, emotional, physical, and cognitive development of children (Marshall, 2008). How will this effect differ in Sweden and Canada as a result of the different nature of their paternal leave policies?



Figure 5.16 The socialized roles of dads and moms vary by society. (Photo courtesy of Nate Grigg/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Peer Groups

A **peer group** is made up of people who are not necessarily friends but who are similar in age and social status and who share interests. Peer group socialization begins in the earliest years, such as when kids on a playground teach younger children the norms about taking turns, the rules of a game, or how to shoot a basket. Peer groups provide childrens' first major socialization experience outside the realm of their families.

Randall Collins' (2004) model of **interaction rituals** and emotional-entrainment describes the powerful socializing effect of early childhood interactions with peers. Interactions with other children while at play or in other situations gives the child a sense of the social order and their place within it outside the direct control of parents. An **interaction ritual** is defined as an interaction where individuals come together physically in a bounded situation, (i.e., in which it is clear who is participating and who is not), to participate in a mutual focus of attention that creates a shared emotional experience. At a micro-sociological level interaction rituals are mechanisms where socialization into group life occurs and gets reinforced.

Collins describes four outcomes of the socialization process in interaction rituals:

1. Group solidarity: a feeling of membership;
2. Emotional energy...in the individual: a feeling of confidence, elation, strength, enthusiasm, and initiative in taking action;
3. Symbols that represent the group: emblems or other representations (visual icons, words, gestures) that

members feel are associated with themselves collectively.... Persons pumped up with feelings of group solidarity treat symbols with great respect and defend them against the disrespect of outsiders, and even more, of renegade insiders.

4. Feelings of morality: the sense of rightness in adhering to the group, respecting its symbols, and defending both against transgressors. Along with this goes the sense of moral evil or impropriety in violating the group's solidarity and its symbolic representations (Collins, 2004).

Children's play is an example of an interaction ritual. In play, children bring their attention to a common focus – an “emblem” such as a game, a toy, a ball, etc. – and become aware of, and mutually attuned to, each other's attention to the object of interest. At a physical level they become rhythmically coordinated in a repetition of actions. At an emotional level they also become emotionally entrained or fixed on the common focus. They conform to each other's emotions, which gradually build up and become increasingly intense through the self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms of play – the minor successes, failures, victories, betrayals, provisional agreements, etc. that make up the back and forth of events. Play is therefore an intense process of socialization and conformity into the norms and feelings of the group.

At the same time, playing with peers is a high-stakes game where children are socialized into relations of status, power and in/out groups; again, independently of their position within the family group. Through the flows of emotional energy in play some children become the center of attention and reap the emotional awards of confidence, respect, and prestige, which they can carry into other activities, whereas other children find themselves relegated to supporting roles or sidelined, where their access to the rewards and emotional energy of play is diminished. Some children cast as victims or excluded from play can be emotionally suppressed by play. Daycare centers and play groups can become enclosed “status goldfish bowls” where children divide themselves into cliques: “little groups of bullies and their scapegoats, popular play leaders and their followers, fearful or self-sufficient isolates” (Collins, 2004).



Figure 5.17 “When peer group relationships are positive, it is reasonable to assume that the school environment is a supportive and potentially enjoyable one. Children who are accepted by their peers tend to have a more safe school environment, while those who have been rejected by their peers are at a greater risk of targeted harassment and bullying” (Robson, 2019). (Image courtesy of Udo Herzog/ Flickr.)

As children grow into teenagers, this process continues. Peer groups are important to adolescents in a new way, as they begin to develop an identity separate from their parents and exert independence. This is often a period of parental-child conflict and rebellion as parental values come into conflict with those of youth peer groups. Peer groups provide their own opportunities for socialization since kids usually engage in different types of activities with their peers than they do with their families. They are especially influential, therefore, with respect to preferences in music, style, clothing, etc., sharing common social activities, and learning to engage in romantic relationships. With peers, adolescents experiment with new experiences outside the control of parents: sexual relationships, drug and alcohol use, political stances, hair and clothing choices, and so forth. The most visible and highly structured cliques and in/out groups are probably found in high schools – nerds, jocks, preppies, stoners, rebels, religious evangelicals, etc..

Interestingly, studies have shown that although friendships rank high in adolescents' priorities, this is balanced by parental influence. Conflict between parents and teenagers is usually temporary and in the end families exert more influence than peers over educational choices and political, social, and religious attitudes.

Peer groups might be the source of rebellious youth culture, but they can also be understood as agents of social integration. The seemingly spontaneous way that youth in and out of school divide themselves into cliques with varying degrees of status or popularity prepares them for the way the adult world is divided into status groups. The racial characteristics, gender characteristics, intelligence characteristics, and wealth characteristics that lead to being

accepted in more or less popular cliques in school are the same characteristics that divide people into status groups in adulthood.

Institutional Agents

The social institutions of a culture also inform their processes of socialization. Formal institutions — like schools and workplaces — teach people how to behave in and navigate these systems. Other institutions, like the media, contribute to socialization by inundating people with messages about norms and expectations.

School

Most Canadian children spend about seven hours a day and 180 days a year in school, which makes it hard to deny the importance school has on their socialization. In elementary and junior high, compulsory education amounts to over 8,000 hours in the classroom (OECD, 2013). Students are not only in school to study math, reading, science, and other subjects — the manifest function of this system. Schools also serve a latent function in society by socializing children into behaviours like teamwork, following a schedule, and using textbooks.



Figure 5.18 These kindergarteners are not just learning to read and write at the library; they are being socialized to norms like cooperation, rule oriented behaviour, and deference to teachers. (Photo courtesy of Howard County Library System/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

School and classroom rituals, led by teachers serving as role models and leaders, regularly reinforce what society expects from children. Sociologists describe this aspect of schools as the **hidden curriculum**, the informal teaching done by schools. For example, in North America, schools have built a sense of competition into the way grades are awarded and the way teachers evaluate students. Students learn to evaluate themselves within a hierarchical system of A, B, C, etc. students (Bowles & Gintis, 1976). However, different lessons can be taught by different instructional techniques. When children participate in a relay race or a math contest, they learn that there are winners and losers in society. When children are required to work together on a project, they practice teamwork with other people in cooperative situations. Bowles and Gintis argue that the hidden curriculum prepares children for a life of conformity in the adult world. Children learn how to deal with bureaucracy, rules, expectations, to wait their turn, and to sit still for hours during the day. The latent functions of competition, teamwork, classroom discipline, time awareness, and dealing with bureaucracy are features of the hidden

curriculum. Schools also socialize children by teaching them overtly about citizenship and nationalism. In the United States, children are taught to say the Pledge of Allegiance. Most school districts require classes about U.S. history and geography. In Canada, on the other hand, critics complain that students do not learn enough about national history, which undermines the development of a sense of shared national identity (Granatstein, 1998). But this might also be a way of socializing students into the Canadian national identity, which prides itself in a *weak* attachment to political institutions and nationalistic projects, allowing citizens to be detached from patriotic sentimentality. Textbooks in Canada are also continually scrutinized and revised to update attitudes toward the different cultures in Canada as well as perspectives on historical events; thus, children are socialized to a different national or world history than earlier

textbooks may have done. For example, recent textbook editions include information about the colonial mistreatment of First Nations which more accurately reflects those events than in textbooks of the past. In this regard, schools educate students explicitly about aspects of citizenship important for being able to participate in a modern, heterogeneous culture.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

Mike Mountain Horse: Socialization on First Day at Residential School



Figure 5.19 Blood recruits, 191st Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force, Fort Macleod, Alberta, ca.1916. Mike Mountain Horse, far right in front row. (Image courtesy of the Glenbow Museum, Image No: NA-2164-1.) [Public Domain](#)

In 1893, six-year-old Mike Mountain Horse, a member of the Blood (Kainai) First Nation in what is now southern Alberta, was enrolled in the Anglican boarding school on the Blood Reserve. His brother Fred was already attending the school and was there to provide guidance on his first day.

My Indian clothes, consisting of blanket, breech cloth, leggings, shirt and moccasins, were removed. Then my brother took me into another room where I was placed in a steaming brown fibre

paper tub full of water. Yelling blue murder, I started to jump out, but my brother held on to me and I was well scrubbed and placed before a heater to dry. Next came Mr. Swainson [the principal] with a pair of shears. I was again placed in a chair. Zip went one of my long braids to the floor: the same with the other side. A trim was given as a finish to my haircut. My brother again took me in charge. “Don’t cry any more,” he said. “You are going to get nice clothes.” Mrs. Swainson then came into the room with a bundle of clothes for me: knee pants, blouse to match with a wide lace collar, a wee cap with an emblem sewn in front, and shoes. Thus attired I strutted about like a young peacock before the other pupils.

The education at the school was conducted in English, but, Mountain Horse recalled, the church services were held in Siksika (Blackfoot). To encourage students to learn English, the principal offered to honour any request for a gift that was written in English. To test the system, Mountain Horse requested, and received, a pound of butter and a can of milk. It was, he discovered, more butter than he had use for, and he threw it out.

Although one of the key goals of the school was to convert the students to the Christian faith, Mountain Horse wrote that “the powerful sway of the new was not sufficient to entirely dethrone the many spirits to whom we had previously made our offerings.” In the end, however, he said, “The majority of the Indian youth have no alternative than to embrace the religion of the white man as taught in their schools.”

Mountain Horse went on to attend the Calgary industrial school. After graduating, he went to work for the Mounted Police, served in the First World War, returned to work for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, wrote the manuscript of his book on the Bloods, and ended his career as a railway labourer.

Mike Mountain Horse account, in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. (2015). *Canada’s Residential Schools: The History, Part 1, Origins to 1939. Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada* (Volume 1, pp. 174–175). McGill-Queen’s University Press. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report is in the public domain.

The Workplace

Just as children spend much of their day at school, most Canadian adults at some point invest a significant amount of time at a place of employment. After school, the workplace is the next major institution of socialization that people encounter in their lives. Although socialized into their culture since birth, workers require new socialization into a workplace both in terms of material culture (such as how to operate the copy machine) and nonmaterial culture (such as whether it is okay to speak directly to the boss or how the refrigerator is shared).

Different jobs require different types of socialization. In the past, many people worked a single job until retirement. Today, the trend is to switch jobs at least once a decade. Between the ages of 18 and 44, the average baby boomer of the younger set held 11 different jobs (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). This means that people must become socialized to, and socialized by, a variety of work environments.

One common feature of workplace socialization is learning time discipline and efficiency. At work, people are required to make continuous productive use of time and avoid idleness, and they are disciplined or fired if they do not. E.P. Thompson (1967) described the historical shift from a pre-industrial ‘task orientation’ in work to an industrial ‘time orientation’ in work. In pre-industrial societies the workday was organized according to the tasks that needed to be accomplished, with little attention paid to clock-time, whereas in industrial societies the workday is organized

according to regulated, coordinated clock-time and the need to intensify productivity per unit of standardized time. This shift altered time sense from natural, irregular, cyclical and experientially comprehensible time, blurring work and leisure, to an artificial and abstract time sense based on the invention and implementation of mechanical clocks that sharply divided work and leisure and imposing an external synchronization of labour through timed work and concepts of efficiency. As Thompson points out, this imposition of clock-time on the labour process was not universally accepted by workers. It took place against resistance over a period of centuries, but gradually spread beyond the workplace to dominate society as a whole. The socialization effect of the modern workplace has to do with the internalization of clock-time along with a sense of urgency in getting tasks done within a specific, albeit artificial, time frame.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

Girls and Movies




Figure 5.20 Some people are concerned about the way girls today are socialized into a “princess culture.” (Photo courtesy of Emily Stanchfield/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Pixar is one of the largest producers of children's movies in the world and has released large box office draws, such as *Toy Story*, *Cars*, *The Incredibles*, and *Up*. What Pixar has never before produced is a movie with a female lead role. This changed with Pixar's movie *Brave* in 2012. Before *Brave*, women in Pixar served as supporting characters and love interests. In *Up*, for example, the only human female character dies within the first ten minutes of the film. For the millions of girls watching Pixar films, there are few strong characters or roles for them to relate to. If they do not see possible versions of themselves, they may come to view women as secondary to the lives of men.

The animated films of Pixar's parent company, Disney, have many female lead roles. Disney is well known

for films with female leads, such as *Snow White*, *Cinderella*, *The Little Mermaid*, and *Mulan*. Many of Disney's movies star a female, and she is nearly always a princess figure. If she is not a princess to begin with, she typically ends the movie by marrying a prince or, in the case of *Mulan*, a military general. Although not all "princesses" in Disney movies play a passive role relative to male characters, they typically find themselves needing to be rescued by a man, and the happy ending they all search for includes marriage.

Alongside this prevalence of princesses, many parents express concern about the culture of princesses that Disney has created. Peggy Orenstein addresses this problem in her popular book, *Cinderella Ate My Daughter*. Orenstein wonders why every little girl is expected to be a "princess" and why pink has become an all-consuming obsession for many young girls. Another mother wondered what she did wrong when her three-year-old daughter refused to do "non-princessy" things, including running and jumping. The effects of this princess culture can have negative consequences for girls throughout life. An early emphasis on beauty and sexiness can lead to eating disorders, low self-esteem, and risky sexual behaviour among older girls.

What should we expect from Pixar's *Brave*, the company's first film to star a female character? Although *Brave* features a female lead, she is still a princess. Will this film offer any new type of role model for young girls? (Barnes, 2010; O'Connor, 2011; Rose, 2011).

Mass Media

Mass media refers to the distribution of impersonal information to a wide audience via television, newspapers, radio, and the internet. With the average person spending over four hours a day in front of the TV (and children averaging even more screen time), media greatly influences social norms (Roberts, Foehr, & Rideout, 2005; Oliveira, 2013). Statistics Canada reports that for the sample of people they surveyed about their time use in 2010, 73 per cent said they watched 2 hours 52 minutes of television on a given day (see the Participants column in Table 5.1 below).

Television continues to be the mass medium that occupies the most free time of the average Canadian, but the internet has become the fastest growing mass medium. In the Statistics Canada survey, television use on a given day declined from 77 per cent to 73 per cent between 1998 and 2010, but computer use increased amongst all age groups from 5 per cent to 24 per cent and averaged 1 hour 23 minutes on any given day. People who played video games doubled from 3 per cent to 6 per cent between 1998 and 2010, and the average daily use increased from 1 hour 48 minutes to 2 hours 20 minutes (Statistics Canada, 2013).

Through media, people learn about objects of material culture (like new technology, transportation, and consumer options), as well as nonmaterial culture—what is true (beliefs), what is important (values), and what is expected (norms). This can be beneficial as a way that people are socialized about the norms, expectations, and values of their society, but also harmful when media messages distort reality or present unrealistic images and expectations. For example, sex, as many films, television shows, music videos, and song lyrics present it, is frequent and casual. Rarely do these media point out the potential emotional and physical consequences of sexual behavior. Additionally, actors and models depicted in sexual relationships in the media are thinner, younger, and more attractive than the average adult. This creates unrealistic expectations about the necessary ingredients for a satisfying sexual relationship. Media representations can therefore socialize people into expectations of norms and standards that are unhinged from the lived experiences of everyday life.

Table 5.1. Average time per day spent on various activities for participants aged 15 and over, grouped by sex, Canada, 2010 [\[Skip Table\]](#)

Activity group	Population			Participants			Participation rate		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
	hours and minutes			hours and minutes			percentage		
1. Television, reading, and other passive leisure	02:29	02:39	02:20	03:08	03:19	02:58	79	80	79
Watching television	02:06	02:17	01:55	02:52	03:03	02:41	73	75	71
Reading books, magazines, newspapers	00:20	00:18	00:23	01:26	01:29	01:25	24	20	27
Other passive leisure	00:03	00:03	00:02	01:04	01:16	00:52	4	4	4
2. Active leisure	01:13	01:27	00:59	02:22	02:42	02:01	51	54	49
Active sports	00:30	00:37	00:23	01:54	02:12	01:34	26	28	25
Computer use	00:20	00:23	00:17	01:23	01:32	01:14	24	25	23
Video games	00:09	00:14	00:04	02:20	02:40	01:38	6	9	4
Other active leisure	00:14	00:13	00:15	02:05	02:06	02:04	11	10	12

Note. Average time spent is the average over a 7-day week.

Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2010 (Statistics Canada, 2011). Note: this survey asked approximately 15,400 Canadians aged 15 and over to report in a daily journal details of the time they spent on various activities on a given day. Because they were reporting about a given day, the figures cited about the average use of television and other media differ from reports provided by BBM and other groups on the average weekly usage, like the figure of 4 hours per day of TV cited in Roberts, Foehr, and Rideout (2005) above.

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5.4. Socialization Across the Life Course

Socialization is not a one-time or even a short-term event. People are not stamped by some socialization machine as they move along a conveyor belt and thereby socialized once and for all. In fact, socialization is a lifelong process. Human development is not simply a product of the biological changes of physical maturation or the cognitive changes of psychological development, but follows a pattern of engaging and disengaging from a succession of roles that does not end with childhood but continues through the course of people's lives.

In North America, socialization throughout the life course is determined greatly by age norms and “time-related rules and regulations” (Setterson, 2002). As people grow older, they encounter age-related transition points that require socialization into a new role, such as becoming school age, entering the workforce, or retiring. At each point in life, as an individual sheds previous roles and assumes new ones, institutions or situations are involved, which requires both learning and revising one's self-definition: You are no longer living at home; you have a job! You are no longer a child; you in the army! You are no longer single; you are going to have a child! You are no longer free; you are going to jail! You are no longer in mid-life; it is time to retire!

Many of life's social expectations are made clear and enforced on a cultural level. Through interacting with others and watching others interact, the expectation to fulfill roles becomes clear. While in elementary or middle school, the prospect of having a boyfriend or girlfriend may have been considered undesirable. The socialization that takes place in high school changes the expectation. By observing the excitement and importance attached to dating and relationships within the high school social scene, it quickly becomes apparent that one is now expected not only to be a child and a student, but a significant other as well.

Adolescence in general is a period stretching from puberty to about 18 years old, characterized by the role adjustment from childhood to adulthood. It is a stage of development in which the self is redefined through a more or less arduous process of “socialized anxiety” (Davis, 1944), re-examination and reorientation. As Jean Piaget described it, adolescence is a “decisive turning point ... at which the individual rejects, or at least revises his estimate of everything that has been inculcated in him, and acquires a personal point of view and a personal place in life” (1947). It involves a fundamental “growth process” according to Edgar Friedenberg “to define the self through the clarification of experience and to establish self esteem” (1959).

In some cultures, adolescence is marked and ritualized through a clear **rite of passage**, a ritual that marks a life cycle transition from a previous status to a new status. Wade Davis described the rite of passage of Algonquin boys of northeastern North America when they hit puberty: Traditionally, the boys were isolated from the rest of the tribe in longhouses for two or three weeks and consumed nothing but a hallucinogenic plant from the *datura* family (1985). During the long disorienting period of intoxication brought on by the plant the boys would forget what it meant to be a child and learn what it was to be a man.

In modern North American society, the rites of passage are not so clear cut or socially recognized. Already in 1959, Friedenberg argued that the process was hindered because of the pervasiveness of mass media that interfered with the expression of individuality crucial to this stage of life. Nevertheless, North American adolescence provided a similar trial by fire entry into adulthood: “The juvenile era provides the solid earth of life; the security of having stood up for yourself in a tough and tricky situation; the comparative immunity of knowing for yourself just exactly how the actions that must not be mentioned feel...the calm gained from having survived among comrades, that makes one ready to have friends” (Friedenberg, 1959).

Graduation from formal education — high school, vocational school, or college — involves a formal, ceremonial rite of passage yet again and socialization into a new set of expectations. Educational expectations vary not only from culture to culture, but from social class to social class. While middle- or upper-class families may expect their daughter or son to attend a four-year university after graduating from high school, other families may expect their child to immediately begin working full-time, as others within their family may have done before them.

In the process of socialization, adulthood brings a new set of challenges and expectations, as well as new roles to fill.

As the aging process moves forward, social roles continue to evolve. Pleasures of youth, such as wild nights out and serial dating, become less acceptable in the eyes of society. Responsibility and commitment are emphasized as pillars of adulthood, and men and women are expected to “settle down.” During this period, many people enter into marriage or a civil union, bring children into their families, and focus on a career path. They become partners or parents instead of students or significant others. Just as young children pretend to be doctors or lawyers, play house, and dress up, adults also engage **anticipatory socialization**, the preparation for future life roles. Examples would include a couple who cohabitate before marriage, or soon-to-be parents who read infant care books and prepare their home for the new arrival. University students volunteer, take internships, or enter co-op programs to get a taste for work in their chosen careers. As part of anticipatory socialization, adults who are financially able begin planning for their retirement, saving money, and looking into future health care options. The transition into any new life role, despite the social structure that supports it, can be difficult.

Socialization is ongoing throughout adulthood in another sense as well. The study of contemporary society reveals an increasing fluidity of roles, as opposed to previous eras when one could expect to be married only once, live in one location, or to have a single career. This experience is part of what Zygmunt Bauman has called **liquid modernity**, “a society in which the conditions under which its members act change faster than it takes the ways of acting to consolidate into habits and routines” (2005). As opposed to previous eras when one could expect to have a predictable sequence of role transitions – from school to work to retirement, from single to married to parenting to empty nest, etc. – the expectation today is that the individual will experience an increasing fluidity of roles. It is more difficult to view socialization as a smooth and uninterrupted process. Rather, life is increasingly fragmented, “cut into a succession of ill-connected episodes” (Bauman, 2004). As a result, social identities have become more flexible, more adaptable to unpredictable transitions, more open to taking on new roles or picking and choosing from a globalized palette of cultural values and practices.

Bauman observes that this has led to a new basis of calculation when it comes to passing through the stages of transition in the adult life cycle. In the absence of any clear, permanent, institutional structures of continuity and stable transition through the life course, people are thrown back on themselves to provide their own continuity. Jobs disappear overnight, marriages end, friends and family move, and online communities emerge. Under these circumstances each life choice is regarded as temporary and provisional and, thereby, it involves a calculated trade off between maximizing flexibility or commitment. It is a risk to put all one’s eggs in one basket. The individual has to continually decide “which one of the alternative identities to select and how long to hold on to it once the choice has been made?” (Bauman, 2004). Therefore, individuals enter jobs with an eye to their exit strategy, seizing opportunities to continually retrain, upgrade skills, and make contacts to be prepared for a better job to show up. They enter into amorous relationships on the basis of what Anthony Giddens calls “confluent love:” “a relationship that lasts only as long as, and not a moment longer than, the satisfaction it brings to both partners” (Bauman, 2004). In love, dumping the partner is a normal event to be planned for. They cultivate a wider network of “weak ties” rather than committing to deep friendships.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

The Long Road to Adulthood for Millennials



Figure 5.21 Generation Y. (Image courtesy of Patrick Marione/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

Millennials, sometimes also called Gen Y, is a term that describes the generation born during the early 1980s to early 1990s. They are the generation that is approximately between the ages of 30 and 40. While the “dot-com bubble burst” recession was in full swing after 2000, many were in the process of entering, attending, or graduating from high school and college. With employment prospects at historical lows, large numbers of graduates were unable to find work, sometimes moving back in with their parents and struggling to pay back student loans.

According to *The New York Times*, this economic stall caused the Millennials to postpone what most North Americans consider to be adulthood: “The traditional cycle seems to have gone off course, as young people remain untethered to romantic partners or to permanent homes, going back to school for lack of better options, traveling, avoiding commitments, competing ferociously for unpaid internships or temporary ... jobs, forestalling the beginning of adult life” (Henig, 2010).

In Canada in 2013:

- 30 per cent of Millennials found it difficult to support themselves on their low wages

- 44 per cent found it difficult to pay for their education
- 38 per cent were strapped by loan payments
- 51 per cent still lived with their parents
- 90 per cent felt overwhelmed and experience excessive stress (Tsintziras, 2013)

On the other hand, Statistics Canada reports that the Millennials, while being the most educated generation ever, are also the most unequal generation (Heisz & Richards, 2019). The top 10 per cent of millennials hold 55 per cent of the total wealth of their generation. They hold a median net worth of \$588,600 as a result of university education, high income, low debt and home ownership, as well as other financial assets. They are doing very well, while the bottom 90 per cent of millennials continue to struggle with high student debt loads, unaffordable housing and stagnant wages.

The outcome is that there does not appear to be a Millennial middle class, which has implications for sociologists attempting to conceptualize socialization into “adulthood.” The five milestones, Henig writes, that define adulthood, are “completing school, leaving home, becoming financially independent, marrying, and having a child” (2010). These social milestones are taking longer for Millennials to attain, if they are attained at all. Sociologists wonder what long-term impact this generation’s situation may have on society as a whole. It is possible that adulthood, as it has been previously conceived, is simply a 20th century middle class phenomenon and will need to be redefined with new milestones.

Meanwhile, preliminary survey research on Generation Z, born between the late 1990s and early 2010s, suggests that these children of the post-boomer Generation X are both completely fluent in digital technology and raised to be more self-reliant. It is also estimated that for each Generation Z member to enter the workforce, three baby boomers will be retiring. However, the world they confront is characterized by monumental global risks such as climate change, geopolitical insecurity and increasing inequality (Bland, 2016). Surveys of mental health suggest that growing up and being socialized into an age of increased stress and anxiety has impacted Generation Z more heavily than previous generations, although they are also more likely than previous generations to seek mental health counselling (Bethune, 2019).

Resocialization

In the process of **resocialization**, old behaviours that were helpful in a previous role are removed because they are no longer of use. Resocialization is necessary when a person moves to a senior care centre, goes to boarding school, or serves time in jail. In the new environment, the old rules no longer apply. The process of resocialization is typically more stressful than normal socialization because people have to unlearn behaviours that have become customary to them.

The most common way resocialization occurs is in a **total institution** where people are isolated from society and are forced to follow someone else’s rules. A ship at sea is a total institution, as are religious convents, asylums, prisons, residential schools or some cult organizations. They are places cut off from a larger society. The 15,000 Canadians who lived in federal prisons or penitentiaries at the end of 2012 are also members of a total institution (Sapers, 2013). As another example, every branch of the military is a total institution.



Figure 5.22 Personnel entering a gas chamber during a training exercise, No. 2 CWAC Basic Training Centre, Vermilion, Alberta (1943). In basic training, soldiers are taught to walk, move, and look like each other. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Ken Bell (1914-2000), Library and Archives Canada, [1967-052 NPC] [PA-141008](#).) [Public Domain](#)

Many individuals are resocialized into an institution through a two-part process. First, members entering an institution must leave behind their old identity through what is known as a degradation ceremony. In a **degradation ceremony**, new members lose the aspects of their old identity and are given new identities. The process is sometimes gentle. To enter a senior care home, an elderly person often must leave a family home and give up many belongings which were part of their long-standing identity. Though caretakers guide the elderly compassionately, the process can still be one of loss. In many cults, this process is also gentle and happens in an environment of support and caring. In other situations, the degradation ceremony can be more extreme. Erving Goffman referred to the process of being stripped of one's external identity as a "mortification of the self" (1961). New prisoners lose freedom, rights (including the right to privacy), and personal belongings. When entering the army, soldiers have their hair cut short. Their old clothes are removed and they wear matching uniforms. These individuals must give up any markers of their former identity in order to be resocialized into an identity as a soldier. The accounts of Aboriginal people forced to attend residential school, like Mike Mountain Horse's report (above), describe the colonial aspect of cross-cultural degradation ceremonies. Daniel Kennedy's account was similar:

In his memoirs, Daniel Kennedy, an Assiniboin man, recounted, “In 1886, at the age of twelve years, I was lassoed, roped and taken to the Government School at Lebret. Six months after I enrolled, I discovered to my chagrin that I had lost my name and an English name had been tagged on me in exchange” (Kennedy 1972, p. 54). Until he went to school, his name had been Ochankuga’he, meaning “pathmaker.” The name honoured a trek his grandfather had led through a Prairie blizzard (ibid.). The new name, Daniel Kennedy, referred to the Old Testament’s Daniel of the lion’s den (Gresko, 1992, p. 80). The school interpreter later told Kennedy, “When you were brought here, for purposes of enrolment, you were asked to give your name and when you did, the Principal remarked that there were no letters in the alphabet to spell this little heathen’s name and no civilized tongue could pronounce it. ‘We are going to civilize him, so we will give him a civilized name,’ and that was how you acquired this brand new whiteman’s name” (Kennedy, ibid.).

Kennedy lost more than his name on that first day.

“In keeping with the promise to civilize the little pagan, they went to work and cut off my braids, which, incidentally, according to the Assiniboin traditional custom, was a token of mourning—the closer the relative, the closer the cut. After my haircut, I wondered in silence if my mother had died, as they had cut my hair close to the scalp. I looked in the mirror to see what I looked like. A Hallowe’en pumpkin stared back at me and that did it. If this was civilization, I didn’t want any part of it. I ran away from school, but I was captured and brought back. I made two more attempts, but with no better luck. Realizing that there was no escape, I resigned myself to the task of learning the three Rs” (ibid.).

(Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2015, p. 173 [excerpt]).

After new members of an institution are stripped of their old identity, they build a new one that matches the new society. In the military, soldiers go through basic training together, where they learn new rules and bond with one another. They follow structured schedules set by their leaders. Soldiers must keep their areas clean for inspection, march in correct formations, and salute when in the presence of superior officers.

In *Asylum* (1961), Goffman provides an acute analysis of some of the perverse implications of resocialization within the structure of total institutions. In institutions of resocialization, inmates pass through a standard sequence of changes with respect to how their capacity to act “morally” (i.e., as someone answerable for their actions) is established, recognized, and affirmed by others (and by themselves). Goffman refers to this as their **moral career**.



Figure 5.23 Riverview mental hospital was opened in 1913, in Port Coquitlam, B.C. After a lengthy process of deinstitutionalization and repurposing it was closed in 2012 (Image courtesy of Niall Williams/Flickr.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

Goffman observed that the stratagems for securing recognition of viable selfhood or moral capacity from others — mental patients from ward staff, for example — often undermined the stated goals of rehabilitation. As it was the psychiatric authorities who decided who had viable selfhood and who did not, and as tangible benefits of status and privileges were at stake, the setting of the mental institution provided the conditions under which *amoral strategies* of self became effective. Patients found that “it is not very practicable to sustain solid claims about oneself” because these were easily torn down by staff after glancing at the patients records (Goffman, 1961). Instead it was easier give up the goal of moral rehabilitation and just mimic what the staff wanted to get privileges.

Goffman writes:

Learning to live under conditions of imminent exposure and wide fluctuation in regard, with little control over the granting or withholding of this regard, is an important step in the socialization of the patient, a step that tells something important about what it is like to be an inmate in a mental hospital. Having one’s past mistakes and present progress under constant moral review seems to make for a special adaptation consisting of a less than moral attitude to ego ideals. One’s shortcomings and successes become too central and fluctuating an issue in life to allow the usual commitment of concern for other persons’ views of them. It is not very practicable to try to sustain solid claims about oneself. The inmate tends to learn that degradations and reconstructions of the

self need not be given too much weight, at the same time learning that staff and inmates are ready to view an inflation or deflation of a self with some indifference. He learns that a defensible picture of self can be seen as something outside oneself that can be constructed, lost, and rebuilt, all with great speed and some equanimity. He learns about the viability of taking up a standpoint — and hence a self — that is outside the one which the hospital can give and take away from him.

The setting, then, seems to engender a kind of cosmopolitan sophistication, a kind of civic apathy. In this unserious yet oddly exaggerated moral context, building up a self or having it destroyed becomes something of a shameless game, and learning to view this process as a game seems to make for some demoralization, the game being such a fundamental one. In the hospital, then, the inmate can learn that the self is not a fortress, but rather a small open city; he can become weary of having to show pleasures when held by troops of his own, and weary of how to show displeasure when held by the enemy. Once he learns what it is like to be defined by society as not having a viable self, this threatens definition — the threat that helps attach to the self society accords them — is weakened. The patient seems to gain a new plateau when he learns that he can survive while acting in a way that society sees as destructive of him (Goffman, 1961).

Learning to deal with life after having lived in a total institution requires yet another process of resocialization. In the Canadian military, soldiers learn discipline and a capacity for hard work. They set aside personal goals to achieve a mission, and they take pride in the accomplishments of their units. Many soldiers who leave the military transition these skills into excellent careers. Others find themselves lost upon leaving, uncertain about the outside world, and what to do next. For those suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), these issues are compounded. The process of resocialization to civilian life is not a simple one.

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Chapter 5 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

adolescence: A period stretching from puberty to about 18-years-old characterized by the role adjustment from childhood to adulthood.

agency: The ability to choose and act independently of external constraints.

anticipatory socialization: When people prepare for future life roles.

degradation ceremony: The process by which new members of a total institution lose aspects of their old identity and are given new ones.

doing gender: The way people perform tasks based on assigned gender scripts and gendered feedback from significant others.

epigenetics: The study of variations in gene expression under the impact of environmental influences.

game stage: The stage in child development in which children begin to recognize and interact with particular others on the basis of fixed norms and roles.

gender schema: A cognitive picture or abstraction delineating the difference between gender categories that people utilize to guide their behavior and information processing.

generalized other: The common behavioural expectations of general society.

hidden curriculum: The informal teaching done in schools that socializes children to societal norms.

I and me: The two components or phases of the self-reflective self.

interaction ritual: An activity in a bounded situation where there is a mutual focus of attention and a shared emotional experience.

liquid modernity: The fluid and transitory nature of late modern life, which is increasingly fragmented and cut into a succession of ill-connected episodes.

looking glass self: The self or self-image that arises as the reaction to the judgement of others.

mass media: The distribution of impersonal information to a wide audience via television, newspapers, radio, and the internet.

moral career: A standard sequence of changes in a person's moral capacity to be answerable for their actions.

moral development: The way people learn what is "good" and "bad" in society.

nature: The influence of genetic makeup on self development.

nurture: The role that social environment plays in self development.

peer group: A group made up of people who are similar in age and social status and who share interests.

play stage: A time when children begin to episodically imitate and take on roles that another person might have.

preparatory stage: A time when children are only capable of imitation and have no ability to imagine how others see things.

resocialization: The process by which old behaviours are removed and new behaviours are learned in their place.

rite of passage: A ritual that marks a life cycle transition from a previous status to a new status.

role conflict: When one or more of an individual's social roles clash.

self: A person's distinct sense of identity as developed through social interaction.

social expectation: Internalized social norms that define what people should do when they occupy a social role in society.

social role: The behaviour expected of a person who occupies a particular position.

socialization: The process wherein people come to understand societal norms and expectations, to accept society's beliefs, and to be aware of societal values.

stages of child socialization: The four stages of child development (preparatory, play, game, and generalized other) in which the child develops the capacity to assume social roles.

symbolic interactionism: A theoretical perspective that focuses on the relationship of individuals within society by studying their communication (language, gestures, and symbols).

total institution: An institution in which members are required to live in isolation from the rest of society.

Section Summary

[5.1 Theories of Self Development](#)

Psychological theories of self development have been broadened by sociologists who explicitly study the role of society and social interaction in self development. Charles Cooley and George Mead both contributed significantly to the sociological understanding of the development of self. Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan developed their ideas further, researching how our sense of morality develops. Gilligan added the dimension of gender differences to Kohlberg's theory. West and Zimmerman present a performative model of *doing gender* to explain the socialization of gender patterns.

[5.2 Why Socialization Matters](#)

Socialization is important because it helps uphold societies and cultures. It is also a key part of individual development and internalization of societal expectations. Research demonstrates that *who a person is* is affected by both nature (genetic and hormonal makeup) and nurture (the social environment in which a person is raised). Sociology is most concerned with the way that society's influence affects individual behaviour patterns, which is made clear by the way behaviour varies historically and cross-culturally.

[5.3 Agents of Socialization](#)

Direct interactions with social groups, like families and peers, teach children and teenagers how others expect them to behave. Likewise, a society's formal and informal institutions socialize its population. Schools, workplaces, and the media communicate and reinforce cultural norms and values.

[5.4 Socialization Across the Life Course](#)

Socialization is a lifelong process recurring as people enter new phases of life, such as adulthood or old age. Resocialization is a process that removes the socialization people have developed over time and replaces it with newly-

learned rules and roles. Because it involves removing old habits that have been built up, resocialization can be a stressful and difficult process. Total institutions are places where the effects of resocialization are felt the greatest.

Questions

Quiz: Socialization

5.1 Theories of Self Development

1. Socialization, as a sociological term, describes:
 - a. how states redistribute economic wealth and democratize key sectors of economic activity.
 - b. how people learn societal norms, beliefs, and values.
 - c. a person's skill set and interactions when in a group setting.
 - d. the scale measuring the difference between introverts and extroverts.
2. The Harlows' study on rhesus monkeys showed:
 - a. rhesus monkeys raised by other primate species are poorly socialized.
 - b. monkeys can be adequately socialized by imitating humans.
 - c. food is more important than social comfort.
 - d. social comfort is more important than food.
3. What occurs in Lawrence Kohlberg's conventional level?
 - a. Children develop the ability to have abstract thoughts.
 - b. Morality is developed by pain and pleasure.
 - c. Children begin to consider what society considers moral and immoral.
 - d. Parental beliefs have no influence on children's morality.
4. What did Carol Gilligan believe earlier researchers into morality had overlooked?
 - a. The justice perspective
 - b. Sympathetic reactions to moral situations
 - c. The perspective of females
 - d. How social environment affects how morality develops
5. What is one way to distinguish between psychology and sociology?
 - a. Psychology focuses on the mind, while sociology focuses on society.
 - b. Psychologists are interested in mental health, while sociologists are interested in societal functions.
 - c. Psychologists look inward to understand behaviour, while sociologists look outward to understand behaviour.

- d. All of the above.
6. How did Danielle's nearly-complete isolation as a child affect her verbal abilities?
- a. She could not communicate at all.
 - b. She never learned words, but she did learn signs.
 - c. She could not understand much, but she could use gestures.
 - d. She could understand and use basic language like "yes" and "no."

5.2 Why Socialization Matters

7. Why do sociologists need to be careful when drawing conclusions from twin studies?
- a. The results do not apply to singletons.
 - b. The twins were often raised in different ways.
 - c. The twins may turn out to be fraternal.
 - d. The sample sizes are often small.
8. From a sociological perspective, which factor does not greatly influence a person's socialization?
- a. Gender
 - b. Class
 - c. Blood type
 - d. Race
9. Chris Langan's story illustrates that:
- a. children raised in one-parent households tend to have higher IQs.
 - b. intelligence is more important than socialization.
 - c. socialization can be more important than intelligence.
 - d. neither socialization nor intelligence affects college admissions.

5.3 Agents of Socialization

10. Why are wealthy parents more likely than poor parents to socialize their children toward creativity and problem solving?
- a. Wealthy parents are socializing their children toward the skills of white-collar employment.
 - b. Wealthy parents are not concerned about their children rebelling against their rules.
 - c. Wealthy parents never engage in repetitive tasks.
 - d. Wealthy parents are more concerned with money than with a good education.
11. How do schools prepare children to one day enter the workforce?
- a. With a standardized curriculum
 - b. Through a hidden curriculum
 - c. By socializing them in teamwork
 - d. All of the above
12. Which one of the following is not a way people are socialized by peers?

- a. Emotional entrainment
 - b. Play time
 - c. Formal degradation ceremonies
 - d. Interaction rituals
13. Which of the following is a manifest function of schools?
- a. Understanding when to speak up and when to be silent
 - b. Learning to read and write
 - c. Following a schedule
 - d. Knowing locker room etiquette
14. Which of the following is typically the earliest agent of socialization?
- a. School
 - b. Family
 - c. Mass media
 - d. Zygotes

5.4 Socialization Across the Life Course

15. Which of the following is not an age-related transition point when Canadians must be socialized to new roles?
- a. Infancy
 - b. School age
 - c. Adulthood
 - d. Senior citizen
16. Which of the following is true regarding degradation rituals?
- a. They are practiced by bullies in playschool cliques.
 - b. They are required in anticipatory socialization in liquid modernity.
 - c. They take place when entering prisons, asylums, boarding schools, and the military.
 - d. They take place when leaving prisons, asylums, boarding schools, and the military.

[\[Quiz answers at the end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

5.1 Theories of Self Development

1. Think of a question regarding self-development that a sociologist might study. What types of frameworks would the sociologist use, and what research methods might they employ? Now consider the

questions and methods a psychologist might use to study the same issue. Comment on their different approaches.

2. Compare Freud, Cooley, Mead, Kohlberg, Gilligan and West and Zimmerman on theories of self development. How are they similar? How are they different?

5.2 Why Socialization Matters

3. Why are twin studies an important way to learn about the relative effects of genetics and socialization on children? What questions about human development do you believe twin studies are best for answering? What types of questions would twin studies not be as helpful in answering?
4. Why do you think that people like Chris Langan continue to have difficulty even after they are helped through societal systems? What is it they have missed that prevents them from functioning successfully in the social world?
5. How do sociologists reconcile the conformity implied by socialization with the existence of individual uniqueness?

5.3 Agents of Socialization

6. Do you think it is important that parents discuss gender roles with their young children, or is gender a topic better left for later? How do parents consider gender norms when buying their children books, movies, and toys? How do you believe they should consider it?
7. Based on your observations, when are adolescents more likely to listen to their parents or to their peer groups when making decisions? What types of dilemmas lend themselves toward one social agent over another?
8. To what degree have you been influenced by the media in your socialization and self-development?

5.4 Socialization Across the Life Course

9. Consider a person who is moving into a university residence, or attending university or boarding school, or even a child beginning kindergarten. How is the process the student goes through a form of socialization? What new cultural behaviours must the student adapt to?
10. Do you think resocialization requires a total institution? Why or why not? Can you think of any other ways someone could be resocialized?
11. Describe the different aspects of degradation ceremony that Mike Mountain Horse and Daniel Kennedy experienced on entering residential school. How does the colonial nature of residential school distinguish it from other total institutions?

Further Research

5.1 Theories of Self Development

Lawrence Kohlberg was most famous for his research using moral dilemmas. He presented dilemmas to boys and asked them how they would judge the situations. Read about Kohlberg's most famous moral dilemma, known as [the Heinz dilemma](#).

5.2 Why Socialization Matters

Learn more about [five other sets of twins who grew up apart and discovered each other later in life](#).

5.3 Agents of Socialization

See the [controversy surrounding one Canadian couple's refusal to socialize their child into gender norms](#).

5.4 Socialization Across the Life Course

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is an endemic problem among veterans. Many soldiers leave the military or return from war and have difficulty resocializing into civilian life. Review the data on this 2020 issue of the [Federal Framework On Posttraumatic Stress Disorder \[PDF\]](#) report.

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Solutions to Quiz: Socialization

1 B, | 2 D, | 3 C, | 4 C, | 5 D, | 6 A, | 7 D, | 8 C, | 9 C, | 10 A, | 11 D, | 12 C, | 13 B, | 14 B, | 15 A, | 16 C, [\[Return to Quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 6. SOCIAL INTERACTION



Figure 6.1 The dynamics of unspoken conversation. (Image courtesy of Yusaini Usulludin/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

Learning Objectives

6.1. Micro-Level Interaction

- Describe the social dimensions of emotional life.
- Explain the sociological concept of “reality as a social construct.”
- Explain the impact of social roles on individual identities and status.
- Use Goffman's dramaturgical perspective to analyze the social dynamics of self-presentation.

Introduction to Social Interaction

Face-to-face interaction of even the simplest sort is a far more socially intricate operation than people generally recognize. It is rife with unacknowledged rituals, tacit understandings, covert symbolic exchanges, impression management techniques, and calculated strategic maneuverings.

The Canadian born sociologist Erving Goffman went to the Shetland Islands in the 1950s to do fieldwork on the social structure of the island community for his PhD dissertation. However, he found that the complex interpersonal relationships in the hotel he stayed at to be a much richer site for social study. The theories that became the basis for his **dramaturgical analysis** in *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life* (1959) developed from his detailed observations of the elaborate “interaction rituals” in everyday social interaction.



Figure 6.2 “The face is like a switch on a railroad track. It affects the trajectory of the social interaction the way the switch would affect the path of the train” (Alan Fridlund, 1994). (Image courtesy of Derrick Tyson/ Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Goffman (1959) describes the way that people try to control the impression they make on others in social encounters. They want to be received well. They want to be taken as credible. They want to be accepted. At the same time, the others are interested in checking up on the person's sincerity, trustworthiness and general suitability as someone worth spending time with. In face-to-face encounters in “real time,” they might not have access to information from the person's background. So in the absence of confirming or disconfirming information that the person is as they claim, they compare what the person intentionally expresses about themselves against other expressions that the person unintentionally “gives off”: facial expressions, mannerisms, gestures, nervousness, quality of clothing, application of make-up, use of language and so on. This dynamic between a person's self-presentation and the audience's critical discernment sets in motion a number of micro-level structures that govern the course of social interactions no matter their specific content.

In the Shetland Islands, Goffman observed how islanders were sometimes amused to watch the manners of neighbours who dropped in for a cup of tea. As there were no impediments to the view in front of the simple cottages and no electric lights inside, they were well positioned to see how a neighbour would drop one expression as they approached and adopt another as they entered the door. The visitor consciously composed their “social **face**” by adopting a “warm expectant smile.” Based on these cues, the hosts were able

to judge how the neighbour really felt about them. However, other neighbours who were aware of this dynamic of examination adopted a social face well before turning into the cottage,” thus ensuring the projection of a constant image” (Goffman, 1959). Successful impression management requires an awareness of both the expressions that one gives and

the expressions that one gives off. In this manner, Goffman examines how impression management in social interaction always involves some degree of cynical performance.

In his essay “On Face-Work,” Goffman (1972) suggests that individuals in any social encounter attempt to establish and act out a **line**, not unlike the pick-up line a suitor might try out on a potential companion in a bar. The line the individual adopts in any social encounter expresses their view of the situation, their attitude towards the other members of the group, and especially, their attitude towards themselves. It can be communicated verbally, as in the pick-up line noted above, or non-verbally, by a display of attitude: pride, deference, disdain, irritability, humility, joy, depression, etc. Consciously or unconsciously, they decide what “line” they are going to take to respond to the situation. Their line might be, “I’ve been down on my luck, can you help me out?” or “I know more about wine than that guy, so I’m going to let him know it” or “I am really polite so I am not going to say directly that the dress does nothing for her,” etc.

As a result of this line, they present a certain **face** to the group that Goffman describes as a claim to a “positive social value” for themselves. “This is the type of person I am.”

Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes—albeit an image that others may share, as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for himself (Goffman, 1972).

Face is similar to the sociological concept of social role, except that it emphasizes the dynamics of “face to face” social interaction involved in playing the role. It is not enough to “be” a doctor and have a medical certificate, one has to present oneself professionally and knowledgeably, or perhaps warmly and caringly, to have one’s “doctor-ness” accepted. Without the credibility established through face-work, doctor patient encounters can go badly.

Moreover, the face one presents varies depending on the situation. People present themselves as humble, sincere, knowledgeable, decisive, aggressive, or easygoing, depending on the circumstances and the nature of the social crowd present. Goffman remarks that whether people intentionally take a specific line or present a specific face, or not, they will find that the others assume they have done so and will act towards them accordingly. The flow of events unfolds according to how the participants have read each others faces.

Therefore, the dynamics of social encounters play out based on whether an individual is successful in their bid to “maintain face” or whether they make a gaff or do something that inadvertently interrupts their performance. If they are a professor, they might misspell a word on the blackboard, which undermines their claim to rarefied knowledge and erudition. If they are a new MLA (Member of the Legislative Assembly), they might have to account for inappropriate pictures or posts on their Facebook page which undermine their claim to have the requisite responsibility and perspicuity for the job. If they are a driver, the hint of liquor on their breath might undermine the appearance of sobriety they wish to display to a police officer at a check stop. Then it becomes a question of whether they can “save face” or whether they will end up “shame faced.” Goffman calls the management of one’s face in light of the responses of others—how we make it consistent with the line we are acting out, how we make adjustments to cover over inconsistencies or incidents, etc.—**face-work**.

The strange insight that Goffman offers is that one’s “face”—essentially positive social attributes one claims for oneself in any situation, but also one’s actual face (its expressiveness, nonverbal cues, potential for betrayal)—does not really belong to the individual:

A person may be said to have, or be in or maintain face when the line he effectively takes presents an image of



Figure 6.3 How is forgiveness accomplished? The face-work of forgiving and forgetting. (Photo courtesy of Yusaini Usulludin/ Flickr.) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

him that is internally consistent, that is supported by judgments and evidence conveyed by other participants, and that is confirmed by evidence conveyed through impersonal agencies in the situation. At such times the person's face clearly is something that is not lodged in or on his body, but rather something that is diffusely located in the flow of events in the encounter and becomes manifest only when these events are read and interpreted for the appraisals expressed in them. (1972, pp. 6–7)

The acceptance or rejection of one's face is in the hands of the others who generally are prepared to accommodate small glitches in performance, but not indefinitely. In Goffman's analysis, a social encounter is a precarious affair in which each of the participants desperately hopes to survive without disaster or mishap. An elaborate system of tact and etiquette evolves to which the participants in a face-to-face encounter consciously or unconsciously submit, even when they have their doubts about the credibility of a performance, so that the group as a whole can maintain face. If the disruption to someone's face becomes too severe however a "scene" is created and the encounter falls apart. Goffman illustrates the way in which even the seemingly free and spontaneous interactions of everyday life are governed by intricate and predictable structures of self-presentation and mutual accommodation.

Media Attributions

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- **Figure 6.3** [Time to forgive and forget ... Kak Yut and Family](#) by Yusaini Usulludin, via Flickr, is used under a [CC BY-NC 2.0](#) licence.

6.1. Micro-level Interaction

Social interaction is the process of reciprocal influence exercised by individuals over one another during social encounters. Usually it refers to face-to-face encounters in which people are physically present with one another for a specified duration. However, in contemporary society one can also think of social encounters that are technologically mediated like texting, zoom meeting, or direct messaging. In terms of the different levels of analysis in sociology—micro, meso, macro, and global—social interaction is generally approached at the micro-level where the structures and **social scripts**, the pre-established patterns of behaviour that people are expected to follow in specific social situations, that govern the relationship between particular individuals can be examined. However, as the sociological study of emotions indicates, the micro-level processes of everyday life are also impacted by macro-level phenomena such as gender inequality and historical transformations.

Emotional Life



Figure 6.4 A-maze-ing Laughter sculpture (2009) by Chinese artist Yue Minjun, Vancouver B.C. (Image courtesy of Ruth Hartnup/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

The study of micro-level interaction has been a rich source of insight in sociology. The idea that people's emotions, for example, have a social component might not be all that surprising at first because often individuals are subject to having "emotional reactions" to other people, positive or negative. The other person, or the social situation itself, brings on an emotion that otherwise would not arise.

However, sociological research has shown that emotions also can have a systematic, socially structured quality which is not immediately apparent. Studies of face-to-face conversations show that the outward signs of emotion like smiling or laughing are not equally distributed. For example, the predisposition to show emotion by laughing in a conversation is structured by differences in gender, status, role, and norm. Robert Provine (1996) studied 1200 two-person conversations, observed discretely in public places like shopping malls. He discovered that when a woman was speaking and a man was listening the woman laughed more than twice as much as the man. Similarly when a man was speaking and a woman listening, she was still more likely to laugh than him. "Female speakers laugh 127 per cent more than their male audience. In contrast, male speakers laugh about 7 per cent less than their female audience" (Provine, 1996). Provine suggests that this shows that males lead in producing humour while females lead in laughing at humour, but it might also show a pattern of social deference reflecting the unequal social status of men and women.

How a culture laughs, when it laughs and at what it laughs also varies through history. Jokes often hone in on what people are most anxious about as a culture. The Roman Classicist Mary Beard (2014) argues that while it is very difficult to go from the recorded literature to a confident appraisal of what laughter and its place in social life in ancient Rome was like, the nature of the jokes the Romans told reveals an anxiety about the ability to demonstrate identity unique to Roman culture. Many jokes had the common theme of "how do I know that I am me?" and "how can I prove to others that I am me?"

For example, "two friends meet in the street and one says to the other, 'I heard that you were dead,' and the other says, 'I'm not dead, you can see me, here I am,' to which the first replies, 'But the person who told me you were dead is much more reliable than you are.' "

This typical Roman joke refers to a cultural context in which demonstrating status was extremely important but official proofs of identity like passports or ID cards were minimal (Beard 2014).



Figure 6.5 The Emperor Commodus (depicted recently in the film *Gladiator*, 2000). Roman statues do not depict their subjects with smiles. What does the absence of a culture of smiling indicate about the emotional experience of everyday social interaction in ancient Rome? (Image courtesy of the Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 3.0](#)

On the other hand, one rare account from ancient Rome in which the physical, bodily, uncontrollable nature of laughter is actually recorded was when the Emperor Commodus was playing at being a gladiator in the Roman forum. He decapitated an ostrich and threatened the Roman senators in the front row by waving its head and neck at them. What a modern audience would probably find horrifying or disgusting, the Roman senator Dio Cassius found so ridiculous he had to bite down on a laurel leaf from the wreath he was wearing to suppress his urge to giggle (Beard 2014).

What is perhaps even more significant with regard to the unique emotional life of the Romans is Beard's claim that the Romans did not smile, or more accurately, that the expression contemporary people experience as smiling played no significant role in Roman facial communication. The Romans might have turned their mouths up at the corners but the smile was not a significant gesture in their social interaction. There are no accounts of smiling in Roman literature. The Roman words that are sometimes translated into English as smile are

ridere and *subridere* which mean “laugh” and “little laugh” respectively; no word for smile exists. Beard concludes that the culture of the smile and the expectation of cheerfulness that figure so prominently in modern emotional life (smiling when meeting someone, smiling to show pleasure, smiling in photographs, etc.) did not exist in Roman life. Medieval scholars suggest that the culture of the smile was not invented until the middle ages (Beard 2014).

Raymond Williams referred to **structures of feeling** to capture large scale, societal shifts in people's feelings or emotional responses towards things. These are “characteristic elements of impulse, restraint, and tone; specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships” (Williams, 1977). They are structures in the sense that they are composed of sets of interlocking emotional components that go together, but in the moment they are also fluid and in process; difficult to define until after the fact. Research into the transition from premodern to modern European family life, for example, indicates several changes in societal structures of feeling in the 18th and 19th centuries: the growing importance of romantic love in mate selection, of maternal love and commitment in child-rearing, of deep grief for the loss of a child, and of anger constraint and temper management within the family (Stearns, 2014). The emotional environment of family life became “warmer” as capitalist economic life became “colder” and more calculated. New humanitarian feelings of connection with the suffering of distant others also emerged, which fueled the 19th century movements for the abolition of slavery. Similarly, the emergence of nostalgia was a new structure of feeling at this time. People formulated emotional responses to the losses and displacements brought about by new patterns of migration, travel, urbanization and industrialization. Structures of feeling are a fluid component of collective life yet they lead to large scale social change. They impact *how* individuals feel and *what* they feel about.

Prominent sociologists have argued that the structure of feeling of contemporary society is defined by an emotional state of anxiety (Giddens, 1990; Beck, 1992). Anxiety is a future-oriented emotion aroused by uncertainty, unpredictability and lack of control. In a global context of existential crises including climate change, virus pandemics, economic crises, immigration and refugee flows, the ability to collectively understand and manage risk is compromised. Public trust in the numerous technical and expert systems which govern global life outside of or beyond individual control, is also shaken when these are revealed to be precarious. People become skeptical about scientific knowledge and public authorities, but because responsibilities for managing and understanding risks are increasingly downloaded onto individuals, the structure of feeling that emerges is a permanent, pervasive, low intensity anxiety. In moments of crisis, this drives the characteristic divide in contemporary Canadian emotional life between the demands for more caring institutional or collective responses and outbursts of violence and aggression towards authorities.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

The Emotional Life of COVID-19




Figure 6.6 The Corona Virus. Symptoms: Fever, Difficulty Breathing, Headache, and Tiredness etc. (Image courtesy MughalKings/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

The Covid-19 pandemic crisis of the 2020s has been described as “the greatest mass emotional event since the Second World War” (Rebughini, 2021). It was a sudden, globally destabilizing state of emergency, which amplified the social dynamics of precariousness, uncertainty and insecurity driving the late modern emotional state of anxiety. Anxiety during the pandemic was not only about the risk of catching the virus or spreading it to vulnerable others, but also anxiety over the absence of social connection, the shut down of the economy, the collapse of supply chains, the loss of employment, the incapacity of scientists and public

health officials to provide accurate and timely knowledge, and the proliferation of conspiracy theories, disinformation and dubious alternative treatments.

Measures of life satisfaction used to measure well-being indicate that, under the impact of the pandemic, life satisfaction in Canada declined by approximately 20% between 2018 and 2020 to the lowest level over the 2003-to-2020 period for which comparable data are available (Helliwell et al., 2020).

In a state of emergency, old norms of daily life that provide security and alleviate anxiety are suspended and people are confronted with no clear path to address a new, unknown situation. As a result, Rebughini writes:

The Covid-19 pandemic crisis is an all-pervading source of anxiety, in social relations, in terms of impact on economic and healthcare systems, and for its capacity to reveal situations of scientific and practical ignorance. In this respect, the emotional spread of anxiety is related to the questioning of scientific knowledge, to the political capacity to react to the crisis rapidly, and to the necessity that individuals reorganize their everyday lives on the basis of unclear dispositions (Rebughini, 2021).

Throughout late modernity the anxieties about hypothetical dangers posed by climate change, economic crisis, etc., have been managed on an individual and collective level by the belief in expert knowledge, technoscientific solutions and changes in lifestyle (Rebughini, 2021). Feelings of anxiety have been typically assuaged by shifting the dangers to the future. But the Covid-19 crisis revealed that instead of living in a knowledge-based society where dangers are known and controlled, society was largely ignorance-based. People suddenly discovered the extent of their ignorance and unpreparedness to deal with the viral condition.

As Williams (1977) argues, structures of feeling have the capacity to produce large scale social change. What the long term outcome of the feelings around Covid-19 will be is unclear, but the emotional division between the majority who support the public health measures and the skeptical minority who prioritize unrestricted personal freedoms has the potential to produce long term societal consequences. Firstly, it indicates the frailty of a common universe of factual reality. As discussed later in the chapter, social realities are constructed. But the Covid-19 crisis has shown that they are often constructed in “patches” rather than as one unified “common sense” (Lyotard, 1984). In a kind of tribalization of the social discourse, people begin to live in simultaneous but separate realities. This is an explosive situation as the work of the ethnomethodologist, Harold Garfinkel, shows that when people’s common sense understanding of situations are challenged, the emotional response is disorientation, bewilderment and anger (Garfinkel, 1967).

Secondly, the declining trust in the role of technoscience and of evidence based solutions to global problems, indicates a shifting relationship to modern science and its central role in advancing society. To exercise control over the risks they confront, laypersons try to assimilate expert knowledge and internalize it into their conduct of life. They reassert control over their powerlessness by creating new forms of popular skepticism: they become self-taught experts by trusting no one and relying on their own ability to vet contradictory sources of information. In the case of Covid-19, this has produced new sources of anxiety in the form of an *infodemic* – the massive amount of information, true and false, circulating around the disease (Pulido et al., 2020). No one truly knows who to believe about information that is nevertheless consequential to human health and decisions concerning future crises.

Feeling Rules

In fact emotional life follows detailed cultural scripts and **feeling rules**. Feeling rules are a set of socially shared guidelines that direct how people want to try to feel and not to feel emotions according to given situations (Hochschild, 1979). People are obliged to systematically manage their emotions in response to different social situations.

For example, we often speak of “having the right” to feel angry at someone. Or we say we “should feel more grateful” to a benefactor. We chide ourselves that a friend’s misfortune, a relative’s death, “should have hit us harder,” or that another’s good luck, or our own, should have inspired more joy. We know feeling rules, too, from how others react to what they infer from our emotive display. Another may say to us, “You shouldn’t feel so guilty; it wasn’t your fault,” or “You don’t have a right to feel jealous, given our agreement” (Hochschild, 1979).

As Hochschild argues, the fact that people are even *able* to distance themselves enough from their feelings to recognize that something like a set of feeling rules may or may not apply in certain situations is a product of the modern “ironic” posture towards the self, quite foreign to traditional cultures.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

Do Funeral Selfies Violate Deeply Held Feeling Rules?



Figure 6.7 Do funeral selfies violate deeply held feeling rules? (Image courtesy of MudflapDC/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

An example of issue that revolves around feeling rules is the controversy that emerged over people, generally teenagers, or millennials, posting selfies at funerals. Selfies are the photographic self portraits taken with camera at arms length to be shared on social media. Taking and posting selfie photographs on social media like Instagram is commonly regarded as a frivolous, if not a purely narcissistic and self-absorbed pastime. A headline in the *Huffington Post* read, “Funeral Selfies Are The Latest Evidence Apocalypse Can’t Come Soon Enough” (*Huffington Post*, 2013). Taking selfies at funerals is seen to violate deeply held views about the solemnity and emotional tenor of funerals and the etiquette of mourning.

A commentator on an article that defended funeral selfies stated the problem clearly:

But I can’t comprehend WHY you would be taking pictures of yourself if you’re so deep into the grieving process. It does not compute. When my mother died six years ago ... I didn’t decide to whip out my phone and take photos of myself in my cute outfit or pretty makeup I didn’t even think about that stuff. I was too busy grieving the loss of someone that I loved. I just don’t understand how taking a selfie has anything to do with the grieving process. It’s just wildly inappropriate imo [in my opinion]. It bugs me that they don’t think of this before they post the damn pic or don’t care (Doughty, 2013).

For this commentator, it is not just that selfies are seen as frivolous, but that the people taking them do not know how to feel the appropriate feelings. She sees this as a character defect.

The defender of funeral selfies, a mortician herself, makes a similar argument but from the other side of the issue. Breaking the feeling rules of funerals is not good etiquette but reflects “our tragic disengagement with the reality of death” rather than a personal defect. “Modern death practices in the West, created by the funeral industry, have given teenagers diddly squat to do when someone dies” and therefore their feelings have no support in collective ritual (Doughty, 2013).

Emotional Management

Emotions are therefore subject to more or less conscious practices of **emotion management**, the way individuals work on producing or inhibiting feelings according to the social expectations of different situations. They are not as natural, spontaneous or involuntary as popularly assumed. Moreover, this intimate and personal component of life is subject to macro-level processes like commodification. In post-industrial societies, services—nursing and care professions, flight attendants, call center employees, waiters, sales clerks, teachers, community policing officers, therapists, etc.—increasingly require expertise in the use of **emotional labour**. Sociologists speak of emotional labour “when deep gestures of exchange enter the market sector and are bought and sold as an aspect of labour power” (Hochschild, 1979). Managing emotion according to meticulous protocols becomes part of the job description because emotional tonality is part of the commodity being sold.

The philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1992) also noted the emotional or affective nature of power. He drew on Spinoza’s distinction between joy and sadness as affects that express the feelings of power and powerlessness respectively. Power for Deleuze is defined as the sense of being able to do something; feeling uninhibited. Powerlessness on the other hand is the sense of being unable to do something; feeling blocked. When a person feels joy, they feel themselves to be at the maximum of their power of action; they feel that they have fulfilled one of their abilities. Joy is the *expression* of the experience of feeling empowered. When a person feels sadness they feel separated from their power of action; they feel that they failed to do something they could have done because of circumstances, inhibitions, or because they were prevented or forbidden from doing it. Sadness is the expression of the experience of feeling disempowered. Deleuze argues that sadness is therefore the effect of a power that is exercised over people; they are prevented from realizing or fulfilling their powers of action. In Deleuze’s analysis contemporary manifestations of power—the power of various types of tyrant, judge or priest in particular—are accompanied by techniques that strip people of their powers of action (joy) and instill feelings of impotence, inadequacy, guilt, indebtedness, and bad conscience.

As Brym et al., (2013) argue, “the common sense view of emotions as unique, spontaneous, uncontrollable, authentic, natural, and perhaps even rooted exclusively in our biological makeup proves to be misguided.”

Social Constructions of Reality



Figure 6.8 According to sociologists, reality is constructed through interactions with others. To what degree is this like the fanciful realities of mimes who make their own worlds through gestures and physical comedy? (Photo courtesy of Jan Lewandowski/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

How do sociologists explain large scale social structures starting from the point of view of micro-scale social interactions? In 1966 sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann wrote *The Social Construction of Reality*. They asked, how do institutions actually arise? If an institution is essentially just a collection of interacting individuals, how do they come to appear as “given, unalterable or self evident”? Berger and Luckmann argued that the objective reality of society, (i.e., Durkheim’s “social facts”), is created by humans and human interaction, through a process of **habitualization**. If society and its institutions seem to be objective social facts that exist externally to individuals, they become that way through an ongoing process of creation and forgetting. Habitualization describes how “any action that is repeated frequently becomes cast into a pattern, which can then be ... performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effort” (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Not only do people construct their own society, but they accept it as it is because others have created it before them. Society is, in fact, “habit.”

Berger and Luckmann (1966) describe three separate processes through which “society” is accomplished: externalization, objectivation and internalization. Firstly, in *externalization*, human activity and labour create products that are separate from the creator. This is evident in commodity production when cars and other things are produced and then sold on the market, but it also applies to the production of social agreements, job descriptions, social roles, technical knowledge, managerial decisions, memoranda, rules, systems and so on. These are created by individuals through various social processes but then stand independently from them. Secondly, in *objectivation*, products of human

creation obtain the character of objects which act back on the creators. Once a rule is established for example, it acts upon people, as if through its own agency, and constrains the lives of the people it rules. Thirdly, in *internalization*, the objective world is “retrojected” into consciousness through socialization. People internalize the rules and accept them as the guiding principles of their behaviour.

For example, a school exists as a school and not just as a building because students, teachers and others agree that it is a school. They create the school and formulate expectations about the type of activities and relationships that will go on there. They interact “in school” in regular patterns according to this construct. If the school is older than the student, it was created by the agreement of others before the student enrolled. In a sense, it continues to exist by consensus and habit, both prior and current. This is an example of the process of **institutionalization**, the act of implanting a convention or norm into society that is repeated through time. Bear in mind that the institution, while socially constructed, is still quite real.

Another way of looking at this concept of socially constructed reality is through W. I. Thomas’s notable **Thomas theorem** which states, “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas and Thomas, 1928). That is, people’s behaviour can be determined by their mutual **definition of the situation** rather than by any independent or “objective” criterion of reality. Once the definition of the situation is established, people act according to it. It is real *in its consequences*. In the school for example, there is an agreed upon rule of etiquette between students and teachers, which could have been formulated otherwise. This definition of the situation is *inter-subjective* in the sense that it is based on a subjective understanding shared mutually by multiple individuals, but it is also real in its consequences. If a student or teacher steps out of line at school there are sanctions of varying severity. Thomas states therefore that moral codes and social norms are created by “successive definitions of the situation.”

Howard Becker (1963) elaborates on this idea in his theory of labeling and deviance (see [Chapter 8. Deviance, Crime, and Social Control](#)). If someone violates a particular rule it does not mean they are deviant in other respects. But being labelled “deviant” by authorities (police, parents, teachers, etc.) initiates a chain of consequences for the individual, which makes it difficult for them to participate in conventional groups and activities (like holding a job or going to school) with the “normals.” The individual is also subject to common popular diagnoses about why they have “gone” that way – e.g., “he is a bad seed,” “she is weak willed,” etc. – which furthers the perception that they are an outsider. These factors in turn make it more difficult for the individual to conform to other rules which they had no intention of violating. The individual is placed in an increasingly untenable position in which it becomes increasingly likely they will need to resort to deceit and rule violation. “Treating a person as though he [or she] were generally rather than specifically deviant produces a self-fulfilling prophecy” (Becker, 1963). A teenager who is repeatedly given a label – overachiever, player, bum, delinquent – might live up to the term, even though it was not initially part of their character.



Figure 6.9 The story line of a self-fulfilling prophecy appears in many literary works, perhaps most famously in the story of Oedipus. Oedipus is told by an oracle that he will murder his father and marry his mother. In going out of his way to avoid his fate, Oedipus inadvertently fulfills it. Oedipus's story could be read as a parable about the social construction of reality. (Photo courtesy of Jean-Antoine-Theodore Giroust/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

This concept is further refined by sociologist Robert K. Merton in his definition of a **self-fulfilling prophecy**. Merton explains that with a self-fulfilling prophecy, even a false idea can become true if it is acted on. Merton gives the example of a “bank run.” Say for some reason, a number of people falsely fear that their bank is soon to be bankrupt. Because of this false notion, people run to their bank and demand all their cash at once. As banks rarely, if ever, have that much money on hand, the bank does indeed run out of money, fulfilling the customers’ prophecy. Similarly, the role of “investor confidence” was prominent in the promotion of unsupportable investments that lead up to the financial crisis of 2008. Investor confidence is another social construct, which is “real in its consequences” but based on a fiction.

Social reality is constructed by an idea which people follow. The idea does not need to be correct to be followed. This is a key component in people acting on conspiracy theories. A **conspiracy theory** is an explanation of events based on the belief that a group of actors have colluded in secret to reach malevolent goals (Bale, 2007). There have been actual conspiracies at the

highest level of politics and commerce, the Watergate scandal of the 1970s and the 1950-1960s collusion between American automakers to prevent installation of catalytic converters and other technologies to reduce pollution are examples. More frequently, conspiracies about the “deep state” or international agencies seeking world domination are fabricated but consequential when people believe them. The most tragic example of this was the fake 19th century “Protocols of Zion” text, which German Anti-Semites and eventually the German Nazi Party claimed was evidence of an international Jewish conspiracy for global domination.

A more contemporary cycle of conspiracy began with the QAnon conspiracy “Pizzagate.” This started in 2016 with the Wikileaks theft and release of emails from John Podesta, the then chair of Hillary Clinton’s 2016 U.S. presidential campaign (LeFrance, 2020). Podesta had emailed with the owner of Comet Ping Pong, a pizza restaurant in Washington, DC., about fundraising events. The anonymous “Q” on the 4chan imageboard website started the rumour that these emails were evidence of secret, ritualistic child abuse by various Democratic party and celebrity elites taking place in the basement of the restaurant. The restaurant does not have a basement and the rumours were completely fabricated, but an ordinary citizen, Edgar Maddison Welch, believed them, armed himself with weapons, entered the restaurant and threatened staff and customers until he realized his mistake. “The intel on this wasn’t 100 percent,” he admitted after being taken into custody by police (LeFrance, 2020). The conspiracy was false, some might say completely ludicrous, but it was real in its consequences. People periodically continue to gather outside the restaurant to protest the non-existent underground pedophilia ring (Schaffer, 2021). In Canada, there were approximately 100,000 members of Canadian QAnon Facebook groups in 2020 (Remski, 2021).



Figure 6.10 “Pizzagate” conspiracy protest, March 25, 2017. “Conspiracy theories are **consequential** as they have a real impact on people’s health, relationships, and safety; they are **universal** in that belief in them is widespread across times, cultures, and social settings; they are **emotional** given that negative emotions and not rational deliberations cause conspiracy beliefs; and they are **social** as conspiracy beliefs are closely associated with psychological motivations underlying intergroup conflict” (Prooijen & Douglas, 2018). (Image courtesy of Blink O’fanaye/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

Symbolic Interaction

How does a definition of the situation come to be established in everyday social interaction? Social interaction is in crucial respects **symbolic interaction**—interaction which is mediated by the exchange and interpretation of symbols. In symbolic interaction, people contrive to reach a mutual understanding of each other and of the tasks at hand through the exchange and interpretation of symbols and gestures. Only on this basis can a coordinated action be accomplished. The process of communication is the central quality of the human social condition. Social interaction depends on communication.

George Herbert Mead (1934) argues that people often act as if an idea they have “in their head” defines who they are and what the situation in front of them is. But ideas are in fact nebulous. They have to be confirmed by the others in the situation before they can become “real” or “actual.” Therefore, communication is central to defining social situations and making them “real.” Moreover, communication operates less on exchanging fully formed ideas and more on *indications* or *gestures* of meaning that call out responses in others. One person says “Hello” in the expectation that the other person will say “Hello” in response. The meaning of the exchange of “Hellos” is established when both parties recognize and define the situation as an encounter. If the 1st person then indicates with their body language that they are on their way somewhere, they call out a response in the 2nd person to release them from the encounter. If the 2nd person complies, they mutually define the situation as a “brief encounter.” If the 2nd person lingers, then the situation can become awkward, and further explanations are required to redefine the situation.

Herbert Blumer (1969) clarifies the three parts of this communication processes as follows. The speaker’s own and the other’s actions might be physical but they are also *symbolic* in that they refer beyond themselves to meanings which call out for the response of the other: (a) they indicate to the other what they are expected to do, (b) they indicate what the speaker plans to do, and (c) on this basis they form a mutual definition of the situation that indicates how

a joint action will be agreed upon, carried out, and accomplished. Until each of the “indications” is confirmed by the other, the situation is undefined and no coordinated joint action is possible. A robber tells a victim to put their hands up, which indicates (a) what the victim is supposed to do (i.e., not resist); (b) what the robber intends to do (i.e., take the victim’s money), and (c) what the joint action is going to be (i.e., a robbery). Blumer writes: “If there is confusion or misunderstanding along any one of these three lines of meaning, communication is ineffective, interaction is impeded, and the formation of joint action is blocked” (Blumer, 1969).

In this model of communication, the **definition of the situation**, or mutual understanding of the context and tasks at hand, arises out of ongoing communicative interaction. Situations are not defined in advance, nor are they defined by the isolated understandings of the individuals involved. They are defined by the ongoing indications of meaning given by participants and the responses by the others. “Such a response is its meaning, or gives it its meaning” (Mead, 1934). Even the most habitualized situations involve a process of symbolic interaction in which a definition of the situation emerges through a mutual interpretation of signs or indications.

Making Connections: Sociological Research

Conversation Analysis



Figure 6.11 In this conversation, how do the body gestures indicate the meaning of what is being said. How do you “read” body gestures? (Image courtesy of Search Engine People Blog/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Examine a recent conversation in which you participated. If possible, record it or write it out.

- Did your conversation result in a “joint action” in the sense defined by Mead and Blumer? What was the joint action accomplished in this conversation (e.g., a casual passing of time, a game, a decision, a command, a fight, a work task, an agreement to disagree, etc.)?
- Compare a recent joint action you were involved with at home, at work, or in a recreational setting that *failed* (i.e., in the manner Blumer describes). Along which of the three “lines of meaning” did it fail? Did you or someone else fail to express their intentions clearly? Did the others fail to interpret the intentions correctly? Was the definition of the situation unclear or ambiguous?
- How did you get from “a” to “b” in the conversation? To what degree did your conversation proceed as a conversation of indications or gestures? Did the conversation unfold according to your initial intention or your initial opinion about things (i.e., according to the “indication” you expressed)? On the other hand, in what way did you have to modify your line of conversation as a result of the responses of the other person, and vice versa? In what way was the course, meaning, or content of the conversation socially determined through the process of conversation itself?
- With respect to any specific statement made in the conversation, is Mead right in saying that it is only the response of the other that “gives it its meaning”? If you said, “it’s a nice day,” does this require confirmation from the other person to make it so? Does the meaning of a statement like that change according to the other person’s response? Maybe they do not think the day is nice. What does this imply for the social nature of conversation and language? Is it ever possible to refer to fixed meanings or already existing definitions of the situation in particular social settings? Or is meaning always unfixed or “emergent,” waiting to be discovered at the outcome of an interaction?
- In light of the concept of communication described by Mead and Blumer, define what is meant by “symbol” and what is meant by “interaction” in the term symbolic interaction. How was your conversation a symbolic interaction?

Roles and Status

People employ many types of behaviours in day-to-day life. From the point of view of micro-level sociology, **roles** are patterns of behaviour expected of a person who occupies particular social status or position in society. They are held in place by one's own and others' expectations of how people in that role are supposed to behave. Currently, while reading this text, readers are playing the role of a student. They are expected to be reading in a certain way, linking ideas together and remembering information. However, the reader also plays other roles in their life, such as daughter, pet owner, boyfriend, neighbour, or employee. Each of these other roles comes with a set of expectations as well.

These various roles are each associated with a different status. Sociologists use the term **status** to describe the access to resources and benefits a person experiences according to the rank or prestige of their role in society. Some statuses are **ascribed** – those that individuals do not select, such as son, elderly person, racial minority member or female. Others, called **achieved statuses**, are obtained by personal effort or choice, such as a high school dropout, self-made millionaire, or sociologist. As a daughter or son, one occupies a different status than as a dropout or millionaire. One person can be associated with a multitude of roles and statuses. Even a single status such as “student” has a complex **role-set**, or array of roles, attached to it: roles in the classroom, in study groups, in interactions with university administrators and student loans officers, in solicitations from credit card companies, in getting bus or movie discounts, in earning tuition, etc. (Merton 1957).

If too much is required of a single role, individuals can experience **role strain**. Consider the duties of a parent: cooking, cleaning, nursing, driving, problem solving, tears drying, moral counseling—the list goes on. Similarly, a person can experience **role conflict** when one or more roles are contradictory. A parent who also has a full-time career can experience role conflict on a daily basis. When there is a deadline at the office, but a sick child needs to be picked up from school, which comes first? When a parent is working toward a promotion but their children want them to take them to hockey practice several times a week, which do they choose? Being a college student can conflict with being an employee, being an athlete, or even being a friend. People's roles in life have a great effect on their decisions and on who they become.

Presentation of Self in Everyday Life



Figure 6.12 William Shakespeare (1564–1616).
(Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Of course, it is impossible to look inside a person's head and study what role they are playing. All sociologists can observe is behaviour, or role performance. **Role performance** is how a person expresses their role. Describing it as a “performance” emphasizes that individuals use certain gestures, manners, scripts and “routines” to act out their roles. But they also seek to influence others in their enactments of specific roles. They perform for audiences of various sorts. In this sense, individuals in social contexts are always performers.

The focus on the importance of role performance in everyday life led Erving Goffman (1922–1982) to develop a framework called **dramaturgical analysis**. It represents a sociological reflection on the famous line from Shakespeare's *As You Like It*, “all the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players.”

Goffman used the theater as an analogy for social interaction. Dramaturgy in theater is the art of dramatic composition on stage. He recognized that people played their roles and engaged in interaction *theatrically*, often following common social scripts and using props and costumes to support their roles. For example, he notes that simply wearing a white lab coat brings to mind in the observer stock images of cleanliness, scientific modernity, scrupulous exactitude and authoritative knowledge. In

England in the 1950s, even chimney sweeps and perfume clerks wore white lab coats as props “to provide the client with the understanding that the delicate tasks performed by these persons [would] be performed in ... a standardized, clinical confidential manner” (Goffman, 1959). Whether the perfume clerk was clinically competent or not, the lab coat was used to bolster the impression that they were. Today, even without the lab coats, an analogous repertoire of props, sets and scripts are used to convey the clean, clinical, and confidential tasks of the perfume clerk.

Scripts and props are important in social encounters, because, as noted earlier, individuals are constrained to present a “face” that represents how they want the others to see them. They appear “in-face.” They present themselves to others as they hope to be perceived. “First impressions” and “getting off on the right foot” are therefore crucial for the way the events during a social interaction unfold. Individuals project an image of themselves that, once proposed, they find themselves committed to for the duration of the encounter. If a person presents themselves as a “know-it-all,” then they have to follow through on knowing it all or else they will end up “shame-faced.”

Their presentation therefore defines the situation but also entails that certain lines of responsive action will be available to them while others will not. It is difficult to change one's mode of self-presentation midway through a social interaction. The individual's self-presentation therefore has a promissory character that will either be borne out by the ensuing interactions or discredited. In either case, it commits the performer and the audience to a certain predictable series of events no matter what the specific content of the social encounter is.

The audience of a performance is not passive however. The audience also projects a definition of the situation through their responses to the performer. In general, it is normal for the audience of a performance to try to attune their responses as much as possible with the performer's self-presentation so that open contradiction in the interaction does not emerge. The rules of *tact* dictate that the audience accommodates the performer's claims and agrees to overlook minor flaws in the performance so that the encounter can reach its conclusion without mishap.

Goffman points out that this attunement is not usually a true consensus in which everyone expresses their honest feelings and agrees with one another in an open and candid manner. Rather, it is more like a covert agreement, much like that in a theater performance, to temporarily suspend disbelief. Individuals are expected to suppress their real feelings and project an attitude to the performance that they imagine the others will find acceptable. They establish a provisional “official ruling” on the performance. In this way social encounters work based on a temporary *modus vivendi* or “working consensus” with regard to “whose claims concerning what issues will be temporarily honoured” (Goffman, 1959).

As everyone who has been in an awkward social situation knows, the stakes of mutual accommodation in social interactions are high. Events that contradict, discredit or throw doubt upon the performer threaten to disrupt the social encounter. When it happens, this results in a kind of micro-level *anomie* or normlessness, which is characterized by a general uncertainty about what is going to happen and is usually painful for everyone involved.

When these disruptive events occur, the interaction itself may come to a confused and embarrassed halt. Some of the assumptions upon which the responses of the participants had been predicated become untenable, and the participants find themselves lodged in an interaction for which the situation has been wrongly defined and is now no longer defined. At such moments the individual whose presentation has been discredited may feel ashamed while the others present may feel hostile, and all the participants may come to feel ill at ease, nonplussed, out of countenance, embarrassed, experiencing the kind of *anomie* that is generated when the minute social system of face-to-face interaction breaks down (Goffman, 1959).

As a result, the logic of social situations dictates that individuals are continually obliged to *manage the impression* they are making on the others. **Impression management** often involves using the same type of “props” and “lines” as an actor, but also various defensive strategies like avoiding certain topics of conversation that might discredit the actor's face or status. It is also in the interest of the audience to accommodate the performance, as far as is practicable, through various protective practices (e.g., tact, willful ignorance, etc.). Social interactions are not governed by truth so much as by preventative practices employed to avoid embarrassments.



Donation Update: Over \$21 Million in \$10 donations raised for the people of #Haiti through the @RedCross text HAITI to 90999 campaign.



Figure 6.13 Perfume shop in Mumbai, India. (Photo courtesy of monika.monika/Flickr) [CC BY 2.0](#)

This led to Goffman's focus on the ritualized nature of social interaction—the way in which the “scripts” of social encounters become routine, repetitive, and unconscious. They follow predictable forms to avoid social breakdowns. For example, the ritual exchange in passing, “Hi. How are you?” “Fine, how are you?” is an exchange of symbolic tokens, ordinarily empty of actual content, (i.e., one does not really want to know how the other is in any detail), which indicates sufficient mutual concern for the other that it stands in for a complete social interaction. Nothing is substantially exchanged, but a ritualized acknowledgement of the other is accomplished.

Nevertheless, the emphasis in Goffman's analysis, as in symbolic interactionism as a whole, is that the social encounter, and social reality itself, is open and unpredictable. It can be unclear what part a person may play in a given situation, they have to improvise their role as the situation unfolds. Each situation is like a new scene in a play, and individuals perform different roles depending on who is present. Face to face interaction relies on a continuous process of mutual interpretation, of signs given and signs received. Social reality is not *predetermined* by structures, functions, roles, or history, even if it often draws on these in the same way actors draw on background knowledge and experience in creating a credible character.

Front Stage and Back Stage



Figure 6.14 Erving Goffman (1922–1982). “We move into the world as individuals, achieve character, and become persons” (Goffman, 1959). (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 3.0](#)

Goffman observes that face-to-face performances usually take place in highly bounded “regions”—both spatially and temporally—which the impressions and understandings fostered by the performances tend to saturate. A work meeting takes place in a board room for a specified period of time and generally provides the single focus for the participants. The same can be said for dinner in a restaurant, a ball hockey game or a classroom lecture. Following his theatrical metaphor, Goffman (1959) further breaks down the regions of performance into front stage and back stage to examine the different implications they have for behaviour.

The **front stage** is the place where the performance is given to an audience, including the fixed sign-equipment (props) or setting that supports the performance (the raised podium of the judge's bench, the family photos of the living room, the bookshelves of the professor's office, etc.). On the front stage the performer puts on a *personal front* (or face), which includes elements of *appearance*—uniforms, insignia, clothing, hairstyle, gender or racial characteristics, body weight, posture, etc.—that convey their claim to status, and elements of *manner*—aggressiveness or passivity, seriousness or joviality, politeness or informality, etc.—that foreshadow how they plan to play their role. The front stage is where the performer is on display. They are therefore constrained to maintain expressive control, as a single note off key can disrupt the tone of an entire performance.

A server, for example, needs to read the situation table-by-table in walking the tricky line between establishing clear, firm, professional boundaries with the paying clients, (who are generally of higher status than the server), while also being friendly, courteous and informal so that tips will be forthcoming.

The **back stage** is generally out of the public eye, the place where the front stage performance is prepared. It is also the place where “the impression fostered by the performance is knowingly contradicted as a matter of course” (Goffman, 1959). The waitress retreats to the kitchen to complain about the customers, the date retreats to the washroom to reassemble crucial make-up or hair details, the lawyer goes to the reference room to look up a matter of law she is not sure about, the neat and proper clerk goes out in the street to have a cigarette, etc. The back stage regions are where

props are stored, costumes adjusted and examined for flaws, roles rehearsed and ceremonial equipment hidden—like a good bottle of scotch one is saving for a special occasion—so the audience cannot see how their treatment differs from others. As Goffman says, back stage is where the performer goes to drop the performance and be themselves temporarily: “Here the performer can relax; he can drop his front, forgo speaking his lines, and step out of character” (Goffman, 1959).

However, the implications of Goffman’s dramaturgical approach are that one is always playing a role. Even backstage the performer is not necessarily able to be their “true self.” Firstly, role performances are often performed as part of a team “whose intimate cooperation is required if a given projected definition of the situation is to be maintained”—the restaurant staff, the law office, the husband and wife team, etc. As Goffman describes, this means that team members are involved with each other in a relationship of *reciprocal dependence*, because any team member of a team has the power to give away the secrets of the show, and *reciprocal familiarity*, because team members are all “persons in the know” and not a position to maintain their front before each other. This entails that even backstage they are obliged to demonstrate their allegiance to the team project and play their respective “back stage” roles.

Secondly, whether one plays one’s role *sincerely*—by being fully taken in with one’s own act—or with a degree of *cynicism* or **role distance**—aware of acting a role that one is not fully identified with—the self is never truly singular or authentic in Goffman’s view. There is no single, authentic self free of the obligations to perform. The self is just a collection of roles that people play out for others in different situations. Think about the way one behaves around coworkers versus the way one behaves around one’s grandparents versus the way one behaves with a blind date. Even if one does not consciously try to alter their personal performance in each situation, the grandparents, coworkers, and date probably see different sides of one. Back stage or front stage, the self is always an artifact of the ongoing stratagems of accommodation and impression management involved in the social interaction with particular persons.

Goffman concludes that the self is, on one side, “an image pieced together from the expressive implications of the full flow of events in an undertaking,” and on the other, “a kind of player in a ritual game” (Goffman, 1972). The self is essentially a mask: a *persona*.

It is probably no mere historical accident that the word person, in its first meaning, is a mask. It is rather a recognition of the fact that everyone is always and everywhere, more or less consciously, playing a role... It is in these roles that we know each other; it is in these roles that we know ourselves (Park quoted in Goffman, 1959)

Goffman’s point here is not that individuals are completely inauthentic or phony. “In so far as this mask represents the conception we have formed of ourselves—the role we are striving to live up to—this mask is our truer self, the self we would like to be” (Goffman, 1959).

The Individual and Society



Figure 6.15 The individual and society. (Image courtesy of Stefan Klauke/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

Many sociological findings like the ones surveyed in this chapter strike the newcomer to the discipline as counter-intuitive because people in modern society are so steeped in a certain way of thinking about themselves as unique individuals. This way of thinking is what Goffman called the “schoolboy attitude”: the idea that individuals make their way in life and establish their identity and their merits by personal effort and individual character (Goffman, 1972). In this way of thinking, the individual is understood to be independent of external influences; as having a private subjective interior life of memories, impressions, feelings, fantasies, likes and dislikes that is their s alone. The individual makes free, rational, and autonomous decisions between different courses of action and is therefore individually responsible for their decisions and actions, etc. From this perspective, the individual is unique, and their authenticity resides in finding and expressing this uniqueness. “Be yourself!” might be the dominant message we receive through childhood and adolescence, if not beyond.

However, these ideas about the individual are social. They go back to the political and ethical philosophies of the 18th century Enlightenment, the aesthetic reaction of the 19th century Romantic movement, and before that to ideas of self-cultivation from the Renaissance and earlier Stoic practices of the ancient Greeks and Romans. What this means is that the modern idea of the individual is not a product of universal “human nature” or of unique personal self-discovery but a type of *relationship to the self* that emerges under specific historical conditions. People make themselves into individuals using a model of individuality which is socially approved. The inquiry of micro-level sociology is to examine the various ways in which the individual is produced in social interaction, just like any other human artifact.

One aspect of late modern society has in fact been the proliferation of **practices of the self** such as mindfulness exercises, life long learning, or crossfit training in which people seek to consciously modify their individuality and individual potential. Practices of the self are shared ways in which people freely or voluntarily act upon themselves to transform themselves (Foucault, 1994). Today people are confronted with an array of competing options for engaging in practices of the self including various forms of counseling and therapy, meditation practices, yoga, martial arts, dieting, fitness regimes, different systems of health management, as well as numerous spiritual practices adopted in ‘do-it-yourself’ fashion from the world religions.

In Monty Python’s *Life of Brian* (1979), there is a scene in which Brian addresses the crowd of disciples that have assembled outside his window. He implores them to be themselves and not to follow him.

Brian: Look, you’ve got it all wrong! You don’t need to follow ME, You don’t need to follow anybody! You’ve got to think for your selves! You’re all individuals!

The Crowd: Yes! We’re all individuals!

Brian: You’re all different!

The Crowd: Yes, we are all different!

Man in crowd: I’m not...

The Crowd: Sssh!

The Python troupe put their finger on the paradox of the modern idea of the individual. The idea of the modern individual is to be defined by one’s uniqueness and difference from all others. In a sense, one is *socially obliged* to be an individual in a manner that forces one to conform to the crowd. There is no individual choice in the matter. Moreover, as Goffman would have it, to be “an individual” is to make a claim for one’s uniqueness and authenticity before others using a common, shared repertoire impression management stratagems to demonstrate it. Paradoxically, to be different means to be the same in many important aspects.



Figure 6.16 We are all individuals! (Image courtesy of RXAphotos/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

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Chapter 6 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

achieved statuses: Statuses obtained by personal effort or choice.

ascribed status: Statuses obtained by attributions outside of an individual's control, such as sex or race.

definition of the situation: The mutual understanding of a shared social context, which arises out of communicative interaction

dramaturgical analysis: A technique sociologists use in which they view society through the metaphor of theatrical performance.

emotion management: Producing or inhibiting feelings according to the social expectations of different situations.

emotional labour: The production of emotional qualities required as an aspect of paid labour.

face: An image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes.

face-work: The management of one's face in light of the responses of others.

feeling rules: A set of socially shared guidelines that define appropriate emotions in given situations.

habitualization: The process whereby social patterns become routinized through repetition so they can be performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effort

impression management: Strategies used by a performer to control the impressions and responses of the others in a social interaction.

institutionalization: The act of implanting a convention or norm into society.

line: An act of self-presentation in which an individual expresses their view of the situation, their attitude towards the other members of the group, and their attitude towards themselves.

looking-glass self: The individual's perception of how they think they appear to others.

practice of the self: Shared way in which people freely or voluntarily act upon themselves to transform themselves

role conflict: When one or more of an individual's roles clash.

role performance: The expression of a role.

role strain: Stress that occurs when too much is required of a single role.

role-set: An array of roles attached to a particular status.

roles: Patterns of behaviour that are representative of a person's social status.

self-fulfilling prophecy: An idea that becomes true when acted on.

social interaction: The process of social exchange and reciprocal influence exercised by individuals over one another during social encounters.

social scripts: Pre-established patterns of behaviour that people are expected to follow in specific social situations.

status: The privileges and benefits that a person experiences according to their prestige and role in society.

structure of feeling: Large scale, societal patterns in people's feelings or emotional responses towards things

Thomas theorem: How a subjective reality can drive events to develop in accordance with that reality, despite being originally unsupported by objective reality.

Section Summary

[6.1 Micro-Level Interaction](#)

Society is based on the social construction of reality. How people define society influences how society actually is. Likewise, how people see other people influences their actions as well as people's actions toward them. People take on various roles throughout their lives, and their social interactions depend on what types of roles they assume, who they assume them with, and the scene where interaction takes place.

Questions

Quiz: Social Interaction

[6.1 Micro-Level Interaction](#)

1. Mary works full-time at an office downtown while her young children stay at a neighbour's house. She's just learned that the child care provider is leaving the country. Mary has succumbed to pressure to volunteer at her church, plus her ailing mother-in-law will be moving in with her next month. Which of the following is likely to occur as Mary tries to balance her existing and new responsibilities?
 - a. role strain
 - b. self-fulfilling prophecy
 - c. status conflict
 - d. status strain
2. According to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, society is based on _____.
 - a. habitual actions
 - b. social facts
 - c. structures of feeling

- d. role performance
3. Paco knows that women find him attractive, and he has never found it hard to get a date. But as he ages, he dyes his hair to hide the grey and wears clothes that camouflage the weight he has put on. Paco's behaviour can be best explained by the concept of _____.
- a. role strain
 - b. the looking-glass self
 - c. role performance
 - d. habitualization

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

6.1 Micro-Level Interactions

1. Draw a large circle and then “slice” the circle into pieces like a pie, labeling each piece with a role or status that you occupy. Add as many statuses, ascribed and achieved, that you have. Do not forget things like dog owner, gardener, traveler, student, runner, employee. How many statuses do you have? In which ones are there role conflicts?
2. Think of a “self-fulfilling prophecy” that you have witnessed or experienced. Based on this experience, do you agree with the Thomas theorem? What are the implications of the Thomas theorem for the difference between studying natural as opposed to social phenomena? Or is there a difference?

Further Research

6.1 Micro-Level Interactions

[TV Tropes](http://tvtropes.org/) (<http://tvtropes.org/>) is a website where users identify concepts that are commonly used in literature, film, and other media. Although its tone is for the most part humorous, the site provides a good jumping-off point for research. Browse the list of examples under the entry of “[Self-Fulfilling Prophecy](http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/SelfFulfillingProphecy)” (<http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/SelfFulfillingProphecy>). Pay careful attention to the real-life examples. Are there ones that surprised you or that you do not agree with?

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Solutions to Quiz: Social Interaction

1 A, | 2 A, | 3 B, [\[Return to Quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 7. GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS



Figure 7.1 Students, environmentalists, union members, and Aboriginal people showed up to protest at the Occupy movement in Victoria, B.C. What brings these divergent groups together to form a group? (Photo courtesy of rpaterso/ Flickr.) [CC BY SA 2.0](#)

Learning Objectives

7.1 How is Society Possible?

- Understand Simmel's argument "there is no such thing as society as such."
- Distinguish the *forms* and *contents* of social interactions.
- Situate sociological structures within three levels of analysis: micro, meso, and macro.

7.2 Groups

- Understand the ways in which a group is more than the sum of its parts.
- Describe the influence of primary and secondary groups, in-groups and out-groups, and reference groups.
- Distinguish between different forms of organization and different styles of leadership.
- Explain how conformity and groupthink are products of group properties.

7.3 Networks

- Distinguish social networks from social groups and formal organizations.
- Analyze the dynamics of dyads, triads, and larger social networks in terms of structure, function and contagion
- Understand the principles of “6 degrees of separation” and “3 degrees of influence.”

7.4 Formal Organizations

- Categorize the different types of formal organizations.
- Define the characteristics of bureaucracies.
- Analyze the opposing tendencies of bureaucracy toward efficiency and inefficiency.
- Identify the concepts of the McDonaldisation of society and the McJob as aspects of the process of rationalization.

7.5 A Sociological Analysis of the Holocaust

- Apply the sociological study of group behaviour to analyze the Holocaust.

Introduction to Groups and Organizations

The punk band NOFX is playing outside in Los Angeles. The music is loud, the crowd pumped up and excited. But neither the lyrics nor the people in the audience are quite what you might expect. Mixed in with the punks and young rebel students are members of local unions, from well-dressed teachers to more grizzled labour leaders. The lyrics are not published anywhere but are available on YouTube: “We’re here to represent/The 99 percent/Occupy, occupy, occupy.” The song: “Wouldn’t It Be Nice If Every Movement Had a Theme Song” (Cabrel, 2011).

The slogan, “We are the 99%,” emblematic of the Occupy movement that flourished in North America in 2011 and 2012, refers to the transfer of wealth from the middle class to the upper class (the “one percenters”). Even during the severe economic crisis after 2008, the personal income, bonuses, and overall share of social wealth of the elite 1% increased. Occupiers observed that the very people responsible for the crisis and the massive loss of wealth in the economy were paying themselves bonuses for a job well done, even while they were receiving billions of dollars in bailouts from the government. This would seem to be a grievance worthy of a movement, but simply having a grievance does not explain the ways in which movements take form as groups.

In Victoria, B.C., a tent community sprang up in Centennial Square outside city hall, just like tent cities in other parts of the country. Through the “horizontal decision-making process” of daily general assemblies, the community decided to change its name from Occupy Victoria to the People’s Assembly of Victoria because of the negative colonial connotations of the word “occupy” for Aboriginal members of the group. Occupy Montreal adopted the concept of stepping back or “progressive stack” in their meetings. Men and other dominant movement figures were encouraged to step back from monopolizing the conversation so that a diversity of opinions and experiences could be heard. As the tent cities of the Occupy movement began to be dismantled, forcibly in some cases, a separate movement, Idle No More, emerged to advocate for Aboriginal justice and organized itself according to Aboriginal principles of decentralized leadership. Horizontal decision making processes, progressive stack, and decentralized leadership refer to the different organizational structures these social movements experimented with in rethinking traditional hierarchical structures of organization.

Numerous groups made up the Occupy movement, yet there was no central movement leader. What makes a group something more than just a collection of people? How are leadership functions and styles established in a group

dynamic? What unites the people protesting from New York City to Victoria, B.C.? Are homeless people truly aligned with law school students? Do Aboriginal people genuinely feel for the environmental protests against pipelines and fish farming? How does a non-hierarchical organization work? How is the social order of a diverse group maintained when there are no formal regulations in place? What are the implicit or tacit rules that such groups rely on? How do members come to share a common set of meanings concerning what the movement is about?



Figure 7.2 Slavoj Žižek addresses the crowd at Occupy Wall Street: “You don’t need to be a genius to lead, anyone can be a leader.” (Photo courtesy of Daniel Latorre/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

At one point during the occupation of Wall Street in New York, speakers like Slovenian social critic and philosopher Slavoj Žižek were obliged to abandon the use of microphones and amplification to comply with noise bylaws. They gave their speeches one line at a time and the people within earshot repeated the lines so that those further away could hear. How did this communicational format, despite its cumbersome nature, come to be an expression of the group’s solidarity?

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7.1 How is Society Possible?

One of the basic questions raised in sociology is: How is society possible? What holds society together? What gives society form and continuity? This was the classical sociologist Georg Simmel's basic question. In his essay, "The Problem of Sociology," Simmel (1908/1971) begins by saying: "Society exists where a number of individuals enter into interaction." This would appear to be a truism. After all, what else could society be?

However, a few pages later, he reaches the conclusion that:

With each formation of parties, with each joining for common tasks or in a common feeling or way of thinking, with each articulation of the distribution of positions of submission and domination, with each common meal, with each self-adornment for others — with every growth of new synthesizing phenomena such as these, the same group becomes "more society" than it was before. *There is no such thing as society "as such";* that is, there is no society in the sense that it is the condition for the emergence of all these particular phenomena. For there is no such thing as interaction "as such" — there are only specific kinds of interaction. And it is with their emergence that society too emerges, for they are neither the cause nor the consequence of society but are, themselves, society. The fact that an extraordinary multitude and variety of interactions operate at any one moment has given a seemingly autonomous historical reality to the general concept of society (Simmel, 1908/1971, emphasis is the editor's).

There is no such thing as society as such. There is no such thing as "society" outside of the moments of interaction between the individuals that compose it. Society is the name we give to the "extraordinary multitude and variety" of specific interactions between individuals that are occurring at any particular moment.

If society does not exist outside of these simultaneous interactions, Simmel's problem of sociology is clear. Sociology, as the "science of society," appears to be a discipline without a solid object of study! But what he means is that 'Society' is not an object or a thing; it is just the name people have given to the multitude of ongoing, unfinished processes of interaction between individuals. This means sociologists have to ask the questions of sociology at a more basic level. How do these processes hold together and take shape? How are sociologists able to recognize and talk about different social phenomena like the formation of parties, the joining together in common tasks, the creation of hierarchies, the wearing of jewellery, etc.? If society is nothing but a number of individuals who have entered into specific interactions, how do widespread norms of behaviour, structured relations of power, and predictable relationships between social variables form? How do sociologists find something in this "extraordinary multitude and variety of interactions operat[ing] at any one moment" to grasp hold of and study?

The 3-string punk blues manifesto




Figure 7.3 Punk rock's stripped down "do it yourself" manifesto was illustrated in a diagram from the punkzine *Sideburns* in 1977. The attitude of building music from nothing but feeling was central to the creation of punk as a new musical form or genre within rock and roll. (Image courtesy of Mark Cottle/Airburst.) [CC BY-SA 2.0 UK](#)

Punk rock in the 1970s saw itself returning to the roots of rock and roll. Part of this was to simplify the structure of the music to renew rock and roll as a form of music. This is a good metaphor for how Simmel understands social interaction between individuals as both *mutual attunement* and an *act of creation*. For a coherent interaction to take place, everyone tunes their instruments together (at least somewhat) and plays the same notes and chords. To play music together a group needs to get in tune and find a rhythm. However, this attunement also enables everyone to introduce new elements into the interaction and to invent new musical or social forms (or reinvent old ones). Along with the new musical form of punk rock came new lyrical and thematic contents: "the tendency towards wilful desecration and the voluntary assumption of outcast status which characterized the whole punk movement" (Hebdige, 1979).

Simmel's solution to the problem of how society is possible is based on the idea that the mutual influence of individuals on each other during interaction creates mutual attunements, not unlike a band tuning its instruments. As Randall Collins puts it, people like to come together and get caught up in a mutual focus of intention. Automatically they become "entrained" in each other's bodily rhythms and emotions and begin to match each other (Collins, 2004). This is so automatic and unconscious that one would be tempted to describe it as human nature. The process of mutual influence in turn creates enduring, recognizable *social forms* like a genre of music, a business lunch, a university lecture class, a birthday party, etc., (hence the term *formal sociology*

to describe Simmel's work). People can say to themselves, "I know what this is, it's a birthday party," and then they know what to expect, how to act, what types of things people will say and do, how to feel emotionally, what the 'rules' are, etc.

We will discuss Simmel's formal sociology later in the chapter. In general, the solution to the question — How is society possible? — differs depending on the level of analysis used to pose the question. Excluding the global for the time being (see [Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology](#)), sociologists describe group behaviour at three levels of social interaction: micro, meso, and macro.

Micro Meso Macro

At the micro-level of analysis, the focus is on the social dynamics of face-to-face interaction: How are specific individuals in specific locations able to interact in a coherent and consistent manner? For example, how is a conversation possible? How does a person know when it is their turn to speak or when someone has been speaking too long? Various types of social interaction at the micro-level were discussed in [Chapter 6. Social Interaction](#).

At the meso-level of analysis, the focus shifts to the characteristics of specific networks, groups, and organizations (i.e., collectivities). The meso-level refers to the connection, interaction and ongoing coordination of numerous different social roles simultaneously. When sociologists speak of a school, for example, they need to move beyond the analysis of single face-to-face interactions — interactions in a single setting where participants are co-present — to examine the combined interactions and relationships between students, parents, teachers, and administrators. At this level, sociologists ask, how do the properties of different types of local social collectivity affect or alter the behaviour of individuals? Why does an individual's behaviour change when they are in a collectivity? How do collectivities constrain or enable their members to act in certain ways? What is it about collectivities that entice people to conform? In these

meso-level examples sociologists are still talking about specific, identifiable individuals — albeit not necessarily in direct face-to-face situations — but take into account the complex entwinement of their lives to account for their behaviour.

Finally, at the macro-level of analysis, the focus is on the properties of large-scale, society-wide social interactions: the dynamics of institutions, classes, or whole societies. The macro therefore extends beyond the immediate milieu or direct experience of individuals. These large-scale social structures might be nothing more than the aggregations of specific interactions between individuals at any particular moment as Simmel argues. However, the properties of structures, institutions, and societies — described by statistical analysis, cross-cultural comparisons, or historical research — also have a reality that Emile Durkheim called *sui generis* (i.e., of their own kind). The properties that make society possible at a macro scale cannot be explained by, or reduced to, their components without missing their most important features.



Figure 7.4 Hockey is a social activity that can be examined at micro-, meso-, and macro-levels of analysis. (Image courtesy of Dinur/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

To illustrate the micro, meso, and macro distinction, consider how a sociologist would analyze the game of hockey. At the micro-level of analysis, the sociologist would be interested in the interpersonal structures and role-play that governs how various specific individuals (players, coaches, managers, owners, fans, etc.) interact face to face. With respect to the players, how do they interact on the ice in a coherent manner? How do they coordinate their activities to win games? How do they make the game work? In part, this analysis is a matter of simply knowing the rules of the game and each player's role or position (center, winger, defense, goalie). From a different angle, the analysis has to do with the

players practicing the plays by which they move the puck out of the defensive zone, enter the offensive zone, defend against offensive plays, cycle the puck behind the net, set up a power play, etc. From another angle, the analysis is also a matter of the personal dynamic between individual players, their ability to read each other's cues, to call out on the ice, to anticipate each other's moves, and to work off each other's strengths, etc. (or the failure to do so). In this regard, hockey is a symbolic interaction, which depends on individuals sending signals and interpreting signals. It is, after all, a game based on chasing a small disk of rubber around a frozen surface of ice on skates. It is thoroughly symbolic.

At the meso-level of analysis, a sociologist takes a slightly wider view. Its focus lies between micro-level face to face interactions and macro-level society-wide phenomena. The meso-level of analysis takes into account group or organization dynamics involving a number of different, simultaneously interacting social roles such as the relationship between a team, local media and fans. How does local media reporting on a team's fortunes and "story lines" engage with the feelings of both team members and fans for example? Or, focusing on fans as a group, what are the social dynamics of local fandom? How and why do fans get so emotionally involved in the fortunes of their favourite team? How do they sort themselves into categories — "true" fans and "occasional" fans — and with what consequences? How do team rivalries between fans develop? Similarly, the sociologist might be interested in the hockey team as a type of local institutional arrangement of roles that organizes its members by collectively defining roles, functions, norms, official and informal rules, hierarchical relationships, and channels of communication, etc. How are these relationships coordinated on an ongoing basis to produce 80 hockey games in a season?

The meso-level sociologist might also be interested in trying to define what defines hockey as a type of activity — a "game." Roger Caillois (1961) noted that games, or what Simmel called the "play forms" of association, constitute a separate and unique type of activity. People cross a boundary whenever they leave the ordinary world of everyday life to enter the zone of play. In particular, games are defined by six characteristics:

1. They are free (playing cannot be obligatory),
2. They are separate (play is distinct from ordinary life),
3. They are uncertain (outcomes cannot be determined in advance),
4. They are unproductive (play by itself creates neither goods nor wealth),
5. They are governed by rules (under conventions that suspend ordinary laws), and
6. They are make-believe (they partake in a second reality or a "free unreality") (Caillois, 1961).

In part, due to the distinction between games and normal life, activities like the use of violence and the infliction of injury — that would be punishable by law off the ice — are events that are frequently celebrated (or at most deplored) when they occur on the ice. It is the status of hockey as a game that makes the issue of its violence both ambiguous and subject to arbitrary assessments and punishments.

At the macro-level of analysis, the sociologist would be interested in how hockey is structured by the type of society in which it is embedded. The Micmac game of *wolchamaadijik*, which is cited as an early stick and ball progenitor of Canadian hockey, was played in the context of ceremonial exchanges between native tribes (Rand, 2005). NHL hockey, on the other hand, is a capitalist enterprise, and as such, it is a product or commodity produced for sale on the market for profit. The commodity is the spectacle of the hockey game, which fans pay to see and advertisers pay to use as a vehicle for promoting their products. Therefore, the organization and dynamics of the sport are defined by the logic of capital as Marx defined it — a logic in which teams are competitive corporations that invest in, buy and sell their players like any other asset; in which team hometowns are assessed in terms of their viability as profitable markets (hence the oddity of having teams based in Florida or California where natural ice probably has not existed for 10,000 years); in which the logic of class struggle periodically leads to disruptions in play (such as lock-outs and strikes); and in which an elaborate set of regulations (like salary caps and organized draft picks) are instituted by the league to ensure the viability of the competition and manage the excesses and crises that are tendencies of capitalist accumulation.

Making Connections: Classical Sociologists

Georg Simmel and Formal Sociology



Figure 7.5 Georg Simmel. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Georg Simmel (1858–1918) was an early German sociologist and contemporary of Max Weber. He developed what he called **formal sociology**, or the sociology of social forms, in order to understand how a collection of individuals driven by their own individualistic interests could coalesce into a group with common purposes and then persist and develop through time. When he said that “society exists where a number of individuals enter into interaction” (1908/1971), he meant that whenever people gather, something happens that would not have happened if the individuals had remained alone. They begin to “correlate their condition” with that of others. They influence others and are influenced in return. A “reciprocity of effects” or “reciprocal influence” occurs that Simmel calls “sociation.” People *attune* themselves to one another in a way that is very similar to musicians tuning their instruments to one another so they can play a song. Like musicians playing a song, a pattern or *form* of interaction emerges that begins to guide or coordinate the behaviour of the individuals. Social interactions are society’s songs.

Key to Simmel’s analysis is the distinction he makes between the **contents** and **forms** of sociation. Individuals enter into interaction on the basis of their specific drives, needs, purposes, or interests (erotic, spiritual, acquisitive, defensive, playful, etc.). He defines these specific factors as the *contents* of the interaction. As Simmel says, “In themselves, these materials which fill life, these motivations which propel it, are not social... strictly speaking”(1908/1971). It is “only when they transform the mere aggregation of isolated individuals into specific *forms* of being with and for one another... in which individuals grow together into a unity and within which their interests are realized” that these contents become social (emphasis is the editor’s).

Therefore, the *forms* of sociation are the true objects of sociology because only through these forms can the social (i.e., companionship or “reciprocal influence”) be said to exist. Simmel (1908/1971) notes that innumerable types of forms are possible, including “superiority, subordination, competition, division of labour, formation of parties, representation, inner solidarity coupled with exclusiveness from the outside,” etc. These forms are the patterns of behaviour that guide individuals’ actions in different social settings. Therefore, his analysis shifts from the micro-level to the meso- and macro-levels when he posits how the forms themselves endure and work on the individuals who compose them.

An example Simmel uses is of a cocktail party where a subtle set of instructions begins to emerge which defines what can and cannot be said. In a cocktail party where the conversation is light and witty, the effect would be jarring if someone suddenly tried to sell you an insurance policy or confided about the spousal abuse they had suffered. The person would be thought of as being crass or inappropriate. Similarly, in the pleasant pastime of flirtation, if one of the parties began to press the other to consummate the flirtation by

having sex, the flirtation would be over. Flirtation is a form of interaction in which the answer to the question of having sex — yes or no — is perpetually suspended. Each social form has its own subtle set of instructions, which may not be written down or even consciously acknowledged, but enable the participants to orient themselves to each other in mutual attunement.




Figure 7.6 Cocktail parties as the play form of interaction. What are the rules for “gracious entertaining”? (Image courtesy of James Vaughan/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

In both examples, Simmel argues that social interaction takes on a specific form. Both are examples of what he calls the *play form* of social interaction, or **pure sociability**: the pleasure people experience from the mere fact of being together, regardless of the *content* of the interaction (Simmel, 1910/1971). Mutual attunement is enjoyable for its own sake over and above the specific purposes of an interaction. If the cocktail party conversation suddenly turns to a business proposition or an overly personal confession, it is no longer *playful*. The underlying form of the interaction has been violated, even if the participants were not consciously aware that they had adopted a play form of interaction.

Simmel proposed that sociology would be the study of the social forms that recur in different contexts and with different social contents. The same *play form* governs the interaction in two different contexts with two different contents of interaction: one is the free-ranging content of polite or witty conversation (the cocktail party form); the other is the drive or content of sexual desire (the flirtation form). Different contents or interests can be realized in different forms and vice versa with quite different consequences for the individuals involved. The same erotic impulse (content) can be expressed socially through the *forms* of a

flirtation, a casual sexual relationship, a dating relationship, a marriage, or a transaction with a prostitute. On the other hand, the same *form* of competition can organize the impulse to play hockey, to gain financially, to learn, to find a sexual partner, or to dress stylishly. The emphasis on *forms* is why Simmel called his approach to the study of society **formal sociology**.

Simmel's work on social forms was not just confined to micro-level interactions. He developed an analysis of the **tragedy of culture** in which he argued that the cultural creations of “subjective culture” — like the emergent social forms created by people in their face-to-face interactions, as well as the forms of art, music, literature, political analyses, etc. — tended to detach themselves from lived experience and become fixed and elaborated in the form of “objective culture” — the accumulated products of human cultural creation. There are intrinsic limits to an individual's ability to assimilate, organize, appreciate, and make sense of these forms. As the quantity of objective culture increases and becomes more complex, it becomes progressively more alienating, incomprehensible, and overwhelming. It takes on a life of its own and the individual can no longer see him- or herself reflected in it. Music, for example, can be enriching, but going to an orchestral performance of contemporary music can often be baffling, as if you need an advanced music degree just to be able to understand that what you are hearing is music.

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7.2 Groups

Most of us feel comfortable using the word “group” without giving it much thought. But what does it mean to be part of a group? The concept of a group is central to much of how we think about society and human interaction. As Georg Simmel (1858–1915) put it, “[s]ociety exists where a number of individuals enter into interaction” (1908/1950). Society exists in and through groups. For Simmel, society did not exist otherwise. What fascinated him was the way in which people mutually attune to one another to create relatively enduring forms. In a group, individuals behave differently than they would if they were alone. They conform, they resist, they forge alliances, they cooperate, they betray, they organize, they defer gratification, they show respect, they expect obedience, they share, they manipulate, they riot, etc. At this meso-level of interaction, being in a group changes their behaviour and also their abilities. Emile Durkheim recognized that groups generate their own particular energy — **collective effervescence** — that gives group members confidence and powers of action they otherwise would not have. This is one of the founding insights of sociology: *the whole is greater than the sum of its parts*. The group has properties over and above the properties of its individual members. It has a reality *sui generis*, of its own kind. But how exactly does the whole come to be greater?

Defining a Group

How can the meaning of the term **group** be honed more precisely for sociological purposes? The term is an amorphous one and can refer to a wide variety of gatherings, from just two people (think about a “group project” in school when you partner with another student), to a club, a regular gathering of friends, a hockey team’s fans, or a collection of people who work together or share a hobby. In short, the term refers to any collection of at least two people who interact with some frequency and who share a sense that their identity is aligned with each other as a group.

Of course, every time people gather, they do not necessarily form a group. An audience assembled to watch a street performer is a one-time random gathering. Conservative-minded people who come together to vote in an election are not necessarily a group because the members do not necessarily interact with one another with any frequency. People who exist in the same place at the same time, but who do not interact or share a sense of identity — such as a bunch of people standing in line at Starbucks — are considered an **aggregate**, or a crowd. People who share similar characteristics (e.g., conservative-mindedness), but are not otherwise tied to one another in any way, are considered a **category**.

An example of a category would be Millennials, the term given to all children born from approximately 1980 to 2000. Why are Millennials a category and not a group? Because while some of them may share a sense of identity, many do not. They do not, as a whole, interact frequently with each other.

Interestingly, people within an aggregate or category can become a group. During disasters, people in a neighbourhood (an aggregate) who did not know each other might become friendly and depend on each other at the local shelter. After the disaster ends and the people go back to simply living near each other, the feeling of cohesiveness may last since they have all shared an experience. They might remain a group, practicing emergency readiness, coordinating supplies for the next emergency, or taking turns caring for neighbours who need extra help. Similarly, there may be many groups within a single category. Consider the social category of teachers, for example. Within this category, groups may exist like teachers’ unions, teachers who coordinate to coach after-school sports, or teachers who create book clubs together.



Figure 7.7 Engineering and construction students gather around a job site. How do academic interests define a person's in- and out-groups? (Photo courtesy of USACEpublicaffairs/Flickr.) [Public Domain](#)

Types of Groups

Sociologist Charles Horton Cooley (1864–1929) suggested that groups can broadly be divided into two categories: **primary groups** and **secondary groups** (Cooley, 1909/1963). According to Cooley, primary groups play the most critical role in people's lives. The primary group is usually fairly small and is made up of individuals who generally engage face-to-face in long-term, emotionally intimate ways. This group serves emotional needs: **expressive functions** rather than instrumental ones. The primary group is usually made up of **significant others** — those individuals who have the most impact on a person's socialization or play a formative role in shaping the life of another. The best example of a primary group is the family.

Secondary groups are larger and more impersonal. They are usually task-focused and time-limited. These groups serve an **instrumental function** rather than an expressive one, meaning that their role is more goal- or task-oriented than emotional. A school class or office team can be an example of a secondary group. Neither primary nor secondary groups are bound by strict definitions or set limits. In fact, people can move from one group to another. A graduate seminar, for example, can start as a secondary group focused on learning course material, but as the students work together in the seminar, they may find common interests and strong ties that transform them into a primary group that meet outside of class or after the seminar has been completed.

Peter Marsden (1987) refers to one's group of close social contacts as a **core discussion group**. These are individuals with whom you can discuss important personal matters or with whom you choose to spend your free time. Christakis and Fowler (2009) found that the average North American had four close, personal contacts. However, 12% of their sample had no close personal contacts of this sort, while 5% had more than eight close personal contacts. Half of the people listed in the core discussion group were characterized as friends, as might be expected, but the other half included family members, spouses, children, colleagues, and various professional consultants. Marsden's original research from the 1980s showed that the size of the core discussion group decreases as one ages, there was no difference in size between men and women, and those with a post-secondary degree had core discussion groups almost twice the size of those who had not completed high school.

Making Connections: Case Study

Best Friends She's Never Met




Figure 7.8 What are the parameters of online communities? The **x axis** (from fully on-line to “in real life”) describes whether the most meaningful engagement happens online because asynchronicity and global reach are important. Or, is sharing the same time and space in face-to-face conversations and activities the way to most meaningfully engage? The **y axis** (from hosted or commercial social media infrastructure to “do it yourself” infrastructure) describes whether the community builds its own technology to control membership, features, and data, or uses free and fast pre-existing social media and networking sites. The **z axis** (from pre-formed groups to unformed groups) describes whether the online community offers another way of interaction for a tribe that already exists or provides a space for otherwise unrelated people to connect. (Description and Image courtesy of 10ch/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

Writer Allison Levy worked alone. While she liked the freedom and flexibility of working from home, she sometimes missed having a community of coworkers, both for the practical purpose of brainstorming and the more social “water cooler” aspect. Levy did what many do in the internet age: she found a group of other writers online through a web forum. Over time, a group of approximately 20 writers, who all wrote for a similar audience, broke off from the larger forum and started a private invitation-only forum. While writers in general represent all genders, ages, and interests, it ended up being a collection of 20- and 30-something women who comprised the new forum — they all wrote fiction for children and young adults.

At first, the writers’ forum was clearly a secondary group united by the members’ professions and work

situations. As Levy explained, “On the internet, you can be present or absent as often as you want. No one is expecting you to show up.” It was a useful place to research information about different publishers, find out who had recently sold what, and track industry trends. But as time passed, Levy found it served a different purpose. Since the group shared other characteristics beyond their writing (such as age and gender), the online conversation naturally turned to matters such as childrearing, aging parents, health, and exercise. Levy found it was a sympathetic place to talk about any number of subjects, not just writing. Further, when people didn’t post for several days, others expressed concern, asking whether anyone had heard from the missing writers. It reached a point where most members would tell the group if they were traveling or needed to be offline for a while. The group continued to share. One member on the site who was going through a difficult family illness wrote, “I don’t know where I’d be without you women. It is so great to have a place to vent that I know isn’t hurting anyone.” Others shared similar sentiments.

On the other hand, Zygmunt Bauman (2004) discusses the way electronically mediated groups like this online web forum tend to be frail communities, “easy to enter and easy to abandon.” They do not substitute for the more tangible and solid “we feeling” of face to face forms of togetherness, which require commitment and risk. Virtual communities “create only an illusion of intimacy and a pretense of community. They are not valid substitutes for ‘getting your knees under the table, seeing people’s faces, and having real conversation.’” They are a version of what Bauman calls **cloakroom communities**, places where one can hang one’s identity like a cloak for the duration of the “show” — i.e., for the duration of one’s interest in the group’s focus and interactions — and then collect it again when it is time to move on.

So is this online writers’ forum a primary group? Most of these people have never met each other. They live in Hawaii, Australia, Minnesota, and across the world. They may never meet. Levy wrote recently to the group, saying, “Most of my ‘real-life’ friends and even my husband don’t really get the writing thing. I don’t know what I’d do without you.” Despite the distance and the lack of physical contact, the group clearly fills an expressive need. How are people’s needs for primary group intimacy altered in the age of electronic media?

In-Groups and Out-Groups

One of the ways that groups can be powerful is through inclusion, and its inverse, exclusion. Groups draw boundaries and how these boundaries are drawn is of interest to sociologists because they are purely social products.

In-groups and out-groups are subcategories of primary and secondary groups that help identify this dynamic. Primary groups consist of both in-groups and out-groups, as do secondary groups. The feeling that one belongs in an elite or select group is a heady one, while the feeling of not being allowed in, or of being in competition with a group, can be motivating in a different way. Sociologist William Sumner (1840–1910) developed the concepts of **in-group** and **out-group** to explain this phenomenon (Sumner, 1906/1959). In short, an in-group is the group that an individual feels they belong to, and believes it to be an integral part of who they are. The group provides identity to the individual. An out-group, conversely, is a group someone does not belong to, or possibly defines oneself *against*. Often there may be a feeling of distance, disdain or competition in relation to an out-group.

Sports teams, cliques, gangs and secret societies are examples of groups that have a tendency to organize themselves into in-groups and out-groups; people may belong to, or be an outsider to, any of these. Of interest here is that these types of group are formed on the basis of voluntary membership. People join them because they identify with, and want to be identified with, an exclusive group. They are not born into them, like families, so the group’s recognition of their

membership is always to some degree unguaranteed, as is their commitment to remain in the group. Nevertheless, as a demonstration of commitment, their identity comes to be at stake in them. As the prestige of the in-group rises or falls, especially with respect to out-groups, so does the prestige of personal identity. Symbols that represent the group, (emblems, clothing, gestures, names, beliefs — i.e., Durkheim's "totems," see [Chapter 15. Religion](#)), consolidate group solidarity and become a proxy of group identity itself. For the zealous insider, they are treated with great respect as almost sacred objects and defended vigorously from the disrespect of outsiders, and even from renegade insiders.

Why do in-group/out-group boundaries form? One explanation is that groups form boundaries when there is competition with other groups for scarce resources. Another is that they form to defend status, privileges and self-esteem of members by denigrating outsider groups. The *Robber's Cave Study* in the 1950s provided interesting but ambiguous answers to this question (Sherif et al., 1961). In the formal published study, two groups of white, middle class, 11-year-old boys were sent to a summer camp, but kept separate for a week to bond. They named themselves the Eagles and the Rattlers, which they stenciled onto t-shirts and flags. Towards the end of the week they were able to catch glimpses of the other group but not directly interact. An antipathy began to develop in each group against the "outsiders" or "intruders." The researchers, posing as camp counselors and staff, then introduced direct competition for scarce resources between the groups in the form of baseball games and other sports with a winner-takes-all prize of a trophy and pocket-knives. Conflict between the groups ensued with food fights, the Eagles burning the Rattlers' flag, the Rattlers retaliating by ransacking the Eagles' cabins, and a final fist fight, which the camp counselors intervened to prevent. In the third phase of the experiment, a common crisis was created in the form of a blocked water supply, which both groups were tasked with cooperating to resolve. The boys did manage to overcome their hostility to solve the problem but some enmity remained.

The outcome of the experiment seems to support both explanations. Competition over scarce resources created an incentive to harden group boundaries, until a common problem emerged that demanded cooperation. This is the basis of **realistic conflict theory**, which predicts that in-group/out-group antagonism will develop if there is a competition for a resource in which only one group can be the winner (i.e., a zero-sum game) and will not diminish unless superordinate goals requiring cooperation can be established (Sherif, 1966). On the other hand, the cooperative activity that ended the experiment also provided the face to face social mixing that diminished the low esteem the boys in each group held for each other. This diminished the need to defend status, self-esteem and identity against external threats. Interestingly an earlier attempt to set up the experiment failed because the first test subjects were allowed to mix before being broken into competitive groups. Despite the researchers going to lengths to introduce conflict, the boys remained cooperative and friendly, and even began to suspect the "camp counselors" of manipulating them (Perry, 2018).

While in-group affiliations can be neutral or even positive, such as the case of a team-sport competition, the concept of in-groups and out-groups can also explain some negative human behaviour, such as white supremacist movements including the Ku Klux Klan or Proud Boys, or the bullying of gay or lesbian students. By defining others as "not like us" and inferior, in-groups can end up practicing ethnocentrism, racism, sexism, ageism, and heterosexism — manners of judging others negatively based on their culture, race, sex, age, or sexuality. Some of the starkest outcomes of this behaviour results from **scapegoating**. As in the biblical story in Leviticus, where a goat is laden with the sins and impurities of the community and chased away into the wilderness to die, the dominant group will displace their unfocused aggression and violence onto a subordinate group (Girard, 1977). History reveals many examples of the scapegoating of a subordinate group. An example from the last century is the way that Adolf Hitler was able to use the Jewish people as scapegoats for Germany's social and economic problems.

Making Connections: Social Policy and Debate

Bullying and Cyberbullying: How Technology Has Changed the Game



Figure 7.9 Cyberbullying is a 21st century problem. (Photo courtesy of Karolina Grabowska/Pexels). [Pexels site license](#)

Most people know that the old rhyme “sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me” is inaccurate. Words can hurt, and never is that more apparent than in instances of bullying. Bullying has always existed, often reaching extreme levels of cruelty in children and young adults. People at these stages of life are especially vulnerable to others’ opinions of them, and they’re deeply invested in their peer groups.

Today, technology has ushered in a new era of this dynamic. Cyberbullying is the use of interactive media by one person to torment another, and it is on the rise. Cyberbullying can mean sending threatening texts, harassing someone in a public forum (such as Facebook), hacking someone’s account and pretending to be that person, posting embarrassing images online, and so on.

A study by the Cyberbullying Research Center found that 20% of middle-school students admitted to “seriously thinking about committing suicide” as a result of online bullying (Hinduja and Patchin, 2010). Whereas bullying face-to-face requires willingness to interact with your victim, cyberbullying allows bullies to harass others from the privacy of their homes without witnessing the damage firsthand. This form of bullying is particularly dangerous because it is widely accessible and therefore easier to accomplish.

Cyberbullying, and bullying in general, made international headlines in 2012 when a 15-year-old girl, Amanda Todd, in Port Coquitlam, B.C., committed suicide after years of bullying by a cyber-stalker who lived in the Netherlands. A month before her suicide, she posted a YouTube video in which she recounted her story. It began in grade 7 when she had been lured to reveal her breasts in a webcam photo. A year later, when she refused to give an anonymous male “a show,” the picture was circulated to her friends, family, and contacts on Facebook. She was subsequently bullied by classmates and peers despite changing schools numerous times. Statistics Canada reported that 7% of internet users aged 18 and over have been cyberbullied, most commonly (73%) by receiving threatening or aggressive emails or text messages. Nine per cent of adults who had a child at home aged 8 to 17 reported that at least one of their children had been cyberbullied. Two per cent reported that their child had been lured or sexually solicited online (Perreault, 2011).

In the aftermath of Amanda Todd’s death, most provinces enacted strict guidelines and codes of conduct obliging schools to respond to cyberbullying and encouraging students to come forward to report victimization. In 2013, the federal government proposed Bill C-13 — the Protecting Canadians from Online

Crime Act — which would make it illegal to share an intimate image of a person without that person's consent. Critics, however, note that the anti-cyberbullying provision in the bill is only a minor measure among many others that expand police powers to surveil all internet activity. Will these measures change the behaviour of would-be cyberbullies? That remains to be seen. But hopefully communities can work to protect victims before they feel they must resort to extreme measures.

Reference Groups



Figure 7.10 Athletes are often viewed as a reference group for young people. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY SA 3.0](#)

A **reference group** is a group that people compare themselves to — it provides a standard of measurement and self-evaluation. The members of a reference group become role models. In Canadian society, peer groups are common reference groups. Children, teens, and adults pay attention to what their peers wear, what music they like, what they do with their free time — and they compare themselves to what they see.

But reference groups are also often made up of people one has never met: one's generation, one's fellow Canadians, one's political party, one's mountaineering community, etc. There is a strong “imaginary community” (Anderson, 1991) component in many of these broader reference groups because, although they can inspire loyalty and even intimacy, the chances of a person

meeting more than a fraction of their members are minimal.

Most people have more than one reference group, so a junior highschool boy might look not only at his classmates but also at his older brother's friends and see a different set of norms. He might study the lives of hip hop musicians and the street “scene” of distant cities that the music describes. He might observe the skills and work ethic of his favourite athletes for yet another set of behaviours. He might even be influenced by media images of “tough guy” masculinity, even if the tough guy character is largely based on an imaginary ideal.

Often, reference groups convey competing messages. For instance, on television and in movies, young adults often have wonderful apartments, cars, and lively social lives despite not holding a job. In music videos, young women might dance and sing in a sexually aggressive way that suggests experience beyond their years. At all ages, people use reference groups guide their behaviour and define social norms. Identifying reference groups can help sociologists understand the source of the social identities by examining who people aspire to or who they want to distance themselves from.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

University: A World of In-Groups, Out-Groups, and Reference Groups

For a student entering university, the sociological study of groups takes on an immediate and practical meaning. After all, when someone arrives someplace new, they look around to see how well they fit in, or stand out, in the ways they want. This is a natural response to a reference group, and on a large campus, there can be many competing groups. Say a person is a strong athlete who wants to play intramural sports, but their favourite musicians are a local punk band. They may find themselves engaged with two very different reference groups.

These reference groups can also become a person's in-groups or out-groups. For instance, different groups on campus solicit people to join.

Are there students-union sponsored clubs at the school? Is there a Club Day when the student clubs set up tables and displays? The spelunking club, the Aikido club, the square dance club, the Conservative Party club, the Green Party club, the chess club, the jazz club, the kayak club, the tightrope walkers club, the peace and disarmament club, the French club, the young women in business club — enumerable clubs will try to convince students to join them.

While most clubs are pretty casual, along with a shared interest comes many subtle cues about what sorts of people will fit in and what sorts will not. While most campus groups refrain from insulting competing groups, there is a definite sense of an in-group versus an out-group. “Them?” a member might say, “They’re all right, but they are pretty geeky.” Or, “Only really straight people join that group.” This immediate categorization into in-groups and out-groups means that students must choose carefully, since whatever group they associate with will not just define their friends during their university years — it may also define types of people with whom they will not associate and never get a chance to meet.



Figure 7.11 Aikido practice. Which university club would you fit into, if any? Campus club recruitment day offers students an opportunity to learn about these different groups. (Photo courtesy of Kesara Rathnayake/Flickr.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

Large Groups

It is difficult to define exactly when a small group becomes a large group. One step might be when there are too many people to join in a simultaneous discussion. Another might be when a group joins with other groups as part of a movement that unites them. These larger groups may share a geographic space, such as Occupy Montreal or the People's Assembly of Victoria, or they might be spread out around the globe. The larger the group, the more attention it can

garner, and the more pressure members can put toward whatever goal they wish to achieve. At the same time, the larger the group becomes, the more the risk grows for division and lack of cohesion.

Tepperman (2010) describes teams, bands and gangs as groups that occupy a space in between the small intimate primary group of the family or intimate friendship circle and larger more anonymous secondary groups. They do not command the “primary allegiance” of a primary group member, like family does, but they are more like a family than like larger, impersonal instrumental secondary groups (such as schools or workplaces). As such they offer an interesting window into the social structures that emerge when groups begin to get larger but are still without formal chains of command, rules, regulations, and permanent organizations. For instance, teams, bands and gangs have a clear idea of membership (who is in and who is out), a clear concept of their focal concerns, goals and activities, and a leadership structure, albeit informal. As Tepperman puts it: “Unlike small groups, TBGs (teams, bands and gangs) have a rudimentary political structure (i.e., leaders and followers), a rudimentary legal system (i.e., set procedures to resolve conflicts), a rudimentary economy (i.e., a treasury and assets), and a rudimentary culture (i.e., a shared historical memory of great events, heroes, and villains)” (Tepperman, 2010). These are, however, informal and fluid structures.

As groups get larger, they get more systematized. A system or pattern is abstracted from the ongoing, casual forms of coordination of the group and imposed back onto it as an impersonal organizational structure. Going back to Simmel's distinction between social forms and contents, one can think of three main social forms by which the content or activity of a group might be organized on a more impersonal and permanent basis: domination, cooperation, and competition. No matter what the organization is — a hockey franchise, a workplace, or a social movement — the choice of one form of organization over the others has consequences in terms of the loyalty of members and the efficiency and effectiveness of the group in achieving its goals. In the form of **domination**, power is concentrated in the hands of leaders while the power of subordinates is severely restricted or constrained. In extreme versions of domination, like slavery, loyalty and efficiency are low because fear of coercion is the only motivation. In the form of **cooperation** on the other hand, power is distributed relatively equally and loyalty and efficiency are high because the group is based on mutual trust and high levels of commitment. In the form of **competition**, power is distributed unequally but there is latitude for movement based on the outcome of competition for prestige or money. Loyalty and efficiency are relatively high but only as long as the pay-offs are high.



Figure 7.12 Props from the Star Trek episode “Patterns of Force” found in the Ticonderoga, New York, Star Trek Set displays. (Photo courtesy Bryan Alexander/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

In a Star Trek episode from the 1960s, “Patterns of Force,” the crew of the Enterprise discover that a rogue historian has gone against the Prime Directive of non-interference with local societies and reorganized a planet's culture on the basis of Nazi Germany. In order to address the planet's condition of chaos, he appealed to the “efficiency” of Nazism only to unleash a systematic persecution of one native group by the other. The ensuing drama in the episode reveals that the historian mistook the form of domination for efficiency. As Mr. Spock puts it at the end of the episode, how could such a noted historian make the logical error of emulating the Nazis? Captain Kirk responds by saying that the failure was in putting too much power in the hands of a dictator, to which Dr. McCoy adds that power corrupts.

In fact, as historians point out, Nazi Germany was startlingly inefficient, if only because all major decisions were filtered

through Hitler himself who was notoriously unpredictable, hard to get the attention of, and lacked any form of personal routine (Kershaw, 1998). The hierarchy operated on the basis of a culture of fear in which subordinates felt unable to offer criticism or factual feedback to superiors, even when decision making was poor. The irony of the Star Trek episode is of course that the Starship Enterprise itself is organized on the formal basis of hierarchical domination. It is only the leadership style that differs.

Group Leadership

Often, larger groups require some kind of leadership. In small, primary groups, leadership tends to be informal as noted above. Most families do not take a vote on who will rule the group, nor do most groups of friends. This is not to say that *de facto* leaders do not emerge, but formal leadership is rare.

In a series of small group studies at Harvard in the 1950s, Robert Bales (1970) studied the group processes that emerged around solving problems in training groups (referred to as T-groups). No matter what the specific tasks were, he discovered that in all the *successful* groups — i.e., in the groups that were able to see their tasks through to the end without breaking up — three types of informal leader emerged: a task leader, an emotional leader, and a joker. The task leader was the person who stepped up to organize the group to solve the problem by setting goals and distributing tasks. The emotional leader was the person who helped the group resolve disagreements and frustrations when strong feelings emerged. The joker made fun and fooled around but also had the knack for releasing group tension by making jokes. These leadership roles emerged spontaneously in the small groups without planning or awareness that they were needed. They appear to simply be properties of task-oriented, face-to-face groups.

Making Connections: Case Study

Women Leaders and the Glass Ceiling



Figure 7.13 Former leader of the Green Party Elizabeth May stands out for her gender and her leadership style among federal party leaders. (Photo courtesy Visible Hand/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Elizabeth May, former leader of the Green Party, was voted best parliamentarian of the year in 2012,

hardest-working parliamentarian in 2013 and most-knowldgeable parliamentarian in 2020. She stands out among the party leaders as both the only female and the only leader focused on changing leadership style. Among her proposals for changing leadership are reducing centralization and hierarchical control of party leaders, allowing MPs to vote freely, decreasing narrow political partisanship, engaging in cross-partisan collaboration, and restoring respect and decorum to House of Commons debates. The focus on a collaborative, non-conflictual approach to politics is a component of her expressive leadership style, typically associated with female leadership qualities.

However, as a female leader Elizabeth May is obliged to walk a tight line that does not generally apply to male politicians. According to political analysts, women candidates face a paradox: they must be as tough as their male opponents on issues, such as foreign or economic policy, or risk appearing weak (Weeks, 2011). However, the stereotypical expectation of women as expressive leaders is still prevalent. Consider that Hillary Clinton's popularity surged in her 2008 campaign for the U.S. Democratic presidential nomination after she cried on the campaign trail. It was enough for the *New York Times* to publish an editorial, "Can Hillary Cry Her Way Back to the White House?" (Dowd, 2008). Harsh, but her approval ratings soared afterwards. In fact, many compared it to how politically likable she was in the aftermath of President Clinton's Monica Lewinsky scandal. During the 2016 presidential campaign, Hillary Clinton's "trustworthiness" issues, which came under scrutiny through vague but concerted partisan accusations about her private emails, were compounded by gender issues in which women leaders are required to be "likeable" in ways that men are not, "honest" according to standards that men are not expected to meet, and "able to look and sound presidential" while also being authentically "real women." For Clinton, "appearing too stern and not smiling enough on the campaign trail" was criticized as a character flaw, whereas it was not for Bernie Saunders or Donald Trump (Dittmar, 2016).

In the case of Elizabeth May, going back as far as the 2008 election leaders debate, many pundits believed that she won by being firm in her criticism of government policy, and being both intelligent and clear in her statements. She was able to articulate the rationale behind a national carbon tax to reduce greenhouse gases, whereas then Liberal leader Stéphane Dion seemed to struggle to explain his "Green Shift" policy. "We tax the pollution, and we take the taxes off families," she said (Foot, 2008). The idea of winning debates and defeating opponents in a hostile environment is regarded as a masculine virtue. At the same time, May is subject to criticisms that have to do with her femininity, in a way that male politicians are not subject to similar criticisms about their masculinity. Media tycoon Conrad Black called her "a frumpy, noisy, ill-favoured, half-deranged windbag" to which, May quipped, "He's right on one point: I certainly am frumpy. I don't have anything like Barbara Amiel's [Black's well-known journalist wife] sense of style. But on the whole, I figure being attacked by Conrad Black is in its own way an accolade in this country" (Allemang, 2009).

Despite the cleverness of May's retort, the pitfalls of her situation as a female leader reflect broader issues women confront in assuming leadership roles. Whereas women have been closing the gap with men in terms of workforce participation and educational attainment over the last decades, their average income has remained at approximately 70% of men's, and their representation in leadership roles (legislators, senior officials, and managers) has remained at 50% of men's (i.e., men are twice as likely as women to attain leadership roles in these professions than women). In terms of the representation of women in Parliament, cabinet, and political leadership, the figures are much lower at 15% (despite the fact that several provinces have had women as premiers) (McInturff, 2013).

One concept for describing the situation facing women's access to leadership positions is the **glass ceiling**. Whereas most of the explicit barriers to women's achievement have been removed through

legislative action, norms of gender equality, and affirmative action policies, women often get stuck at the level of middle management. There is a glass ceiling or invisible barrier that prevents them from achieving positions of leadership (Tannen, 1994). This is also reflected in gender inequality in income over time. Early in their careers men's and women's incomes are more or less equal but at mid-career, the gap increases significantly (McInturff, 2013).

Tannen argues that this barrier exists in part because of the different work styles of men and women, in particular conversational-style differences. Whereas men are very aggressive in their conversational style and their self-promotion, women are typically consensus builders who seek to avoid appearing bossy and arrogant. As a linguistic strategy of office politics, it is common for men to say "I" and claim personal credit in situations where women would be more likely to use "we" and emphasize teamwork. As it is men who are often in the positions to make promotion decisions, they interpret women's style of communication "as showing indecisiveness, inability to assume authority, and even incompetence" (Tannen, 1994).

Because of the inherent qualities in women's expressive leadership, which in many cases is more effective, their skills, merits, and achievements go unrecognized. In terms of political leadership, one political analyst said bluntly, "women don't succeed in politics — or other professions — unless they act like men. The standard for running for national office remains distinctly male" (Weeks, 2011).

In formal secondary groups, leadership is usually more overt. There are often clearly outlined roles and responsibilities, with a chain of command to follow. Some secondary groups, like the army, have highly structured and clearly understood chains of command, and many lives depend on those. After all, it is argued, how well could soldiers function in a battle if they had no idea whom to listen to or if different people were calling out orders? Other secondary groups, like a workplace or a classroom, also have formal leaders, but the styles and functions of leadership can vary significantly.

In structural functionalist analysis, the **leadership function** refers to the role of the leader in determining how an organization determines what its goals are and how it will attain them. An **instrumental leader** is one who is goal-oriented and largely concerned with accomplishing set tasks. An army general or a Fortune 500 CEO would be an instrumental leader. In contrast, **expressive leaders** are more concerned with promoting emotional strength and health, and ensuring that people feel supported. Social and religious leaders — rabbis, priests, imams, and directors of youth homes and social service programs — are often perceived as expressive leaders. There is a longstanding stereotype that men are more instrumental leaders and women are more expressive leaders. Although gender roles have changed, even today, many women and men who exhibit the opposite-gender manner can be seen as deviants and can encounter resistance. Former U.S. Secretary of State and presidential candidate Hillary Clinton provides an example of how society reacts to a high-profile woman who is an instrumental leader. Despite the stereotype, Boatwright and Forrest (2000) have found that both men and women prefer leaders who use a combination of expressive and instrumental leadership.

In addition to these leadership functions, there are three different **leadership styles**. **Democratic leaders** encourage group participation in all decision making. The group is essentially inclusive and cooperative. These leaders work hard to build consensus before choosing a course of action and moving forward. This type of leader is particularly common, for example, in a club where the members vote on which activities or projects to pursue. These leaders can be well-liked, but there is often a challenge that the work will proceed slowly since consensus building is time-consuming. A further risk is that group members might pick sides and entrench themselves into opposing factions rather than reaching a solution. Except perhaps during times of crisis, democratic styles of leadership are most effective because they allow the best ideas of the group to come forth and create the conditions for group members to “buy in” to the chosen strategies.

In contrast, a **laissez-faire leader** (French for “let it/them do” or “let it be”) is hands-off, allowing group members to self-manage and make their own decisions. An example of this kind of leader might be an art teacher who opens the art cupboard, leaves materials on the shelves, and tells students to help themselves and make some art. While this style can work well under conditions of mutual trust, with highly motivated, well-trained, mature participants who have clear goals and guidelines, it risks group dissolution and a lack of progress.

As the name suggests, **authoritarian leaders** issue orders, assigns tasks and demand compliance from subordinates. These leaders are clear instrumental leaders with a strong focus on meeting goals. Often, entrepreneurs fall into this mould, like Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg. Not surprisingly, this type of leader risks alienating the workers. There are times of crisis, however, when this style of leadership can be begrudgingly accepted.



Figure 7.14 This gag gift demonstrates how female leaders may be viewed if they violate social norms. (Photo courtesy of istoletv/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Conformity and Groupthink

People generally like to fit in to some degree. Likewise, when they want to stand out, they want to choose how they stand out and for what reasons. For example, a woman who loves cutting-edge fashion and wants to dress in thought-provoking new styles likely wants to be noticed within a framework of high fashion. She would not want people to think she was too out of touch with reality to find sensible clothes. **Conformity** is the extent to which an individual complies with group norms or expectations. As noted above, people use **reference groups** to assess and understand how they should act, dress, and behave. Not surprisingly, young people are particularly aware of who conforms and who does not. A high school boy whose mother makes him wear ironed, button-down shirts might protest that he will look stupid — that everyone else wears T-shirts. Another high school boy might like wearing those shirts ironically as a way of standing out. Recall Georg Simmel’s analysis of the contradictory dynamics of fashion (see [Chapter 3. Culture](#)): it represents both the need to conform and the need to stand out. How much does a person enjoy being noticed? Do they consciously prefer to conform to group norms so as not to be singled out?

A number of famous experiments in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s tested the propensity of individuals to conform to authority. Stanley Milgram conducted experiments in the 1960s to determine how structures of authority rendered individuals obedient (Milgram, 1963). This was shortly after the Adolf Eichmann war crime trial in which Eichmann

claimed that he was just a bureaucrat following orders when he helped to organize the Holocaust. As Hannah Arendt asked in her analysis of the trial, how were Nazis like Eichmann able “to overcome . . . the animal pity by which all normal men are affected in the presence of physical suffering”? (Arendt, 1964)

Milgram had experimental subjects administer, what they were led to believe were electric shocks to a subject when the subject gave a wrong answer to a question. Each time a wrong answer was given, the experimental subject was told to increase the intensity of the shock. The experimental subjects were told that the experiment was supposed to test the relationship between punishment and learning, but the individual receiving the shocks was an actor. As the experimental subjects increased the amount of voltage, the actor began to show distress, eventually begging to be released. When the subjects became reluctant to administer more shocks, Milgram (wearing a white lab coat to underline his authority as a scientist) assured them that the actor would be fine and that the results of the experiment would be compromised if the subject did not continue. Seventy-one per cent of the experimental subjects were willing to continue administering shocks, even beyond 285 volts, despite the actor crying out in pain, and the voltage dial labelled with warnings like “Danger: Severe shock.”

Milgram interpreted the results of the experiment as a demonstration of ordinary people’s willingness to conform to figures of authority (Milgram, 1974). Actions that may be unthinkable for people on their own can be conducted without hesitation when carried out under orders. It was not the personality traits of the subjects (a desire to be cruel, moral weakness or a conformist personality structure) but qualities of the social situation that produced the alarmingly inhuman propensity to conform to authority. In particular he noted:

- The further away the test subject was from the victim, physically and psychically, the easier it was to be cruel.
- The effect of physical and psychical distance from the victim was enhanced when the test subject was physically and psychically closer to the authority figure, i.e., when the test subject and the authority figure began to form an in-group separate from the victim.
- Sequential action (in this case, incrementally increasing the voltage of the shocks) was a main “binding factor” that locked the test subject into continuing to conform to authority. “[I]f the subject decides that giving the next shock is not permissible, then, since it is (in every case) only slightly more intense than the last one, what was the justification for administering the last shock he just gave?” (Milgram, 1974). Test subjects could not stop administering the shocks at any point without having to revisit and reject the sequence of their previous decision-making.
- The test subjects assumed an *agentic state*: a condition, the opposite of autonomy, in which they see themselves as carrying out another person’s wishes or passing responsibility for the acts to another. It is easier to ignore personal responsibility for actions when an individual is just an intermediate link in a chain of actions far removed from the final consequences of the action.
- As long as there was only a single source of undivided authority, test subjects complied with the experiment. When more than one authority figure was introduced, and they were instructed to disagree about the command, compliance of the test subjects disappeared.

Similarly, Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison experiment (see [Chapter 2. Sociological Research](#)) showed that within days of beginning the simulated prison experiment, the random sample of university students, carefully screened to exclude traits of psychological abnormality, proved themselves capable of conforming to the roles of prison guards and prisoners to an extreme degree (Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo, 1973). Even though the conditions were highly artificial, within days the guards took the initiative to expand their powers to humiliate the prisoners and the prisoners responded with acts of greater submissiveness and humiliation. Unlike Milgram’s experiment in which test subjects carried out commands from an authority, Zimbardo and his colleagues simply established the scenario by dividing test subjects into roles and

defining a pattern of interaction. Responsibility for the degradation could not be passed to an external authority in a lab coat because authority for each intensification of abuse was generated by the subjects themselves.

What explained the transformation of ordinary, well adjusted university students into agents of escalating and disturbingly inhumane acts of humiliation and violence? It would appear that the social nature of the group situation itself, especially the existence of a polarized division between authorities and subordinates, enabled individuals to assume a role they otherwise would never consider. It is in situations where one group is given total, exclusive and unrestricted power over another group that acts of appalling inhumanity become possible.

Making Connections: Sociological Research

Groupthink: Conforming to Group Expectations




Figure 7.15 In the Asch conformity experiments, a subject had to determine which of the three lines on the left matched the length of the line on the right. (Photo courtesy of Nyenyec/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 3.0](#)

Psychologist Solomon Asch (1907–1996) conducted experiments that illustrated how great the pressure to conform is, specifically within a small group (1956). In 1951, he sat a small group of eight people around a table. Only one of the people sitting there was the true experimental subject; the rest were actors or associates of the experimenter. However, the subject was led to believe that the others were subjects brought in for an experiment in visual judgments. The group was shown two cards, the first card with a

single vertical line, and the second card with three vertical lines differing in length. The experimenter polled the group, asking each participant, one at a time, which line on the second card matched up with the line on the first card.

However, this was not really a test of visual judgment. Rather, it was Asch's study on the pressures of conformity. He was curious to see what the effect of multiple wrong answers would be on the subject, who presumably was able to tell which lines matched. In order to test this, Asch had each planted respondent answer in a specific way. The subject was seated in such a way that he had to hear almost everyone else's answers before it was his turn. Sometimes the non-subject members would unanimously choose an answer that was clearly wrong.

So what was the conclusion? Asch found that 37 out of 50 test subjects responded with an "obviously erroneous" answer at least once. When faced by a unanimous wrong answer from the rest of the group, the subject conformed to a mean of four of the staged answers. Asch revised the study and repeated it, wherein the subject still heard the staged wrong answers, but was allowed to write down his answer rather than speak it aloud. In this version, the number of examples of conformity — giving an incorrect answer so as not to contradict the group — fell by two-thirds. He also found that group size had an impact on how much pressure the subject felt to conform. The tendency to conform was greatest in groups of 3 to 5 people.

The results showed that speaking up when only one other person gave an erroneous answer was far more common than when five or six people defended the incorrect position. Finally, Asch discovered that people were far more likely to give the correct answer in the face of near-unanimous consent if they had a single ally. If even one person in the group also dissented, the subject conformed only a quarter as often. Clearly, it was easier to be a minority of two than a minority of one.

Asch concluded that there are two main causes for conformity: people want to be liked by the group or they believe the group is better informed than they are. He found his study results disturbing. To him, they revealed that intelligent, well-educated people would, with very little coaxing, go along with an untruth. This phenomenon is known as **groupthink**, the tendency to conform to the attitudes and beliefs of the group despite individual misgivings. He believed this result highlighted real problems with the education system and values in North American society (Asch, 1956).

One might think that one would answer Asch's tests honestly and accurately, despite having to go against the opinion of the other subjects. But as sociologists like Asch, Milgram and Zimbardo have demonstrated, what people do under conditions of social pressure is determined by the situation. One does not necessarily know in advance how one would respond under conditions of duress.

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7.3 Networks

Dyads, Triads, and Social Networks




Figure 7.16 A visual representation of network connections formed through Twitter showing dense nodes of tightly interconnected Twitter accounts and outliers. (Image courtesy of Marc Smith/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)


A small group is typically one where the collection of people is small enough that all members of the group know each other and share simultaneous interaction, such as a nuclear family, a dyad, or a triad. Georg Simmel wrote extensively about the difference between a **dyad**, or two-member group, and a **triad**, a three-member group (Simmel, 1950 (1908)). No matter what the content of the groups is — business, friendship, family, teamwork, etc. — the dynamic or *formal* qualities of the groups differ simply by virtue of the number of individuals involved. The *forms of sociation* available to individuals differ significantly for dyads and triads, no matter the specific reason (*content*) for the sociation (e.g., friendship, love, business, leisure, etc.). The social dynamic inheres in the number of individuals, no matter who they are, how their backgrounds differ or what defines their specific interests. This insight forms the basis of the analysis of networks, which are another of the major meso-level social phenomena examined in sociology.

For example, in a dyad, if one person withdraws, the group can no longer exist. Examples include a divorce, which effectively ends the “group” of the married couple, or two best friends, who may never speak again. Neither of the two


members can hide what they have done behind the group, nor hold the group responsible for what they have failed to do. A dyad is more precarious, but also more intimate, than a triad or larger networks.

In a triad the dynamic is quite different. If one person withdraws, the group lives on. A triad has a different set of relationships. If there are three in the group, two-against-one dynamics can develop and the potential exists for a majority opinion on any issue. At the same time, the relationships in a triad cannot be as close as in a dyad because a third person always intrudes. Whereas a group of two is both closer and more vulnerable than a group of three, because it rests on the immediate, ongoing reciprocity of the two members, a group of three is able to attain a sense of super-personal life and superordinate goals, independent of the members. There is a group “over and above” its members.

Exploring the difference between a dyad and a triad is an example of network analysis. A **social network** is a collection of people who exchange resources (emotional, informational, financial, etc.) and who are tied together by a specific configuration of connections. They do not need to know each other or share a group identity, yet they are part of a collectivity that is more than the sum of its parts. They can be characterized by the number of people involved, as in the dyad and triad, but also in terms of the *structure* of their ties (who is connected to whom) and the *functions* of their ties (what resources flow across ties). The study of structures (network ties), functions (resources shared) and degree of *contagion* (the degree of transmissibility of a resource) are key to network analysis. The particular configurations of the connections determine how networks are able to do more things and different things than individuals acting on their own could. Networks have this effect, regardless of the content of the connections or specific persons involved.



Each person only has one other friend. It takes 5 conversations to find the sweatshirt owner.



Each person has multiple friends. It takes only 2 conversations to find the sweatshirt owner.

Figure 7.17 The difference in efficiency in transmitting a “resource” between a traditional “bucket brigade” or sequential network structure and a “telephone tree” network structure (Image courtesy of Melusine Boon Falleur/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

For example, if one person phones 50 people one after the other to see who could come out to play ball hockey on Wednesday night, it would take a long time to work through the phone list. This is an example of an inefficient network. The *structure* of the network would be one in which the telephone caller has an individual connection with each of the 50 players, but the players themselves do not necessarily have any connections with each other. There is only one *node* in the network: the telephone caller. This can be characterized as a “hub and spoke” structure (see Figure 7.18). On the other hand, if the telephone caller phones five key (or nodal) individuals, who would then call five individuals, and so on, then the telephone calling would be accomplished much more quickly. A telephone tree like this has a different network structure than the single telephone caller model does and can therefore accomplish the task much more

efficiently and quickly (see Figure 7.17). Of course the responsibility is also shared so there are more opportunities for the communication network to break down, (but not as many as in a “bucket brigade” model where the resource, in this case information, is passed from “hand to hand” or “ear to ear” in a linear sequence).




Figure 7.18 The difference between hub and spoke vs. distributed network structures illustrates the importance of examining the structure of network ties in understanding the effectiveness and degree of contagion of a network (Image courtesy of Melusine Boon Falleur/ Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

Network analysis is interesting because much of social life can be understood as operating outside of either formal organizations or traditional group structures. Social media like Twitter or Facebook connect people through networks. One’s posts are seen by friends, but also by friends of friends. The revolution in Tunisia in 2010–2011 was aided by social media networks, which were able to disseminate an accurate, or alternate, account of the events as they unfolded, even while the official media characterized the unrest as vandalism and terrorism (Zuckerman, 2011). On the other hand, military counterinsurgency strategies trace cell phone connections to model the networks of insurgents in asymmetrical or guerilla warfare. Increased densities of network connections indicate the centrality of key insurgents and the ability of insurgents to mount coordinated attacks (Department of the Army, 2006).

The amorphous and fluid nature of global capital and the formation of a global capitalist class consciousness can also be analyzed by mapping interlocking directorates; namely, the way social networks are established and institutionalized between banks, corporations and investment funds in different parts of the world through shared board members. Mapping interlocking directorates can describe shifts in the network of corporate, banking, investment/pension fund board members who sit on each other’s boards of directors. Over the period from 1970 to 2010 for example, network analysis reveals the break up of national-based corporate elite networks, and the establishment of a unified and coordinated transatlantic capitalist class, which corresponds to the shift from national economies to late capitalism: globalized capital accumulation, neoliberal policies of deregulation and increasing economic inequality (Carroll, 2010).

Christakis and Fowler (2009) argue that social networks are influential in a wide range of social aspects of life, including political opinions, weight gain, and happiness. They develop Stanley Milgram’s claim that there is on average only **six degrees of separation** between any two individuals on Earth by adding that in a network there are also **three**

degrees of influence. Milgram showed that if a friend represents one degree of separation, and a friend's friend two degrees of separation, etc. then, on average, there are only six degrees of separation between any two people on earth. Three degrees of influence means that one is not only influenced by one's immediate friends and social contacts, but by their friends, and their friends' friends. For example, an individual's chance of becoming obese increases 57% if a friend becomes obese; it increases by 20% if it is a friend's friend who becomes obese; and it increases 10% if it is a friend's friend's friend who becomes obese. Beyond the third degree of separation, there is no measurable influence.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

The COVID-19 Pandemic and Social Network Analysis: Super-Spreader Events, Global Networks, and Social Bubbles




Figure 7.19 Understanding the uneven spread of COVID-19 in the context of the global interconnected economy. Connections show the global ties between nodes in the global tourism network, which was one of the main conduits for the global spread of the virus (Figure from Tsiotas & Tselios, 2022). [CC BY 4.0](#)

The COVID-19 Pandemic is a perfect example of a 21st century, global social network phenomenon. The first confirmed infections were recorded in Wuhan, China, in December, 2019, and by March 11, 2020 the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 to be a global **pandemic**: “an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide area, crossing international boundaries and usually affecting a large number of people” (Last, 2001). As the virus spreads through respiratory droplets and airborne transmission in close face-to-face interactions, with an incubation period of 1-14 days (Prather et al., 2020), on its own, the virus does not

travel far. Its spread from local outbreak in Wuhan to global pandemic depended on the structure of social connections that link people into a global network of COVID-19 transmission.

Two factors determine the spread of infectious diseases: the biological characteristics of the virus, and the social network that defines the structure of contact between people (Jo et al., 2021). Humans are not just passive hosts for viruses. They are actively involved in creating social networks with others and, as a result, the spread of viruses is not random but to some degree socially predictable. The structure of social network ties affects the spread of infection. What is interesting from a social network analysis is that infection rates — the estimated number of new people each COVID-positive person will infect (Covid ActNow, 2022) — are not uniform across populations. Infection spreads unevenly in a population because of the structure of ties that link people's social networks. From a social network perspective, the overall increase or decrease in infections per unit of time (i.e., the “flatness” of the infection curve) is closely related to the number of network steps needed to connect nodes in a network (Block et al., 2020). The fewer the steps, the more contagious the network is. This has implications for developing effective social strategies to disrupt the transmission of contagious diseases.

Examples of the different types of influence social network structures had in the COVID-19 pandemic include the phenomenon of superspreader events, global transmission through the global tourism network, and the use of social bubbles as a public health measure to inhibit transmission.

Superspreader events — in which one person infects a disproportionate number of other individuals at one time — have been estimated to account for 80% of COVID infections (Lewis, 2021). These events involve prolonged and crowded indoor gatherings with poor ventilation, often exacerbated by activities such as singing and aerobic exercise. From a network analysis perspective, these events involve the convergence of individuals from physically distant, isolated social networks into a single, temporary, dense or distributed network, and then their subsequent dispersal back to their original social networks. Each person that attends becomes a potential vector for the virus from a central hub of contagion. The Pacific Dental Conference in Vancouver in 2020 is described as the first superspreader event in BC. Fifteen thousand people attended the event which generated at least 87 documented cases of COVID-19 and one death (Mackin, 2022). This probably underestimated the overall impact however. Lemieux et al. (2020) describe a two-day international business conference in Boston which directly infected 90 attendees and their close contacts, but using genome sequencing they estimate that approximately 20,000 infections in Boston and its surrounding areas could be traced back to the conference.

The rapid unfolding of the COVID-19 pandemic also exemplifies the properties of social networks. The “small world phenomenon” is a product of Merton's 6 degrees of separation, where every element of the global network seems surprisingly “close” to almost every other element, even when they are geographically far away (Watts, 1999). People often say, “it is such a small world.” This is true but perhaps misrepresents how the global spread of COVID-19 was unevenly distributed due to the structure of pre-existing global networks. In other words, not every place on earth is equally connected through global networks. The virus spread firstly through networks of global tourism (Tsiotas & Tselios, 2022). Figure 7.19 shows the highly connected nodes or major tourist destinations and transfer points in the global tourism network. These were infected earlier by the pandemic than the other nodes. Tsiotas & Tselios (2022) describe the spread of the pandemic through time in three sequential clusters defined by their relative centrality to Wuhan and to the global tourism network: Firstly China, countries neighboring China, North America, Australia, and Western Europe; secondly less well tourism connected countries in Europe and the Americas; thirdly, South America, Southern Africa, Indonesia, Central Europe, Western Mediterranean basin and Turkey.

The concept of creating *social bubbles* was a public health measure deployed in a variety of jurisdictions to inhibit the spread of COVID-19 during the pandemic, especially prior to the introduction of vaccines. They are in a sense the opposite of superspreader events. The idea of a social bubble is to combine 2 or possibly 3 households in a single closeknit network detached as much as possible from the rest of society. This measure provides the benefit of breaking trains of transmission through social distancing while reducing the negative impacts of isolation such as loneliness, social isolation, lack of physical and emotional support and reduced childcare help. In terms of the goal of “flattening the curve” or reducing the impact on the health care system, modelling shows that social bubbles delay the peak of infections by 37%, (i.e., the onset of peak infection numbers), decrease the height of the peak by 60%, (i.e., the number of infected individuals), and results in 30% fewer infected individuals at the end of the simulation (Block et al., 2020).

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7.4. Formal Organizations



Figure 7.20 Franz Kafka in literature and Max Weber in sociology were two early 20th century visionaries who foretold the rise of bureaucratic life (Photo courtesy of Harald Groven/Flickr.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

A complaint of modern life is that society is dominated by large and impersonal secondary organizations. The individual gets lost in the paper work and digital files through which modern society is administered. From universities to businesses to health care to government, these organizations are referred to as **formal organizations**.

A formal organization is a large secondary group deliberately organized to achieve its goals efficiently and effectively. Typically, formal organizations are highly bureaucratized. The term **bureaucracy** refers to what Max Weber termed “an ideal type” of formal organization (1922/1946). In its sociological usage, “ideal type” does not mean “best,” “good” or “perfect”; it refers to a general or typical *model* that can be used to describe a collection of characteristics, or a model that could describe most examples of the item under discussion.

For example, if a professor were to tell the class to picture a car in their minds, most students will picture a car that shares a set of characteristics: four wheels, a windshield, and so on. Everyone’s car will be somewhat different, however. Some might picture a two-door sports car while others might picture

an SUV. Some might picture an electric car while others might picture a combustion car. It is possible for a car to have three wheels instead of four. However, the general idea of the car that everyone shares is the ideal type.

Corporate, state and other organizational bureaucracies are similar. While each bureaucracy has its own idiosyncratic features, the way each is deliberately organized to achieve its goals efficiently shares a certain consistency. In this sense bureaucracies are defined by an ideal type common to most large scale modern organizations.

Types of Formal Organizations



Figure 7.21 Cub and Guide troops and correctional facilities are both formal organizations. Photo (a) Brownie and Cub compare badges (courtesy of Paul Hourigan/Hamilton Spectator, 1983) [CC BY 2.0](#)



Photo (b) Alouette Correctional Centre (courtesy of Province of British Columbia/Flickr) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

Sociologist Amitai Etzioni (1975) posited that formal organizations fall into three categories. **Normative organizations**, also called **voluntary organizations**, are based on shared interests. As the name suggests, joining them is voluntary and typically people join because they find membership rewarding intrinsically, or in an intangible way. Compliance to the group is maintained through compliance with shared norms or moral control. The Audubon Society or a ski club are examples of normative organizations.

Coercive organizations are groups that one must be coerced, or pushed, to join. These may include prison, the military, or a rehabilitation centre. Compliance is maintained through force and coercion. Goffman (1961) states that most coercive organizations are **total institutions** (see [Chapter 5. Socialization](#)). A total institution is one in which members are separated from the rest of society and live a fully controlled life to submit to a process of total resocialization.

The third type are **utilitarian organizations**, which, as the name suggests, are joined for instrumental purposes, as a means to an end. People enter them to pursue a specific credential or material reward. A high school or a workplace would fall into this category — one is joined in pursuit of a diploma, the other in order to make money. Compliance is maintained through remuneration and rewards.

As a result of these differences, the feelings of connectedness between members differs, from shared affinity and common interests in normative organizations, to coerced affinity and disciplinary confinement in coercive organizations, to pragmatic affinity or shared goals in utilitarian organizations.

Table 7.1. Etzioni's Three Types of Formal Organizations (Source: Etzioni, 1975)

	Normative or Voluntary	Coercive	Utilitarian
Benefit of Membership	Non-material benefit	Corrective or disciplinary benefit	Material benefit
Type of Membership	Volunteer basis	Obligatory basis	Contractual basis
Feeling of Connectedness	Shared affinity	Coerced affinity	Pragmatic affinity

Bureaucracies

Bureaucracies can be described as an **ideal type** of formal organization. As noted above, this does not mean that they are perfect, or “ideal” in an ethical sense, but that the logic or relationship of their components can be laid out according to an idealized model. Not all formal organizations or bureaucracies will necessarily conform to the ideal type.

The sociologist Max Weber (1946 (1922)) influentially characterized the bureaucratic ideal type on the basis of five distinct features: hierarchy of authority, clear division of labour, explicit rules, impersonality and meritocracy. These were elements of the modern, rational, continuous, methodical, and disciplined organization known as bureaucracy – literally “rule by desks” or “rule by offices” – which proved superior in efficiency and effectiveness to previous, historical organizational forms. As he put it, bureaucracy was discipline’s “most rational offspring” (Weber, 1946 (1922)).

Previously, rule was often personalized and rulers worked through “personal trustees, table companions, or court servants” on an *ad hoc* (as needed) basis rather than on a permanent basis. Bureaucracies introduced permanent organizational structures with fixed jurisdictions.

Yet even though Weber argued that bureaucracy had become a permanent structure in modern organizational life because of its rational organization and efficiency, people, both then and today, often complain about bureaucracies, declaring them to be slow, rule-bound, difficult to navigate, and unfriendly. Nevertheless, he argued that “the decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization.” This formidable efficiency in turn means that bureaucracy is “a form of power relation...that is practically unshatterable” (Weber, 1946 (1922)). It is very difficult to imagine another form of social organization up to the task of ruling and coordinating activities on a large scale in modern complex societies. Are other alternatives to formal bureaucracy possible?

As Weber observed, the strength of bureaucratic discipline was that when an order was given it would be methodically executed by well trained functionaries regardless of their personal feelings on the matter. This was enabled by the five features of bureaucracy.

Hierarchy of authority refers to the aspect of bureaucracy that places one individual or office in charge of another, who in turn must answer to their own superiors. For example, if an employee at Walmart gets their tasks assigned by their shift manager. The shift manager answers to the store manager, who must answer to the regional manager, and so on in a clear, unambiguous chain of command up to the CEO, who must answer to the board members, who in turn answer to the stockholders. There is a clear chain of authority that enables each person to know who they are answerable to or responsible for, which is necessary for the organization to make and comply with decisions.

A clear **division of labour** refers to the fact that within a bureaucracy, each individual has a specialized task to perform. There are specified spheres of competence and responsibility within a systematic division of labour. For example, psychology professors teach psychology, but they do not attempt to provide students with financial aid forms. In this case, it is a clear and commonsensical division. But what about in a restaurant where food is backed up in the kitchen and a host is standing nearby texting on her phone? The host’s job is to seat customers, not to deliver food. Is this a commonsensical division of labour?

There is a continuous organization of official functions bound by **explicit rules**. Rules are explicitly stated, written down, and standardized. There is also written documentation of administrative acts, decisions, meetings and procedures so that a detailed institutional memory can be kept. For example, at a college or university, student

guidelines governing numerous aspects of student life from class attendance, to illness, exam procedures and plagiarism are contained within the student calendar. Similarly, Ombudsperson Offices are becoming more common on campuses to deal violations of rules about racism, sexism, unfair treatment, and student rights. These processes of adjudicating fairness issues involve following explicit procedures of documentation, mediation and correction.

Bureaucracies are also characterized by **impersonality**, which is meant to take personal feelings out of professional situations and make the institution and institutional processes independent of particular functionaries and clients. Each office or position exists independently of its incumbent, meaning that positions are defined and continue through time regardless of the person occupying them. The business of the bureaucracy is also conducted impersonally, “without regard for persons” (Weber, 1946 (1922)). Each client and each worker receive equal treatment, regardless of who they are, their personal background, or their personal circumstances. This characteristic grew out of a desire to eliminate the potential for nepotism, discrimination, backroom deals, and other types of “irrational” favouritism. Impersonality is an attempt by large formal organizations to protect their members, clients and customers. However, the result is often that personal experience is disregarded. For example, a worker may be late for work because her car broke down, but the manager at Pizza Hut does not care why the worker is late, only that she is late. The rules apply whatever the specific circumstances.

Finally, bureaucracies are in principle **meritocracies**, meaning that hiring and promotion are based on proven and documented skills, rather than on nepotism, discrimination or random choice. In order to get into graduate school, one needs to have an impressive transcript. In order to become a lawyer and represent clients, one must graduate from law school and pass the provincial bar exam. These are documented credentials that can be weighed and compared in job or student competitions. Of course, there is a popular image of bureaucracies that they reward conformity and sycophancy rather than skill or merit. “One rises to one’s own level of incompetence.” How well do established meritocracies identify real talent though? Wealthy families hire tutors, interview coaches, test-prep services, and consultants to help their children get into the best schools. This starts as early as kindergarten in New York City, where competition for the most highly regarded schools is especially fierce. Are these schools, many of which have copious scholarship funds that are intended to make the school more democratic, really offering all applicants a fair shake?

Max Weber (1946 (1922)) summarizes the principle of bureaucracy:

Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs — these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration ... Bureaucratization offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specializing administrative functions according to purely objective considerations . . . The ‘objective’ discharge of business primarily means a discharge of business according to calculable rules and ‘without regard for persons.’

There are several positive aspects of bureaucracies. They are intended to improve efficiency, ensure equal opportunities, and increase effective delivery of services or products. There are times and circumstances when rigid hierarchies are needed. However, there is also a clear component of *irrationality* within the rational organization of bureaucracies. As a byproduct of rational organization, bureaucracies can be inefficient and ineffective in a number of ways.

Firstly, bureaucracies create conditions of bureaucratic alienation in which workers cannot find meaning in the repetitive, standardized nature of the tasks they are obliged to perform. As Max Weber put it, the “individual bureaucrat cannot squirm out of the apparatus in which he is harnessed... He is only a single cog in an ever-moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march” (1946 (1922)). Secondly, bureaucratic procedures can lead to inefficiency and ritualism (red tape). They can focus on rule following and regulations to the point of undermining the organization’s goals and purpose. Thirdly, bureaucracies have a tendency toward inertia. Changing the direction of a bureaucratic organization in response to new goals, situations and circumstances can be like “trying to turn a tanker around mid-ocean.” Something large, cumbersome and set in its ways has difficulty changing directions. Inertia means bureaucracies focus on perpetuating themselves rather than responding to new needs or effectively accomplishing the tasks they were designed to achieve. Finally, as Robert Michels (1949 (1911)) argued, bureaucracies are characterized by

the **iron law of oligarchy** in which the organization is ruled by a few elites. The organization serves to promote the self-interest of oligarchs and insulate them from worker input or the needs of the public or clients.

Bureaucracies grew large at the same time that modern institutions like the public school system, the industrial workplace, the hospital system and modern armies were developed. In the Fordist economic model of the first half of the 20th century, young workers were trained and organizations were built for mass production, assembly-line work, and factory jobs. In these scenarios, a clear chain of command was critical because of the large scale and centralized nature of production and the number of moving parts that needed coordinating. Now, in post-industrial, late capitalist societies, this kind of rigid training and adherence to protocol can actually decrease both productivity and efficiency.

Today's workplace is based on flexible accumulation and just-in-time inventory systems (see [Chapter 4. Society and Modern Life](#)), which are argued to require a faster pace, more distributed problem solving, and a flexible approach to work. Smaller organizations are often more innovative and competitive because they have flatter hierarchies and more democratic decision making, which invites more communication, greater networking, and increased individual participation of members. These flexible systems are often based on precarious and uncertain work conditions, but too much adherence to hierarchical chains of command, inflexible rules and a division of labour can leave an organization behind. However, once established, bureaucratic structures can take on a life of their own. As Max Weber said, "Once it is established, bureaucracy is among those social structures which are the hardest to destroy" (1946 (1922)).



Figure 7.22 This McDonald's storefront in Egypt shows the McDonaldization of society. (Photo courtesy of SW Ellis/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

The McDonaldization of Society

The **McDonaldization** of society refers to the increasing presence of the fast-food business model in common social institutions (Ritzer, 2013). This business model is based on four principles: efficiency, predictability, calculability, and control (monitoring). For example, in the average chain grocery store every aspect of the organization is geared toward the minimization of time it takes for a customer to shop, for shelves to be restocked, and for checkout and payment to be made (efficiency). Whenever a person enters a store within that grocery chain, they receive the same type of goods, see the same floor organization, and find the same brands at the same prices (predictability). Prices are clearly marked and goods sold by the kilogram, so that customers can weigh their fruit and vegetable purchases rather than simply guessing at the price for that bag of onions. Employees often have a time card so their hours, work process, breaks and wages can be precisely quantified, measured and standardized (calculability). Finally, customers will notice that all store employees are wearing a uniform (and usually a name tag) so that they can be easily identified. Transactions between employees and customers are formalized with stock phrases or scripts and clear directives about how to perform tasks so that nobody has to think. Non-human technologies like self-scanning check-out items reduce human error and human interaction to streamline the shopping process. Surveillance systems and bar code data entry allows management to control consumer and work processes at a distance (control).

While McDonaldization has resulted in improved profits and an increased availability of standardized goods and services to more people worldwide, it has also reduced the variety of goods available in the marketplace while rendering available products uniform, generic, and bland. Think of the difference between a mass-produced shoe and one made by a local cobbler, between a free range chicken from a family-owned farm versus a corporate factory farmer, or a cup of coffee from the local roaster instead of one from a coffee-shop chain. Ritzer also notes that the rational systems, as efficient as they are, are irrational in that they become more important than the people working within them, or the clients being served by them. “Most specifically, irrationality means that rational systems are unreasonable systems. By that I mean that they deny the basic humanity, the human reason, of the people who work within or are served by them” (Ritzer, 2013).

Some contemporary trends can be referred to as “de-McDonaldization:” the resurgence of farmer’s markets, the 100 mile diet and slow-cooking movement, micro-breweries and shop-local campaigns. As a corporate model, Starbucks is often seen as an alternative chain that has abandoned the one-size-fits-all, standardized of service of McDonald’s in a way that is more suited to late modern sensibilities. Principally, it moved away from the mediocre or low quality products of fast food restaurants, refocused on providing comforts for consumers (over-stuffed couches, wooden furniture, wifi, artwork, popular music), branded itself as a kinder, gentler, and caring corporation (fair-trade coffee, calling employees “partners,” etc.) and created a “theatrics” that provides an “experience” of being in an old-fashioned, local coffee-shop (Ritzer, 2013). Nevertheless Starbucks still clearly fits, and operates in accordance with, the four McDonaldization principles of efficiency, predictability, calculability and control, while somehow convincing customers to pay \$4 for a coffee. It is also famous for ruthlessly eliminating local competition. On the other hand, with its recent advertising campaigns, changes in menu, and products emphasizing individuality, even McDonald’s might be seen as de-McDonaldizing itself.

Making Connections: Sociological Research

Secrets of the McJob



Figure 7.23 A fast food breakfast sandwich from Tim Hortons, the largest fast-food chain in Canada (followed by Subway in second place). 40% of Canadians say they have breakfast out, largely because they do not have time to make breakfast or because of the convenience of getting something on the way to work (Bush, 2023). (Photo courtesy of Calgary Reviews/Flickr). [CC BY 2.0](#)

People often talk about bureaucracies disparagingly, and no organizations have taken more heat than fast-food restaurants. The book and movie *Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American Meal* by Eric Schlosser (2001) paints an ugly picture of what goes in, what goes on, and what comes out of fast-food chains. From their environmental impact to their role in the North American obesity epidemic, fast-food chains are connected to numerous societal ills. Furthermore, working at a fast-food restaurant is often disparaged, and even referred to dismissively, as a McJob rather than a real job.

But business school professor Jerry Newman (2007) went undercover and worked behind the counter at seven fast-food restaurants to discover what really goes on there. His book, *My Secret Life on the McJob*, documents his experience. Newman found, unlike Schossler, that these restaurants have much good alongside the bad. Specifically, he asserted that the employees were honest and hard-working, the management was often impressive, and the jobs required a lot more skill and effort than most people imagined. In the book, Newman cites a pharmaceutical executive who states that a fast-food service job on an applicant's résumé is a plus because it indicates the employee is reliable and can handle pressure.

The fast food sector is an important industry, employing 394,134 people or 3.7% of Canadians 2021 (Bush, 2023). 28.3% of Canadians have worked directly in the food service industry and almost half of the population have either worked in the industry themselves or someone in their family has or still does. Four out of five people see fast-food restaurants as an important first job source.

So what is the verdict? Are these McJobs and the organizations that offer them still serving a useful role in the economy and people's careers? Or are they dead-end jobs that typify all that is negative about McDonaldization?

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7.5 A Sociological Analysis of the Holocaust




Figure 7.24 *Anti-Christ* (1942), by Polish-Jewish artist Arthur Szyk (1894-1951) (Image courtesy of The Arthur Szyk Society/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

This chapter concludes with a sociological analysis of the Holocaust to indicate the significance of some of the sociological dynamics of group behaviour. In sociology the group is always more than the sum of its parts. This chapter has examined this with regard to how individuals change their behaviour when they are around others in different types of group structure.

[Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology](#) noted how being in a crowd affected people very differently during the exuberance of the 2010 Vancouver Olympics and the riots of the 2011 Stanley Cup final. [Chapter 6. Social Interaction](#) has shown how being a member of a **social group** influences people to conform, to engage in groupthink or to choose in-group and out-group attachments. **Social networks** are also deeply influential. Depending on where one is located in a social network, individuals are enabled or inhibited, to a lesser or greater degree, to share and receive resources of various sorts from friends, friends of friends, and friends of friends of friends, in ways which change peoples behaviours, attitudes and beliefs. **Formal organizations** structure the relationships between individuals in consistent and impersonal ways to be able to achieve organizational goals that individuals could not achieve on their own.

How does the insight that the group is more than the sum of the parts help to analyze how the Holocaust was possible? The Holocaust (literally “whole burnt”) refers to the systematic program of extermination of European Jews and Roma by Nazis between 1941 and 1945. During this period, it is estimated that 6,000,000 Jews and Roma were killed by the Nazis. How was it possible? It is difficult to imagine how the scale of this event could be the product of isolated individuals entering into interaction. It needs to be understood at the level of group behaviour.

Clearly, a significant minority of the population of Germany in the 1930s were anti-Semitic, but even among these individuals the concept of the Final Solution would have been unthinkable. Often, the explanation that has been put forward is that the Nazi era in 20th century Germany was a temporary aberration, a period of mass irrationality and social breakdown; an imposition of racism, hatred, and violence on the population by a megalomaniacal madman — Adolf Hitler — devoted to world domination. This explanation has an element of truth in that the combination of war reparations imposed on Germany after the First World War, the hyper-inflation of the 1920s, and the onset of a global capitalist crisis in the 1930s (the Great Depression) created conditions of instability and widespread desperation. Desperate people do not think clearly.

However, the sociological analysis of the rise of the Nazis and the implementation of the Holocaust is far more discomfiting. Rather than an aberration or irrational outburst, the Holocaust unfolded within the purview of legal norms and on the basis of normal sociological phenomena. The Nazis were democratically elected into power not once but twice (in 1932 and 1933); the suspension of the Weimar constitution and the institution of emergency rule were enacted through formal legal, constitutional means; the imposition of totalitarian rule and the internment of Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, people with disabilities, and political opponents were enabled by the voluntary contributions of ordinary citizens; and perhaps most perplexingly, all of this was accomplished in one of the most modern, cultured, educated, technologically advanced, and rationalized societies of Europe. Explanations of the behaviour of the perpetrators that relies on the idea that they were sadists, criminals, or madmen have been discredited for lack of evidence. While there were clearly a few individuals in the death camps known for their sadistic cruelty, “by conventional

clinical criteria no more than 10 per cent of the SS could be considered ‘abnormal’” (Kren and Rappoport, quoted in Bauman, 1989).

As Zygmunt Bauman (1989) has argued, the Holocaust could not have occurred without the existence of modern, rational forms of social organization and the modernist desire to improve and “perfect” society:

The Holocaust was not an irrational outflow of the not-yet-fully-eradicated residues of pre-modern barbarity. It was a legitimate resident in the house of modernity; indeed, one who would not be at home in any other house (Bauman, 1989).

Bauman argues in particular that it was the rational, efficient organization of the Nazi bureaucracy which, once the problem of a *Judenfrei* Germany was posed by Hitler — a Germany “free” of Jews — enabled a series of solutions to be examined and rejected before the Final Solution was settled on. Bureaucracy also provided the three conditions which made overcoming individual emotional and moral aversion to the mass killing possible. Firstly, the violence was *authorized* according to correct bureaucratic procedures and hierarchical channels of command. Secondly, the violence was *routinized* by the rule-bound practices and clear division of labour of bureaucratic organization. Thirdly, the victims of the violence were *dehumanized* and distanced through, not only ideological propaganda and media spin, but also the impersonality inherent in bureaucracy (Bauman, 1989).

At no point of its long and tortuous execution did the Holocaust come in conflict with the principles of rationality. The ‘Final Solution’ did not clash at any stage with the rational pursuit of efficient, optimal goal implementation. On the contrary, it arose out of a genuinely rational concern, and it was generated by bureaucracy true to its form and purpose (Bauman, 1989).

As this chapter can be read to suggest, the bureaucratic planning and implementation of the Holocaust was supported by a number of other social conditions and properties of group behaviour. In-group and out-group distinctions divided the population into racialized categories of “Aryan” and Jews-Roma-Others. Eugenics and Social-Darwinism described the racialized division of society as a conflict over survival and limited resources. Reference groups created “imaginary” racial and national identities that minimized differences and maximized commonalities within in-groups and communities of comparison. Styles of leadership in a time of economic and political crisis favoured authoritarianism and social order based on domination. Processes of social conformity and groupthink eroded sources of independent thinking, autonomy and pluralism. Social networks expanded the influence of Nazi propaganda and the influence of the Nazi Party in accessing resources and rewards, while also providing a technology of surveillance and a clandestine network of informants.

The point is that the Holocaust was the product of the same ordinary sociological phenomena that operate in society today, including the formation of in-groups and out-groups, conformity to structures of authority, groupthink, networks and the “rational” structure of bureaucratic organizational forms. Therefore, an answer to the question about how the Holocaust was possible must begin with a study of Simmel’s *forms* of collective behaviour. Why do individuals conform to the will of collectivities even when this means overcoming strong personal moral convictions or rational thinking?

A sociological answer to this problem begins at the micro-level perspective of interpersonal interactions. In face to face social situations, people are inclined to attune and adjust themselves to each other in finding a common focus of attention. If people achieve feelings of solidarity and agreement with each other in a joint task they leave with feelings of strength, confidence and enthusiasm. If they do not, the feelings are ones of tension and discomfort, which are difficult to sustain and counter to the drive to socialability (Collins, 2004). Social behaviour at the micro-level is weighted to conformity, but is also episodic and fluid. Where joint actions like the Holocaust extend beyond the immediate, face to face group, sociologists need to examine the properties of groups, networks and formal organizations at meso- and macro-levels to understand how the effect of the whole is more than the sum of the individual parts.

Media Attributions

- **Figure 7.24** [File:Arthur Szyk \(1894-1951\). Anti-Christ \(1942\), New York.jpg](#) by Polish-Jewish artist Arthur Szyk (1894-1951), courtesy of The Arthur Szyk Society, via Wikimedia Commons, is used under a [CC BY-SA 4.0](#) licence.

Chapter 7 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

aggregate: A collection of people who exist in the same place at the same time, but who do not interact or share a sense of identity.**authoritarian leader:** A leader who issues orders and demands compliance from subordinates.

bureaucracy: A formal organization characterized by a hierarchy of authority, a clear division of labour, explicit rules, impersonality and meritocracy.

category: People who share similar characteristics but who are not otherwise socially connected.

coercive organization: Organization that people do not voluntarily join, such as prison or a mental hospital.

collective effervescence: The elevated feeling experienced by individuals when they come together as a group

conformity: The extent to which an individual complies with group or societal norms.

contents: The specific drives, needs, purposes, or interests of individuals that motivate them to interact with others.

core discussion group: The group of close, personal contacts with whom one confides on personal matters and with whom one chooses to spend free time.

democratic leader: A leader who encourages group participation and consensus-building before acting.

division of labour: Organizational structure in which each individual has a specialized task to perform.

dyad: A two-member group.

explicit rules: Rules that are explicitly stated, written down, and standardized.

expressive function: A group function that serves an emotional need.

expressive leader: A leader who is concerned with process and with ensuring everyone's emotional well-being.

formal organizations: Large, impersonal organizations.

formal sociology: The study of how specific social contents are organized into regular patterns of social coordination.

forms: The patterns of behaviour that guide or regulate individuals' actions in different social settings.

glass ceiling: An invisible barrier that prevents women from achieving positions of leadership.

group: Any collection of at least two people who interact with some frequency and who share a sense that their identity is aligned with the group.

groupthink: The tendency to conform to the attitudes and beliefs of the group despite individual misgivings.

hierarchy of authority: A clear chain of command.

ideal type: An abstract model of a recurring social phenomenon that describes the form and logical relation of components.

impersonality: The absence of personal feelings in the conduct of organizational tasks.

in-group: A group a person belongs to and feels is an integral part of their identity.

instrumental function: A group function that serves achieving a task or goal efficiently and effectively.

instrumental leader: A leader who is goal oriented with a primary focus on accomplishing tasks.

iron law of oligarchy: The theory that an organization is ruled by a few elites rather than through collaboration.

laissez-faire leader: A hands-off leader who allows members of the group to make their own decisions.

leadership function: The role of the leader in determining how an organization decides what its goals are and how it will attain them.

leadership style: The style a leader uses to achieve goals or elicit action from group members.

McDonaldization: The increasing presence of the fast-food business model of control, predictability, calculability and efficiency in common social institutions.

macro-level of analysis: A research focus on the properties of large scale, society-wide, social interactions.

meso-level of analysis: A research focus on the characteristics of local networks, groups, and organizations.

micro-level of analysis: A research focus on the social dynamics of small groups and face-to-face interaction.

meritocracy: An organization principle where group membership and advancement are based on merit as shown through proven and documented skills.

normative or voluntary organizations: Organizations that people choose to join to pursue shared interests or because they provide intangible rewards.

out-group: A group that an individual is not a member of and may compete with.

primary groups: Small, informal groups that provide the individual with intimacy and support.

pure sociability: The experience and attraction to the act of being together for its own sake, regardless of the content of the interaction.

realistic conflict theory: An explanation of in-group/out-group behaviour which predicts that antagonism will develop between groups if there is a competition for a resource in which only one group can be the winner and in the absence of superordinate goals requiring cooperation.

reference groups: Groups to which an individual compares herself or himself.

scapegoating: A process in which a dominant group displaces their unfocused aggression and violence onto a subordinate group

secondary groups: Large, impersonal groups that are task-focused and time-limited.

six degrees of separation: Any two individuals on Earth can be linked on average by six network connections.

significant other: An individual who has a large impact on a person's socialization or plays a formative role in shaping their life.

social network: A collection of people tied together by a specific configuration of connections through which resources are exchanged.

three degrees of influence: An individual in a network is influenced by their immediate social contacts, their social contacts' contacts, and their social contacts' contacts' contacts.

total institution: An organization in which participants live a controlled life focused on resocialization.

tragedy of culture: The tendency for the products of culture to detach themselves from lived experience and become increasingly complex, specialized, alienating, or oppressive.

triad: A three-member group.

utilitarian organization: An organization that people join to fill a specific material need.

Section Summary

[7.1 How is society possible?](#)

Georg Simmel argues that “there is no such thing as society as such” because society is nothing except for the ongoing interactions between individuals at any particular moment. Nevertheless the *forms* of interaction can be analyzed independently of the *contents* of interaction. Whether at a micro, meso, or macro level of analysis, the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

[7.2 Groups](#)

Groups largely define how people think of themselves and their place in the world. There are two main types of groups: primary and secondary. Primary groups are small, long-term, intimate, and expressive, whereas secondary groups are large and instrumental in focus. People divide into in-groups and out-groups and use reference groups as standards of comparison to define themselves—as both who they are and who they are not. Sometimes groups can be used to exclude people or as a tool that strengthens prejudice.

The size and dynamic of a group greatly affects how members act. Primary groups rarely have formal leaders, although there can be informal leadership. Groups generally are considered large when there are too many members for a simultaneous discussion.

In secondary groups, there are two types of leadership functions, with expressive leaders focused on emotional health and wellness, and instrumental leaders more focused on results. Further, there are different leadership styles: democratic leaders, authoritarian leaders, and laissez-faire leaders.

Within a group, conformity is the extent to which people want to go along with the norm. Groupthink is the tendency to conform to the attitudes and beliefs of the group despite individual reservations. A number of experiments have illustrated how strong the social pressure to conform can be. It is worth considering real-life examples of how conformity and obedience can lead people to ethically and morally suspect acts.

[7.3 Networks](#)

Social networks are collections of people tied together by a specific configuration of connections through which resources like information, goods, diseases and feelings flow. The structure of the connections, and the function and degree of contagion of the resources that flow through them, determine what the network is capable of and how it influences its members.

[7.4 Formal Organizations](#)

In modern societies, large organizations are organized as bureaucracies based on hierarchy of authority, clear division of labour, explicit rules, impersonality and meritocracy. They fall into three main categories: normative/voluntary, coercive, and utilitarian. Despite their focus on rational organization and efficiency, the outcome of bureaucratic organization is often contradictory in contemporary society. While the pace of change and technology are requiring people to be more nimble and less bureaucratic in their thinking, large bureaucracies like hospitals, schools, and

governments are more hampered than ever by their organizational format. At the same time, the past few decades have seen the development of a trend to bureaucratize and streamline local institutions. Over the last 50 years, main streets across the country increasingly resemble each other; instead of a Bob's Coffee Shop and Jane's Clothing Boutique there is a Dunkin Donuts and a Gap store. This trend has been referred to as the McDonaldization of society.

[7.5 A Sociological Analysis of the Holocaust](#)

The Holocaust is a traumatic example of how sociological principles of group behaviour can explain atrocities. The Holocaust would not have been possible without the formation of in-groups and out-groups, conformity to structures of authority, groupthink, networks and the rational structure of bureaucratic organizational forms.

Questions

Quiz: Groups and Organizations

[7.1 How is society possible?](#)

1. Which of the following is an example of a social phenomenon that would be best understood at the meso-level of analysis?
 - a. The gender differences in facial expressions of couples on first dates.
 - b. The impact of social class on voter preference.
 - c. The informal networks that form within bureaucratic structures.
 - d. The effect of new technologies on knowledge transfer between First World and Third World nations.
2. An example of a social *form* and a social *content* would be:
 - a. An employment application and an employment history.
 - b. Sexual desire and flirtation relationship.
 - c. Cooperation and conflict.
 - d. A hockey game and having fun.

[7.2. Groups](#)

3. What role do secondary groups play in society?
 - a. They are task-based, filling practical needs.
 - b. They provide intimacy and emotional resources.
 - c. The members provide a voluntary, family-like support system outside the home
 - d. They allow individuals to challenge their beliefs and prejudices.
4. When a high school student gets teased by her basketball team for receiving an academic award, she is dealing with competing _____.
 - a. Primary groups

- b. Out-groups
 - c. Reference groups
 - d. Secondary groups
5. Which of the following is NOT an example of an in-group?
- a. The Ku Klux Klan
 - b. A university club
 - c. A synagogue
 - d. A high school
6. What is a group whose values, norms, and beliefs come to serve as a standard for one's own behaviour?
- a. Secondary group
 - b. Formal organization
 - c. Reference group
 - d. All of the above
7. A parent who is worrying over her teenager's dangerous and self-destructive behaviour and low self-esteem may wish to look at her child's _____.
- a. Reference group
 - b. In-group
 - c. Out-group
 - d. All of the above
8. Who is more likely to be an expressive leader?
- a. The sales manager of a fast-growing cosmetics company
 - b. A high school teacher at a youth correctional facility
 - c. The director of a summer camp for chronically ill children
 - d. A manager at a fast-food restaurant
9. Which of the following is NOT an appropriate group for democratic leadership?
- a. A fire station
 - b. A college classroom
 - c. A high school prom committee
 - d. A homeless shelter
10. In Asch's study on conformity, what contributed to the ability of subjects to resist conforming?
- a. A very small group of witnesses
 - b. The presence of an ally
 - c. The ability to keep one's answer private
 - d. All of the above
11. Which type of group leadership has a communication pattern that flows from the top down?
- a. Authoritarian
 - b. Democratic

- c. Laissez-faire
- d. All of the above

7.3 Networks

12. In terms of network analysis, two people who have just had a baby have turned from a _____ to a _____.
- a. Primary group; secondary group
 - b. Dyad; triad
 - c. Couple; family
 - d. De facto group; nuclear family
13. Networks can be characterized by the structure of ties, the functions of ties, and _____.
- a. Who is connected to whom.
 - b. The content of the resources that pass between nodes
 - c. Social media platforms.
 - d. The degree of transmissibility of resources.

7.4 Formal Organizations

14. Which of these is an example of a total institution?
- a. Jail
 - b. High school
 - c. Nazi Party
 - d. All of the above
15. Why do people join utilitarian organizations?
- a. Because they feel an affinity with others there
 - b. Because they receive a tangible benefit from joining
 - c. Because they have no choice
 - d. Because they feel pressured to do so
16. Which of the following is NOT a characteristic of bureaucracies?
- a. Coercion to join
 - b. Hierarchy of authority
 - c. Explicit rules
 - d. Division of labour
17. What are some of the intended positive aspects of bureaucracies?
- a. Increased productivity
 - b. Increased efficiency
 - c. Equal treatment for all
 - d. All of the above
18. What are some of the unintended negative aspects of bureaucracies?

- a. Horizontalization.
 - b. Undermines efficient oligarchical decision-making.
 - c. Red tape.
 - d. All of the above
19. What is a disadvantage of the McDonaldization of society?
- a. There is less variety of goods.
 - b. There is an increased need for employees with postgraduate degrees.
 - c. There is less competition so prices are higher.
 - d. There are fewer jobs so unemployment increases.

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

[7.1. How is society possible?](#)

1. Choose an example of a social activity like hockey, business or dating. How would this activity be approached at a micro, meso, and macro level of analysis?
2. Think of a recent social encounter in which you interacted with one or more people. What purely individual drives, needs, purposes, or interests (i.e., *contents*) drew you together? Can you describe the characteristics of the *form* of the interaction (e.g., cooperation, competition, division of labour, polite, informal, etc.)? Were there a set of rules that structured the encounter? If so, were they implicit or explicit? Can you list them? What would have happened if you had broken a rule?

[7.2 Groups](#)

3. How has technology changed your primary groups and secondary groups? Do you have more (and separate) primary groups due to online connectivity? Do you believe that someone, like Levy, can have a true primary group made up of people she has never met? Why or why not?
4. Compare and contrast two different political groups or organizations, such as the MeToo, Black Lives Matter, Anti-Vaxxer or White Nationalist movements. How do the groups differ in terms of leadership, membership, and activities? How do the group's goals influence participants? Do they have in-groups and out-groups? Explain your answer.
5. The concept of hate crimes has been linked to in-groups and out-groups. Can you think of an example where people have been excluded or tormented due to this kind of group dynamic?
6. Describe a time you were led by a leader using, in your opinion, a leadership style that did not suit the situation. When and where was it? What could she or he have done better?

[7.3 Networks](#)

7. From personal experience, describe how the group dynamics between two people changes when a

third person joins the group (or vice versa, when one person leaves a group of three). Do your observations corroborate Simmel's analysis of dyads and triads?

8. How often do you get valuable information from a friend? From a friend of a friend? How significant do network connections seem to be in your life, i.e., with regard to your political preferences, your body weight and dietary choices, your life style, etc.?
9. How many friends would you call "close"? How many friends would your parents and grand parents call close? Does this correspond with Marsden's research that the size of one's "core discussion group" decreases as one ages?

7.4 Formal Organizations

10. What do you think about fast-food restaurants? Do you think there is a trade-off between the loss of local diversity and a cheap, low quality, standardized service? Is that the best framework to analyze their role in society? Have you ever worked in a fast-food restaurant? What did you learn?
11. Think of an interaction you have had with a bureaucracy, either as an employee or as a client. Did you encounter any of the irrational aspects of bureaucracy? Which aspect applies best to your interaction and why?
12. Where do you prefer to shop, eat out, or grab a cup of coffee? Large chains like Walmart or smaller retailers? Starbucks or a local restaurant? What do you base your decisions on? How does McDonaldization influence your experience?

Further Research

7.2 Groups

Information about [cyberbullying causes and statistics](#) from the Cyberbullying Research Centre.

Take the quiz [What is your leadership style?](#) by Kendra Cherry (updated on October 05, 2021) at Verywell Mind.

Explore the Stanford Prison [experiment on conformity](#) on the official Stanford Prison Experiment website.

7.3 Networks

If you have a Facebook account, you might be interested in downloading the networking software "[Touchgraph](#)" from Christakis and Fowler's website to see a visual representation of your own network connections.

7.4 Formal Organizations

As mentioned above, the concept of [McDonaldization](#) is a growing one.

7.5 A Sociological Analysis of the Holocaust

For more on Zygmunt Bauman's analysis of the Holocaust, see his lecture [Lessons of the Holocaust](#) from January 27, 2012 at Radboud University, Netherlands.

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Solutions to Quiz: Groups and Organizations

1 C, | 2 D, | 3 A, | 4 C, | 5 D, | 6 C, | 7 D, | 8 C, | 9 A, | 10 D, | 11 A, | 12 B, | 13 D, | 14 A, | 15 B, | 16 A, | 17 D, | 18 C, | 19 A, [[Return to quiz](#)]

CHAPTER 8. DEVIANCE, CRIME, AND SOCIAL CONTROL



Figure 8.1 Psychopaths and sociopaths are some of the star deviants in contemporary popular culture. What makes them so appealing as fictional characters? (Photo courtesy of Christian Weber/Flickr.) [CC BY SA 2.0](#)

Learning Objectives

8.1. Deviance and Social Control

- Define deviance and categorize different types of deviant behaviour.
- Determine why certain behaviours are defined as deviant while others are not.
- Differentiate between different methods of social control.

- Understand social control as forms of government including penal social control, discipline, and risk management.

8.2. Theoretical Perspectives on Crime and Deviance

- Describe the positivist view of deviance in society including social disorganization theory, control theory, and strain theory.
- Define how critical sociology understands the relationship between deviance, crime, and inequalities of power.
- Explain feminist theory's unique contributions to understanding the gendered nature of crime and deviance.
- Describe the symbolic interactionist approach to deviance, including differential association theory and labeling theory.

8.3. Crime and the Law

- Identify and differentiate between different types of crimes.
- Distinguish three different measures of crime statistics.
- Explain the falling rate of crime in Canada.
- Examine the overrepresentation of different minorities in the corrections system in Canada.
- Discuss alternatives to prison.

8.4. Public Policy Debates on Crime

- Review the sources of public opinion about crime policy, including media representations, moral panics and moral entrepreneurs.
- Summarize the role of sociology in providing evidence-based public policy on crime.

Introduction to Deviance, Crime, and Social Control

Psychopaths and sociopaths are some of the favourite “deviants” in contemporary popular culture. From Dr. Hannibal Lecter in *The Silence of the Lambs* to Patrick Bateman in *American Psycho* to Dexter Morgan in *Dexter*, the figure of the dangerous individual who lives quietly within society provides a fascinating fictional figure. Psychopathy and sociopathy both refer to personality disorders that involve anti-social behaviour, diminished empathy, and lack of inhibitions.

Psychopaths and sociopaths are often able to manage their condition and pass as “normal” citizens, although their capacity for manipulation and cruelty can have devastating consequences for people around them. The term **psychopathy** is often used to emphasize that the source of the disorder is internal, based on psychological, biological, or genetic factors, whereas **sociopathy** is used to emphasize predominant social factors in the disorder: The social or familial sources of its development and the inability to be social or abide by societal rules (Hare, 1999). In this sense sociopathy would be the sociological disease *par excellence*. It entails an incapacity for companionship (*socius*), yet many accounts of sociopaths describe them as being charming, attractively confident, and outgoing (Hare, 1999).

In a modern society characterized by the predominance of secondary rather than primary relationships, the sociopath or psychopath functions, in popular culture at least, as a prime index of contemporary social unease. The sociopath is like the nice neighbour next door who one day “goes off” or is revealed to have had a sinister second life. In many ways

the sociopath is a cypher for many of the anxieties people have about the loss of community and living among people they do not know. In this sense, the sociopath is a very modern sort of deviant.

Contemporary approaches to psychopathy and sociopathy have focused on biological and genetic causes. This is a tradition that goes back to 19th century positivist approaches to deviance, which attempted to find a biological cause for criminality and other types of deviant behaviour.

Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909), an Italian professor of legal psychiatry, was a key figure in positivist criminology who thought he had isolated specific physiological characteristics of “degeneracy” that could distinguish “born criminals” from normal individuals (Rimke, 2011). In a much more sophisticated way, this was also the premise of James Fallon (b. 1947), a neuroscientist at the University of California. His research involved analyzing brain scans of serial killers (Fallon, 2013). He found that areas of the frontal and temporal lobes associated with empathy, morality, and self-control are “shut off” in serial killers. In turn, this lack of brain activity has been linked with specific genetic markers suggesting that psychopathy or sociopathy was passed down genetically. Fallon’s premise was that psychopathy is genetically determined. An individual’s genes determine whether they are psychopathic or not.



Figure 8.2 Lizzie Borden was tried but not convicted of the axe murders of her father and stepmother in 1892. The popular rhyme of the time went, “Lizzie Borden took an axe, and gave her mother 40 whacks. When she saw what she had done, she gave her father 41.” (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

However, at the same time that Fallon was conducting research on psychopaths, he was studying the brain scans of Alzheimer’s patients. In the Alzheimer’s study, he discovered a brain scan from a control subject that indicated the symptoms of psychopathy he had seen in the brain scans of serial killers. The scan was taken from a member of his own family. He broke the seal that protected the identity of the subject and discovered it was his own brain scan!

Fallon was a married man who had raised children and held down a demanding career as a successful scientist, and yet the brain scan indicated he was a psychopath. When he researched his own genetic history, he realized that his family tree contained seven alleged murderers including the famous Lizzie Borden (1860–1927) who allegedly killed her father and stepmother in 1892. He began to notice some of his own behaviour patterns as being manipulative, obnoxiously competitive, egocentric, and aggressive, just not in a criminal manner. He decided that he was a “pro-social psychopath” — an individual who lacks true empathy for others but keeps their behaviour within acceptable social norms — due to the loving and nurturing family he grew up in. He had to acknowledge that environment, and not just genes, played a significant role in the expression of genetic tendencies (Fallon, 2013).

What can students learn from Fallon’s example from a sociological point of view? Firstly, psychopathy and sociopathy are recognized as problematic forms of deviance because of prevalent social anxieties about the serial killer as a type of criminal who “lives next door” or “blends in.” This is partly because of the nature of modern society where people do not know their neighbours well and partly because identifiable traits of psychopathy and sociopathy are often concealed or not

immediately evident.

Secondly, Fallon acknowledged that there is no purely biological or genetic explanation for psychopathy and sociopathy. A person with mutations in the MAO-A gene and damaged frontal lobes also needed to have a violently traumatic childhood experience for the syndrome of violent psychopathy to be triggered. Trauma can be the product of individual family circumstances but also, potentially, war or other social crises. Many individuals with the biological and genetic markers of psychopathy are not dangers to society — key to pathological expressions of psychopathy are elements of an individual’s social environment and social upbringing (i.e., nurture).

Finally, in Fallon’s own account, it is difficult to separate the discovery of the aberrant brain scan and the discovery

and acknowledgement of his personal traits of psychopathy. Is it clear which came first? He only recognizes the psychopathology in himself after seeing the brain scan. This is the problem of what Ian Hacking calls the **looping effect** that affects the sociological study of deviance (Hacking, 2006). It is not simply a matter of defining and identifying an activity or category of persons deviant, but of the processes by which individuals come to recognize themselves as deviant. The scientific or legal categories of deviance do not simply describe a pre-existing reality, they affect and interact with the people they categorize. Once a category of deviance has been established and applied to a person, that person begins to define themselves in terms of this category and behave accordingly. An identity and criminal or deviant “career path” is constructed when a category *loops back* and changes the person’s behaviour. This influence makes it difficult to define criminals as kinds of person in terms of pre-existing, innate predispositions or individual psychopathologies.

In summary, what Fallon’s example illustrates is the complexity of the study of social deviance.

Media Attributions

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- **Figure 8.2** [Lizzie Borden](#) by Anonymous, via Wikipedia, is in the [public domain](#).

8.1. Deviance and Social Control



Figure 8.3 Much of the appeal of dressing in drag comes from the humour inherent in seeing everyday norms violated. (Photo courtesy of Vicki Burton/Flickr.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

What, exactly, is deviance? What is the relationship between deviance and crime? According to sociologist William Graham Sumner (1840–1910), **deviance** is a violation of norms. More specifically, it is a violation of established contextual, cultural, or social norms, whether folkways, mores, or codified law (1906). As discussed in [Chapter 3. Culture](#), **folkways** are norms based on everyday cultural customs concerning practical matters like how to hold a fork, what type of clothes are appropriate for different situations, or how to greet someone politely. **Mores** are more serious moral injunctions that are broadly recognized in a society, like lying or stealing. Codified **laws** are norms that are specified in explicit codes and enforced by government bodies. A **crime** is therefore an act of deviance that breaks not only a norm, but a law. Deviance can be as minor as picking one's nose in public or as major as committing murder.

John Hagen provides a typology to classify deviant acts in terms of their perceived harmfulness, the degree of consensus concerning the norms violated, and the severity of the response to them (1994). The most serious acts of deviance are **consensus crimes** about which there is near-unanimous public agreement. Acts like murder and sexual assault are generally regarded as morally intolerable, injurious, and subject to harsh penalties. **Conflict crimes** are acts like prostitution or eating psychedelic mushrooms, which may be illegal but about which there is considerable public disagreement concerning their seriousness. **Social deviations** are acts like abusing serving staff or behaviours arising from mental illness or addiction, which are not illegal in themselves but are widely regarded as serious or harmful. People agree that these behaviours call for institutional intervention. Finally there are **social diversions** like riding

skateboards on sidewalks, overly tight leggings, or facial piercings that violate norms in a provocative way but are generally regarded as distasteful, or for some cool, but harmless.

The point is that the question, “What is deviant behaviour?” cannot be answered in a straightforward manner. No act or person is *intrinsically* deviant. This follows from two key insights of the sociological approach to deviance, which distinguish it from moral and legalistic approaches. Firstly, deviance is defined by its social context. This means that where norms differ — locally, cross-culturally or historically — what constitutes deviance also differs. To understand why some acts are deviant and some are not, it is necessary to understand what the social context is, what the existing rules are, and how these rules came to be established. If the rules change, what counts as deviant also changes. As rules and norms vary across cultures and time, it makes sense that notions of deviance also change.

Fifty years ago, public schools in Canada had strict dress codes that, among other stipulations, often banned women from wearing pants to class. Today, it is socially acceptable for women to wear pants, but less so for men to wear skirts. In a time of war, acts usually considered morally reprehensible, such as taking the life of another, may actually be rewarded. Much of the confusion and ambiguity regarding the use of violence in hockey has to do with the different sets of rules that apply inside and outside the arena. Acts that are acceptable and even encouraged on the ice would be punished with jail time if they occurred on the street. Whether an act is deviant or not depends on society’s definition of that act. Acts are not deviant in themselves.

The second sociological insight follows closely from the first. Deviance is not an intrinsic (biological or psychological) attribute of individuals, nor an intrinsic quality of the acts themselves, but a product of social processes. The norms that define deviance are themselves continually defined and redefined through ongoing social processes — moral, political, legal, cultural, etc. Similarly, to *become* deviant means to be *assigned* a deviant identity or to actively *assume* a deviant identity. It is the outcome of a process of identity formation. It is not a single rule breaking act that defines someone as deviant. Being deviant is to incorporate rule-breaking into one’s life on an ongoing basis.

As discussed later in this chapter, it is a central tenet of symbolic interactionist **labeling theory**, that individuals become criminalized through contact with the **criminal justice system** (Becker, 1963). The well-known problem of using imprisonment to respond to criminal offenders is that prison influences individual behaviour and self-understanding, but often not in the way intended. Incarceration has a latent function. Prisons can be agents of socialization *into* a life of crime. The act of imprisonment itself modifies individual behaviour to make individuals more criminal. If the insight of the sociological research into the social characteristics of those who have been arrested or processed by the criminal justice system — variables such as gender, age, race, and class — is added to this, it is evident that social variables and power structures are key to understanding who chooses a criminal career path.

In sum, an individual’s deviant status is ascribed to them through social processes. Individuals are not born deviant, but become deviant through their interaction with reference groups, institutions, and authorities. Through social interaction, individuals are labelled deviant or recognize themselves as deviant.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

Why I Drive a Hearse



Figure 8.4 When playing in his first band, The Squires, in Winnipeg in the 1960s, Neil Young bought a 1948 Buick Roadmaster hearse to transport the instruments. He named the hearse Mortimer Hearseburg, shortened to Mort. When Mort I died, he bought a 1953 Pontiac hearse, which became Mort II. (Photo courtesy of Greg Gjerdingen/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

When singer/song writer Neil Young left Canada in 1966 to seek his fortune in California as a musician, he drove his famous 1953 Pontiac hearse “Mort II.” He and Bruce Palmer were driving the hearse in Hollywood when they happened to see Stephen Stills and Richie Furay driving the other way, a fortuitous encounter that led to the formation of the band Buffalo Springfield (McDonough, 2002). Later Young wrote the song *Long May You Run*, which he performed at the closing ceremonies of the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, as an elegy to his first hearse “Mort”.

Rock musicians are often noted for their eccentricities, but is driving a hearse deviant behaviour? When sociologist Todd Schoepflin ran into his childhood friend Bill who drove a hearse, he wondered what effect driving a hearse had on his friend and what effect it might have on others on the road. Would using such a vehicle for everyday errands be considered deviant by most people? Schoepflin interviewed Bill, curious to know why he drove such an unconventional car. Bill had simply been on the lookout for a reliable winter car; on a tight budget, he searched used car ads and stumbled on one for the hearse. The car ran well and the price was right, so he bought it.

Bill admitted that others’ reactions to the car had been mixed. His parents were appalled and he received odd stares from his coworkers. A mechanic once refused to work on it, stating that it was “a dead person

machine.” On the whole, however, Bill received mostly positive reactions. Strangers gave him a thumbs-up on the highway and stopped him in parking lots to chat about his car. His girlfriend loved it; his friends wanted to take it tailgating; and people offered to buy it.

Could it be that driving a hearse is not really so deviant after all? Schoepflin theorized that, although viewed as outside conventional norms, driving a hearse is such a mild form of deviance that it actually becomes a mark of distinction. Conformists find the choice of vehicle intriguing or appealing, while nonconformists see a fellow oddball to whom they can relate. As one of Bill’s friends remarked, “Every guy wants to own a unique car like this and you can certainly pull it off.” Such anecdotes are a reminder that although deviance is often viewed as a violation of norms, it is not always viewed in a negative light (Schoepflin, 2011).



Figure 8.5 A hearse with the licence plate “LASTRYD.” How would you view the owner of this car? (Photo courtesy of Brian Teutsch/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Social Control and Regulation

Social Control as Sanction

When a person violates a social norm, what happens? A driver caught speeding can receive a speeding ticket. A student who texts in class gets a warning from a professor. An adult belching loudly is avoided. All societies practice **social control**, the regulation and enforcement of norms. Social control can be defined broadly as an organized action intended to change or correct people’s behaviour (Innes, 2003). The underlying goal of social control is to maintain **social order**, the ongoing, predictable arrangement of practices and behaviours on which society’s members base their daily lives. Think of social order as an employee handbook, and social control as the incentives and disincentives used to encourage or oblige employees to follow those rules. When a worker violates a workplace guideline, the manager steps in to enforce the rules.

One means of enforcing rules are through **sanctions**. Sanctions can be positive as well as negative. **Positive sanctions**

are rewards given for conforming to norms. A promotion at work is a positive sanction for working hard. **Negative sanctions** are punishments for violating norms. Being arrested is a punishment for shoplifting. Both types of sanctions play a role in social control.

Sociologists also classify sanctions as formal or informal. Although shoplifting, a form of social deviance, may be illegal, there are no laws dictating the proper way to scratch one's nose. That does not mean picking one's nose in public will not be punished; instead, nose-pickers will encounter **informal sanctions**. Informal sanctions emerge in face-to-face social interactions. For example, wearing flip-flops to an opera or swearing loudly in church may draw disapproving looks or even verbal reprimands, whereas behaviour that is seen as positive — such as helping an old man carry grocery bags across the street — may receive positive informal reactions, such as a smile or pat on the back.

Formal sanctions, on the other hand, are ways to officially recognize and enforce norm violations. If a student is caught plagiarizing the work of others or cheating on an exam, for example, they might be expelled. Someone who speaks inappropriately to the boss could be fired. Someone who commits a crime may be arrested or imprisoned. On the positive side, a soldier who saves a life may receive an official commendation, or a CEO might receive a bonus for increasing the profits of the corporation.

Not all forms of social control are adequately understood through the use of sanctions, however. Donald Black (b. 1941) identified four key styles of social control, each of which defines deviance and the appropriate response to it in a different manner (1976). **Penal social control** functions by prohibiting certain social behaviours and responding to violations with punishment. **Compensatory social control** obliges an offender to pay a victim to compensate for a harm committed. **Therapeutic social control** involves the use of therapy to return individuals to a normal state. **Conciliatory social control** aims to reconcile the parties of a dispute and mutually restore harmony to a social relationship that has been damaged. While penal social controls emphasize the use of sanctions, compensatory, therapeutic and conciliatory social controls emphasize processes of restoration and healing. The latter are types of social control that sociologists refer to as *disciplinary*.



Figure 8.6 Machiavelli: “If an injury has to be done to a man it should be so severe that his vengeance need not be feared.” The ruthlessness with which Machiavelli advised the prince to govern his relationships with subjects and rivals has earned its own adjective in common usage: Machiavellian. (Image courtesy of Wikipedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Social Control as Government and Discipline

Michel Foucault (1926–1984) notes that from a period of early modernity onward, European society became increasingly concerned with social control as a practice of government (Foucault, 2007). In this sense of the term, government does not simply refer to the activities of the state, but to all the practices by which individuals or organizations seek to govern the behaviour of others or themselves. **Government** refers to the strategies by which one seeks to direct or guide the conduct of another or others.

In the 15th and 16th centuries, numerous treatises were written on how to govern and educate children, how to govern the poor and beggars, how to govern a family or an estate, how to govern an army or a city, how to govern a state and run an economy, and how to govern one's own conscience and conduct. These treatises described the burgeoning arts of government, which defined the different ways in which the conduct of individuals or groups might be directed. Niccolò Machiavelli's *The Prince* (1532), which offers advice to the prince on how best to conduct his relationship with his subjects, is the most famous of these treatises.

The common theme in the various arts of governing proposed in early modernity was the extension of Christian monastic practices involving the detailed and continuous government and salvation of souls. The principles of

monastic government were gradually expanded and applied to a variety of non-monastic areas. People needed to be

governed in all aspects of their lives. It was not, however, until the 19th century and the invention of modern institutions like the prison, public school, modern army, asylum, hospital, and factory, that the means for extending government and social control widely through the population were developed.

Foucault describes these modern forms of government as **disciplinary social control** because they each rely on the detailed continuous training, control, and observation of individuals to improve their capabilities: to transform criminals into law abiding citizens, children into educated and productive adults, recruits into disciplined soldiers, patients into healthy people, etc. (1979). Foucault argues that the ideal of discipline as a means of social control is to render individuals docile. That does not mean that they become passive or sheep-like, but that disciplinary training simultaneously increases their abilities, skills, and usefulness while making them more compliant and manipulable.



Figure 8.7 Presidio Modelo prison, Cuba, built between 1926 and 1928 was based on Bentham's panopticon design. (Photo courtesy of Friman/Wikimedia Commons.)
[CC BY SA 3.0](#)

The chief components of disciplinary social control in modern institutions like the prison and the school are surveillance, normalization, and examination (Foucault, 1979). **Surveillance** refers to the various means used to make the lives and activities of individuals visible to authorities. In 1791, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) published his book on the ideal prison, the **panopticon** or “seeing machine.” Prisoners’ cells would be arranged in a circle around a central observation tower where they could be both separated from each other and continually exposed to the view of prison guards. In this way, Bentham proposed, social control could become automatic because prisoners would be induced to monitor and control their own behaviour.

Similarly, in a school classroom, students sit in rows of desks immediately visible to the teacher at the front of the room. In a store, shoppers can be observed through one-way glass or video monitors. Contemporary surveillance expands the capacity for observation using video or electronic forms of surveillance to render the activities of a population visible. London, England holds the dubious honour of being the most surveilled city in the world. The city’s “ring of steel” is a security cordon in which over half a million surveillance cameras are used to monitor and record traffic moving in and out of the city centre.

The practice of **normalization** refers to the way in which norms, such as the level of math ability expected from a grade 2 student, are first established and then used to assess, differentiate, and rank individuals according to their abilities (e.g., as an A student, B student, C student, etc.). Individuals’ progress in developing their abilities, whether in math skills, good prison behaviour, health outcomes, or other areas, is established through constant comparisons with others and with natural and observable norms. Minor sanctions are used to continuously modify behaviour that does not comply with correct conduct: Rewards are applied for good behaviour and penalties for bad.

Periodic **examinations** through the use of tests in schools, medical examinations in hospitals, inspections in prisons, year-end reviews in the workplace, etc. bring together surveillance and normalization in a way that enables each individual and each individual's abilities to be assessed, documented, and known by authorities. On the basis of examinations, individuals can be subjected to different disciplinary procedures more suited to them. Gifted children might receive an enriched educational program, whereas poorer students might receive remedial lessons.

Foucault describes disciplinary social control as a key mechanism in creating a **normalizing society**. The establishment of norms and the development of disciplinary procedures to correct deviance from norms become increasingly central to the organization and operation of institutions from the 19th century onward. To the degree that “natural” or sociological norms are used to govern our lives more than laws and legal mechanisms, society can be said to be controlled through normalization and disciplinary procedures. Whereas the use of formal laws, **courts**, and the **police** come into play only when laws are broken, disciplinary techniques enable the continuous and ongoing social control of an expanding range of activities in our lives through surveillance, normalization, and examination. While people may never encounter the police because of breaking a law, if they work, go to school, or end up in hospital, they are routinely subject to disciplinary control through most of the day.

Social Control as Risk Management



Figure 8.8 The contents of a needle exchange kit. (Image courtesy of Todd Huffman/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Many recent types of social control have adopted a model of **risk management** in a variety of areas of problematic behaviour. Risk management refers to interventions designed to reduce the likelihood of undesirable events occurring based on an assessment of probabilities of risk. Unlike the crime and punishment model of penal social sanctions, or the rehabilitation, training, or therapeutic models of disciplinary social control, risk management strategies do not seize hold of individual deviants but attempt to restructure the environment or context of problematic behaviour in order to minimize the risks to the general population.

For example, the public health model for controlling intravenous drug use does not focus on criminalizing drug use or obliging users to rehabilitate themselves to “kick drugs” (O'Malley, 1998). It argues that fines or imprisonment do not curtail drug users propensity to continue to use drugs, and that therapeutic rehabilitation of drug use is not only expensive but unlikely to succeed unless drug users are willing to quit. Instead, it calculates the risk of deaths from drug overdoses and the danger to the general population from the transmission of disease (like HIV and hepatitis C) and attempts to modify the riskiest behaviours through targeted interventions. Programs like needle exchanges (designed to prevent the sharing of needles) or safe-injection-sites (designed to provide sanitary conditions for drug injection and immediate medical services for overdoses) do not *prevent* addicts from using drugs but *minimize* the harms resulting

from drug use by modifying the environment in which drugs are injected. Reducing risks to public health is the priority of the public health model.

In the case of crime, the **new penology** strategies of social control are also less concerned with criminal responsibility, moral condemnation, or rehabilitative intervention and treatment of individual offenders (Feely & Simon, 1992). Rather, they are concerned with techniques to identify, classify, and manage groupings of offenders sorted by the degree of dangerousness they represent to the general public. In this way, imprisonment is used to incapacitate those who represent a significant risk, whereas probation, restorative justice and various levels of surveillance are used for those who represent a lower risk. Examples include sex offender tracking and monitoring, or the use of electronic monitoring ankle bracelets for low-risk offenders. New penology strategies seek to regulate levels of deviance, not intervene or respond to individual deviants or the social determinants of crime.

Similarly, **situational crime control** redesigns spaces where crimes or deviance could occur to minimize the risk of crimes occurring there (Garland, 1996). Using alarm systems, CCTV surveillance cameras, adding or improving lighting, broadcasting irritating sounds, or making street furniture uncomfortable are all ways of working on the cost/benefit analysis of potential deviants or criminals before they act rather than acting directly on the deviants or criminals themselves.

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8.2. Theoretical Perspectives on Crime and Deviance



Figure 8.9 Do the masked criminals in *The Joker's* criminal gang (*The Dark Knight* (Nolan, 2008)) have back stories that help explain their choice of a life of crime? Or is crime a spontaneous, in the moment, kind of decision? (Photo courtesy of Brecht Bug/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

Why do crime and deviance occur? How does one become “a criminal” or “a deviant”? How does crime affect society and how does society affect crime? How do sociologists explain crime? Since the early days of sociology, crime and deviance have been seen as social problems that call for sociological research and explanation in order to find solutions.

Sociologists have developed theories attempting to explain what causes deviance and crime and what they mean to society. These theories can be grouped according to the three major sociological types of knowledge: positivism, critical sociology and interpretive sociology (see [Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology](#)).

Positivist types of theory focus on identifying the background variables in an offender's social environment that determine or predict criminal and deviant behaviour. Crime or deviance are taken as relatively straightforward to define. They are simply rule-breaking or law-breaking acts, which can be linked to objective variables in the offenders social backgrounds.

With critical sociology the picture gets more complicated. Critical types of theory focus on the historical context of class, gender, racial, colonial and other power relations in society to explain crime and deviance. Why are certain

acts punished as criminal or deviant and certain acts not? Why are certain types of crime or deviance prevalent in one community, gender or social strata and not in others? Institutional regulation, the criminal justice system, and crime itself are seen as arms of different types of power, sometimes as extensions of power and sometimes as resistance.

Finally, interpretive types of theory focus on how the meanings of criminality or deviance get established. Key to understanding crime and deviance is not simply the objective fact of law-breaking or rule-breaking, but the intentions of the individuals involved, the variable meanings the acts or behaviours hold for people, and the social processes through which acts and individuals get defined as criminal or deviant. As Jack Katz (1988) puts it, “What are people trying to do when they commit a crime?” should be the first thing a sociologist asks.

The different paradigms within these types of knowledge lead to different ways of researching and addressing the problems of crime and deviance.

Positivism




Figure 8.10 Face measurements based on Cesare Lombroso's criminal anthropology (Photo courtesy of Nicolasbuenaventura/ Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 3.0](#)

Sociologists who follow the positivist approach view the social world as a place governed by predictable and regular social patterns that can be uncovered through systematic observation. They are concerned with describing law-like relationships between variables that can predict outcomes: if *this*, then *that*. What are the background variables — age, family circumstances, economic position, racial or ethnic background, gender, etc. — that cause criminal or deviant behaviours or predict their likelihood in the future? The emphasis in positivism is on identifying factors that are directly observable or measurable, which implies that infractions themselves are straightforward to define. Tappan (1947) defines crime, for instance, as an intentional act that violates criminal law and is subject to penalization by the state. This is a relatively easy thing to identify through crime statistics and victimization surveys.

Early positivism relied on a biological or psychological **defect model** of crime and deviance to explain law-breaking and rule-breaking behaviours. As Box (1981) describes it, “people who break the rules of society were [seen as] defective, and ... the root of this defect lay within them.” It was noted at the beginning of the chapter, for example, that Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909) founded the 19th century school of positivism by attempting to isolate specific physiological characteristics of “degeneracy” that could distinguish “born criminals” from normal individuals (Rimke, 2011). Similarly, from the point of view of psychology, deviants could be distinguished by personality defects or traumas that cognitively or libidinally prevented them from adjusting to normal rule-following behaviour. The idea of the sociopath is a case in point.

In sociological positivism, the background variables identified in explanations of crime and deviance are not usually individual defects but “social defects.” “Deviant behaviour [is] not to be perceived as the manifestation of a defective human being, but as the indicator of a defective social environment” (Box, 1981). Background variables like social disorganization, absence of social controls, and social strain (discussed below) are expected to predict a higher likelihood of criminal or deviant behaviour.

There are numerous frameworks in positivist sociology for identifying which variables of social environment are key. For example, Pratt and Cullen's (2005) meta-analysis of 214 empirical studies discussed the relative strengths of seven different macro-level predictors of crime derived from seven different positivist theories including social

disorganization theory, strain theory, economic deprivation theory, routine activity theory, deterrence theory, social support theory and subcultural theory. Their findings showed the strongest empirical support for explanations based on indicators of concentrated disadvantage, whereas explanations that emphasized lack of deterrence (increased policing, “tough on crime” policies) had the weakest support.

Four influential positivist theories of deviance are Durkheim’s functionalist theory, social disorganization theory, control theory and strain theory.

Émile Durkheim and Functionalism

Within positivism, the functionalist paradigm has been a productive source of explanatory frameworks for crime and deviance. Sociologists who follow the functionalist approach analyse the functions of different social structures, norms or patterns of behaviour in the maintenance of society, understood as a systematic whole. This, oddly enough, includes crime and deviance, which are persistent social facts in all societies. Deviance, by definition, would appear to be the opposite of normal, yet Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) believed that deviance is a necessary, normal and functional part of normal society. Crime and deviance are disruptive, sometimes brutally so, but they also perform important functions.

Durkheim was aware of the diversity of acts or behaviours that different societies defined as criminal or deviant. He therefore defined crime by the one common external property it shared across different cultures and periods of history: crime is an act that offends the collective conscience and evokes collective punishment. “[W]e note the existence of certain acts, all presenting the external characteristic that they evoke from society the particular reaction called punishment. We constitute them as a separate group, to which we give a common label; we call every punished act a crime...” (1938 (1895)). Crime and deviance are not defined by their individual motivations or by specific rules and infractions but by the collective response they evoke.

As such, crime and deviance have four important functions in supporting the social solidarity or cohesiveness of societies. They have: (1) a *boundary-setting function*, marking the moral boundaries that members of society should not cross; (2) a *group solidarity function*, uniting the group against a common enemy; (3) an *adaptive function*, allowing society to change its boundaries in response to new circumstances and innovative crimes (for example, the “sit in” protests of the Civil Rights Movement); and (4) a *tension-reduction function*, reducing the internal tensions of a society by projecting them onto criminal or deviant groups or scapegoats (Kramar, 2011).

Therefore, for Durkheim, the persistent patterns of crime and deviance observed in society could be explained by the functions they performed in maintaining society as a whole. These functions did not *cause* crime and deviance *per se*, but they explained why they existed and what their role in society was. It suggests that if crime and deviance did not exist they would have to be invented, otherwise substitutes for these functions would have to be found.

Social Disorganization Theory and Control Theory

Developed by researchers at the University of Chicago in the 1920s and 1930s, **social disorganization theory** asserts that crime is most likely to occur in communities with weak social ties and the absence of social control. What they observed from the Chicago court records of juvenile offenders was that rates of crime were not evenly distributed across Chicago. High crime rates were concentrated in particular zones of the city and these rates remained stable over time, regardless of which particular individuals or groups resided there. In other words, crime rates seemed to be products of the areas, not the people *per se*. As the different ethnic, immigrant and racialized groups transitioned out of these zones and moved to other parts of the city, their crime rates decreased accordingly but the rates in the high crime zones remained stable. This led the Chicago School sociologists to propose a **social ecology** theory of the city in which, like the biotic communities of a natural ecosystem, different groups of people occupied specific *niches* in an overall

system. Human communities were complex systems of mutual dependence that, like ecosystems, go through stages of succession from disruption to climax (or stable) communities.

They termed the disrupted areas **zones of transition**. These had emerged near the center of Chicago along the transportation conduits into the city and between the established working class neighbourhoods and the manufacturing district. 1920s and 1930s Chicago was a city in flux. The city's poorest and newest residents tended to live in these transitional, economically deprived zones, where there was a fractious mixture of racialized groups, immigrant ethnic groups, and non-English speakers. The Chicago School sociologists proposed that the zones themselves were *socially disorganized*. They were sites of poor social control and regulation because their populations were fluid and transient and conventional institutions of control like family, schools, work, churches, and voluntary community organizations had not become established there (Shaw and McKay, 1942). In a certain way, this is the opposite of Durkheim's thesis. Rather than deviance being a force that reinforces moral and social solidarity, it is the absence of moral and social solidarity that provides the conditions for social deviance to emerge.



Figure 8.11 Proponents of social disorganization theory believe that individuals who grow up in impoverished and transient areas are more likely to participate in deviant or criminal behaviours. (Photo courtesy of Phillis1fan777 /English Wikipedia.) [Public Domain](#)

Social disorganization theory points to the built environment and overall social organization of cities as the cause of deviance. A person is not born a criminal but becomes one over time, based on factors in their social environment. This theme was taken up by Travis Hirschi's (1935–2017) **control theory**, which examines social disorganization from the point of view of the individual.

According to Hirschi, social control is directly affected by the strength of social bonds that tie an individual to the institutional life of society (1969). Many people would be willing to break laws or deviate from the rules to reap the rewards of pleasure, excitement, and profit, etc. if they had the opportunity to do so. Those who *do* have the opportunity are those who are only weakly controlled by the type of social bonds that tie others to mainstream society and give them a stake in it. Similar to Durkheim's theory of anomie ([Chapter 4. Society and Modern Life](#)), deviance is seen to result where

disconnection from society predominates over social integration. Individuals who believe they are a part of society or believe they have a future in society are less likely to commit crimes against it.

Hirschi identified four types of social bond that connect people to society (1969):

1. *Attachment* measures the degree of connection to others. When one is closely attached to other people, one worries about their opinions. People conform to society's norms in order to gain approval (and prevent disapproval) from family, friends, colleagues and romantic partners.
2. *Commitment* refers to the investments people make in conforming to conventional behaviour. A well-respected local businesswoman who volunteers at her synagogue and is a member of the neighbourhood block organization has more to lose from committing a crime than a woman who does not have a career or ties to the community. There is a cost/benefit calculation in the decision to commit a crime in which the costs of being caught are much higher for some than others.
3. Similarly, levels of *involvement*, or participation in socially legitimate activities, lessen a person's likelihood of deviance simply due to lack of opportunity. Children who are members of Little League baseball teams have less time and opportunity to engage in deviant behaviour. "The person involved in conventional activities is tied to appointments, deadlines, working hours, plans, and the like, so the opportunity to commit deviant acts rarely arises" (Hirschi, 1969).
4. The final bond, *belief*, is an agreement on common values in society. If a person views social values as beliefs, they will conform to them. An environmentalist is more likely to pick up trash in a park because a clean environment is

a social value to that person.

Thus each of the types of bond Hirschi identifies describes a background variable which predicts who is more or less likely to engage in criminal acts. An individual who grows up under conditions where ties to legitimate institutions and authorities are weak, difficult to establish, or distant from the individual's lived reality and future prospects is more likely to become a criminal than an individual from a privileged background who has a lot more at stake and a lot more to lose by breaking the law. The latter has "skin in the game", whereas, for the former, the mutual dependencies and complex relationships that form the basis of a healthy "ecosystem" of social control do not get established.

Research into social disorganization theory can greatly influence public policy. How can socially disorganized communities be reorganized? Evidence from Pratt and Cullen's (2005) meta-analysis suggests that social disorganization at the neighbourhood level is a stronger predictor of crime than variables concerning the implementation of "harder" law and order criminal justice policies (with the exception of the use of incarceration, which *increases* crime rates). The public policy implications of the sociological research therefore suggest that rather than using the police to crack down on crime in designated neighbourhoods, public spending and private investment should be used on programs physically located in the most economically deprived neighbourhoods and run by people from those neighbourhoods. This serves to create not only local employment but local institutions of community control, whose absence is in fact the source of the problem of social disorganization. Investments in community based agencies work to strengthen ties within the community and between people in the community and external social services. Research shows that social control is least effective when imposed by outside forces (Figueira-McDonough, 1991). In a similar vein, funding family preservation programs, which focus on keeping families intact and empowered rather than punishing individual offenders, strengthen families' abilities to resist social disorganization (Nelson, Landsman and Duetelman, 1990). However, in proposing that social disorganization is essentially a moral problem of anomie — that it is shared moral values and social integration that hold communities together — questions about historical relations of economic inequality, racism, and power do not get asked.

Robert Merton: Strain Theory




Figure 8.12 Al Capone or “Scarface” (1899–1947), the famous prohibition era Chicago gangster. Robert Merton (1938) writes that within the context of social strain, “Capone represents the triumph of amoral intelligence over morally prescribed ‘failure,’ when the channels of vertical mobility are closed or narrowed.” (Photo courtesy of the Miami Police Department/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Sociologist Robert Merton (1910–2003) agreed that deviance is, ironically, a *normal* behaviour in modern society, but expanded on Durkheim’s ideas by developing **strain theory** (1938). He noted that social strains or contradictory forces are built into the structure of society when access to the legitimate means of achieving socially acceptable goals like material or financial success was not evenly distributed. A kind of *anomie* or normlessness emerged in segments of North American society because of a dysfunctional relationship or disequilibrium between values and norms.

The North American value system glorifies the value and prestige of wealth, while its normative system defines and regulates acceptable means of attaining wealth: a good job, a good education, a good network of contacts, a good familial

background, a good neighbourhood, etc. For the majority of people this works without too much conflict. However, not everyone in North American society stands on equal footing. In a class based society not everyone has access to the legitimate means of obtaining success. A person may have the socially acceptable goal of financial success but lack a socially acceptable way to reach that goal. This is a cause of mental and moral conflict for many.

According to Merton's theory, a person growing up in a neighbourhood where conventional occupational opportunities are limited to unskilled, manual labour will see few opportunities to "get ahead" through legal means. Similarly, an entrepreneur who can not afford to launch his own company may be tempted to embezzle from his employer for start-up funds. When motivated by success but confronted with barriers to attaining it, individuals are caught in a quandary or strain that is built in to the structure of North American society. They are tempted to abandon the norms and rules and adopt alternative, illegitimate solutions (what Merton referred to as "innovations") to attain the universally revered standards of success. The discrepancy between the reality of structural inequality and the high cultural value placed on economic success creates a strain that has to be resolved by some means.

Table 8.1. Five Possible Modes of Adjustment or Adaptation by Individuals to Social Strain (Merton, 1938)

	Cultural goals	Institutionalized means
1. Conformity	+	+
2. Innovation	+	-
3. Ritualism	-	+
4. Retreatism	-	-
5. Rebellion	+/-	+/-

Merton (1938) in fact defined five ways that people adapt to this strain between socially accepted goals and socially accepted ways to pursue them. These are indicated in [Table 8.1](#) in which "+" indicates acceptance, "-" indicates rejection, and "+/-" indicates "rejection and substitution of new goals and standards."

1. *Conformity*: The majority of people in society choose to conform to institutionalized means of attaining success. They pursue their society's valued goals to the extent that they can through socially accepted means.
2. *Innovation*: Those who innovate pursue goals they cannot reach through legitimate means by substituting criminal or deviant means.
3. *Ritualism*: People who ritualize lower their goals until they can reach them through socially acceptable ways. These "social ritualists" like middle management bureaucrats, hard workers who accept they will never get ahead or people who "go through the motions" focus on conformity to the accepted means of goal attainment while abandoning the distant, unobtainable dream of success.
4. *Retreatism*: Others retreat from the structural strain and reject both society's goals and accepted means. Some street people, hermits, religious cloisters, voluntary simplicity advocates or "back-to-the-landers" have withdrawn from society's goal of financial success. They drop out.
5. *Rebellion*: Some people rebel, seeking to replace a society's goals and means with an alternate or revolutionary model.

With respect to crime and deviance, the second category "innovation" is the most relevant. In a class divided society, many youth from poor backgrounds are exposed to the high value placed on material success in capitalist society but face insurmountable odds to achieving it, so turning to illegal means to achieve success is a rational, more effective, in fact normal, solution to the problem. As Merton sums up, "On the one hand, they are asked to orient their conduct toward the prospect of accumulating wealth and on the other, they are largely denied effective opportunities to do so

institutionally” (Merton, 1938). Al Capone’s ruthless choice of purely instrumental means over moral means to achieve success is a rational, if anomic, choice within a dysfunctional society.

Critical Sociology

Critical sociology examines macro-level social and economic factors as the causes of crime and deviance. Unlike positivists, critical sociologists do not see these factors as objective social facts, but as evidence of operations of power and entrenched social inequalities. The normative order and the criminal justice system are not simply neutral or “functional” with regard to the collective interests of society. Institutions of normalization, law, and the criminal justice system have to be seen in context as mechanisms that actively maintain the power structure of the political-economic order.

The rich, the powerful, and the privileged have unequal influence on who and what gets labelled deviant or criminal, particularly in instances where their privilege or interests are being challenged. As capitalist society is based on the institution of private property, for example, it is not surprising that theft is a major category of crime. By the same token, when street people, addicts, or hippies drop out of society, they are labelled deviant and are subject to police harassment because they have refused to participate in the productive labour that is the basis of capital accumulation and profit.

Richard Quinney (1977) examined the role of law, policing and punishment in modern society. He argued that, as a result of inequality, many crimes can be understood as **crimes of accommodation**, or ways in which individuals cope with conditions of inequality and oppression. *Predatory crimes* like break and enter, robbery, and drug dealing are often simply economic survival strategies. *Personal crimes* like murder, assault, and sexual assault are products of the strains of living under stressful conditions of scarcity, deprivation and humiliation. *Defensive crimes* like economic sabotage, illegal strikes, civil disobedience, and eco-terrorism are direct political challenges to social injustice.



Figure 8.13 Corporate crime as a crime of domination. (Figure courtesy of Anonymous9000/Flickr) [CC BY 2.0](#)

On the other hand, crimes committed by people in power are often **crimes of domination**. *Crimes of control* are committed by police and law enforcement, such as violations of rights, over-policing minority communities, illegal surveillance and use of excessive force. *Crimes of government* are committed by elected and appointed officials of the state through misuse of state powers, including corruption, misallocation of funds, political assassinations and illegal wars. *Crimes of economic domination* comprise white collar and corporate crime, including embezzlement, fraud, price-fixing, insider trading, tax evasion, unsafe work conditions, pollution, and marketing of hazardous products. *Crimes of social injury* include practices of institutional racism and economic exploitation, violations of basic human rights, or denials of gender, sexual and racial

equality, that are often not considered unlawful.

Those in power define what crime is and who is excluded from full participation in society as a matter of course. Quinney pointed out that crimes of domination are not criminalized and policed to the degree that crimes of accommodation are, even though the harms they pose to society are greater and affect more people.

Inequality in normative regulation, law, policing and punishment is compounded in Canada through the legacy of colonialism. Although racial inequality has been formally eliminated by law and policy, racialized minorities are overrepresented in the criminal justice system in large part due to historical colonial narratives linking criminality and race (Mawani and Sealy, 2011). While crime rates have been declining overall, incarceration rates for Indigenous people and Blacks have increased, as has the use of racial profiling and the unequal application of discretionary powers

by police and criminal justice authorities. A pattern of prejudice, racial bias and stereotyping is pervasive within the administration of justice.

Critical sociologists argue that this is not so much a product of a few “bad seeds” within the criminal justice system, but of the institutional repercussions of colonialism, the process whereby Europeans established control over other people’s territories and lives. As the formal structures of colonial segregation were dismantled — i.e., slavery, the Reserve system, residential schools, legal disenfranchisement, etc. — informal post-colonial segregation was reestablished to control the “freed” populations, who continue to be defined by the same colonial narratives as dangerous, violent, irrational, child-like, unassimilable, un-civil, or degenerate *Others*.

Garland (1985) describes one outcome of this colonial legacy as the **penal welfare complex**. This refers to a system of control that effectively uses the prison and criminal justice system to manage the surplus, largely racialized, underclass of people who have been excluded from normal circuits of civility. Generations of people find themselves caught in a vicious circle of broken households, incarcerated parents or family members, engagement in minor crimes (petty theft, drinking alcohol in public, loitering, drugs, etc.), prison, parole, and back to prison because of parole violations. In the era of neoliberal capitalism, welfare budgets are cut and imprisonment expands, leading to the construction of a semi-permanent quasi-criminal population managed by police, judges, parole officers and social workers.

Crime and Social Class

While positivist theories often emphasize crime and deviance associated with the underprivileged, there is in fact no clear evidence that crimes are committed disproportionately by the poor or lower classes. There is an established association between the underprivileged and serious **street crimes** like armed robbery or assault, but these do not constitute the majority of crimes in society, nor the most serious crimes in terms of their overall social, personal, and environmental harms.

On the other hand, “suite crimes” or crimes committed by the wealthy and powerful remain an underpunished and costly problem within society. **White-collar crime** refers to “crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his [or her] occupation” (Sutherland, 1949). **Corporate crime** refers to crimes committed by corporate employees or owners in the pursuit of profit or other organization goals. White collar crime benefits the individual involved whereas corporate crime benefits the company or corporation. Both types of crime are more difficult to detect than street crime because the transactions take place in private and are more difficult to prosecute because the criminals can secure expert legal advice on how to bend the rules.

In the United States it has been estimated that the yearly value of all street crime is roughly 5 per cent of the value of corporate crime or “suite crime” (Snider, 1994). Comparable data is not compiled in Canada; however, the Canadian Department of Justice reported that the total value of property stolen or damaged due to property crime in 2008 was an estimated \$5.8 billion (Zhang, 2008), which would put the cost of corporate crime at \$116 billion (if the same ratio holds true in Canada). For example, Revenue Canada estimates that wealthy Canadians had a combined total of between \$75.9 billion and \$240.5 billion in 2013 concealed in untaxed offshore tax havens (Canada Revenue Agency, 2018). In 2020, the Canada Revenue Agency was reported as pursuing an estimated \$4.4 billion in taxes from individuals and corporations suspected of concealing wealth in offshore tax havens (Nardi, 2020).

PricewaterhouseCoopers reports that 36 per cent of Canadian companies were subject to white-collar crime in 2013 (theft, fraud, embezzlement, cybercrime). One in ten lost \$5 million or more (McKenna, 2014). Recent high-profile Ponzi scheme and investment frauds run into tens of millions of dollars each, destroying investors’ retirement savings. Vincent Lacroix was sentenced to 13 years in prison in 2009 for defrauding investors of \$115 million; Earl Jones was sentenced to 11 years in prison in 2010 for defrauding investors of \$50 million; Weizhen Tang was sentenced to 6 years in prison in 2013 for defrauding investors of \$52 million. These were highly publicized cases in which jail time was demanded by the public (although as nonviolent offenders the perpetrators are eligible for parole after serving one-sixth of their sentence). However, in 2011–2012 prison sentences were nearly twice as likely for the typically lower-class perpetrators

of break and enters (59 per cent) as they were for typically middle- and upper-class perpetrators of fraud (35 per cent) (Boyce, 2013).

This imbalance based on class power can also be put into perspective with respect to homicide rates (Samuelson, 2000). In 2005, there were 658 homicides in Canada recorded by police, an average of 1.8 a day. This is an extremely serious crime, which merits the attention given to it by the criminal justice system. However, in 2005 there were also 1,097 workplace deaths that were, in principle, preventable. Canadians work on average 230 days a year, meaning that there were on average five workplace deaths a day for every working day in 2005 (Sharpe & Hardt, 2006). Estimates from the United States suggest that only one-third of on-the-job deaths and injuries can be attributed to worker carelessness (Samuelson, 2000).

In 2005, 51 per cent of the workplace deaths in Canada were due to occupational diseases like cancers from exposure to asbestos (Sharpe & Hardt, 2006). The Ocean Ranger oil rig collapse that killed 84 workers off Newfoundland in 1982 and the Westray Mine explosion that killed 26 workers in Nova Scotia in 1992 were due to design flaws and unsafe working conditions that were known to the owners. However, whereas corporations are prosecuted for regulatory violations governing health and safety, it is rare for corporations or corporate officials to be prosecuted for the consequences of those violations. “For example, a company would be fined for not installing safety bolts in a construction crane, but not prosecuted for the death of several workers who were below the crane when it collapsed (as in a recent case in Western Canada)” (Samuelson, 2000).

Corporate crime is arguably a more harmful type of crime than street crime, yet white-collar criminals are treated relatively leniently. Fines, when they are imposed, are typically absorbed as a cost of doing business and passed on to consumers, and many crimes, from investment fraud to insider trading and price fixing, are simply not prosecuted. For example, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that law enforcement fail to apprehend money launderers 99.8% of the time (UNODC, 2011). From a critical sociology point of view, this is because white-collar crime is committed by elites who are able to use their power and financial resources to evade punishment. Here are some examples:

1. An expert panel estimated that annual money laundering activity in Canada in 2018 was \$46.7 billion and \$7.4 billion in British Columbia (Maloney, Somerville and Unger, 2019). The use of real estate as a means to launder money is estimated to be a major contributor to the inflation of real estate prices in Vancouver, increasing property values by approximately 5% and contributing to the affordability crisis. However because of laws protecting the privacy of financial transactions and property ownership information, law enforcement agencies have difficulty tracing who has committed money-laundering crime, where the crime has been committed, or even that a crime has been committed at all.
2. The KPMG offshore tax avoidance scheme involved creating shell companies for Canadian multimillionaires and billionaires in the Isle of Man, where clients could “give away” their wealth and get back regular tax-free “gifts,” thus avoiding paying federal taxes. Because of difficulties in prosecuting the cases, the Canada Revenue Agency offered secret amnesty to some clients who had been using the scheme and “settled out of court” with others (Cashore and Zalac, 2021; Cashore, Ivany & Findlay, 2017).
3. In the United States, not a single criminal charge was filed against a corporate executive after the financial mismanagement of the 2008 financial crisis. The American Security and Exchange Commission levied a total of \$2.73 billion in fines and out-of-court settlements, but the total cost of the financial crisis was estimated to be between \$6 and \$14 trillion (Pyke, 2013).
4. In Canada, three Nortel executives were charged by the RCMP’s Integrated Market Enforcement Team (IMET) with fraudulently altering accounting procedures in 2002–2003 to make it appear that Nortel was running a profit (thereby triggering salary bonuses for themselves totalling \$12 million), but were acquitted in 2013. The accounting procedures were found to inflate the value of the company, but the intent to defraud could not be proven. The RCMP’s IMET, implemented in 2003 to fight white-collar crime, managed only 11 convictions over the first nine years of its existence (McFarland & Blackwell, 2013).
5. Canadian pipeline company Enbridge’s 20,000-barrel spill of bitumen (tar sands) oil into the Kalamazoo River,

Michigan in 2010 was allowed to continue for 17 hours and involved the company twice re-pumping bitumen into the pipeline. The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board report noted that the spill was the result of “pervasive organizational failures,” and documents revealed that the pipeline operators were more concerned about getting home for the weekend than solving the problem (Rusnell, 2012). No criminal charges were laid.



Figure 8.14 In the United States, from 1986 until 2010, the punishment for possessing crack, a “poor person’s drug,” was 100 times stricter than the punishment for cocaine use, a drug favoured by the wealthy. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Feminist Contributions

Women who are regarded as criminally deviant are often seen as being **doubly deviant**. They have broken the law but they have also broken gender norms about appropriate female behaviour, whereas men’s criminal behaviour is seen as consistent with their aggressive, self-assertive character.

This double standard explains the tendency to medicalize women’s deviance, to see it as the product of physiological or psychiatric pathology. For example, in the late 19th century, kleptomania was a diagnosis used in legal defences that linked an extreme desire for department store commodities with various forms of female physiological or psychiatric illness. The fact that “good” middle- and upper-class women, who were at

that time coincidentally beginning to experience the benefits of independence from men, would turn to stealing in department stores to obtain the new feminine consumer items on display there, could not be explained without resorting to diagnosing the activity as an illness of the “weaker sex” (Kramar, 2011).

Feminist analysis focuses on the way gender inequality influences the opportunities to commit crime and the definition, detection, and prosecution of crime. In part the gender difference revolves around patriarchal attitudes toward women and the disregard for matters considered to be of a private or domestic nature. For example, until 1969 abortion was illegal in Canada, meaning that hundreds of women died or were injured each year when they received illegal abortions (McLaren & McLaren, 1997). It was not until the Supreme Court ruling in 1988 that struck down the law that it was acknowledged that women are capable of making their own choice, in consultation with a doctor, about the procedure.

Similarly, until the 1970s two major types of criminal deviance were largely ignored or were difficult to prosecute as crimes: sexual assault and spousal assault. Through the 1970s, women worked to change the criminal justice system and establish rape crisis centres and battered women’s shelters, bringing attention to domestic violence. In 1983 the Criminal Code was amended to replace the crimes of rape and indecent assault with a three-tier structure of sexual assault (ranging from unwanted sexual touching that violates the integrity of the victim to sexual assault with a weapon or threats or causing bodily harm to aggravated sexual assault that results in wounding, maiming, disfiguring, or endangering the life of the victim) (Kong et al., 2003). Holly Johnson (1996) reported that in the mid-1990s, when violence against women began to be surveyed systematically in Canada, 51 per cent of Canadian women had been the subject to at least one sexual or physical assault since the age of 16.

The goal of the amendments was to emphasize that sexual assault is an act of violence, not a sexual act. Previously, rape had been defined as an act that involved penetration and was perpetrated against a woman who was not the wife of the accused. This had excluded spousal sexual assault as a crime and had also exposed women to **secondary victimization** by the criminal justice system when they tried to bring charges. Secondary victimization occurs when the women’s own sexual history and her willingness to consent are questioned in the process of laying charges and reaching a conviction, which as feminists pointed out, increased victims’ reluctance to lay charges.

In particular, feminists challenged the **twin myths of rape** that were often the subtext of criminal justice proceedings presided over largely by men (Kramar, 2011). The first myth is that women are untrustworthy and tend to lie about assault

out of malice toward men, as a way of getting back at them for personal grievances. The second myth, is that women will say no to sexual relations when they really mean yes. Typical of these types of issues was the judge's comment in a Manitoba Court of Appeal case in which a man pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting his twelve- or thirteen-year-old babysitter:

The girl, of course, could not consent in the legal sense, but nonetheless was a willing participant. She was apparently more sophisticated than many her age and was performing many household tasks including babysitting the accused's children. The accused and his wife were somewhat estranged (as cited in Kramar, 2011).

Because the girl was willing to perform household chores in place of the man's estranged wife, the judge assumed she was also willing to engage in sexual relations. In order to address these types of issue, feminists successfully pressed the Supreme Court to deliver rulings that restricted a defence attorney's access to a victim's medical and counselling records and rules of evidence were changed to prevent a woman's past sexual history being used against her. Consent to sexual discourse was redefined as what a woman actually says or does, not what the man believes to be consent. Feminists also argued that spousal assault was a key component of patriarchal power. Typically it was hidden in the household and largely regarded as a private, domestic matter in which police were reluctant to get involved.

Interestingly women and men report similar rates of spousal violence — in 2009, 6 per cent had experienced spousal violence in the previous five years — but women are more likely to experience more severe forms of violence including multiple victimizations and violence leading to physical injury (Sinha, 2013). In order to empower women, feminists pressed lawmakers to develop zero-tolerance policies that would support aggressive policing and prosecution of offenders. These policies oblige police to lay charges in cases of domestic violence when a complaint is made, whether or not the victim wished to proceed with charges (Kramar, 2011).

In 2009, 84 per cent of violent spousal incidents reported by women to police resulted in charges being laid. However, according to victimization surveys only 30 per cent of actual incidents were reported to police. The majority of women who did not report incidents to the police stated that they dealt with them in another way, felt they were a private matter, or did not think the incidents were important enough to report. A significant proportion, however, did not want anyone to find out (44 per cent), did not want their spouse to be arrested (40 per cent), or were too afraid of their spouse (19 per cent) (Sinha, 2013).

Interpretive Sociology

Interpretive sociology is a theoretical approach that can be used to explain how societies and/or social groups come to view behaviours as deviant or conventional. The key emphasis is on the way that the meanings which guide behaviour are constructed in the course of social interactions and become attached to things and people. Research focuses on the social processes through which specific activities and identities are socially defined as “deviant” and then come to be “lived” as deviant. Deviance is something that, in essence, is learned. In interpretive research, crime, deviance and deviants are not approached as quantifiable things or objects, but as the products of processes of *criminalization*, *Othering* and *identity formation*.

- *Criminalization* is “the process by which behaviors and individuals are transformed into crime and criminals” (Michalowski, 1985). For example, Becker (1963) notes the processes whereby moral entrepreneurs and authorities come to decide that specific activities are criminal, as well as the sequence of interactions with the criminal justice system that a person goes through in being assigned a criminal identity.
- *Othering* is the process in which an individual becomes recognized and stigmatized as socially deviant. In Othering, a deviant, abnormal or Other group is defined in opposition to a “normal” group. Negative or deviant characteristics are attributed to behaviours, individuals or groups that set them apart as abnormal, different or

“other.” This is a process that involves power relations because not all groups have the power to determine what their social identity is. For example, Michel Foucault describes the institutional “dividing practices” used in psychology, medicine and criminology to objectify the subjects under their control in relation to norms of sanity, health, and innocence that the institutions themselves define: the “mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the ‘good boys’” (Foucault, 1994).

- *Identity formation* is the process in which an individual creates and sustains a self-image and position in the world. In the study of crime and deviance, identity formation describes the process in which an individual goes from committing an act of deviance or rule breaking to assuming a deviant identity in which rule breaking is a matter of course. It involves a process of aligning subjective self-understanding with external definitions of self.

To sum up, social groups and authorities create deviance by first making the rules and then applying them to people who are thereby labelled as outsiders (Becker, 1963). Deviance is not an intrinsic quality of individuals but is created through the social interactions of various authorities, institutions and individuals.

Deviance as Learned Behaviour

In the early 1900s, sociologist Edwin Sutherland (1883-1950) sought to understand how deviant behaviour developed among people. Since criminology was a young field, he drew on other aspects of sociology including social interactions and group learning (Laub, 2006). His conclusions established **differential association theory**, stating that individuals *learn* deviant behaviour from those close to them who provide models of and opportunities for deviance. According to Sutherland, deviance is less a personal choice and more a result of differential socialization processes. Differential association refers to the balance of a person's criminal and non-criminal associations. “A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favourable to violation of the law over definitions unfavourable to violation of law” (Sutherland and Cressey, 1977). In other words, having a social milieu in which most of one's contacts encourage or normalize criminality predicts the likelihood of becoming criminal, whereas a social milieu where one's contacts discourage criminality predict the opposite. A teenager whose friends shoplift is more likely to view shoplifting as acceptable.



Figure 8.15 Howard Becker playing piano at a club on 63rd Street in Chicago, circa 1950. (Photo courtesy of Howard S. Becker.) Used with Permission.

The concept of deviance as learned behaviour can be illustrated by Howard Becker's (b. 1928) study of marijuana users in the jazz club scene of Chicago in the 1950s (1953). Becker paid his way through graduate studies by performing as a jazz pianist and took the opportunity to study his fellow musicians. He conducted 50 interviews and noted that becoming a marijuana user involved a social process of initiation into a deviant role that could not be accounted for by either the physiological properties of cannabis or the psychological needs (for intoxication, escape, fantasy, etc.) of the individual. Rather the "career" of the marijuana user involved a sequence of changes in attitude and experience learned through social interactions with experienced users before cannabis could be regularly smoked for pleasure.

Regular cannabis use was a social achievement that required the individual to pass through three distinct stages. Failure to do so meant that the individual would not assume a deviant role as a regular user of cannabis.

- *Firstly*, individuals had to learn to smoke cannabis in a way that would produce real effects. Many first-time users do not feel the effects. If they are not shown how to inhale the smoke or how much to smoke, they might not feel the drug had any effect on them. Their "career" might end there if they are not encouraged by others to persist.
- *Secondly*, they had to learn to recognize the effects of "being high" and connect them with drug use. Although people might display different symptoms of intoxication — feeling hungry, elated, rubbery, etc. — they might not recognize them as qualities associated with the cannabis or even recognize them as different at all. Through listening to experienced users talk about their experiences, novices are able to locate the same type of sensations in their own experience and notice something qualitatively different going on.
- *Thirdly*, they had to learn how to enjoy the sensations. They had to learn how to define the situation of getting high as pleasurable. Smoking cannabis is not necessarily pleasurable and often involves uncomfortable experiences like loss of control, impaired judgement, insecurity, distorted perception, and paranoia. Unless the experiences can be redefined as pleasurable, the individual will not become a regular user. Often experienced users are able to coach novices through difficulties and encourage them by telling them they will learn to like it. It is through differential association with a specific set of individuals that a person learns and assumes a deviant role. The role needs to be learned and its value recognized before it can become routine or normal for the individual.

Procurement into prostitution involves a similar process, one which is manipulated by the procurers or pimps. Hodgson (1997) describes two methods of procurement that pimps use to draw girls into a life of prostitution. After judging a girl's level of vulnerability, they deploy either a *seduction method*, providing affection, attention and emotional support for the most isolated girls, or a *stratagem method*, promising wealth, glamour and excitement for those who are less vulnerable. After a girl has "chosen" to stay with the "family," they are socialized step by step to comply to the roles, rules and expectations of the world of prostitution. Their former identity is neutralized and attachment to previously learned values and norms is weakened through a process that begins with (a) training in the rules of the sex trade by the pimp's "wife-in-law" or "main lady," (b) turning the first trick, which deepens the girl's identification with street culture and the other prostitutes, and (c) the use of violence to enforce compliance when the girl has second thoughts and the relationship with the pimp deteriorates. At each stage the girl finds herself more deeply entrenched in a world of norms, values and behaviours that are strongly stigmatized in the dominant culture. While various levels of coercion are present, the process of learning, internalizing and acknowledging the deviant self-image and social role of the prostitute is necessary for continued participation in prostitution.

Labeling Theory

Although many people violate norms from time to time, few people would consider themselves deviant. Often, those who do, however, have gradually come to believe they are deviant because they have been labelled "deviant" by society. **Labeling theory** examines the ascribing of a deviant behaviour to another person by members of society. Thus, what is considered deviant is determined not so much by the behaviours themselves or the people who commit them, but

by the reactions of others to these behaviours. As a result, what is considered deviant changes over time and can vary significantly across cultures. As Becker put it, “deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to the offender. The deviant is one to whom the label has successfully been applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour people so label” (1963).

It is important to note that labeling theory does not address the initial motives or reasons for the rule-breaking behaviour, which might be unknowable, but the outcome of criminal justice procedures that process offenders as deviants. It does not attempt to answer the questions of why people break the rules so much as why particular acts or particular individuals are labelled deviant while others are not. How do certain acts get labelled deviant and what are the consequences?

Sociologist Edwin Lemert expanded on the concepts of labeling theory, identifying two types of deviance that affect identity formation. **Primary deviance** is the initial violation of norms that does not result in any long-term effects on the individual's self-image or interactions with others. Speeding is a deviant act, but receiving a speeding ticket generally does not make others view the offender as a bad person, nor does it alter offender's own self-concept. Individuals who engage in primary deviance still maintain a feeling of belonging in society and are likely to continue to conform to norms in the future.

However, primary deviance can morph into secondary deviance. **Secondary deviance** occurs when a person's self-concept and behaviour begin to change after their actions are labelled as deviant by members of society. The person may begin to take on and fulfill the role of a “deviant” as an act of rebellion against the society that has labelled that individual as such. For example, consider a high school student who often cuts class and gets into fights. The student is reprimanded frequently by teachers and school staff, and soon enough, develops a reputation as a “troublemaker.” As a result, the student might take these reprimands as a mark of status and start acting out even more, breaking more rules, adopting the troublemaker label and embracing this deviant identity.

Secondary deviance can be so strong that it bestows a **master status** on an individual. A master status is a label that describes the chief characteristic of an individual. Some people see themselves primarily as doctors, artists, or grandfathers. Others see themselves as beggars, convicts, or addicts. The criminal justice system is ironically one of the primary agencies of socialization into the criminal “career path.” The labels “juvenile delinquent” or “criminal” are not automatically applied to individuals who break the law. A teenager who is picked up by the police for a minor misdemeanour might be labelled as a “good kid” who made a mistake and who then is released after a stern talking to, or they might be labelled a juvenile delinquent and processed as a young offender. In the first case, the incident may not make any impression on the teenager's personality or on the way others react to them. In the second case, being labelled a juvenile delinquent sets up a set of responses to the teenager by police and authorities that lead to criminal charges, more severe penalties, and a process of socialization into the criminal identity.

In detention in particular, individuals learn how to assume the identity of serious offenders as they interact with hardened, long-term inmates within the prison culture (Wheeler, 1961). The act of imprisonment itself modifies behaviour, to make individuals more criminal. Aaron Cicourel's (b. 1928) research in the 1960s showed how police used their discretionary powers to label rule-breaking teenagers who came from homes where the parents were divorced as juvenile delinquents and to arrest them more frequently than teenagers from “intact homes” (1968). Judges were also found to be more likely to impose harsher penalties on teenagers from divorced families. Unsurprisingly, Cicourel noted that subsequent research conducted on the social characteristics of teenagers who were charged and processed as juvenile delinquents found that children from divorced families were more likely to be charged and processed. Divorced families were seen as a cause of youth crime. This set up a vicious circle in which the research confirmed the prejudices of police and judges who continued to label, arrest, and convict the children of divorced families disproportionately. The labeling process acted as a self-fulfilling prophecy in which police found what they expected to see.

Once a label is applied it can become a **self-fulfilling prophecy**. Self-fulfilling prophecies refer to the mechanisms put in play by the act of labeling, which “conspire to shape the person in the image people have of him” (Becker, 1963). A person may or may not fit the label given, but through a series of processes eventually does. Becker notes several elements in the process in which a label becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Firstly, someone who has been labelled a criminal or deviant based on committing a specific act of deviance or crime is often considered as criminal and

deviant in other respects as well. Their entire personality is tainted. They are considered, at their core, “to be a person ‘without respect for the law’” (Becker, 1963). Secondly, once characterized as such, a person tends to get cut off and isolated from participation in conventional social life even if, prior to the labeling, their deviant activity did not affect their participation. The use of intravenous drugs might not affect a user’s work performance but the public knowledge and subsequent reaction to their drug use will most likely lead to them losing their job. The person who is labelled as an addict is seen as “weak-willed” and unemployable, whether actual job performance is affected or not. Thirdly, as a consequence of the resulting social isolation, the labelled person finds it difficult *not* to break other norms and laws, which they had otherwise no intention of breaking. They are also more likely to turn to social support from criminal or deviant subcultures where the support from conventional society has been withdrawn. To continue to enjoy the pleasures of using prohibited drugs, the user is obliged to turn to the black market where drugs are expensive and dangerous and forge relationships there. “Hence the treatment of the addict’s deviance places him in a position where it will probably be necessary to resort to deceit and crime in order to support his habit. The behavior is a consequence of the public reaction to the deviance rather than a consequence of the inherent qualities of the deviant act” (Becker, 1963).

Micro sociology: The Foreground of Crime and Deviance

Much of the sociological explanation of crime and deviance focuses on the background variables that lead or make it likely that individuals will break rules. Positivist sociology often examines background factors like broken homes, employment status, neighbourhood or social strain, etc. as causes of criminality or deviance. Critical sociology examines structural inequalities based on class, gender or race, etc. as the historical context of crime and deviance. Micro-sociologists do not necessarily disagree, but emphasize that crime or rule-breaking, whatever its likelihood predicted by background variables, always takes place in a particular situation and a particular moment in time. They draw attention to the *foreground* variables of rule breaking: the immediate circumstances of the violation, the opportunities and impediments to rule breaking that are present, the different motives, experiences and interpretations of the people involved, and the moods and emotional process of perpetrators (or victims). Without these foreground factors the crime or violation would not take place.

As Katz (1988) puts it, something “in the moment” must exist to propel an individual to commit a crime. Each crime has unique situational or micro-sociological variables that provide the foreground of the crime.

By way of explanation, I will propose for each type of crime a different set of individually’ necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, each set containing (1) a path of action – distinctive practical requirements for successfully committing the crime, (2) a line of interpretation – unique ways of understanding how one is and will be seen by others, and (3) an emotional process – seductions and compulsions that have special dynamics (Katz, 1988).

Katz notes in particular that there is an emotional quality that accompanies different types of crime: the hot-blooded murder, the furtive sneakiness of shoplifting, the hardening of the stickup “hardman,” etc. Each type of crime has its own “seductions and compulsions”— a distinctive and compelling feeling or attraction to the perpetrator in the moment that leads them to overcome resistance. Types of *moral emotion* such as “humiliation, righteousness, arrogance, ridicule, cynicism, defilement, and vengeance” (Katz, 1988) are especially central to experiences of criminal rule breaking. One of the most compelling attractions of rule breaking is to overcome a challenge and “prove oneself” in some fashion. The highschool shooter seeks to overcome the humiliation of having his masculinity challenged by committing an act of exaggerated violent masculinity. The teenage shoplifter engages in a “thrilling melodrama about the self” in being able to demonstrate personal competence and get away with shoplifting under the noses of adults. These claims to “moral existence,” as Katz describes them, (i.e., claims to self-validity, self-righteousness or self-vindication, etc.), are compelling motivators in the moment of the act.



Figure 8.16 A macro-level explanation of gun violence might point to the culture of violence or the availability of weapons as a cause. A micro-level explanation focuses on the situational processes or pathways that make gun violence possible. Collins (2008) argues that most gun violence is incompetent because of the difficulties people have overcoming the confrontational tension/fear barrier. (Figure courtesy of Daniel Grosvenor/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

Similarly, Collins (2008) argues that micro-sociological or situational variables have to be taken into account in explaining violence. Although background conditions of poverty, racial discrimination, toxic masculinity, family disorganization, abuse, stress, frustration or exposure to media violence, etc. might predispose someone to violence, they are not sufficient to explain specific acts of violence. Micro-sociological evidence shows that in order for violence to take place in actual face-to-face situations, a person has to overcome powerful barriers that are built in to the processes of social interaction itself. He refers to this as a **confrontational tension/fear barrier**. Violence is difficult to accomplish because the natural tendency in any social interaction is agreement. Dischord and confrontation cause tension, which is uncomfortable and usually avoided, but if the confrontation escalates towards violence, a potent physiological “cocktail” in the form of fear, anxiety and adrenalin kicks in as a barrier to the confrontation going further. “No matter how motivated someone may be, if the situation does not unfold so that confrontational tension/fear is overcome, violence will not proceed” (Collins, 2008). This applies to ordinary street violence, domestic violence and other criminal violence, as well as professional violence such as police violence or military combat, where direct confrontations take place face to face. Violence is correspondingly easier the more distant the combatants are from each other.

For example, Collins describes the escalation of tensions and “bluster” that lead to street fights. Tensions escalate in a confrontation when the individuals start breaking the codes of conversational turn taking and start talking over each other. The argument gets louder and more heated as each person tries to control the “conversational space,” interrupting the other and disrupting the other’s ability to speak. The cognitive content of the dispute tends to dissipate and is replaced by staccato utterances, insults, and swearing, which have more dramatic impact. However, usually the confrontation will end before coming to violence. One person will leave “in a huff” even if it means loss of face, or the exchange will become boring and lose energy, for both the participants and the audience. Only if specific situational conditions are met will the confrontation become violent.

[C]onfrontations bring tension and fear, which inhibits effective violence; emotional tension gets released into violent attack only where there is a weak victim, or where the conflict is hedged round with social supports to make it a staged fight fought within socially enforced limits. Thus bluster is likely to lead onward to a fight in one of these two circumstances: First, if one side feels much stronger than the other, at least at that moment, the stronger launches an attack. The bluster itself may provide the test of who is weaker; wavering or cringing in the face of bluster, or retreating from it, is one thing that can trigger an attack. Second, if there is a highly interested audience, witnessing the buildup of boast and bluster, the scene is set for a fight, and the principals may not be able to back out of it if they wished (Collins, 2008).

As a result, Collins defines violence micro-sociologically as a process: “a set of pathways around confrontational tension and fear” (Collins, 2008).

From the micro-sociological perspective, it is important for sociology to determine the situational circumstances of rule-breaking or crime in forming an explanation therefore: “I suggest that a seemingly simple question be asked persistently in detailed application to the facts of criminal experience: what are people trying to do when they commit a crime?” (Katz, 1988).

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8.3. Crime and the Law

What Is Crime?

Although deviance is a violation of social norms, it is not always punishable, and it is not necessarily bad. Crime, on the other hand, is a behaviour that violates official law and is punishable through formal sanctions. Walking to class backwards is a deviant behaviour. Driving with a blood alcohol percentage over the province's limit is a crime. Like other forms of deviance, however, ambiguity exists concerning what constitutes a crime and whether all crimes are, in fact, “bad” and deserve punishment.

For example, in 1946 Viola Desmond refused to sit in the balcony designated for blacks at a cinema in New Glasgow, Nova Scotia, where she was unable to see the screen. She was dragged from the cinema by two men who injured her knee, and she was then arrested, obliged to stay overnight in the male cell block, tried without counsel, and fined.

The court ruling ended up ignoring the laws concerning racial segregation in Canada, which was the reason why she was removed from the cinema. Instead her crime was determined to be tax evasion because she had not paid the 1 cent difference in tax between a balcony ticket and a main floor ticket. She took her case to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia where she lost. In hindsight, and long after her death, she was posthumously pardoned, because the application of the law was clearly in violation of norms of social equality.

As noted above, all societies have informal and formal ways of maintaining social control. Within these systems of norms, societies have **legal codes** that maintain formal social control through laws, which are rules adopted and enforced by a political authority. Those who violate these rules incur negative formal sanctions in the form of fines, jail or court ordered retribution. Normally, punishments are relative to the degree of the crime and the importance to society of the value underlying the law. There are, however, other factors that influence criminal sentencing.



Figure 8.17 From criminal to iconic figure on the \$10 bill. “Viola Desmond was a successful black businesswoman who was jailed, convicted and fined for defiantly refusing to leave a whites-only area of a movie theatre in 1946. Her court case was an inspiration for the pursuit of racial equality across Canada” (Bank of Canada, 2018.) [Public Domain](#)

Types of Crimes

Not all crimes are given equal weight. Society generally socializes its members to view certain crimes as more severe than others. As discussed earlier, John Hagen distinguished between serious **consensus crimes**, like murder and sexual assault, about which there is near-unanimous public agreement, and **conflict crimes**, like prostitution or recreational drugs, which may be illegal but about which there is considerable public disagreement concerning their seriousness. Even within the category of crimes on which there is consensus, there is disagreement about levels of seriousness and punishment. For example, most people would consider murdering someone to be far worse than stealing a wallet and would expect a murderer to be punished more severely than a thief. In modern North American society, crimes are typically classified as one of two types based on their severity. **Violent crimes** (also known as “crimes against a

person”) are based on the use of force or the threat of force. Rape, murder, and armed robbery fall under this category. **Nonviolent crimes** involve the destruction or theft of property, but do not use force or the threat of force. Because of this, they are also sometimes called “property crimes.” Larceny, car theft, and vandalism are all types of nonviolent crimes. If you use a crowbar to break into a car, you are committing a nonviolent crime; if you mug someone with the crowbar, you are committing a violent crime.

As noted earlier in the section on critical sociological approaches, when people think of violent and non-violent crime, they often picture **street crime**, or offenses committed by ordinary people against other people or organizations, usually in public spaces. An often overlooked category of non-violent crime is **corporate crime** (or “suite crime”), crime committed by white-collar workers in a business environment. Embezzlement, insider trading, ponzi schemes and fraud are all types of corporate crime. Although these types of offences rarely receive the same amount of media coverage as street crimes, they can be far more damaging. The 2008 world economic recession was the ultimate result of a financial collapse triggered by corporate crime. An often-debated third type of crime is **victimless crime**. These are called victimless because the perpetrator is not explicitly harming another person. As opposed to battery or theft, which clearly have a victim, a crime like drinking a beer at age 17 or selling a sexual act do not result in injury to anyone other than the individual who engages in them, although they are illegal. While some claim acts like these are victimless, others argue that they actually do harm society. Prostitution may foster abuse toward women by clients or pimps. Drug use may increase the likelihood of employee absences. Such debates highlight how the interpretation of the deviant and criminal nature of actions develops through ongoing public discussion.

Making Connections: Sociological Research

Hate Crimes

Police-reported hate crimes, by type of motivation, Canada, 2011




Figure 8.18 In Canada, there were 1,332 reported victims of hate crimes in 2011. The General Social Survey suggests that only one-third of hate motivated incidences are reported to police. (Source: Allen & Boyce, 2013.) [Stats Can Open Licence Agreement](#)

In the early morning of January 4, 1998, Nirmal Singh Gill, a 65-year-old Sikh caretaker in Surrey, B.C. was beaten to death in the parking lot of the Guru Nanak Sikh temple by five white-supremacist skinheads, aged 17 to 25, as he was about to open the temple for early morning worship. The skinheads were part of a group that called itself White Power. They had been to an all-night drinking party when they decided they were going to vandalize some cars in the temple parking lot. They encountered the caretaker Nirmal Singh Gill and took turns attacking him. In trial it came out that the eldest of the skinheads had recently been released from the military because of his racist beliefs. Another had a large Nazi flag pinned to the wall of his apartment. In a telephone call intercepted during the investigation that led to the skinheads' arrest, one skinhead was recorded as saying, "Can't go wrong with a Hindu death cause it always sends a f'n message" (R. v. Miloszewski, 1999). Gill was not Hindu, but Sikh.

Attacks motivated by hate based on a person's race, religion, or other characteristics are known as **hate crimes**. The category of hate crimes grew out of the provisions in the Criminal Code that prohibit hate propaganda (sections 318 and 319) including advocating genocide, public incitement of hatred, or the willful promotion of hatred against an identifiable group. In 1996, section 718.2 of the Criminal Code was amended to introduce hate motivation as an aggravating factor in crime that needed to be considered in sentencing (Silver et al., 2004).

In 2009 Statistics Canada's *General Social Survey on Victimization* reported that 5 per cent of the offenses experienced by victims of crime in Canada were believed by the victims to be motivated by hate (approximately 399,000 incidents in total) (Perreault & Brennan, 2010). However, police reported hate crimes totaled only 1,473 incidents in 2009. About one-third of the *General Social Survey* respondents said they reported the hate-motivated incidents to the police. In 2011 police-reported hate crimes had dropped to 1,322 incidents. The majority of these were racially or ethnically motivated, but many were based on religious prejudice (especially anti-Semitic) or sexual orientation. A significant portion of the hate-motivated crimes (50 per cent) involved mischief (vandalism, graffiti, and other destruction of property). This figure increased to 75 per cent for religious-motivated hate crimes. Violent hate crimes constituted 39 per cent of all hate crimes (22 per cent accounted for by violent assault specifically). Sexual-orientation-motivated hate crimes were the most likely to be violent (65 per cent) (Allen & Boyce, 2013).

The number of police-reported hate crimes in Canada increased by 37% during the first year of the pandemic, rising from 1,951 incidents in 2019 to 2,669 in 2020 (Statistics Canada, 2021). This marks the largest number of police-reported hate crimes since comparable data became available in 2009. Police-reported hate crimes targeting race or ethnicity almost doubled (+80%) compared with the previous year, accounting for the vast majority of the national increase in hate crimes.

Crime Statistics

What crimes are people in Canada most likely to commit, and who is most likely to commit them? The first step to understanding criminal statistics, is understanding how these statistics are collected. Since 1962, Statistics Canada has been collecting and publishing an archive of crime statistics known as the *Uniform Crime Reports Survey* (UCR). These annual publications contain data from all the police agencies in Canada. Although the UCR contains comprehensive data on police reports, it fails to take into account the fact that many crimes go unreported due to the victims' unwillingness to report them, largely based on fear, shame, or distrust of the police. The accuracy of the data collected by the UCR also varies greatly. Because police and other authorities decide which criminal acts they are going to focus on in their policing strategies, the data reflects the priorities of the police rather than actual levels of crime *per se*. For example, if police decide to focus on gun-related crimes, chances are that more gun-related crimes will be discovered and counted. Similarly, changes in legislation that introduce new crimes or change the categories under which crimes are recorded will also alter the statistics.

To address some of these problems, in 1985, Statistics Canada began to publish a separate report known as the *General Social Survey on Victimization* (GSS). The GSS is a self-report study. A **self-report study** is a collection of data acquired using voluntary response methods, based on telephone interviews. In 2019, for example, survey data were gathered from 20,000 respondents across Canada on the frequency and type of crime they experience in their daily lives (Statistics Canada, 2019). The surveys are thorough, providing a wider scope of information than was previously available. This

allows researchers to examine crime from more detailed perspectives and to analyze the data based on factors such as the relationship between victims and offenders, the consequences of the crimes, and substance abuse involved in the crimes. Demographics are also analyzed, such as age, ethnicity, gender, location, and income level.

The GSS reports a higher rate of crime than the UCR, especially for less serious crimes, because not all crime is reported to the police. In the 2009 *GSS on Victimization*, only 31 per cent of criminal incidents experienced by respondents were reported to police (Perreault & Brennan, 2010). Though the GSS is a critical source of statistical information, disadvantages exist. “Non-response,” or a victim’s failure to participate in the survey or a particular question, is among them. Inability to contact important demographics, such as those who do not have access to phones or who frequently relocate, also skews the data. For those who participate, memory issues can be problematic for the data sets. Some victims’ recollection of the crimes can be inaccurate or simply forgotten over time.


A third statistical measure, the *Crime Severity Index* was introduced by Statistics Canada in 2009 (Statistics Canada, 2009). This measures changes in the amounts of serious crime, or the overall seriousness of crime in a given year, by calculating a rate based on weighting the relative seriousness of crimes committed. Crimes that receive higher sentences are considered more serious than other types of crime, so 1st degree murder and sexual assault are weighted the highest, whereas disturbing the peace and cannabis possession are weighted relatively low. Because traditional crime rate measures are heavily influenced by fluctuations in high-volume, less serious offenses —about 40% of police-reported crime in Canada comes from two relatively less serious offenses: thefts under \$5,000 and mischief — the Crime Severity Index provides a standardized measure of whether serious crime is increasing or decreasing. The Index is standardized to “100,” using 2006 as a base year. Figures higher than 100 would indicate that crime is more severe than it was in 2006. Figures less than 100 mean that crime is less severe than it was in 2006.

The Declining Crime Rate in Canada

While none of these measures can take into account all of the crimes committed in the country, some general trends may be noted. Crime rates were on the rise after 1960, but following an all-time high in the 1980s and 1990s, rates of violent and nonviolent crimes started to decline. In 2012 they reached their lowest level since 1972 (Perreault, 2013).

Chart 7
Police-reported crime rates, Canada, 1962 to 2019

rate per 100,000 population



Note: Information presented in this chart represents data from the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR1) Aggregate Survey, and permits historical comparisons back to 1962. New definitions of crime categories were introduced in 2009 and are only available in the new format back to 1998. As a result, numbers in this chart will not match data released in the new UCR2 format. Specifically, the definition of violent crime has been expanded. In addition, UCR1 includes some different offences in the "other crimes" category. Populations are based upon July 1st estimates from Statistics Canada, Centre for Demography.

Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice and Community Safety Statistics, Uniform Crime Reporting Survey.

Figure 8.19 The crime rates for all types of crime in Canada, including violent crime, have been declining since 1992, with a slight uptick between 2014 and 2019. Why? (Source: Moreau, Jaffray and Armstrong, 2020.) [Stats Can Open Licence Agreement](#)

In 2012, approximately 2 million crimes occurred in Canada. Of those, 415,000 were classified as violent crimes, the majority being assault and robbery. The rate of violent crime reached its lowest level since 1987, led by decreases in sexual assault, common assault, and robbery. The homicide rate fell to its lowest level since 1966. An estimated 1.58 million nonviolent crimes also took place; the most common being theft under \$5,000 and mischief. The major contribution to the declining crime rate has been decreases in nonviolent crime, especially decreases in mischief, break-ins, disturbing the peace, theft of a motor vehicle, and possession of stolen property. As noted above, however, only 31 per cent of violent and nonviolent crimes were reported to the police. Since 2012, crime rates have increased slightly. In 2019, there were over 2.2 million police-reported *Criminal Code* incidents (not including traffic violations), about 164,700 more incidents than in 2018. At 5,874 incidents per 100,000 population, the police-reported crime rate—which measures the volume of crime—increased 7% in 2019. This rate, however, was still 9% lower than a decade earlier in 2009 (Moreau, Jaffray and Armstrong, 2020).




Figure 8.20 Crime Severity Indexes based on police reported crime rates from 2000 to 2020 in Canada. The base index was set at 100 for 2006. Severe crime shows a similar pattern declining until 2014, rising to 2009 levels, and then dropping again by 8% in the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is interesting to note that although the crime severity index heavily weights homicides in its calculation, homicides in Canada in 2020 increased to their highest reported level since 1991, (even taking into account the 22 victims of the Nova Scotia attacks, the largest mass murder in Canadian history) (Statistics Canada, 2021b). (Figure courtesy of Statistics Canada, 2021a.) [Stats Can Open Licence Agreement](#)

What accounts for the general decreases in the crime rate since the early 1990s? During the period of lowest crime rates, opinion polls showed that a majority of Canadians believed that crime rates, especially violent crime rates, were rising (Edmiston, 2012), even though the statistics showed a steady decline since 1991. Where is the disconnect? There are three primary reasons for the decline in the crime rate. Firstly, it reflects the demographic changes to the Canadian population. The post-war baby boom continued into the early 1960s but the birth rate fell afterwards and has remained low since the 1970s. As most crime is committed by people aged 18 to 34 and this age cohort has declined in size since 1991, it makes sense statistically that the crime rate has fallen. Property crimes, which are predominantly associated with teenagers and young adults, leveled off during the 80's, while violent crimes, associated with teenagers and young adults but also middle aged adults, decreased in the 90s. The number of people aged 20 to 34 dropped by 18% Canada between 1990 and 1999 (Oimet, 2004).

Secondly, male unemployment is highly correlated with the crime rate, especially property crimes. Unemployment rates were high in the 1980s and again in the early 1990s, correlating with trends in property crime (Pottie Bunge, Johnson and Baldé, 2005). Following the recession of 1990–1991, better economic conditions improved male unemployment. The total unemployment rate dropped by 27% in Canada between 1991 and 1999, meaning that the economic situation for young adults improved (Oimet, 2004).

Thirdly, police methods have arguably improved since 1991, including having a more targeted approach to particular sites and types of crime. Strategies such as “hot-spot policing” and “focused deterrence,” as well as collaboration with non-police organizations such as private security, neighbourhood watch programs, local health professionals, community and municipal groups, and other government organizations have proven effective (Council of Canadian

Academies, 2014). Similarly, the shift to community policing and a more problem solving rather than reactive approaches improves relationships between police and citizens and lowers crime rates (Pottie Bunge, Johnson and Baldé, 2005).

A fourth, more controversial, reason for declining crime rates was the legalization of abortion in Canada in 1969. Levitt (2004) argues that legalizing abortion resulted in fewer unwanted children who would have been at a greater risk of crime when they reached their teen and adult years.



Figure 8.21 Kingston Penitentiary was opened in 1835 and officially closed in 2013. (Photo courtesy of R. Orville Lyttle/Flickr.) [CC BY SA 2.0](#)

Corrections

The **corrections system**, more commonly known as the prison system, is tasked with supervising individuals who have been arrested, convicted, and sentenced for a criminal offence. At the end of 2011, approximately 38,000 adults were in prison in Canada, while another 125,000 were under community supervision or probation (Dauvergne, 2012). By way of contrast, seven million Americans were behind bars in 2010 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011). Canada's rate of adult incarceration in 2011 was 140 per 100,000 population. In the United States in 2008, the incarceration rate was approximately 1,000 per 100,000 population. More than 1 in 100 U.S. adults were in jail or prison, the highest benchmark in U.S. history. While Americans account for 5 per cent of the global population, they have 25 per cent of the world's inmates, the largest number of prisoners in the world (Liptak, 2008). While Canada's rate of incarceration is far lower than that of the United States, there are nevertheless some disturbing features of the Canadian corrections system.

As noted in [Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology](#), from 2010 to 2011, Indigenous Canadians were 10 times more likely to be incarcerated than the non-Indigenous population. While Indigenous people accounted for about 4 per cent of the Canadian population, in 2013, they made up 23.2 per cent of the federal penitentiary population. Indigenous women made up 33.6 per cent of incarcerated women in Canada. This problem of **overrepresentation** of Indigenous people

in the corrections system — the difference between the proportion of Indigenous people incarcerated in Canadian correctional facilities and their proportion in the general population — continues to grow appreciably despite a Supreme Court ruling in 1999 (*R. vs. Gladue*) that the social history of Indigenous offenders should be considered in sentencing. Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code states, “all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.” Prison is supposed to be used only as a last resort. Nevertheless, between 2003 and 2013, the Indigenous population in prison grew by 44 per cent (Correctional Investigator Canada, 2013).

Hartnagel (2004) summarised the literature on why Indigenous people are overrepresented in the criminal justice system. Firstly, Indigenous people are disproportionately poor and poverty is associated with higher arrest and incarceration rates. Unemployment in particular is correlated with higher crime rates. Secondly, Indigenous lawbreakers tend to commit more detectable street crimes than the less detectable white collar or suite crimes of other segments of the population. Thirdly, the criminal justice system disproportionately profiles and discriminates against Indigenous people. It is more likely for Indigenous people to be apprehended, processed, prosecuted, and sentenced than non-Indigenous people. Fourthly, the legacy of colonization has disrupted and weakened traditional sources of social control in Indigenous communities. The informal social controls that effectively control criminal and deviant behaviour in intact communities have been compromised in Indigenous communities due to the effects of forced assimilation, the residential school system, and migration to poor inner city neighbourhoods.

Although black Canadians are a smaller minority of the Canadian population than Indigenous people, they experience a similar problem of overrepresentation in the prison system. Blacks represent approximately 2.9 per cent of the Canadian population, but accounted for 9.5 per cent of the total prison population in 2013, up from 6.3 per cent in 2003–2004 (Correctional Investigator Canada, 2013). A survey revealed that blacks in Toronto are subject to racial profiling by the police, which might partially explain their higher incarceration rate (Wortley, 2003). **Racial profiling** occurs when police single out a particular racial group for extra policing, including a disproportionate use of stop-and-search practices (i.e., “carding”), undercover sting operations, police patrols in racial minority neighbourhoods, and extra attention at border crossings and airports. Survey respondents revealed that blacks in Toronto were much more likely to be stopped and searched by police than were whites or Asians. Moreover, in a reverse of the situation for whites, older and more affluent black males were more likely to be stopped and searched than younger, lower-income blacks. As one survey respondent put it: “If you are black and drive a nice car, the police think you are a drug dealer or that you stole the car. They always pull you over to check you out” (Wortley, 2003).

Prisons and their Alternatives

Recent public debates in Canada on being “tough on crime” often revolve around the idea that imprisonment and mandatory minimum sentences are effective crime control practices. It seems intuitive that harsher penalties will deter offenders from committing more crimes after their release from prison. However research shows that punitive “tough on crime” policies do not reduce crime rates (Pottie Bunge, Johnson and Baldé, 2005; Pratt and Cullen, 2005). Nor does serving prison time reduce the propensity to re-offend after the sentence has been completed. In general the effect of imprisonment on **recidivism** — the likelihood for people to be arrested again after an initial arrest — was either non-existent or actually *increased* the likelihood of re-offence in comparison to non-prison sentences (Nagin, Cullen, & Jonson, 2009). In particular, first time offenders who are sent to prison have higher rates of recidivism than similar offenders sentenced to community service (Nieuwebeerta, Nagin, & Blockland, 2009).

Moreover, the collateral effects of the imprisonment of one family member include negative impacts on the other family members and communities, including increased aggressiveness of young sons (Wildeman, 2010) and increased likelihood that the children of incarcerated fathers will commit offences as adults (van de Rakt & Nieuwebeerta, 2012). As noted above, some researchers have spoken about a **penal-welfare complex** to describe the creation of inter-generational criminalized populations who are excluded from participating in society or holding regular jobs on a

semi-permanent basis (Garland, 1985). The painful irony for these groups is that the petty crimes like theft, public consumption of alcohol, drug use, etc. that enable them to get by in the absence of regular sources of security and income are increasingly targeted by zero tolerance and minimum sentencing policies of crime control.

There are a number of alternatives to prison sentences used as criminal sanctions in Canada including fines, electronic monitoring, probation, and community service. These alternatives divert offenders from forms of penal social control, largely on the basis of principles drawn from labelling theory. They emphasize to varying degrees **compensatory social control**, which obliges an offender to pay a victim to compensate for a harm committed; **therapeutic social control**, which involves the use of therapy to return individuals to a normal state; and **conciliatory social control**, which reconciles the parties of a dispute to mutually restore harmony to a social relationship that has been damaged.

Many non-custodial sentences involve **community-based sentencing**, in which offenders serve a conditional sentence in the community, usually by performing some sort of community service. The argument for these types of programs is that rehabilitation is more effective if the offender is in the community rather than prison. A version of community-based sentencing is **restorative justice conferencing**, which focuses on establishing a direct, face-to-face connection between the offender and the victim. The offender is obliged to make restitution to the victim, thus “restoring” a situation of justice. Part of the process of restorative justice is to bring the offender to a position in which they can fully acknowledge responsibility for the offence, express remorse, and make a meaningful apology to the victim (Department of Justice, 2013).

In special cases where the parties agree, **Aboriginal sentencing circles** involve victims, the Aboriginal community, and Aboriginal elders in a process of deliberation with Aboriginal offenders to determine the best way to find healing for the harm done to victims and communities. The emphasis is on forms of **traditional Aboriginal justice**, which center on healing and building community rather than retribution. These might involve specialized counseling or treatment programs, community service under the supervision of elders, or the use of an Aboriginal nation’s traditional penalties (Aboriginal Justice Directorate, 2005).

It is difficult to find data in Canada on the effectiveness of these types of programs. However, a large meta-analysis study that examined ten studies from Europe, North America, and Australia was able to determine that restorative justice conferencing was effective in reducing rates of recidivism and in reducing costs to the criminal justice system (Strang et al., 2013). The authors suggest that recidivism was reduced between 7 and 45 per cent from traditional penal sentences by using restorative justice conferencing.

Rehabilitation and recidivism are of course not the only goals of the corrections systems. Many people are skeptical about the capacity of offenders to be rehabilitated and see criminal sanctions more importantly as a means of (a) deterrence to prevent crimes, (b) retribution or revenge to address harms to victims and communities, or (c) incapacitation to remove dangerous individuals from society.

Media Attributions

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8.4. Public Policy Debates on Crime




Figure 8.22 Violent crime lends itself to spectacular media coverage that distorts its actual threat to the public. (Photo courtesy of Fox Features Syndicate/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

The sociological study of crime, deviance, and social control is especially important with respect to public policy debates. In 2012 the Conservative government passed the Safe Streets and Communities Act, a controversial piece of legislation because it introduced mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug or sex related offenses, restricted the use of conditional sentencing (i.e., non-prison punishments), imposed harsher sentences on certain categories of young offender, reduced the ability for Canadians with a criminal record to receive a pardon, and made it more difficult for Canadians imprisoned abroad to transfer back to a Canadian prison to be near family and support networks. The legislation imposed a mandatory six-month sentence for cultivating six marijuana plants, for example.

Noting that the mandatory minimum sentencing disproportionately affected Indigenous and Black Canadians, the Liberal government passed Bill C-22 in 2021, which repealed mandatory minimum sentencing for 14 offenses in the criminal code, including all 6 provisions that applied to the *Controlled Drugs and Substances Act* (Department of Justice Canada, 2021). Approximately 39 per cent of Black inmates and 20 per cent of Indigenous prisoners in federal prisons were serving sentences dictated by mandatory minimums. Supreme court rulings had already struck down two mandatory minimums for firearm offenses in 2015, declaring them “cruel,” and drug-related minimums in 2016, on the grounds that they violated the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, the Bill C-22 reform leaves 52 offenses with mandatory minimums in place.

Government policy shifts back and forth between a punitive approach to crime control and preventive strategies such as drug rehabilitation, prison diversion, and social reintegration programs. Why? Part of the reason has to do with the discourses surrounding crime. Despite the evidence that rates of serious and violent crime have been falling in Canada, in 2011 Justice Minister Rob Nicholson said, “Unlike the Opposition, we do not use statistics as an excuse not to get tough on criminals. As far as our Government is concerned, one victim of crime is still one too many” (Galloway, 2011). What accounts for the appeal of “getting tough on criminals” policies at a time when rates of crime, and violent crime in particular, are falling and in 2012 were at their lowest level since 1972 (Perreault, 2013)? Crime rates have since risen but remain lower than they were in 2009 (Moreau, Jaffray and Armstrong, 2020).

One reason is that violent crime is a form of deviance that lends itself to spectacular media coverage that distorts its actual threat to the public. Television news broadcasts frequently begin with **chaos news** — crime, accidents, natural disasters — that present an image of society as a dangerous and unpredictable place. However, the image of crime presented in the headlines does not accurately represent the types of crime that actually occur. Whereas the news typically reports on the worst sorts of violent crime, violent crime made up only 22 per cent of all police-reported crime in 2019 (down 3 per cent from 2009), and homicides made up only one-tenth of 1 per cent of all violent crimes in 2019 (Moreau, Jaffray and Armstrong, 2020). An analysis of television news reporting on murders in 2000 showed that while 44 per cent of CBC news coverage and 48 per cent of CTV news coverage focused on murders committed by strangers,

only 12 per cent of murders in Canada are committed by strangers. Similarly, while 24 per cent of the CBC reports and 22 per cent of the CTV reports referred to murders in which a gun had been used, only 3.3 per cent of all violent crime involved the use of a gun in 1999. In 1999, 71 per cent of violent crimes in Canada did not involve any weapon (Miljan, 2001).

The issue is that the news is a commercial product used to sell newspapers and advertising. “If it bleeds, it leads” is the adage that describes the financial motivation to publish the most dramatic crime news because it sells more subscriptions and receives more views. Czerny and Swift (1988) argue that the commercial media distort the content of the news in a number of ways. Typically stories emphasize:

1. the intense (stories are selected to play up drama and action)
2. the unambiguous (complex issues and lived experiences are simplified into straightforward moral stories of good and bad)
3. the familiar (stories are made to fit in with common sense understandings and prejudices)
4. the marketable (stories are packaged to appeal to consumer tastes, often with sex and violence imagery)

This distortion is amplified by the use of on-line sources where about 60% of Canadians report getting their news most of the time (Canadian Journalism Foundation, 2019). In particular, emotional responses to stories rather than critical analysis influence people’s decisions to “retweet” a story (Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2013). Emotions have also been shown to be contagious in on-line environments and are linked to rumor spreading behaviour (Kramer et al., 2014; Oh et al. 2013; Pröllochs et al., 2021). Vosoughi et al.’s (2018) research showed that on social media platforms like Twitter “falsehood diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information.”

Media distortion can create the conditions for **moral panics** around crime. A moral panic occurs when a relatively minor or atypical situation of deviance arises that is exaggerated and distorted by the media, police, or members of the public. It thereby comes to be defined as a general threat to the civility or moral fibre of society (Cohen, 1972). As public attention is brought to the rule breakers, more instances are discovered, dire predictions are made, and the rule breakers are rebranded as “folk devils” who endanger and disrupt society. Authorities then react by taking social control measures disproportionate to the original acts of deviance. Relatively isolated occurrences of deviance get caught up in an *amplification cycle*. As Cohen sums up, “It is the perception of threat and not its actual existence that is important” (Cohen, 1972).



Figure 8.23 The Mods (left) and Rockers (right) were the subject of Stanley Cohen’s *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The creation of the Mods and Rockers* (1972). (Images courtesy of Sergio Calleja/Wikimedia Commons; and Phil Sellens/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#); [CC BY 2.0](#)

Stanley Cohen’s (1972) original example of the phenomenon was the Mods and Rockers confrontations in Margate,

Brighton, Clacton and Bournemouth — oceanside resort towns in England — in the 1960s. The Mods and Rockers became well known as distinctive British youth subcultures, but only after some minor incidents of scuffling and stone throwing in the streets of Clacton on Easter, 1964, were blown up in the national newspapers: “Day of Terror by Scooter Groups” (*Daily Telegraph*), ‘Youngsters Beat Up Town – 97 Leather Jacket Arrests’ (*Daily Express*), “Wild Ones Invade Seaside – 97 Arrests” (*Daily Mirror*) (Cohen, 1972). The publicity set the scene for further confrontations between the groups in seaside towns throughout the summer, the heavy deployment of combined police forces, the extension of police powers, calls for banning Mod/Rocker clothing and long hair, and demands for the Home Secretary to hold an inquiry and take firm action.

Like subsequent examples of moral panic in Canada over gang violence, unemployed male youth, paedophilia, “nasty girls,” high school shootings, satanism, and date rape drugs, etc. (O’Grady, 2014), the Mods and Rockers became visible social types that stood as symbols of social degeneration and of moral boundaries that should not be crossed. In particular, they amplified the public’s ambivalent feelings about Britain in the 1960s becoming an ‘affluent society’ and focused them onto young people who were seen to be rejecting adult ideals: “the response was as much to what they stood for as what they did” (Cohen 1972). Panics happen in part because they fulfill a function of reaffirming society’s moral values.

In addition to the media, one way in which certain activities or people come to be understood and defined as deviant is through the intervention of moral entrepreneurs. Howard Becker defined **moral entrepreneurs** as individuals or groups who, in the service of their own interests, publicize and problematize “wrongdoing” and have the power to create and enforce rules to penalize wrongdoing (1963). Judge Emily Murphy, commonly known today as one of the Famous Five feminist suffragists who fought to have women legally recognized as “persons” (and thereby qualified to hold a position in the Canadian Senate), was also a moral entrepreneur instrumental in changing Canada’s drug laws. In 1922 she wrote *The Black Candle*, in which she raised alarms about the use of cannabis (as well as Chinese opium dens, white slavery, Black train porters selling drugs and pornography, etc.):

[Cannabis] has the effect of driving the [user] completely insane. The addict loses all sense of moral responsibility. Addicts to this drug, while under its influence, are immune to pain, and could be severely injured without having any realization of their condition. While in this condition they become raving maniacs and are liable to kill or indulge in any form of violence to other persons, using the most savage methods of cruelty without, as said before, any sense of moral responsibility.... They are dispossessed of their natural and normal will power, and their mentality is that of idiots. If this drug is indulged in to any great extent, it ends in the untimely death of its addict (Murphy, 1922).

In his analysis of the Marijuana Tax Act in the United States, Becker (1963) shows how moral entrepreneurs like Emily Murphy play an instrumental role in generating public concern about a particular condition, mounting a “symbolic crusade” aided by publicity and the actions of supporting interest groups, and producing a *moral enterprise*: “the creation of a new fragment of the moral constitution of society.”

Creating moral panic is one tactic used by moral entrepreneurs to make activities, like marijuana use, seem deviant and in need of social control. The framework for the moral crisis might change through time however. For example, in 2012 the implementation of mandatory minimum sentences for the cultivation of marijuana was framed in the Safe Streets and Communities legislation as a response to the infiltration of organized crime into Canada. For years newspapers uncritically published police messaging on grow-ops and the marijuana trade that characterized the activities as widespread, gang-related, and linked to the cross-border trade in guns and more serious drugs like heroin and cocaine. Television news coverage often showed police in white, disposable hazardous-waste outfits removing marijuana plants from suburban houses, and presented exaggerated estimates of the street value of the drugs. However a Justice Department study in 2011 revealed that out of a random sample of 500 grow-ops, only 5 per cent had connections to organized crime. Moreover, an RCMP-funded study from 2005 noted that “firearms or other hazards” were found in only 6 per cent of grow-op cases examined (Boyd & Carter, 2014). While 76 per cent of Canadians at the time believed that cannabis should be legally available (Stockwell et al., 2006), and several jurisdictions (Washington and Colorado states, and Uruguay) had already legalized cannabis, the Safe Streets and Communities Act appeared to be an attempt to reinvigorate the punitive messaging of the “war on drugs” based on disinformation and moral panic around marijuana use and cultivation.




Figure 8.24 *Reefer Madness* was a 1936 American anti-Cannabis propaganda film, part of a successful “moral enterprise” to define cannabis use as a moral threat to society. (Image from Motion Picture Ventures.) [Public Domain](#)

Conclusions

One of the principle outcomes of these sociological insights is that a focus on the *social construction* of different social experiences and problems leads to alternative ways of understanding them and responding to them. In the study of crime and deviance, the sociologist often confronts a legacy of entrenched beliefs concerning either the innate biological disposition or the individual psychopathology of persons considered abnormal: the criminal personality, the sexual or gender “deviant,” the “bad seed,” the addict, or the mentally unstable individual. However, as Ian Hacking observed, even when these beliefs about “kinds of persons” are products of objective scientific classification, the institutional context of science and expert knowledge is not independent of societal norms, beliefs, and practices (2006).

The process of classifying kinds of people is a social process that Hacking called “making up people” (2006) and Howard Becker called “labeling” (1963). Crime and deviance are social constructs that vary according to the definitions of crime, the forms and effectiveness of policing, the social characteristics of criminals, and the relations of power that structure society. Part of the problem of deviance is that the social process of labeling some kinds of persons or activities as abnormal or deviant limits the type of social responses available. The major issue is not that labels are arbitrary, nor that it is possible not to use labels at all, but that the choice of label has consequences. Who gets labelled by whom and the way social labels are applied have powerful social repercussions. Therefore, it is necessary to use the sociological imagination to address crime and deviance both at the individual and social levels. With a deeper understanding of the social factors that produce crime and deviance, it becomes possible to develop a set of strategies

that might more effectively encourage individuals to change direction when their acts are harmful to others, to society and to themselves.

The sociological study of crime, deviance, and social control is especially important with respect to public policy debates. The political controversies that surround the question of how best to respond to crime are difficult to resolve at the level of political rhetoric. Often, in the news and public discourse, the issue is framed in moral terms; therefore, for example, the policy alternatives get narrowed to the option of either being “tough” on crime or “soft” on crime. Tough and soft are moral categories that reflect a moral characterization of the issue. A question framed by these types of moral categories cannot be resolved by using evidence-based procedures.

Posing the debate in these terms narrows the range of options available and undermines the ability to raise questions about which responses to crime actually work. In fact policy debates over crime seem especially susceptible to the various forms of specious reasoning described in [Chapter 2. Sociological Research](#) (“Science vs. Non-Science”). The story of the isolated individual whose specific crime becomes the basis for the belief that the criminal justice system as a whole has failed illustrates several qualities of unscientific thinking: knowledge based on casual observation, knowledge based on overgeneralization, and knowledge based on selective evidence. Moral categories of judgement pose the problem in terms that are unfalsifiable and non-scientific.

The sociological approach is essentially different. It focuses on the effectiveness of different social control strategies for addressing different types of criminal behaviour and the different types of risk to public safety. Thus, from a sociological point of view, it is crucial to think systematically about who commits crimes and why. It is also crucial to look at the big picture to see why certain acts are considered normal and others deviant, or why certain acts are criminal and others are not. In a society characterized by large inequalities of power and wealth, as well as large inequalities in arrest and incarceration, an important social justice question needs to be examined regarding who gets to define whom as criminal or deviant.

This chapter has illustrated the sociological imagination at work by examining the “individual troubles” of criminal behaviour and victimization within the social structures that sustain them. In this regard, sociology is able to advocate policy options that are neither hard nor soft, but evidence-based and systematic.

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Chapter 8 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

Aboriginal sentencing circles: The involvement of Indigenous communities in the sentencing of Indigenous offenders.

community-based sentencing: Offenders serve a conditional sentence in the community, usually by performing some sort of community service.

compensatory social control: A means of social control that obliges an offender to pay a victim to compensate for a harm committed.

conciliatory social control: A means of social control that reconciles the parties of a dispute and mutually restores harmony to a social relationship that has been damaged.

consensus crimes: Serious acts of deviance about which there is near-unanimous public agreement.

conflict crimes: Acts of deviance that may be illegal but about which there is considerable public disagreement concerning their seriousness.

confrontational tension/fear barrier: A threshold that needs to be crossed for violence to take place in face to face conflicts.

control theory: A theory that states social control is directly affected by the strength of social bonds and that deviance results from a feeling of disconnection from society.

corporate crime: Crime committed by white-collar workers in a business environment.

corrections system: The system tasked with supervising individuals who have been arrested, convicted, or sentenced for criminal offences.

court: A system that has the authority to make decisions about criminal responsibility and sentencing based on law.

crime: A behaviour that violates official law and is punishable through formal sanctions.

crimes of accommodation: Crimes committed as ways in which individuals cope with conditions of oppression and inequality.

criminal justice system: An organization that exists to enforce a legal code.

deviance: A violation of contextual, cultural, or social norms.

differential association theory: A theory that states individuals learn deviant behaviour from those close to them.

disciplinary social control: Detailed continuous training, control, observation, correction and rehabilitation of individuals to improve their capabilities.

doubly deviant: Women (or other categories of individual) who break both laws and gender (or other) norms.

examination: The use of tests by authorities to assess, document, and know individuals.

folkways: Norms based on everyday cultural customs like etiquette.

formal sanctions: Penalties for rule breaking that are officially recognized and enforced.

government: Practices by which individuals or organizations seek to govern the behaviour of others or themselves.

hate crimes: Attacks based on prejudice against a person's or group's race, religion, sexuality or other characteristics.

informal sanctions: Penalties for rule breaking that occur in face-to-face interactions.

labelling theory: The ascribing of a deviant identity to another person by members of society.

law: Norms that are specified in explicit codes and enforced by government bodies.

legal codes: Codes that maintain formal social control through laws.

looping effect: The interaction between scientific classifications and targeted “kinds of people,” which influences the behaviour of the people thus classified.

master status: A label that describes the chief characteristic of an individual.

moral entrepreneur: An individual or group who, in the service of its own interests, publicizes and problematizes “wrongdoing” and has the power to promote, influence, create or enforce rules to penalize wrongdoing.

moral panic: An expanding cycle of deviance, media-generated public fears, and police reaction.

mores: Serious moral injunctions or taboos that are broadly recognized in a society.

negative sanctions: Punishments for violating norms.

new penology: Strategies of social control that identify, classify, and manage groupings of offenders by the degree of risk they represent to the general public.

nonviolent crimes: Crimes that involve the destruction or theft of property, but do not use force or the threat of force.

normalization: The process by which norms are used to differentiate, rank, and correct individual behaviour.

normalizing society: A society that uses continual observation, discipline, and correction of its subjects to exercise social control.

overrepresentation: The difference between the proportion of an identifiable group in a particular institution (like the correctional system) and their proportion in the general population.

panopticon: Institutional architecture that renders subjects visible to a centralized authority; Jeremy Bentham's model for the ideal prison.

penal social control: A means of social control that prohibits certain social behaviours and responds to violations with punishment.

penal-welfare complex: The network of institutions that create and exclude inter-generational, criminalized populations on a semi-permanent basis.

police: A civil force in charge of regulating laws and public order at a federal, provincial, or community level.

positive sanctions: Rewards given for conforming to norms.

primary deviance: A violation of norms that does not result in any long-term effects on the individual's self-image or interactions with others.

psychopathy: A personality disorder characterized by anti-social behaviour, diminished empathy, and lack of inhibitions.

racial profiling: The singling out of a particular racial group for extra policing.

recidivism: The tendency of offenders to reoffend.

restorative justice conferencing: A technique of conciliatory social control which focuses on establishing a direct, face-to-face connection between the offender and the victim.

risk management: (1) Interventions designed to reduce the likelihood of undesirable events occurring based on an assessment of probabilities of risk. (2) As a means of social control, the strategies to restructure the environment or context of problematic behaviour in order to minimize the risks to the general population.

sanctions: A means of enforcing rules through either rewards or punishments.

secondary deviance: A change in a person's self-concept and behaviour after their actions are labelled as deviant by members of society.

secondary victimization: After an initial victimization, secondary victimization is incurred through criminal justice processes.

self-fulfilling prophecy: The act of labeling someone as criminal or deviant creates barriers and impediments that make it difficult for them to pass or survive in legitimate society. The label causes itself to become true.

self-report study: Collection of data acquired using voluntary response methods, such as questionnaires or telephone interviews.

situational crime control: Strategies of social control that redesign spaces where crimes or deviance could occur to minimize the risk of crimes occurring there.

social control: The regulation and enforcement of norms.

social deviations: Departures from normal behaviour that are not illegal but are widely regarded as harmful.

social disorganization theory: Theory that asserts crime occurs in communities with weak social ties and the absence of social control.

social diversions: Acts that violate social norms but are generally regarded as harmless.

social order: An arrangement of regular, predictable practices and behaviours on which society's members base their daily lives and expectations.

sociopathy: A personality disorder characterized by anti-social behaviour, diminished empathy, and lack of inhibitions.

strain theory: A theory that addresses the conflictual relationship between having socially acceptable goals while lacking socially acceptable means to reach those goals.

street crime: Crime committed by average people against other people or organizations, usually in public spaces.

surveillance: Various means used to make the lives and activities of individuals visible to authorities.

therapeutic social control: A means of social control that uses therapy to return individuals to a normal state.

traditional Aboriginal justice: A system of justice centred on healing and building or re-establishing community rather than retribution and punishment.

twin myths of rape: The notion that women lie about sexual assault out of malice toward men and women will say “no” to sexual relations when they really mean “yes”.

victimless crime: Activities against the law that do not result in injury to any individual other than the person who engages in them.

violent crimes: Crimes based on the use of force or the threat of force against a person or persons.

white-collar crime: Crimes committed by high status or privileged members of society.

zones of transition: Areas within the city characterized by high levels of migration, social diversity, and social change.

Section Summary

8.1 Deviance and Control

Deviance is a violation of norms. Whether or not something is deviant depends on contextual definitions, the situation, and people’s response to the behaviour. Authorities seek to limit deviance through the use of sanctions and strategies of disciplinary correction or risk management that help maintain a system of social control.

8.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Deviance

The three major sociological paradigms offer different explanations for the motivation behind deviance and crime. Positivist explanations develop predictions of criminal or deviant behaviour based individuals’ social background variables. Durkheim’s functionalist theory, social disorganization theory, control theory and strain theory are examples of positivist theories. Critical sociologists argue that crime stems from a system of inequality that keeps those with power at the top and those without power at the bottom. Feminist sociologists emphasize that gender inequalities play an important role in determining what types of acts are actually regarded as criminal. Symbolic interactionists focus attention on the socially constructed nature of the labels related to deviance. Crime and deviance are learned from the environment and enforced or discouraged by close contacts and situational processes or variables.

8.3 Crime and the Law

Crime is established by legal codes and upheld by the criminal justice system. Although crime rates increased throughout most of the 20th century, they have been dropping since their peak in 1991 because of changes in demographics, employment and policing strategies. The corrections system is the dominant system of criminal punishment but a number of community-based sentencing models offer alternatives that promise more effective outcomes in terms of recidivism.

8.4 Public Policy Debates on Crime

Public policy on crime is affected by interest groups, moral entrepreneurs, political actors, media representations, and cycles of moral panic. Sociology can contribute to public policy by providing a basis for evidence based decision making.

Questions

Quiz: Deviance, Crime and Social Control

8.1 Deviance and Control

1. Which of the following best describes how deviance is defined?
 - a. Deviance is defined by federal, provincial, and local laws.
 - b. Deviance is defined by moral philosophy and religious texts.
 - c. Deviance is defined by acts that cause another harm.
 - d. Deviance is defined by historical social processes.
2. In 1946, Viola Desmond was arrested for refusing to sit in the blacks-only section of the cinema in Nova Scotia. This is an example of _____.
 - a. A consensus crime.
 - b. A conflict crime.
 - c. A social deviation.
 - d. A social diversion.
3. A student has a habit of texting during class. One day, the professor stops their lecture and asks the student to respect the other students in the class by turning off their phone. In this situation, the professor used _____ to maintain social control.
 - a. Informal positive sanctions
 - b. Formal negative sanction
 - c. Informal negative sanctions
 - d. Reintegrative shaming
4. Public health measures practice risk management to _____.
 - a. Increase capacities and skills.
 - b. Reduce harms.
 - c. Exercise surveillance.
 - d. Fulfill prophecies.
5. School discipline obliges students to sit in rows and listen to lessons quietly in order for them to learn. This strategy of education demonstrates _____.
 - a. Compensatory social control.
 - b. A manifest function.
 - c. Production of docility.
 - d. Positive sanctions.

8.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Deviance

6. A student wakes up late and realizes their sociology exam starts in five minutes. They jump into their car and speeds down the road, where they are pulled over by a police officer. The student explains that they are running late, and the officer lets them off with a warning. The student's actions are an example of _____.
- Primary deviance.
 - Driving while white.
 - Secondary deviance.
 - Master deviance.
7. According to critical sociology, which of the following people is most likely to commit a crime of accommodation?
- A student struggling to get better grades
 - An addict who sees a handful of loonies in an unlocked car
 - A professor who is tempted to publish someone else's work as his own
 - A mechanic who dislikes a customer
8. According to social disorganization theory, where is crime most likely to occur?
- A transient community where neighbours do not know each other very well
 - A neighbourhood with poor urban planning
 - In unpatrolled streets or public spaces
 - A class society with individuals who are under strain to be very competitive
9. Symbolic interactionists argue that crime is linked primarily to _____.
- Power relationships.
 - Master status.
 - Rejection of family values.
 - Symbolic gestures of protest or disaffiliation.
10. According to the concept of crimes of domination, why would a celebrity film producer such as Harvey Weinstein commit a crime?
- His parents committed similar crimes
 - His power protects him from retribution
 - His power disconnects him from society
 - He is challenging socially accepted norms
11. A convicted sexual offender is released on parole and arrested two weeks later for repeated sexual crimes. How would labelling theory explain this?
- The offender has been labelled deviant by society and has accepted this master status
 - The offender has returned to his old neighbourhood and so re-established his former habits
 - The offender has lost the social bonds he made in prison and feels disconnected from society
 - The offender is poor and coping with conditions of oppression and inequality
12. According to micro-sociology, violence is difficult in practice because _____.

- a. A culture of violence does not actually exist in face-to-face encounters.
- b. People are fearful of getting hurt.
- c. Violence breaks social norms.
- d. Violence has an emotional basis.

8.3 Crime and the Law

13. Which of the following is an example of corporate crime?
- a. Embezzlement
 - b. Larceny
 - c. Exploitation
 - d. Burglary
14. Spousal abuse is an example of a _____.
- a. Street crime.
 - b. Crime of domination.
 - c. Violent crime.
 - d. Conflict crime.
15. Which of the following situations best describes crime trends in Canada?
- a. Rates of violent and nonviolent crimes were decreasing until 2014 and then increased.
 - b. Rates of violent crimes are decreasing, but there are more nonviolent crimes now than ever before.
 - c. Crime rates have been increasing since the 1970s but since 2014 have slightly decreased.
 - d. Rates of street crime have gone up, but corporate crime has gone down.
16. What is a disadvantage of crime victimization surveys?
- a. They do not take into account the personal circumstances of the criminals.
 - b. They may be unable to reach important groups, such as those without phones.
 - c. They do not address the relationship between the criminal and the victim.
 - d. They only include information not reported to police officers.

8.4 Public Policy Debates on Crime

17. A moral panic is _____.
- a. A stampede of ethicists to the lunch counter between conference sessions.
 - b. Anxiety based on existential threats like climate change and system collapse.
 - c. Anxiety based statistical crime rates.
 - d. Anxiety based on the actions of folk devils.
18. People are likely to have distorted views of actual levels of crime or threat to personal safety because of _____.
- a. Moral entrepreneurs.
 - b. Moral enterprises.
 - c. Chaos news.

- d. All of the above.

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

8.1 Deviance and Control

1. Since deviance is culturally defined, most of the decisions people make are dependent on the reactions of others. During the COVID-19 pandemic was wearing a mask or getting a vaccine encouraged or discouraged in your milieu? Would defying the attitudes of your milieu be an example of “consensus” or “conflict” deviance? What were the repercussions for yourself or others of defying the prevailing attitudes of your milieu on this issue?
2. Deaths from intravenous drug use from a poisoned drug supply is regarded as a crisis in many communities. What do you think the best response to this issue is? Which type of social control strategy does your choice of response best match: sanction, discipline or risk management?

8.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Deviance

1. Pick a famous politician, business leader, or celebrity who has been arrested recently. What crime did they allegedly commit? Who was the victim? Explain their actions from the point of view of one of the major sociological paradigms. What factors best explain how this person might be punished if convicted of the crime?
2. Discuss the merits of positivist, critical sociology and interpretive sociology to violent crime.

8.3 Crime and the Law

1. What are the three different types of statistic used to measure crime rates in Canada? What are the merits and limitations of each of them?
2. Could you imagine abolishing the prison system? Why or why not? Would any of the alternatives to prison be an effective replacement? Why or why not?

8.4 Public Policy Debates on Crime

1. Recall the crime statistics presented earlier in this chapter. Do they surprise you given the way crime is reported in the media? Or do you find the media generally accurate? Why does the public perceive that crime rates are increasing and believe that punishment should be stricter when actual crime rates are much lower than they were in 1991?
2. The media's focus on different types of crime topic or criminal waves and wanes over time. Think about a recent media focus or one that you were aware of in your lifetime. Does it conform to the model of a moral panic? Why/why not?

Further Research

8.1 Deviance and Control

Although people rarely think of it in this way, deviance can have a positive effect on society. Check out the [Positive Deviance Initiative](#), a program initiated by Tufts University to promote social movements around the world that strive to improve people's lives.

8.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Deviance

The Vancouver safe injection site is a controversial strategy to address the public health concerns associated with intravenous drug use. Read about the perspectives that promote and critique the safe injection site model at the following websites. Can you determine how the positions expressed by the different sides of the issue fit within the different sociological perspectives on deviance? What is the best way to deal with the problems of addiction?

- [City of Vancouver's "Four Pillars Drug Strategy"](#)
- [Health Officers Council of British Columbia, "A Public Health Approach to Drug Control in Canada" \[PDF\]](#)
- [Drug Prevention Network of Canada](#)
- [Canadian Institute for Substance Use Research](#)

8.3 Crime and the Law

How is crime data collected in Canada? Read about [the victimization survey used by Statistics Canada](#): <http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=4504>.

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Solutions to Quiz: Deviance, Crime and Social Control

1 D, | 2 B, | 3 A, | 4 B, | 5 C, | 6 A, | 7 B, | 8 A, | 9 D, | 10 B, | 11 A, | 12 C, | 13 A, | 14 C, | 15 A, | 16 B, | 17 D, | 18 D, [\[Return to Quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 9. SOCIAL INEQUALITY



Figure 9.1 Tesla founder Elon Musk was the richest person in the world in 2021 (Pendleton, 2021). The car a person drives is a practical transportation technology but also a symbol. What does a Tesla signify about the class, status and power of its owner? Why? (Photo courtesy of kqedquest/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

Learning Objectives

[9.1. What Is Social Inequality?](#)

- Analyze social differentiation and social stratification as components of social inequality.
- Define the difference between equality of opportunity and equality of condition.
- Compare caste and class systems.
- Distinguish between Marx and Weber's approaches to class and status.

[9.2. Social Inequality in Canada](#)

- Distinguish between relative and absolute poverty.
- Analyze trends of inequality in wealth and income in Canada.

[9.3. Social Classes in Canada](#)

- Describe characteristics of social classes and social mobility in Canada.

9.4. Theoretical Perspectives on Social Inequality

- Understand and apply functionalist, critical sociological, and interpretive perspectives to social inequality.

Introduction to Social Inequality in Canada



Figure 9.2 The Ted Rogers statue with Ted Rogers Centre for Heart Research in the background. Who gets monumentalized in Canada, and who gets forgotten? (Image courtesy of Oaktree/Wikimedia Commons.)
[Free Art License](#)

When he died in 2008, Ted Rogers Jr., then Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Rogers Communications, was the fifth-wealthiest individual in Canada, holding assets worth \$5.7 billion. In his autobiography (2008) he credited his success to a willingness to take risks, work hard, bend the rules, be on the constant lookout for opportunities, and be dedicated to building the business. In many respects, he saw himself as a self-made billionaire who started from scratch, seized opportunities, and created a business through his own initiative.

The story of Ted Rogers is not exactly a rags-to-riches one, however. His grandfather, Albert Rogers, was a director of Imperial Oil and his father, Ted Sr., became wealthy when he invented an alternating current vacuum tube for radios in 1925. Ted Rogers Sr. went from this invention to manufacturing radios, owning a radio station, and acquiring a licence for TV broadcasting.

However, Ted Sr. died when Ted Jr. was five years old, and the family businesses were sold. His mother took Ted Jr. aside when he was eight and told him, “Ted, your business is to get the family name back” (Rogers, 2008). The family was still wealthy enough to send him to Upper Canada College, the famous private school that also educated the children from the Black, Eaton, Thompson, and Weston families. Ted seized the opportunity at Upper Canada to make money as a bookie, taking bets on horse racing from the other students. Then he attended Osgoode Hall Law School, where his secretary reportedly went to classes and took notes for him. He bought an

early FM radio station when he was still in university, and started in cable TV in the mid-1960s. By the time of his death, Rogers Communications was worth \$25 billion. At that time, just three families — the Rogers, Shaws, and Péladeaus — owned much of the cable service in Canada.

At the other end of the spectrum are the Aboriginal gang members in the Saskatchewan Correctional Centre, who were discussed in [Chapter 1. Introduction](#) (CBC, 2010). The CBC program noted that 85% of the inmates in the prison were of Aboriginal descent, half of whom were involved in Aboriginal gangs. Moreover, the statistical profile of Aboriginal youth in Saskatchewan in 2010 was grim, with Aboriginal people making up the highest number of high school dropouts, domestic abuse victims, drug dependencies, and child poverty backgrounds. In some respects, the Aboriginal gang members interviewed were like Ted Rogers in that they were willing to seize opportunities, take risks, bend rules, and apply themselves to their vocations. They too aspired to get the money that would give them the freedom to make their own lives. However, as one of the inmates put it, “the only job I ever had was selling drugs” (CBC, 2010). The consequence of that “job” was to fall into a lifestyle that led to joining a gang, being kicked out of school, developing addiction issues,

and eventually getting arrested and incarcerated. Unlike Ted Rogers, however, the inmate added, “I didn’t grow up with the best life” (CBC, 2010).

How does one make sense of the divergent stories? Canada is supposed to be a country in which individuals can work hard to get ahead. It is an “open” society. There are no formal class, gender, racial, ethnic, geographical, or other boundaries that prevent people from rising to the top. People are free to make choices. But does this adequately explain the difference in life chances that divide the fortunes of the Aboriginal youth from the Rogers family’s youth? What determines a person’s social standing and privileges? How does social standing direct or limit a person’s choices?

Habitus

The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) defined **habitus** as the deeply-seated schemas, habits, feelings, dispositions, and forms of practical know-how that people hold as a result of living in a specific social milieu or context (Bourdieu, 1990). It is the way a person of a particular background perceives and reacts to the world. More technically, it is “the way society becomes deposited in persons in the form of lasting dispositions, or trained capacities and structured propensities to think, feel, and act in determinate ways, which then guide them in their creative responses to the constraints and solicitations of their extant milieu” (Wacquant, 2004). Bourdieu referred to it as one’s “feel for the game,” to use a sports metaphor. Choices are perhaps always “free” in some formal sense, but they are also always situated within one’s habitus.

Depending on one’s location in society, habitus can vary markedly across a country like Canada. The Aboriginal gang members display “street-smarts” that enable them to survive and successfully navigate their world. Street-smarts define their habitus and exercise a profound influence over the range of options to consider — the neighbourhoods they know to avoid, the body languages that signal danger, the values of illicit goods, the motives of different street actors, the routines of police interactions, and so on. The habitus affects both the options to conform to the group they identify with or to deviate from it. Ted Rogers occupied a different habitus, which established a fundamentally different set of options for him in his life path. How are different life worlds or habitus distributed in society so that some reinforce patterns of deprivation while others provide the basis for access to wealth and power?

As Bourdieu pointed out, habitus is so deeply ingrained that people take its reality as natural rather than as a product of social circumstances. This false sense of universality has the unfortunate effect of justifying social inequalities. It allows people to believe that the Ted Rogers of the world are uniquely gifted and predisposed for success, when in fact it is success itself that is “predisposed” by underlying structures of power and privilege.

Media Attributions

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- **Figure 9.2** [Statue of Ted Rogers](#) by Oaktree, via Wikimedia Commons, is used under a [Free Art Licence](#).

9.1. What Is Social Inequality?

Sociologists use the term **social inequality** to describe the unequal distribution of valued resources, rewards, and social positions in a society. Key to the concept are the notions of **social differentiation** and **social stratification**. The question for sociologists is: how are systems of stratification formed? What is the basis of systematic social inequality in society?

Social differentiation refers to the social characteristics — social differences, identities, and roles — used to differentiate people and divide them into different categories, such as race, gender, age, class, occupation, and education. These social categories have implications for social inequality. Social differentiation by itself does not necessarily imply a division of individuals into a hierarchy of rank, privilege, and power. However, when a social category like class, occupation, gender, or race puts people in a position where they can claim a greater share of resources or rewards, then social differentiation becomes the basis of social inequality.

The term **social stratification** refers to an institutionalized system of social inequality. It refers to a situation in which social inequality has solidified into an ongoing system that determines and reinforces who gets what, when, and why. Social differentiation based on different characteristics becomes the basis for social inequality.

Students may remember the word “stratification” from geology class. The distinct horizontal layers found in rock, called “strata,” are a good way to visualize social structure. Society’s layers are made of people, and society’s resources are distributed unevenly throughout the layers. The people with the most resources represent the top layer of the social structure of stratification. Other groups of people, with progressively fewer and fewer resources, represent the lower layers of society. Social stratification assigns people to socio-economic strata based on a process of social differentiation — “these type of people go here, and those type of people go there.” The outcome is differences in wealth, income and power. Again, the question for sociologists is how systems of stratification are formed. What is the basis of systematic social inequality in society?



Figure 9.3 People in the upper echelons of class society make the decisions, exercise power and earn the most money. (Photo courtesy of Alex Proimos/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

Equality of Condition and Equality of Opportunity



Figure 9.4 Strata in the badlands illustrate social stratification. People are sorted, or layered, into social categories. Many factors determine a person's social standing, such as income, education, occupation, age, race, gender, and physical abilities. (Photo courtesy of Just a Prairie Boy/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

In Canada, the dominant ideological presumption about social inequality is that everyone has an equal chance at success. This is the belief in **equality of opportunity**, which can be contrasted with the concept of **equality of condition**. Equality of opportunity is the idea that everyone has an equal possibility of becoming successful. It exists when people have the same chance to pursue economic or social rewards. This is often seen as a function of equal access to education, **meritocracy** (where individual merit determines social standing), and formal or informal measures to eliminate social discrimination.

Equality of condition is the situation in which everyone in a society has a similar *actual* level of wealth, status, and power. Although degrees of equality of condition vary markedly in modern societies, it is clear that even the most egalitarian societies today have considerable degrees of *inequality* of condition. Ultimately, equality of opportunity means that inequalities of condition are not so great that they greatly hamper a person's opportunities or life chances. Whether Canada is a society characterized by equality of opportunity, or not, is a subject of considerable sociological debate.

To a certain extent, Ted Rogers' story illustrates the idea of equality of opportunity. His personal narrative is one in which hard work and talent — not inherent privilege, birthright, prejudicial treatment, or societal values — determined his social rank. This emphasis on individual effort is based on the belief that people individually control where they end up in the social hierarchy, which is a key piece in the idea of equality of opportunity. Most people connect inequalities of wealth, status, and power to the individual characteristics of those who

succeed or fail. The story of the Aboriginal gang members, although it is also a story of personal choices, casts that belief into doubt. It is clear that the type of choices available to the Aboriginal gang members are of a different range and quality than those available to the Rogers family. The available choices and opportunities are a product of habitus and location within the system of social stratification.

While there are always inequalities between individuals in terms of talent, skill, drive, chance, and so on, sociologists are interested in larger social patterns. Social inequality is not about individual qualities and differences, but about systematic inequalities based on group membership, class, gender, ethnicity, and other variables that structure access to rewards and status. In other words, sociologists are interested in examining the structural conditions of social inequality. There are of course differences in individuals' abilities and talents that will affect their life chances. The larger question, however, is how inequality becomes systematically structured in economic, social, and political life. In terms of individual ability: Who gets the opportunities to develop their abilities and talents, and who does not? Where does "ability" or "talent" come from? As Canadians live in a society that emphasizes the individual (individual effort, individual morality, individual choice, individual responsibility, individual talent, etc.) it is often difficult to see the way in which life chances are socially structured.

Wealth, Income, Power and Status

Factors that define the layers of stratification vary in different societies. In most modern societies, stratification is indicated by differences in **wealth**, the net value of money and assets a person has, and **income**, a person's wages, salary, or investment dividends. It can also be defined by differences in **power** (e.g., how many people a person must take orders from versus how many people a person can give orders to, or how many people are affected by one's orders) and **status** (the degree of honour or prestige one has in the eyes of others). These four factors create a complex amalgam that defines an individual's social standing within a hierarchy.

Usually the four factors coincide, as in the case of corporate CEOs, like Ted Rogers, at the top of the hierarchy – wealthy, powerful, and prestigious – and the Aboriginal offenders at the bottom – poor, powerless, and abject. Sociologists use the term **status consistency** to describe the consistency of an individual's rank across these factors.

Students can also think of someone like the Canadian Prime Minister – who ranks high in power, but with a salary of approximately \$320,000 – earns much less than comparable executives in the private sector (albeit eight times the average Canadian salary). The Prime Minister's status or prestige also rises and falls with the fluctuations of politics and public opinion. The Nam-Boyd scale of status, based on education and income, ranks politicians (legislators) at 66/100, the same status as cable TV technicians (Boyd, 2008). There is status inconsistency in the prime minister's position.

Teachers often have high levels of education, which give them high status (92/100 according to the Nam-Boyd scale), but they receive relatively low pay. Many believe that teaching is a noble profession, so teachers should do their jobs for the love of their profession and the good of their students, not for money. Yet no successful executive or entrepreneur would embrace that attitude in the business world, where profits are valued as a driving force. Cultural attitudes and beliefs like these support and perpetuate social inequalities.



Figure 9.5 The people who live in these houses likely share similar income levels and education. Neighbourhoods often house people of the same social standing. Typically, wealthy families do not live next door to poorer families, though this may vary depending on the particular city and country. (Photo courtesy of Orin Zebest/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Systems of Stratification

Sociologists distinguish between two types of stratification systems. Closed systems accommodate little change in social position. They do not allow people to shift levels and do not permit social relations between levels. Open systems, which are based on achievement, allow movement and interaction between layers and classes. The different systems also produce and foster different cultural values, like the values of loyalty and traditions versus the values of innovation and individualism. The difference in stratification systems can be examined by the comparison between class systems and caste systems.

The Caste System



Figure 9.6 India used to have a rigid caste system. The people in the lowest caste suffered from extreme poverty and were shunned by society. Some aspects of India's defunct caste system remain socially relevant. The Indian woman in this photo is of a specific Hindu caste. (Photo courtesy of PxHere.) [CCO Public Domain](#)

Caste systems are closed stratification systems in which people can do little or nothing to change their social standing. A **caste system** is one in which people are born into their social standing and remain in it their whole lives. It is based on fixed or rigid **status** distinctions, rather than economic classes per se.

As noted above, status is defined by the level of honour or prestige one receives by virtue of membership in a group. Sociologists make a distinction between **ascribed status**: a status one receives by virtue of being born into a category or group (e.g., caste, hereditary position, gender, race, ethnicity, etc.), and **achieved status**: a status one receives through individual effort or merits (e.g., occupation, educational level, moral character, etc.). Caste systems are based on a hierarchy of ascribed statuses, because people are born into fixed caste groups. A person's occupation and opportunity for education follow from their caste position.

In a caste system, people are assigned roles regardless of their individual talents, interests, or potential. Marriage is **endogamous** (from endo- 'within' and Greek *gamos* 'marriage') which means marriage between castes is forbidden, whereas **exogamous marriage** is a marriage union between people from different social groups. There are virtually no opportunities to improve one's social position. Instead, the relationship between castes is bound by institutionalized rules, and highly ritualistic procedures come into play when people from different castes come into contact. People value traditions and often devote considerable time to perfecting the details of ritualistic procedures.

The feudal systems of Europe and Japan can, in some ways, be seen as caste systems in that the statuses of positions in the social stratification systems were fixed, and there was little or no opportunity for movement through marriage or economic opportunities. In Europe, the feudal estate system divided the population into clergy (first estate), nobility (second estate), and commoners (third estate), which included artisans, merchants, and peasants. In early European feudalism, it was still possible for a peasant or a warrior to achieve a high position in the clergy or nobility, but later the divisions became more rigid. In Japan, between 1603 and 1867, the *mibunsei* system divided society into five rigid strata in which social standing was inherited. At the top was the Emperor, then court nobles (*kuge*), military commander-in-chief (*shogun*), and land-owning lords (*daimyo*). Beneath them were four classes or castes: the military nobility (*samurai*), peasants, craftsmen, and merchants. The merchants were considered the lowest class because they did not produce anything with their own hands. There was also an outcast or untouchable caste known as the *burakumin*, who were considered impure or defiled because of their association with death: executioners, undertakers, slaughterhouse workers, tanners, and butchers (Kerbo, 2006).

The caste system in India from 4,000 years ago until the 20th century probably best typifies the system of stratification. In the Hindu caste tradition, people were expected to work in the occupation of their caste and enter into marriage according to their caste. Originally there were four castes: *Brahmans* (priests), *Kshatriyas* (military), *Vaisyas* (merchants), and *Sudras* (artisans, farmers). There were also the *Dalits* or *Harijans* ("untouchables"). Hindu scripture said, "In order to preserve the universe, Brahma (the Supreme) caused the Brahmin to proceed from his mouth, the Kshatriya to proceed from his arm, the Vaishya to proceed from his thigh, and the Shudra to proceed from his foot" (Kashmeri, 1990).

Accepting this social standing was considered a moral duty. Cultural values and economic restrictions reinforced the system. Caste systems promote beliefs in fate, destiny, and the will of a higher power, rather than promoting individual

freedom as a value. A person who lives in a caste society is socialized to accept their social standing, and this is reinforced by the society's dominant norms and values.

Although the caste system in India has been officially dismantled, its residual presence in Indian society is deeply embedded. In rural areas, aspects of the tradition are more likely to remain, while urban centres show less evidence of this past. In India's larger cities, people now have opportunities to choose their own career paths and marriage partners. As a global centre of employment, corporations have introduced merit-based hiring and employment to the nation. The caste system has been largely replaced by a class system of structured inequality. Nevertheless, Dalits continue to experience violence and discrimination in hiring or obtaining business loans (Jodhka, 2018).

The Class System

A **class system** is based on both socio-economic factors and individual achievement. It is at least a partially open system. A **class** consists of a set of people who have the same relationship to the **means of production** or productive property — that is, to the things used to produce the goods and services needed for survival, such as tools, technologies, resources, land, workplaces, etc. In Karl Marx's (1848) analysis, class systems form around the institution of private property, dividing those who own or control productive property from those who do not, who survive on the basis of selling their labour. In capitalist societies, for example, the dominant classes are the capitalist class and the working class.

In a class system, social inequality is structural, meaning it is built into the organization of the economy. The relationship to the means of production (i.e., ownership/non-ownership) defines a persistent, objective pattern of social relationships that exists independently of individuals' personal or voluntary choices and motives.

Unlike caste systems, however, class systems are open in the sense that individuals are able to change class position. Individuals are at least formally free to gain a different level of education or occupation than their parents. They can move up and down within the stratification system. They can also socialize with and marry members of other classes, allowing people to move from one class to another. In other words, individuals can move up and down the class hierarchy, even while the class categories and the class hierarchy itself remain relatively stable. It is not impossible for individuals to pass back and forth between classes through **social mobility**, but the class structure itself remains intact, structuring people's lives, privileges, wealth, and social possibilities.

In a class system, one's occupation is not fixed at birth. Though family background tends to predict where one ends up in the stratification system, personal factors play a role. For example, Ted Rogers Jr. chose a career in media like his father but managed to move upward from a position of modest wealth and privilege in the petite bourgeoisie, to being the fifth-wealthiest bourgeois in the country. On the other hand, his father Ted Sr. chose a career in radio based on individual interests that differed from his own father's. Ted Sr.'s father, Albert Rogers, held a position as a director of Imperial Oil. Ted Sr. therefore moved downward from the class of the bourgeoisie to the class of the petite bourgeoisie.

Making Connections: Case Study

The Commoner Who Could Be Queen



Figure 9.7 Prince William, Duke of Cambridge, who is in line to be King of England, married Catherine Middleton, a so-called commoner, meaning she does not have royal ancestry. (Photo courtesy of Gerard Stolk/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

On April 29, 2011, in London, England, Prince William, Duke of Cambridge, married Catherine (“Kate”) Middleton, a commoner. Throughout its history, it has been rare, though not unheard of, for a member of the British royal family to marry a commoner. Kate Middleton had an upper-middle-class upbringing. Her father was a former flight dispatcher, and her mother was a former flight attendant. The family then formed a lucrative mail order business for party accessories. William was the elder son of Charles, Prince of Wales, and Diana, Princess of Wales. Kate and William met when they were both students at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland (Köhler, 2010).

The rules regarding the marriage of royals trace their history to Britain’s formal feudal monarchy, which arose with William of Normandy’s conquest in 1066. Feudal social hierarchy was originally based on landholding. The monarch’s family (royalty) was at the top, vassals, nobles and knights (landholders) below the king, and commoners or serfs on the bottom. This was generally a closed system, with people born into

positions of nobility or serfdom. Wealth was passed from generation to generation through **primogeniture**, a law stating that all property was to be inherited by the firstborn son. If the family had no son, the land went to the next closest male relation. Women could not inherit property, and their social standing was primarily determined through marriage. From the late feudal era onward, a royal marrying a commoner was a scandal. In 1937, the British parliament obliged Edward VIII to abdicate his succession to King of the United Kingdom, so he could marry the American divorcée, Wallis Simpson. Not only was she a commoner, but she was also divorced, which contradicted the Church of England doctrine.

The rise of capitalism changed Britain's class structure. The feudal commoner class generated both the new dominant class of the bourgeoisie or capitalists and the new subordinate class of the proletariat or wage labourers. The aristocracy and the royals continued as a class through their wealth and property, but their position in society became increasingly based on status and tradition alone. Today, the British government is a constitutional monarchy, with the prime minister and other ministers elected to their positions. The royal family's role is largely ceremonial. The historical differences between nobility and commoners have blurred, and the modern class system in Britain is similar to Canada. Since Edward VIII's abdication in 1937, Queen Elizabeth II's sister and several of her children and grandchildren have married commoners.

Today, the royal family still commands wealth, power, and a great deal of attention. In 2017, Forbes estimated the total wealth of the royal family to be \$88 billion (Rodriguez, 2017). Since Queen Elizabeth II passed away in September 2022, Prince Charles has ascended the throne as king. His wife Camille Parker-Bowles, also a commoner and divorcée, is expected to become "Princess Consort." If Charles had abdicated (chosen not to become king) or died, the position would go to Prince William. If that happened, Kate Middleton would be called Queen Catherine and hold the position of Queen Consort. She would be one of the few queens in history to have earned a university degree (Marquand, 2011). Of note here is, of course, Prince Harry, who married the commoner and divorcée Meghan Markle. Prince Harry is currently 6th in line for the British throne, after Prince William's children. If she succeeded to Queen Consort, Meghan Markle would be the first queen with African heritage.

Initially there was a great deal of social pressure on Kate Middleton not only to behave as a royal, but to bear children. The royal family recently changed its succession laws to allow daughters, not just sons, to ascend the throne. Her firstborn son, Prince George, was born on July 22, 2013, so the new succession law is not likely to be tested in the near future. However, behind George is Princess Charlotte (b. 2015) and Prince Louis (b. 2018). Kate's experience — from commoner to possible queen — demonstrates the fluidity of social class position in modern society.

Social Class




Figure 9.8 The traditional working class — Miners in Nanaimo, B.C. (late 19th century). The Nanaimo coal mines were the site of a brutal two-year strike from 1912–1914 against low wages and dangerous working conditions. Source: Miners of Number One Mine, Nanaimo, at the pithead, B-03624 (Image courtesy of the Royal B.C. Museum.) [Public Domain](#)



Figure 9.9 The owning class — James and Laura Dunsmuir — shown beside their Italian-style garden at their Hatley Castle residence near Victoria, B.C. (now part of Royal Roads University). James Dunsmuir was heir to his family's coal fortune and managed the family's coal operations on Vancouver Island from 1876–1910. He was a powerful spokesman for capitalist interests and anti-union efforts in B.C. and spent two years as B.C. Premier from 1900–1902. (Image courtesy of Craigdarroch Castle Society.) [Public Domain](#)

Social class is both obvious and not so obvious in Canadian society. It is based on subjective impressions, outward symbols, and less visible structural determinants. Can one tell a person's education level based on clothing? Is opening an \$80 bottle of wine for dinner normal, an exceptional occasion, or an insane waste of money? Can one guess a person's income by the car they drive? There was a time in Canada when people's class was more visibly apparent. In some countries, like the United Kingdom, class differences can still be gauged by differences in schooling, lifestyle, and even accent. In Canada, however, it is harder to determine class from outward appearances.

For sociologists, too, categorizing class is a fluid science. One debate in the discipline is between Marxist and Weberian approaches to social class (Abercrombie & Urry, 1983).

Karl Marx

Marx's analysis emphasizes a historical materialist approach to the underlying structures of the capitalist economy. Classes are historical formations that distribute people into categories based on the organization and structure of the economy. Marx's definition of social class rests essentially on one *materialist* variable: a group's relation to the means of production (ownership or non-ownership of productive property or capital). Therefore, in Marxist class analysis, there are two dominant classes in capitalism — the working class and the owning class — and any divisions within the classes based on occupation, status, education, etc. are less important than the tendency toward increasing separation and polarization of these two classes.

Marx referred to these two classes as the **bourgeoisie** and the **proletariat**. The capitalist class (bourgeoisie) lives from the proceeds of owning or controlling productive property (capital assets like factories, technology, software platforms or machinery, or capital itself in the form of investments, stocks, and bonds). The working class (proletariat) live from selling their labour to the capitalists for a wage or salary. Their interests are in conflict, as higher profits depend on lower wages, which accounts for the characteristic power dynamics, conflicts, instabilities and periodic crises of capitalist societies.

In addition, he described the classes of the **petite bourgeoisie** (the little bourgeoisie) and the **lumpenproletariat** (the sub-proletariat). The petite bourgeoisie are those like small business owners, farmers, and contractors who own some property and perhaps employ a few workers, but still rely on their own labour to survive. The lumpenproletariat are the chronically unemployed or irregularly employed, who are in and out of the workforce. They are what Marx referred to as the “reserve army of labour,” a pool of potential labourers who are surplus to the needs of production at any particular time.

Max Weber

Weber defined social class slightly differently, as the **life chances** one shares in common with others by virtue of possession of property, goods, skills or opportunities for income (1969). Life chances refer to the ability or probability of an individual to act on opportunities and attain a certain standard of living. Owning property or capital, or not owning property or capital, is still the basic variable that defines a person's class situation or life chances. However, class position is defined with respect to *markets* rather than the process of *production*. It is the value of one's capital, products or skills in the commodity or labour markets at any particular time that determines whether one has greater or fewer life chances.

This yields a model of class hierarchy based on multiple gradations of socio-economic status, instead of a division between two principle classes. Analyses of class inspired by Weber tend to emphasize gradations of status relating to several variables like wealth, income, education, and occupation. Class stratification is not just determined by a group's economic position, but by the prestige of the group's occupation, education level, consumption, and lifestyle. It is a matter of **status** — the level of honour or prestige one holds in the community by virtue of one's social position — as much as a matter of class.

Based on the Weberian approach, some sociologists talk about upper, middle, and lower classes (with many subcategories within them) in a way that mixes status categories with class categories. These gradations are often referred to as a group's **socio-economic status (SES)**: their social position relative to others based on income, education, and prestige of occupation. For example, although plumbers might earn more than high school teachers and have greater “life chances” in a particular economy, the status division between **blue-collar** work (people who “work with their hands”) and **white-collar** work (people who “work with their minds”) means the plumbers might be characterized as lower class but teachers as middle class.

There is a randomness in the division of classes into upper, middle, and lower in the Weberian model. However,

this manner of classification based on status distinctions captures something about the subjective experience of class and the shared lifestyle and consumption patterns of class that Marx's categories often do not. An NHL hockey player receiving a salary of \$6 million a year is a member of the working class, strictly speaking. He might even go on strike or get locked out according to the dynamic of capital and labour conflict described by Marx. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see what the life chances of the hockey player have in common with a landscaper or receptionist, despite the fact that they might share a common working-class background.

Class: Materialist and Interpretive Factors

Social class is a complex category to analyze. It has both a strictly *materialist* quality relating to a group's structural position within the economic system, and an *interpretive* quality relating to the formation of status gradations, common subjective perceptions of class, differences of power in society, and class-based lifestyles and consumption patterns. Considering both the Marxist and Weberian models, social class has at least three objective components: a group's position in the occupational structure (i.e., the status and salary of one's job), a group's position in the power structure (i.e., who has authority over whom), and a group's position in the property structure (i.e., ownership or non-ownership of capital). It also has an important subjective component that relates to recognitions of status, distinctions of lifestyle, and ultimately how people perceive their place in the class hierarchy.

Making Connections: Classic Sociologists

Marx and Weber on Social Class: How Do They Differ?



Figure 9.10 Max Weber: Class as common “life chances” based on possession of goods and opportunities for income (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)




Figure 9.11 Karl Marx: Class as relationship to the means of production (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.)
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Often, Marx and Weber are perceived as at odds in their approaches to class and social inequality, but it is perhaps better to see them as articulating different styles of analysis.

Weber's analysis presents a more complex model of the social hierarchy of capitalist society than Marx. Weber's model goes beyond the economic *structural class* position to include the variables of **status** (degree of social prestige or honour) and **power** (degree of political influence). Thus, Weber provides a multi-dimensional model of social hierarchy. As a result, although individuals might be from the same objective class, their position in the social hierarchy might differ according to their status and political influence. For example, women and men might be equal in terms of their class position, but because of the inequality in the status of the genders within each class, women (as a group) remain lower in the social hierarchy.

With respect to *class* specifically, Weber also relies on a different definition than Marx. As noted above, Weber (1969) defines class as the “life chances” one shares in common with others by virtue of one's possession of goods or opportunities for income. Class is defined with respect to markets, rather than the process of production. As in Marx's analysis, the economic position that stems from owning property and capital, or not owning property and capital, is still the basic variable that defines one's class situation or life chances. However, as the value of different types of capital or property (e.g., industrial, real estate, financial, etc.), or the value of different types of opportunity for income (i.e., different types of marketable skills), varies according to changes in the commodity or labour markets, Weber can provide a more nuanced description of an individual's class position than Marx. A skilled tradesman like a pipe welder might enjoy a higher class position and greater life chances in Northern Alberta where such skills are in demand, than a high school teacher in Vancouver or Victoria where the number of qualified teachers exceeds the number of positions available. If one adds the element of status into the picture, the situation becomes even more complex, as the educational requirements and social responsibilities of the high school teacher usually confer more social prestige than the requirements and responsibilities of the pipe welder.

Nevertheless, Weber's analysis is *descriptive* rather than *analytical*. It can provide a useful description of differences between the levels or “strata” in a social hierarchy or stratification system but does not provide an analysis of the formation of classes themselves.

On the other hand, Marx's analysis of class is essentially one-dimensional. It has one variable: the relationship to the means of production. If one is a professional hockey player, a doctor in a hospital, or a clerk in a supermarket, one works for a wage and is therefore a member of the working class. In this regard, his analysis challenges common sense, as the difference between these different "fragments" of the working class seems paramount — at least from the point of view of the subjective experience of class. It would seem that hockey players, doctors, lawyers, professors, and business executives have very little in common with grocery clerks, factory or agricultural workers, tradespeople, or low level administrative staff, despite the fact that they all depend on being paid wages by someone.

However, the key point of Marx's analysis is not to ignore the existence of status distinctions within classes, but to examine class structure *dialectically* in order to provide a more comprehensive and historical picture of class dynamics.

The four components of dialectical analysis were described in [Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology](#): (1) Everything in society is related; (2) everything is caught up in a process of change; (3) change proceeds from the quantitative to the qualitative; and (4) change is the product of oppositions and struggles in society. These dialectical qualities are also central to Marx's account of the hierarchical structure of classes in capitalist society.

With regard to the first point — everything in society is related — the main point of the dialectical analysis of class is that the working class and the owning class have to be understood in a structural relationship to one another. They emerged together out of the old class structure of feudalism. More significantly for Marx, each exists only because the other exists. The wages that define the wage labourer are paid by the capitalist; the profit and capital accumulated by the capitalist are products of the workers' labour.

In Marx's dialectical model, "everything is caught up in a process of change" occurs because the system is characterized by the struggle of opposites. The classes are *structurally* in conflict because the contradiction in their class interests is built into the economic system. The bourgeoisie as a class is defined by the economic drive to accumulate capital and increase profit. The key means to achieve this in a competitive marketplace is by reducing the cost of production by lowering the cost of labour (by reducing wages, moving production to lower wage areas, or replacing workers with labour-saving technologies). This conflicts with the interests of the proletariat who seek to establish a sustainable standard of living by maintaining their level of wages and employment in society. While *individual* capitalists and individual workers might not see it this way, *structurally*, their class interests clash and define a persistent pattern of management-labour conflict and political cleavage in modern, capitalist societies.

So, from the dialectical model, Marx can predict that the composition of classes changes over time: the statuses of different occupations vary, the proportions between workers' income and capitalists' profit change, and the types of production and the means of production change (through the introduction of labour-saving technologies, globalization, new products and consumption patterns, etc.). In addition, change proceeds from the quantitative to the qualitative, in the sense that the multiplicity of changes in purely quantitative variables like salary, working conditions, unemployment levels, rates of profitability, product sales, supply and demand, etc., lead to changes in qualitative variables like the subjective experience of inequality and injustice, the political divisions of "left" and "right," the formation of class-consciousness, and eventually change in the entire economic system through new models of capital accumulation or even revolution.

The strength of Marx's analysis is its ability to go beyond a description of where different groups fit within

the class structure at a given moment in time to an analysis of why those groups and their relative positions change with respect to one another. The dialectical approach reveals the underlying logic of class structure as a dynamic system, and the potential commonality of interests and subjective experiences that define class-consciousness. As a result, in an era in which the precariousness of many high status “middle class” jobs has become clearer, the divisions of economic and political interests between the different segments of the working class becomes less so.

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9.2. Social Inequality

Sociologists define social class as a grouping based on the relationship to the means of production or productive property (i.e., capital). However, individuals' *subjective experience* of class in 21st century Canada is defined largely by the sense of sharing similar social characteristics like wealth, income, education, occupation, and lifestyle. As noted above, there is dispute within sociology about the relative importance of different criteria for characterizing economic class position. Whether the Marxist emphasis on property ownership is more important than the Weberian emphasis on gradations of occupational status is a matter for debate. Each definition captures some aspects of the experience of inequality in modern society but misses others. Either way, the concept of class implies a shared **standard of living** based on social factors like wealth, income, education, and occupation. These factors also affect how much power and prestige a person has. In most cases, having more money means having more power, privileges, and opportunities.

Standard of Living



Figure 9.12 More than 235,000 people in Canada experience homelessness in any given year. 25,000 to 35,000 people may experience homelessness on any given night (Strobel et al., 2021) (Image courtesy of Kyle Pearce/Flickr) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

“When you’ve set up a place to sleep for the night, someone comes along and threatens you or forces you to leave, it’s no way to live. It’s tiring to be forced to move every day or every night when you’re cold and wet and have no place to go.” (Testimony of Drug War Survivors member Harvey Clause, as quoted in Hollett, 2015)

In the last century, Canada has seen a steady rise in the **standard of living**: the level of wealth available to acquire the material necessities and comforts to maintain one’s lifestyle. Osberg (2021) reports that in the post-war era, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in Canada went from \$16,179 in 1946 to \$60,918 in 2019; an increase in standard of living of almost 400%.

The standard of living is unevenly distributed, however, based on factors such as income, employment, class status, poverty rates, and affordability of housing. Because standard of living is

closely related to quality of life, it can represent factors such as the ability to afford a home, own a car, and take vacations. It affects health and longevity.

Similarly, access to a standard of living that enables people to participate on an equal basis in community life is not equally distributed. The irony of rising standards of living is that one does not have to live in **absolute poverty** — “a severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information” (United Nations, 1995) — to be marginalized and socially excluded. **Relative poverty** refers to the minimum amount of income or resources needed to participate in the “ordinary living patterns, customs, and activities” of a society (Townsend, 1979). People do not need to be destitute to experience the exclusions of living in relative poverty in a wealthy society like Canada.

In Canada, a small portion of the population has the means to the highest standard of living. Statistics Canada data from 2012 showed that only 20% of the population earned 50% of all income and held 70% of Canadian’s wealth (Macdonald, 2014). In 2016, the top 87 families held as much wealth as the lowest 12,000,000 Canadians, about one third of the population. The top 87 families were, on average, 4,448 times wealthier than the average Canadian, and 10,000 times wealthier than the median Canadian (the Canadian who was exactly in the middle of the wealth distribution in

the country) (Macdonald, 2018). Wealthy people receive the most schooling, have better health, and consume the most goods and services.

Wealthy people also wield decision-making power. One aspect of their decision-making power comes from their positions as owners or top executives of corporations and banks. They are able to grant themselves salary raises and bonuses. By 2010, only two years into the economic crisis of 2008, the executive pay of CEOs at Canada's top 100 corporations jumped by 13% (McFarland, 2011), while negotiated wage increases in 2010 amounted to only 1.8% (HRSDC, 2010). Executive pay has steadily increased since then (Macdonald, 2021).

Many people think of Canada as a “middle class” society. They think a few people are rich, a few are poor, and most are pretty well off, existing in the middle of the social strata. But as the data above indicate, the distribution of wealth is not even. Millions of women and men struggle to pay rent, buy food, and find work that pays a living wage. Moreover, the share of the total income claimed by those in the middle-income ranges has been shrinking since the early 1980s, while the share taken by the wealthiest has been growing (Osberg, 2021).

Making Connections: Sociological Research

Measuring Levels of Poverty



Figure 9.13 Picking bottles in Vancouver, Canada. (Image courtesy of Neil Moralee/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

Statistics Canada produces two relative measures of poverty: the low income measure (LIM) and the low income cut-off (LICO) measure. In 2019, a third, absolute measure of poverty — the market basket measure (MBM) — was adopted as Canada's Official Poverty Line. According to the MBM, a family lives in poverty if it does not have enough income to purchase a specific basket of goods and services in its community. Sociologists need to be careful in choosing which measure of poverty they use, because each measure produces different estimates of the number of poor in Canada.

Low income measure (LIM): The LIM is defined as half the median family income. A person whose income is below that level is said to be on a low income. The LIM is adjusted for family size.

Low income cut-off (LICO): The LICO is the income level below which a family would devote at least 20 percentage points more of their income to food, clothing, and shelter than an average family would. People

are said to be in the low income group if their income falls below this threshold. The threshold varies by family size and community size, as well as if income is calculated before or after taxes. For example, a single individual in a city with a population of over 500,000 would be said to be living with a low income if their 2019 after-tax income was below \$21,899.

Market basket measure: The MBM is a measure of the disposable income a family would need to be able to purchase a basket of goods that includes food, clothing, shelter, transportation, and other basic needs. The dollar value of the MBM varies by family size and composition, as well as community size and location. MBM data are available since 2000 only.

The three measures produce different results. In 2009, according to each measure, the following numbers of Canadians were living in low income:

- LICO—3.2 million (9.6% of the population)
- MBM—3.5 million (10.6%)
- LIM—4.4 million (13.3%)

Figure 9.14 shows, in a table format, how the three measures also produce different results over time. Using the LICO measure results in a decreasing share of people in low income from 1996 to 2007, followed by a slight upturn in 2008 and 2009. The LIM measure results in a share of people in low income that has increased since 1990. The MBM, which has data starting only in 2000, shows results similar to the LICO but with a sharper upturn in 2008 and 2009.




Figure 9.14 “Measuring Levels of Poverty” excerpted from *The Conference Board of Canada* (2011) (Figure used under the [Conference Board of Canada’s Terms of Use](http://www.conferenceboard.ca/terms_of_use.aspx): http://www.conferenceboard.ca/terms_of_use.aspx)]

Figure 9.14 and **Figure 9.15**, from 2019 (Statistics Canada, 2021), show that the poverty rate declined from 2018 based on the MBM and LIM measures. According to the market basket measure (MBM), about 3.7 million Canadians, or 10.1% of the population, lived below the poverty line in 2019, down from 11.0% in 2018, whereas the low income measure (LIM) recorded about 4.5 million Canadians, or 12.1% of the population in 2019, slightly down from 12.3% in 2018. Depending on which measure a sociologist uses, the estimated numbers of the poor vary significantly.

Trends in Social Inequality

Sociological research into inequality shows that the gap in income and wealth between the rich and the poor has been increasing in Canada over the last 40 years (Osberg, 2021). In 1982, the median income earner in the top 1% of incomes earned seven times more than the median income earner in the other 99%. In 2010, the median income earner in the top 1% earned ten times more. Moreover, while the median income for the top 1% increased from \$191,600 to \$283,000 in constant dollars (i.e., adjusted for inflation), the median income for the bottom 99% only increased from \$28,000 to \$28,400 (Osberg, 2008). In the early 1980s, the top 1% of income earners accounted for 7% of the total income generated in Canada, whereas in 2010 they accounted for 10.6%, down slightly from 12.1% in 2006 (Statistics Canada, 2013).

This is similar to the trend in the United States and the United Kingdom. In the US, the top 1% share went from 10.7% to 19.8%, and in the United Kingdom from 5.9% to 12.5% over the same time period (Alvaredo et al. 2018). In Canada, between 1981 and 2019, the average income of the top 1% doubled whereas for those between the median and the 90th percentile income increased only 10% and actually declined for those in the bottom half of the income distribution (Osberg, 2021). For the most wealthy, the top 0.01%, the average income gain was \$5,187,956 — a 189% increase during this period. In effect, the incomes for middle-income earners remained flat over the last 40 years, while the incomes for the top 1% increased significantly both in absolute terms and as a proportion of all incomes.

TABLE 1 Families and unattached individuals: Income shares from 1951–2018

	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991	1996	2001	2006	2010	2015	2018
Poorest 20%	4.4	4.2	3.6	4.6	4.5	4.3	4.1	4.1	4.1	3.9	3.9
2nd	11.2	11.9	10.6	11	10	9.6	9.7	9.7	9.5	9.3	9.5
Middle	18.3	18.3	17.6	17.7	16.4	16.4	15.6	15.7	15.4	15.4	15.5
4th	23.3	24.5	24.9	25.1	24.7	24.7	23.8	23.8	23.9	24	23.9
Richest 20%	42.8	41.1	43.3	41.6	44.4	45.2	46.9	46.8	47.1	47.4	47.1

Sources Statistics Canada, *Income Distribution by Size in Canada*, (1998), Catalogue No. 13-207, CANSIM Table 202-0701 V1546461 to V1546465, CANSIM Table 206-0031 and Podoluk (1968)

Figure 9.15 Share of Aggregate Incomes Received by Each Quintile of Families and Unattached Individuals. (Table courtesy of Osberg, 2021/CCPA.) [CC BY-NC-ND 3.0](#)

This discrepancy does not simply mean that the very rich are increasing their share of the wealth at the expense of the very poor — the middle classes are also losing their share of the wealth. One way to analyze this trend is to examine the changing distribution of income in Canada over time. In **Figure 9.15** (labelled Table 1, above), changes in inequality are measured by looking at how the total annual income is distributed between each fifth (or “quintile”) of Canadian families from the lowest earning to highest earning for different years (Osberg, 2008). If perfect *equality of income* existed, each quintile would have earned exactly 20% of the total income. Instead, **Figure 9.15** shows that between 1951 and 1981 the top 20% of family units received around 42% of total income, but after 1981 this figure steadily increased to 47%. On the other hand, the share of income of the middle 60% of families declined by 4.7%, going from 53.8% in 1981 to 48.9% in 2018. The lowest 20% also lost 0.7% of their already tiny share, going from 4.6% to 3.9%. Although the majority of people in Canada have not seen any growth in real income in four decades, the average income of the top 1% grew by about 200% (Osberg, 2021). Over the period from 1980–2010, the share of the total income received by the top 1% has doubled, the top 0.1% has tripled, and the top 0.01% has quintupled (Yalnizyan, 2010).

Why is this news? For several decades, Lars Osberg notes that the joke was that the study of income inequality was

like watching grass grow because nothing ever happened (2008). Between 1946 and 1981, changes in income inequality were small despite the fact the Canadian economy went through a massive transformation. It went from an agricultural base to an industrial base; the population urbanized and doubled in size; the overall production of wealth measured by the GDP increased by 4.5%; and per capita output increased by 227% (Osberg, 2008). As Osberg puts it, the key question was why did economic inequality not change during this period of massive transformation? From 1981 until the present, during another period of rapid and extensive economic change in which the overall production of wealth continued to expand, economic inequality has increased dramatically. What happened?

The main explanatory factor is that between 1946 and 1981 real wages increased in pace with the growth of the economy, but since 1981 only the top 20% of families have seen any meaningful increase in real income while the very wealthy have seen huge increases. The taxable income of the top 1% of families increased by 80% between 1982 and 2004 (Osberg, 2008). Neo-liberal policies of reduced state expenditures and tax cuts have been major factors in defining the difference between these two eras. The neo-liberal theory that tax cut benefits to the rich would “trickle down” to the middle class and the poor has proven false. The biggest losers with regard to neo-liberal policy, of course, are the very poor. As Osberg notes, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s that the homeless — those forced to beg in the streets and those dependent on food banks — began to appear in Canada in significant numbers (2008).

Measuring Degrees of Social Inequality

Some have argued that to the degree that **equality of opportunity** exists, *inequality of condition* or inequality of “outcome” is perhaps not fair, but it is justifiable. Others have argued that because capitalism is built on the basis of structural inequality, equality of conditions is impossible and growing inequality is inevitable. The idea that equality of opportunity or **meritocracy**, actually exists and that it leads to a meaningful access to social mobility, the free movement of people from one social position to another, is debatable, as is discussed below. But it is important to note that even if total equality of condition — a world where everyone’s social position and financial rewards would be exactly the same — is unlikely, varying degrees of social inequality are possible. In fact, degrees of social inequality vary significantly historically and between countries based on social policy decisions.

FIGURE 4 Gini index of equivalent income inequality, Canada 1976–2018, current year change since 1976



Source CANSIM Table: 11-10-0134-01 (formerly CANSIM 206-0033)

Figure 9.16 Gini Index of Inequality: 1976–2018. “To separate the impact of trends in market incomes from changes in government transfers and taxes, Figure [9.2] shows trends in the Gini Index of Inequality of market income (i.e., labour earnings plus capital income), total income (i.e., market income plus government transfers) and after-tax income (i.e., total income minus any income tax paid) compared to 1976” (Osberg, 2021). (Figure courtesy of Osberg, 2021/CCPA.) [CC BY-NC-ND 3.0](#)

The **Gini Index** is a measure of income inequality in which zero is absolute equality and one is absolute inequality. The table in Figure 9.16 represents the percentage change in the Gini Index from 1976 to 2018. It shows that Canada’s degree of inequality based on market income increased by 5% between 1980 and 2018 (Osberg, 2021).

For a comparative perspective, see the bar graph in **Figure 9.17**. Canada’s Gini Index (0.303) is much higher than many European countries but is lower than the extremes of inequality in the United States (0.390) and Mexico (0.458), who are Canada’s free trade partners in the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA). This comparison indicates that a much greater equality of conditions can exist even under the same pressures of globalization if different social and economic policy models are chosen. Even though the countries with some of the lowest levels of inequality – Norway (0.262), Denmark (0.264), Sweden (0.275), and the Netherlands (0.285) – have progressive tax systems and strong welfare states, they are able to maintain high levels of employment and economic growth while remaining “competitive” in the global economy (Osberg, 2010). If addressing poverty and inequality rather than promoting tax policies that transfer wealth to the rich is a reasonable goal, a variety of viable policy alternatives are available from which Canadians can choose.




Figure 9.17 Gini Coefficients of Income Concentration in 37 OECD Countries, 2019 (or latest available data). Norway (yellow), Denmark (teal), Sweden (blue), Netherlands (green), Canada (purple), UK (red), USA (orange), Mexico (blue). ([Modified] Figure courtesy of OECD, 2021.) [OECD Terms and Conditions for Data](#)

Media Attributions


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- **Figure 9.15** [Table 1: Families and unattached individuals: Income shares from 1951–2018](#) by Osberg (2021, p. 18) is used under the [CC BY-NC-ND 3.0](#) licence on the CCPA website.
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- **Figure 9.17** OECD, 2019, Gini Coefficients of Income Concentration in 37 OECD Countries, [Income Inequality Data](#), <https://doi/10.1787/459aa7f1-en>, is used under the [OECD Terms and Conditions for Data](#).

9.3 Social Classes in Canada

The concept of social class was discussed earlier in the chapter. Below, the major divisions of Canadian social class and their key subcategories are developed in more detail.

The Owning Class

FIGURE 4 Inherited wealth among wealthiest Canadians, 1999 & 2016



Source Canadian Business magazine and author's calculations.

Figure 9.18 Inherited wealth is a major source of the wealth and continued reproduction of the owning class. The pie charts show that the proportion of 1st generation members of the group of 87 wealthiest families in Canada declined between 1999 and 2016 while the proportion of 2nd and 3rd generation members increased, meaning that wealth inherited from parent and grandparent generations became more significant in maintaining one's position within this exclusive group (Figure courtesy of Macdonald, 2018/CCPA). [CC BY-NC-ND](#)

The owning class is considered Canada's highest elite. Members of the owning class can afford to live, work, and play in exclusive places designed for luxury and comfort. Only the very powerful get to see the view from there. In Canada, the richest 87 families account for 0.002% of the population, but in 2016 they had accumulated the equivalent wealth of everyone in Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick combined (including all savings, investments, pensions, houses, cottages, cars, etc. minus mortgages and debts). The combined net worth of these 87 families added up to \$259 billion in 2016, which equaled the net worth of the lowest 12 million Canadians (Macdonald, 2018).

What is the source of the owning class's wealth? Among the wealthiest families in Canada are also many of the top paid CEOs in the country. For example, among the top 20 wealthiest families, including the Thomsons, Westons, Saputos, Desmarais and Southernns, are nine of the 100 top paid CEOs in the country (Macdonald, 2018). In 2019, the average income of the top 100 CEOs in Canada was \$10.8 million (Mcdonald, 2021). It is significant that a large portion of this

income is paid in the form of non-cash bonuses like corporate shares and stock options because these are taxed at half the rate of salaries and cash bonuses. In 2019, only 12% of top-100 CEO pay came in the form of a salary while 82% of it came in some form of a bonus.

But income from work is not the most important source of wealth for the owning class. In Marx's definition, it is ownership of capital that distinguishes the owning class from the other classes. Ownership of capital increases wealth in three primary ways: (1) capital gains from the buying and selling of assets such as businesses or real estate; (2) dividends from corporate investments and stock shares; (3) interest from investments, such as savings, bonds and GICs (Guaranteed Investment Certificates) (Macdonald, 2018). In Canada, income generated from capital gains and corporate dividends is taxed at about 50% and 75%, respectively, of the tax rate for ordinary wage labour income. In addition, the owning class benefits from numerous "aggressive tax planning approaches" like the use of private corporations, trusts and offshore tax havens to hide income from Canadian taxation (Macdonald, 2018).

Finally, inheritance is also a key source of the owning class' wealth. In 2016, within the wealthiest 87 families, 39 (45%) were first generation wealth holders, meaning that they did not inherit their wealth, whereas the other 55% did, sometimes through multiple generations (see **Figure 9.14**). Incidentally, Canada is the only country in the G7 without inheritance taxes.

Canadian society has historically distinguished between "old money" (inherited wealth passed from one generation to the next) and "new money" (first generation wealth holders). While both types may have equal net worth, they have traditionally signified different social standing. People of old money, firmly situated in the upper class for generations, hold high prestige. Their families have socialized them to know the customs, norms, and expectations (or habitus) that come with wealth. New money members of the owning class are not oriented to the customs and mores of the elite. They have not gone to the most exclusive schools. They have not established old money social ties. As a result, people with new money are often ostentatious, flaunting their wealth by buying sports cars and mansions, for example, while still exhibiting behaviours attributed to the middle and lower classes. Toronto politicians Rob and Doug Ford are estimated to hold family assets worth \$50 million, yet they present themselves as just "average guys" who stand with their blue-collar constituents against "rich elitist people" (McArther, 2013; Warner, 2014). Before his death in 2016, Rob Ford's infamous crack cocaine smoking, public binge drinking, and use of foul language would not have made him at home within the circles of old money in Canada, even if they otherwise shared similar class interests and goals.

Wealth provides not just access to material goods, but also access to power. Canada's owning class wields a lot of power. Whereas democracy works on the one person, one vote principle, corporations work on the principle that each share gives its owner a vote in corporate decision making. However, as share ownership is highly concentrated among a few major shareholders, including wealthy families, corporations, and institutional investors, these few shareholders effectively control corporate decision making. As corporate leaders, their investment decisions affect the job status of millions of people. As media owners, they shape the narratives of current events and the collective identity of the nation. As philanthropists, they establish foundations to support social causes they believe in. They also fund think tanks like the C. D. Howe Institute and the Fraser Institute which promote the values and interests of business elites. As campaign contributors, they influence politicians and fund campaigns, which partially explains why tax policies in recent decades have been crafted to serve their economic interests.

Making Connections: Social Policy and Debate

Fractions of the Capitalist Class: The Rise of Carbon Capital

Figure 9.19: The Canadian corporate network, clustered by seven cities, showing five economic sectors




Figure 9.19 A visual representation of the relationship of the five different segments of the owning class in Canada can be given by mapping the network of interlocking corporate directors who sit on each other's corporate boards. Each node in the network is represented by a shaded dot representing its class segment (Carroll, 2021). (Image courtesy of William Carroll/ AU Press) [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0](#)

Just as social inequality has been growing in Canada, corporate concentration has also been growing. Brennan (2012) showed that the share of corporate profit of the 60 largest Canadian corporations on the Toronto Stock Exchange increased from 35% in 1961 to 60% in 2010. Fewer corporations are controlling the wealth generated in Canada.

But it is interesting that the owning class, small as it is, is not completely unified in its hegemonic interests. **Hegemony** refers to the ability of a dominant group in society to secure consent to its rule by successfully presenting its own interests, values, and norms as the common sense values of everybody. There is often conflict between different “fractional” interests that make up the owning class. In Weber's definition of class, the “life chances” one shares in common with others by virtue of one's possession of goods or opportunities for income defines one's class position. As the value of different types of capital or

property (e.g., industrial, real estate, financial, etc.) goes up and down according to changes in the market, it means that the interests of different types or fractions of capital do not coincide.

In his study of the rise to prominence of “carbon capital” — the oil and gas sector in Canada — Carroll (2017/2021) notes that there are at least five distinct class interests or fractions within Canada’s owning class, based on competing sectors of the economy: (1) carbon capital, (2) carbon-related industrial capital, including petrochemicals, electricity, steel, transport and the automobile industry, (3) Non-carbon industry, including non-carbon resource extraction, pharmaceuticals and biotech, food and beverage production, equipment manufacture, software, communication and media, (4) commercial capital, including chain stores and the sale of commodities, retail goods and services, and (5) finance capital, including banking, loans, insurance, financial products and services (see **Figure 9.15**).

These interests do not necessarily coincide. For example, the dominance of the interests of carbon capital in the Canadian economy lead to a Canadian version of the process referred to as the “Dutch disease.” International investment of capital in Alberta oil and gas drove up the value of the Canadian dollar at the expense of manufacturing in Ontario, which struggled to find markets for its suddenly expensive Canadian-manufactured products. Similarly, the subsequent collapse in international markets for oil and gas lead to capital flight from Canada, as international investors withdrew their capital from Canada to invest in more profitable ventures elsewhere in the world. This had negative consequences for the entire economy, but a lower exchange rate with the US benefited export-oriented manufacturing interests in Eastern Canada.

Overall, the hegemonic dominance of the carbon sector in Canada through the first two decades of the 21st century has meant that the interests of carbon capital segment of the owning class are represented as the interests of all Canadians. From a critical sociological perspective, this poses obstacles to transitioning to “a socially just, low-carbon future” in response to climate change (Carroll, 2017/21).

The Middle Class and the Traditional Working Class



Figure 9.20 The middle class in Canada. (Photo courtesy of Fanboy30/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

Many people call themselves **middle class**, but there are differing ideas about what that means. People with annual incomes of \$150,000 call themselves middle class, as do people who annually earn \$30,000. That helps explain why some sociologists divide the middle class into upper and lower subcategories. But is the middle class actually a class grouping or is it a status grouping?

The divisions of “upper” and “lower” are largely based on gradations of status defined by levels of education, types of work, types of cultural capital, and the lifestyles afforded by income. Therefore upper-middle-class people tend to hold bachelor’s and postgraduate degrees in subjects such as business, management, law, or medicine that lead to occupations in the professions. **Professions** are occupations that claim high levels of specialized technical and intellectual expertise and are governed and regulated by autonomous professional organizations (like the Canadian Medical Association or legal bar associations). Lower-middle-class members hold bachelor’s degrees or vocational associate’s degrees from two-year community or technical colleges that lead to various types of white-collar, service, administrative, or paraprofessional occupations that do not hold the same level of prestige and power over working conditions of professions.

The common denominator that ties the two categories together is the status of **white-collar** occupations. White-collar refers to the traditional white-collared shirts worn by employees engaged in various types of “mental” or non-manual work, including professional, intellectual, technical, service and administrative work.

On this basis the middle class can be distinguished from the **traditional working class**. The traditional working class

is usually equated with blue-collar types of jobs: “wage-workers who are engaged in the production of commodities, the extraction of natural resources, the production of food, the operation of the transportation network required for production and distribution, the construction industry, and the maintenance of energy and communication networks” (Veltmeyer, 1986, p. 83). The work is considered **blue-collar** because it is hands-on and often physically demanding. The term “blue-collar” comes from the traditional blue coveralls worn by manual labourers.

There are some problems with this distinction however. On one hand, as noted earlier, members of the middle class who earn an income from salaries or wages are, in Marx’s definition, members of the working class, even if they do not see themselves that way. As wage or salary workers, they are distinct from both the owning class and from the small business people, farmers and ranchers, and private contractors who are Marx’s **petite bourgeoisie** or “small owners.” They share a common class position with the traditional working class, which explains to some degree why all middle-income earners, regardless of manual or mental work, have lost a share of the total income with respect to the owning class. Marxist sociologists would explain this as a product of the dynamics of class conflict and class power in Canada.

On the other hand, skilled labour and trades in the traditional working class — skilled carpenters, mechanics, plumbers, electricians, pipe welders, etc. — often earn as much or more than white-collar workers and enjoy a higher standard of living. The median income of families and unattached individuals in Canada in 2019 was \$62,900 (Statistics Canada, 2021), whereas the average income of electricians and plumbers was \$65,890 and \$59,222 respectively (2016 figures) (Statistics Canada, 2019).

If there is a class distinction to be made within middle-income earners in Canada it might make more sense to describe it in terms of degree of control over one’s work circumstances. Abercrombie and Urry (1983) note that there is growing a division within the white-collar occupations between a “service class” of credentialed or professional workers who enjoy relative autonomy and authority at work, and a subordinate group of deskilled nonprofessional white-collar workers such as clerical workers and salespeople who do not. In the lower-middle-class, people hold jobs supervised by members of the upper middle class. They fill technical, lower-level management or administrative support positions. This is roughly parallel to the control that credentialed blue-collar tradespeople enjoy over their work compared to those without trades tickets.

Compared to non-trades traditional working-class work, lower-middle-class jobs might carry more prestige and come with slightly higher paycheques. But for both groups, their incomes afford them a decent, mainstream lifestyle, even if they struggle to maintain it. They generally do not have enough income to build significant savings. In addition, their grip on class status is more precarious than in the upper tiers of the class system. When budgets are tight, lower-middle-class people and non-trades traditional working-class workers are often the ones to lose their jobs.

The Working Poor and the Under Class



Figure 9.21 This man is a custodian at a restaurant. His job, which is crucial to the business, does not pay a living wage. (Photo courtesy of David Bruce Jr/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Beneath those in the working class are the working poor. Like some sections of the working class, they have unskilled, low-paying employment. However, their jobs rarely offer benefits or enough income for retirement planning, and their positions are often precarious, seasonal or temporary. They work as migrant farm workers, house cleaners, and day labourers. Some are high school dropouts. Some are illiterate, unable to read job ads. Many do not vote because they do not believe that any politician will help change their situation (Beeghley, 2008).

How can people work full work weeks and still be poor? Even working full time, more than a million of the working poor earn incomes too meagre to support a family. In 2012, 1.8 million working people (including 540,000 working full time year round) earned less than Statistic Canada's low income cut-off level or LICO measure or

poverty (Johnstone & Cooper, 2013). Minimum wage varies from province to province, from \$9.95/h in Alberta to \$11/h in Nunavut and Ontario (Retail Council of Canada, 2014). However, it is estimated that a **living wage** — based on a 35-hour work week — was \$19.50/hr in Vancouver in 2019, \$22.08/hr in Toronto, and \$21.80/hr in Halifax in 2020 (differences due to the difference in cost of living and government policies in these locations) (Ivanova and Saugstad, 2019; Ontario Living Wage Network, 2020; Driscoll and Saulnier, 2020). A living wage is the amount needed to meet a family's basic needs and enable them to participate in community life (Johnstone & Cooper, 2013). Even for a single person, minimum wage is low. A married couple with children will have a hard time covering expenses.

The underclass or Marx's "lumpenproletariat" is Canada's lowest tier. Members of the underclass live mainly in inner cities. Many are unemployed or underemployed. Those who do hold jobs typically perform menial tasks for little pay. Some of the underclass are homeless. For many, welfare systems provide a much-needed support through food assistance, medical care, housing, and the like, but they live in **relative poverty**.

Social Mobility

Social mobility refers to the ability to change positions within a social stratification system. When people improve or diminish their economic status in a way that affects social class, they experience social mobility. This is a key concept in describing whether *inequalities of condition* limit people's life chances or whether there is actual *equality of opportunity*. A high degree of social mobility, upwards or downwards, would suggest that the stratification system of a society is in fact "open" and that there is equality of opportunity.

Upward mobility refers to an increase — or upward shift — in social class. In Canada, people applaud the rags-to-riches achievements of celebrities like Guy Laliberté who went from street busking in Quebec to being the CEO of Cirque du Soleil, with a net worth of \$2.5 billion. Actor and comedian Jim Carey lived with his family in camper van at one point growing up in Scarborough, Ontario, but in 2021 it was estimated that his net worth was about \$180 million (Celebrity Net Worth, 2021). Ron Joyce was a beat policemen in Hamilton before he co-founded Tim Hortons. CEO of Magna International Frank Stronach immigrated to Canada from Austria in 1955 with only \$50 to his name. There

are many stories of people from modest beginnings rising to fame and fortune. But the truth is that relative to the overall population, the number of people who launch from poverty to wealth is miniscule. Still, upward mobility is not only about becoming rich and famous. In Canada, people who earn a university degree, get a job promotion, or marry someone with a good income may move up socially. **Downward mobility** indicates a lowering of one's social class. Some people move downward because of business setbacks, unemployment, or illness. Dropping out of school, losing a job, or becoming divorced may result in a loss of income or status and, therefore, downward social mobility.

Upward and downward mobility can be refined into *intergenerational*, *intragenerational* and structural mobility. **Intergenerational mobility** explains a difference in social class between different generations of a family. Children may make a higher (or lower) standard of living than their parents and grandparents. Measures of intergenerational mobility describe the likelihood that a child from the bottom or top of the income distribution ends up at the bottom or top of the distribution as an adult. For example, an upper-class executive may have parents who belonged to the middle class. In turn, those parents may have been raised in the lower class. This is different from **intragenerational mobility**, which describes a change in social class within one's adult life time or differences in mobility between members of the same generation. For example, the change in wealth and prestige experienced by one person may be quite different from that of their siblings. Finally, **structural mobility** happens when societal changes enable a whole group of people to move up or down the social class ladder. Structural mobility is attributable to changes in society as a whole, not individual changes. In the first half of the 20th century industrialization expanded the Canadian economy, which raised the standard of living of industrial workers and led to their upward mobility as a group. In today's work economy, the recession and the outsourcing of jobs overseas have contributed to deindustrialization and high unemployment rates among industrial workers. Many people have experienced economic setbacks, creating a wave of downward structural mobility in this segment.

Measuring Social Mobility

Many Canadians believe that people move up in class because of individual efforts and move down by their own doing. This is the myth of the self-made man or woman, a term coined by a United States senator Henry Clay in 1832 (Wyllie, 1954). In the ideal of equality of opportunity, one's access to rewards would exactly equal one's personal efforts and merits toward achieving those rewards. One's class position or other social characteristics (gender, race, ethnicity, etc.) would not skew the relationship between merit and rewards. Others argue that equality of opportunity is itself a myth, designed to keep people motivated to work hard, while getting them to accept social inequality as the legitimate outcome of personal achievement. It is an ideology that masks real and permanent structural inequality in society. The rich stay rich, and the poor stay poor. Data that measures social mobility suggest that the truth is a bit of both.

Typically social mobility is measured by comparing either the occupational status or the earnings between parents and children (i.e., intergenerational mobility). If children's earnings or status remain the same as their parents then there is no social mobility. If children's earnings or status moves up or down with respect to their parents, then there is social mobility. Corak and colleagues compared "intergenerational earnings elasticity" (IGE) between fathers and sons in Canada and the United States (2010). (Some data are available on daughters as well, but it is less common and therefore difficult to use to make cross-national comparisons). Intergenerational earnings elasticity gives a percentage figure that indicates the degree to which fathers' income predicts sons' income (i.e., the degree of intergenerational "stickiness" or lack of social mobility). The data show that there is a much lower degree of social mobility in the United States than in Canada. While earnings elasticity (from 2006 data) in the United States was 0.47, meaning that almost one half of the fathers' earning advantage (or disadvantage) was passed on to their sons, in Canada the figure was 0.19, meaning that less than one-fifth of the father's earnings advantage or disadvantage was passed on. This suggests that Canada has a relatively high rate of social mobility and equality of opportunity compared to the United States, where almost 50 per cent of sons remain at the same income level as their fathers. In an international comparison, the United Kingdom

had even lower social mobility than the United States with an earnings elasticity of 0.50, while Finland, Norway, and Denmark had greater social mobility than Canada with earnings elasticities of 0.18, 0.17, and 0.15 respectively.

Recent research shows that intergenerational mobility in Canada has been declining over time however. Connolly, Haeck and Lapierre (2021) compared the intergenerational mobility of birth cohorts born at 5 year intervals from 1963 to 1982 (i.e., the social mobility of people born in 1963 compared to those born in 1967, compared to those born in 1972, etc.). When people's income is divided into ranks or percentiles, the correlation between an adult child's income and their parent's income has been steadily increasing from 18.9% for those born between 1963 and 1966 to 23.4% for those born between 1982 and 1985. In other words, the greater the correlation between adult children and parents, the lower the social mobility. This was even more pronounced for children of the lowest 20% of earners where the correlation increased from 27.1% to 32.6% between 1963 to 1982. Regionally, Connolly, Haeck and Lapierre (2021) show that social mobility is highest in Atlantic Canada, lowest in Manitoba, and decreased the most in Saskatchewan over this time period.

One of the key factors that distinguishes Canada's degree of social mobility from that of the United States is that the United States has a much greater degree of social inequality to begin with. A higher degree of social inequality is linked to a lower degree of social mobility. This is referred to as the **Great Gatsby Curve** which predicts that the greater the overall inequality in a society, the lower the intergenerational mobility (Connolly, Haeck and Lapierre, 2021). Therefore, the main factor that contributes to the difference in the intergenerational earnings elasticity figures between Canada and the United States is that there is a great degree of intergenerational social *immobility* at the lower and higher ranges of the income scale in the United States. For example, over 25 per cent of sons born to fathers in the top 10 per cent of income earners remain in the top 10 percent, compared to about 18 per cent in Canada. On the other hand, in the United States, 22 per cent of sons born to fathers in the bottom 10 per cent of income earners remain in the bottom 10 percent, while another 18 per cent only move up to the bottom 10 to 20 per cent of income earners. The figures for Canada are 16 per cent and 14 per cent respectively (Corak et al., 2010).

However, these data also show that Canada has by no means "perfect" social mobility or equality of opportunity. Class background significantly affects one's chances to get ahead. For example, the chance that a son born to a father in the 30 to 40 per cent or 40 to 50 per cent ranges of income earners (i.e., in 2004 families averaging \$42,000 or \$55,000 a year respectively) would move up into the top 50 per cent of income earners (i.e., families averaging \$65,000 a year or more) was about 50 per cent (Yalnizyan, 2007). In contrast, a son from the bottom 20 per cent of income earners had only a 38 per cent chance of moving into the top 50 per cent of income earners. For the bottom 20 per cent of families, 62 per cent of sons remained within the bottom 50 per cent of income earners (Corak et al., 2010).

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9.4. Theoretical Perspectives on Social Inequality

Social inequality is defined by unequal access to rewards in society. Research has shown a growing gap in wealth and income between the economic elites and all the other segments of the population in Canada and elsewhere over the last 40 years (Osberg, 2021; Alvaredo et al., 2018). In 2021, *Forbe's* annual list of global billionaires increased by 660 to a new record of 2755 individuals, during a global pandemic which had placed severe economic hardship on the majority of the world's population. Together their wealth added up to \$13.1 trillion (US), up \$5 trillion from 2020 (Dolan, 2021). In 2020, Oxfam calculated that the world's 2,153 billionaires had more wealth than lowest 4.6 billion people combined, or more than 60 per cent of the planet's population (Lawson et al., 2020). Similarly, Canada's top 20 billionaires had become \$37 billion wealthier over the first 6 months of the pandemic (CCPA, 2020).

What accounts for social inequality? In sociology, the issue is studied from various points of view. Structural functionalists examine the purpose or social function of wealth discrepancies, while critical sociologists examine the accumulation of wealth as a product of the unequal distribution of power in society. Interpretive sociologists are interested in how the meanings of social inequality, status and class are constructed and deployed in the conduct of everyday life. The question of how to account for social inequality opens up several debates in sociology.

Structural Functionalism

In sociology, the structural functionalist perspective examines how society's structures operate to maintain the overall functioning of the system. Different aspects of society like social inequality persist because they serve a needed purpose. What is the social function of social inequality?

In 1945, sociologists Kingsley Davis (1908–1997) and Wilbert Moore (1914–1987) put forward the **Davis-Moore thesis**, which argued that the greater the functional importance of a social role, the greater must be the reward. The theory argues that systems of social stratification have a social function, which reflects the inherently unequal value of different types of work. Certain tasks in society are more valuable than others. Qualified people who fill those positions must be rewarded more than others. Therefore the function of stratification or social inequality in societies is “the requirement faced by any society of placing and motivating individuals in the social structure. As a functioning mechanism a society must somehow distribute its members in social positions and induce them to perform the duties of these positions.” Societies do this through the unequal distribution of rewards, esteem and social prestige between different social positions, which ensures that “the most important positions are conscientiously filled by the most qualified persons” (Davis and Moore, 1945).



Figure 9.22 Who gets to the top of the ladder in society and why? (Image courtesy of Thomas Hawk/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

Davis and Moore (1945) presented this theory of stratification as universally applicable to all societies. They argued that “Every society ... must differentiate persons in terms of both prestige and esteem, and must therefore possess a certain amount of institutionalized inequality” (Davis and Moore, 1945). However, how inequality manifests differs from society to society. To try to explain this, they outlined two principles to explain variations between systems of stratification in different types of society: (1) the functional importance of a social position for that society, and (2) scarcity of personnel due to the level of specific skills or capacities required for the position.

So according to Davis and Moore, a firefighter’s job is both more functionally important and more skilled than, for instance, a grocery store cashier’s job. The cashier position does not require the same skill, commitment and level of training as firefighting. Without the incentive of higher pay and better benefits, why would someone be willing to rush into burning buildings? If pay levels were the same, the firefighter might as well work as a grocery store cashier and not risk their life. Davis and Moore believed that rewarding more important and scarce work with higher levels of income, prestige, and power encourages people to go through lengthy training procedures and to work harder and longer. The more skill required for a job, the fewer qualified people there would be to do that job. Certain jobs, such as cleaning hallways or answering phones, do not require much skill. The employees do not need a university degree. Other work, like designing a highway system or removing a cataract, requires immense skill and years of training.

In 1953, Melvin Tumin (1919–1994) countered the Davis-Moore thesis in *Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis*. Tumin (1953) questioned what determined a job’s degree of functional importance. The Davis-Moore thesis does not explain why a media personality with little education, skill, or talent becomes famous and rich on a reality show or a campaign trail. Similarly, during the global pandemic of 2020–2021, it was revealed that some of the poorest paid members of society like store clerks and cashiers were in fact the most functionally “essential workers” needed to keep

society operating in a time of crisis and lock-down. The thesis also does not explain inequalities in the education system, or inequalities due to race or gender. Contra Davis and Moore, Tumin believed social stratification was *dysfunctional* because it prevented qualified people from attempting to fill roles. For example, an underprivileged youth has less chance of becoming a scientist, no matter how smart they are, because of the relative lack of opportunity available.

The Davis-Moore thesis, though open for debate, was an early attempt to explain why stratification exists. The thesis states that social stratification is necessary to promote excellence, productivity, and efficiency, thus giving people something to strive for. Davis and Moore believed that the stratification system serves society as a whole because it allows everyone to benefit from a functional economy, even if they benefit unequally.

Critical Sociology



Figure 9.23 “Towards the Dawn,” a 1930s promotional poster for the Saskatchewan Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) (Image courtesy of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Critical sociologists are deeply critical of social inequality, asserting that it benefits only some people not all of society. For instance, to a critical sociologist it seems problematic that after a long period of increasing equality of incomes from World War II to the 1970s, the wealthiest 1 per cent of income earners have been increasing their share of the total income of Canadians from 7.7 per cent in 1977 to 13.8 per cent in 2007 (Yalnizyan, 2010). In 1982, the median income earner in the top 1 per cent of incomes earned seven times more than the median income earner in the other 99 percent. In 2010, the median income earner in the top 1 per cent earned ten times more. Moreover, while the median income for the top 1 per cent increased from \$191,600 to \$283,000 in constant dollars (i.e., adjusted for inflation), the median income for the bottom 99 per cent only increased from \$28,000 to \$28,400 (Statistics Canada, 2013). Canada’s richest 1 per cent took almost a third (32 percent) of all

growth in incomes 2007 (Yalnizyan, 2010).

Critical sociologists view this “great U-turn” in income equality over the 20th and 21st centuries as a product of both the ability of corporate elites to grant themselves huge salary and bonus increases and the shift toward **neo-liberal** public policy and tax cuts (see [Chapter 4. Society and Modern Life](#)). Rather than creating conditions in which wealth trickles down, tax cuts and neo-liberal policies tremendously benefit the rich at the expense of the poor. This is an example of the way that stratification perpetuates inequality. Contrary to the analysis of functionalists, huge corporate bonuses continued to be awarded even when dysfunctional corporate and financial mismanagement of the economy led to the global financial crisis of 2008. Nor is it the case that corporate elites work harder to merit more rewards. Over the period of increasing inequality in income, the only group not working more weeks and hours in the paid workforce is the richest 10 per cent of families (Yalnizyan, 2007). Critical sociologists argue that the functionalist explanation of inequality cannot account for the growing gap of wealth and income inequality over the last 40 years. Social functions and scarcity of personnel remain relatively unchanged through this period, whereas the unique historical configuration of globalization, neo-liberal policy, new technologies and markets and the decline of labour unions has enhanced the power of the owning classes.

Critical sociologists try to bring awareness to the *structural* nature of social inequalities, such as how a rich society can have so many poor members. The work of Karl Marx has been an important resource in this analysis. In the 19th century, Marx analyzed the way the owning class or capitalists accumulated profit and wealth in the new industrial economies, while working-class proletarians experienced deep exploitation, alienation, and misery (Marx, 1848). For

Marx, differences of wealth and power were products of class structures and class power rather than the qualities of individuals. In particular, ownership and control over private property or capital defined where individuals stood within the class structure and conferred great power on the owners while dispossessing the power of wage earners. He also predicted that the growing collective impoverishment of the working class would lead them, through the leadership of unions, to recognize their common class interests. A common class “consciousness” uniting different types of labour would lead to the revolutionary conditions whereby the working class could remove their “fetters” and overthrow the capitalists. Marx imagined that with the abolition of private property (i.e., privately controlled capital), collective ownership of the means of production would end class conflict forever. A “communist” society that abolished the private ownership of the means of production would remove a key non-democratic source of power and become a true democracy.

Marx did not live to see the state socialist systems in the Soviet Union and elsewhere that called themselves communist but ended up replacing capitalist-based inequality with bureaucratic-based inequality, but his analysis of class structure and the control of economic wealth remains a key source of insight into the sources and dynamics of social inequality. Today, the class structure of capitalism still exists. Capitalists own the means of production, and a neo-liberal economic system is in place that keeps them rich and keeps workers poor, especially when capitalism is regarded on a global scale. Moreover, the privileged position of the middle classes, which emerged as a result of the changing nature of the capitalist economy in the 20th century, has been steadily eroded in the 21st century by growing inequalities of wealth and income. Some sociologists argue that the middle class is becoming **proletarianized**, meaning that in terms of income, property, control over working conditions, and overall life chances, the middle class is becoming more and more indistinguishable from the traditional wage-earning working class (Abercrombie & Urry, 1983). Nevertheless, according to critical sociologists, increasing social inequality is neither inevitable nor necessary.

Other critical sociologists focus on social inequalities based on gender, sexuality, colonialism, race and ethnicity as discussed in the chapters ahead. It is important to note that none of these forms of inequality stand alone. They intersect, with one social determinant of inequality like class compounding the effects of others like gender and race. **Intersectionality** refers to an analysis which examines the overlapping effects of multiple vectors of social inequality. Kimberly Crenshaw argues that the inequality and discrimination experienced by a Black woman in the United States, for example, is more than simply gender inequality and racial inequality added together. As she puts it, “Because the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take intersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in which Black women are subordinated” (Crenshaw, 1989).

Interpretive Sociology

Within interpretive sociology, determining the meanings of social inequality, status and class for individuals is key to being able to explain the nature of social interactions and social identities. The distribution of privileges in society is something that can be objectively measured by various indicators such as income, class position, and surveys of status, etc., but its role in every day life is a matter of lived experience. The meanings attributed to privilege can be examined at a micro and macro level in interpretive sociology.

Symbolic interactionism is a paradigm that uses everyday micro-level interactions of individuals to explain the operation of society. This analysis strives to explain how people’s social standing affects their everyday interactions. For example, Erving Goffman (1967) describes the elaborate rituals of deference that come into play when people recognize they have a difference in status. Deference includes ceremonial and symbolic acts and events “by which appreciation is regularly conveyed to a recipient,” including avoidance and presentation rituals.

Avoidance rituals are practices people use to keep both a physical and social distance from status superiors. These include the use of politeness, formality and terms of respect. Status or honour places an “ideal sphere” of inviolability

around the privileged individual, which is guarded by a “system of deferential stand-off arrangements.” For intimates this sphere can be violated more or less freely, like a mother wiping her child’s nose, but the greater the status difference, the more this distance is protected by extensive and elaborate taboos against contact. Use of avoidance rituals can therefore be used as a social indicator of status differences in a society. On the other hand, **presentation rituals** are practices by which individuals display the esteem they hold for others and indicate how they will treat them in an interaction. These include interactions involving salutations, invitations, compliments, and minor services. Noticing someone’s new hair style or clothes with a compliment, regardless of what one might actually think about the change, is a kind of group acknowledgement of the new status claimed or undertaken by the recipient. Presentation rituals concretely demonstrate a person’s appreciation for the recipient, but as Goffman notes, to the degree that they violate a recipient’s privacy or reserve by commenting on personal matters there is an awkward conflict between the two types of deference ritual in interactions between people of unequal status.

In most communities, people interact primarily with others who share the same social standing, which may account for why structures of inequality persist through time. It is precisely because of social stratification that people tend to live, work, and associate with others like themselves; people who share their same income level, educational background, or racial background, and even tastes in food, music, and clothing. The built-in system of social stratification groups similar people together. George Homans’ (1961) examined the interactions between students at the New York State Training School for Girls to try to explain this phenomena from a micro-level perspective. He developed the concept of *social exchange* as the explanation for why the girls tended to spend their leisure time with status equals rather than with superiors or inferiors.

Homans’ **exchange theory** suggests that human behaviour can be modeled on the basis of calculated social exchanges of resources including tangible gifts, but also more intangible resources like favours, time, attention, etc. The principle is that a *norm of reciprocity* governs exchanges, meaning that, in an equal relationship, the gifts given equal the gifts received. Inequality in status is therefore understood as a product of *unequal* exchanges of gifts: there are net creditors and debtors in relationships. If spending time with a person is a form of gift giving, then persons of higher status give more than persons of lower status because their time is considered to be more valuable. Therefore, for the girls at the school and others, people tend not to spend time with people of either higher or lower status because it is difficult to feel comfortable when one is aware of being a either debtor or creditor in the relationship (or is uncertain of ones status with respect to the other).

Symbolic interactionists also note that people’s appearance reflects their perceived social standing. Housing, clothing, and transportation indicate social status, as do hairstyles, taste in accessories, and personal style. On a broader, macro-scale of interpretive sociology, Pierre Bourdieu’s (1930–2002) concept of **cultural capital** suggests that the cultural “assets” embodied in people’s appearance, such as education and taste, are accumulated and passed down between generations in the same manner as financial capital or wealth (1984). This capital marks individuals from an early age by such things as knowing how to wear a suit or having an educated manner of speaking. In fact the children of parents with a postsecondary degree are 60 per cent likely to attend university themselves, while the children of parents with less than a high school education have only a 32 per cent chance of attending university (Shaienks & Gluszynski, 2007). This relates back to Bourdieu’s concept of **habitus**, discussed at the beginning of the chapter. Habitus is in a sense the physical embodiment of cultural capital, the deeply ingrained habits, skills, and dispositions that people possess due to the cultural capital inherited through their family upbringing and location in the social hierarchy.

Cultural capital is capital also in the sense of an investment, as it is expensive and difficult to attain while eventually “paying off” by providing access to better occupations, financial rewards, life styles, health and privileges. Bourdieu argued that the privilege accorded to those who hold cultural capital is a key means of reproducing the power of the ruling classes. People with the “wrong” cultural attributes have difficulty attaining the same privileged status or the same ability move freely within a social milieu. Cultural capital becomes a key measure of distinction between social strata. For example, cultural capital and habitus also apply to people’s “taste” in cultural objects such as art, food, and clothing. Matters of taste are often key markers of distinction, which people detect in each other almost immediately.



Figure 9.24 Imelda Marcos, the wife of the Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos, was reputed to be one of the ten wealthiest woman in the world in 1975. When her husband was deposed in 1986, the couple fled leaving behind 2,000 to 3,000 shoes from world renowned designers Ferragamo, Givenchy, Chanel, and Christian Dior. (Image courtesy of Vince Lamb/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

In the *Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899), Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) described the activity of **conspicuous consumption** as the tendency of people to buy things as a display of status rather than out of need. Conspicuous consumption refers to buying certain products to make a social statement about status. Carrying pricey but eco-friendly water bottles could indicate a person's social standing. Some people buy expensive trendy sneakers even though they will never wear them to jog or play sports. A \$17,000 car provides transportation as easily as a \$127,000 Tesla Model S, but the luxury car makes a social statement that the less-expensive car can not live up to. All of these symbols of social inequality are worthy of examination by interpretive sociologists because their social significance is determined by the shared meanings people recognize in them.



Figure 9.25 J. Gooch, Canadian hip hop artist from Windsor. (Photo courtesy of Liam Higgins/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

In North American culture, displays of conspicuous consumption can be complex. For example, Randall Collins (2008) describes the dynamic of visual appearance according to the “street code” of Black inner city poverty areas in the United States. The street code is a product of the experience of unreliable police protection in which each individual attempts to demonstrate to others their ability to take care of themselves, using violence if necessary. In terms of individual self-presentation through clothing style, grooming and accessories, it has two contradictory implications. On one hand, 1990s street style for Black males involved wearing baggy pants low on the hips, untied sneakers or work boots, and caps worn backwards. These were counter-cultural markers or displays that rejected the conventions and symbols of success in white mainstream society. On the other hand, wearing expensive athletic suits and shoes, or prestigious brand-named gear, was meant as a conspicuous claim to status within that community. It meant that owner had overcome poverty by “street means” rather than selling out, and since ostentatious displays of wealth marked one as a potential target of theft, wearing these symbolic objects also communicated the ability to protect oneself as a kind of “visual boast.” They signified street status.

The irony of hip hop style being picked up by white youth far from the inner city worlds where it developed was that it carried a meaning or counter-cultural gesture of survival under conditions of oppression, which itself became a treasured symbol of prestige and conspicuous consumption under more affluent conditions.

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Chapter 9 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

absolute poverty: A severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information.**achieved status:** A status received through individual effort or merits (e.g., occupation, educational level, moral character, etc.).

ascribed status: A status received by virtue of being born into a category or group (e.g., hereditary position, gender, race, etc.).

avoidance rituals: Ritualized practices by which people keep both a physical and social distance from status superiors.

blue-collar: Relating to manual work or workers.

bourgeoisie: In capitalism, the owning class who live from the proceeds of owning or controlling capital.

caste system: A system in which people are born into a social standing that they will retain their entire lives.

class: A group who shares a common social status based on their economic position or relationship to the means of production.

class system: A stratification system based on class structure and individual achievement.

conspicuous consumption: Buying and using products to make a statement about social standing.

cultural capital: Cultural assets in the form of knowledge, education, and taste that can be transferred intergenerationally.

Davis-Moore thesis: An argument that social inequality provides positive functional incentives in the occupational system.

downward mobility: A lowering of one's social class.

endogamous marriages: Unions of people within the same social category.

equality of conditions: A situation in which everyone in a society has a similar level of wealth, status, and power.

equality of opportunity: A situation in which everyone in a society has an equal chance to pursue economic or social rewards.

exchange theory: A sociological paradigm that models human interaction on the basis of calculated social exchanges of resources governed by a norm of reciprocity

exogamous marriages: Unions of people from different social categories.

Gini Index: A measure of income inequality in which zero is absolute equality and one is absolute inequality.

Great Gatsby curve: the correlation between greater social inequality in a society and lower intergenerational mobility

hegemony: the ability of a dominant group in society to secure consent to its rule by successfully presenting its own interests, values and norms as the common sense interests, values and norms of everybody.

income: The money a person earns from work or investments.

intergenerational mobility: A difference in income level between different generations of a family.

intragenerational mobility: A difference in income level between different members of the same generation.

intersectionality: The compounding effects of multiple determinants of social inequality

living wage: The income needed to meet a family's basic needs and enable them to participate in community life.

lumpenproletariat: In capitalism, the underclass of chronically unemployed or irregularly employed who are in and out of the workforce.

means of production: Productive property, including the things like tools, technologies, resources, land, workplaces, etc. used to produce the goods and services needed for survival

meritocracy: An ideal system in which individual achievements determine social standing.

neo-liberalism: A set of policies in which the state reduces its role in providing public services, regulating industry, redistributing wealth, and protecting the commons while advocating the use of free market mechanisms to regulate society.

petite bourgeoisie: In capitalism, the class of small owners like shopkeepers, farmers, and contractors who own some property and perhaps employ a few workers but rely on their own labour to survive.

power: How many people a person must take orders from versus how many people a person can give orders to or influence with their decisions.

presentation rituals: Ritualized practices by which individuals attest to the esteem they hold for others.

primogeniture: A law stating that all property passes to the firstborn son.

proletariat: The class of people defined by selling their labour for a wage or salary.

proletarianization: The process in which work conditions increasingly resemble those of the traditional, blue-collar working class.

relative poverty: Living without the minimum amount of income or resources needed to be able to participate in the ordinary living patterns, customs, and activities of a society.

social differentiation: The division of people into categories based on socially significant characteristics, identities, and roles.

social inequality: The unequal distribution of valued resources, rewards, and positions in a society.

social mobility: The ability to change positions within a social stratification system.

social stratification: An institutionalized system of social inequality.

socio-economic status (SES): A group's social position in a hierarchy based on income, education, and prestige of occupation.

standard of living: A level of material goods and comforts required to maintain a particular socio-economic lifestyle.

status: The degree of honour or prestige one has in the eyes of others.

status consistency: The consistency, or lack thereof, of an individual's rank across different social categories like income, education, and occupation.

structural mobility: When societal changes increase or decrease the relative income of an entire group or category of people vis-a-vis other groups.

upward mobility: An increase in one's social class.

wealth: The value of a person's assets.

white-collar: Relating to "mental," administrative or services work, particularly in an office or other professional environment

Section Summary

[9.1 What Is Social Inequality?](#)

Social inequality is defined by the unequal distribution of valued resources, rewards, and social positions in a society. Key to the concept are the notions of *social differentiation*—the social characteristics used to differentiate people—and *social stratification*—the institutionalized systems that maintain and perpetuate social inequality. Stratification systems are either closed, meaning they allow little change in social position, or open, meaning they allow movement and interaction between the layers. A caste system is a closed system in which social standing is based on ascribed status or birth. Class systems are open, to a degree, with individual achievement playing a role in social position. A debate exists between Marxist and Weberian sociologists about whether class is best understood as a structure based on a group's relationship to the ownership of the means of production or as a multi-dimensional variable based on factors like wealth, income, education, status, and occupation.

[9.2 Social Inequality](#)

Standards of living range from extreme wealth to *absolute poverty*—an inability to meet basic needs for survival—and *relative poverty*—an ability to participate in the ordinary activities of a society. Sociological research into inequality shows that the gap in income and wealth between the rich and the poor has been increasing in Canada over the last 40 years. In a comparative perspective, the Gini Index measure of inequality shows that Canada's level of inequality is much higher than many European countries but is lower than the United States and Mexico.

[9.3 Social Classes in Canada](#)

There are three main classes in Canada: the owning class, middle class/traditional working class and the working poor/underclass. Social mobility describes the ability of people to shift from one social class to another, but even in open class societies research shows that people tend to remain in the classes they were born into. Class background significantly affects one's chances to get ahead.

[9.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Social Inequality](#)

The increasing social inequality of the last four decades can be examined from different sociological perspectives — functionalism, critical sociology, and interpretive sociology. The functionalist perspective states that inequality serves an important function in aligning individual merit and motivation with social position. Critical sociologists observe that class power accounts for the increasing wealth of the owning class over the last 40 years. Interpretive sociologists examine how social inequality is communicated at both micro-level and macro-levels in society. They observe how social standing affects people's everyday interactions, particularly the tendency to use rituals of deference and interact with people of like status, and how social class is constructed and maintained through cultural capital and conspicuous consumption.

Questions

Quiz: Social inequality and class

9.1 What Is Social Inequality?

1. Caste systems are closed due to what factor?
 - a. Exogenous marriage practices.
 - b. People cannot change their social standings.
 - c. Feudal deference rituals and values.
 - d. All of the above.
2. What factor makes class systems open?
 - a. There are no formal restrictions on movement between classes.
 - b. People are more open-minded.
 - c. People naturally socialize within their class.
 - d. All of the above.
3. Social inequality is based on _____.
 - a. Social differentiation
 - b. Social stratification
 - c. Unequal distribution of valued resources, rewards and social positions
 - d. All of the above
4. Which of the following best illustrates equality of condition?
 - a. Everyone in a society has an equal possibility of becoming successful.
 - b. Everyone in a society has an equal level of wealth, status, and power.
 - c. Everyone in society as an equal level of skill, talent, and ability.
 - d. Everyone in society has equal access to meritocracy.
5. Which statement illustrates low status consistency?
 - a. A suburban family lives in a modest ranch home and enjoys a nice vacation each summer.
 - b. A single mother receives welfare and struggles to find adequate employment.
 - c. A college dropout launches an online company that earns millions in its first year.
 - d. A celebrity actor spoils his public image by slapping another actor on stage.
6. Based on meritocracy, a physician's assistant would _____.
 - a. Receive the same pay as all the other physician's assistants.
 - b. Be encouraged to earn a higher degree to seek a better position.
 - c. Most likely marry a professional at the same level.
 - d. Earn a pay raise for doing excellent work.

7. Marx defines social class as _____.
- a. A group of people with the same relationship to the means of production.
 - b. A group of people with the same relationship to the market value of their property or labour skills.
 - c. A group of people with the same life chances.
 - d. Proletarians, Lumpen proletarians, Bourgeoisie, and Petit-Bourgeoisie.

9.2 Social Inequality

8. In Canada, most people define themselves as _____.
- a. Lower class.
 - b. Upper class.
 - c. Middle class.
 - d. Classless and free.
9. Structural mobility occurs when _____.
- a. A large group moves up or down the class ladder.
 - b. An individual moves up or down the class ladder.
 - c. The degree of intergenerational “stickiness” changes.
 - d. A member of a family belongs to a different class than their siblings.
10. The difference between relative and absolute poverty is _____.
- a. A living wage vs. minimum wage.
 - b. The ability to participate in society vs. the ability to survive.
 - c. Half the median family income vs. the income level below which a family would devote at least 20 percentage points more of their income to food, clothing, and shelter.
 - d. All of the above.
11. Which of the following scenarios is an example of intergenerational mobility?
- a. A janitor belongs to the same social class as their grandmother.
 - b. An executive belongs to a different class than their parents.
 - c. An editor in 2021 earns less than an editor did in 1981.
 - d. A lawyer belongs to a different class than their sister.
12. The difference between blue-collar and white-collar means that jobs are _____.
- a. not all equal in status.
 - b. not all equally paid.
 - c. not all equally defined by relation to the means of production.
 - d. not all equally distributed between genders.
13. Fragments of the Canadian capitalist class refer to _____.
- a. The Bourgeoisie and Petit-Bourgeoisie.
 - b. 1st, 2nd and 3rd generation wealth holders.
 - c. Break-up of corporate conglomerates due to the “Dutch Disease” phenomenon.

- d. Carbon capital, industrial capital, pharmaceuticals and biotech, commercial retail chains, financial institutions.
14. A figure of “0” in the Gini Index indicates _____.
- a. Social inequality.
 - b. Equality of opportunity.
 - c. Equality of condition.
 - d. Disenchantment of the world.

9.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Social Inequality

15. The basic premise of the Davis-Moore thesis is that the unequal distribution of rewards in social stratification _____.
- a. Serves a purpose in society.
 - b. Is an outdated and dysfunctional mode of societal organization.
 - c. Is a source of social strain.
 - d. Is a product of class power.
16. Unlike Davis and Moore, Melvin Tumin believed that because of social stratification some qualified people were _____ higher-level job positions.
- a. Encouraged to train for
 - b. Denied the opportunity to obtain
 - c. Fired from
 - d. Naturally suited to
17. Which statement represents stratification from the perspective of interpretive sociology?
- a. Flashy clothes demonstrate street cred[i]bility].
 - b. After work, Pat, a janitor, feels more comfortable eating in a truck stop than a French restaurant.
 - c. Doctors earn more money because their job requires rarer skills.
 - d. Teachers have relatively high status and relatively low wages.
18. Critical theorists explain the increasing share of the pie controlled by capitalists as a product of _____.
- a. The rarity of specific skills or capacities required by corporate executives.
 - b. Inheritance of wealth.
 - c. Global corporate networks.
 - d. Neo-liberal taxation policies.

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

9.1 What Is Social Inequality?

1. Track the social stratification of your family tree. Did the social standing of your parents differ from the social standing of your grandparents and great-grandparents? What social traits were handed down by your forebears? Are there any exogamous marriages in your history? Does your family exhibit status consistencies or inconsistencies?
2. Outline the differences between Marx's and Weber's definition of class. What do you see as the strengths and limitations of each definition?

9.2 Social Inequality

1. Which social class do you and your family belong to? Are you in a different social class than your grandparents and great-grandparents? Does your class differ from your social status and, if so, how? What aspects of your societal situation establish you in a social class?
2. Is the middle class the same or different from the working class? Consider Marxist and Weberian arguments. Why does it matter whether the middle class is same or different from the working class?
3. Do a search of recent newspaper articles on poverty in Canada. How is poverty represented in the media? Are the representations informed by concepts of absolute poverty, relative poverty, or both? How might the sociological analyses of class structure, status distinction, and habitus contribute to the discussion of poverty?

9.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Social Inequality

1. Analyze the Davis-Moore thesis. Do you agree with Davis and Moore that inequality is necessary for society to function? What examples can you think of that support the thesis? What examples can you think of that refute the thesis?
2. Do you see any evidence of the growing gap between the rich and poor in Canada? What evidence do you see of the relative decline in wealth and income of the middle class? Does growing inequality affect you personally? What do you think the broader implications are?
3. What class traits define your peer group? For example, what speech patterns or clothing trends do you and your friends share? What cultural elements, such as taste in music or hobbies, define your peer group? How do you see this set of class traits as different from other classes either above or below yours?

Further Research

9.1 What Is Social Inequality?

The *New York Times* investigated social stratification in their series of articles called "Class Matters." The online accompaniment to the series includes an interactive graphic called "[How Class Works.](#)" which tallies four factors — occupation, education, income, and wealth — and places an individual within a certain class and percentile. What class describes you? Test your class rank on the [New York Times interactive site](#).

9.2 Social Inequality

Mark Ackbar made a documentary about social class and the rise of the corporation called [The Corporation](#). The filmmakers interviewed corporate insiders and critics. The accompanying website is full of information, resource guides, and study guides to the film.: <http://thecorporation.com/>.

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Solutions to Section Quiz

1 B, | 2 A, | 3 D, | 4 B, | 5 C, | 6 D, | 7 A, | 8 C, | 9 A, | 10 B, | 11 B, | 12 A, | 13 D, | 14 C, | 15 A, | 16 B, | 17 B, | 18 D, [\[Return to Quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 10. GLOBAL SOCIETY



Figure 10.1 Satellite photo of the gigantic container ship Ever Given stuck in the Suez Canal, Egypt – March 24th, 2021. The incident, which occurred during the global COVID-19 pandemic, demonstrated the precarious nature of contemporary globalization, causing an estimated \$6-10 billion/day in costs, and backing up the 12% of global trade that passes between Europe and Asia through the canal (Russon, 2021). The blockage severely disrupted global supply chains, just-in-time manufacturing processes, workers' jobs, and consumer prices around the world. (Image courtesy of Pierre Markuse/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Learning Objectives

10.1 Trade, Colonialism and the Origins of Global Society

- Define the stages of the development of global society.
- Analyse the relationship between the history of colonialism and contemporary global society.

10.2. Global Wealth and Poverty

- Describe concepts and indicators of global stratification and global poverty.

- Distinguish between relative and absolute poverty.
- Examine the World Bank's classification of economies into high-income, middle-income, and low-income.
- Compare the explanations of global inequality from the perspectives of modernization theory, dependency theory and global capitalism theory.

10.3. Contemporary Global Society

- Analyse the lived experience of global society from an interpretive sociology perspective.
- Describe four distinct features of global society: de-traditionalization, globalization, expressive individualism/new tribalism, and the risk/trust dynamic.

Global Society



Figure 10.2 Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980). “We can now live, not just amphibiously in divided and distinguished worlds, but pluralistically in many worlds and cultures simultaneously.... The new electronic interdependence recreates the world in the image of a global village” (McLuhan, 1962). (Image courtesy of Bernard Gotfryd/Wikimedia Commons.) [No Known Copyright Restrictions](#)

In the 1960s, Canadian media theorist Marshall McLuhan described the world as a “global village” (McLuhan, 1962; 1964; 1968). Due to the development of electronic media and other technological advances, communication from almost any point in the world to any other point became instantaneous. The sharing of news, culture and viewpoints expanded from neighbourhoods to the world. It was as if everyone lived in everyone else’s backyard.

“Ours is a brand-new world of all-at-once-ness. ‘Time’ has ceased, ‘Space’ has vanished. We now live in a ‘global village’...a simultaneous happening. Information pours upon us, instantaneously and continuously. As soon as information is acquired, it is rapidly replaced by still newer information” (McLuhan, 1967).

The sense of simultaneity (“time has ceased”) and closeness (“space has vanished”) that McLuhan described is a product of *globalization*. As Ulrich Beck (1944-2015) put it, the effect of globalization has been to “conjure away distance” on a variety of different levels (Beck, 2000). Individual actors no longer “live and act in the self-enclosed spaces of national states and their respective national societies. Globalization means that borders become markedly less relevant to everyday behaviour in the various dimensions of economics, information, ecology, technology, cross-cultural conflict and civil society” (Beck, 2000).

Globalization therefore refers to the processes of increasing integration and interconnection, which incorporate people across the world into a single *global* society (Albrow and King, 1990). It is “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens 1991). If, as Dorothy Smith (1999) said in [Chapter 1 An Introduction to Sociology](#), the *social* is the “ongoing concerting and coordinating of individuals’ activities,” then these activities must be understood to be increasingly coordinated on a global scale.

Using a **global level of analysis**, sociologists study how the world operates as a whole. In a global society, local activities need to be understood in a global context. The local is global, and vice versa. Many view this process with anxiety, while others view it with hope. In the current period of globalization, which Robertson (1990) describes as its “uncertainty phase,” many examples come to mind where global level factors significantly affect people’s lives in different ways in different locations.

Global pandemic: The COVID-19 virus was first recorded in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, but by March 2020, it had become a global pandemic, spreading initially through the networks of global tourism (Tsiotas & Tselios, 2022).

Global climate change: Global climate change driven by emissions from human activities does not respect societal borders. It is producing weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe (heatwaves, heavy precipitation, droughts, and tropical cyclones), and threatening the homes and livelihoods of people living in low elevation coastal zones through rising sea levels — around 11% of the world’s population in 2010 (IPCC, 2019).

Global economy: Global flows of economic investment and disinvestment affect the availability of work in various locations. Investment reflects global markets and prices for different commodities, impacting everything from the volatility of the petro-economy in Northern Alberta to the affordability of housing in Vancouver and Toronto.



Figure 10.3 Anthony Giddens (1938-). “We are the first generation to live in global society, whose contours we can as yet only dimly see. It is shaking up our existing ways of life, no matter where we happen to be. This is.... emerging in an anarchic, haphazard, fashion... it is not settled or secure, but fraught with anxieties, as well as scarred by deep divisions. Many of us feel in the grip of forces over which we have no control” (Giddens, 2002). (Image courtesy of Szusi/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 3.0](#)

Container Ships: Globalization and Uncertainty

These are some of the big-ticket items confronting global society and will be discussed later in the textbook. But to take a smaller example of the effects of globalization, the grounding of the gigantic container ship *Ever Given* in the Suez Canal for several days in March 2021, indicates just how interconnected the world has become in the 21st century.




Figure 10.4 The mega-container ship *Ever Given* is one of the largest container ships ever built: 400 metres long, nearly 60 metres wide, and capable of carrying 20,000 shipping containers. The technology of containerization is a key component of globalization. It has greatly decreased the cost of global trade and increased its speed, especially of consumer goods and commodities. (Image courtesy of Kees Torn/Flickr.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

In 2021, the *Ever Given* was one of approximately 100 mega-container ships worldwide that are almost as long as the Empire State Building is high, as wide as a city block, and capable of transporting 20,000 six-metre-long metal shipping containers. In the 21 km stretch of the canal where the *Ever Given* got stuck, its keel would have been only a few metres from the bottom. The canal was not built for such huge ships. Initial reports stated the ship was blown off course by heavy winds, although subsequent reporting indicated communication problems, lack of tugboats, and poor piloting contributed to the ship running aground (Yee and Glanz, 2021). The accident caused an estimated \$6–10 billion per day in costs and backed up the 12% of global trade that passes between Europe and Asia through the canal (Russon, 2021). The blockage severely disrupted global supply chains, just-in-time manufacturing processes, workers' jobs and consumer prices around the world.

There are numerous components of the global economy at play in this incident. The first is the global shipping industry itself. Container shipping was only invented in 1956, but because the cost of shipping boxes is so inexpensive, secure, and efficient, approximately 90% of all non-bulk cargo is now moved in containers (Dicken, 2015). **Containerization** is a key technological driver of contemporary globalization, the means by which the clothes, coffee mugs, wall paint, laptops — practically all the raw materials, parts and household products — in any Canadian home are transported. The accessories of contemporary life are thoroughly global in origin, largely because of the transformation in the transportation and trade of goods brought about by container ships.

The second component is the **multinational corporations** that propel global trade. Characteristics of multinational corporations include the following: a large share of their capital is collected from various nations, their business is conducted without regard to national borders, they concentrate wealth in the hands of core nations and already wealthy individuals, and they play a key role in the global economy. The global nature of ownership and management of container ships is an indicator of the interlinked complexity of multinationals and corporate business models in the

global economy. A Japanese company owned the *Ever Given*, and it was registered in Panama, operated by a Taiwanese conglomerate, and staffed by an all-Indian crew employed by a German ship management company (Wise, 2021).

The third component at play is the emergence of **global assembly lines**, where the process of designing and assembling products is distributed in different geographical locations, and **global commodity chains**, where resources, workers and corporations are internationally coordinated for the purpose of manufacture and marketing of goods and services (Plahe 2005). For instance, Apple engineers and designs its iPhone in the United States, rare earth minerals for its components are sourced in Mongolia, semi-conductors are made in Taiwan, touch screens are made in Japan and Korea, gyroscopes are made in Switzerland, and they are shipped to China for assembly, while tech support is outsourced to Cork, Ireland (Anthony, 2022).

As the *Ever Given* incident illustrates, container shipping exemplifies the precarious nature of the tightly coordinated network of interactions in global assembly lines and global commodity chains. Key to these processes are just-in-time production and distribution systems, which depend on goods arriving precisely when needed. Just-in-time production saves manufacturers and stores the cost of storage and inventory, but it only takes a single problem in the supply chain for the entire system to break down. There are numerous “choke points,” like the Suez Canal, where things can go wrong, affecting container ports, jobs, costs of production, prices of components and goods, and inflation around the world (Browne, 2021).

Furthermore, global assembly lines and global commodity chains bring a global division of labour, in which comparatively wealthy workers from core nations compete with the low-wage labour pool of peripheral and semi-peripheral nations. This can lead to a sense of **xenophobia**, which is an intense fear and even hatred of foreigners and foreign goods. Corporations trying to maximize their profits in the United States are aware of this risk and attempt to “Americanize” their products, selling shirts printed with U.S. flags that were nevertheless made in China, Mexico or elsewhere.

Finally, the *Ever Given* incident demonstrates the global complexity of international regulation and national jurisdictions. The development of the **sovereign state system** was itself a product of early modern globalization (see discussion later in the chapter), but it means that individual states have jurisdiction over regulations within their borders, whereas many processes they seek to regulate are global in scale. Maritime traffic through the Suez Canal is a case in point: numerous overlapping authorities were engaged in the grounding of the *Ever Given* (Yee and Glanz, 2021). Who was responsible for the accident?

Shipping industry analysts note that the development of mega-container ships is the product of companies attempting to maximize efficiency and minimize costs in a competitive marketplace, but that canals and ports were not designed to handle them safely. The International Maritime Organization is responsible for mandating safety standards, but the Egyptian government maintains the canal, and collects fees for passage through it. The Suez Canal Authority provides the pilots to navigate the canal, while the ship’s captain has ultimate authority over the ship. Investigating an accident is the responsibility of the country where it happened (in this case Egypt), and of the country where the ship is registered (in this case Panama), rather than a neutral party such as the International Maritime Organization. Sorting out what went wrong and what to do to prevent it happening again involves a complex interplay of competing interests and jurisdictions, while the consequences of incidents like these are shared globally.

The example of the *Ever Given* shows us how one small event can have significant worldwide ramifications due to the interconnectedness of global society. Larger events like pandemics, climate change, and decisions about capital investment and disinvestment can be enduring and potentially catastrophic on a global scale. How did the world become so globalized?

Media Attributions

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10.1. Trade, Colonialism, and the Origins of Global Society



Figure 10.5 The Silk Road (in green) and other caravan routes of Eurasia in the 1st century A.D. (Image courtesy of Kaidor/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

Robertson (1990) has argued that an understanding of global society has to begin with the long historical processes by which “the global system has been and continues to be made.” Although he cites the 2nd Century Roman historian Polybius, who noted that “[f]ormerly the things which happened in the world had no connection among themselves.... [b]ut since then all events are united in a common bundle,” it was not until the “germinal phase” of globalization in early modernity (15th – 18th century) that it became realistic to talk about humanity becoming organized as a single global society. Interestingly, Robertson argues that the process of dividing the world into separate national societies was itself an aspect of globalization, rather than an existing or ‘natural’ state of affairs replaced or undermined by globalization.

Robertson (1990) defines several stages on the path to the creation of global society:

- Phase I: the germinal phase (15th – mid-18th century)
- Phase II: the incipient phase (mid-18th century – 1870s)
- Phase III: the take-off phase (1870s – mid-1920s)
- Phase IV: the struggle-for-hegemony phase (mid 1920s – mid-1960s)
- Phase V: the uncertainty phase, (1960s – present)

These stages can be mapped onto the development of colonialism and contemporary globalization, as described in the sections below.

Silk Roads (1st Century BCE–5th Century CE, and 13th–14th Centuries CE)

People have been trading goods and connecting over distances for almost as long as people have been around. In North America, for example, before the arrival of Europeans, Mississippian culture (ca. 500–1400 BCE) extended from the lower Great Lakes to the southeastern-most points of North America. Mississippians traded goods as far afield as the Bow Valley in Alberta, the Tiger Hills in southern Manitoba, along the Wəlastəkw — a.k.a. St. John River — in what is now New Brunswick, and in the farming villages of the Eastern Woodlands of the southern Maritimes, Quebec and Ontario (Belshaw, Nichel, & Horton, 2020).

In terms of the creation of global society, it was not until the 1st century BCE that a key step towards globalization occurred (Vanham, 2019). The development of the 6500 kilometre long Silk Road marked the shift from trade as a local or regional practice to becoming a global phenomenon. Luxury items originating from China began to appear in Rome, marking the first time in history that such products had traveled such a great distance. Regular trading between distant societies began to become routinized.

Although the intercontinental trade of luxury goods such as silk and spices between Asia and Europe had begun, it was not yet a full-fledged globalization. Silk was mostly a luxury good, and so were the spices that were added to the intercontinental trade between Asia and Europe. As a percentage of the total economy, the value of these exports was tiny, and many middlemen were involved to get the goods to their destination. Nonetheless, global trade links were established, and those involved in the trade reaped significant profits, with prices often multiplying by dozens from purchase to final sale.

The success of the Silk Road was largely due to the dominance of two great empires that controlled much of the trade route. Interruptions in trade were typically caused by blockades from local enemies of Rome or China. The eventual closure of the Silk Road after several centuries was due to the fall of these empires. When the road was reopened during Marco Polo's travels in the late medieval period (1271–1295), it was due to the rise of a new dominant empire — the Mongols. Throughout history, the pattern of trade's success has been linked to the protection provided by dominant empires, and its decline has been associated with the weakening or fall of these empires.

Spice Routes (7th–15th Centuries)



Figure 10.6 Sinbad the Sailor represented as a trader hosting merchants from different cultures from China to Europe. The Abbasid Caliphate was at the centre of the spice trade, which inspired the tales of Sinbad the Sailor. (Painting by Abanindranath Tagore, 1930, courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Islamic merchants were responsible for the next phase of global trade (Vanham, 2019). With the widespread dissemination of Islam from its Arabian origins in the 7th century, trade also began to expand in all directions. The prophet Mohammed, who founded Islam, was a renowned merchant, as was his wife Khadija, thus making trade a pivotal component of the religion and its adherents. By the early 9th century, Muslim traders had already established dominance over trade in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean regions, and eventually expanded their reach as far east as Indonesia, which later became a Muslim-majority country, and as far west as Moorish Spain.

During the Middle Ages, the primary focus of Islamic trade was on spices, which had been traded mainly by sea since ancient times. By the medieval era, spices had become the central focus of international trade. Among these spices were cloves, nutmeg, and mace from the renowned Spice Islands located in the Maluku islands of Indonesia. These spices were in high demand in Europe and incredibly expensive. Therefore, they were still considered luxury items, and the trade remained relatively low-volume. Although globalization had not yet taken off, the original Belt (sea route) and Road (Silk Road) of trade between East and West was established.

Age of Colonization (15th–18th Centuries)

The Age of Colonization marked the beginning of truly global trade (Vanham, 2019). This era, starting from the late 15th century, connected the East and the West through the efforts of European explorers who also accidentally discovered the Americas. The scientific revolution in fields like astronomy, mechanics, physics, and shipping aided these explorations by Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and English explorers. They first discovered lands unknown to Europe, then subjugated them, and ultimately integrated them into their economies, a process referred to as *colonialism*.

The Age of Colonization had a significant impact on the world. The discovery of the Americas by Columbus, which almost destroyed pre-Columbian civilizations, is the most infamous example. However, the circumnavigation of the globe by Magellan was perhaps more consequential for the process of globalization. It opened the door to the Spice Islands, eliminating Arab and Italian middlemen. Although trade remained small compared to total GDP (Gross Domestic Product), expanded global integration considerably transformed people's lives on a global scale.

For example, the European colonization of the Americas initiated the **Columbian Exchange** (Crosby, 2003), the enormous widespread exchange of plants, animals, foods, human populations (including slaves), communicable diseases (like smallpox), and culture between the Eastern and Western hemispheres. It was one of the most significant global events concerning ecology, agriculture, and culture in history. New crops like corn, potatoes, tomatoes, tobacco and chocolate that had come from the Americas via the European seafarers in the 16th century significantly contributed to the world's population growth and to the formation of new habits of life around global products.

Colonialism

Two key developments contributed to the form and nature of global integration during this period. The first was the development of **colonialism**. Colonialism is a form of domination in which a state or state sponsored group exercises direct control over the territory and inhabitants of another society (Horvath, 1972; Mahoney, 2010). Colonization implies the power to settle, govern and extract resources from a foreign territory even in the face of resistance by its inhabitants. Marx (1977) described this process as **primitive accumulation**: wealth generated by separating people from a territory and its resources, and subjecting them to unfree labour (e.g., slavery, **peonage**), expropriation of land, and destruction of previously self-determining communities.

From the point of view of those inhabitants, local political structures and Indigenous self-government, including the Indigenous capacity to exercise control over their own territory, are forcibly eliminated, neutralized or rendered subordinate to the colonizing power. From the point of view of global integration, colonialism coercively subsumed a huge proportion of the planet to European control and supplanted local, isolated economies; first with mercantilism and then with global capitalism.

For the European colonizers of the early modern period, colonial dispossession of Indigenous inhabitants was legitimated through the doctrine of **Terra Nullius** or “nobody’s land” — the idea that territory and economic resources that are not being effectively utilized by an Indigenous population “could legitimately be expropriated and developed by a superior invading nation” (Lieven, 2000). Ideologies that characterized Indigenous People as inferior, savage, childlike or uncivilized, and therefore in need of colonial government further supported this notion. In this way colonization could be presented as a type of “civilizing mission.”



Figure 10.7 Jacques Cartier meeting with the St. Lawrence Iroquois at Hochelaga during his second voyage in 1535 (Painting by Lawrence Batchelor (1933) courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

In the development of the European colonial empires, two major forms of colonialism were utilized, which had significant impact on the formation of contemporary global inequality (discussed later in the chapter): **colonies of exploitation** and **colonies of settlement** (Pares, 1937; Shipley, 2020). As Shipley (2020) sums it up: “Though no two cases are identical, it is possible to distinguish between these two categories of colonialism: those designed primarily for economic exploitation (Spanish America, British India and the Dutch East Indies) and a more settler-oriented colonialism (British North America, French Algeria and Portuguese Brazil).”

The formation of the 16th-century Spanish Empire for example was based largely on **exploitative colonialism** in which its colonies in the Americas and elsewhere were treated as sources of natural resources to exploit, especially precious metals. Efforts to conquer and enslave the inhabitants were focused on the extraction of wealth. The violent exploitation of the “mountain of silver” in Potosí, Bolivia, in the 16th and 17th century, described by Eduardo Galeano in *Open Veins of Latin America* (1973), is a grim example. The Spanish colonists imposed a forced labour system known as the *mita*, in which Indigenous Incans from hundreds of miles away were forced to labour in the mines and then carry a daily quota of 25 45kg bags of silver ore to the surface. This led to a demographic collapse of Incan society in the area. Thousands of Incans and African slaves died before the resource was exhausted at the end of the 17th century, but the silver funded the Spanish colonial empire and provided the key ingredient of capitalism — fluid money — that enabled the global exchange of slaves, fabrics, spices, silk, porcelain, tea and other goods on a permanent basis.

On the other hand, the British colonization of the Americas took the form of **settler colonialism**, involving permanent European settlement and displacement of Indigenous Peoples. The colonies that became Canada, the United States, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa were settler colonies. While the colonization of Western Canada in the 19th century might appear less directly violent than in Potosí, the Canadian government used the collapse of population due to epidemic disease, the decimation of the buffalo and an active policy of starvation to force Indigenous Peoples off their land and onto relatively unproductive reserve lands to make way for railway development and advancing European settlement (Daschuk, 2013).

The Sovereign State System

The second development of global integration in this period is related to the first: the formation of the **sovereign state system**. As discussed in [Chapter 17. Government and Politics](#), the sovereign state system is the structure by which the world is divided up into separate and indivisible sovereign territories. Prior to the early modern age, feudal Europe and most of the world was divided into a complex patchwork of small overlapping jurisdictions with uncertain borders, sometimes held in allegiance to empires like the Mongol Empire or the Holy Roman Empire. Secular or political authority was often at odds with religious authority or entwined with it in complex ways. It was not until the Peace of Westphalia (1648) at the end of the Thirty Years War that the modern nation-state system can be said to have come into existence based on the principle of **sovereignty**: the political form in which a single, central “sovereign” or supreme lawmaking authority governs within a clearly demarcated territory.




Figure 10.8 The partition of Africa by colonial powers showing the expansion of colonization from 1880 (shown in green) to 1891 (shown in pink). (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

except through diplomatic agreements and voluntary international norms, which are generally not backed by force. While order is maintained by “the sovereign” *within* each sovereign state, *outside* the state or between states there is no sovereign to enforce law. The international sovereign state system is inherently unstable in this sense, and war is always a possibility as individual states pursue their interests.

In addition, as noted earlier with the container ship example, the modern state system means that while individual states have jurisdiction or authority over processes occurring within their borders, their capacity to act is restricted to the many issues affecting their populations that are global in scale. Regulating maritime traffic is one example, but finding adequate, global-level responses to issues ranging from climate change to global poverty, to the spread of misinformation in social media is inherently tenuous.

According to some sociologists, the early Age of Colonization may not be considered as true globalization as the resulting global economy was still segmented and unbalanced (Vanham, 2019). Although trade became global and was the main reason for colonization, the European Empires primarily established global supply chains with their own colonies. Additionally, their colonial model was centred on exploitation and primitive accumulation, which included the disgraceful legacy of the slave trade. Therefore, the empires developed a mercantilist and a colonial economy, but not a genuinely globalized one. Nevertheless, it was during this period that the entire world was reconfigured around a new centre of power in Europe, which for the first time in human history had the power to shape historical events all over the planet (Shipley, 2020).

It might seem ironic today that the development of the sovereign state system was a key component of early globalization. The separation of societies into discrete sovereign territories and nations is often presented as a source of resistance to processes of globalization, which tend to bypass or break borders down. However, the division of the entire globe into territorially separate states (except for the oceans and Antarctica) was a mechanism that imposed a single model of political community onto every corner of the Earth. Combined with colonialism, eight different European nation-states controlled and defined the territories of what eventually became 125 different nation-states (Abernethy, 2000). The arbitrariness of where the colonial borders were drawn remains a significant source of conflict today, particularly in the Middle East and Africa where artificial borders often cut through existing ethnic communities or combined rival communities into a single sovereign territory.

Moreover, the modern state system imposed a structure onto global politics that remains in effect to this day (Walker, 1993). Whereas states claim the power to regulate and control processes within their borders, the international relations between states are unregulated

Three Waves of Globalization (19th Century–1914, 1945–1989, 1989–Present)

First Wave

The period from the 19th century up to 1914 saw the emergence of the true **first wave of globalization** (Vanham, 2019). During this time, Great Britain rose to global dominance both in terms of its global empire of colonies, and in terms of its early industrialization, thanks to new technologies like the steam engine and spinning jenny. This was the era of the *industrial revolution*.



Figure 10.9 Hundreds of English workers leaving Platt's Works, Oldham 20th August 1900. Platt's Works manufactured textile machinery and by the end of the 19th century employed 12,000 workers (Image courtesy of BFI Archive/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)



Figure 10.10 Missionary holds up a Congolese man's decapitated arm, circa 1890–1910. The 1904 report by Roger Casement documented “Congo atrocities”, including punishment, murders and mutilations (particularly amputation of the right hand on living victims or after death) that took place on colonial rubber plantations in the Congo Free State, territory owned by Belgian King Leopold II, who exploited it for its plant and mineral resources. (Image courtesy of International Mission Photography Archive/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

The industrial revolution in Britain provided a powerful driving force for global trade through two main factors (Vanham, 2019). Firstly, the development of steamships and trains facilitated the efficient transportation of goods over long distances, both domestically and internationally. Secondly, the industrialization of Britain allowed the production of inexpensive goods, such as iron, textiles, and manufactured items, which were in high demand globally. As the economist John Maynard Keynes observed: “The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole Earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep” (cited in Globalist, 2001).

Although Britain was the primary beneficiary of the first wave of globalization due to its significant capital and technological advancements, other countries also benefited from it. With the invention of the refrigerated cargo ship in

the 1870s, countries like Argentina and Uruguay were able to export meat on a large scale, which led to their golden age. Other countries also began to specialize and trade in goods in which they were most competitive.



Figure 10.11 The vast territory of Rupert's Land was incorporated into the global economy when exclusive rights to trade in the area were granted to the Hudson's Bay Company in 1670. This model of joint stock company became key to the expansion of the global economy in the 19th century. (Image courtesy of Matthew Trump, 2004/ Wikimedia Commons.) [GNU Free Documentation Licence](#)

John Maynard Keynes noted that a similar situation was also true in the world of investing. International banking structures, the invention of the joint stock corporation and then the modern private corporation facilitated the global circulation of capital investment, as well as the physical infrastructure of globalization. Individuals with financial resources in major cities like New York, Paris, London, or Berlin had the ability to invest in joint stock companies that were engaged in international activities.

The Hudson's Bay Company, for example, was an early joint stock company that was granted control and exclusive trading rights over the huge territory of "Rupert's Land" traversed by rivers flowing into Hudson Bay as early as 1670 (Ray, 2009). This effectively drew most of what became Western Canada and the Northern United States into the global economy. Another joint stock corporation was the French Compagnie de Suez. It constructed the Suez Canal between 1859 and 1869, connecting the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean and opening yet another artery of world trade. Others built railways in Canada,

the United States and India, or managed mines in African colonies.

The 19th century also entrenched the processes of colonization (Vanham, 2019). By the end of the 19th century, "most [globalizing and industrialized] European nations grabbed for a piece of Africa, and by 1900 the only independent country left on the continent was Ethiopia" (Stokes Brown, 2022). Similarly, major countries such as India, China, Mexico, or Japan, once powerful, were subdued either militarily or economically by Europe and the United States. They were either unable or not permitted to adjust to the industrial and global trends. Western powers placed restrictions on their development, or they could not compete due to their limited access to capital or industrial technology. Finally, globalization did not benefit many workers in industrialized nations, either — their work became subservient to industrial machinery, or their employment was undercut by competition from imports.

Second Wave

Between the First and Second World Wars, global integration regressed as world powers entered the "struggle for hegemony" phase of globalization (Robertson, 1990). But the end of World War II marked a **second wave of globalization**. Formal **decolonization** dismantled the European Empires as many former colonies fought for and attained independence. This did not mean economic independence however as many were quickly subsumed into forms of **neo-colonialism** in a restructured global order.

At first, this happened in two separate tracks that continued the struggle for hegemony phase described by Robertson (1990). The Cold War divided the world into two spheres of influence: the communist Warsaw Pact lead by the Soviet Union and the capitalist order lead by the United States. In the capitalist sphere of influence, under the hegemony (i.e., leadership) of the United States, and aided by new technologies like the car and the plane, global trade and foreign investment started to rise again.

Key to developing global integration in this phase was the formation of several new global level institutions at the end of the Second World War. These were based on international negotiations and agreements to enable political, economic, and non-governmental affairs to be globally coordinated. The United Nations was formed in 1945, focusing on collective

security following the failure of the former League of Nations to prevent World War II. The UN also created measures for protecting global health and human rights, including the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the World Health Organization. In terms of economic coordination, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) were created as global institutions to help control the destructive ups and downs of global markets, which had been acute problems during the interwar period, and to ensure stable currencies. Similarly, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) like Amnesty International, Oxfam, Greenpeace, etc. emerged to play an increasingly important role outside of government to address global scale problems and foster a sense of global citizenship and responsibility.

Third Wave

When the “Iron Curtain” dividing East and West fell in 1989, the Soviet Union collapsed, and globalization entered its **third wave**. The newly created World Trade Organization (WTO) encouraged nations all over the world to adopt a **neo-liberal** model of globalization (discussed later in the chapter), including free trade agreements that reduced political barriers to the circulation of capital, investment, and commodities. Increased circulation of people and their labour through migration diversified populations worldwide. In 2001, even China, which was a secluded, agrarian economy for most of the 20th century, became a member of the WTO, and started to manufacture for the world. Since then, the world has been increasingly dominated by two global powers, the U.S. and China.

At the same time, new technologies from the **Third Industrial Revolution** — computerization, the internet and digital technology — connected people all over the world in an even more direct way. The orders Keynes could place by phone in 1914 could now be placed over the internet. Instead of having them delivered in a few weeks, they could arrive at one's doorstep the next day. Digital technology, communication and banking allowed for a further global integration of supply and production chains, as noted earlier in the chapter. These digital technologies continue to eliminate distance around the globe through instantaneous e-commerce, digital services, 3D printing, artificial intelligence and, of course, social media.

The changing configuration of global capitalism and international relations in the 3rd wave of globalization has been described by some as the reemergence of **empire** (Hardt & Negri, 2000). Instead of the historical empires organized from a single centre like the Roman Empire, British Empire, or Post WWII American hegemony, contemporary empire is arguably organized around a fluid, ad hoc network of international agreements, supra-national agencies and transnational corporations (Negri, 2004). Alongside the numerous trade agreements, which have harmonized economies and removed tariff borders that restrict the flow of capital and goods, in recent decades frequent global “police actions” and trade embargoes have been enacted by various “coalitions of the willing” to enforce global peace or intervene in domestic policy (in, for example, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, etc.). Similarly, the Paris Agreement on climate change or the Ottawa Treaty on landmines are examples of global initiatives that blur the sovereign jurisdictions and boundaries of the sovereign state system.

Effects of Globalization

The effects of this globalization have been uneven. Later in the chapter, the formation of a fluid, global, late modern culture which disembeds people from locality, organizes them through global scale expert systems and exposes them to planetary risks, will be discussed.

In terms of the economic aspects of globalization, some have argued that a majority of the global population has benefited from this: more people than ever before belong to the global middle class, having achieved this status by participating in the global economy. But many workers, especially in the West, have become skeptical about a political and economic system that has resulted in increased economic inequality, job insecurity, social instability, outsourcing,

capital disinvestment, and immigration. Outsourcing shifts production to low-wage enclaves, displacement leads to sectors of precarious employment in the traditionally wealthy global north, global markets compel people to migrate from rural to urban areas and “slum cities,” legal and illegal immigration from poor countries to rich countries fuels **xenophobia**, while large numbers of workers simply become redundant to global production and turn to informal, casual labour. This has led to both **anti-globalization movements** that challenge the corporate focus of neo-liberal globalization and neo-populist, anti-immigrant movements that seek to arrest globalization altogether.



Figure 10.12 Walter Rodney (1942–1980) was a Guyanese historian, political activist and academic. His notable works include *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (1972). Rodney was assassinated in Georgetown, Guyana, in 1980. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Non-Free Use](#)

More significantly, for much of the world patterns of systematic underdevelopment persist. Sub-Saharan Africa for example is poorer in the 2020s than it was during the period of decolonization (Broadberry and Gardner, 2022). The debt it owes the developed world, including increasingly to China, has quadrupled since the 1970s, largely under the auspices of loans and structural adjustment programs (SAPs) provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). These programs come with the requirement to adopt free market policies including liberalization of trade, privatization, and reduction of barriers to foreign capital. But the interest alone that African states pay to service the debts is half of their annual revenue, meaning that this phase of globalization has taken the form of perpetual debt bondage. Global Justice Now (2017) report that the continent loses more money each year through multinationals repatriating profits and illegally moving money into tax havens than it receives in aid, investment, and remittances. Walter Rodney’s (1972) analysis remains salient: “When the terms of trade are set by one country in a manner entirely advantageous to itself, then trade is usually detrimental to the trading partner.”

In Rodney’s view, rather than seeing contemporary globalization as the end of the period of colonialism, it would be more accurate to describe the expansion of global inequality and the economic underdevelopment of many former colonies as forms of *neo-colonialism*. Where **decolonization** refers to the process whereby former colonies attained formal political

self-determination and independence from colonial powers, **neo-colonialism** describes the way in which decolonization often masks the continued socio-economic and political dominance of external powers in matters of domestic policy, resource extraction and labour exploitation. While the decolonized state appears to be independent and has total control over its dealings, the society remains structured and organized around neo-colonial relationships and interests (Nkrumah, 1965). As Walter Rodney (1972) argued in *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, after the period of formal decolonization Western Europe and Africa continued to have a relationship “which insured the transfer of wealth from Africa to Europe.”

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10.2. Global Wealth and Poverty

Just as North America’s wealth is increasingly concentrated among its richest citizens, while the middle class slowly disappears, **global inequality** involves the concentration of resources in certain nations, significantly affecting the opportunities of individuals in poorer and less powerful countries.

Global income inequality has always been significant, reflecting the persistence of a world economic system that is extremely hierarchical, both between countries and within them (Chancel et al., 2022). Global inequality increased between 1820 and 1910, in the context of the rise of Western dominance and colonial empires, and then stabilized at a remarkably high level between 1910 and 2020. Since 1980, domestic inequality has grown, but international inequality started to decline thanks to fast growth in the large so-called emerging economies. These two effects balance each other out so that, in the past few decades, global inequality has been basically stable, albeit at a very high level.

Global Stratification

Global stratification describes how worldwide patterns or structures of social inequality persist through time. While stratification in Canada refers to the unequal distribution of resources among individuals, global stratification refers to unequal distribution among states. It compares the wealth, economic stability, status, and power of countries across the world. There are two dimensions to this stratification: gaps between nations and gaps within nations. When it comes to global inequality, both economic inequality and social inequality concentrate the burden of poverty among certain segments of the Earth’s population (Myrdal, 1970).

One measure of global stratification compares the quality of life of different countries’ populations. Simple indicators of this are infant mortality rates and life expectancy. As the table below illustrates, people’s life expectancy depends heavily on where they happen to be born.

Table 10.1. Statistics such as infant mortality rates and life expectancy vary greatly by country of origin. (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011)

Country	Infant Mortality Rate	Life Expectancy
Canada	4.9 deaths per 1,000 live births	81 years
Mexico	17.2 deaths per 1,000 live births	76 years
Democratic Republic of Congo	78.4 deaths per 1,000 live births	55 years

Another way to evaluate stratification is to consider how many people live in poverty, and particularly extreme poverty, which has been defined as needing to survive on less than \$2.15 per day (Filmer, Fu & Sanchez-Paramo, 2022). As noted in [Chapter 9. Social Inequality](#), social scientists define poverty in different ways to take into account the complexities and issues of comparing poverty between jurisdictions. **Relative poverty** is a state of living where people can afford necessities, but cannot meet their society’s average standard of living. This cut off level might be considered the basic cost to participate in society. People often disparage “keeping up with the Joneses:” the idea that one must keep up with the neighbours’ standard of living to not feel deprived. But in Canada, the experience of living without a car to drive to and from work, without any money for a safety net should a family member fall ill, or without any “extras” beyond just making ends meet, effectively limits participation in society and makes life precarious. On the other hand, contrary to relative poverty, people who live in extreme or **absolute poverty** lack even the basic necessities, which typically include adequate food, clean water, safe housing, and access to healthcare.

The positive news is that, until the COVID-19 pandemic impacted economies in 2020, the extreme poverty rate had been on a 30-year decline. In 1990, 1 in 3 people lived in extreme poverty, compared to approximately 1 in 10 in 2019

(World Bank, 2022). In 2015, 10.8% of the world's population lived in extreme poverty. In 2019, that number had dropped an entire percentage point to 8.4%. While this is positive, 8.4% is still equivalent to 648 million people living on less than \$2.15 a day. The same year (2019), 23.5% of the world lived on less than \$3.65 per day, and 46.7% on less than \$6.85 per day (Schoch et al., 2022). Unfortunately, the pandemic ended this trend with an estimated spike in poverty rates of 11% in 2022. Followed by the invasion of Ukraine and climate impacts on the world's biggest food producers, the goal of ending extreme poverty by 2030 seems unreachable (World Bank, 2022).

Table 10.2 clearly demonstrates the significant differences in poverty between several countries.

Table 10.2. The differences between countries are clear when considering their extreme poverty rates. For the most part, the selected countries show disparities even within countries from the same regions. All data is from 2018 (Hasell et al., 2022).

Country	Percentage of people living on less than \$2.15	Percentage of people living on less than \$3.65	Percentage of people living on less than \$6.85
Colombia	4.5	12.2	33.9
Costa Rica	1.5	4	13.9
Georgia	5.6	19.6	53.9
Kyrgyzstan	0.7	13.2	66.1
Sierra Leone	26.1	64.3	89.9
Angola	31.1	52.9	78
Lithuania	0.9	1.3	2.9
Ukraine	0.0	0.5	9.4
Vietnam	1.2	5.3	22.2
Indonesia	5.4	26.4	62.8

A third measure of income inequality tries to capture the two dimensions of global stratification — gaps between countries and gaps within countries — by comparing standardized income distributions. Figure 10.12 compares income distribution in 16 different countries from different regions of the world based on percentiles. To be in the top 1% of income earners in the United States in 2021, one had to earn \$336,953 before taxes (about \$140,000 more than in Canada (\$193,036)), whereas in Ethiopia one only had to earn about \$24,297. This means that top 1% in the U.S. were the highest income earners in the world, while Ethiopia is overall one of the poorest countries in the world. On the other hand, the income gap *within* Columbia in which the 99th percentile earner earns 192 times more than the 10th percentile earner is much higher than in the U.S. where the 99th percentile earner earns 83 times more than the 10th percentile earner (Mathisen, 2022).

Find Your Percentile Position in Income Distributions Around the World

The numbers are percentiles in each country's income distribution. To find out where a certain income places you in a country's distribution, follow the horizontal line and look for the closest percentiles for that country.

Example: An annual income of \$30,000 means that you are near the 50th percentile in the US, but already near the 90th percentile in Argentina, and the 95th percentile in India (which means that you are in the top 5 percent in India).

Data: World Inequality Database, data for 2021 (<https://wid.world/income-comparator/>)

Graph by: @rubenmathisen (Twitter)




Figure 10.13 Income Distributions in 16 Different Countries in U.S. dollars using 2021 income data from the World Inequality Database. (Image courtesy of Ruben Berge Mathisen/[Visual Capitalist](#).)

Most people are accustomed to thinking of global stratification as economic inequality. For example, Ethiopia's average worker's wage ("ET" in Figure 10.13 above) can be compared to Canada's average wage. Social inequality, however, is just as harmful as economic discrepancies. Prejudice and discrimination — whether against a certain race, ethnicity, religion, or the like — can create and aggravate conditions of economic equality, both within and between nations. Think about the inequity that existed for decades within the nation of South Africa. Apartheid, one of the most extreme cases of institutionalized and legal racism, created a social inequality that earned it the world's condemnation. When looking at inequity between states, one can think also about the disregard of the civil war in Yemen by most Western nations (Center for Preventive Action, 2022). Since few citizens of Western nations identified with the impoverished, non-white victims of the resulting humanitarian crisis, there has been little push to provide aid or resolve the conflict.

Gender inequity is another global concern. Women continue to have less access to the labour market (and especially to the most rewarding occupations) in many countries and this exacerbates the gender inequality in earnings and access to positions of power and status (Chancel et al., 2022). Women's inequality can also be measured in terms of degrees of **agency**, defined as the "ability to define one's goals and act on them" (Kabeer, 1999). Women are often at a systematic disadvantage in their ability to make effective choices in a range of spheres, from making decisions at home, deciding what kind of work to do, to choosing whether or when to get married and how many children to have to becoming politically active (World Bank Group, 2014).

Inequalities based on sexual orientation and gender identity also exist around the globe. According to Amnesty International (2012), a number of types of crimes are committed against individuals who do not conform to traditional gender roles or sexual orientations (however those are culturally defined). From culturally sanctioned rape to state-sanctioned executions, the abuses are serious. These legalized and culturally accepted forms of prejudice and discrimination exist everywhere — from the United States to Somalia to Tibet — restricting the freedom of individuals and often putting their lives at risk. As of March 2019, 70 global states continue to criminalize same-sex consensual activity. The death penalty for consensual same-sex sexual acts is imposed in 6 UN member states (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and Nigeria) (Mendos, 2019).

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

Multiple Disadvantages Among Adolescent Hmong Girls



Figure 10.14 Two young Hmong girls holding each other, near Sapa, Vietnam. (Image courtesy of Lon & Queta/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

Vietnam has achieved tremendous progress in development, but the gains have been unevenly enjoyed. In Ha Giang Province in northern Vietnam, Hmong children and adolescents, especially girls, face multiple disadvantages. Among the Hmong ethnic minority, poverty rates exceed 80 percent, compared with 20 per cent for Vietnam as a whole.

Traditional preference for sons and filial piety mean that girls spend long hours on domestic chores—only 4 per cent of Hmong girls are enrolled in secondary school and, as adults, their opportunities for paid work are negligible.

Rates of child marriage and total fertility for Hmong are double the rate for the Kinh majority ethnic group. Hmong girls also have inadequate access to sexual and reproductive health information and services. In recent fieldwork in Ta Lung commune, girls often struggled to imagine future lives that differed from those of their mothers. Most Hmong girls reported very little say in family or community decisions, where they faced discrimination on the grounds of both their gender and their age. That was reflected in one mother's plans for her children: "My daughter will finish grade nine only, and then she will get married. My son won't go anywhere; he will live with me, so I let him reach the

high grade."

Adapted from: World Bank Group. (2014). *Voice and agency: Empowering women and girls for shared prosperity*. CC BY 3.0 IGO

Global Classification

Poverty levels have been shown to vary greatly. The poor in wealthy countries like Canada or Europe are much better off than the poor in less-industrialized countries such as Mali or India. When using the World Bank categorization to classify economies, the measure of GNI, or gross national income, provides a picture of the overall economic health of a nation. **Gross national income** equals the market value of all goods and services produced within a country (its GDP or **gross domestic product**), plus net income earned outside the country by nationals and corporations headquartered in the country doing business out of the country, measured in U.S. dollars. In other words, the GNI of a country includes not only the value of goods and services inside the country, but also the value of income earned outside the country if it

is earned by foreign nationals or foreign businesses. That means that multinational corporations that might earn billions in offices and factories around the globe are considered part of a core nation's GNI if they have headquarters in the core nations. Along with tracking the economy, the World Bank tracks demographics and environmental health to provide a complete picture of whether a nation is high-income, middle-income, or low-income.

The \$100 Trillion World Economy

GLOBAL GDP 2022


Despite conflict and looming stagflation, the global economy will hit an impressive new milestone, reaching **\$104 trillion**, according to the latest IMF projections for end of year.



By 2030, **China's GDP** is projected to surpass that of the U.S.



The **U.S.** has been the world's largest economy since 1871.



Many of the world's smallest economies are located in the Oceania region, such as **Tuvalu** with a GDP of \$66 million.



Ireland is expected to be the fastest growing economy in the Eurozone, with a 5.2% increase this year.

Figure 10.15 Visualizing the \$100 Trillion World Economy in 2022. (Image courtesy of Joyce Ma/ [Visual Capitalist](#).)

High-Income Nations

The World Bank defines high-income nations as having a gross national income of at least \$12,536 per capita in 2019 (World Bank 2021). The classifications will always lag by a couple of years so that analysts can evaluate the true income of the nations. It separates out the OECD (Organization for Economic and Co-operative Development) countries, a group of 34 nations whose governments work together to promote economic growth and sustainability. According to the World Bank (2011), in 2010, the average GNI of a high-income nation belonging to the OECD was \$40,136 per capita; on average, 77% of the population in these nations was urban. Some of these countries include Canada, the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom (World Bank, 2011). In 2010, the average GNI of a high-income nation that did not belong to the OECD was \$23,839 per capita and 83% was urban. Examples of these countries include Saudi Arabia and Qatar (World Bank, 2011).

There are two major issues facing high-income countries: capital flight and deindustrialization. **Capital flight** refers to the movement (flight) of capital from one nation to another, as when General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler close Canadian factories in Ontario and open factories in Mexico. **Deindustrialization**, a related issue, occurs as a consequence of capital flight, when no new companies open to replace jobs lost to foreign nations. As expected, global companies move their industrial processes to the places where they can get the most production with the least cost, including the costs for building infrastructure, training workers, shipping goods, and, of course, paying employee wages. This means that as low-wage economies create their own industrial zones, global companies see the opportunity for existing infrastructure and much lower costs. Those opportunities lead to businesses closing the factories that provide jobs to the middle class within core nations and moving their industrial production to peripheral and semi-peripheral nations.



Figure 10.16. This old General Motors plant in Oshawa, Ontario, is a victim of auto industry outsourcing and capital flight. (Photo courtesy of Rick Harris/Flickr.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

Middle-Income Nations

The World Bank divides middle-income economies into two categories. Lower-middle-income areas are those with a

GNI per capita of more than \$1,036 but less than \$4,045, such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Tunisia, Philippines, El Salvador, and Nepal. Upper-middle-income areas are those with a GNI per capita between \$4,046 and \$12,535, including Argentina, Mexico, China, Iran, Turkey, and Namibia are examples of upper-middle-income nations (World Bank 2021).

Perhaps the most pressing issue for middle-income nations is the problem of debt accumulation. As the name suggests, **debt accumulation** is the buildup of external debt, when countries borrow money from other nations to fund their expansion or growth goals. As the uncertainties of the global economy make repaying these debts, or even paying the interest on them, more challenging, nations can find themselves in trouble. Once global markets have reduced the value of a country's goods, it can be difficult to manage the debt burden. Such issues have plagued middle-income countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as East Asian and Pacific nations (Dogruel and Dogruel, 2007). By way of example, even in the European Union, which is composed of more core nations than semi-peripheral nations, the semi-peripheral nations of Italy, Portugal, and Greece face increasing debt burdens. The economic downturns in these countries are threatening the economy of the entire European Union.

Low-Income Nations

The World Bank defines low-income countries as nations whose per capita GNI was \$1,035 per capita or less in 2019. For example, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Yemen are considered low-income countries. Low-income economies are primarily found in Asia and Africa (World Bank 2021), where most of the world's population lives.

Nations' classifications often change as their economies evolve and, sometimes, when their political positions change. Nepal, Indonesia, and Romania all moved up to a higher status based on improved economies. While Sudan, Algeria, and Sri Lanka moved down a level. A few years ago, Myanmar was a low-income nation, but now it has moved into the middle-income area. With Myanmar's 2021 coup, the massive citizen response, and the military's killing of protesters, its economy may go through a downturn again, returning it to the low-income nation status.

There are two major challenges that these countries face: women are disproportionately affected by poverty (in a trend toward a global feminization of poverty) and much of the population lives in absolute poverty. In some ways, the term **global feminization of poverty** says it all: around the world, women are bearing a disproportionate percentage of the burden of poverty. This means more women live in poor conditions, receive inadequate health care, bear the brunt of malnutrition and inadequate drinking water, and so on. Throughout the 1990s, data indicated that while overall poverty rates were rising, especially in peripheral nations, the rates of impoverishment increased nearly 20% more for women than for men (Mogadham, 2005).

Why is this happening? While there are myriad variables affecting women's poverty, research specializing in this issue identifies three causes:

1. The expansion of female-headed households
2. The persistence and consequences of intra-household inequalities and biases against women
3. The implementation of neo-liberal economic policies around the world (Mogadham, 2005)

In short, this means that within an impoverished household, women are more likely to go hungry than men; in agricultural aid programs, women are less likely to receive help than men; and often, women are left taking care of families with no male counterpart.

With respect to the challenge of absolute poverty, in 2019, 8.4% of the global population or 648 million people lived on less than \$2.15 a day (Schoch et al., 2022). Not surprisingly, the consequences of extreme poverty are often also causes. The poor experience inadequate health care, limited education, and the inaccessibility of birth control. Those born into these conditions are incredibly challenged in their efforts to break out since these consequences of poverty are also causes of poverty, perpetuating a cycle of disadvantage.

According to sociologists Neckerman and Torche (2007) in their analysis of global inequality studies, the

consequences of poverty are many. They have divided the consequences into three areas. The first, termed “the sedimentation of global inequality,” relates to the fact that once poverty becomes entrenched in an area, it is typically difficult to reverse. As mentioned above, poverty exists in a cycle where the consequences and causes are intertwined. The second consequence of poverty is its effect on physical and mental health. Poor people face physical health challenges, including malnutrition and high infant mortality rates. Mental health is also detrimentally affected by the emotional stresses of poverty, with relative deprivation carrying the strongest effect. Again, as with the ongoing inequality, the effects of poverty on mental and physical health become more entrenched as time goes on. Neckerman and Torche’s third consequence of poverty is the prevalence of crime. Cross-nationally, crime rates are higher, particularly with violent crime, in countries with higher levels of income inequality (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 2002).

Explanations of Global Stratification

Cold War Terminology, Modernization Theory and Structural Functionalism

The terminology of “first world” and “third world,” and “underdeveloped,” “developing” and “developed” nations originated during the Cold War era (1945–1989) when the world was divided between capitalist and communist economic systems and their respective geopolitical spheres of influence. Familiar and still used by many, it involves classifying countries into a global hierarchy of development based on respective economic development and standards of living.

Capitalist democracies such as the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Japan were considered part of the **first world**. The poorest, most undeveloped countries (largely former colonies) were referred to as the **third world** and included most of Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Asia. The **second world** was the communist world or Soviet bloc: industrially developed but organized according to a state socialist or communist model of political economy. Later, native activist George Manuel (1974) added the term **fourth world** to refer to stateless, poor, or marginal peoples, particularly Indigenous Peoples, who live under premodern or third world conditions in whichever nation-state they reside in.

MODERNIZATION THEORY

Rostow's Stages of Economic Development




Figure 10.17 Rostow's stages of economic growth. (Image courtesy of TRU, 2023, based on Knox and Marston, 2013). [\[Image Description\]](#)

The idea of first world and third world as developed and developing or underdeveloped nations was based on an evolutionary model of economic transition. **Modernization theory** suggests that societies moved through natural stages of development as they progress toward becoming developed societies (i.e., stable, democratic, market oriented, and capitalist). The economist Walt Rustow (1960) provided a significant influential schema of modernization theory when he described economic development as a linear sequence of stages: *traditional society* (agrarian based with low productivity); *pre-take off society* (state formation and shift to industrial production, expansion of markets, and generation of surplus); *take-off* (rapid self-sustained economic growth and reinvestment of capital in the economy); *drive to maturity* (a modern industrialized economy, highly capitalized and technologically advanced); *high mass-consumption* (shift to the mass production and consumption of durable goods (TVs, cars, refrigerators, etc.) and luxury goods, general prosperity, egalitarianism).

This is a structural functionalist type of theory, proposing that global inequality is a product of cultural and technological differences between societies. Societies that were organized around traditional cultural values, kinship systems and despotic social relations were in a sense too stable; unable to invent or adapt to innovations in technology that, in Western Europe, drove the industrial revolution. Western Europe gained a developmental advantage due to the progress-oriented elements in its culture like the Protestant Ethic and the Protestant Reformation's emphasis on the individual. These *functioned* to enable technological innovation, economic development, and revolutionary changes in social systems to occur.

According to modernization theory, low-income countries are affected by their lack of industrialization and can improve their global economic standing through:

1. An adjustment of cultural values and attitudes to work
2. Industrialization and other forms of economic growth (Armer and Katsillis, 2010)

Like most versions of modernization theory, Rustow's schema describes a linear process of development culminating in the formation of democratic, capitalist societies. The inability of some societies to develop was the product of rigid traditional values and failure to adopt capitalism. This explanation was clearly in line with Cold War ideology that placed capitalist democracy at the pinnacle of civilization, but it also echoed widely held beliefs about the idea of social progress as an evolutionary process.

Nevertheless, however "natural" these stages of development were taken to be, they required intervention, protection, and support. This was the era when the idea of geopolitical *noblesse oblige* (first world responsibility) took root, suggesting that the so-called developed nations should provide foreign aid and industrial technologies to the less developed and underdeveloped nations in order to raise their standard of living. But as critical sociologists like Walter Rodney (1972) noted, these aid programs tended to conceal the magnitude of neo-colonial exploitation behind a discourse of benevolence. Massive amounts of economic value were extracted from former colonies in the form of resources and low-wage labour, while a significantly smaller proportion of wealth was returned in the form of foreign aid.

Dependency Theory, World Systems Approach, and Critical Sociology

A major concern when discussing global inequality therefore is how to avoid a Eurocentric bias implying that less developed nations want to be like those who have attained postindustrial global power. Terms such as "developing" (non-industrialized) and "developed" (industrialized) imply that non-industrialized countries are somehow inferior and must Westernize to participate successfully in the global economy and global civilization.

Dependency theory was created in part as a response to the Western-centric mindset of modernization theory. As a non-Western perspective on globalization, it developed a critical sociological framework to describe global inequality as the outcome of historical power relations and colonialism. Dependency theory states that global inequality is primarily

caused by core nations (or high-income nations) exploiting semi-peripheral and peripheral nations (or middle-income and low-income nations), creating a cycle of dependence (Hendricks, 2010).

In the period of colonialism, core or metropolis nations based in Europe created the conditions for the underdevelopment of peripheral or hinterland nations through a **metropolis-hinterland relationship**. The resources of the hinterlands were shipped to the metropolises where they were converted into manufactured goods and shipped back for consumption in the hinterlands. The hinterlands were used as the source of cheap resources and labour, while the import of inexpensive manufactured goods prevented them from developing competitive manufacturing sectors of their own.

Wallerstein's (1979) **world systems approach** provided a systematic and historical framework for dependency theory. He conceived of the world-system as "as a unit with a single division of labour and multiple cultural systems," which redistributes surplus value from the *periphery* to the *core* (Wallerstein, 1974). The economic and political basis of contemporary global inequality did not emerge from stages of a natural process of gradual modernization, but as the product of the exercise of power: colonialism and the skewed development of global capitalism. In this model, the global economy is a complex historical system supporting an economic hierarchy that placed **core nations** in positions of power with numerous resources and other **peripheral** or **semi-peripheral nations** in a state of economic subordination. Those that were in a state of subordination faced significant obstacles to economic mobilization and political independence and stability.




Figure 10.18 The world system in 2000, divided into core countries (blue), semi-periphery countries (yellow) and periphery countries (red). "Other" refers to countries with a population of less than one million, which were excluded from the analysis. Map based on data from Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer (2000). (Image courtesy of Wikipedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Core nations are dominant capitalist countries, highly industrialized, technological, and urbanized. Wallerstein contends that the United States is an example of a core nation where global resources are accumulated, value-added products are manufactured, and wealth is generated. At the centre of global economic processes, it can exert control over every aspect of the global economy and exploit both semi-peripheral and peripheral nations. Free trade agreements, such as the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), are examples of how a core nation can leverage its power to gain the most advantageous position in the matter of global trade.

Peripheral nations have little industrialization; what they do have often represents the outdated castoffs of core nations, the factories and means of production owned by core nations, or the resources exploited by core nations. The resources and labour of peripheral nations have historically supported the accumulation of wealth in core nations, first

as colonies and then as sites for multinational corporations. They typically have unstable governments, poor labour standards and inadequate social programs. They are economically dependent on core nations for jobs, loans, and foreign aid. There are abundant examples of countries in this category. The label on most jeans or sweatshirts sold in Canada will likely indicate its source in a peripheral nation such as Guatemala, Bangladesh, Malaysia, or Thailand. The workers in these garment factories, which are owned, leased, or contracted by multinational companies headquartered in core nations, do not enjoy the same privileges and rights as Canadian workers.

Semi-peripheral nations like India, Brazil and Mexico are in-between nations, more closely integrated with the core, but not powerful enough to dictate global policy. They also tend to be major sources of raw material and labour. For example, Mexico provides abundant cheap agricultural labour to the United States and Canada, and supplies goods to the North American market at a rate dictated by U.S. and Canadian consumers without the labour laws and constitutional protections offered to U.S. or Canadian workers. But they also provide an expanding middle class marketplace for the products of core nations, while in turn also exploiting peripheral nations.

Dependency theory states that as long as peripheral nations are dependent on core nations for economic stimulus and access to the global economy, they will never achieve stable and consistent economic growth. Further, the theory states that since core nations, as well as the World Bank, choose which countries to make loans to, and for what they will loan funds, they are creating highly segmented, externally oriented labour markets that are built to benefit the dominant market countries. The tourist industry is a prime example.

At first glance, it seems this theory ignores the formerly low-income nations that are now considered middle-income nations and are on their way to becoming high-income nations and major players in the global economy, such as China. It does not explain how some former colonies like Singapore and Sri Lanka have been able to develop while others in Sub-Saharan Africa have not. It is plausible that factors like culture and technological adaptation, which are the focus of modernization theories, have a role to play.

China is an interesting case because since 1978, 800 million people, or approximately half the population have been lifted out of poverty, meaning that China is now an upper-middle-income country (World Bank, 2022b). Yet at the same time, 25% of the population in China live under the \$6.85 a day poverty cut-off line for middle-income countries (compared to 0.75% in Canada, adjusted for inflation and for differences in the cost of living) (Hasell et al., 2022). This suggests a disjuncture in people's standard of living within the same country. In fact, from a critical sociology perspective, it becomes more interesting to examine the way development and underdevelopment occur side by side *within* the core nations, peripheral nations, and semi-peripheral nations. The idea of "nations" as containers of national economies and the unit of analysis for understanding global inequality might not be the most effective way to analyse the configurations of power, wealth, and poverty in an increasingly globalized world.

Global Capitalism: Neo-liberalism and Globalization

A third type of explanation for global stratification focuses on the properties of **global capitalism** itself. From its origins, capitalism has been global in scope. Marx and Engels already described globalization in 1848:

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations (Marx & Engels,

1848/1977).

The development of global capitalism intensified after World War II, and especially in the late 20th century with the introduction of new economic policies and new technologies that enabled vast volumes of capital and goods to circulate globally. Contrary to the analyses of modernization theory and dependency theory, **global capitalism theory** proposes that since the 1970s capital accumulation has taken place less and less in the context of national economies. Instead, the context of international flows of capital investment and disinvestment is an increasingly integrated world market. The concept of development has shifted from the model of nationally managed economic growth to “participation in the world market” (McMichael, 2017).

The neo-liberal model of capital accumulation has been central to these changes. When nationally managed economies began to experience economic crisis in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see [Chapter 4. Society and Modern Life](#)), the relationship between states and the global economy started to change. **Neo-liberalism** is the term used to define the new rationality of government, which abandons the interventionist model of national economic management and the welfare state to emphasize the use of “free market” mechanisms to regulate society. It is a set of policies in which the state reduces its role in providing public services, regulating industry, redistributing wealth, and protecting “the commons” — i.e., the collective resources that exist for everyone to share (the environment, public infrastructure, community facilities, airwaves, etc.).

Neo-liberalism is also a response to the ever more competitive global market for capital. Neo-liberal policy is presented as a way to attract increasingly fickle global capital by making entire countries more “competitive.” As a result, the policies of neo-liberalism have been enacted on a global scale: the imposition of open “free” markets across national borders, the deregulation of trade and investment, and the privatization of public goods and services. The globalization of investment and production means that capital is increasingly able to shift production around the world to where labour costs are cheapest and profit greatest. As noted above in the example of **global assembly lines** and **global commodity chains**, capital investments, production and markets are coordinated on a global scale, leading to a *global* reordering of production and consumption, as well as inequalities both between nations and within nations.

Within this model, the world and its resources are reorganized and managed on the basis of the free trade of goods and services, the free circulation of capital, and coordination by political and economic elite organizations like the G7, the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF. The global economy as a whole, not modernized national economies, emerges as the site of development and underdevelopment. The production, distribution, and consumption of finance, goods and services are administratively and technologically integrated on a worldwide basis (Robinson, 2004; 2017).




Figure 10.19. The global reordering of inequalities both between countries and within countries from 1820 to 2020. Inequality is calculated as a ratio of the top 10% average income to the bottom 50% average income (T10/B50), which provides a standardized measure of income inequality regardless of changes and differences in the values of specific national currencies. The graph indicates that during the period of neo-liberal globalization, from 1980 onward, income inequality within countries increased while income inequality between countries declined. While a number of contingent factors like the 2008 economic crisis have affected the calculation of global inequality, the graph lends support to the argument that global inequality between countries becomes (somewhat) less significant as bifurcated labour systems and within-country inequality spread globally. (Image courtesy of Chancel et al., 2022.) [CC by 4.0](#)

The result, as David Harvey (b. 1935) forcefully argues, has been to massively shift the balance of power to the economic elites of the global or transnational capitalist class (Harvey, 2005). Wealth and poverty have been redistributed on a global scale. On one hand, global capitalism has produced a **transnational capitalist class** who “detach their interests from the home market” (Hymer, 1974, cited in Carroll, 2018) and exist as a network of CEOs, investors and corporate managers distributed (albeit unevenly) around the world. For example, while the U.S. was home to the majority of billionaires in 2021 (975 individuals), China was home to the second most (400), Germany was third (176) and India fourth (124) (Koop, 2022).

On the other hand, the globalization of production has led to the creation of a vast global workforce as farm production is integrated into global supply chains and millions of people have migrated to cities to work in global factories and global service work. Others are marginalized as **surplus humanity**, of no direct use to capitalism, sustaining themselves in informal sectors of the economy, and consigned to what Mike Davis referred to as a “planet of slums” (Davis, 2006). However, rather than the global north simply extracting wealth from peripheral countries of the global south as predicted by dependency theory, McMichael (2017) describes the outcome of these massive shifts as the spread of a **bifurcated labour system** to all regions of globe. In the global north as well as the south, a core of relatively stable, well-paid labour is separated from a periphery of casual, precarious, low-cost labour. Davis’ (2006) description of Los Angeles as a “fortress city” provides an image of bifurcated social life in which the wealthy and better off live in gated communities, insulated from the poor and precariously employed by new systems of spatial organization, social control, and policing.

Carroll (2018) cautions that global capitalism theory tends to over-emphasize the way that the creation of a single global market and a transnational capitalist class eliminates distinct national economies and enduring neo-colonial structures of North-South disparity. Populist movements like MAGA (Make America Great Again) that seek to decouple

some aspects of national economies from globalization, as well as China's state directed form of capitalism and "Belt and Road Initiative," indicate that global capitalism is, in significant ways, *simultaneously* national and transnational.

Making Connections: Big Picture

The True Cost of a T-Shirt



Figure 10.20 Where did your t-shirts come from? (Photo courtesy of Mika Meskanen/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

Most people do not pay too much attention to where their favourite products are made. Certainly, when they are shopping for a cheap T-shirt, they probably do not turn over the label, check who produced the item, and then research whether or not the company has fair labour practices. In fact, it can be extremely difficult to discover where exactly the items people use every day have come from. Nevertheless, the

purchase of a T-shirt involves the consumer in a series of social relationships that tie them to the lives and working conditions of people around the world.

On April 24, 2013, the Rana Plaza building in Dhaka, Bangladesh, collapsed killing 1,129 garment workers. The building, like 90% of Dhaka's 4,000 garment factories, was structurally unsound. Garment workers in Bangladesh work under unsafe conditions for as little as \$38 a month so that North American consumers can purchase T-shirts in the fashionable colours of the season for as little as \$5. The workers at Rana Plaza were in fact making clothes for the Joe Fresh label – the signature popular Loblaw brand – when the building collapsed. Having been put on the defensive for their overseas sweatshop practices, companies like Loblaw have pledged to improve working conditions in their suppliers' factories, but compliance has proven difficult to ensure because of the increasingly complex web of globalized production (MacKinnon and Strauss, 2013).



Figure 10.21 A relative reacts with a picture of a garment worker, who has been missing, during a protest to demand capital punishment for those responsible for the collapse of the Rana Plaza building in Savar, outside Dhaka April 29, 2013. (Photo courtesy of Coolcloud/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

At one time, the garment industry was important in Canada, centred on Spadina Avenue in Toronto and Chabanel Street in Montreal. But over the last two decades of globalization, Canadian consumers have become increasingly tied through popular retail chains to a complex network of outsourced garment production that stretches from China, through South East Asia, to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The early 1990s saw the economic opening of China when suddenly millions of workers were available to produce and manufacture consumer items for Westerners at a fraction of the cost of Western production. Manufacturing that used to take place in Canada moved overseas. Over the ensuing years, the Chinese began to outsource production to regions with even cheaper labour:

Vietnam, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. The outsourcing was outsourced. The result is that when a store like Loblaw places an order, it usually works through agents who in turn source and negotiate the price of materials and production from competing locales around the globe.

Most of the T-shirts that people wear in Canada today begin their life in the cotton fields of arid west China, which owe their scale and efficiency to the collectivization projects of centralized state socialism. However, as the cost of Chinese labour has incrementally increased since the 1990s, the Chinese producers have moved into the role of connecting Western retailers and designers with production centres elsewhere. In a global division of labour, if agents organize the sourcing, production chain and logistics, Western retailers can focus their skill and effort on retail marketing. It was in this context that Bangladesh went from having a few dozen garment factories to several thousand. The garment industry now accounts for 80% of Bangladesh's export earnings. Unfortunately, although there are legal safety regulations and inspections in Bangladesh, the rapid expansion of the industry has exceeded the ability of underfunded state agencies to enforce them.

The globalization of production makes it difficult to follow the links between the purchasing of a T-shirt in a Canadian store and the chain of agents, garment workers, shippers, and agricultural workers whose

labour has gone into producing it and getting it to the store. Canadian's lives are tied to this chain each time they wear a T-shirt, yet the history of its production and the lives it has touched are more or less invisible. It becomes even more difficult to do something about the working conditions of those global workers when even the retail stores are uncertain about where the shirts come from. There is no international agency that can enforce compliance with safety or working standards. Why do worker safety standards and factory building inspections have to be imposed by government regulations rather than being simply an integral part of the production process? Why does it seem normal that the issue of worker safety in garment factories is set up in this way? Why does this make it difficult to resolve or address the issue?

The fair trade movement has pushed back against the hyper-exploitation of global workers and forced stores like Loblaw to try to address the unsafe conditions in garment factories like Rana Plaza. Organizations like the Better Factories Cambodia program inspect garment production regularly in Cambodia, enabling stores like Mountain Equipment Co-op to purchase reports on the factory chains it relies on. After the Rana Plaza disaster, Loblaw signed an Accord of Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh to try to ensure safety compliance of their suppliers. However, the bigger problem seems to originate with people's desire to be able to purchase a T-shirt for \$5 in the first place.

Image Descriptions

Figure 10.17 Long Description: Flowchart of Rostow's Stages of Economic Growth

The flowchart starts at the bottom left with traditional society and, with increased time and level of development, moves up and to the right through the following steps.

1. Traditional society
 - a. Limited technology; static society
 - b. Transition triggered by external influence, interests, or markets
2. Preconditions for take-off
 - a. Commercial exploitation of agriculture and extractive industry
 - b. Installation of physical infrastructure (roads, railways, etc.) and emergence of social/political elite
3. Take-Off
 - a. Development of a manufacturing sector
 - b. Investment in manufacturing exceeds 10% of national income; development of modern social, economic, and political institutions
4. Drive to Maturity
 - a. Development of wider industrial and commercial base
 - b. Exploitation of comparative advantages in international trade
5. High Mass consumption [\[Return to Figure 10.17\]](#)

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10.3. Contemporary Global Society

Global society is a new and distinct form of social life. Over the tens of thousands of years of human existence, the world has never been as integrated. From the point of view of interpretive sociology, globalization signifies a qualitative shift in the nature of the lived experience of everyone on the planet. In particular, it has strong implications for the way in which people understand themselves, conceptualize the problems they face and define their place in the world.

Anthony Giddens (1990, 1991) and others have referred to this new form of life as **late modernity**. He identifies four key developments that characterize this new period of human existence.

De-Traditionalization

One aspect of the world as a global village that Marshall McLuhan described at the beginning of the chapter is the way it both resembles and no longer resembles the village life of humans that existed for millennia. It resembles that village life because, through the transformation of media and transportation, the world has shrunk. People around the world are in many respects closer, more aware of, and more involved in each other's lives. They are also exposed to each other's traditions. But it also no longer resembles that age-old village because, through the same transformations, as well as the formation of a global economy, people's lives have become increasingly *disembedded* from the particularities of local traditions and local cycles of nature.



Figure 10.22. The Beatles performing on Dutch TV in 1964 and displaying their “mop top” haircuts. Adopting hairstyles and fashions from global popular culture might seem trivial and faddish but is a significant way in which people's lives become disembedded from local traditions and norms. Inversely, reviving local traditions to reinforce local distinctiveness or even create local, folkloric brands is a process of **re-embedding** that presupposes a global context or global market. (Image courtesy of Archief Beeld en Geluid/B&G Wiki.) [CC BY-SA 3.0 NL](#)

Giddens describes two concepts involved in this aspect of globalization. **De-traditionalization** is the process whereby day-to-day life is increasingly less informed by traditions or the ways of life passed down in local cultural and ecological contexts. “For someone following a traditional practice, questions don't have to be asked about alternatives. Tradition provides a framework for action that can go largely unquestioned” (Giddens, 2002).

Disembedding is the process in which day to day life is no longer embedded in local, micro-level interactions in any simple way but becomes coordinated on a global basis. One has to get up at 3AM for a video meeting with business colleagues in New York or Tokyo, or (back in the day) train their hair stylist to give them a Beatle's or Twiggy haircut. Giddens describes it as a process that “lifts out social relations from local contexts of interaction” and restructures them “across indefinite spans of time and space” (Giddens, 1991).

What replaces tradition and locality? The hold of tradition — the customary patterns of life, beliefs, rituals of *places* — and the

restraints of local time and space are diminished to the degree that societies are organized extra-locally and globally through **expert systems** (Giddens, 1990). Expert systems refer to advanced systems of knowledge and practice in science, technology, computerization, communications, law, medicine, and finance, etc., that are required to run the complex institutional arrangements and technological systems that coordinate contemporary global life. The routine of air travel, for example, is guided every step of the way by air traffic control, global satellite systems, digital communications, multilevel security surveillance and detailed international agreements. In the absence of the stability provided by traditions and local knowledge, Giddens argues that reliance on expert systems in global society provides a

new source of “‘guarantees’ of expectation across distanciated time-space” (Giddens, 1990). They provide the sense of order, predictability, and stability that local traditions no longer provide.

Globalization

As discussed throughout the chapter, globalization is the process by which people around the world are integrated into a single global society, albeit in “an anarchic, haphazard, fashion” as Giddens (2002) puts it. People have become increasingly interdependent on a global scale. To sum up the key points, the structures of contemporary globalization are driven and defined by (1) the increasingly geographically interconnected processes of **global capitalism**, (2) the division of the world into the **sovereign state system**, (3) the system of international relations and the emergence of super-national agencies and institutions like the UN and the WTO, (4) the role of transportation and communication technologies that reduce constraints of time and space.

In terms of the lived experience of people across the world, the local and the global come together as people are exposed to diverse languages, cultures, cuisines, music, religions, current events, economic trends, global markets, and diseases. People interact daily with friends, strangers, family, colleagues, employers, and contacts on the other side of the world in real time.

This has lead, on one hand, to an exposure to the *diversification* of social life and cultures, which can bridge distances between people or become sites for new and deeper divisions. People live with cultural differences as an everyday norm.

On the other hand, globalization has also lead to the opposite tendency, the *homogenization* of life. Local cultures become more alike through the commodification, standardization and uniformity of products and processes: McDonald’s restaurants, Hollywood movies, social media platforms, even the architecture of international airports and the design of bank machines.

Finally, people develop a *global consciousness* as they become increasingly aware of shared planetary conditions and come to grips with global events like climate change, pandemics, economic crises, terrorism, and the threat of nuclear war.



Figure 10.23. An encounter between Tibetan Buddhism, Northwest Coast Indigenous traditions, and settler Canadian children. The children participate in a Blessing Ceremony at the First Nations Longhouse at the University of British Columbia. Dilgo Khyentse Yangsi Rinpoche is the tulku or reincarnation of the Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leader Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche. He lives in exile in Bhutan due to the Chinese occupation of Tibet, but his displacement has also allowed Nyingma Tibetan Buddhist teachings to be disembedded from their traditional context and to circulate globally. (Image courtesy of Wonderlane/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Expressive Individualism and the New Tribalism

This means that through de-traditionalization and globalization, individuals increasingly form their identities in the context of global **cosmopolitanism**, (literally ‘world citizenship’ from the Greek *kosmopolitēs*), where a multiplicity of ideas, traditions and customs intermingle. The individual is no longer constrained by local tradition and authority and

has to exercise at least some degree of freedom and autonomy in constructing their identity and choosing the cultural practices best suited to them from a variety of available possibilities.

Expressive individualism is the late modern drive to find one's "self" and to *express* one's unique individuality, even in the face of resistance. With the diminishing influence of tradition and the expansion of lifestyle options, the individual's identity becomes increasingly a product of individual choices and personal achievements. Rather than a predetermined role ascribed by birth, family, custom or social convention, with the rapid changes of globalization there is an expansive and increasingly global range of alternatives to engage with. Once the traditional options for identity can no longer be taken for granted, the individual is compelled to invent their own identity (Bauman, 2004).

At the same time as there is a need to "become oneself," individuals continue to seek one another out to share common experiences and world views. They seek like-minded others to construct common narratives, which can turn their personal choice of identity into something more meaningful and collective. The **new tribalism** refers to the emergence of group identities like fundamentalist religion, Antifa, "Freedom Convoy" populism, Indigenous resurgence, Quebecois nationalism, etc., which provide individuals with a means of distinguishing themselves from others. Attachment to cultural, ethnic, political, or religious differences as identity markers provides a distinct place of allegiance or belonging in the face of cosmopolitan diversity. Unlike historical tribalism however, these identities are often based on symbols, imagery and lineages of belief that circulate globally through the media, disembedded from specific localities and traditions.

Risk and Trust

Risk management has become a prevalent element of institutional and individual life in the 20th and 21st centuries. The future is seen as something that can be shaped by calculation and risk analysis. As a result, individuals and institutions have become increasingly **reflexive** in their activities. They continuously accumulate and examine data to reflect on how to improve their effectiveness and anticipate future threats and problems. Constant monitoring of activities to assess risks, and a readiness to modify practices in response to new information, are hallmarks of contemporary reflexivity.

Cultures and lands at risk



Figure 10.24. The risk of climate change is not distributed equally on Earth. Climate change is particularly acute in the north. Inuit communities are more vulnerable than southerners to food insecurity, changing water availability, potential relocation from historic homelands, and the loss of livelihoods and traditional knowledge. Their experience of colonialism also makes the risk/trust dilemma more acute. (Image courtesy of NASA Goddard Space Flight Center/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

The scope and nature of these risks change with globalization. As Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990) argue, people are increasingly aware of *existential risks* like climate change, loss of species diversity, pandemics, nuclear accidents, and weapons of mass destruction that threaten planetary existence. They are also aware of *contingent risks* to everyday life that emerge from the complex interdependence of global systems: the failure of U.S. subprime mortgage mechanisms that sparked the 2008 global financial crisis or the global effect of a single container ship stuck in the Suez Canal, discussed earlier in the chapter. At the same time, people have become aware of changes in the *type* of risk they confront. The unanticipated consequences of human interventions into nature, like the effect of fish farming on salmon run collapses, the release of carbon into the atmosphere, fear of mRNA vaccines, or the invention of plastics, define a new category of risk with global implications. Parallel to these risks, humans create their own “*institutionalized risk environments*” like futures markets or algorithmic trading, which expose the livelihood of millions of people to risky decisions made by a few.

The awareness of global risks establishes an emotional baseline for global society. They are sources of anxiety and insecurity for everyone on the planet. Notably, global integration itself has become a source of risk, which defines a characteristic **risk/trust dilemma** of late modernity.

To deal with their anxiety, people tend to default to an attitude of *trust* in the expert systems that govern the complex technical systems that coordinate global life. The scope of the systems, the complexity of the knowledge involved, and the magnitude of the issues presented offer little alternative. However, this creates a distinctive dilemma of global society because people are also aware of the limitations of these expert systems in responding to risks, not to mention the role of the systems in creating risk in the first place. Some reject scientific expertise altogether and invest in “*alternate science*” that allows global problems like pandemics and climate change to magically disappear. But inevitably the *reflexive stance* of contemporary forms of life is based on the awareness of the unpredictability and contingency of

global existence (the “unknown unknowns”), as well as the fallibility of science and planning. Science itself is uncertain and open to revision. Thus, global citizens are destined to fluctuate between the anxiety of recognizing risks and the uncertainty of trust in expert systems to respond to them.

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Chapter 10 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

absolute poverty: The state where one is barely able, or unable, to afford basic necessities.

agency: the ability to define one's goals and act on them; used as a variable to measure inequality

anti-globalization movement: A global countermovement based on principles of environmental sustainability, food sovereignty, labour rights, and democratic accountability that challenges the corporate model of globalization.

bifurcated labour system: A labour market divided into a core of relatively stable, well-paid jobs and a periphery of casual, precarious, and low-cost labour.

capital flight: The movement (flight) of capital from one nation to another, via jobs and resources.

chattel slavery: A form of slavery in which one person owns another.

containerization: The transformation in the transportation and trade of goods brought about by the use of container ships.

colonialism: A form of domination in which a state or state sponsored group exercises direct control over the territory and inhabitants of another society

Columbian Exchange: The widespread exchange of plants, animals, foods, human populations, communicable diseases, and culture between the Eastern and Western hemispheres beginning in the 16th century.

core nations: Dominant capitalist countries.

cosmopolitanism: A social condition or setting of social and cultural diversity in which a multiplicity of ideas, traditions and customs intermingle.

debt accumulation: The buildup of external debt, wherein countries borrow money from other nations to fund their expansion or growth goals.

debt bondage: When people pledge themselves as servants in exchange for money for passage and are subsequently paid too little to regain their freedom.

decolonization: The process whereby former colonies attain formal political self-determination and independence from colonial powers.

deindustrialization: The loss of industrial production, usually to peripheral and semi-peripheral nations where the costs are lower.

dependency theory: Theory stating that global inequity is due to the exploitation of peripheral and semi-peripheral nations by core nations.

de-traditionalization: The process whereby day-to-day life is increasingly less informed by traditions or the ways of life passed down in local cultural and ecological contexts.

disembedding: The process in which day to day life is no longer completely embedded in local, micro-level interactions but becomes coordinated and organized on a global basis.

expert system: Advanced systems of knowledge and practice required to run the complex institutional arrangements and technological systems of contemporary societies.

exploitative colonialism: A form of colonialism in which the focus is on the extraction of wealth (rather than settlement). *See settler colonialism.*

expressive individualism: A form of identity formation defined by the drive to find one's "self" and to express one's unique individuality, even in the face of resistance.

first wave of globalization: 19th century-1914.

first world: A term from the Cold War era that is used to describe industrialized capitalist democracies.

fourth world: A term that describes stigmatized minority groups who have no voice or representation on the world stage.

global assembly lines: A practice where products are designed, manufactured, and assembled in different international locations.

global capitalism: The extension of the capitalist mode of production to the entire world.

global capitalism theory: Analytical framework that the development of global capitalism takes place less in the context of national economies and more in the context of global flows of capital investment in an increasingly integrated world market.

global commodity chains: Internationally integrated economic links that connect workers and corporations around the world for the purpose of manufacture, distribution, and marketing.

global feminization of poverty: A global pattern in which women increasingly bear a disproportionate percentage of the burden of poverty.

global inequality: The concentration of resources in core nations and in the hands of a wealthy minority.

global level of analysis: The study of structures and processes that extend beyond the boundaries of states or specific societies.

global stratification: The unequal distribution of resources between countries.

globalization: The processes of increasing integration and interconnection which incorporate people across the world into a single world society.

gross domestic product (GDP): the market value of all goods and services produced within a country in a given time period.

gross national income (GNI): The income of a nation calculated based on domestic goods and services produced, plus income earned by citizens and corporations headquartered in that country.

late modernity: Features that define the common culture of global society.

metropolis-hinterland relationship: The relationship between core and peripheral countries in which resources of the hinterlands are shipped to the metropolises to be converted into manufactured goods and then shipped back to the hinterlands for consumption.

modernization theory: A theory that low-income countries can improve their global economic standing by industrialization of infrastructure and a shift in cultural attitudes toward work.

multinational corporation: A corporation whose ownership and operations span multiple nation-states.

neo-colonialism: The continued socio-economic and political dominance of external political and economic agents in former colonies.

neo-liberalism: A set of policies in which the state reduces its role in providing public services, regulating industry, redistributing wealth, and protecting the commons while advocating the use of free market mechanisms to regulate society.

new tribalism: The emergence of group identities that provide individuals with a means of distinguishing themselves from others in the context of global diversity and cosmopolitanism.

peonage: A system where an employer compels a worker to pay off a debt with work.

peripheral nations: Nations on the fringes of the global economy, dominated by core nations, with very little industrialization.

primitive accumulation: the initial stage of capitalist accumulation in which people are separated from a territory and its resources, and subjected to forms of unfree labour, expropriation of land and destruction of self-determining communities.

reflexivity: A stance of contemporary individuality and institutional life that involves (a) continuous monitoring of activities and performance to assess effectiveness and future risks, and (b) a readiness to modify understandings and practices in response to new information.

relative poverty: The state of poverty where one is unable to live the lifestyle of the average person in the country.

risk/trust dilemma: A characteristic trade off in late modern society between trust in expert systems to manage collective risks and threats, and the recognition of the fallibility of expert systems.

risk management: Interventions designed to reduce the likelihood of undesirable events occurring based on an assessment of probabilities of risk.

second wave of globalization: 1945-1989

second world: A term from the Cold War era that describes nations with moderate economies and standards of living.

semi-peripheral nations: In-between nations, not powerful enough to dictate policy but acting as a major source of raw materials and providing an expanding middle class marketplace.

settler colonialism: A form of colonialism focused on permanent settlement and corresponding displacement of Indigenous Peoples and societies.

sovereign state system: The system by which the world is divided up into separate and indivisible sovereign territories or states.

sovereignty: The political form in which a single, central, supreme lawmaking authority governs within a clearly demarcated territory.

subjective poverty: A state of poverty subjectively present when one's actual income does not meet one's expectations.

surplus humanity: Sectors of the global labour market who are of no direct use to capitalism and obliged to sustain themselves precariously in informal sectors of the economy.

Terra Nullius: The principle that territory and economic resources that are not being effectively utilized by an indigenous population could legitimately be expropriated and developed by a superior invading nation.

third industrial revolution: The spread of automation, computation, instantaneous communication, and digitization through the use of electronics, computers and internet.

third wave of globalization: 1989–present.

third world: A term from the Cold War era that refers to poor, non-industrialized countries.

transnational capitalist class: A network of owners of capital who are distributed around the world and focused on international markets, rather than their home markets, for investment and capital accumulation.

underground economy: An unregulated economy of labour and goods that operates outside of governance, regulatory systems, or human protections.

world systems theory: Analytical framework which conceptualizes a single world-system operating as a global division of labour, divided between multiple states, which redistributes surplus value from the *periphery* to the *core*.

xenophobia: An irrational fear and even hatred of foreigners and foreign goods.

Section Summary

[10.1 Trade, Colonialism and the Origins of Global Society](#)

Globalization refers to processes of increasing integration and interconnection which incorporate people across the world into a single global society. Climate change, disease pandemics and global capitalism are examples of the ways in which people around the world are caught up in the same global scale processes. While trade has occurred between different distant locations for millennia, it was not until the development of colonialism that a single global society began to emerge. Three waves of globalization from the 19th century British Empire to the post-Second World War development of global institutions, to the contemporary post-Cold War period have intensified the process of global integration and created new and unprecedented capabilities, issues, and social dynamics.

[10.2 Global Wealth and Poverty](#)

Stratification refers to the gaps in access to resources both between countries and within countries. While economic equality is of great concern, so is social equality, like the discrimination stemming from race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and/or sexual orientation. When looking at the world's poor, sociologists first have to define the difference between relative poverty and absolute poverty. While those in relative poverty might not have enough to live at their country's standard of living, those in absolute poverty do not have, or barely have, basic necessities such as food. Global poverty has numerous negative consequences, from increased crime rates to a detrimental impact on physical and mental health.

Different explanations of global inequality focus on modernization theory, dependency theory and global capitalism theory. Modernization theory posits that countries go through evolutionary stages and that industrialization and improved technology are the keys to forward movement. Dependency theory sees global inequality as the result of core nations creating a cycle of dependence by exploiting resources and labour in peripheral and semi-peripheral countries. Globalization theory argues that the division between the wealthy and the poor is now organized in the context of a single, integrated global economy rather than between core and peripheral countries.

[10.3 Contemporary Global Society](#)

Global society has effects on day-to-day life beyond economic integration and displacement. To varying degrees, people around the world experience a new global reality characterized by de-traditionalization, disembedding from local time and space, organization through global expert systems, cosmopolitanism, homogenization, expressive

individualism, new tribalism, and new forms of risk/trust dynamics. The relationship between the local and the global is complexly intertwined in many distinct aspects of daily life.

Questions

Quiz: Global Society

10.1 Trade, Colonialism and the Origins of Global Society

1. Globalization is a process that:
 - a. Creates a sense of global simultaneity and closeness.
 - b. Makes borders markedly less relevant to everyday behaviour.
 - c. Makes many people feel that they are in the grip of forces over which they have no control.
 - d. All of the above.
2. A system in which materials are sourced and products designed and manufactured in different geographical locations distributed around the globe is:
 - a. Global assembly lines.
 - b. Global commodity chains.
 - c. Containerization.
 - d. Just-in-time production and distribution.
3. Truly global trade kicked off in _____.
 - a. The Mississippian culture (ca. 500–1400 BCE)
 - b. The development of the Silk Road trade between China and Europe (1st century BCE–5th century CE)
 - c. The Spice Route trade of Islamic merchants (7th–15th centuries)
 - d. The Age of Colonization (15th–18th centuries)
4. The enormous widespread transfer of plants, animals, foods, human populations (including slaves), communicable diseases (like smallpox), and culture between the Eastern and Western hemispheres is referred to as:
 - a. The Age of Discovery.
 - b. The Columbian Exchange.
 - c. Primitive Accumulation.
 - d. Exploitive Colonialism.
5. Colonialism was initially based on:
 - a. Primitive Accumulation.

- b. The principle of Terra Nullius.
 - c. Resource extraction.
 - d. All of the above.
6. The second wave of globalization refers to:
- a. The period after WWII when international organizations like the UN were founded.
 - b. The establishment of the Belt and Road trade routes between East and West.
 - c. The collapse of time and space into a single global village.
 - d. The introduction of new technologies such as computerization, the internet and digital technology.
7. Neo-colonialism refers to:
- a. The process whereby former colonies attained formal political self-determination and independence from colonial powers.
 - b. The continued socio-economic and political dominance of colonial powers in former colonies in matters of domestic policy, resource extraction and labour exploitation.
 - c. Colonization through permanent European settlement and displacement of Indigenous Peoples.
 - d. Global dominance through a fluid, ad hoc network of international agreements, supra-national agencies, and transnational corporations.

10.2 Global Wealth and Poverty

8. Maya is a 12-year-old girl living in Thailand. She is homeless and often does not know where she will sleep or when she will eat. We might say that Maya lives in _____ poverty.
- a. Subjective
 - b. Absolute
 - c. Relative
 - d. Global
9. Mike, a college student, rents a studio apartment. He cannot afford a television and lives on cheap groceries like dried beans and ramen noodles. Since he does not have a regular job, he does not own a car. Mike is living in _____.
- a. Global poverty
 - b. Absolute poverty
 - c. Subjective poverty
 - d. Relative poverty
10. If a sociologist says that nations evolve toward more advanced technology and more complex industry as their citizens learn cultural values that celebrate hard work and success, she is using _____ to study the global economy.
- a. Modernization theory
 - b. Dependency theory
 - c. Global capitalism theory
 - d. Anthony Giddens's late modernity theory

11. Dependency theorists explain global inequality and global stratification by focusing on the way that _____.
- a. Bifurcated labour systems spread to all regions of the globe.
 - b. All nations participate in a single world market.
 - c. The “big fish” eat the “little fish.”
 - d. Core nations exploit peripheral nations.
12. One flaw in dependency theory is the unwillingness to recognize _____.
- a. That previously low-income nations such as China have successfully developed their economies and can no longer be classified as dependent on core nations.
 - b. That previously advanced nations such as China have been economically and militarily overpowered by colonial nations.
 - c. That countries such as China are growing more dependent on exploiting peripheral regions of core nations.
 - d. That countries such as China do not necessarily adopt the cultural values of core nations in their development.
13. If a sociologist points out that transnational corporate interests dominate the global economy, in part through state policies that advance global trade agreements that favour the ability of capital to invest in low-wage regions, they are a _____.
- a. Dependency theorist
 - b. Global Capitalism theorist
 - c. Modernization theorist
 - d. Reactionist

10.3 Contemporary Global Society

14. A common aspect of late modernity is the process of disembedding in which _____.
- a. People have to get out of bed at night to answer phone calls.
 - b. Day to day life is coordinated at a global level and restructured “across indefinite spans of time and space.”
 - c. Day to day life is no longer informed by local traditions or ways of life passed down in local cultural and ecological contexts.
 - d. Semi-peripheral nations hit the “take off” stage of development.
15. To sum up, there are four main processes that drive globalization including (a) interconnected processes of global capitalism, (b) the development of international organizations like the UN, (c) new communications and transportation technologies, and (d) _____.
- a. The formation of a new type of networked Empire.
 - b. Conflict between the U.S. and China over global hegemony.
 - c. The division of the world into discrete sovereign territories.
 - d. Slum cities and surplus humanity.
16. The late modern emphasis on having to invent oneself is referred to _____.

- a. Cosmopolitan citizenship
 - b. Liberal individualism
 - c. Tribal identification
 - d. Expressive individualism
17. The difference between existential and contingent risks is:
- a. The threat of global catastrophe and the threat of complex, interdependent systems breaking down.
 - b. Making a personal leap of faith that does not work out and making a personal leap of faith based on uncertain information.
 - c. The unpredictable consequences of human intervention into nature and the creation of institutionalized risk environments.
 - d. All of the above.

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

10.1 Trade, Colonialism and the Origins of Global Society

1. Describe the historical stages of the long process by which “the global system has been and continues to be made.” How do Robertson’s five “phases” compare to the expansion of distant trade routes, the Age of Colonization and the three waves of globalization described later in the section?
2. At what point did globalization truly become established? What criteria are used to determine this?
3. Define colonialism. Contrast settler colonialism with exploitative colonialism.
4. In what ways is the sovereign state system a key component of globalization?
5. Describe the historical relationship between colonialism and globalization, including the processes of decolonization and neo-colonialism. How has globalization has been uneven in its effects?

10.2 Global Wealth and Poverty

6. What are three indicators used to measure global economic inequality?
7. Give an example of the feminization of poverty in core nations. How is it the same or different in peripheral nations?
8. Consider the concept of relative poverty. Does it make sense that a person is still in poverty even if they have a home and are able to have regular meals? How would the threshold between relative poverty and relative affluence be defined in your own community?
9. Compare and contrast modernization theory, dependency theory, and globalization theory. Which do you think is more useful for explaining global inequality? Explain, using examples.
10. There is much criticism that modernization theory is Eurocentric. Do you think dependency theory and globalization theory are also biased? Why or why not?

10.3 Contemporary Global Society

11. Define “expert systems” and describe the ways that they coordinate routine activities of daily life. Why are these described as *disembedding*? Inversely, what would an embedded way of life be like?
12. Why did McLuhan describe global society as a global village? Describe the four key processes that drive globalization. Which seems most relevant to McLuhan’s concept?
13. Expressive individualism and new tribalism seem like opposites. What aspect of global society in late modernity provides their common underlying condition?
14. Do you personally find existential risks like climate change, pandemics, or nuclear war threatening? How do you manage the trust/risk dynamic of global life?

Further Research

10.1 Trade, Colonialism and the Origins of Global Society

See Concordia University’s [“Colonialism in Canada”](#) website for a selected list of books, articles and films on the Indigenous experience with colonialism in Canada.

10.2 Global Wealth and Poverty

For more information about global affairs, check the [Munk School of Global Affairs](#) website.

Go to [Naomi Klein](#)’s website for more information about the anti-globalization movement.

10.3 Contemporary Global Society

For a summary of the concepts of modernity, late modernity and postmodernity in video format see the tutor2u video: [Theoretical Debates in Sociology: Modernity and Late Modernity](#).

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Solutions to Section Quiz

1 D, | 2 A, | 3 D, | 4 B, | 5 D, | 6 A, | 7 B, | 8 B, | 9 D, | 10 A, | 11 D, | 12 A, | 13 B, | 14 B, | 15 C, | 16, D, | 17, A | [\[Return to Quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 11. RACE AND ETHNICITY



Figure 11.1 The dastaar (turban) is a required article in the observance of the Sikh faith. Baltej Singh Dhillon was the first Sikh member of the RCMP to wear a turban on active duty. This sparked a major controversy in 1990, but today people barely bat an eye when they see a police officer wearing a turban. Issues of racial and ethnic difference are fluid, yet persistent in Canada. Why? (Photo used with permission of Baltej Singh Dhillon.)

Learning Objectives

11.1. Racial, Ethnic, and Minority Groups

- Define the difference between the concepts of race, ethnicity, minority group and subaltern group.
- Understand the concepts of racialization and racialized groups.
- Explain the difference between race and ancestry in the contemporary context of genomic research.

11.2. Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Discrimination

- Explain the difference between stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination, and racism.
- Identify different types of racial discrimination: individual racism, systemic racism, institutional racism, and White privilege.
- Review the historical example of Residential Schools as an example of institutional racism.

11.3. Theories of Race and Ethnicity

- Describe how positivist, critical, and interpretive perspectives approach issues of race and ethnicity.

11.4. Intergroup Relations and the Management of Diversity

- Explain different intergroup relations in terms of their relative levels of tolerance.
- Give historical and/or contemporary examples of each type of intergroup relation.

11.5. Race and Ethnicity in Canada

- Compare and contrast the different experiences of various ethnic groups in Canada.
- Apply theories of intergroup relations and race and ethnicity to different subordinate groups.

Introduction to Race and Ethnicity

Visible minorities are defined as “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour” (Statistics Canada, 2017). This is a contentious term, as discussed later in this chapter, but it does provide a way to describe the growing ethnic and racial diversity of Canada. The 2021 census noted that visible minorities or racialized groups made up 25% of the Canadian population, or one out of every four Canadians (Statistics Canada, 2022a). This was up from 16.2% in the 2006 census (Block, Galabuzi, and Tranjan, 2019). The three largest non-Indigenous visible minority groups were South Asians (7.1%), Chinese (4.7%), and Blacks (4.3%). Indigenous Canadians, including First Nations, Inuit, and Métis, made up 5.0% of the population in the 2021 census (Statistics Canada, 2022a).

Going back to the 1921 census, only 0.8% of the population were made up of people of Asian origin, whereas 0.2% of the population were Black. Indigenous Canadians made up 1.3% of the population. The vast majority of the population were Caucasians (“Whites”) of British or French ancestry. These figures did not change appreciably until after the changes to the Immigration Act in 1967, which replaced an immigration policy based on racial criteria with a point system based on educational and occupational qualifications (Li, 1996). The 2021 census reported that 83% of immigrants who arrived in Canada between 2016 and 2021 were visible minorities (Statistics Canada, 2017).

Still, these figures do not really give a complete picture of racial and ethnic diversity in Canada. 96% of visible minorities live in cities, mainly Vancouver and Toronto, making these cities extremely diverse and cosmopolitan. In Vancouver, almost half the population (48.9%) is made up of visible minorities. Within Greater Vancouver, 76.3% of the residents of Richmond, 63.6% of the residents of Burnaby, and 58.5% of the residents of Surrey are visible minorities. In the Toronto area, where visible minorities make up 51.3% of the population, 77.9% of the residents of the suburb of Markham are visible minorities (Statistics Canada, 2019). In many parts of urban Canada, it is a misnomer to use the term visible minority, as the “minorities” are now in the majority.

Table 11.1. Non-Indigenous Visible minority population and top three visible minority groups, selected census metropolitan areas, Canada, 2016.

Cities	Total Population	Visible Minority Population	Percentage	Top Three Visible Minority Groups
Canada	36,328,475	9,639,200	26.5%	South Asian, Chinese, Black
Toronto	6,142,885	3,501,270	57%	South Asian, Chinese, Black
Montréal	4,206,455	1,143,820	27.2%	Black, Arab, Latin American
Vancouver	2,607,015	1,420,275	54.5%	Chinese, South Asian, Filipino
Ottawa – Gatineau	1,464,495	386,920	26.4%	Black, Arab, South Asian
Calgary	1,465,180	567,955	38.8%	South Asian, Chinese, Filipino
Edmonton	1,397,750	461,580	33%	South Asian, Filipino, Black
Winnipeg	819,715	258,185	31.5%	Filipino, South Asian, Black
Hamilton	773,440	182,115	23.5%	South Asian, Black, Arab

Data Source: Statistics Canada (2022b) Census of Population, Statistics Canada Catalogue no. [98-10-0324-01](#). [Open Government Licence](#)

Projecting forward based on current trends, Statistics Canada estimates that by 2036, between 31.2% and 35.9% of the Canadian population will be visible minorities (Statistics Canada, 2017). By 2031, visible minority groups were forecast to make up 63% of the population of Toronto and 59% of the population of Vancouver (Statistics Canada, 2010). The outcome of these trends is that Canada has become a much more racially and ethnically diverse country over the 20th and 21st centuries. It will continue to become more diverse in the future.



Figure 11.2 British America and Dominion of Canada, 1882, as colonial settler society. (Photo courtesy of H.H. Hardesty & Co. from the Library of Congress Map Division/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

In large part this has to do with immigration policy. Canada is a **settler society**, a society historically based on colonization through foreign settlement and displacement of Indigenous inhabitants, so immigration is the major influence on population diversity. Up until the two decades following World War II, Canada followed an immigration policy that was explicitly race based. Prime Minister Mackenzie King's statement to the House of Commons in 1947 expressed this in what were, at the time, seen as uncontroversial terms:

There will, I am sure, be general agreement with the view that the people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population. Large-scale immigration from the orient would change the fundamental composition of the Canadian population. Any considerable oriental immigration would, moreover, be certain to give rise to social and economic problems of a character that might lead to serious difficulties in the field of international relations. The government, therefore, has no thought of making any change in immigration regulations which would have consequences of the kind (as cited in Li, 1996, pp. 163-164).

Today this would be a completely unacceptable statement from a Canadian politician. Immigration today is based on a non-racial point system. In other words, eligibility for immigration is based on numerical measures of human capital rather than racial characteristics: work skills, education level, language ability (in French or English), and family connections. Canada defines itself as a multicultural nation that promotes and recognizes the diversity of its population.

This does not mean, however, that Canada's legacy of institutional and individual prejudice and racism has been erased. Nor does it mean that the problems of managing a diverse population have been resolved.

In 1997, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination criticized the Canadian government for using the term “visible minority,” citing that distinctions based on race or colour are discriminatory (CBC, 2007). The term combines a diverse group of people into one category whether they have anything in common or not. What does it actually mean to be a member of a visible minority in Canada? What does it mean to be a member of the “non-visible” majority? What do these terms mean in practice? The sociology of race and ethnicity has developed in large part to address these questions.

Media Attributions

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- **Figure 11.2** [British America: Dominion of Canada, 1882](#) by H.H. Hardesty, via Wikimedia Commons, is in the [public domain](#).

11.1. Racial, Ethnic, and Minority Groups

While many students may be accustomed to conflating the terms race, ethnicity, and minority group, these three terms have distinct meanings for sociologists. The idea of **race** refers to superficial physical differences, like skin colour, that a particular society considers significant; **ethnicity** is a term that describes shared culture; and a **minority group** is subordinate, or lacking power in society regardless of skin colour or culture of origin. **Subaltern groups** are minorities that have difficulty expressing an identity outside of the definitions imposed on them by a dominant or colonial culture.

What Is Race?

Historically, the concept of race has changed across cultures and eras, eventually becoming less connected with ancestral and familial ties, and more concerned with superficial physical characteristics. In the origins of race science, theorists posited categories of race based on various geographic regions, ethnicities, skin colours, facial structures, and more. Their labels for racial groups often connoted regions (Mongolia and the Caucasus Mountains, for instance) or denoted skin tones (black, white, yellow, and red, for example). A common notion is the **five race theory** that can be traced back to the early race science of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840). Blumenbach suggested that humans were one species but could be categorized into five racial categories: African, European, Asian, Oceanic, and Native American (Bhopal, 2007).

However, this typology of race, developed during early racial science, has fallen into disuse in sociology, and **racialization** (the social construction of race) is a far more useful way of understanding racial categories. Races are complex sociocultural entities rather than genetically distinct categories. According to this school of thought, race is not a biologically meaningful term as humans are estimated to share 99.9% of their DNA (National Human Genome Research Institute, 2018). Rather, certain groups become racialized through a social process that marks them for unequal treatment based on perceived physiological differences or phenotypes. When considering skin colour, for example, the social construction of race perspective recognizes that the relative darkness or fairness of skin is an evolutionary adaptation to the available sunlight in different regions of the world. It speaks to geographical **ancestry**, but the amount of melanin (a pigment that determines skin colour) in the skin is relatively insignificant in itself. It is a minor trait that evolved independently of other genetic factors that might influence health, intelligence or behaviour.

Although a 2018 poll revealed that 53% of Americans believed that biology either totally (33.8%) or somewhat (18.8%) determines racial identity (Tillery, 2018), the use of skin colour to mark significant racial difference tends to be based on socioeconomic assumptions. In the 19th and early 20th century, numerous immigrant groups from Europe, such as Jews, Italians, Greeks, Ukrainians and Irish, were not considered “White” and only became so through cultural assimilation (Jacobson, 1999). The key variable in determining “Whiteness” therefore was not skin pigmentation but the official and unofficial processes of social gatekeeping and civic assimilation. In modern society, some people who consider themselves “White” actually have more melanin in their skin than other people who identify as “black.” Consider the case of the actress Rashida Jones. She is the daughter of a Black man (the jazz musician and producer Quincy Jones), but she does not play a Black woman in her television or film roles. On the other hand, the White Supremacist Craig Cobb, who was seeking through intimidation to turn a small town in North Dakota all “White,” went on a talk show where he was revealed through DNA testing to have genetically 14% sub-Saharan African ancestry (Stranglin, 2013). In Brazil, where racialized groups historically intermarried, the matter is more ambiguous because being considered “White” or “Black” is independent of racial descent in a biological sense (Telles, 2004). Racial identity depends on a complex social evaluation of skin pigmentation, hair type, nose shape, and lip shape, etc. so that biological siblings can potentially be of different races.

The social construction of race is also reflected in the way that names for racial categories change with changing


times. It is worth noting that race, in this sense, is a system of labeling that provides a source of identity — specific labels fall in and out of favour during different historical eras. For example, the category “Negroid,” popular in the 19th century, evolved into the term “Negro” by the 1960s, and then this term fell from use and was replaced with “Black.” The term was intended to celebrate the multiple identities that a Black person might hold, but the word choice is an ambiguous one: It lumps together a large variety of ethnic groups under an umbrella term. Unlike the case in the United States where the term “African American” is common, most Black Canadians immigrated from the Caribbean and retain ethnic roots from that area. Culturally they remain distinct from immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, or the descendants of the slaves brought to mainland North America. Some prefer to use the term “Afro-Caribbean Canadians” for that reason.

BIPOC is the contemporary acronym that stands for Black, Indigenous and People of Colour. The *New York Times* traced its first usage to a Twitter message in 2013, although the phrase “People of Colour” was first introduced as a term in the *Oxford English Dictionary* in 1796 (Garcia, 2020). It is an inclusive term that describes the shared experience of “visible minorities” as equity seeking groups facing similar practices of racial discrimination. It is not without controversy, however. While marking a distinction between Black and Indigenous experiences and other People of Colour to acknowledge their different historical backgrounds, as with the term “visible minorities,” there is also the danger of lumping all racialized groups in a category together rather than seeing the distinct issues they face.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

Race in the New Era of Human Genetics Research (Vivian Chou, 2017)

A) Popular conception of genetics and "5 races"



B) Actual genetic variation




Figure 11.3 ‘Race’ cannot be biologically defined due to genetic variation among human individuals and populations. (A) The old concept of the “five races:” African, Asian, European, Native American, and Oceanian. According to this view, variation between the races is large, and thus, each race is a separate category. Additionally, individual races are thought to have a relatively uniform genetic identity. (B) Actual genetic variation in humans. Human populations do roughly cluster into geographical regions. However, variation between different regions is small, thus blurring the lines between populations. Furthermore, variation within a single region is large, and there is no uniform identity. (Image by Daniel Utter.) [CC BY-NC-SA 4.0](#)

In 2003, scientists completed the Human Genome Project, making it finally possible to examine human ancestry with genetics. Scientists have since tackled topics such as human migrations out of Africa and around the world (Rincon, 2016; Ghosh, 2015; BBC News, 2015). It is not just scientists who are excited about human genetics: widely affordable at-home ancestry test kits are now readily available from companies like 23andMe, Family Tree DNA, and Ancestry. For \$99—around the price of a romantic dinner or a pair of Nikes—a customer can receive an analysis from 23andMe indicating that they are, for instance, 18.0% Native American, 65.1% European and 6.2% African.

The popularity of ancestry testing indicates a widespread perception that people can use these tests to dissect, delineate, and define their ancestral composition. Indeed, social media is teeming with posts from excited customers sharing their test results and their reactions. Ancestry test kits are the new “it” item — and with their success is the tacit admission of the belief that DNA can unambiguously sort people into categories like the “five races:” African, European, Asian, Oceania, and Native American (Bhopal, 2007).

Estimating ancestral composition down to 0.1% seem to suggest that there are exact, categorical divisions between human populations. But reality is far less simple. Compared to the general public’s enthusiasm for ancestry testing, the reaction from scientists has been considerably more lukewarm (Bolnick et al., 2007). Research indicates that the concept of “five races” does, to an extent, describe the way human populations are distributed among the continents—but the lines between races are much more blurred than ancestry testing companies would have us believe (Tishcoff and Kidd, 2004).

A landmark 2002 study by Stanford scientists examined the question of human diversity by looking at the distribution across seven major geographical regions of 4,000 *alleles* (Rosenberg et al., 2003). Alleles are the different “flavors” of a gene. For instance, all humans have the same genes that code for hair: the different alleles are why hair comes in all types of colours and textures. In the Stanford study, over 92% of alleles were found in two or more regions, and almost half of the alleles studied were present in *all* seven major geographical regions. The observation that the vast majority of the alleles were shared over multiple regions, or even throughout the entire world, points to the fundamental similarity of all people around the world—an idea that has been supported by many other studies (Romualdi et al., 2002; Chakrevarti, 2001).

If separate racial or ethnic groups actually existed, researchers would expect to find “trademark” alleles and other genetic features that are characteristic of a single group but not present in any others. However, the 2002 Stanford study found that only 7.4% of over 4000 alleles were specific to one geographical region. Furthermore, even when region-specific alleles did appear, they only occurred in about 1% of the people from that region—hardly enough to be any kind of trademark. Thus, there is no evidence that the groups people commonly call “races” have distinct, unifying genetic identities. In fact, there is ample variation within races (See Figure 11.3B).

Ultimately, there is so much ambiguity between the races, and so much variation within them, that two people of European descent may be more genetically similar to an Asian person than they are to each other (Gannon, 2016; see Figure 11.3).




Figure 11.4 Case study of genetic variation between three scientists. Left: Schematization of the genetic variation between Drs. James Watson, Craig Venter, and Kim Seong-jin. Coloured bars represent genes; different colours represent different alleles, i.e., versions of genes. Some alleles are shared by all three men; these are represented by the dark brown allele shared by every person in this image. Besides the universal dark brown allele, Watson and Venter share one other allele (bright blue). However, both share two alleles with Kim (Watson shares red and orange with Kim, Venter shares green and magenta), in addition to the universal allele. Right: There is more similarity between Kim and Watson and Kim and Venter, than between Watson and Venter. (Image by Daniel Utter.) [CC BY-NC-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/)

The divisions between races are doubtlessly blurred, but does this necessarily mean that race is a myth—a mere social construct and biologically meaningless? As with other race-related questions, the answer is multi-dimensional and may well depend on whom one asks.

In the biological and social sciences, the consensus is clear: race is a social construct, not a biological attribute. Today, scientists prefer to use the term “ancestry” to describe human diversity. “Ancestry” reflects the fact that human variations *do* have a connection to the geographical origins of one’s ancestors—with enough information about a person’s DNA, scientists can make a reasonable guess about their ancestry (Lewontin, 1972; Collins, 2004). However, unlike the term “race,” it focuses on understanding how a person’s history unfolded, not how they fit into one category and not another. In a clinical setting, for instance, scientists would say that diseases such as sickle-cell anemia and cystic fibrosis are common in those of “sub-Saharan African” or “Northern European” descent, respectively, rather than in those who are “Black” or “White” (Yudell et al., 2016).

However, even if scientists agree that race is, at most, a social construct, any cursory search of the internet reveals that the broader public is not convinced of this. After all, if an Asian person looks so different from a European, how could they *not* be from distinct groups? Even if most scientists reject the concept of “race” as a biological concept, race exists, undeniably, as a social and political concept.

The popular classifications of race are based chiefly on skin colour, with other relevant features including height, eyes, and hair. Though these physical differences may appear, on a superficial level, to be very dramatic, they are determined by only a minute portion of the genome: humans as a species have been estimated to share 99.9% of our DNA with each other (National Human Genome Research Institute, 2018). The few differences that do exist reflect differences in environments and external factors, not core biology. Importantly, the evolution of skin colour occurred independently, and did not influence other traits such as mental abilities and behavior. In fact, science has yet to find evidence that there are genetic differences in intelligence between populations (Lindsey, 2013). Ultimately, while there certainly are some biological differences between different populations, these differences are few and superficial. The traits that humans do share are far more profound.

Despite the scientific consensus that humanity is more alike than unlike, the long history of racism is a somber reminder that throughout human history, a mere 0.1% of variation has been sufficient justification for committing all manner of discrimination and atrocity. The advances in human genetics and the evidence of negligible differences between races might be expected to halt racist arguments. But, in fact, genetics has been used to further racist and ethnocentric arguments—as in the case of the alt-right, which promotes far-right ideologies, including White-supremacism and anti-Semitism.

“Race in the new era of human genetics research” adapted from Vivian Chou, 2017, [How Science and Genetics are Reshaping the Race Debate of the 21st Century](#). Used under a [CC BY-NC-SA 4.0](#) licence.

What Is Ethnicity?

Ethnicity is a term that describes shared cultural heritage — the distinct practices, beliefs and way of life of a group. This includes shared origins, geographical locations, languages, religions, and traditions, among other commonalities. **Ethnic identity** is the positive attitude and attachment an individual or group forms with an ethnicity based on their perception of common ancestry and shared socio-cultural characteristics and experiences. It implies the ability to use cultural distinctions to identify with the “we-ness” of a self-group in distinction to the “they-ness” of other groups, considered as Others, outsiders, enemies or strangers.

Although there is an influential tradition going back to philosophers like Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) that views ethnicity as an underlying and unchanging spirit or essence of “a people” (Taylor, 1994), contemporary sociologists who examine ethnicity as it is practiced and lived today tend to view it as non-fixed, fluid and situational in character. Unlike race, ethnicity is usually considered a product of cultural heritage distinct from biology (although the concepts can overlap in complex ways), but, like race, individuals may be identified or self-identified with ethnicities in complex, even contradictory, ways.

For example, defining ethnicity is an identification method that individuals and institutions use today — whether through immigration categories, the census, truth and reconciliation commissions, anti-discrimination laws and equity measures, or simply in personal day-to-day relations. These categories often appear as straightforward social facts, even if it is common for Canadians to have mixed ethnic backgrounds that make it difficult to self-identify. Nevertheless, the

ethnic categories themselves have histories and social contexts. As with race, individual actors and groups negotiate their ethnic identity internally as well as with those outside the group.



Figure 11.5 Giant sculpture of a Ukrainian Easter egg or pysanka in Vegreville, Alberta. Public monuments are one means used to solidify concepts of ethnic identity. (Photo courtesy of Myke Waddy/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

The history of the Ukrainians in Canada is a case in point (Satzewich, 2000; 2002). The first wave of Ukrainian migration to the Canadian prairies from parts of the (contemporary) Ukraine controlled by the Austrian Hapsburg Empire took place between the 1880s and 1914. They faced discrimination in Canada in the form of racialized discourses that regarded peripheral Southern and Eastern Europeans – the “Latin, Slav, Semitic, and Mongolian races” – as “inferior racial stock,” incapable of assimilating and building a new civilized Canadian society (Satzewich, 2000). This rejection by the dominant culture and institutions, however, was the first element in the formation of a vibrant Ukrainian ethnic identity. In order to solidify and maintain their communities, the immigrants were obliged to turn inward to create their own diasporic community organizations, churches, dance and music events, libraries and cultural or folkloric activities.

Recall the concept of **diaspora** from [Chapter 3. Culture](#): The increasing flows of global migrants, temporary foreign workers, and political or economic refugees create globalized and displaced local communities as people from around the world spread out into global **diasporas**: The communities that emerge through resettlement of a people from their original homeland to new locations.

The second element was the creation of a unique ethnic identity itself. Most of the immigrant workers and peasants who migrated to Canada came without a concept of themselves as Ukrainians. They tended to identify themselves with their local villages or regions of origin and the idea of “The Ukraine” as a distinct nation or nationality was nebulous. During the immigration process they might describe themselves to immigration authorities by country of origin, (which varied between Austria, Russia, or Hungary), by regional identity, (Galician, Bukovynian, or Lemko), or by religion (Ukrainian Greek Catholic, which was often interpreted as “Greek”). The larger ethno-cultural category that identified them was “Rusyn,” which translated confusedly into English as Russian or “little Russian,” and by 1900 this term was replaced by “Ruthenian.” It was not until the 1st World War (1914–1918) that “Ukrainian” was adopted.

Satzewich (2002) regards this “Ukrainianization” of the community as the outcome of an internal conflict between factions within the larger North American diasporic community, which struggled over whether they would align themselves with a Ukrainian, Hungarian or Russian homeland and aspirations to statehood in Europe. The identity had to do more with the politics of an imagined homeland than with the expression of an existing,

well defined cultural tradition. Comparing the Ukrainian struggle for ethnic identity with the Irish struggle to be regarded as “White,” Satzewich says:

For stateless members of diaspora communities [like the Canadian Ukrainians], the politics and identities in the homeland may have led them to be less concerned about their place within racial hierarchies in their new homelands and more concerned about the place of their imagined community on the map of Europe.... Contrary to the Irish, who responded to their racial assignment by asserting a [White] racial identity, Ukrainians responded by creating and asserting an ethnic identity that legitimated claims to statehood in Europe (Satzewich, 2000).

The Ukrainian example illustrates the complexity and overlapping of ethnicity, race and national identity. From the point of view of interpretive or social constructivist sociology, ethnic identification, like racialization, is a *process* subject to historical, cultural and political factors and negotiation. To say that it is a fluid category like this means that it is subject to both external recognition and validation and to periodic redefinition and reinvention of “traditions.”

What is a Minority Group?

Sociologist Louis Wirth (1897-1952) defined a **minority group** as “any group of people who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination” (1945). The term minority connotes discrimination, and in its sociological use the term **subordinate** can be used interchangeably with the term minority, while the term **dominant** is often substituted for the group that is in the majority. These definitions correlate to the concept that the **dominant group** is that group which holds the most power in a given society, while **subordinate groups** are those who lack power compared to the dominant group.

According to Charles Wagley and Marvin Harris (1958), a minority group is distinguished by five characteristics: (1) unequal treatment and less power over their lives, (2) distinguishing physical or cultural traits like skin colour or language, (3) involuntary membership in the group, (4) awareness of subordination, and (5) high rate of in-group marriage (Wagley and Harris, 1958). Additional examples of minority groups might include the LGBTQ community, religious practitioners whose faith is not widely practiced where they live, and people with disabilities.

Note that being a numerical minority is not necessarily a characteristic of being a minority group; sometimes larger groups can be considered minority groups due to their lack of power. It is the lack of power that is the predominant characteristic of a minority, or subordinate group. For example, consider apartheid in South Africa, in which a numerical majority (the Black inhabitants of the country) were exploited and oppressed by the White minority.

Subaltern groups, which have become the focus of research in postcolonial subaltern studies, are groups defined by cultural subordination to the degree that they have “no identity except that which they can derive from the fact of their subordination” (Pocock, 2009). Especially in the case of colonization, their cultural identity within society has been defined by the dominant group to the degree that they look at themselves through the dominant group’s eyes. As Gayatri Spivak argues, they have internalized their subaltern identity to such a degree that they cannot speak for themselves except through the language of the dominant group (Spivak, 1988).

Multiple Identities



Figure 11.6 Golfer Tiger Woods has Chinese, Thai, African American, Native American, and Dutch heritage. Individuals with multiple ethnic backgrounds are becoming more common as populations become more fluid. (Photo courtesy of Tim Hipps/ U.S. Army, via Wikimedia Commons) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Prior to the 20th century, racial intermarriage in North America (referred to as **miscegenation**) was rare, and in many places, illegal. In the United States, 41 of the 50 states at one time or another enacted legislation to prevent racial intermarriage. In Canada, there were no formal anti-miscegenation laws, though strong informal norms ensured that racial intermixing was extremely limited in scope. Thompson makes the case, however, that the various versions of the Indian Act, originally enacted in 1876, effectively worked on a racial level to restrict the marriage between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people (2009). A key part of the Act enumerated the various ways in which Indigenous people could lose their status through intermarriage and, thus, their claim to Aboriginal land title and state provisions. Until its amendment in 1985, one of the most egregious sections of the Act (Section 12.1.b) determined that an Indian woman who married a non-Indian man would lose her Indian status and her children's Indian status, whereas an Indian man who married a non-Indian woman would retain his status, as would his children. In this way, the thorny question of having multiple racial identities could be avoided.



Figure 11.7 Louis Riel was the son of a prominent French-Ojibwa father and French mother. He was executed in 1885 on the charge of high treason for his role in the Northwest Rebellion. This picture was taken at the time of his trial in 1885. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

The Métis, or *Bois-Brûlés*, are Canada's original exception to this rule. Prior to the full establishment of British colonial rule in Canada, racial intermarriage was encouraged in some areas to support the fur trade. The Métis formed a unique mixed-race culture of French fur traders and mostly Cree, Anishinaabe, and Saulteaux people centred in the Red River settlement of what is now Manitoba. On the other hand, the progeny of liaisons between the Hudson's Bay Company's British traders and Indigenous women were known as "half-breeds," a term that was pejorative in some contexts but not others (Brown, 1993; O'Toole, 2013; Dahl, 2013). It is unfortunately a testament to the untenability of multiple identities in 19th century Canada that the attempt to establish and protect an independent Métis culture under the provisional government of Louis Riel (1844-1885) led to the violent suppression of the Métis in the Red River Rebellion of 1869 and the Northwest Rebellion of 1885. Despite the promises of the newly founded Canadian government after Confederation (1867), the Métis were swindled out of their land through a corrupt script system and displaced by a massive influx of Anglo-Saxon immigrants (Purich, 1988).

During the late modern era, the trend toward equal rights and legal protection against racism have steadily reduced the social stigma attached to miscegenation or racial exogamy. **Exogamy** refers to marriage outside of one's core social unit, often defined by race or ethnicity. It is now common for children of racially mixed parents to acknowledge and celebrate their various ethnic identities. Golfer Tiger Woods, for instance, has Chinese, Thai, African American, Native American, and Dutch heritage; he jokingly refers to his ethnicity as "Cablinasian," a term he coined to combine several of his ethnic backgrounds. In Canada the prevalence of

multiple identities is captured in the 2011 *Statistics Canada National Household Survey*. While just over 19 million Canadians described themselves as having a single ethnic origin, (including almost 6 million who claimed a "Canadian" ethnic origin), almost 14 million Canadians described themselves as having a multiple ethnic origin (Statistics Canada, 2011). According to 2006 census data, 3.9% of all Canadian couples were "mixed unions," that is, couples made up of either a visible minority member and a non-visible minority member or two members from different visible minorities. This was up from 3.1% in 2001 and 2.6% in 1991 (Milan et al., 2010).

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- **Figure 11.7** [Louis Riel](#) by [ArchiviaNet/ Collections Canada](#), Reference #C-018082, via Wikimedia Commons, is in the [public domain](#).

11.2. Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Discrimination

The terms stereotype, prejudice, discrimination, and racism are often used interchangeably in everyday conversation. But when discussing these terms from a sociological perspective, it is important to define them: **Stereotypes** are oversimplified ideas about groups of people; **prejudice** refers to negative thoughts and feelings about those groups; **discrimination** refers to negative actions toward them; **racism** is a type of prejudice that involves set beliefs about a specific racial group.

Stereotypes

Stereotypes are oversimplified ideas about groups of people in the sense that they are based on rigid generalizations which do not bear up under critical scrutiny. Stereotypes can be based on race, ethnicity, age, gender, sexual orientation – almost any characteristic. They may be positive (usually about one's own group, such as when women suggest they are less likely than men to complain about physical pain) but are often negative (usually toward other groups, such as when members of a dominant racial group suggest that a subordinate racial group is stupid or lazy). In either case, the stereotype is a generalization that does not take individual differences into account.

For example, when a newspaper prints the race of individuals accused of a crime, it may enhance stereotypes of a certain minority. It is difficult to think of Somali Canadians, for example, without recalling the news reports of gang-related deaths in Toronto's social housing projects or the northern Alberta drug trade (Wingrove & Mackrael, 2012).

Where do stereotypes come from? New stereotypes are rarely created; rather, they are recycled from subordinate groups that have assimilated into society and are reused to describe newly subordinate groups. For example, many stereotypes currently used to characterize Black people were used earlier in Canadian history to characterize Irish and Eastern European immigrants. Current stereotypes about Black youth are also circulated and reinforced through media imagery. Manzo and Bailey's (2008) research on young Black and Mulatto offenders in Alberta described two types of Black stereotypes, the offenders recognized as imposed on them: the *gangsta* image, which characterized them as dangerous, defiant and criminal, and the entertainer image, which characterized them as athletic or musically and theatrically talented. As one respondent described it, "because I'm black, everyone looks at you like...a *gangsta*, playa, baller, right. I don't look at myself like that, but everyone else calls me that, like 'What's up, thug?'.... They look at you and if you're not that then you are not popular, you are not really black" (Manzo and Bailey, 2008).

Prejudice and Racism



Figure 11.8 A Ku Klux Klan cross-burning ceremony in London, Ontario, Canada in late 1925. The KKK is a White supremacist group that originated in the post-Civil War United States, but enjoyed considerable popularity in Canada in the 1920s. In Saskatchewan, it enlisted 40,000 members and was instrumental in the defeat of the Liberal government in provincial elections in 1929 (Pitsula, 2014). (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Prejudice refers to negative beliefs, thoughts, feelings, and attitudes that someone holds about a group. It is a personal disposition or attitude although often shared collectively. If, despite evidence to the contrary, a person rigidly maintains negative beliefs and opinions about that groups, then that person is prejudiced. As such, prejudice is not based on experience; instead, it is a prejudgment originating outside of actual experience. **Racism** is a type of prejudice used to justify the belief that one racial category is somehow superior or inferior to others. White supremacist groups are examples of racist organizations; their members' belief in **White supremacy** – the doctrine that non-White groups are inferior and that racial discrimination, segregation, and domination is justified – was the basis of African American slavery and has encouraged hate crimes and hate speech for over a century in North America.

Discrimination

While prejudice refers to biased *thinking* or *attitudes*, discrimination consists of biased *actions* against a group of people. It is the unequal treatment of others based on their perceived or actual membership in a group. Discrimination can be based on age, religion, health, and other indicators, but when it is based on stereotypes about race or ethnicity, it can be defined as **racism** or **ethnocentrism**, respectfully.


Discrimination based on race or ethnicity can take many forms, from unfair housing practices to biased hiring systems. An example of racial discrimination is **racial steering**, in which real estate agents direct prospective homeowners toward or away from certain neighbourhoods based on their race. Overt discrimination has long been part of Canadian history. Discrimination against Jews was typical until the 1950s. McGill University imposed quotas on the admission of Jewish students in 1920, a practice which continued in its medical faculty until the 1960s. As evident in the Nova Scotia case of Viola Desmond (see [Chapter 7. Groups and Organizations](#)), Canada also had its own version of American Jim Crow laws, which designated “Whites only” areas in cinemas, public transportation, workplaces, etc. Both Ontario and Nova Scotia had racially segregated schools. It is interesting to note that while Viola Desmond was prosecuted for sitting in a Whites only section of the cinema in Glasgow, Nova Scotia, she was in fact of mixed-race descent as her mother was White (Backhouse, 1994). These practices are unacceptable in Canada today.

Race-based discrimination and anti-discrimination laws strive to address this set of social problems. However, discrimination cannot be erased from our culture just by enacting laws to abolish it. Even if a magic pill managed to eradicate racism from each individual's psyche, societal structures would maintain it. Sociologist Émile Durkheim (1895) would call racism “a social fact,” meaning it does not require the intentional action of individuals to continue. The reasons for this are complex and relate to the way educational, criminal justice, economic, and political systems are historically structured by racial distinctions. **Systemic racism** refers to the idea that there are numerous overlapping structures of discrimination embedded within and between organizations and institutions, which mutually reinforce unequal race-based distinctions and outcomes regardless of the personal attitudes of individual actors. As opposed to **institutional racism** within specific institutions (see below), systemic racism emphasizes how racial discrimination

within specific organizations and institutions, often unacknowledged, is reinforced by racial discrimination within other organizations and institutions (i.e., it is systemic across a society).

Prejudice and discrimination can overlap and intersect in many ways. To illustrate, here are four examples of how prejudice and discrimination interact. *Unprejudiced non-discriminators* are open-minded, tolerant, and accepting individuals. *Unprejudiced discriminators* might be those who, unthinkingly, practice racism in their workplace by not considering racialized minorities for certain positions that are traditionally held by Whites. *Prejudiced non-discriminators* are those who hold racist beliefs but do not act on them, such as a racist store owner who serves minority customers. *Prejudiced discriminators* include those who actively make disparaging remarks about others or perpetuate hate crimes.

White Privilege

A quote about White Privilege on a teal background. The text is in a light blue, serif font. The quote is: "Friendly reminder that White Privilege doesn't mean your life isn't hard, can't be hard, or was never hard... It means the colour of your skin will never be a factor in what's causing your difficulties." Below the quote, the author's name and Twitter handle are listed in a smaller, white, sans-serif font.

“Friendly reminder that White Privilege doesn't mean your life isn't hard, can't be hard, or was never hard... It means the colour of your skin will never be a factor in what's causing your difficulties.”

-Indygo Arscott

known on Twitter as Decolonize Schools, @decolonizeont

Figure 11.9 Tweeting out about White privilege. (Photo courtesy of Ken Whytock/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

Discrimination can also involve the promotion of a group's status, such as occurs with White privilege. While most White people are willing to admit that people of colour live with a set of disadvantages due to the colour of their skin, very few White people are willing to acknowledge the benefits they receive simply by being White. **White privilege** is defined by Derald Wing Sue (2015) as “the unearned advantages and benefits that accrue to White folks by virtue of a system normed on the experiences, values, and perceptions of their group.” In other words, the norms that White people have defined for themselves and others make their privilege within a system of inequality difficult for them to recognize as such. In everything from relationships to authorities, to job opportunities, to simply walking in public areas, it seems that their advantages and benefits in society are natural, or even earned. They do not see or experience the barriers or disadvantages that others confront as a matter of course.

However, as Sue continues:

White privilege (a) automatically confers dominance to one group, while subordinating groups of colour in a descending relational hierarchy, (b) owes its existence to White supremacy, (c) is premised on the mistaken notion of individual meritocracy and deservingness (hard work, family values, etc.) rather than favouritism, (d) is deeply embedded in the structural, systemic, and cultural workings of U.S. [and Canadian] society, and (e) operates within an invisible veil of unspoken and protected secrecy (Sue, 2015).

Like the heated reactions to the breaching experiments conducted by Garfinkel and his students (see [Chapter 3. Culture](#)), getting individuals to think about these sorts of privilege can be challenging because they are supported by an unspoken system of norms that even well meaning people do not want to think about. Failure to recognize this “normality” as race-based is an example of a dominant group’s often unconscious racism.

Institutional Racism

Discrimination also manifests in different ways. The illustrations above are examples of individual discrimination, but other types exist. Institutional discrimination or **institutional racism** is when a societal institution has developed with an embedded disenfranchisement of a group, such as Canadian immigration policies that imposed “head taxes” on Chinese immigrants in 1886 and 1904. Institutional racism refers to the way in which racial distinctions are used to organize the policy and practice of state, judicial, economic, and educational institutions. As a result these distinctions systematically reproduce inequalities along racial lines. They define what people can and cannot do based on racial characteristics. It is not necessarily the intention of these institutions to reproduce inequality, nor of the individuals who work in the institutions. Rather, inequality is the outcome of patterns of differential treatment based on racial or ethnic categorizations of people.

Clear examples of institutional racism in Canada can be seen in the Indian Act and immigration policy, as already noted. The residential school system for Indigenous children is another example that provided different types of education for Indigenous and non-Indigenous children. Similarly, as described below, the effects of institutional racism can be observed in the structures that reproduce income inequality for visible minorities and Indigenous Canadians. This can be seen in the racialized characteristics of the economy. Although labour participation rates are similar for racialized and non-racialized individuals, unemployment for racialized men, (and even more so for racialized women), is much higher than for their non-racialized counterparts. Moreover, income levels for racialized Canadians are much lower than for non-racialized Canadians (Block and Galabuzi, 2011). These substantial, statistically significant differences between racialized and non-racialized Canadians indicate that economic institutions in Canada are systematically structured on the basis of racialized differences in the workforce rather than on the basis of individual qualities of workers or individual acts of prejudice of employers.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

The Residential School System



Figure 11.10 St. Joseph's Mission residential school near Williams Lake, B.C., circa 1890. (Photo courtesy of Library Archives/Flickr.)

In 2021, the Tk'emlúps te Secwépemc First Nation near Kamloops, BC, announced the discovery of the remains of 215 children in unmarked graves on the grounds of the former Kamloops Indian Residential School. This, and other ground penetrating radar surveys at residential schools across Canada, have confirmed what residential school survivors have said for years—that many Indigenous children who were removed from their families and forced to attend the schools never returned. Survivors witnessed abuse and the deaths of children. They described how these children just “disappeared.” The National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation has documented 4,118 children who died at residential schools but the actual number is expected to be greater than that (Deer, 2021).

The residential school system was set up in the 19th century to educate and assimilate Indigenous children into European culture. From 1883 until 1996, over 150,000 Indigenous, Inuit, and Métis children were forcibly separated from their parents and their cultural traditions and sent to missionary-run residential schools. In the schools, they received substandard education and many were subject to neglect, disease, and abuse. Many children did not see their parents again, and thousands of children died at the

schools. When they did return home they found it difficult to fit in. They had not learned the skills needed for life on reserves and had also been taught to be ashamed of their cultural heritage. Because the education at the residential schools was inferior they also had difficulty fitting into non-Indigenous society.

The residential school system was part of a system of **institutional racism** because it was established on the basis of a distinction between the educational needs of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. In introducing the policy to the House of Commons in 1883, Public Works Minister Hector Langevin argued, “In order to educate the children properly we must separate them from their families. Some people may say that this is hard but if we want to civilize them we must do that” (as cited in Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2012, p. 5). The sad legacy of this “civilizing” mission has been several generations of severely disrupted Indigenous families and communities; the loss of Indigenous languages and cultural heritage; and the neglect, abuse, and traumatization of thousands of Indigenous children and parents. As the Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded, the residential school system constituted a systematic assault on Indigenous families, children, and cultures in Canada. Some have likened the policy and its aftermath to a cultural genocide (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2012).

While the last of the residential schools closed in 1996, the problem of Indigenous education remains grave, with 40% of all Indigenous people aged 20 to 24 having no high school diploma (61% of on-reserve Indigenous people), compared to 13% of non-Indigenous (Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, 2010). The impact of generations of children being removed from their homes to be educated in an underfunded and frequently abusive residential school system has been “joblessness, poverty, family violence, drug and alcohol abuse, family breakdown, sexual abuse, prostitution, homelessness, high rates of imprisonment, and early death” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2012). Even with the public apology to residential school survivors and the inauguration of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2008, the federal government, and the interests it represents, continue to refuse basic Indigenous claims to title, self-determination, and control over their lands and resources.

Income Inequality among Racialized Canadians



Figure 11.11 Rastafarian in Toronto, Kensington Market, 2012. (Photo courtesy of Eric Parker/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

The effects of institutional racism are visible in the structures that reproduce income inequality for visible minorities or racialized Canadians. As discussed in [Chapter 9. Social Inequality](#), race and ethnicity are the basis of **ascribed status**, a status one receives by virtue of being born into a category or group, as opposed to **achieved status**, a status one receives through individual effort or merits. In a society like Canada, which is based on formal **equality of opportunity** or meritocracy, race should not be a barrier to equality and social mobility. The evidence shows otherwise however.

In 2015, the median income of Registered Indians living on reserve was *less than half* that of the non-Indigenous population (\$20,357/yr. vs. \$42,930/yr.), whereas Registered Indians living off reserve, Non-Status Indians, and Inuit had median incomes between 75% and 80% of the non-Indigenous population median income (Department of Indigenous Services, 2020). In 2015, the rates of poverty (using the after tax Low-Income Measure) for Registered Indians living on reserve were at 47.7%, Registered Indians living off reserve were 30.3%, Non-Status Indians were 25.2%, and Inuit were 22.3%, whereas the rates for non-Indigenous, non-racialized individuals were 13.8%. Rates of poverty for Indigenous people declined between 2005 and 2015, but in some areas of the country like Saskatchewan and Manitoba poverty rates stood at between 60% and 40% for on reserve, off reserve and

non-status Indigenous people.

Institutional racism is also deeply problematic for other visible minorities. In 2016, racialized individuals made up 22% of the Canadian population, up from 16% in 2006, and less than 5% in the 1980s (Block, Galabuzi, & Tranjan, 2019). By 2031, this figure is expected to be 32% (Block & Galabuzi, 2011). In 2016, of these 7.7 million individuals:

- 25.1% were South Asian
- 20.5% were Chinese
- 15.6% were Black
- 10.2% were Filipino
- 6.8% were Arab
- 5.8% were Latin American
- 4.1% were South East Asian (Block, Galabuzi, & Tranjan, 2019)

While labour *participation* rates in the economy (i.e., employed or actively looking for work) were higher for racialized than non-racialized individuals, racialized individuals were 20% more likely to be unemployed than non-racialized individuals in 2016 (Block, Galabuzi, & Tranjan, 2019). The racialized population had an unemployment rate of 9.2% compared to the non-racialized rate of 7.3%. This gap was highest between racialized women whose unemployment rate was 9.6% compared to non-racialized women at 6.4%, but racialized men were also unemployed at a higher rate than non-racialized men (8.8% compared to 8.2% respectively). Moreover, racialized men earned only 78% of the income that non-racialized men earn, and racialized women only 59%, because they tend to find work in insecure, temporary, and low paying jobs like call centres, security services, and janitorial services. Those identifying as Chinese men and

women earned 87% and 66% respectively of the income of non-racialized Canadian men; South Asians 83% and 57%; and Filipinos, Latin Americans, and Arabs approximately 75% and 52% (60% for Filipino women). Black men and women earned 66% and 56% of the income of non-racialized men. These figures were more or less unchanged between 2006 and 2016.

Some people suggest that these inequalities are less to do with race as an ascribed status and more to do with immigration status. It stands to reason that the percentage of racialized individuals is highest among recent immigrants and therefore it will take a generation to catch up with native born Canadians. However, according to Block, Galabuzi, & Tranjan (2019), these inequalities in income are not simply the effect of the time it takes immigrants to integrate into the society and economy. Table 11.2 (below) shows how the income inequality between racialized and non-racialized individuals remains substantial even into the third generation of immigrants.

Table 11.2. Average Employment Income for Racialized and Non-Racialized Canadians by Generation in 2016 (Block, Galabuzi, & Tranjan, 2019)

Generation	Racialized Men	Racialized Women	Non-Racialized Men	Non-Racialized Women	Earnings Gap (%) with Non-racialized men vs Men	Earnings gap (%) with Non-racialized men vs. Women
1st Generation	\$49,786	\$36,127	\$69,838	\$45,803	71%	52%
2nd Generation	\$60,039	\$48,713	\$75,582	\$50,590	79%	64%
3rd or more Generation	\$60,399	\$42,904	\$66,208	\$44,698	91%	65%

Source: [Average Employment Income for Racialized and Non-racialized Canadians by generation in 2016](#) [modified], from Block and Galabuzi and Tranjan (2019) [Original data source: 2016 Census of Population, Statistics Canada, Catalogue Number [98-400-X2016210](#) and Block, et al. (2019) calculations. [Open Government License](#)

The question concerning racial and ethnic inequality therefore remains a sociological problem. How can sociologists draw on the different paradigm of sociological explanation to provide insight into the sources and nature of racism, prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination? Is more than one theory needed? Which of the sociological frameworks makes the most sense, and why?

Media Attributions

- **Figure 11.8** [A Ku Klux Klan cross-burning ceremony in London, Ontario, Canada in late 1925](#) by the *Toronto Star* is in the [public domain](#).
- **Figure 11.9** Quotation: “Friendly reminder that White Privilege doesn’t mean your life isn’t hard...” by Ken Whytock, via Flickr, is used under a [CC BY-NC 2.0](#) licence.
- **Figure 11.10** [Class of Mi’kmaq \(Micmac\) girls taken in the Shubenacadie Residential School, Shubenacadie, Nova Scotia, 1929](#) by Library Archives, via Flickr, is used under [CC BY 2.0](#) licence.
- **Figure 11.11** [Marijuana Shop](#) by Eric Parker, via Flickr, is used under [CC BY-NC 2.0](#) licence.

11.3 Theories of Race and Ethnicity

Theoretical Perspectives

Issues of inequality and discrimination based on race and ethnicity can be observed through the paradigms of positivism, critical sociology and interpretive sociology. As discussed throughout this textbook, the choice of perspective affects the type of analysis sociologists can provide.

Positivism




Figure 11.12 Blumenbach's five races. Five skulls labelled *Tungusae*, *Caribaei*, *Feminae Georgianae*, *O-taheitae*, and *Aethiopissae* serving as specimens for Blumenbach's Mongolian, American, Caucasian, Malayan and Aethiopian races. (Image courtesy of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

In the framework of positivism, race and ethnicity are regarded as social facts, that is, they are observed, examined and explained as measurable *variables* independently of historical context, power relations, or subjective experiences. Early positivist approaches to race and ethnicity sought biological determinist explanations of racial differences, often based on using hereditary physiological characteristics such as skin colour, skull shape, and facial or skeletal features to categorize people into biological races and then to predict characteristics of behaviour, intelligence, ability, personality and social forms from these. More recent biological determinist arguments, such as Murray and Herrnstein's *The Bell Curve* (1994), attempt to link race and intelligence genetically by showing that “Blacks” (Murray and Herrnstein, 1994; Sarich and Miele, 2004) and “Hispanics” (Richwine, 2009) score lower on IQ tests than “Whites.” These studies are deeply flawed because they are unable to define their key variable, “race,” genetically, (see discussion of race and genetics above), and rely on *social* attributions of race to make their *biological* argument. They also mistake IQ tests as measures of innate mental ability, when these have shown to vary based on socio-economic status as well as the specific skill sets they test (Turkheimer et al., 2003). Nevertheless, as a type of positivist knowledge, they are still used to advocate certain courses of action in public policy decision making, from limiting immigration of racialized groups to

reducing funding for educational programs and social supports in marginalized communities (Murray and Herrnstein, 1994; Richwine, 2009).

However, positivist approaches can also describe racial and ethnic differences based on sociological variables. For example, racial minorities are overrepresented in the criminal justice system (see [Chapter 7. Groups and Organizations](#)). Statistics can be used to determine whether this is due to biological or social differences. In fact, the research indicates that when social variables like socio-economic status are controlled for, the impact of race on crime rates diminishes or disappears (Wortley, 1999). Blau and Blau's (1982) study of the data showed that the high rates of violent crime among Blacks in American cities had nothing to do with biological characteristics, but was an expression of social inequalities between Blacks and Whites. Specifically they showed that neither poverty (on its own), nor region, nor racial characteristics could strongly account for rates of violent crime when the index of inequality was controlled for. In other words, the degree of socio-economic inequality within a jurisdiction accounted for the variability of crime rates. Other studies (Roberts and Gabor, 1990) have shown that crime rates among Blacks are much higher in the United States than they are in Africa, again indicating the social rather than biological dimension of the issue. When social variables can be identified as the cause of racial differences in crime rates, poverty and IQ tests, a different set of policy options opens up.

Within the positivist framework, structural functionalists generate explanations of racial differences in terms of their role in maintaining social order. One plausible argument is that racial and ethnic inequalities must have served an important function in order to exist for as long as they have. This argument, of course, is problematic. How can racism and discrimination contribute positively to the social order of society? Sociologists who adhere to the functionalist view argue that racism and discrimination *do* contribute positively, but only to the dominant group. Historically, it has indeed served dominant groups well to discriminate against subordinate groups. Slavery was beneficial to slaveholders; racialized labour is cheaper and provides competitive market advantages for employers. Holding racist views can benefit those who want to deny rights and privileges to people they view as inferior to them, but over time, racism harms society and becomes dysfunctional. Outcomes of race-based disenfranchisement — such as poverty levels, crime rates, and discrepancies in employment and education opportunities — illustrate the long-term (and clearly negative) results of colonialism and racism in Canadian society.

Apart from the issues of race, ethnicity, and social inequality, the close ties of ethnic and racial membership can be seen to serve some positive functions even if they lead to the formation of ethnic and racial enclaves or ghettos. The close ties promote group cohesion, which can have economic benefits. For example, recent immigrants can find race and ethnicity to be a ready-made source of belonging. This allows them to use community contacts to find their footing in a new society and pursue employment. They can also have political benefits in the form of political mobilization for group recognition, services, or resources by different communities. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Indigenous residential school survivors or the policy of multiculturalism are examples. Finally, the close ties of racial or ethnic groups also provide cultural familiarity, positive reinforcement and emotional support for individuals who might otherwise feel alienated by or discriminated against by the dominant society.

Critical Sociology

Critical sociological theories are often applied to inequalities of gender, social class, education, race, and ethnicity. They generally take a macro or global level, historical approach to understanding the formation of relations of power based on ethnicity and race. They aim to explain the social context in which particular experiences and disadvantages based on race or ethnicity are embedded. How did racial and ethnic inequality form in the first place, how does it structure society today, and in which direction is it going in the future?



Figure 11.13 David Laird, Lieutenant Governor of the North-West Territories, explaining the terms of Treaty #8, Fort Vermilion, (now in Alberta), 1899. The eleven numbered treaties signed between 1871 and 1921 created reserves in the prairie provinces and were key to the expansion of European settlement, the building of the Canadian National Railroad and the development of resource extraction. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

A critical sociology perspective of Canadian history would examine the numerous past and current struggles between the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) ruling class and racial and ethnic minorities (Porter, 1965), noting specific conflicts that have arisen when the dominant group perceived a threat from the minority group. Modern Canada itself can in fact be described as a product of **internal colonialism**. While Canada was originally a colony itself, the product of external colonialism, first by the French and then the English, it also adopted colonial techniques like the Indian Reservation system internally as it became an independent nation state. Internal colonialism refers to the process of uneven regional and social development by which a dominant group establishes its control over existing populations within a country. Typically it works by maintaining segregation among colonized subjects, which enables different geographical distributions of people, different wage and educational levels, and different occupational concentrations to form based on race or ethnicity. **Institutional racism**, discussed earlier in this chapter, is one means by which

this segregation and unequal treatment has been institutionally organized and perpetuated.

For critical sociology, addressing the issues that arise when race and ethnicity become the basis of social inequality is a central focus of any emancipatory project. They are often complex problems, however. Feminist sociologist Patricia Hill Collins (b. 1948) developed **intersection theory** to analyze the combined effects of race, class, gender, sexual orientation, disability and other attributes on inequality. Intersection theory proposes that these sources of inequality cannot be examined independently because they *compound* their effects (1990). When race is examined sociologically, it can be shown to provide advantages and disadvantages, but it is important to acknowledge the way racial inequality is influenced, for example, by gender, class or disability. Multiple layers of disadvantage intersect to create the way race is experienced.

For example, if sociologists want to understand the effects of discrimination, they must understand that the discrimination that affects a White woman because of her gender is very different from the layered discrimination that affects a poor Asian, Indigenous or Black woman, who is affected by stereotypes related to being poor, being a woman, and being part of a visible minority. In fact labour market discrimination is both gendered and racialized. Block, Galabuzi, and Tranjan (2019) show that in 2016, “Racialized women earned 59 cents for every dollar that non-racialized men earned, while non-racialized women earned 67 cents for every dollar that non-racialized men earned. Little progress was made in reducing this gap over the 10-year period [between 2006 and 2016].”

A relatively recent development in the formation of racial and ethnic difference and inequality has been the prominence of *identity* and identity politics as ways in which people understand themselves, as opposed to the universal properties of “humanity” that were the focus of earlier class struggles and civil or human rights movements. People increasingly define themselves less by what they *do* (for a living, etc.) and more by what they *are*, or what they imagine themselves to be. Manuel Castells (2010) defines **identity** as “the process by which a social actor recognizes itself and constructs meaning primarily on the basis of a given cultural Attribute or set of Attributes.” He contextualizes this historically in terms of the dramatic social transformations of globalization and technological advancement. As he puts it, “in such a world of uncontrolled, confusing change, people tend to regroup around primary identities.... In a world of global flows of wealth, power, and images, the search for identity, collective or individual, ascribed or constructed, becomes the fundamental source of social meaning.” As discussed earlier, race or ethnicity are sources of these cultural attributes, sometimes imposed on groups and sometimes chosen or actively invented. Either way, Castells argues that identity is “becoming the main, and sometimes the only, source of meaning in an historical period characterized by

widespread destructuring of organizations, delegitimation of institutions, fading away of major social movements, and ephemeral cultural expressions” (Castells, 2010).

Interpretive Sociology

Interpretive sociology focuses on how meanings are attributed to race and ethnicity. Race and ethnicity provide strong symbols as sources of identity. Interpretive sociologists propose that the symbols or representations of race, not the biology or genetics of race, are what lead to racism. The reality of race is therefore grounded in the meanings that individuals attach temporarily to their world. As such race relations are subject to continuous change. The question is, how do stable understandings of the meaning of race or ethnicity emerge?

Part of the answer has to do with the process of representation. Race and ethnicity acquire new meanings when they are re-presented in the form of discourses and imagery for collective consumption. **Representation** refers to the process by which meaning is produced and circulated in a society through the use of language, signs and images to stand in for, or re-present, things (Hall, 1997). In *The Imaginary Indian* (1992), Francis describes the representations of Indigenous people that emerged during the period of colonization and have continued to operate up until the present day. Through 19th century painting and photography, and later through travelling road shows and film, Indigenous people were alternately presented as a vanishing people — noble, romantic, ethnographic, exotic, but also childlike and gullible — and a lawless people — drunkards, brawlers, and sexually licentious. Similar types of representation have been used to characterize other minority groups in Canada. The Chinese, for example, were represented as a “yellow peril” or menace to Western Civilization and unsuitable for Canadian citizenship. JH Preston’s (1881) characterization was typical:

“Their civilization, such as it has been, is effete and worn out, and their intellect is of a low order, being confined to cunning, which we are told is the wisdom of the weak. They have the talent of imitation, but do not possess the inventive faculty. They never add to the little they will consent to learn” (J. Preston (1881), cited in Wang, 2006).

In the case of representing racialized and ethnic Others, a pattern of self/Other identifications and distinctions can be observed. The “normal” Western self is often assumed to be a bounded, independent, rational decision-making, reflexive agent, able to autonomously pursue their own goals. The non-Western self then becomes the opposite of these traits: unbounded, dependent, irrational, non-reflexive, unable to separate unique individuality from social role, and unable to independently pursue individual goals. Two versions of this that have existed in both the sociological literature and popular culture as products of colonialism are orientalism and primitivism. **Orientalism** is the practice of projecting a series of exotic characteristics onto “Asia,” “the East” or “the Orient” that are said to be the opposite of Western characteristics. Oriental culture is therefore represented as passive, static, ahistorical, secretive and despotic, while the oriental self is sensual, emotional, lethargic, rigid, irrational, and mysterious (Said, 1978). **Primitivism** is the similar practice of projecting “savagery” or premodern characteristics onto Indigenous and racialized peoples around the globe. Primitive cultures are represented as simple, timeless, collective, pre-scientific, ritualistic, fetishistic, bound by tradition, and ‘pure’ whereas the primitive self is instinctual, irrational, unindividuated, submerged in nature, sometimes “noble” and sometimes “childlike” (Diamond, 1969).



Figure 11.14 “The Heathen Chinee in British Columbia.” An 1879 cover of *Canadian Illustrated News* depicting Amor De Cosmos, Premier of British Columbia (1872–1882) deporting a Chinese merchant. Caption reads: “Why you sendee me offee?” “Because you can’t or won’t ‘assimilate’ with us.” “What is datee?” “You won’t drink whiskey and talk politics and vote like us” (Image courtesy of UBC Chung Collection.)

Minority groups have to contend with these representations in the formation of their identities. The process of identity formation can be seen as a way in which a stable understanding of self, others and place in society is established. However, as sociologists like Sen (2006) have observed, contemporary identity formation often involves navigating between numerous, sometimes divergent, identities and groups to which one belongs.

The same person can, for example, be a British citizen, of Malaysian origin, with Chinese racial characteristics, a stockbroker, a nonvegetarian, an asthmatic, a linguist, a bodybuilder, a poet, an opponent of abortion, a bird-watcher, an astrologer, and one who believes that God created Darwin to test the gullible (Sen, 2006).

This becomes more complicated with visible racial or ethnic characteristics. When one carries what Goffman (1963) calls a tribal **stigma** — a “mark” like skin colour which categorically distinguishes one from “the normals” — a whole set of social dynamics emerge to manage the effects of a discredited or “spoiled” identity. Stigma in this sense is an “attribute that is deeply discrediting.”

As Goffman points out:

an individual who might have been received easily in ordinary social intercourse possesses a trait that can obtrude itself upon attention and turn those of us whom he [or she] meets away from him, breaking the claim that his [or her] other attributes have on us. He [or she] possesses a stigma, an undesired differentness from what we had anticipated. (Goffman, 1963).

In other words, even though an individual might share many attributes of identity in common with the people with whom they are interacting, with a stigma these commonalities recede in significance and only the stigma comes to define the identity of the individual. Moreover, on the basis of this original “imperfection,” numerous other negative traits are imputed to the stigmatized person.



Figure 11.15 Auschwitz survivor Sam Rosenzweig displays his identification tattoo. “The Greeks, who were apparently strong on visual aids, originated the term stigma to refer to bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier. The signs were cut or burnt into the body and advertised that the bearer was a slave, a criminal, or a traitor—a blemished person, ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places” (Goffman, 1963). (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

In Goffman’s micro-level analysis, this places a complex set of tensions on social interaction and makes the process

of identity formation precarious. In normal company, the expectation is that everyone should be regarded as sharing the same status and be equally accepted. However the person with a racial or ethnic stigma is at the same time, and often unthinkingly, regarded by the others as “not quite human” and subject to various forms of discrimination. These are justified by informal “stigma-theories” that account for the person’s inferiority and the danger they represents. Therefore, in order to pass in ordinary company, the stigmatized person must try to “cheerfully and unselfconsciously accept himself [or herself] as essentially the same as normals, while at the same time he [or she] voluntarily withholds himself [or herself] from those situations in which normals would find it difficult to give lip service to their similar acceptance of him [or her]” (Goffman, 1963). The stigmatized individual has to somehow conceal or minimize their difference even though it is evident to everyone. As a result “shame becomes a central possibility, arising from the individual’s perception of one of his [or her] own attributes as being a defiling thing to possess” (Goffman, 1963).

Moving beyond the dynamics of face to face interaction, famed symbolic interactionist Herbert Blumer (1900–1987) suggested that explaining racial stigma and prejudice requires understanding the *collective processes* by which groups form racial images of themselves and others. Racial prejudice in society is less a matter of understanding the psychology of *individual* prejudice — a set of feelings that *individual* members of a group hold about another — and more a matter of understanding how a sense of group position and group identity vis-a-vis other groups is collectively defined. The dominant group is not so much concerned with the subordinate group *per se* but rather with establishing its *social position* with respect to the subordinate group. Racialized groups are “put in their place,” where they should stay. This jockeying for position among racial identities can not be explained from the point of view of the specific factors of psychology or personal experience that produce individual feelings of prejudice.

Similar to the concept of White privilege discussed earlier in the chapter, Blumer argues that four types of feeling characterize racial prejudice in the dominant group: “(1) a feeling of superiority, (2) a feeling that the subordinate race is intrinsically different and alien, (3) a feeling of proprietary claim to certain areas of privilege and advantage, and (4) a fear and suspicion that the subordinate race harbors designs on the prerogatives of the dominant race” (Blumer, 1958). The formation of these types of feeling is fundamentally a collective process. They give the dominant group a shared orientation and identity that is not given by the separate, individual feelings and views of its members.




Figure 11.16 Herbert Blumer (1900–1987) was an American sociologist who coined the term “symbolic interactionism” based on the work of GH Mead. (Photo courtesy of American Sociological Association.) Used with permission.

The key element of this process for Blumer is that it is based on the circulation of *abstractions* about racial groups as a whole — *the* Native Indians, *the* Chinese, *the* Jews, etc. — rather than on direct experiences or face to face interactions. Therefore even if an individual of a dominant group has never personally met a member of a subordinate group, they know where they stand with regard to them. Blumer draws four implications from this: (1) racialization and social positioning depend on collective processes in the public arena where representatives and agents of the dominant group are able to define subordinate groups in the abstract; (2) the definitions need to carry heightened significance to be effective, and therefore the importance of big events, like the widely circulated images of spectacular police violence against Blacks and the subsequent street protests, become central in the formation of racial images; (3) race prejudice does not emerge organically from a multitude of isolated experiences and attitudes, but under the impact of spokespersons and influencers with standing, prestige, and authority who hold public attention; (4) race prejudice is also a site of opportunity for strongly organized interest groups to promote their special interests and align them with the advantages already enjoyed by the dominant group. “Hence, [interest groups] may be vigorous in seeking to manufacture events to attract public attention and to set lines of issue in such a way as to

predetermine interpretations favourable to their interests” (Blumer, 1958).

Blumer concludes that race prejudice will become prevalent and impervious to change in societies where the social

order is rooted in the hierarchical social positioning of racial groups. He described the Black/White relationship in the southern United States as an example. In places where social positioning is not entrenched, race prejudice will be much more “variable and intermittent” (Blumer, 1958). He felt that the Jew/Gentile relationship in post-WWII Western Europe and North America was an example. He argues that race prejudice and social positioning are only kept alive when influential spokespersons and elites perpetuate strong racial images and narratives. Where significance is withdrawn from racial imagery in public discourse, or where discourses of racial harmony dominate, racial prejudice tends to diminish.

Media Attributions

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- **Figure 11.16** [Herbert Blumer](#) from the American Sociological Association. Used with permission.

11.4. Intergroup Relations and the Management of Diversity

Throughout Western history intergroup relations (relationships between different groups of people) have been subject to different strategies for the management of diversity. The problem of management arises when differences between different peoples are regarded as so insurmountable that it is believed they cannot easily coincide or cohabit with one another. A **strategy for the management of diversity** refers to the systematic methods used to resolve conflicts, or potential conflicts, between groups that arise based on perceived differences. How can the unity of the self-group or political community be attained in the face of the divisive presence of non-selves or *others*?

As Richard Day (b. 1964) describes it, the template for the problem of diversity was laid down at least as early as the works of the ancient Greeks Herodotus, Plato, and Aristotle: “the division of human individuals into groupable ‘types,’ the arrangement of these types into a hierarchy, the naming of some types as presenting a ‘problem,’ and the attempt to provide ‘solutions’ to the problem so constructed” (2000, p. 7). The solutions proposed to intergroup relations have ranged along a spectrum between tolerance and intolerance. The most tolerant form of intergroup relations might be multiculturalism, in which cultural distinctions are made between groups, but the groups are regarded to have equal standing in society. At the other end of the continuum are assimilation, expulsion, and even genocide — stark examples of intolerant intergroup relations.

Genocide

Genocide, the deliberate annihilation of a targeted (usually subordinate) group, is the most toxic intergroup relationship. Historically, genocide has included both the intent to exterminate a group and the act of exterminating of a group, intentional or not.

The most well-known case of genocide is Hitler’s attempt to exterminate the Jewish people in the first part of the 20th century. Also known as the Holocaust, the explicit goal of Hitler’s “Final Solution” was the eradication of European Jewry, as well as the decimation of other minority groups such as the Roma, people with disabilities, and homosexuals. With forced emigration, concentration camps, and mass executions in gas chambers, Hitler’s Nazi regime was responsible for the deaths of 12 million people, 6 million of whom were Jewish. Hitler’s intent was clear, and the high Jewish death toll certainly indicates that Hitler and his regime committed genocide. But how can genocide that is not so overt and deliberate be understood?



Figure 11.17 Portrait of Demasduit in 1819, a Beothuk woman captured and renamed “Mary March” by her captors. Demasduit died of tuberculosis in 1820. She was one of the last known Beothuk people. (Photo courtesy of Philip Henry Gosseis/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

During the European colonization of North America, some historians estimate that Indigenous populations dwindled from approximately 12 million people in the year 1500 to barely 237,000 by the year 1900 (Lewy, 2004). European settlers coerced Aboriginal people off their own lands, often causing thousands of deaths in forced removals, such as occurred in the Cherokee or Potawatomi Trail of Tears in the United States. Settlers also enslaved Aboriginal people and forced them to give up their religious and cultural practices. The Beothuk of Newfoundland were decimated in their encounter with Europeans in the 1700s through disease, violence and starvation after being forced inland from their traditional settlement at Red Indian Lake and Notre Dame Bay by settlers (Marshall, 1996). By the early 1800s they had ceased to exist as a nation; the last known Beothuk, Shawnadithit, dying in 1829.

But the major cause of Aboriginal death was neither slavery nor war nor forced removal: it was the introduction of European diseases and Aboriginal people's lack of immunity to them. Smallpox, diphtheria, tuberculosis and measles flourished among North American Aboriginal peoples, who had no exposure to the diseases and no ability to fight them. Quite simply, these diseases decimated them. How planned this genocide was remains a topic of contention. Some argue that the spread of disease was an unintended effect of conquest, while others believe it was intentional with rumours of smallpox-infected blankets being distributed as “gifts” to Aboriginal communities.

Importantly, genocide is not a just a historical concept, but one practiced in contemporary societies. In 1994, approximately 500,000 Tutsi, three quarters of the Tutsi population, were murdered by armed Hutu militias in Rwanda (Des Forges, 1999). Since 2003, ethnic and geographic conflicts in the Darfur region of Sudan have led to hundreds of thousands of deaths. As part of an ongoing land conflict, the Sudanese government and their state-sponsored Janjaweed militia have led a campaign of killing, forced displacement, and systematic rape of Darfuri people (Human Rights Watch, 2004). A treaty was signed in 2011 but an estimated 400,000 people have died due to violence, starvation and disease. In Myanmar (Burma), persecutions, rapes, assaults and killings of the Muslim Rohingya minority by the Myanmar military

since 2017 have lead to an estimated 25,000 dead and over 700,000 in exile in neighbouring Bangladesh (Habib, 2018; UN Human Rights Council, 2019).

Expulsion

Expulsion refers to a dominant group forcing a subordinate group to leave a certain area or country. As seen in the examples of the Holocaust and the Rohingya minority in Myanmar, expulsion can be a factor in genocide. However, it can also stand on its own as a destructive group interaction. Expulsion has often occurred historically with an ethnic or racial basis. The Great Expulsion of the French-speaking Acadians from Nova Scotia by the British beginning in 1755 is perhaps the most notorious case of the use of expulsion to manage the problem of diversity in Canada. The British conquest of Acadia (which included contemporary Nova Scotia and parts of New Brunswick, Quebec, and Maine) in 1710 created the problem of what to do with the French colonists who had been living there for 80 years. In the end, approximately three-quarters of the Acadian population were rounded up by British soldiers and loaded onto boats without regard for keeping families together. Many of them ended up in Spanish Louisiana where they formed the basis of contemporary Cajun culture.

On the West Coast, the War Measures Act was used in 1942 after the Japanese government's attack on Pearl Harbor to designate Japanese Canadians as enemy aliens and intern them in camps in the Slocan Valley in British Columbia, in southern Alberta, and elsewhere in Canada. Their property and possessions were sold to pay for their forced removal and internment. Over 22,000 Japanese Canadians (14,000 of whom were born in Canada) were held in these camps between 1941 and 1949, despite the fact that the RCMP and the Department of National Defence reported there was no evidence of collusion or espionage. In fact, many Japanese Canadians demonstrated their loyalty to Canada by serving in the Canadian military during the war. This was the largest mass movement of people in Canadian history. At the end of World War II, Japanese Canadians were obliged to settle east of the Rocky Mountains or face deportation to Japan. This ban only ended after 1949, four years after the war's end. In 1988, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney issued a formal apology for this expulsion, and compensation of \$21,000 was paid to each surviving internee.

Segregation

Segregation refers to the physical separation of two groups, particularly in residence, but also in workplace and social functions. It is important to distinguish between *de jure* segregation (segregation that is enforced by law) and *de facto* segregation (segregation that occurs without laws but because of other factors). A stark example of *de jure* segregation is the apartheid movement of South Africa, which existed from 1948 to 1994. Under apartheid, Black South Africans were stripped of their civil rights and forcibly relocated to areas that segregated them physically from their White compatriots. Only after decades of degradation, violent uprisings, and international advocacy was apartheid finally abolished.

De jure segregation occurred in the United States for many years after the Civil War. During this time, many former Confederate states passed "Jim Crow" laws that required segregated facilities for Blacks and Whites. These laws were codified in 1896's landmark Supreme Court case *Plessey v. Ferguson*, which stated that "separate but equal" facilities were constitutional. For the next five decades, Blacks were subjected to legalized discrimination, forced to live, work, and go to school in separate — but *unequal* — facilities. It was not until 1954 and the *Brown v. Board of Education* case that the Supreme Court declared that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal," thus ending *de jure* segregation in the United States.



Figure 11.18 In the “Jim Crow” South, it was legal to have “separate but equal” facilities for Blacks and Whites. (Photo courtesy of Library of Congress/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

De jure segregation was also a factor in Canada’s development. Although slavery ended in Canada in 1834, when Britain abolished slavery throughout the empire, the approximately 60,000 Blacks who arrived with the British Empire Loyalists following the American Revolution and through the “Underground Railroad” up until the end of the American Civil War, were subject to discrimination and differential treatment. Legislation in Ontario and Nova Scotia created racially segregated schools, while *de facto* segregation of Blacks was practiced in the workplace, restaurants, hotels, theatres, and swimming pools. Similarly, segregating laws were passed in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Ontario preventing Chinese- and Japanese-owned restaurants and laundries from hiring White women out of concern that the women would be corrupted (Mosher, 1998). The reserve system created through the treaty process with First Nations peoples can also be regarded as a form of *de jure* segregation. As was the case in the United States, *de jure* segregation (with the exception of the reserve system) was largely eliminated in Canada by the 1950s and 1960s.

De facto segregation, however, cannot be abolished by any court mandate. Segregation has existed throughout Canada, with different racial or ethnic groups often segregated by neighbourhood, borough, or parish. Various Chinatowns or Japantowns developed in Canadian cities in the 19th and 20th centuries. The community of Africville was a residentially and socially segregated Black enclave in Halifax established by escaped American slaves. As noted at the beginning of the chapter, some urban neighbourhoods like Richmond, Surrey, and Markham are home to high concentrations of Chinese and South Asians.

Sociologists use segregation indices to measure racial segregation of different races in different areas. The indices employ a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 is the most integrated and 100 is the least. In Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal, these indices were relatively high (2001 data) for visible minorities as a whole — over 40 — and higher for Chinese and South Asians — over 50 (Walks & Bourne, 2006). This means that 40% of either visible minorities or Whites, 50% of Chinese and South Asians or Whites, would have to move in order for each neighbourhood to have the same racial balance as the whole metro region. However, these indices are much lower than those observed in the United States for Black populations. In the New York metropolitan area, for instance, the Black-White segregation index was 79 for the years 2005–2009. This means that 79% of either Blacks or Whites would have to move in order for each neighbourhood to have the same racial balance as the whole metro region (Population Studies Center, 2010).

Assimilation

Assimilation describes the process by which a minority individual or group gives up its own identity by taking on the characteristics of the dominant culture. In Canada, assimilation was the policy adopted by the government with the Indian Act, which attempted to integrate the Indigenous population by Europeanizing them. Assimilation was also the policy for absorbing immigrants from different lands through the function of immigration.



Figure 11.19 Government advertisement in 1907 to encourage immigration and settlement of the western provinces. (Photo courtesy of Globe Printing Co./Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Canada is a settler nation. With the exception of Indigenous Canadians, all Canadians have immigrant ancestors. In the 20th century, there were three waves of immigration to Canada (Li, 1996). During the wheat boom from 1900 to the beginning of World War I, Canada recruited almost 3 million settlers from various parts of Europe, although many subsequently emigrated to the United States. For the two decades following World War II, another 3 million immigrants arrived (96% from Europe between 1946 and 1954, and 83% from Europe between 1954 and 1967). As described at the beginning of the chapter, the third wave of immigration following the change of the race-based immigration policy saw increasingly larger proportions of immigrants from non-European countries. Most immigrants are eventually absorbed into Canadian culture, although sometimes after facing extended periods of prejudice and discrimination. Assimilation

means the loss of the minority group's cultural identity as the people in that group become absorbed into the dominant culture, while there is minimal to no impact on the majority group's cultural identity.

Some assimilated groups may keep only symbolic tokens of their original ethnicity. For instance, many Irish Canadians may celebrate Saint Patrick's Day, many Hindu Canadians enjoy the Diwali festival, and many Chinese Canadians may celebrate Chinese New Year. However, for the rest of the year, other aspects of their originating culture may be forgotten.

Assimilation is considered the opposite of the "cultural mosaic" model understood by Canadian multiculturalism; rather than maintaining their own cultural flavour, subordinate cultures give up their own traditions in order to conform to their new environment. Cultural differences are erased. Assimilation is sometimes described as the American "melting pot" model, where differences "melt away," although ideally the melting pot model sees the combination of cultures resulting in a new culture entirely. Sociologists measure the degree to which immigrants have assimilated to a new culture with four benchmarks: socioeconomic status, spatial concentration, language assimilation, and intermarriage (Waters and Jimenez, 2005). When faced with racial and ethnic discrimination, it can be difficult for new immigrants to fully assimilate. Language assimilation, in particular, can be a formidable barrier, limiting employment and educational options and therefore constraining growth in socioeconomic status.

Multiculturalism

In the government document, *Multiculturalism: Being Canadian*, **multiculturalism** is defined as "the recognition of the cultural and racial diversity of Canada and of the equality of Canadians of all origins" (as cited in Day, 2000). It is represented in Canada by the metaphor of the *mosaic*, which suggests that in a multicultural society each ethnic or racial group preserves its unique cultural traits while together contributing to national unity. Each culture is equally important within the mosaic. There is a great mixture of different cultures where each culture retains its own identity and yet adds to the colour and configuration of the whole. The ideal of multiculturalism is characterized by mutual respect on the part of all cultures, both dominant and subordinate, creating a polyethnic environment of mutual tolerance and acceptance.



Figure 11.20 The Monument to Multiculturalism (1985) by Francesco Pirelli, in front of Union Station, Toronto (Courtesy of Paul (dex) from Toronto/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

As a strategy for managing diversity, Canada was the first country to adopt an official multicultural policy. In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau implemented both a policy of official bilingualism (both French and English would be the languages of the state) and a policy of multiculturalism. The multicultural policy was designed to assist the different cultural groups in Canada to preserve their heritage, overcome cultural barriers to participation in Canadian society, and exchange with other cultural groups in order to contribute to national unity (Ujimoto, 2000). Critics argue that Trudeau's motives were more oriented to undermining the Québécois separatist movement and winning the votes of urban ethnic communities than distributing more power to ethnic communities (Li, 1996). However, as a result of this policy initiative, multiculturalism was enshrined in the Canadian Constitution in 1982 and in the Multiculturalism Act of 1988 as a fundamental principle of Canadian society. The result is a mechanism, stated in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, that obliges Canadian law and federal institutions to operate "in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians" (as cited in Li, 1996).

Whereas constitutional democracies like Canada are typically based on the protection of individual rights, multiculturalism implies that the protection of cultural difference also depends on protecting **group-specific rights** or group-differentiated rights (i.e., rights conferred on individuals by virtue of their membership in a group). Kymlicka notes that there are three different ways that the principle of multicultural group-specific rights can be conceived: (1) as *self-government rights* in which culturally distinct nations within a society attain some degree of political autonomy and self-determination to ensure their survival and development as unique peoples; (2) as *polyethnic rights* in which culturally distinct groups are able to express their particular cultural beliefs and practices without being discriminated against, and (3) as *special representation rights* in which the systematic underrepresentation of minorities in the political process is addressed by some form of proportional representation (e.g., reserving a certain number of parliamentary seats for specific ethnic minorities or language groups) (Kymlicka, 1995). While multicultural policy in Canada has generally been implemented on the basis of polyethnic rights, self-government rights have been a key part of Quebecois and First Nations' claims, and special representation rights have also occasionally been proposed, as was the case for First Nations during the Charlottetown Accord debate in 1992.



Figure 11.21 Baltej Singh Dhillon, RCMP graduation day in Regina, May 1990. (Photo used by permission of Baltej Singh Dhillon.)

While the outcome of Canadian multicultural policy has been the establishment of a generally accepted norm in which no culture takes precedence over any other in Canadian society, at least not in official practice, and all Canadians are recognized as "full and equal participants in Canadian society" (as stated in the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988), there have been a number of flashpoints in which the viability of the policy has been called into question. The case of whether Sikhs in the RCMP should be allowed to wear *dastaar* while in uniform was an early example. Although it seems trivial today, in 1990 many felt that the right of Sikhs to maintain their religious practice undermined a core and inviolable tradition of both the police force and Canada. As such, the case served as an emblem of a deeper fear about multiculturalism, namely that it would foster a dangerous fragmentation of an already fragile Canadian unity. In particular, new non-European immigrants were seen by some as too different and their demands for accommodation too disruptive to "Canadian" values and practices to sustain. Of course, similar claims about the unassimilable differences of immigrants from Ireland, eastern Europe, and southern Europe were made in earlier waves of immigration.

More recently a similar issue has played out in Quebec with respect to the Parti Québécois' Quebec Charter of Values, which sought to secularize government institutions by removing visible symbols of religious practice like the Sikh *dastaar*, Muslim *hijab*, or Jewish *kippah* from public service. In 2019, Bill 21, "An Act respecting the laicity of the State," was introduced by the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) government and passed by the National Assembly of Quebec. Civil service employees in positions

of authority, including teachers, crown prosecutors and police officers, are prohibited from wearing religious symbols, and people's faces are required to be uncovered when providing or receiving certain government services.

While the positive outcome of the multicultural policy is that the Canadian population remains remarkably accepting of diversity — the most accepting of all OECD countries in 2011 according to the Gallup World Poll (Conference Board of Canada, 2013) — issues around multiculturalism continually bring up the problem of **ethical relativism**, the idea that all cultures and all cultural practices have equal value (see [Chapter 3. Culture](#) for further discussion). In a fully multicultural society, what principles can be appealed to in order to resolve issues where different cultural beliefs or practices clash? Richard Day (2000) has argued that rather than resolving the problem of diversity, official multiculturalism has exacerbated it. “Far from achieving its goal, this state sponsored attempt to design a unified nation has paradoxically led to an increase in both the number of minority identities and in the amount of effort required to ‘manage’ them” (Day, 2000).

Hybridity

Hybridity is the process by which different racial and ethnic groups combine to create new or emergent cultural forms of life. Rather than a multicultural mosaic, where each culture preserves its unique traditions, or a melting pot, where cultures assimilate into the majority group, the hybrid combination of cultures results in a new culture entirely. The post-colonialist theorist Homi Bhabha (b. 1949) suggested that the mingling of formerly fixed cultural identities “open[s] up the possibility of a cultural hybridity that entertains difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy” (Bhabha, 1994). The contemporary cultures of the Caribbean, for example, are a mixture of European colonization, African roots, South Asian influences, and a New World setting that defies the imposition of a single cultural identity. Those things that are regarded as essentially Caribbean like the accents, racial blending, religious beliefs, spicy cuisines, and music have thoroughly diverse origins while being continuously reinvented (Hall, 1990).

As noted earlier in this chapter, intermarriage between people of different races or cultures creates new hybrid identities. The Métis were Canada's original hybrid culture (Day, 2000). More recently, Canadian culture has been home to numerous emergent cultural forms, some superficial and some profound, due to the intermingling of people from diverse backgrounds. From fusion cuisine to martial arts and yoga, from klezmer to reggae, and including alternative spiritual and healing practices, hybridity seems to capture some of the fluidity of contemporary Canadian culture. As the category of multiple ethnic origins by which people identify themselves grows, it is possible that the distinctions between ethnicities or between races that supported the “us versus them” narratives of earlier forms of racism and ethnocentrism might disappear all by themselves (Day, 2000).

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11.5. Race and Ethnicity in Canada

When colonists came to the New World, they found a land that did not need “discovering” since it was already occupied. While the first wave of immigrants came from Western Europe, eventually the bulk of people entering North America were from Northern Europe, then Eastern Europe, then Latin America and Asia. This does not include the forced immigration of African slaves. Most of these groups underwent a period of disenfranchisement in which they were relegated to the bottom of the social hierarchy before they managed (those who could) to achieve social mobility. Today, Canadian society is multicultural, in the sense of being socially and culturally diverse, although the extent to which multiculturalism, as a practice and belief in pluralism, is embraced varies. The many manifestations of diversity carry significant political repercussions as has been discussed throughout this chapter. The sections below describe how several groups became part of Canadian society, discuss each group’s history of intergroup relations, and assess each group’s status today.

Indigenous Canadians

The only non-immigrant ethnic group in Canada, Indigenous people were once the only human inhabitants of North America (numbering approximately 2.8 to 5.7 million north of Mexico (Koch et al., 2019)), but by 2011 they made up only 4.3% of the Canadian populace (Statistics Canada, 2013).

How and Why They Came

The earliest humans in Canada arrived millennia before European immigrants. Dates of the migration are debated with estimates ranging from between 130,000 and 12,000 BCE (Steeves, 2021). It is thought that people migrated to this new land from Asia in search of big game to hunt, which they found in huge herds of grazing herbivores in the Americas. Over the centuries and then the millennia, Indigenous cultures blossomed into an intricate web of hundreds of interconnected groups, each with its own customs, traditions, languages, and religions.

History of Intergroup Relations



Figure 11.22 Elders and Indigenous soldiers in the uniform of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in World War I. Seated in the middle is W. M. Graham, an ambitious official in the Department of Indian Affairs, whose career was focused on preventing Canadian Indians from “regressing” to their old traditions. To his mind ceremonial dancing was an unmitigated evil that only “demoralized the Indians” (Tittley, 1983). (Photo courtesy of Library and Archives Canada/PA-041366/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Indigenous cultures prior to European settlement are referred to as pre-contact or pre-Columbian: that is, prior to the coming of Christopher Columbus in 1492. Mistakenly believing that he had landed in the East Indies, Columbus named the Indigenous people “Indians,” a name that has persisted for centuries despite it being a geographical misnomer used to homogenously label over 500 distinct groups who have their own languages and traditions.

The history of intergroup relations between European colonists and Indigenous peoples is a brutal one that most Canadians are familiar with. As discussed in the section on genocide, the effect of European settlement was to nearly destroy the Indigenous population. Although Indigenous people’s lack of immunity to European diseases caused the most deaths, overt mistreatment by Europeans was equally devastating.



Figure 11.23 Nisga'a mask of a White man used for ceremonial purposes. From the Royal British Columbia Museum. (Photo courtesy of John Koetsier/Openverse.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 JP](#)

The history of Indigenous relations with Europeans in Canada since the 16th century can be described in four stages (Patterson, 1972). In the first stage, the relationship was largely mutually beneficial and profitable as the Europeans relied on Indigenous groups for knowledge, food, and supplies, whereas the Indigenous people traded for the products of European technologies. In the second stage, however, Indigenous people were increasingly drawn into the European-centred economy, coming to rely on fur trading for their livelihood rather than their own Indigenous economic activity. This resulted in diminishing autonomy and increasing subjugation economically, militarily, politically, and religiously. In the third stage, the reserve system was established, clearing the way for full-scale European colonization, resource exploitation, agriculture, and settlement. If Indigenous people tried to retain their stewardship of the land, Europeans fought them off with superior weapons. A key element of this issue is the Indigenous view of land and land ownership. Most First Nations cultures considered the Earth a living entity whose resources they stewarded. The concepts of private land ownership and

exploitation did not exist in Indigenous societies. The last stage of the relationship developed after World War II, when Indigenous Canadians began to mobilize politically to challenge the conditions of oppression and forced assimilation they had been subjected to. In this stage, Indigenous people developed political organizations and turned to the courts to fight for treaty rights and self-government.

A key turning point in Indigenous-European relations was the Royal Proclamation of 1763 which established British rule over the former French colonies, but also established that lands would be set aside for First Nations people. It legally established that First Nations had sovereign rights to their territory. Although these were often disputed, challenged, or ignored by the arriving waves of colonists, land speculators, and subsequent government administrations, they became the basis of contemporary treaty rights and negotiations.

The Indian Act of 1876 was another turning point. The Act attempted to codify and formalize the provisions of the Royal Proclamation and all other accumulated acts of government with respect to First Nations along the lines of a paternalistic “civilizing policy.” The care of the Indigenous population was placed under the control of the federal government until they were assimilated into European culture. In effect, discrimination against Indigenous Canadians was institutionalized in a series of provisions intended to subjugate them and keep them from gaining any power. The belief was that a separate act to govern Indigenous peoples would no longer be necessary once they had integrated into society. As the deputy superintendent of Indian Affairs said in 1920, “Our objective is to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic and there is no Indian question, and no Indian Department” (as cited in Leslie, 1978). Nevertheless the Indian Act became the most pervasive mechanism in Indigenous life, regulating and controlling everything from who could be defined as an Indian, to the reserve and band council system, to the types of Indigenous activities that would no longer be permitted (e.g., *potlatch* and ceremonial dancing).

Some of the most impactful provisions of the Indian Act (and its subsequent amendments) were:

- The prohibition against owning, acquiring, or “pre-empting” land
- The dismantling of traditional institutions of Indigenous government and the banning of ceremonial practices
- The imposition of the band council system, which was foreign to Indigenous tradition and powerless to make meaningful decisions without approval of the Department of Indian Affairs

- Denial of the power to allocate funds and resources
- The prohibition against hiring lawyers or seeking legal redress in pursuing land claims
- The denial of the right to vote municipally (until 1948), provincially (until 1949), and federally (until 1960) (Mathias & Yabsley, 1991)

Indigenous Canadian culture was further eroded by the establishment of residential schools in the late 19th century, as described earlier in this chapter. These schools, run by both Christian missionaries and the Canadian government, also had the express purpose of “civilizing” Indigenous Canadian children and assimilating them into European society. The residential schools were located off-reserve to ensure that children were separated from their families and culture. Schools forced children to cut their hair, speak English or French, and practice Christianity. Education in the schools was substandard, and physical and sexual abuses were rampant for decades; only in 1996 did the last of the residential schools close. Prime Minister Stephen Harper delivered an apology on behalf of the Canadian government in 2008. Many of the problems that Indigenous Canadians face today result from almost a century of traumatizing mistreatment at these residential schools.

Current Status

The eradication of Indigenous Canadian culture continued until the 1960s, when First Nations began to mobilize politically and intensify their demands for Indigenous rights. The Liberal government’s White Paper of 1969 became a focus of Indigenous protest as it proposed to eliminate the Indian Act, the Department of Indian Affairs, and the concept of Indigenous rights altogether. First Nations people would be treated just like everyone else, as if the sovereign treaties and centuries of oppression had not occurred. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau declared, “No society can be built on historical might-have-beens” (as cited in Weaver, 1981, p. 55). By the time of the repatriation of the Constitution in 1982, the government’s position had reversed and the status of Indians, Inuit, and Métis were recognized, as were existing Indigenous and treaty rights. The 1996 Nisga’a Treaty of the Nisga’a people of the Nass Valley in northern British Columbia is the first modern treaty in British Columbia. The comprehensive treaty provisions for the Nisga’a’s right to self-government and authority over lands and resources serve as a new model for First Nations–Crown relations in Canada.

However, First Nations people still suffer the effects of centuries of degradation. As noted earlier in the chapter, the income of Indigenous people in Canada is far lower than that of non-Indigenous people and rates of child poverty are much greater. Even though the last residential school closed in 1996, the problem of Indigenous education remains grave with 40% of all Indigenous people failing to complete high school. Long-term poverty, inadequate education, cultural dislocation, and high rates of unemployment contribute to Indigenous Canadian populations falling to the bottom of the economic spectrum. Indigenous Canadians also suffer disproportionately with poorer health outcomes and lower life expectancies than most groups in Canada.

The Québécois

Modern Canada was founded on the displacement of the Indigenous population by two colonizing nations: the French and the British. The French and the British were the two “charter groups” of Confederation and the British North America Act of 1867. The British North America Act (renamed the *Constitution Act*, 1867 in 1982) protected the linguistic, religious, and educational of the French and English in Quebec and Ontario, as well as the rest of the country. However,

the French were both colonized by the English and, by 1867, were a numerically smaller group, leading to a relationship of inequality that has been a prominent issue throughout Canada's history. Due to their linguistic and cultural isolation in English speaking North America, the Québécois —or “*les habitants*,” descendants of the original settlers from France — developed a unique ethnic identity, which became the basis of nationalist and sovereigntist aspirations during the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s.

How and Why They Came



Figure 11.24 Jacques Cartier made three voyages to map and establish short lived settlements on the Gulf of Saint Lawrence and the shores of the Saint Lawrence River. He named the area “The Country of Canadas” after the Iroquoian communities at today's Quebec City and Ile de Montreal, but claimed the territory for France. (Image courtesy of British American Bank Note Company/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

French colonists began to settle New France after Jacques Cartier's exploration of the St. Lawrence River in 1534. Permanent French settlements were established in Port Royal, Acadia (now Nova Scotia) in 1605, and Quebec City in 1608. By the time of the British conquest of Acadia in 1710 and the defeat of Montcalm's army in Quebec in 1760, there were approximately 60,000 French settlers. Most of the settlers could trace their origins to the northwest of France, particularly present-day Normandy. One estimate suggests that the Québécois descend from only 5,800 original immigrants from France who arrived between 1608 and 1760 (Marquis, 1923). The economy of New France was based on agriculture and the fur trade, but with the arrival of the British and especially the British Loyalists escaping the American Revolution in 1776, a pattern of British economic and financial domination emerged.

History of Intergroup Relations

The establishment of British rule in Canada was accomplished by **conquest**; that is, the forcible subjugation of territory and people by military action. Port Royal was ceded to the British in the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, and Quebec and Montreal in the Treaty of Paris of 1763. As noted earlier, after attempts at assimilating the French population, the conquest of Port Royal and Acadia led eventually to the Great Expulsion of 1755, in which a large portion of the Acadian French population was deported from Nova Scotia.

However, from the time of the Treaty of Paris onward, the British recognized the need to accommodate the French in Canada to avoid the problem of pacifying a large and hostile population. The Quebec Act of 1774 granted religious and linguistic rights to the French, and the Constitution Act of 1791 divided the province of Canada into Upper and Lower Canada, each with the power of self-government. The division of Canada into two founding charter groups — French and English — was further established by Confederation. The British North America Act (Constitution Act) of 1867 protected the religious, educational, and linguistic rights of the French and English in Canada. In addition, civil law in Quebec continued to be based on the French Napoleonic Code of 1804: the Civil Code of Lower Canada (1866).

Despite the notion that the two-founding-nations of Canadian Confederation were equal, English-speaking Canadians in Montreal held the positions of power in the economy. English was the language of commerce in Quebec. The French-speaking population in Quebec were largely rural, agricultural, and dominated by the Catholic Church until the mid-20th century. Although the Québécois achieved status as a new middle class of lawyers, doctors, administrators, politicians, scientists, and intellectuals, they were effectively barred from the upper echelons of the class system. English and French tended to live in what Canadian author Hugh MacLennan famously called “two solitudes.” This ethnic

stratification system began to be challenged during the period of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec in the 1960s when the control of the Catholic Church was challenged in the spheres of education, health, and welfare, and the long-standing politically reactionary Union Nationale government of Maurice Duplessis was defeated by Jean Lesage's Liberals. In the process of modernizing the state to address the new conditions of industrialization, urbanization, and continental capitalism, the Quebec independence movement emerged alongside an increasingly militant labour movement.

To address the emerging crisis of Canadian unity, the federal government appointed the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963. True to its name, the commission tried to address the grievances of the Québécois solely as cultural and linguistic matters. The report of the commission emphasized ways in which the equality of the two founding peoples could be recognized and led to the Official Languages Act of 1969. The Act recognized French and English as the two official languages in Canada and mandated that federal government services and the judicial system would be conducted in both languages. However, when a small terrorist group — the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) — kidnapped a provincial government minister and a British diplomat in 1970, the response of the federal government was to implement the War Measures Act, suspending the rights of Canadians from coast to coast and arresting and detaining hundreds of individuals without legal due process. The notion of equal partnership between French and English Canada was proven to be questionable at best.



Figure 11.25 St. Jean Baptiste Day, La Fête Nationale, celebrated in Quebec on June 24. (Photo courtesy of Francistremblay 18/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

In 1976, the Parti Québécois was elected as an explicitly separatist political party. It failed to get sufficient votes to separate from Canada in the provincial referendum on sovereignty in 1980, but the move to repatriate the constitution from Great Britain without the consent of Quebec in 1982 fueled nationalist sentiment. Subsequent attempts to include Quebec as a voluntary signatory to the Constitution failed in 1987 (the Meech Lake Accord) and 1992 (the Charlottetown Accord). Many people in Quebec regarded these failures as rejection of Quebec by the English majority in other parts of the country. In 1995 a second referendum on Quebec sovereignty was narrowly defeated by a vote of 50.5% to 49.5%. The history of intergroup relations between the French and English in Canada on the model of equal partnership has therefore proven to be a tenuous experiment in dual nationhood.

Current Status

A major component of the grievances between the French and English in Canada has been the social inequality of the French and English and the threat to Québécois linguistic and cultural survival. Income data from 1991 prior to the second referendum indicated that the income disparity between French and English Canadians both within and outside the province of Quebec had more or less disappeared, suggesting that the issues of intergroup relations had shifted to political, linguistic, and cultural alienation in Canada (Li, 1996).

Bill 101 or the Charter of the French Language was passed in 1977 in Quebec to protect the French language in Quebec. It defines French as the official language of Quebec, limits the use of English in commercial signs, and restricts who may enroll in English schools. Although it remains controversial, it appears to have been effective in preserving the French language. Linguistically, there were 8.1 million people who reported speaking French at home in 2016 compared to 7.9 million in 2006, although this represented a decline from 23.8% to 23.4% of the total population of Canada. (This is much lower than the 28 to 30% of population who claimed French origin in the first half of the 20th century, however). In Quebec, 75.1% of the population spoke *only French* at home in 2006 compared to 71.2% in 2016. This decline was paralleled by the decline in the proportion of the population who spoke only English at home in the rest of Canada from 77.1% to 72.2% between 2006 and 2016 (due to immigration). On the other hand, the number of people reporting that they were able to conduct conversation in both French and English increased by 420,495 to 6.2 million people between 2011 and 2016. Bilingualism was reported by 17.9% of the population, albeit largely in Quebec. In Quebec, 44.5% of people reported being able to conduct conversation in both English and French (Statistics Canada, 2012; Statistics Canada, 2017a; Statistics Canada, 2017b).

Black Canadians

As discussed in the section on race, the term “Black Canadian” is usually preferred to the term African Canadian. Many people with dark skin in Canada have roots in the Caribbean rather than being descendants of the African slaves from the United States. They see themselves ethnically as Caribbean Canadians. Further, actual immigrants from Africa may feel that they have more of a claim to the term “African Canadian” than those who are many generations removed from ancestors who originally came to this country. The commonality of Black Canadians is more a function of racism rather than origin.

How and Why They Came

The first Black Canadians were slaves brought to Canada by the French in the 17th century. It is reported that at least 6 of the 16 legislators in English Upper Canada also owned slaves (Mosher, 1998). The economic conditions in Canada were not conducive to slavery so the practice was not widespread. Nevertheless, it was not until 1834 that slavery was banned throughout the British Empire, including Canada. Canada became the terminus of the famous Underground Railroad, a secret network organized by American abolitionists to transport escaped slaves to freedom. Between the American Revolution in 1776 and the end of the American Civil War in 1865, Canada received approximately 60,000 runaway slaves and Black Empire Loyalists from the United States. It is estimated that 10% of the Empire Loyalists who came to Canada following the American Revolution were Black (Walker, 1980). Many Black Canadians returned to the United States after the Civil War, and by 1911 there were only about 17,000 left in Canada (Mosher, 1998).

After the change in immigration policy in the late 1960s, Blacks from the Caribbean and elsewhere began to immigrate to Canada in increasing numbers. Prior to 1971, Canadians of Black origin made up less than 1% of the population (Li,

1996). In the 2016 census, they made up 3.5% of the population and 15.6% of all visible minorities in the country. The Black population is highly urbanized, with 94.3% of Blacks lived in cities (compared to 71.2% of the whole population): 36.9% of Blacks lived in Toronto (down from 46.9% in 2001) and 22.6% in Montreal (making them the largest visible minority group in Montreal) (Statistics Canada, 2019a; 2019b). However Ottawa-Gatineau, Lethbridge and Moncton had the fastest growing Black populations between 1996 and 2016. It is interesting to note that among those who self-identified as Black in the 2016 census, 12% reported being both “White” and “Black.”

Blacks with origins in the Caribbean make up the largest proportion of Black Canadians with nearly 40% having Jamaican heritage and an additional 32% having heritage elsewhere in the Caribbean (Statistics Canada, 2007). Many Caribbean people come to Canada as part of the Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program or as domestic workers with temporary work permits, although the permanent Caribbean community in Canada has more or less the same higher education attainments and full-time employment rates as the rest of the population. Over time, the source of Black immigrants to Canada has shifted from the Caribbean to Africa. Before 1981 83.3% of Black immigrants were from the Caribbean, whereas 4.8% were from Africa. In 2016, 27.3% were from the Caribbean, whereas 65.1% were from Africa (Statistics Canada, 2019b). In particular, there has been an increase in immigration of Somalis from Africa as people fled conflict in the area. In the 2011 census, 4.4% of the Black population in Canada claimed Somali origin (Statistics Canada, 2013). Between 1988 and 1996, more than 55,000 Somali refugees arrived in Canada, representing the largest Black immigrant group ever to come to Canada in such a short time (Abdulle, 1999).

History of Intergroup Relations

Although slavery became illegal in Canada in 1834, Blacks did not effectively enjoy equal rights in Canada. Blacks had the same legal status as Whites in Canada, but strongly held prejudices and informal practices of segregation lead to pervasive discrimination against the escaping slaves and Black Empire Loyalists in the 19th century. Blacks could vote and sit on juries, but these rights were frequently challenged by White citizens. As noted earlier in this chapter, Ontario (outside of Toronto) and Nova Scotia enacted laws to segregate schools along racial lines that remained in effect until 1965 in Ontario and 1983 in Nova Scotia (Black History Canada, 2014).



Figure 11.26 *Sleeping Car Porter. One of the few occupations open to Black men in Canada in the first half of the 20th century was railway porter. Before the unionization of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters in Canada, Black porters worked long hours for lower wages than Whites, with few hours of sleep, and were not provided berths to sleep in. They faced racism from management and passengers (Foster 2019). (Photo courtesy of CRHA/Exporail, Canadian Pacific Railway Company Fonds). Used with Permission.*

Blacks were also segregated into residential neighbourhoods in Toronto, Hamilton, and Windsor (Mosher 1998). In Halifax, the community of Africville was set aside for Blacks as early as 1749, although most accounts place its establishment to the arrival of Black Loyalists after the War of 1812. It was considered a slum by city councillors and was bulldozed between 1965 and 1970 without meaningful consultation with its residents.

Blacks were also restricted by the type of occupations they could pursue. The employment of Blacks through the first half of the 20th century was typically limited to being domestic workers or railroad porters. For example, the father of Oscar Peterson, the famous jazz pianist, was a Canadian Pacific railroad porter in Montreal, while his mother was employed as a domestic worker (Library and Archives Canada, 2001). Otherwise, for most of the 20th century, Black Canadians were mostly employed in low-pay service jobs or as unskilled labour.

The story of a large group of Black immigrants who arrived in Victoria, British Columbia, from San Francisco in the 1850s, illustrates some of the ambiguities of the early Black experience in Canada. The Blacks were initially welcomed to the British colony by Governor Douglas, who assured them they would have full civic rights. Douglas and others were worried that the immigration of White Americans to Vancouver Island might lead to annexation by the United States and the arrival of several hundred Black immigrants would help to prevent that eventuality. There was also need for an industrious and reliable workforce and by 1858 the Black immigrants were fully employed. In 1859, an all-Black Victoria Pioneer Rifle Company was formed to fight in the “Pig War” dispute with the United States over

the San Juan Islands. The de facto leader of the Black immigrant group, Mifflin Gibbs (1823-1915), was a successful shopkeeper and prominent member of the community. He won a seat on city council in the wealthiest ward of the city, James Bay, and acted as temporary mayor for a time. He was also the Salt Spring Island representative to the Yale Convention where British Columbia’s terms for joining Confederation were drawn up.

On the other hand, tensions and discrimination began to develop between the Black and White communities. Schools were integrated and only one church was segregated. However a dispute over Black voting led to a racist campaign by future premier Amor de Cosmos. Blacks began to be denied access to some saloons and desired seating in theatres. An incident in 1860 involving a brawl that began when two Blacks were denied their legitimate entry into Victoria’s Colonial Theatre generated newspaper accounts that blamed the Blacks for causing trouble. As influential as Gibbs was, he was denied tickets to the retirement banquet of Governor Douglas, who had originally been a great supporter of the Black immigrants. By the time Gibbs returned to the United States in 1870, the end of slavery after the U.S. Civil War had already led to many of the Black community leaving Victoria. Without Gibbs’s presence, the Black community declined even further and eventually disappeared (Ruttan, 2014).




Figure 11.27 *Mifflin Wistar Gibbs (Photo courtesy of Library of Congress /LC-DIG-bellcm-12837/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)*

Current Status

Although formalized discrimination against Black Canadians has been outlawed, in many respects equity does not yet exist. The 2016 census shows that Black males earned 66 cents for every dollar a White male worker earned in Canada, or \$19,103 less on average per year. Black females earned 83 cents for every dollar a White female worker earned in Canada, or \$6347 less on average per year. In 2016, 23.9% of Blacks lived in poverty (compared to 12.2% of non-racialized individuals) (Block, Galabuzi & Tranjan, 2019). In addition Blacks are subject to greater degrees of *racial profiling* than other groups. Racial profiling refers to the practice of selecting specific racial groups for greater levels of criminal justice surveillance. Despite police denials, Wortley and Tanner's study confirms Black complaints in Toronto that they are more frequently stopped, questioned, and searched by the police for "driving while being Black" violations than other groups (2004).

Asian Canadians



Figure 11.28 A Chinese head tax receipt for \$500 issued on August 2, 1918. (Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Like many groups this section discusses, Asian Canadians represent a great diversity of cultures and backgrounds. The national and ethnic diversity of Asian Canadian immigration history is reflected in the variety of their experiences in joining Canadian society. Asian immigrants have come to Canada in waves, at different times, and for different reasons. The experience of a Japanese Canadian whose family has been in Canada for five generations will be drastically different from a Laotian Canadian who has only been in Canada for a few years. This section primarily discusses the experience of Chinese, Japanese, and South Asian immigrants.

How and Why They Came

The first Asian immigrants to come to Canada in the mid-19th century were Chinese. These immigrants were primarily men whose intention was to work for several years in order to earn incomes to support their families in China. Their first destination was the Fraser Canyon for the gold rush in 1858. Many of these Chinese came north from California. By 1860, British Columbia had an estimated population of 7,000 Chinese (out of a total population of approximately 51,000). The second major wave of Chinese immigration arrived in the 1880s for the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway when contractors recruited thousands of workers from Taiwan and Guangdong Province in China. Chinese labourers were paid approximately a third of what White, Black, and Indigenous workers were paid. Even so, they were used to complete the most difficult sections of track through the rugged Fraser Valley Canyon, living under squalid and dangerous conditions; 600 Chinese workers died during the construction of the rail line. Chinese men also engaged in other manual labour like mining, laundry, cooking, canning, and agricultural work. The work was gruelling and underpaid, but like many pioneering immigrants they persevered (Chan, 2013).



Figure 11.29 Japanese internment camp in British Columbia. (Photo courtesy of Jack Long/Library and Archives Canada/PA-142853/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Japanese immigration began in 1887 with the arrival of the first Japanese settler, Manzo Nagano. The Issei (first wave of Japanese immigrants) were, like the first Chinese immigrants, mostly men. They came from fishing and farming backgrounds in the southern Japanese islands of Kyushu and Honshu. They settled in Japantowns in Victoria and Vancouver, as well as in the Fraser Valley and small towns along the Pacific coast where they worked mostly in fishing, farming, and logging. Like the Chinese settlers, they were paid much less than workers from European backgrounds and were usually hired for menial labour or heavy agricultural work. With restrictions imposed on the immigration of

Japanese men after 1907, most of the early Japanese immigrants after 1907 were women, either the wives of Japanese immigrants or women betrothed to be married. By 1914, there were about 10,000 Japanese in Canada (Sunahara & Oikawa, 2011).

South Asians refer to a diverse group of people with different ethnic backgrounds in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The first South Asians in Canada were Sikhs whose origins were in the Punjab region of India. The first group of Sikhs arrived in Vancouver in 1904 from Hong Kong, attracted by stories of high wages from British Indian troops who had traveled through Canada the previous year (Buchignani, 2010). They were encouraged by Hong Kong-based agents of the Canadian Pacific Railway who had seen travel on their passenger liners plummet with the head tax imposed on Chinese immigration. Most of the first Sikhs in Canada arrived via Hong Kong or Malaysia, where the British had typically employed them as policemen, watchmen, and caretakers. They were originally from rural areas of Punjab and mortgaged their properties for passage with the prospect of sending money home. Many arrived in Canada unable to speak English but eventually found employment in mills, factories, the railway, and Okanagan orchards (Johnston, 1989). By 1908 there were over 5,000 South Asians in British Columbia, 90% of them Sikh. Many of them settled in Abbotsford (Buchignani, 2010).

History of Intergroup Relations

Asian Canadians were subject to particularly harsh racism in British Columbia and elsewhere in Canada in the 19th and 20th centuries. Based on orientalist stereotypes, they were not considered “suitable” for Canadian citizenship. The 1902 Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration declared that the Japanese and Chinese were “unfit for full citizenship. They are so nearly allied to a servile class that they are obnoxious to a free community and dangerous to the state” (CBC, 2001). The right of Asians to vote, own property, and seek employment, as well as their ability to immigrate and integrate into Canadian society were therefore severely restricted. The right to vote federally and provincially was denied to Chinese Canadians in 1874, Japanese Canadians in 1895, and South Asians in 1907. This disenfranchisement also prevented these groups from having access to political office, jury duty, professions like law, civil service jobs, underground mining jobs, and labour on public works because these all required being on provincial voters lists. Voting rights were only returned to Chinese and South Asian Canadians in 1947 and to Japanese Canadians in 1949, whereas immigration restrictions were not removed until the 1960s.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the immigration of Chinese workers to Canada, especially during the final stages of the building of Canadian Pacific Railway, led to increasing numbers of single Chinese men in the country who sought to bring their wives to join them. After the railway was completed, the imposition of “head taxes” of \$50 in 1885 and \$500 in 1903 were attempts to restrict Chinese immigration. As the Chinese workers were typically paid much lower wages than workers of European origin, various Asian exclusion leagues developed to press for further restrictions on Asian immigration. This led to riots in Vancouver in 1907 and eventually in 1923 to a complete ban on Chinese immigration.

For similar reasons, the immigration of Japanese men was restricted to 400 a year after 1907, and further reduced to 150 individuals a year after 1928. Their success in the fishing industry led the federal fisheries department to arbitrarily reduce Japanese trolling licences by one-third in 1922. They, like the Chinese, were also subject to “yellow peril” hysteria. When the Japanese, many veterans of the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, successfully defended their community against White supremacist mobs in the 1907 anti-Asian riots in Vancouver, they were accused of smuggling a secret army into Canada (Sunahara & Oikawa, 2011). An even uglier action was the establishment of Japanese internment camps of World War II, discussed earlier as an illustration of expulsion.




Figure 11.30 South Asians aboard the Komagata Maru in English Bay, Vancouver, in 1914. (Photo courtesy of Library and Archives Canada/Library and Archives Canada/PA-034014/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Of the three groups, South Asians were the most recent to arrive. However, by 1908 the large number of arrivals also led to the imposition of immigration restrictions. As the South Asians were British subjects, the restrictions took a more devious form, however. Immigrants from South Asia were obliged to possess at least \$200 on arrival (very challenging considering that in British India they might be able to earn 10 to 20 cents a day), and they had to arrive in Canada by continuous passage from India. The government then put pressure on steamship companies not to sell direct through-passage tickets from Indian ports. The famous incident of the freighter Komagata Maru in 1914 was a direct consequence of this restriction. The ship, carrying 376 South Asian immigrants, many of whom had boarded in Hong Kong, was prevented from docking and kept in isolation in Vancouver harbour for two months until forced to return to Asia. Only 20 of the 376 passengers were allowed to stay in Canada (Johnston, 1989).

Current Status

Asian Canadians certainly have been subject to their share of racial prejudice, despite their seemingly positive stereotype today as the model minority. The **model minority** stereotype is applied to a minority group that is seen as reaching significant educational, professional, and socioeconomic levels without challenging the existing establishment. In the 2006 census, those identifying as Japanese earned 120% of the income of White Canadians, Chinese 88.6%, and South Asians 83.3% (Block & Galabuzi, 2011).

This stereotype is typically applied to Asian groups in Canada, and it can result in unrealistic expectations, putting a stigma on members of this group that do not meet the expectations. Stereotyping all Asians as smart, industrious, and capable can also lead to a lack of much-needed government assistance and to educational and professional discrimination. Some critics speak of a “bamboo ceiling” when it comes to Asians reaching the highest echelons of corporate success. It has been difficult for Asian Canadians to overcome the stereotypes that they are passive, lack communication skills, are “techies,” or not “real” Canadians.



Figure 11.31 The dual pandemic of COVID-19 demonstrates the significance of Blumer's "big events" in the formation of racial images and narratives (Photo courtesy of Susan Jane Golding/ Openverse.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

The COVID-19 pandemic that began in 2020 has also been an event of renewed racism and xenophobia directed towards the Chinese and Asian community. Because of early reports that the pandemic began in a "wet market" in Wuhan, China, where wild animals were sold, the Chinese community has been blamed for the pandemic. US President Donald Trump referred to COVID-19 as the "Chinese virus," for example, and many of the old "yellow peril" narratives have been revived. "Asians continue to be viewed as foreigners whose cultural values and practices are not only incompatible with the North American way of life, but also threats to the health and well-being of Canadian people" (Lou et al., 2021). Lou et al.'s (2021) survey of 874 Chinese Canadians, revealed that between 57% and 61% of respondents reported being treated with disrespect due to their ethnic background and between 35% and 40% reported being

personally threatened or intimidated. Hate crimes against Chinese Canadians reported to the Vancouver police department increased by 717% in 2020 compared to 2019. As one of the survey participants described:

Walking on the streets and getting called an idiot by a lady. Hostile stares when walking on the streets, even with a mask on. Discriminatory remarks at work (e.g., during a PPE training, the instructor tells me to re-tie my ponytail into a bun to put a cap on, but adds "that's how Chinese girls spread the virus").

The COVID-19 pandemic has therefore been described as a *dual pandemic*: one based on the virus, which already disproportionately affects ethnic minorities' health and employment, the other based on racism.

Media Attributions

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Chapter 11 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

achieved status: A status received through individual effort or merits (e.g., occupation, educational level, moral character, etc.). **ancestry:** (in a biological usage) the connection between human variations and the historical-geographical origins of an individual or group's ancestors.

ascribed status: A status received by virtue of being born into a category or group (e.g., hereditary position, gender, race, etc.).

assimilation: The process by which a minority individual or group takes on the characteristics of the dominant culture.

BIPOC: Black, Indigenous, and People of Colour.

conquest: The forcible subjugation of territory and people by military action.

discrimination: Prejudiced action against a group of people.

dominant: Can be used interchangeably with the term majority.

dominant group: A group of people who have more power in a society than any of the subordinate groups.

equality of opportunity: A situation in which everyone in a society has an equal chance to pursue economic or social rewards.

ethical relativism: The idea that all cultures and all cultural practices have equal value.

ethnicity: A shared cultural heritage – the distinctive practices, beliefs and way of life of a group.

ethnocentrism: Evaluating another culture according to the standards of one's own culture.

exogamy: Refers to marriage outside of the group (community, tribe, ethnicity, etc.).

expulsion: When a dominant group forces a subordinate group to leave a certain area or the country.

five race theory: The idea that humans can be categorized into five racial categories: African, European, Asian, Oceanic, and Native American.

genocide: The deliberate annihilation of a targeted (usually subordinate) group.

group-specific rights: Rights conferred on individuals by virtue of their membership in a group.

hybridity: The process by which different racial and ethnic groups combine to create new or emergent cultural forms and practices.

identity: a shared self-perception or self-ascription of an individual or community as belonging to a distinct group based on ethnic, racial, religious, geographical or other characteristics.

institutional racism: When a societal system has developed with an embedded disenfranchisement of a group.

internal colonialism: The process of uneven regional development by which a dominant group establishes control over existing populations within a country by maintaining segregation of ethnic and racial groups.

intersection theory: A theory that suggests that the effects of race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and other attributes on social status compound one another.

minority group: Any group of people who are singled out from others for differential and unequal treatment.

miscegenation: The blending of different racialized groups through sexual relations, procreation, marriage, or cohabitation.

model minority: The stereotype applied to a minority group that is seen as reaching higher educational, professional, and socioeconomic levels without protest against the majority establishment.

multiculturalism: The recognition of cultural and racial diversity and of the equality of different cultures.

orientalism: the practice of projecting exotic characteristics onto “Asia,” “the East” or “the Orient” that are said to be the opposite of Western characteristics.

prejudice: Biased thought based on flawed assumptions about a group of people.

primitivism: The practice of projecting “savagery” or premodern characteristics onto Indigenous and racialized peoples around the globe.

racial profiling: The selection of individuals for greater surveillance, policing, or treatment on the basis of racialized characteristics.

racial steering: When real estate agents direct prospective homeowners toward or away from certain neighbourhoods based on their race.

racialization: The social process by which certain social groups are marked for unequal treatment based on perceived physiological differences.

racism: A set of attitudes, beliefs, and practices used to justify the belief that one racial category is somehow superior or inferior to others.

representation: The process by which meaning is produced and circulated in a society through the use of language, signs and images to stand in for, or *re-present*, things.

segregation: The physical separation of two groups, particularly in residence, but also in workplace and social functions.

settler society: A society historically based on colonization through foreign settlement and displacement of Indigenous inhabitants.

stereotypes: Oversimplified ideas about groups of people.

stigma: a mark or attribute regarded as deeply discrediting.

strategy for the management of diversity: A systematic method used to resolve conflicts, or potential conflicts, between groups that arise based on perceived differences.

subaltern groups: Groups whose identity is defined by cultural subordination.

subordinate group: A group of people who have less power than the dominant group.

systemic racism: Overlapping and mutually reinforcing structures of racial discrimination systematically embedded within and between organizations and institutions.

White privilege: The benefits people receive simply by being part of the dominant group of racialized “whites.”

White supremacy: The doctrine that non-White groups are inferior and that racial discrimination, segregation, and domination is therefore justified.

visible minority: Persons, other than Indigenous persons, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-White in colour.

Section Summary

[11.1 Racial, Ethnic, and Minority Groups](#)

Race is fundamentally a social construct. Ethnicity is a term that describes shared culture and national origin. Minority groups are defined by their lack of power.

[11.2 Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Discrimination](#)

Stereotypes are oversimplified ideas about groups of people. Prejudice refers to thoughts and feelings, while discrimination refers to actions. Racism refers to the belief that one race is inherently superior or inferior to other races.

[11.3 Theories of Race and Ethnicity](#)

Functionalist views of race study the role dominant and subordinate groups play to create a stable social structure. Critical sociologists examine power disparities and struggles between various racial and ethnic groups. Interactionists see race and ethnicity as important sources of individual identity and social symbolism. The concept of culture of prejudice recognizes that all people are subject to stereotypes that are ingrained in their culture.

[11.4 Intergroup Relations and the Management of Diversity](#)

Intergroup relations range from a tolerant approach of pluralism to intolerance as severe as genocide. In pluralism, groups retain their own identity. In assimilation, groups conform to the identity of the dominant group. In assimilation, groups combine to form a new group identity.

[11.5 Race and Ethnicity in Canada](#)

The history of the Canadian people contains an infinite variety of experiences that sociologists understand follow patterns. From the Indigenous people who first inhabited these lands to the waves of immigrants over the past 500 years, migration is an experience with many shared characteristics. Most groups have experienced various degrees of prejudice and discrimination as they have gone through the process of assimilation.

Questions

Quiz: Race, ethnicity, and discrimination

[11.1 Racial, Ethnic, and Minority Groups](#)

1. The racial term “Black Canadian” can refer to _____.

- a. A Black person living in Canada.
 - b. People whose ancestors came to Canada through the slave trade.
 - c. A White person who originated in Africa and now lives in Canada.
 - d. Any of the above.
2. What is the one defining feature of a minority group?
- a. Self-definition
 - b. Numerical minority
 - c. Lack of power
 - d. Strong cultural identity
3. Ethnicity describes shared _____.
- a. Beliefs.
 - b. Language.
 - c. Religion.
 - d. Any of the above.
4. Which of the following is an example of a numerical majority being treated as a subordinate group?
- a. Jewish people in Germany
 - b. Creoles in New Orleans
 - c. White people in Brazil
 - d. Blacks under apartheid in South Africa
5. Scapegoat theory shows that _____.
- a. Subordinate groups blame dominant groups for their problems.
 - b. Dominant groups blame subordinate groups for their problems.
 - c. Some people are predisposed to prejudice.
 - d. All of the above.

11.2 Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Discrimination

6. Stereotypes can be based on _____.
- a. Race.
 - b. Ethnicity.
 - c. Gender.
 - d. All of the above.
7. What is discrimination?
- a. Biased thoughts against an individual or group
 - b. Biased actions against an individual or group
 - c. Belief that a race different from yours is inferior
 - d. Another word for stereotyping
8. Which of the following is the best explanation of racism as a social fact?

- a. It needs to be eradicated by laws.
- b. It is like a magic pill.
- c. It does not need the actions of individuals to continue.
- d. None of the above

11.3 Theories of Race and Ethnicity

9. As a Caucasian in Canada, being reasonably sure that you will be dealing with authority figures of the same race as you is a result of _____.
- a. Intersection theory.
 - b. Conflict theory.
 - c. White privilege.
 - d. Multiculturalism.
10. The Speedy Gonzales cartoon character is an example of _____.
- a. Intersection theory.
 - b. Stereotyping.
 - c. Interactionist view.
 - d. Culture of prejudice.

11.4 Intergroup Relations and the Management of Diversity

11. Which intergroup relation displays the least tolerance?
- a. Segregation
 - b. Assimilation
 - c. Genocide
 - d. Expulsion
12. What doctrine justified legal segregation in the American South?
- a. Jim Crow
 - b. *Plessey v. Ferguson*
 - c. *De jure*
 - d. Separate but equal
13. What intergroup relationship is represented by the “mosaic” metaphor?
- a. Assimilation
 - b. Pluralism
 - c. Expulsion
 - d. Segregation
14. Assimilation is represented by the _____ metaphor.
- a. Melting pot
 - b. Mosaic
 - c. Salad bowl
 - d. Separate but equal

11.5 Race and Ethnicity in Canada

15. What makes Indigenous Canadians unique as a subordinate group in Canada?
 - a. They are the only group that experienced expulsion.
 - b. They are the only group that was segregated.
 - c. They are the only group that was enslaved.
 - d. They are the only group that did not come here as immigrants.
16. Which subordinate group is often referred to as the “model minority?”
 - a. Black Canadians
 - b. Asian Canadians
 - c. White ethnic Canadians
 - d. First Nations
17. Which federal act or program was designed to address Québécois nationalism?
 - a. Official Languages Act
 - b. The Treaty of Utrecht
 - c. The Multiculturalism Act
 - d. The repatriation of the Constitution
18. The Komagata Maru incident affected which visible minority?
 - a. Métis
 - b. Japanese
 - c. South Asians
 - d. Chinese
19. Which of the following groups is not considered a visible minority in Canada?
 - a. The Issei
 - b. Somali Canadians
 - c. Sikhs
 - d. Indigenous Canadians

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

11.1 Racial, Ethnic, and Minority Groups

1. Why do you think the term “minority” has persisted when the word “subordinate” is more descriptive?
2. How do you describe your ethnicity? Do you include your family’s country of origin? Do you consider

yourself multiethnic? How does your ethnicity compare to that of the people you spend most of your time with?

11.2 Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Discrimination

3. How does racial stereotyping contribute to institutionalized racism?
4. Give an example of stereotyping that you see in everyday life. Explain what would need to happen for this to be eliminated.

11.3 Theories of Race and Ethnicity

5. Give three examples of White privilege. Do you know people who have experienced this? From what perspective?
6. What is the worst example of intersection theory you can think of? What are your reasons for thinking it is the worst?

11.4 Intergroup Relations and the Management of Diversity

7. Do you believe immigration laws should foster an approach of pluralism, assimilation, or amalgamation? Which perspective do you think is most supported by current Canadian immigration policies?
8. Which intergroup relation do you think is the most beneficial to the subordinate group? To society as a whole? Why?

11.5 Race and Ethnicity in Canada

9. In your opinion, which group had the easiest time coming to this country? Which group had the hardest time? Why?
10. Which group has made the most socioeconomic gains? Why do you think that group has had more success than others?

Further Research

11.1 Racial, Ethnic, and Minority Groups

Explore aspects of the contemporary debate over racial identity and genomic markers in Vivian Chou's (2017) [How Science and Genetics are Reshaping the Race Debate of the 21st Century](#) on the Harvard University website.

11.2 Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Discrimination

Explore the concept of White privilege with this [White privilege checklist \[PDF\]](#) from the Alliance of Local Service Organizations (ALSO) website (2015) to see how much of it holds true for you or others. [This checklist was adapted from Peggy McIntosh, 1989]

11.3 Theories of Race and Ethnicity

Watch this short video [intersectionality 101](#) by Learning for Justice (2016) on YouTube to explore the basics behind the concept.

11.4 Intergroup Relations and the Management of Diversity

Read more about multiculturalism in a world perspective at the [Multiculturalism Policies in Contemporary Democracies](#) (n.d.) on the [Queen's University website](#)

11.5 Race and Ethnicity in Canada

Are people interested in reclaiming their ethnic identities? Read this article, "[The White Ethnic Revival](#)," by Matthew Frye Jacobson (n.d.) on the George Washington University History News Network website and decide for yourself!

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Solutions to Section Quiz

1 D, | 2 C, | 3 D, | 4 D, | 5 B, | 6 D, | 7 B, | 8 C, | 9 C, | 10 B, | 11 C, | 12 D, | 13 B, | 14 A, | 15 D, | 16 B, | 17 A, | 18 C, | 19 D, [\[Return to quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 12. GENDER, SEX, AND SEXUALITY



Figure 12.1. Some people may learn at an early age that their gender does not correspond with their sex. What does this mean for the sociology of sex and gender? (Photo courtesy of Zackary Drucker/The Gender Spectrum Collection). [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0](#)

Learning Objectives

12.1. The Difference between Sex, Gender and Sexuality

- Differentiate between sex, gender, and sexuality.
- Examine the relationship between society and biology in formations of gender identity.
- Discuss the role of homophobia and heterosexism in society.
- Distinguish between cisgender, transgender, transsex, intersex, and homosexual identities.
- Analyze the dominant gender schema and how it influences social perceptions of sex and gender.

12.2. Gender and Society

- Explain the influence of socialization on gender roles.
- Review the indicators of gender inequality and their causes
- Examine the functionalist, critical, feminist and interpretive perspectives on gender.

12.3. Sex and Sexuality

- Distinguish between the social roles and behaviours of sexual nonconformists
- Examine the control of women's sexuality
- Understand the social variability of sexuality and sexual practices.
- Examine positivist, critical, queer and symbolic interactionist perspectives on sexuality and sexual practices.

Introduction to Gender, Sex, and Sexuality

In 2009, the 18-year old South African athlete, Caster Semenya, won the women's 800-meter world championship in Track and Field. Her time of 1:55:45, a surprising improvement from her 2008 time of 2:08:00, caused officials from the International Association of Athletics Foundation (IAAF) to question whether her win was legitimate. If this questioning were based on suspicion of steroid use, the case would be no different from that of 1988 Olympic 100 meter gold medal winner Ben Johnson. But the questioning and eventual testing were based on allegations that Caster Semenya, no matter what gender identity she possessed, was biologically a male. She had naturally high levels of testosterone which surpassed the threshold defined by the International Olympic Committee.



Figure 12.2 Quinn (formerly Rebecca Quinn) plays soccer as a midfielder for the Canada national team. At the 2021 Tokyo Olympics, Quinn won the gold medal and was the first out, transgender, non-binary athlete to compete at the Olympics. (Image courtesy of Jamie Smed/Wikimedia Commons). [CC BY 2.0](#)

Many think that distinguishing biological maleness from biological femaleness is a simple matter — just conduct some DNA or hormonal testing, throw in a physical examination, and the answer is clear. But it is not that simple. Both biologically male and biologically female people produce a certain amount of testosterone for example, and different laboratories have different testing methods, which makes it difficult to set a specific threshold for the amount of male hormones produced by a female that renders her sex male. In 2019, the IAAF ruled that a threshold of five nanomoles or less per liter (nmol/L) of testosterone determined who could compete on a female team. Most **cisgender** female athletes have testosterone levels between 0.12 and 1.79 nmol/L, whereas adult males have levels of 7.7 to 29.4 nmol/L (Farrell, 2019). In 2012, the IOC said the criteria are not intended to determine biological sex however. “Instead these regulations are designed to identify circumstances in which a particular athlete will not be eligible (by reason of hormonal characteristics) to participate in the 2012 Olympic Games” in the female category (International Olympic Committee, 2012).

To provide further context, during the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, eight female athletes with XY chromosomes underwent testing and were ultimately confirmed as eligible to compete as women (Maugh, 2009). To date, no males have undergone this sort of testing. Does this not imply that when women perform better than expected, they are “too masculine,” but when men perform well they are simply superior athletes? Can you imagine Usain Bolt, the world’s fastest man, being examined by doctors to prove he was biologically male based

instead of this being determined solely on his external appearance and athletic ability? What does this complicated world of competitive athletics say about how sex and gender are actually distinguished?

In this chapter, the social differences between sex and gender, along with issues like gender identity and sexuality, are discussed. What does it mean to “have” a sex in our society? What does it mean to “have” a gender? What does it mean to “have” a sexuality?

Media Attributions

- **Figure 12.1.** [A non-binary femme using a makeup brush vertical](#) by Zackary Drucker, via the Gender Spectrum Collection from Broadly [now VICE] is used under a [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0](#) licence.
- **Figure 12.2** [Washington Spirit playing against Orlando Pride on June 23, 2018](#) (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Quinn_June_2018.jpg) by Jamie Smed, via Wikimedia Commons, is used under a [CC BY 2.0](#) licence.

12.1 The Difference between Sex, Gender, and Sexuality



Figure 12.3 While the biological differences between males and females are products of the physiology of homo sapiens, the social and cultural aspects of being a man or woman can vary significantly between societies. (Photo courtesy of Tournai/Wikimedia Commons). [CC BY 2.0](#)

When filling out a document such as a job application or school registration form people are often asked to provide their name, address, phone number, birth date, and sex or gender. But what if they were asked to provide their sex *and* their gender? It does not occur to many people that sex and gender are not the same. Sociologists view sex and gender as conceptually distinct for a number of reasons. **Sex** refers to physical or physiological differences between males and females, including both primary sex characteristics (the reproductive system) and secondary characteristics such as height and muscularity. **Gender** is a term that refers to social or cultural distinctions and roles associated with being male or female. **Gender identity** is the extent to which one identifies as being either masculine or feminine (Diamond, 2002). As gender is such a primary dimension of identity, socialization, institutional structures and life chances, sociologists refer to it as a *core status*.

The distinction between sex and gender is key to being able to examine gender as a social variable rather than biological variable. Contrary to the common way of thinking about it, gender is not determined by biology in any simple way. For example, the anthropologist Margaret Mead's cross-cultural research in New Guinea in the 1930s

was groundbreaking in its demonstration that cultures differ markedly in the ways that they perceive the gender “temperaments” of men and women; i.e., their masculinity and femininity (Mead, 1963). Unlike the qualities that defined masculinity and femininity in North America at the time, she saw both genders among the Arapesh as sensitive, gentle, cooperative, and passive, whereas among the Mundugumor both genders were assertive, violent, jealous, and aggressive. Among the Tchambuli, she described male and female temperaments as the opposite of those observed in North America. The women appeared assertive, domineering, emotionally inexpressive and managerial, while the men appeared emotionally dependent, fragile, and less responsible.

The experience of **transgender** people — people whose sense of gender does not correspond to their assigned sex at birth — also demonstrates that a person’s sex, as determined by their biology, does not always correspond with their gender. Therefore, the terms *sex* and *gender* are not interchangeable. A baby boy who is born with male genitalia will be identified as male. As he grows, however, he may identify with the feminine aspects of his culture. Since the term *sex* refers to biological or physical distinctions, characteristics of sex will not vary significantly between different human societies. For example, it is physiologically normal for persons of the female sex, regardless of culture, to eventually menstruate and develop breasts that can lactate. The signs and characteristics of gender, on the other hand, may vary greatly between different societies as Margaret Mead’s research noted. For example, in American culture, it is considered feminine (or a trait of the female gender) to wear a dress or skirt. However, in many Middle Eastern, Asian, and African cultures, dresses or skirts (often referred to as sarongs, robes, or gowns) can be considered masculine. The kilt worn by a Scottish male does not make him appear feminine in his culture. These examples are relatively trivial, but the variability can also be consequential, such as the appropriateness or even legality of women holding a paying job, driving a car, or even being seen in public (Schiappa, 2022).



Figure 12.4 George Catlin (1796–1872), *Dance to the Berdache*. Catlin’s sketch depicts a ceremonial dance among the Sac and Fox Indians to celebrate the two-spirit person. (Photo courtesy of George Catlin (1796–1872)/ Wikimedia Commons). [Public Domain](#)

The dichotomous view of gender (the notion that one is either male or female) is specific to certain cultures and is not universal. In some cultures, gender is viewed as fluid. In the past, some anthropologists used the term *berdache* or two spirit person to refer to individuals who occasionally or permanently dressed and lived as the opposite gender. The practice has been noted among certain Aboriginal groups (Jacobs, Thomas, and Lang, 1997). Samoan culture accepts what they refer to as a “third gender.” *Fa’afafine*, which translates as “in the manner of a woman,” is a term used to describe individuals who are born biologically male but have a strong inclination to feminine activities and identity, and take part in traditional women’s work. Fa’afafines are considered an important part of Samoan culture. Individuals from other cultures may mislabel them as homosexuals but fa’afafines have a varied sexual life that may include attraction to men or women (Poasa, 1992).

In North American culture, **gender variability** refers to the larger social category of people who identify as gender nonconformist, genderqueer, nonbinary, or other terms that challenge the traditional binary language of gender (Schiappa, 2022).

Making Connections: Social Policy and Debate

The Legalese of Sex and Gender



Figure 12.5 The BC Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. Who decides who is a “real” woman with the right to work in women-only spaces? (Photo courtesy of Joe Mabel/Openverse) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

The terms *sex* and *gender* have not always been differentiated in the English language. It was not until the 1950s that American and British psychologists and other professionals working with intersex and transgender patients formally began distinguishing between sex and gender. Since then, psychological and physiological professionals have increasingly used the term *gender* (Moi, 2005). By the end of the 20th century, expanding the proper usage of the term *gender* to everyday language became more challenging — particularly where legal language is concerned. In an effort to clarify usage of the terms *sex* and *gender*, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in a 1994 briefing, “The word *gender* has acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics)

distinctive to the sexes. That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to female and masculine is to male” (*J.E.B. v. Alabama*, 144 S. Ct. 1436 [1994]). Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg had a different take, however. Viewing the words as synonymous, she freely swapped them in her briefings so as to avoid having the word “sex” pop up too often. It is thought that her secretary supported this practice by suggestions to Ginsburg that “those nine men” (the other Supreme Court justices), “hear that word and their first association is not the way you want them to be thinking” (Case, 1995).

In Canada, there has not been the same formal deliberations on the legal meanings of sex and gender. The distinction between sex as a physiological attribute and gender as social attribute has been used without controversy. However, things can get a little tricky when biological “sex” is regarded as simply a natural fact, especially in the case of transgender individuals who have undergone sex reassignment surgery and hormone replacement therapy (Cowan, 2005). For example, in British Columbia, people who have surgery to change their anatomical sex can apply through the provisions of the Vital Statistics Act to have their birth certificate changed to reflect their post-operative sex. But if a person was born male, does this mean that after sex reassignment surgery that person is fully regarded as a female in the eyes of the law?

In the 2002 case of *Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief Society*, a male-to-female transsexual, Kimberly Nixon brought an application to the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal that she had been discriminated against by the Vancouver Rape Relief Society (VRR) when her application to volunteer as a helper was rejected. The controversy was not over whether Kimberly was a woman, but whether she was woman *enough* for the position. VRR argued that as Kimberly had not grown up as a woman, she did not have the requisite lived experience as a woman in patriarchal society to counsel women rape victims. The B.C. Human Rights Tribunal ruled against VRR, finding that they had discriminated against Kimberly as a transgender woman. The ruling was overturned by the Supreme Court of British Columbia, which argued that the Act “did not address all the potential legal consequences of sex reassignment surgery” (Cowan, 2005). The court acknowledged that the meaning of both sex and gender vary in different contexts.

Ultimately the BC Supreme Court found that Vancouver Rape Relief’s failure to recognize Kimberly Nixon as a woman constituted discrimination but, because of the organization’s unique status, was not obligated to engage or train her as a volunteer. The BC Human Rights Code has a provision that protects organizations that work in areas of discrimination against identifiable groups. Section 41 states that such an “organization or group must not be considered to be contravening this code because it is granting preference to members of an identifiable group or class of persons.” Vancouver Rape Relief had the right to freedom of assembly and to organize itself as a women-only space, regardless of gender identity. It also had the right to define this space based on its own definition of a woman as someone who has lived their entire life as a female.

These legal issues reveal that even an intimate human experience that is assumed to be deeply personal (such as self-perception, self-identification and behaviour) is subject to social definitions and legal regulations. As Chambers (2007) summarizes it, “Nixon can say she is a woman, and, in most contexts, the law will support her self-definition. Yet other women, and women’s groups, are under no legal obligation to accept her as the woman she claims to be.” The question of “what makes a woman” in the case of *Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief Society* was a matter of the procedures of formal legal decision-making as much as it was a matter of biology, gender or lived experience.

Sexuality

Sexuality refers to a person's capacity for sexual feelings and their emotional and sexual attraction to a particular sex (male or female). In social life sexuality has four components that sociologists typically study: (1) Sexual orientation (attraction to a particular sex); (2) Sexual identities (such as straight, queer, butch, femme or genderqueer); (3) Sexual practices (the type of sexual activity engaged in or fantasized); (4) Sexual social forms (such as monogamy, polyamory, pornography, sexual rites of passage, purity balls, laws of adultery, age of consent).

Sexuality or sexual orientation is typically divided into four categories: *heterosexuality*, the attraction to individuals of the opposite sex; *homosexuality*, the attraction to individuals of one's own sex; *bisexuality*, the attraction to individuals of either sex; and *asexuality*, no attraction to either sex. Heterosexuals and homosexuals may also be referred to informally as “straight” and “gay,” respectively. North America is a heteronormative society, meaning it supports heterosexuality as the norm. This is referred to as **heteronormativity**. Consider that homosexuals are often asked, “When did you know you were gay?” but heterosexuals are rarely asked, “When did you know that you were straight?” (Ryle, 2011).

According to current scientific understanding, individuals are usually aware of their sexual orientation between middle childhood and early adolescence (American Psychological Association, 2008). They do not have to participate in sexual activity to be aware of these emotional, romantic, and physical attractions; people can be celibate and still recognize their sexual orientation. Homosexual women (also referred to as lesbians), homosexual men (also referred to as gays), and bisexuals of both genders may have very different experiences of discovering and accepting their sexual orientation. At the point of puberty, some may be able to claim their sexual orientations while others may be unready or unwilling to make their homosexuality or bisexuality known since it goes against North American society's historical norms (APA, 2008).

Alfred Kinsey was among the first to conceptualize sexuality as a continuum rather than a strict dichotomy of gay or straight. To classify this continuum of heterosexuality and homosexuality, Kinsey created a six-point rating scale that ranges from exclusively heterosexual to exclusively homosexual (see Figure 12.4). In his 1948 work *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*, Kinsey writes, “Males do not represent two discrete populations, heterosexual and homosexual. The world is not to be divided into sheep and goats ... The living world is a continuum in each and every one of its aspects” (Kinsey et al., 1948).




Figure 12.6 The Kinsey scale indicates that sexuality can be measured by more than just heterosexuality and homosexuality. (Image courtesy of Justin Anthony Knapp/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC0 1.0](#) Public Domain licence.

Later scholarship by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick expanded on Kinsey's notions. She coined the term "homosocial" to oppose "homosexual," to include nonsexual same-sex relations. Sedgwick recognized that in heteronormative North American culture, males are subject to a clear divide between the two sides of this continuum, whereas females enjoy more fluidity. This can be illustrated by the way women in Canada can express homosocial feelings (nonsexual regard for people of the same sex) through hugging, hand-holding, and physical closeness. In contrast, Canadian males often refrain from these expressions since they violate the heteronormative code. While women experience a flexible norming of variations of behaviour that spans the heterosocial-homosocial spectrum, male behaviour is subject to strong social sanction if it veers into homosocial territory because of societal homophobia (Sedgwick, 1985).

There is no scientific consensus regarding the exact reasons why an individual holds a heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual orientation. There has been research conducted to study the possible genetic, hormonal, developmental, social, and cultural influences on sexual orientation, but there has been no evidence that links sexual orientation to one factor (APA, 2008). Research, however, does present evidence showing that homosexuals and bisexuals are treated differently than heterosexuals in schools, the workplace, and the military. The 2009 Canadian Climate Survey reported that 59% of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender) high school students had been subject to verbal harassment at school compared to 7% of non-LGBT students; 25% had been subject to physical harassment compared to 8% of non-LGBT students; 31% had been subject to cyber-bullying (via internet or text messaging) compared to 8% of non-LGBT students; 73% felt unsafe at school compared to 20% of non-LGBT students; and 51% felt unaccepted at school compared to 19% of non-LGBT students (Taylor and Peter, 2011).

Much of this discrimination is based on stereotypes, misinformation, and **homophobia** — an extreme or irrational aversion to homosexuals. Major policies to prevent discrimination based on sexual orientation have not come into effect until the last few years. In 2005, the federal government legalized same-sex marriage. The Civil Marriage Act now describes marriage in Canada in gender neutral terms: "Marriage, for civil purposes, is the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others" (Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33). The Canadian Human Rights Act was amended in 1996 to explicitly prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, including the unequal treatment of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals. Organizations such as Egale Canada (Equality for Gays And Lesbians Everywhere) advocate for LGBT and LGBTQ2+ rights, establish gay pride organizations in Canadian communities, and promote gay-straight alliance support groups in schools. Sociologists frequently use the acronym **LGBTQ2+**, which stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or "questioning," two spirited, plus related non-binary or minority sexual identity communities.

Gender Roles: Masculinities and Femininities

As people grow up, they learn how to behave from those around them. In this socialization process, children are introduced to certain roles that are typically linked to their biological sex. The term **gender role** refers to a society's concept of how men and women are expected to act, what types of things they should do and how they should behave. These social roles are based on norms, or standards, created by a society including the typical personality traits that define masculinity and femininity.

In Canadian culture, masculine roles are often associated with strength, aggression, and dominance, while feminine roles are often associated with passivity, nurturing, and subordination. As a result, men tend to outnumber women in professions such as law enforcement, the military, and politics. Women tend to outnumber men in care-related occupations such as child care, health care, and social work. These occupational roles are examples of typical Canadian male and female gender roles, derived from the culture's traditions. Adherence to these occupational gender roles demonstrates fulfillment of social expectations, but not necessarily personal preference (Diamond, 2002).

In 1974, Bem introduced the Bem Sex-Role Inventory based on what were considered masculine and feminine personality traits in North America. It allowed her to classify individuals on a spectrum of masculine, feminine, or 'androgynous' characteristics independently of their biological assignation. A given person might score high on the

masculinity scale, or on the femininity scale, or both. The internalization of these traits, Bem suggested, was a matter of socialization. As she described it, the “sex-typed person” is “someone who has internalized society’s sex-typed standards of desirable behavior for men and women” (Bem, 1974). For sociologists, these items are especially interesting because they provide a list of socially approved gender characteristics for men and women, at least as they were perceived in 1974.

Feminine Items

Affectionate	Sympathetic	Sensitive to the needs of others
Understanding	Compassionate	Eager to soothe hurt feelings
Warm	Tender	Loves children
Gentle	Yielding	Cheerful
Shy	Flatterable	Loyal
Soft-spoken	Gullible	Does not use harsh language
Childlike	Feminine	

Masculine Items

Defends own beliefs	Independent	Assertive
Strong personality	Forceful	Has leadership abilities
Willing to take risks	Dominant	Willing to take a stand
Aggressive	Self-reliant	Athletic
Analytical	Self-sufficient	Makes decisions easily
Individualistic	Masculine	Competitive
Ambitious	Act as a leader	

Neutral Items

Adaptable	Conceited	Conscientious
Conventional	Friendly	Happy
Helpful	Inefficient	Jealous
Likable	Moody	Reliable
Secretive	Sincere	Solemn
Tactful	Theatrical	Truthful
Unpredictable	Unsystematic	

Figure 12.7 The Bem Sex-Role Inventory (or BSRI). (Image from Schiappa, 2022). [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 \[Image Description\]](#)

Bem's research indicates that there is considerable variation in the performance of and adherence to gender roles. Connell (1995) elaborated on this by pointing to the existence of multiple styles of masculinity and femininity that are in operation in a culture at any particular time. These styles are not fixed and can change over time, both in the individual and in the culture. There is more than one kind of masculinity and femininity and what is considered "masculine" or "feminine" differs by race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, and gender.

For example, styles of masculinity and femininity are often associated with stereotypes that carry some truth. Stereotypical styles of masculinity in North American culture can include the jock, the nerd, the ladies' man, the grunt, the maverick, the effeminate man, etc., whereas stereotypical styles of femininity can include the Madonna, the promiscuous woman, the independent woman, the tomboy, the femme, the badass girl, the new age goddess, etc. The key point in Connell's analysis, however, is that the different styles of gender are not perceived equally. They exist in a hierarchical order defined by specific dominant or "hegemonic" understandings of masculinity and femininity.

Hegemonic masculinity is the dominant male ideal within a particular culture at a particular time (Connell, 1995). David and Brannon (1976) describe four rules for establishing masculinity:

1. *No Sissy Stuff*: anything that even remotely hints of femininity is prohibited. A real man must avoid any behavior or characteristic associated with women;
2. *Be a Big Wheel*: masculinity is measured by success, power, and the admiration of others. One must possess wealth, fame, and status to be considered manly;
3. *Be a Sturdy Oak*: manliness requires rationality, toughness, and self-reliance. A man must remain calm in any situation, show no emotion, and admit no weakness;
4. *Give 'em Hell*: men must exude an aura of daring and aggression, and must be willing to take risks, to "go for it" even when reason and fear suggest otherwise.

Hegemonic masculinity operates as a gender norm, and it is against this norm that the many different types of lived masculinities, including gay, racialized and ethnic masculinities, are invited to measure themselves. When someone says, "Be a man!" they typically evoke an ideal of masculinity which is dominant in that specific context. As Garlick (2010) argues, this ideal will change depending on the context but it always takes the same form:

the hegemonic form of masculinity in any particular social context is always the answer to a question—a question of what is needed to maintain control. The answer to this question, which will often involve some form of either physical strength or mental strength (e.g., violence or rationality), will depend on the historical, social, and cultural context in which it is asked. What is crucial is the belief that "to be a man" requires being in control; it is this contention itself that is hegemonic.

Hegemonic masculinity is paralleled by what Connell (1995) refers to as **emphasized femininity**. She argues that in a heteronormative and patriarchal society, the dominant styles of femininity are those which emphasize women's



Figure 12.8 Bruce Lee (1940–1973). Through his martial arts mastery, Chinese-American actor Bruce Lee is credited with providing an alternative model of Asian masculinity. His film roles in the 1960s and 1970s presented a new (to North America) model of heroic masculine Asian identity based on physicality and fighting skills, which challenged popular culture stereotypes of Asian males as “wimpy, asexual nerds.” Contrary to models of hegemonic masculinity however, his portrayal of maleness was also nuanced as he played characters who were often shy with women as well as “loyal to ... friends, naively innocent to city life, and fiercely righteous” (Chan, 2000). (Photo courtesy of National General Pictures/Wikipedia Commons) [Public Domain](#)

compliance with their subordination to men including characteristics of supportiveness, nurturing, empathy, enthusiasm and sexual attractiveness.

Emphasized femininity values ways of expressing femininity that complement hegemonic heterosexual masculinity and therefore displaying traits that either challenge or mimic male dominance is often stigmatized. “Practices and characteristics that are stigmatized and sanctioned if embodied by women include having sexual desire for other women, being promiscuous, “frigid”, or sexually inaccessible, and being aggressive” (Schippers, 2007). On this basis, Schippers (2007) identifies a series of **pariah femininities** based on specific types of non-compliance: the lesbian who is attracted to women instead of men, the “bitch” who takes charge and challenges authority, the “bad-ass girl” who is physically violent, or the “slut” or “tease” who refuses exclusive sexual relationships with men or male control of their sexuality.

Gender Identity

Canadian society allows for some level of flexibility when it comes to acting out gender roles. To a certain extent, men can assume some feminine roles and characteristics and women can assume some masculine roles and characteristics without interfering with their gender identity. **Gender identity** is an individual’s self-conception of being male or female based on their association with masculine or feminine gender roles.

As opposed to **cisgender** individuals, who identify their gender with the gender and sex they were assigned at birth, individuals who identify with the gender that is the “opposite” of their biological sex are **transgender**. Transgender males, for example, are individuals who were assigned the sex ‘female’ at birth, but have such a strong emotional and psychological connection to the forms of masculinity in society that they identify their gender as male. The parallel connection to femininity exists for transgender females. It is difficult to determine the prevalence of transgenderism in society. Statistics Canada estimates that in 2018 approximately one million people were LGBTQ2+ in Canada, accounting for 4% of the total population aged 15 and older (Statistics Canada, 2021). Of these approximately 75,000 Canadians were trans or non-binary, representing 0.24% of the Canadian population aged 15 and older.



Figure 12.9 Transgender women occupy an ambiguous place in the dominant gender schema, which permits only binary, cisgender positions to pass as “natural.” (Image courtesy of Zackary Drucker/The Gender Spectrum Collection.) [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0](#)

In the medical literature, transgender individuals who wish to alter their bodies through medical interventions such as surgery and hormonal therapy – so that their physical being is better aligned with their gender identity – are called **transsex**. They may also be known as male-to-female (MTF) or female-to-male (FTM) transsex. Gender terms are fluid however and many in the transgender community reject the historical term, transsexual, because of its history as medical or psychiatric label used to diagnose a mental illness. The term transsexual also implied a change in sexuality as opposed to gender or sex, which is misleading.

Devor’s (1997) accounts of female-to-male transsex indicate that the distinction between transgender individuals who undergo surgery and hormone therapy and those who do not is significant for self-identity however. Not all transgender individuals choose to alter their bodies: many will maintain

their original physiology but may present themselves to society as the opposite gender. This is typically done by adopting the dress, hairstyle, mannerisms, or other characteristic typically assigned to the opposite gender. It is important to note that people who cross-dress, or wear clothing that is traditionally assigned to the opposite gender,

are not necessarily transgender. Cross-dressing can also be a form of self-expression, entertainment, or personal style, not necessarily an expression of gender identity (APA, 2008).

There is no single, conclusive explanation for why people are transgender. Transgender expressions and experiences are so diverse that it is difficult to identify their origin. Some hypotheses suggest biological factors such as genetics, or prenatal hormone levels, as well as social and cultural factors, such as childhood and adulthood experiences. Most experts believe that all of these factors contribute to a person's gender identity (APA, 2008).

It is known that transgender and transsex individuals experience discrimination based on their gender identity. People who identify as transgender are twice as likely to experience assault or discrimination as non-transgender individuals; they are also one and a half times more likely to experience intimidation (National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, 2010; 2013). Organizations such as the Canadian Professional Association for Transgender Health (CPATH), Trans Pulse, and the National Center for Transgender Equality work to support and prevent, respond to, and end all types of violence against transgender, transsex, and homosexual individuals. These organizations hope that by educating the public about gender identity and empowering transgender and transsex individuals, this violence will end.

The Dominant Gender Schema



Figure 12.10 The Mattel Barbie and Ken dolls were introduced in 1959 and 1961 respectively and became the most popular model dolls in North America. As artifacts of material culture, they solidify the dominant gender schema and place them in the hands of children. As models of gender, researchers have shown the probability of finding Barbie's body proportions in the population is estimated at less than 1 in 100,000, whereas Ken is more realistic at about 1 in 50 (Norton et al., 1996). (Image courtesy of RomitaGirl67/Openverse). [CC BY 2.0](#)

As sociological research points out, the naturalness with which one assumes a gender identity of being either masculine or feminine, or a sexual identity of being sexually attracted to either men or women, has a significant social component. Gender and sexual identities are deep identities in the sense that one does not seem to choose them. They appear to “come over” one, sometimes at a very early age, and thereafter appear for most people to be fixed. Nevertheless they are sustained by social norms and conventions. This social aspect of gender or sexual identity is revealed especially through the research tradition in sociology that focuses on those who break the rules of society. By studying those who break the rules, the rules themselves and what they entail become visible. In the study of gender and sexuality, the experience of intersexuals, transgender individuals, gays, lesbians, bisexuals, fetishists, and sexual “perverts,” etc. are invaluable for understanding what it means to have a gender or a sexuality. These individuals make up a minority of the population, but their lives and struggles reveal the existence of the social norms and processes of which others are often unaware.

Note that in sociology the term **ideology** does not refer simply to a set of ideas but to a set of ideas that *conceal, distort, or justify* power relations in a society.

Part of having a sexuality or a gender has to do with the “naturalness” with which an individual assumes one of the most fundamental identities that define their place in the world. However, having a gender or sexual identity only appears natural to the degree that one fits within the **dominant gender schema** (Devor, 2020). The dominant gender schema is an ideology that, like all ideologies, serves to perpetuate inequalities in power and status. This schema states that: a) sex is a biological characteristic that produces only two options, male or female, and b) gender is a social or psychological characteristic that manifests or expresses biological sex. Again, only two options exist, masculine or feminine: “All persons are either one gender or the other. No person can be neither. No person can be both. No person can

change gender without major medical intervention” (Devor, 2020).

For many people this is natural. It “goes without saying.” However, if one does not fit within the dominant gender schema, then the naturalness of one’s gender identity is thrown into question. This occurs, first of all, by the actions of external authorities and experts who define those who do not fit as either mistakes of nature or as products of failed socialization and individual psychopathology. Gender identity is also thrown into question by the actions of peers and family who respond with concern or censure when a girl is not feminine enough or a boy is not masculine enough. Moreover, the ones who do not fit also have questions. They may begin to wonder why the norms of society do not reflect their sense of self, and thus begin to feel at odds with the world.

As the capacity to differentiate between the genders is the basis of patriarchal relations of power that have existed for 6,000 years, the dominant gender schema is one of the fundamental organizing principles that maintains the dominant societal order. Nevertheless, it is only a *schema*: a cultural pattern that is imposed upon the diversity of world. With respect to the biology of gender and sexuality, Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000) argues that a body’s sex is too complex to fit within the obligatory dual sex system, and ultimately, the decision to label someone male or female is a social decision.

Fausto-Sterling’s research on hermaphrodite or **intersex** children — the 1.7% of children born with a mixture of male and female sexual organs — indicates there are at least *five* different sexes:

1. male;
2. female;
3. herms: true hermaphrodites with both male and female gonads (i.e., testes *and* ovaries);
4. merms: male pseudo-hermaphrodites with testes and a mixture of sexual organs; and

5. forms: female pseudo-hermaphrodites with ovaries and a mixture of sexual organs.

Nevertheless, because assigning a sex identity is a fundamental *cultural* priority, doctors will typically decide “nature’s intention” with respect to intersex babies within 24 hours of an intersex child being born. Sometimes this decision involves surgery, which has scarred individuals for life (Fausto-Sterling, 2000).



Figure 12.11 The American actress Marilyn Monroe (1926–1962) became famous for playing “blonde bombshell” characters, examples of **emphasized femininity**. (Photo courtesy of Bert Parry/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Similarly, with respect to the variability of gender and sexuality, the experiences of gender and sexual outsiders — homosexuals, bisexuals, transgender people, women who do not look or act “feminine” and men who do not look or act “masculine,” etc. — reveal the subtle dramaturgical order of social processes and negotiations through which all gender identity is sustained and recognized by others (see the discussion of Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis in [Chapter 6. Social Interaction](#)). Because one does not usually have the capacity to “look under the hood” to clinically determine the sex of someone one encounters, one reads their gender from their “gender display”— their “conventionalized portrayals” of the “culturally established correlates of sex” (Goffman, 1977). Gender is a performance which is enhanced by props like clothing and hairstyle, or mannerisms like tone of voice, physical bearing, and facial expression.

For a movie star like Marilyn Munroe, the gender display is exaggerated almost to the point of self-satire, whereas for *gender blending* women — women who do not dress or look stereotypically like women — the gender display can be (unintentionally) ambiguous to the point where they are often mistaken for men (Devor, 2020). The signs of gender need to be communicated in an unambiguous manner for an individual to “pass” as a member of their assigned gender. This is often a problem for transgender individuals and the cause of considerable stress and anxiety.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

Intersexed Individuals and the Case of John/Joan




Figure 12.12 David Reimer (1965–2004). (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.)

Part of the rationale of using surgery to “correct” the sexual ambiguity of intersex children is, firstly, the idea that not having a clear biological sex assignment will produce psychological pathology later in life. Secondly, the rationale is based on the idea that gender or sexual identity is fundamentally malleable (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). The practice is based on the logic of the nurture side of the long-standing debate about whether *nature* or *nurture* determines psycho-sexual development.

The nurture side argues that gender is neutral at birth and is subsequently molded by sex assignment and child-rearing (i.e., “environment”) into a stable gender identity as the child matures. This is the principle behind using surgery to modify indefinite sexual organs. It is understood that having an unambiguous penis or vagina is a clear *symbolic* marker of gender identity in one’s relationship to self and others. Whereas

gender formation during childhood is malleable, gender ambiguity later in life is pathological and therefore surgery at an early age is required to avoid psychosexual problems in teenage and adult life.

The nature side, on the other hand, argues that gender is not neutral at birth. Gender is predetermined by the *in utero* hormonal processes that lead to the sexual development of the foetus. Even in intersex children, there is a distinct psychosexual predisposition to one gender or the other. Early in foetal development hormones act directly to organize the brain along gender lines, and the release of hormones at puberty produce sex-specific characteristics and behaviours.

The life of David Reimer, known in the literature of the 1960s and 1970s as the John/Joan case, was used for many years as a demonstration of the validity of nurture arguments over nature arguments. In some respects it seemed like a perfect case to test the two propositions. David Reimer was born in Winnipeg, in 1965, as a male identical twin. However, as a result of a circumcision accident at age 7 months he lost his penis. Experts counseled that David should be surgically altered and raised as a girl. At age two David, known as “John” in the literature, had his testes removed and he became “Joan.” Her mother was cited in the literature as saying that Joan loved wearing dresses, hated getting dirty, and enjoyed having her hair set. As Joan’s biologically identical male twin continued to mature in a manner typical to boys, it seemed to demonstrate the dominant influence of gendered patterns of child-rearing on the formation of gender identity. Joan was being raised as a girl, her male sex organs had been surgically altered, and her transition from boy to girl seemed unproblematic. From the point of view of the nurture side of the debate, the case demonstrated that gender identity was primarily learned (Fausto-Sterling, 2000).

However, in 1980, a BBC documentary doing a follow up on the famous case discovered that by the time Joan was thirteen she was not well adjusted to her sex assignment (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). She peed standing up, walked like a boy, wanted to be a mechanic and thought boys had better lives than girls. Eventually it came out that she had eventually had her breasts removed, had a surgically reconstructed penis implanted, and had married a woman and was fathering his wife’s child. Contradicting the original findings, John/Joan’s mother reported that Joan had consistently resisted attempts to socialize her as a girl. Sadly, following a period of severe depression, David Reimer killed himself at the age of 38. The failure of the sex reassessment lent credence to the nature side of the debate. It seemed to demonstrate that humans are not psycho-sexually neutral at birth, but are biologically predisposed to behave in a male or female manner.

The literature is not conclusive. There have been other reports of individuals in similar circumstances rejecting their sex assignments but in the case of another Canadian child whose sex reassessment occurred at seven months, much earlier than David Reimer’s, gender identity was successfully changed (Bradley et. al., 1998). Nevertheless, while this subject identified as a female, she was a tomboy during childhood, worked in a blue-collar masculine trade, did have love affairs with men but at the time of the report was living as a lesbian. The authors argue that her gender identity was successfully changed through surgery and socialization, even if her gender role and sexual orientation were not.

Fausto-Sterling’s (2000) conclusion is that gender and sex are fundamentally complex and that it is not a simple question of either nurture or nature being the determinant factor. This complexity has practical implications for how to respond to the birth of intersex children. In particular, she outlines practical medical ethics for children whose sex is ambiguous:

1. Let there be no unnecessary infant surgery: do no harm;
 2. Let physicians assign a *provisional* sex based on known probabilities of gender identity formation;
- and

3. Provide full information and long-term counseling to the parents and child.

Fausto-Sterling argues that it is important to recognize the variability of sex and gender beyond the two-sex system.

Image Descriptions

Figure 12.7 Long Description:

The Bem Sex-Role Inventory (or BSRI) of items according to Schiappa (2022) are presented as:

Feminine Items	Masculine Items	Neutral Items
Affectionate	Defends own beliefs	Adaptable
Understanding	Strong personality	Conventional
Warm	Willing to take risks	Helpful
Gentle	Aggressive	Likable
Soft-spoken	Analytical	Secretive
Childlike	Individualistic	Tactful
Sympathetic	Ambitious	Unpredictable
Compassionate	Independent	Conceited
Tender	Forceful	Friendly
Yielding	Dominant	Inefficient
Flatterable	Self-reliant	Moody
Gullible	Self-sufficient	Sincere
Feminine	Masculine	Theatrical
Sensitive to the needs of others	Act as a leader	Unsystematic
Eager to soothe hurt feelings	Assertive	Conscientious
Loves children	Has leadership abilities	Happy
Cheerful	Willing to take a stand	Jealous
Loyal	Athletic	Reliable
Does not use harsh language	Makes decisions easily	Solemn
	Competitive	Truthful [Return to Figure 12.7]

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12.2 Gender and Society



Figure 12.13 George Murdoch's research showed that all societies have gendered division of labour, even if the specific gendered tasks vary from society to society. But why, in nearly all cases, were the tasks assigned to men given greater prestige? (Image courtesy of Find Your Feet/Flickr). [CC BY 2.0](#)

The organization of society is profoundly *gendered*, meaning that the “natural” distinction between male and female, and the attribution of different qualities to each, underlies institutional structures from the family, to the occupational structure, to the division between public and private, to access to power and beyond. **Patriarchy** is the set of institutional structures (like property rights, access to positions of power, and relationship to sources of income) which are based on the belief that men and women are dichotomous and *unequal* categories. How does the “naturalness” of the distinction between male and female get established? What are its consequences for power relationships? How does it serve to organize everyday life?

Gender and Socialization

The phrase “boys will be boys” is often used to justify behaviour such as pushing, shoving, or other forms of aggression from young boys. The phrase implies that such behaviour is unchangeable and something that is part of a boy's nature. Aggressive behaviour, when it does not inflict significant harm, is often accepted from boys and men because it is

congruent with the cultural script for masculinity. The “script” written by society is in some ways similar to a script written by a playwright. Just as a playwright expects actors to adhere to a prescribed script, society expects women and men to behave according to the expectations of their respective gender role. Scripts are generally learned through the process of socialization, which teaches people to behave according to social norms.

Role learning starts with socialization at birth. Children learn at a young age that there are distinct expectations for boys and girls. Even today, people are quick to outfit male infants in blue and girls in pink, even applying these colour-coded gender labels while a baby is in the womb. Cross-cultural studies reveal that children are aware of gender roles by age two or three. At four or five, most children are firmly entrenched in culturally appropriate gender roles (Kane, 1996). Children acquire these roles through **socialization**, a process in which people learn to behave in a particular way as dictated by societal values, beliefs, and attitudes. For example, society often views riding a motorcycle as a masculine activity and, therefore, considers it to be part of the male gender role. Attitudes such as this are typically based on **stereotypes** – oversimplified notions about members of a group. Gender stereotyping involves overgeneralizing about the attitudes, traits, or behaviour patterns of women or men. For example, women may be thought of as too timid or weak to ride a motorcycle.



Figure 12.14 Although North American society may have a gender script that associates motorcycles with men, there is an increasing number of female bikers in their 40s, 50s and 60s, who find riding provides a sense of pride and empowerment, resists stereotypes of gender and aging, and it's a great way to de-stress from busy lives (Weavell, 2016). Nevertheless, males accounted for 85-89% of Canadian motorcyclists in a 2014 survey (tests.ca, 2023). (Photo courtesy of Anastasia Shuraeva/Pexels.) [Pexels license](#)

One way children learn gender roles is through play. Parents typically supply boys with trucks, toy guns, and superhero paraphernalia, which are active toys that promote motor skills, aggression, and solitary play. Girls are often given dolls and dress-up apparel, which are toys that foster nurturing, social proximity, and role play. Studies have shown that children will most likely choose to play with “gender appropriate” toys (or same-gender toys) even when cross-gender toys are available because parents give children positive feedback (in the form of praise, involvement, and physical closeness) for gender-normative behaviour (Caldera, Huston, and O'Brien, 1998). Sociologists are therefore interested in the ways that children learn to **do gender**, rather than seeing gender roles as predetermined by biology. There is considerable variation in the performance of gender roles within and across cultures, which indicates that they have a social explanation. See [Chapter 5. Socialization](#) for further elaboration on the socialization of gender roles.

Gender stereotypes also form the basis of sexism. **Sexism** refers to prejudiced beliefs that value one sex over another. Sexism varies in its level of severity. In parts of the world where women are strongly undervalued, young girls may not be given the same access to nutrition, health care, and education as boys. Furthermore, they will grow up believing they deserve to be treated differently from boys (Thorne, 1993; UNICEF, 2007). While illegal in Canada when practiced as discrimination, unequal treatment of women continues to pervade social life. It should be noted that discrimination based on sex occurs at both the micro- and macro-levels. Many sociologists focus on discrimination that is built into the social structure; this type of discrimination is known as *institutional discrimination* (Pincus, 2008).

Gender socialization occurs through four major agents of socialization: family, education, peer groups, and mass media. Each agent reinforces gender roles by creating and maintaining normative expectations for gender-specific behaviour. Exposure also occurs through secondary agents such as religion and the workplace. Repeated exposure to these agents over time leads men and women into a false sense that they are acting naturally rather than following a socially constructed role.

Family is the first agent of socialization. There is considerable evidence that parents socialize sons and daughters differently. Generally speaking, girls are given more latitude to step outside of their prescribed gender role (Coltrane and Adams, 2004; Kimmel, 2000; Raffaelli and Ontai, 2004). However, differential socialization typically results in greater

privileges afforded to boys. For instance, sons are allowed more autonomy and independence at an earlier age than daughters. They may be given fewer restrictions on appropriate clothing, dating habits, or curfew. Sons are also often free from performing domestic duties such as cleaning or cooking, and other household tasks that are considered feminine. Daughters are limited by their expectation to be passive, nurturing, and generally obedient, and to assume many of the domestic responsibilities. They do not get the same opportunities as boys to work with tools or engage in physical activities and sports regarded as rough or dangerous.

Even when parents set gender equality as a goal, there may be underlying indications of inequality. For example, when dividing up household chores, boys may be asked to take out the garbage or perform other tasks that require strength or toughness, while girls may be asked to fold laundry or perform duties that require neatness and care. It has been found that fathers are firmer in their expectations for gender conformity than are mothers, and their expectations are stronger for sons than they are for daughters (Kimmel, 2000). This is true in many types of activities, including preference of toys, play styles, discipline, chores, and personal achievements. As a result, boys tend to be particularly attuned to their father's disapproval when engaging in an activity that might be considered feminine, like dancing or singing (Coltrane and Adams, 2008). It should be noted that parental socialization and normative expectations vary along lines of social class, race, and ethnicity. Research in the United States has shown that African American families, for instance, are more likely than whites to model an egalitarian gender role structure for their children (Staples and Boulin Johnson, 2004).

The reinforcement of gender roles and stereotypes continues once a child reaches school age. Until very recently, schools were rather explicit in their efforts to segregate and stratify boys and girls. Girls were encouraged to take home economics or humanities courses and boys to take shop, math, and science courses. Segregation and stratification has also been reinforced in learning materials. Quantitative textual analysis of gender stereotyping in elementary school textbooks in the 1970s also revealed “shocking evidence of various other kinds of rigid stereotyping and of racism” (Priegert Coulter, 1996). Observing the number of times women and men appeared in textbooks, and in what types of work and family roles, indicated that none of the curriculum could be regarded as “positive image” or “non-biased.” By the late 1980s, provincial education policy had established guidelines to remove gender bias in learning materials but children's books still under-represent female characters or present them in stereotypical roles (more emotional, less active, and less associated with science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) subjects), while generally omitting role models outside the gender binary (Casey et al., 2021).

Studies suggest that gender socialization still occurs in schools today, perhaps in less obvious forms (Lips, 2004). Teachers may not even realize that they are acting in ways that reproduce gender-differentiated behaviour patterns. Typically this occurs in three ways. Firstly, teachers themselves are gender role models and can reinforce gender stereotypes by their own behaviour, for example, female teacher's who exhibit “math phobias. Secondly, teachers often display different expectations for male and female students. Thirdly, teachers reinforce gender biases by using gender distinctions to categorize and organize students and student activities. Any time they ask students to arrange their seats or line up according to gender, teachers are asserting that boys and girls should be treated differently (Thorne, 1993).

Even in levels as low as kindergarten, schools subtly convey messages to girls indicating that they are less intelligent or less important than boys. For example, in a study involving teacher responses to male and female students, data indicated that teachers praised male students far more than their female counterparts. Additionally, teachers interrupted girls more and gave boys more opportunities to expand on their ideas (Sadker and Sadker, 1994). Further, in social as well as academic situations, teachers have traditionally positioned boys and girls oppositionally — reinforcing a sense of competition rather than collaboration (Thorne, 1993). Boys are also permitted a greater degree of freedom regarding rule-breaking or minor acts of deviance, whereas girls are expected to follow rules carefully and to adopt an obedient posture (Reay, 2001). Schools reinforce the polarization of gender roles and the age-old “battle of the sexes” by positioning girls and boys in competitive arrangements.

In the case of peer group influences on gender, mimicking the actions of significant others is the first step in the development of a separate sense of self (Mead, 1934). Like adults, children become agents who actively facilitate and apply normative gender expectations to those around them. When children do not conform to the appropriate gender role, they may face negative sanctions such as being criticized or marginalized by their peers. Though many of these sanctions are informal, they can be quite severe. For example, a girl who wishes to play hockey instead of dance lessons

may be called a “tomboy” and face difficulty gaining acceptance from both male and female peer groups (Reay, 2001). Boys, especially, are subject to intense ridicule for gender nonconformity (Coltrane and Adams, 2008; Kimmel, 2000).




Figure 12.15 Female character flowchart focuses on the limited options for female characters in contemporary popular culture. Options along the top read: “Can she carry her own story?” (Yes/No); “Is she three dimensional?” (Yes/No); “Does she represent an idea?” (Yes/No); “Is she killed before the third act?” (Yes/No); “Congratulations! Strong female character.” (Image courtesy of Mlawski and Hann Commander/Overthinking it) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/)

Mass media serves as another significant agent of gender socialization. In television and movies, women tend to have less significant roles and are often portrayed as wives or mothers. When women are given a lead role, they are often one of two extremes: a wholesome, saint-like figure or a malevolent, hypersexual figure (Etaugh and Bridges, 2003). This same inequality is pervasive in children’s movies (Smith, 2008). Research indicates that of the 101 top-grossing G-rated movies released between 1990 and 2005, three out of four characters were male. Out of those 101 movies, only seven were near being gender balanced, with a character ratio of less than 1.5 males per 1 female (Smith, 2008).

Television commercials and other forms of advertising also reinforce inequality and gender-based stereotypes. Women are almost exclusively present in ads promoting cooking, cleaning, or child care-related products (Davis, 1993). Think about the last time one saw a man star in a dishwasher or laundry detergent commercial. In general, women are underrepresented in roles that involve leadership, intelligence, or a balanced psyche. Of particular concern is the depiction of women in ways that are dehumanizing, especially in music videos. Even in mainstream advertising, however, themes intermingling violence and sexuality are quite common (Kilbourne, 2000).

Social Stratification and Inequality



Figure 12.16 Emily Murphy (1868–1933) was the first female magistrate in Canada and the British Commonwealth. She was one of the “Famous Five” who challenged the law that women were not “persons” and therefore not eligible for appointment to the Canadian Senate. (Image courtesy of Provincial Archives of Alberta/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

How do the distinctions between male and female, and the social attribution of different qualities to each, serve to organize our institutions (the family, occupational structure, and the public/private divide, etc.)? How do these distinctions organize differential access to rewards, privileges, and power? In society, how and why are women not treated as the equals of men?

Stratification refers to a system in which groups of people experience unequal access to basic, yet highly valuable, social resources. According to George Murdock’s classic work, *Outline of World Cultures* (1954), all societies classify work by gender. When a pattern appears in all societies, it is called a *cultural universal*. While the phenomenon of assigning work by gender is universal, its specifics are not. The same task is not assigned to either men or women worldwide. But the way each task’s associated gender is valued is notable. In Murdock’s examination of the division of labour among 324 societies around the world, he found that in nearly all cases the jobs assigned to men were given greater prestige (Murdock and White, 1969). Even if the job types were very similar and the differences slight, men’s work was still considered more vital.

Canadian society is also characterized by gender stratification. Evidence of gender stratification is especially keen within the economic realm. In Canada, women’s experience with wage labour includes unequal treatment in comparison to men in many respects:

- Women continue to do more of the unpaid labour in the household — meal preparation and cleanup, childcare, elderly care, household management, and shopping — even if they have a job outside the home. In 2010, women spent an average 50 hours a week looking after children compared to 24.4 hours a week for men, 13.8 hours a week doing household work compared to 8.3 hours for men, and, of those caring for elderly family members, 49% of women spent more than 10 hours a week caring for a senior compared to 25% for men (Statistics Canada, 2011). This double duty keeps working women in a subordinate role in the family structure and prevents them from achieving the salaries of men in the paid workforce (Hochschild and Machung, 1989).
- Women’s participation in the labour force has been increasing from 42% of women in 1976 to 58% of women in 2009 (Statistics Canada, 2011). Women now make up 48% of the total labour force (compared to 37% in 1976). They continue to dominate in “pink collar” occupations and part-time work, which are low paying, low status, often unskilled jobs that offer little possibility for advancement. In 2009, 67% of women still worked in traditionally “feminine” occupations like teaching, nursing, clerical, administrative or sales, and service jobs. 70% of part-time workers and 60% of minimum wage workers were women (Ferrao, 2010).
- Despite women making up nearly half (48%) of payroll employment, men vastly outnumber them in authoritative, powerful, and, therefore, high-earning jobs (Statistics Canada, 2011). Women’s income for full-year, full-time workers has remained at 72% of the income of men since 1992. This in part reflects the fact that women are more likely than men to work in part-time or temporary employment. The comparison of average hourly wage is better: Women earned 83% of men’s average hourly wage in 2008, up from 76% in 1988 (Statistics Canada, 2011; see Statistics Canada, 2018, for a more updated report). However, as one report noted, if the gender gap in wages continues to close at the same glacial rate, women will not earn the same as men until the year 2240 (McInturff, 2013).

The reason for the gender gap in wages is fourfold. Firstly, there is **gender discrimination** in hiring and salary. Women and men are often not rewarded equally for the same work despite the fact discrimination on the basis of sex is unconstitutional in Canada. Secondly, as noted above, men and women tend to be concentrated in different types of work which are not equally paid. Often because of choices made in high school and postsecondary education, women are limited to pink collar types of occupation. Thirdly, the unequal distribution of domestic duties, especially child and elder care, women are unable to work the same number of hours as men and experience disruptions in their career path. Fourthly, the work typically done by women is arbitrarily undervalued with respect to the work typically performed by men. It is certainly questionable that early childhood education occupations dominated by women involve less skill, less training, or less significance to society than many occupations dominated by men like tech support or construction, but there is a clear disparity in wages between these typically gender segregated types of occupation.

One way in which gender roles affect women's access to higher paying jobs and leadership positions is the **glass ceiling** phenomenon. Whereas most of the explicit barriers to women's achievement have been removed through legislative action, norms of gender equality, and affirmative action policies, women often get stuck at the level of middle management. There is a glass ceiling or invisible barrier that prevents them from achieving positions of leadership (Tannen, 1994). This is also reflected in gender inequality in income over time.

Early in their careers men's and women's incomes are more or less equal but at mid-career, the gap increases significantly (McInturff, 2013).

Tannen (1994) argues that this barrier exists in part because of the different work styles of men and women, in particular conversational-style differences. Whereas men are very aggressive in their conversational style and their self-promotion, women are typically consensus builders who seek to avoid appearing bossy and arrogant. As a communicative strategy of office politics, it is common for men to say "I" and claim personal credit in situations where women would be more likely to use "we" and emphasize teamwork. As it is men who are often in the positions to make promotion decisions, they interpret women's style of communication "as showing indecisiveness, inability to assume authority, and even incompetence"

(Tannen, 1994).

Beyond the economic sphere, there has been a long history of power relations based on gender in Canada. When looking to the past, it would appear that society has made great strides in terms of abolishing some of the most blatant forms of gender inequality (see timeline below) but the underlying effects of male dominance still permeate many aspects of society. The issue remains especially pertinent with regard to political representation. As elected representatives, the ratio of women to men in federal parliament and provincial legislatures is about 1 in 4, or 25% (McInturff, 2013).

- Before 1859 – Married women were not allowed to own or control property
- Before 1909 – Abducting a woman who was not an heiress was not a crime
- Before 1918 – Women were not permitted to vote (propertied women's right to vote was taken away in New France in 1849)
- Before 1929 – Women were not legally considered "persons"
- Before 1953 – Employers could legally pay a woman less than a man for the same work
- Before 1969 – Women did not have the right to a safe and legal abortion (Nellie McClung Foundation, N.d.)

Making Connections: Sociological Research

Is the Patriarchy Dead?



Figure 12.17 In some cultures, women do all of the household chores with no help from men, as doing housework is a sign of weakness which is considered by society as a feminine trait. (Photo courtesy of Evil Erin/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

It is becoming more common to hear post-feminist arguments that in liberal democracies like Canada, the war against patriarchy (i.e., male rule) has more or less been won. The days in which women were not permitted to work or hold a credit card in their own name are over. Today women are working outside the home more than ever, they are narrowing the wage gap with men (albeit slowly), and they are surpassing men in getting university degrees. They are now as free as men to have a credit card and get into debt. These arguments are more complicated than the post-feminist slogan “patriarchy is dead” suggests, but it is clear that the question of gender inequality is more ambiguous than it once was.

Table 12.1. Women's wages as a percentage of men's in Canada (hourly wage ratio), from 1988 to 2008. [\[Skip Table\]](#)

Year	Total Percentage of Men's Wages	Women Aged 25 to 29 years	Women Aged 30 to 34 years	Women Aged 35 to 39 years	Women Aged 40 to 44 years	Women Aged 45 to 49 years	Women Aged 50 to 54 years
1988	0.757	0.846	0.794	0.768	0.736	0.681	0.645
1993	0.794	0.905	0.886	0.772	0.762	0.700	0.709
1998	0.811	0.901	0.851	0.805	0.808	0.750	0.749
2003	0.825	0.920	0.868	0.843	0.804	0.768	0.771
2008	0.833	0.901	0.858	0.837	0.825	0.784	0.807
Difference from 1988 to 2008	0.076	0.056	0.064	0.068	0.089	0.103	0.162

Source (Statistics Canada, 2011, p 166)

As noted above, women's annual income (for full-time employees) remains at 72% of that earned by men. However, this figure is misleading because it does not take into account that men on average work 3.7 hours more a week than women (Statistics Canada, 2011, p. 166-167). Table 12.1 compares men's and women's hourly wage and shows that between 1988 and 2008, the wage gap has narrowed for each of the age groups. On average, women went from earning 76% of men's hourly wage to 83%. Young women ages 25 to 29 now earn 90% of young men's hourly wage. As the Statistics Canada report says, "younger women are more likely to have high levels of education, work full-time, and be employed in different types of jobs than their older female counterparts" (Statistics Canada, 2011), which accounts for the difference between the age groups.

However, is this a good news story? First, the difference between the 72% figure (gender difference in annual income) and the 83% figure (gender difference in hourly wage) reveals, for reasons which are unclear from the statistics, that women are not working in occupations that pay as well or offer as many hours of work per week as men's occupations. Second, the gender gap is closing in large part because men's wages have remained flat or decreased. In particular, young men who worked traditionally in high paying manufacturing jobs have seen declines in union coverage and real wages (Drolet, 2011, p. 8). Third, even though young women have higher levels of education than young men, and even though they choose to work in higher paying jobs in education and health than previous generations of women, they still earn 10% less per hour than young men. That is still a substantial difference in wages that is unaccounted for. Fourth, the real problem is that although men and women increasingly begin their careers on equal footing, by mid-career, when workers are beginning to maximize their earning potential, women fall behind and continue to do so into retirement. Why?

Theoretical Perspectives on Gender

Sociological theories serve to guide the research process and offer a means for interpreting research data and explaining social phenomena. For example, a sociologist interested in gender stratification in education may study why middle-

school girls are more likely than their male counterparts to fall behind grade-level expectations in math and science. Another sociologist might investigate why women are underrepresented in political office, while another might examine how women in corporate management are treated by their male counterparts in meetings. Positivist approaches seek to establish and explain law-like relationships between variables. Structural functionalists, for example, examine gendered social roles and norms as products of the functional requirements of institutions. Critical sociology focuses on the power relationships that create and reproduce inequalities between the genders, whereas interpretive sociology examines how meanings and inferences about gender differences are established and circulate in society. Each type of theory provides a different angle for sociologists to pursue their research.

Structural Functionalism

Structural functionalism provided one of the most important perspectives of sociological research in the 20th century and has been a major influence on research in the social sciences, including gender studies. Viewing the family as the most integral component of society, assumptions about the complementarity of gender roles within marriage assume a prominent place in this perspective.

Functionalists argue that complementary gender roles were established well before the preindustrial era when men typically took care of responsibilities outside of the home, such as hunting, hard physical labour, and combat, and women typically took care of the domestic responsibilities in or around the home. These roles are considered functional because women were frequently limited by the physical restraints of pregnancy and nursing, and unable to leave the home for long periods of time. Men were less limited. Once established, these roles were passed on to subsequent generations since they served as an effective means of keeping the family system functioning properly.

Jumping forward to the modern era, gender roles began to change. Norms of equality, established in the democratic revolutions of the 18th century, began to be extended to women and other subordinate groups. The transition from feudalism to industrial capitalism reduced the size of families and the economic importance of the family as a unit. Social and economic changes in Canada during and after World War II, produced further changes in the family structure. During the war, many women had to assume the role of breadwinner alongside their domestic role in order to stabilize the wartime society. This created a tension following WWII when men returned from war and wanted to reclaim their civilian jobs. Many women did not want to forfeit the independence that came with their wage-earning positions (Hawke, 2007). In the 1960s as Canadian society shifted from a Fordist to post-Fordist economy, and from the welfare state to neoliberalism, it became increasingly difficult for families to survive on the wages of a single breadwinner and the majority of women entered the workforce permanently. From the point of view of structural functionalism, where every component of the social system as a whole is interrelated, these changes were interpreted as a source of societal imbalance that had ramifications throughout society.

For example, Talcott Parsons (1958) argued that the contradiction between occupational roles and kinship roles of men and women in North America created tension or strain on individuals as they tried to adapt to the conflicting norms or requirements. The division of traditional middle-class gender roles within the family – the husband as breadwinner and wife as homemaker – was functional for him because the roles were complementary. They enabled a clear division of labour between spouses, which ensured that the ongoing functional needs of the family were being met. Within the North American kinship system, wives and husbands' roles were equally valued according to Parsons. However, within the occupational system, only the husband's role as breadwinner was valued. There was an "asymmetrical relation of the marriage pair to the occupational structure." Being barred from the occupational system meant that women had to find a functional equivalent to their husbands' occupational status to demonstrate their "fundamental equality" with their husbands. As a result, Parson theorized that these tensions would lead women to become expressive specialists in order to claim social prestige (e.g., showing "good taste" in appearance, household furnishings, literature, and music), while men would remain instrumental or technical specialists and become culturally narrow. He also proposed that the instability of the female role in this system

would lead to excesses in women like neuroses, compulsive domesticity, garishness in taste, disproportionate attachment to community activities, and the "glamour girl" pattern: "the use of specifically feminine devices as an instrument of compulsive search for power and exclusive attention" (Parsons, 1943).

Contemporary functionalism asks how new forms of stable equilibrium are created in society when gender roles and family structures have become more fluid.



Figure 12.18 Talcott Parsons argued that tensions in North American women's roles would lead women to become "expressive specialists" in order to claim social prestige. (Photo courtesy of Ethan/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Critical Sociology

According to critical sociology, society is structured by relations of power and domination among social groups including genders that determine access to scarce resources. When sociologists examine gender from this perspective, they can view men as the dominant group and women as the subordinate group. According to critical sociology, social problems and contradictions are created when dominant groups exploit or oppress subordinate groups. Consider the women's suffrage movement or the debate over women's "right to choose" their reproductive futures. Even in societies with norms and laws supporting gender equality, it is difficult for women to rise to equality with men, as dominant group members create the rules for success and opportunity in society (Farrington and Chertok, 1993). The **glass ceiling** phenomenon discussed above is an example.



Figure 12.19 Friedrich Engels (1820–1895). A frequent collaborator with Karl Marx, in 1884 he published *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* where he analyzed the double exploitation of women in the emerging capitalist society. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Friedrich Engels (1884) studied family structure and gender roles in the 1880s in the historical context of the development of capitalism. Engels showed that the transition from the household, as the site of production under feudalism, to the capitalist workplace separate from the household lead to a **double exploitation of women**. The same exploitative owner-worker relationship seen in the labour force is seen in the household, with women assuming the role of the household proletariat. Women's unpaid domestic labour supports not only the household itself (and the raising of new workers), but the ability of their male partners, (and increasingly their own), to provide labour to employers. Women are therefore doubly exploited in capitalist society: both when they work outside the home and when they work within the home. This is due to women's dependence on men for the attainment of wages, which is even more constraining for women who are entirely dependent upon their spouses for economic support. Contemporary critical sociologists suggest that when women become wage earners, they can gain power in the family structure and create more democratic arrangements in the home, although they may still carry the majority of the domestic burden, as noted earlier (Risman and Johnson-Sumerford, 1998).

Feminist Theory

Feminist theory is a type of critical sociology that examines inequalities in gender-related issues. It also uses the critical approach to examine the *maintenance* of gender roles and inequalities. Radical feminism, in particular, considers the role of the family in perpetuating male dominance. In patriarchal societies, men's contributions are seen as more valuable than those of women. Women are essentially the property of men. Through the feminist struggles for women's emancipation in post-feudal modern society, the property relationship has been formally eliminated. Nevertheless, women still tend to be relegated to the private sphere, where domestic roles define their primary status identity. Men's roles and primary status continues to be largely defined by their activities in the public or occupational sphere.

As a result, women often perceive a disconnect between their personal experiences and the way the world is represented by society as a whole. Dorothy Smith referred to this phenomenon as **bifurcated consciousness** (Smith, 1987). There is a division between the directly lived, bodily experience of women's worlds (e.g., their responsibilities for looking after children, aging parents, and household tasks) and the dominant, abstract, institutional world to which they must adapt (the work and administrative world of bureaucratic rules, documents, and cold, calculative reasoning). Modern society situates women in a world where there are two modes of knowing, experiencing, and acting that are directly at odds with one another (Smith, 2008). Patriarchal perspectives and arrangements, widespread and taken for granted, are built into the relations of ruling. As a result, not only do women find it difficult to see their experiences acknowledged in the wider patriarchal culture, their viewpoints also tend to be silenced or marginalized to the point of being discredited or considered invalid.

Sanday's study of the Indonesian Minangkabau (2004) revealed that in societies that some consider to be matriarchies (where women are the dominant group), women and men tend to work cooperatively rather than competitively, regardless of whether a job is considered feminine by North American standards. The men, however, do not experience the sense of bifurcated consciousness under this social structure that modern Canadian females encounter (Sanday, 2004).

For feminist scholars of the 1970s and 1980s, the point of identifying gender norms and social conventions was to undercut their cultural force—to free people from behavioral and social expectations that were based on their biological sex. For some gender nonconformists, traits traditionally identified as masculine or feminine are accepted as masculine

or feminine,

but nonconformists want the freedom to express their gender with whatever combination of traits they choose. For example, a person can present as a “femme” transgender woman and still consider themselves as nonbinary (Williams 2019). Moreover, any particular gender identity can be ephemeral—that is, transitory and temporary—as opposed to an enduring commitment.

For some gender nonconformists the very idea of “gender” seems obsolete and society should embrace **postgenderism**. Shulamith Firestone advocated the spirit of postgenderism even before “gender” entered the vocabulary of feminist politics. She wrote in 1970 that, “[The] end goal of feminist revolution must be, unlike that of the first feminist movement, not just the elimination of male privilege but of the sex distinction itself: genital differences between human beings would no longer matter culturally” (Firestone, 1970). Similarly, though Sandra Bem did not use the term “post-gender,” in hindsight it seems fair to describe her dream as a postgender society: “[H]uman behaviors and personality attributes should no longer be linked to gender, and society should stop projecting gender into situations irrelevant to genitalia” (Bem, 1983).

Note: The last two paragraphs have been adapted from from Edward Schiappa, 2021, *The Transgender Exigency: Defining Sex*

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Figure 12.20 People who exhibit gender variance have been described variously as androgynous, gender fluid, gender bending, gender diverse, nonbinary, pangender, and in general “gender nonconformist” (Schiappa, 2021). (Photo courtesy of Zackary Drucker/The Gender Spectrum Collection.) [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Interpretive Sociology and Symbolic Interactionism

Symbolic interactionism aims to understand human behaviour by analyzing the central role of symbols in human interaction. Establishing the meaning of symbols creates a common “definition of the situation” which enables coordinated activities to be carried out. This is certainly relevant to the discussion of masculinity and femininity. As noted earlier, people are rarely given the opportunity in social interactions to clinically determine the sex of the people they are interacting with. Sex is typically “read off” of gender displays and gestures such as clothing, jewelry, makeup, hair style, mannerisms, role performance, tone of voice, etc. and then judgements are made about *how* feminine or *how* masculine the person is that affect how the interaction unfolds. Gender is typically perceived through signs, displays and gender performances. When people perform tasks or possess characteristics based on the gender role assigned to them, they are said to be **doing gender** (West and Zimmerman, 1987). Whether a person is expressing their masculinity or femininity, West and Zimmerman argue, they are *always* “doing gender.” Thus, gender is something a person *does*, signals or performs, not something they *are*.

Sociologist Charles H. Cooley’s concept of the “looking-glass self” (1902) is also relevant here (see [Chapter 5. Socialization](#)). Cooley suggests that one’s determination of self is based mainly on the view of others in society (for instance, if other people perceive a man as masculine, then that man will perceive himself as masculine). In other words, one interiorizes an image of oneself as male, female, or non-binary based on the ongoing reactions or judgements of others.

Because the meanings attached to symbols are socially created and not natural, and fluid, not static, people act and react to symbols based on the current assigned meaning. For example, in Gutmann’s study of **machismo** in contemporary Mexico City, he notes that the use of the term “machismo” for the stereotypical virile, aggressive,

intransigent, hyper-masculine “macho” male has a relatively recent history, coming into usage in the early mid-20th century through the emergence of the Mexican film industry and the consolidation of the Mexican nation-state. Older men he interviewed in the poor district of Colonia Santo Domingo tended to divide males into *machos* (honourable men who looked after their families) and *mandilones* (female-dominated men), but they felt that the true macho men of the past were a disappearing type. Younger men in the district tended to regard the term *macho* pejoratively, as not worthy of emulation. They characterized themselves as “non-macho,” neither-macho-nor-mandilón. “For these younger men, then, the present period is distinguished by its liminal character with respect to male gender identities: as neither-macho-nor-mandilón, these men are precisely betwixt and between assigned cultural positions” (Gutmann, 2007).

These shifts in symbolic meaning apply to family structure as well. In 1976, when only 27.6% of married women with preschool-aged children were part of the paid workforce, a working mother was still considered an anomaly and there was a general view that women who worked were “selfish” and not good mothers. Today, a majority of women with preschool-aged children are part of the paid workforce (66.5%), and a working mother is viewed as normal (Statistics Canada, 2011). The working mother is not only the product of economic necessity, as critical sociologists have argued, but of the communicative processes that have led to a general societal consensus on the changing meaning of a “good mother.”

Nevertheless, the conceptual opposition between male and female, and the privileging of masculine over feminine qualities, is remarkably enduring in Western culture. Interpretive sociologists influenced by the study of semiotics – the science of signs – point to deep and often hidden or unconscious structures of language that take the form of binary oppositions to explain this. **Binary oppositions** are paired terms like male/female, rationality/emotion, mind/body, culture/nature, black/white, etc. that carry opposed or opposite meanings. Logically, the meaning of something becomes clearer if what it does *not* mean can be determined. Binary pairs, particularly binary opposites, form the elementary structure of meaning in all human signifying systems, yet there are no binary relations in nature, only in culture. It is a scheme imposed on nature. Observable *differences* between males and females are translated into *conceptual opposites*, not because of any inherent properties each might have, but only because they are conceptually opposed. Similarities are discarded.

An example of this is the phrase “men are from Mars, women are from Venus” used in pop psychology. Ideas of men and women being complete opposites invite simplistic comparisons that rely on stereotypes: men are practical, women are emotional; men are strong, women are weak; men lead, women support. Binary notions seem to be built into the language a society uses to communicate, but they mask complicated realities and variety in the realm of social identity. They also erase the existence of individuals, such as multiracial or mixed-race people and people with non-binary gender identities, who may identify with neither of the assumed categories or with multiple categories.

Making Connections: Sociological Research

Being Male, Being Female, and Being Healthy



Figure 12.21 Female patient with sleep hysteria wearing a straight jacket, from the Hôpital Salpêtrière (Paris, France). Hysteria was a common diagnosis of emotional disturbance in women in the 19th century and referred historically to the idea of a “wandering” uterus. (Image courtesy of Société de neurologie de Paris, 1906-18 in the Wellcome Collection/ Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 4.0](#)

In 1971, Broverman and Broverman conducted a groundbreaking study on the traits mental health workers ascribed to males and females. When asked to name the characteristics of a female, the list featured words such as unaggressive, gentle, emotional, tactful, less logical, not ambitious, dependent, passive, and neat. The list of male characteristics featured words such as aggressive, rough, unemotional, blunt, logical, direct,

active, and sloppy (Seem and Clark, 2006). Later, when asked to describe the characteristics of a healthy person (not gender-specific), the list was nearly identical to that of a male.

This study uncovered the general assumption that being female is associated with being somewhat unhealthy or not of sound mind. This concept seems extremely dated, but in 2006, Seem and Clark replicated the study and found similar results. Again, the characteristics associated with a healthy male were very similar to that of a healthy (genderless) adult. The list of characteristics associated with being female broadened somewhat but did not show significant change from the original study (Seem and Clark, 2006). This interpretation of feminine characteristics may help us one day to better understand gender disparities in certain illnesses, such as why one in eight women can be expected to develop clinical depression in her lifetime (National Institute of Mental Health 1999). Perhaps these diagnoses are not just a reflection of women's health, but also a reflection of society's labeling of female characteristics as pathological, or the result of institutionalized sexism.

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12.3 Sex and Sexuality



Figure 12.22 The social forms of eroticism and sexuality can differ greatly among groups and subcultures. (Photo courtesy of Max Guitare/Flickr) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

Sexuality is defined as a person's capacity for erotic feelings and the sexual orientation of those feelings. It refers to the predominant patterns of sexual and romantic fantasies, desires, and behaviours of a person at a particular period of their lives (Devor, 2020). Studying sexual orientations and practices is a particularly interesting field of sociology because sexual behaviour is a cultural universal. Throughout time and place, the vast majority of human beings have participated in sexual relationships (Broude, 2003). Each society and each historical period, however, interprets, regulates and practices sexuality and sexual activity in different ways.

Mary McIntosh's "The Homosexual Role" (1968) was a path breaking study of sexuality in the field of sociology. She distinguished between the *social roles* and actual *behaviours* of sexualities. She used a historical and cross-cultural comparative framework to show that the role of sexual nonconformity was a product of socially constructed categories rather than a medical or psychological condition. As she put it,

The current conceptualization of homosexuality as a [medical or psychological] condition is a false one, resulting from ethnocentric bias. Homosexuality should be seen rather as a social role. Anthropological evidence shows that the role does not exist in all societies, and where it does it is not always the same as in modern western societies. Historical evidence shows that the role did not emerge in England until towards the end of the seventeenth century. Evidence from the “Kinsey Reports” shows that, in spite of the existence of the role in our society, much homosexual behavior occurs outside the recognized role and the polarization between the heterosexual man and the homosexual man is far from complete (1968).

In her analysis, McIntosh made important distinctions between the social role of the sexual nonconformist in society and the actual sexual behaviour pattern of people, as empirical evidence from the Kinsey reports showed that these do not neatly match up. The social role of the homosexual in the 1960s came with expectations of exclusive or predominant homoerotic feelings and behaviours, as well as stereotyped notions of an effeminate manner and preferred sexual activity. The role did not necessarily match the actual sexual behaviour of individuals however and excluded “heterosexual” people who may occasionally engage in or fantasize about homoerotic liaisons.

In North American society of the 1960s, social role of the homosexual was used as an element in the social control of sexuality to mark a threshold between permitted and non-permitted activities. Many other cultures recognize and approve a distinct, institutionalized homosexual role, like the *alyhā* and *hwamē* in the Mohave nation, or a period of homosexual relationships between otherwise heterosexual boys and men, as among the Aranda of central Australia or in ancient Greece. As a medical or psychological label, “homosexuality” confused a social designation with a medical or psychological condition. McIntosh concluded that doctors and psychologists were little more than “diagnostic agents in the process of social labeling” (McIntosh, 1968).

Her observations extend beyond the role of the homosexual and can be applied to other forms of sexuality and sexual practice. What is considered “normal” in terms of sexual behaviour is based on the mores and values of the society. Many societies around the world have different attitudes concerning premarital sex, the age of sexual consent, homosexuality, masturbation, and other sexual behaviours, which are not consistent with the moral, psychological and medicalized discourses of North America (Widmer, Treas, and Newcomb, 1998).

What appears to be consistent cross-culturally is the existence of some form of social recognition, normative structure or institutionalization to regulate desire. Sigmund Freud argued that the repression or channeling of sexual desire was a condition of all civilization. “Civilization is built up on a renunciation of instinct” (Freud, 1961 (1930)). What he regarded as primary, instinctual urges for sexual gratification and pleasure are incompatible with social order unless they can be repressed, deferred, redirected or sublimated. Individuals must therefore manage the tension between their instinctual drives for immediate gratification (the **pleasure principle**) and the reality of the restrictions, rules and moral codes of the social order in which transgressions are punished (the **reality principle**). In order to work for eight hours in a day, for example, the individual needs to delay gratification of sexual and other desires until a more appropriate moment and situation when these are socially permitted.

The study of sexuality in sociology has expanded enormously in the last 30 years. Three themes sociologists have focused on are the control of women’s sexuality, the diversity of sexualities, and the social or biopolitical regulation of sexuality.

The Control of Women's Sexuality



Figure 12.23 Afghan girl attends a meeting in Balish Kalay Village, Urgan District, Afghanistan. The global Women Peace and Security Index ranks Afghanistan as the worst place in the world to be a woman (GIWPS, 2022). An estimated two-thirds of Afghan girls do not attend school. Eighty-seven per cent of Afghan women are illiterate, while 70–80 per cent face forced marriage, many before the age of 16 (Amnesty International, 2011). (Image courtesy of DVIDSHUB/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Patriarchal societies are particularly restrictive in their attitudes about sex when it comes to women and sexuality. In traditional patriarchal societies, private property is inherited through the male lineage father to son, so it is not just a matter of pride, but of power, wealth and status to establish biological paternity. As biological paternity is difficult to determine with certainty without modern genetic testing, control of women's sexuality is central to this system. Moreover, because women marry into the husband's family, women themselves become property and items of exchange. This leads to the establishment of patriarchal norms, customs and practices based on the control of women's sexuality, often legitimated and grounded in religious belief. As Christ (2016) summarizes:

The customs that surround patriarchal marriage have the intention of making certain that a man's children are his biologically. These customs include: the requirement that brides be untouched sexually or 'virgin'; the 'protection' of a girl's virginity by her father and brothers; the seclusion of girls and women in the home; the veiling or covering of women's hair or bodies; the requirement that wives must be sexually faithful to their husbands; and the enforcement of these customs through shaming, violence, and the threat of violence (Christ, 2016).

Women's free expression and disposition of their sexuality threatens the patriarchal structure and ideology, which explains to some degree the intensity of contemporary debates about women's right to control their own bodies and access to birth control and abortion in the US. Similarly, opposition to LGBTQ2+ rights and gay marriage has its roots in the fundamental importance of the heterosexual marriage as a means of controlling women and ensuring that inheritance passes to a man's legitimate heirs.

Despite changing norms, and the extension of rights to women and LGBTQ2+ individuals, in many respects North American culture remains restrictive when it comes to women and sexuality. This is manifest in the double standards that apply to the sexuality of men and women. It is widely believed that men are more sexual than women. In fact, there is a popular notion that men think about sex every seven seconds. Research, however, suggests that men think about sex an average of 19 times per day, compared to 10 times per day for women (Fisher, Moore, and Pittenger, 2011). The belief that men have — or have the right to — more sexual urges than women creates a double standard. Ira Reiss, a pioneer researcher in the field of sexual studies, defined the **double standard** as prohibiting premarital sexual intercourse for women but allowing it for men (Reiss, 1960).

This standard has evolved into allowing women to engage in premarital sex only within committed love relationships, but allowing men to engage in sexual relationships with as many partners as they wish without condition (Milhausen and Herold, 1999). Due to this double standard, a woman is likely to have fewer sexual partners in her lifetime than a man. According to a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2011 survey, the average 35-year-old woman has had three opposite-sex sexual partners while the average 35-year-old man has had twice as many (Centers for Disease Control, 2011). In a study of 1,479 Canadians over the age of 18, men had had an average of 11.25 sexual partners over their lifetime whereas women had an average of 4 (Fischtein, Herold, and Desmarais, 2007).

Another mechanism used to control women's sexuality is **gender-based violence**. Gender-based violence refers to harmful acts directed at an individual based on their gender (UNHCR, 2022). They can include a wide variety of behaviours, from violent sexual assault to unwelcome comments, actions or advances, but have the effect of causing victims to feel unsafe, uncomfortable or threatened. The term gender-based violence highlights not only the manner in which transgender people, gay men, and women often experience violence, but also how violence takes place more broadly within the context of a society that is characterized by a sex/gender/sexuality system that disparages femininity, sexual minorities, and gender minorities. In public places and on-line, one in three (32%) women and one in eight (13%) men experienced unwanted sexual behaviour in 2018 according to the Statistics Canada Survey of Safety in Public and Private Spaces (Cotter and Savage, 2019). For both men and women, younger age and sexual orientation (other than heterosexual) increased the odds of experiencing this behaviour more than any other factor. Approximately 4.7 million women in Canada—or 30% of all women 15 years of age and older—reported that they had been a victim of sexual assault at least once since the age of 15 (compared to 1.2 million or 8% of men).

Intimate partner violence refers to emotional, sexual and physical violence by one partner against another and includes “current and former spouses, girlfriends, and boyfriends” (Kirk and Okazawa-Rey 2004). Intimate partner violence occurs in queer as well as heterosexual relationships, but this violence is quite clearly gendered in heterosexual relationships. Almost half (44%) of all women 15 years of age and older who had ever been in an intimate partner relationship reported experiencing some kind of psychological, physical, or sexual violence in the context of an intimate relationship (Cotter, 2021). The most common abusive behaviours were emotional or psychological abuse: being put down or called names (31%), being prevented from talking to others by their partner (29%), being told they were crazy, stupid, or not good enough (27%), having their partner demand to know where they were and who they were with at all times (19%), or being shaken, grabbed, pushed, or thrown (17%). However 23% of women also reported being physically assaulted and 12% being sexually assaulted in the context of intimate relationships. Four in ten (37%) women who were victims of intimate partner violence said that they had lived in fear of a partner.

The intersectional effects of race, sexual orientation, disability and age also increase the likelihood of women experiencing intimate partner violence and gender-based violence. The prevalence of these types of violence is significantly higher among Indigenous women, LGBTQ2+ women, women with disabilities, and young women (Cotter, 2021; Cotter and Savage, 2019).

The Diversity of Sexualities

Adrienne Rich (1980) called heterosexuality “compulsory,” meaning firstly that all people are assumed to be heterosexual and secondly that society is full of formal and informal enforcements that encourage heterosexuality and penalize sexual variation. **Compulsory heterosexuality** plays an important role in reproducing inequality in the lives of sexual minorities. Around the world at least 68 countries have national laws that criminalize same-sex relations between men, 38 countries criminalize same-sex relations between women, and 9 countries criminalize forms of gender expression that target transgender and gender nonconforming people. Many of the laws of former British colonies criminalize same-sex acts in explicitly normative terms as “carnal knowledge against the order of nature,” “debauchery,” “pederasty,” “unnatural and indecent acts,” or “gross indecency” (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

There are indications of global changes in attitude however. Since 2000, when the Netherlands became the first country to legalize same sex marriage, 30 countries and territories have enacted national laws allowing gays and lesbians to marry, including Canada in 2005 (Pew Research Center, 2019). Gender expression and identity have been protected in the *Canadian Human Rights Act* and the *Criminal Code* since 2017 (Statistics Canada, 2021). Attitudes towards societal acceptance of homosexuality have also become more positive around the world between 2002 and 2020, including in the United States, where 72% say it should be accepted, compared with just 49% as recently as 2007 (Pew Research Center, 2020). In Canada 85% said homosexuality should be socially accepted in 2020 compared to 69% in 2002. The world remains divided on the question, with those in Western Europe and the Americas being more accepting of homosexuality than those in Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. The issue is also divisive along religious and political lines.

In Canada, there are approximately one million LGBTQ2+ people, representing 4% of the total population aged 15 and older in 2018 (Statistics Canada, 2021). Of these, 75,000 self-identified as trans or non-binary, accounting for 0.24% of the Canadian population. There were also 72,880 same-sex couples in Canada reported in the 2016 census, representing 0.9% of all couples. One third of all same-sex couples in Canada in 2016 were married, whereas two-thirds were living common-law.

An accurate picture of sexual diversity needs to take into account the complex relationships between sex, gender and sexuality. Not all transgender people are sexually queer for example. A trans man who previously identified as a lesbian may still be attracted to women and may identify as straight, or may identify as queer. Another trans man may be attracted to other men and identify as gay or queer. This multiplicity suggests that the culturally dominant binary model fails to accurately encapsulate the wide variety of sexual and gender lived experiences.

Devor (2020) develops the concept of **gendered sexuality** to describe sexual orientations which take into account both sexes and genders of people. This recognizes that individuals vary in the relationship of their biological sex and social gender, and that while sexual orientation tends to be an attraction to a particular style of *gender* presentation, it also involves the physiological element of biological sex. He describes three examples of gendered sexualities to provide a provisional schema to map the complexity of sexual diversity:

Table 12.2. Three examples of gendered sexuality in couples (Devor, 2020) [\[Skip Table\]](#)

#	Persons in Relationship	Sex	Sex by Sex	Gender	Gender by Gender	Gendered Sexuality
1	Male Crossdresser	Male	Male Heterosexual	Woman	Lesbian Woman	Male Heterosexual Crossdresser
	Female Woman	Female	Female Heterosexual	Woman	Lesbian Woman	Lesbian Woman Female Heterosexual Lesbian Woman
2	Male Crossdresser	Male	Male Homosexual	Woman	Straight Woman	Male Homosexual Crossdresser Straight Woman
	Male Man	Male	Male Homosexual	Man	Straight Man	Male Homosexual Straight Man
3	Male Crossdresser	Male	Male Heterosexual	Woman	Straight Woman	Male Heterosexual Crossdresser Straight Woman
	Female Crossdresser	Female	Female Heterosexual	Man	Straight Man	Female Heterosexual Crossdresser Straight Man

In Table 12.2, “Sex by sex” refers to sexual orientations on the basis of the sexes of people (described as heterosexual / homosexual / bisexual), whereas “gender by gender” refers to sexual orientations on the basis of gender presentations of people (described as gay / lesbian / straight / bi). **Gendered sexuality** therefore describes the sexual orientation of each person in the relationship based on their own sex and gender, the sex and gender of their partners, and the direction of their sexual attraction to sex and gender. This becomes even more complex when one recognizes that the options listed under sex and gender (male/female, man/woman) are more fluid in practice.

The Social and Biopolitical Regulation of Sexuality

Making Connections: Big Picture

The History of Homosexuality: Social Constructionism and Making Up People



Figure 12.24 Two men in Florence kissing. Bartolomeo Cesi, 1600. (Image courtesy of Bartolomeo Cesi (1556–1629) at the Uffizi Gallery/Wikimedia Commons) [Public Domain](#)

One of the principal insights of contemporary sociology is that a focus on the social construction of different social experiences and problems leads to alternative ways of understanding them and responding to them. The sociologist often confronts a legacy of entrenched beliefs concerning innate biological disposition, or the individual psychopathology of persons who are considered abnormal. The sexual or gender “deviant” is a primary example. However, as Ian Hacking (2006) observes, even when these beliefs about *kinds of persons* are products of objective scientific classification, the institutional context of science and expert knowledge is not independent of societal norms, beliefs, and practices. The process of

classifying *kinds of people* is a social process that Hacking calls “making up people” and Howard Becker (1963) calls “labeling.”

A homosexual was first defined as a *kind of person* in the 19th century: the sexual “invert.” This definition was “scientific,” but in no way independent of the cultural norms and prejudices of the times. The idea that homosexuals were characterized by an internal, deviant “inversion” of sexual instincts depended on the new scientific disciplines of biology and psychiatry (Foucault, 1980). The homosexual’s deviance was defined first by the idea that heterosexuality was biologically natural (and therefore “normal”) and second by the idea that, psychologically, sexual preference defined every aspect of the personality. Within the emerging field of psychiatry, it was possible to speak of an inverted personality because a lesbian woman who did not play the “proper” passive sexual role of her gender was masculine. A gay man who did not play his “proper” active sexual role was effeminate. After centuries during which an individual’s sexual preference was largely a matter of public indifference, in the 19th century, the problem of sexuality suddenly emerged as a biological, social, psychological, and moral concern.

The new definitions of homosexuality and sexual inversion led to a series of social anxieties that ranged from a threat to the propagation of the human species, to the perceived need to “correct” sexual deviation through psychiatric and medical treatments. The powerful normative constraints that emerged based largely on the 19th century scientific distinction between natural and unnatural forms of sexuality lead to the legacy of closeted sexuality and homophobic violence that remains to this day. Ironically, conservative Evangelical Christian movements also base their theological arguments about the sinfulness of homosexuality on this 19th century science. Their heavily contested application of scripture to homosexuality depends on the concept of the homosexual as a specific kind of person.

As Hacking (2006) points out, the category of classification, or the label that defines different kinds of people, actually influences their behaviour and self-understanding. It is a “self-fulfilling prophecy” (see [Chapter 6. Social Interaction](#)). They begin to experience the world and live in society in a different manner than they did previously. Interestingly, the gay rights movement has built on the same biological and psychiatric definitions of the homosexual as a kind of person, but reinterpreted them positively to reverse the negative consequences of homophobic culture. Redefining the meaning of being a homosexual type of person advances the social acceptance of gays and lesbians. To some degree the gay rights movement has accepted the idea of the homosexual as a kind of person, and they have self-identified as such, but the outcome of this relabeling has not yet completely reversed the negative connotations of being gay.

Sociological Perspectives on Sexuality

Sociologists representing all three major theoretical perspectives study the role that sexuality plays in social life today. Scholars recognize that sexuality continues to be an important factor in social hierarchies and relations of power and that the manner in which sexuality is defined and problematized has a significant effect on perceptions, interactions, health, and outcomes.

Positivism and Structural Functionalism

Positivist approaches to sexuality have historically been central to defining the social role of sexual nonconformists in modern society. Scientific approaches to sexuality are accredited with the “discovery” of sexualities thought to define different *kinds of person*. In the 19th century a vast variety of sexualities and sexual behaviours were described and given clinical names: homosexuality, transvestism, fetishism, exhibitionism, voyeurism, sadomasochism, coprophilia, undinism, frottage, chronic satyriasis and nymphomania, zoophilia, necrophilia, pederasty (Weeks, 2010). It is interesting in this respect that although heterosexuality has been regarded as the sexual norm in Western society, it was not clinically “discovered” or described until after homosexuality. It had not yet occurred to people that they might be “differentiated from one another by the kinds of love or sexual desire they experienced” (Straight, 2012).

However, positivist science was not independent of prevailing moral attitudes and prejudices. The scientific classification of sexualities emerged at a time when “sexual anomalies were universally regarded as sins or crimes, at the least as vices” (Ellis, 1946). In the 19th and 20th century discourses of evolutionary biology, medicine and psychiatry, heterosexuality was defined as biologically natural because it was procreative. Nonprocreative sexualities that diverged from biology’s natural course were regarded and clinically treated as perversions or pathologies. They were caused by pathological biological or psychiatric conditions. While the stigma of sexual pathology has largely been removed from the understanding of sexual diversity today, (with the likely exception of pedophilia), up until the present a clinical diagnosis of **gender dysphoria** — “a psychiatric classification describing persons experiencing a strong and persistent incongruity between their anatomy (their sex) and the gender with which they identify” — is required for transgender individuals to undergo hormone replacement therapy and sex reassignment surgery (Mathiesen, 2019).

Quantitative sociology has also had to grapple with sexual diversity and fluidity in the formulation of empirically grounded measurements and understandings of sexualities (Sumerau et al., 2017). Traditional binary measures used to code survey responses (male/female, heterosexual/homosexual, etc.) fail to capture important nuances, variations, and complexities of transgender, bisexual, genderqueer, pansexual, intersex, and other non-binary sexual and gender communities. This has made it difficult for quantitative sociology to understand sexualities and explain the ways they influence other social phenomena or to contribute relevant data to public policy issues and debates. Sumerau et al. (2017) propose some options to expand both the gender response options (beyond male/female) and sexual identification methods (beyond gay/bi/straight) on survey instruments to better capture the empirical complexity of gender and sexuality. For example, they suggest shifting from self-identification measures to self-descriptive measures — such as reporting on physical and intimate desire, race, gender, body types, and attraction — in order to capture important aspects of sexual behaviour and experience that might not be captured by self-reported sexual identity questions.

When it comes to sexuality, structural functionalists stress the function of regulating sexual behaviour to ensure social order. Talcott Parsons (1955) argued that the regulation of sexual activity is an important function of the traditional, monogamous, heterosexual nuclear family. Social norms surrounding family life have, traditionally, encouraged sexual activity within the family unit (marriage) and have discouraged activity outside of it (premarital and extramarital sex). From a functionalist point of view, the purpose of encouraging sexual activity in the confines of marriage is to intensify the bond between spouses and to ensure that procreation occurs within a stable, legally recognized relationship. This structure gives offspring the best possible chance for effective socialization, stable upbringing and the provision of basic resources.

From a functionalist standpoint it would be easy to argue that sexual nonconformity and non-heterosexual sexualities present a source of dysfunction in terms of both the procreative role of the family and the unifying myths that the traditional family provides. However new forms of sexual relationship, intimacy, procreation and child-rearing do find new modes of equilibrium and institutionalization, ones which are potentially even more functional than the traditional nuclear family under conditions of fluid modernity. For sexual nonconformists, the functions of the traditional family structure need to be served or satisfied by different family structures for a working social equilibrium to be established. This analysis suggests that sociologists need to examine new structural forms that provide the *functional equivalents* of traditional marriage structures: the increasing legal acceptance of same-sex marriage, the emergence of new narratives

about what makes a marriage legitimate (e.g., the universality of the “love bond” rather than the rites of tradition), and the rise in procreative options for gay, lesbian and other couples who choose to bear and raise children such as adoption, surrogacy, and bio-medical technologies.

Critical Sociology

From a critical perspective, sexuality is another area in which power differentials are present and where dominant groups actively work to promote their worldview as well as their economic interests. Homosexuality was criminalized in Canada in 1841. At the time of Confederation in 1867, sodomy was prohibited, and in 1890 the Canadian Criminal Code made “acts of gross indecency” between men illegal. “Acts of gross indecency” between women were not prohibited until 1953. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, homosexuals were even treated as national security risks; hundreds of gays and lesbians lost their civil service jobs or were purged from the military, and thousands were kept under surveillance (Kinsman, 2000).

It was not until 1969 that the Criminal Code was amended to relax the laws against homosexuality. As then Justice Minister Pierre Trudeau said in 1967 when the amendments were introduced, “Take this thing on homosexuality. I think the view we take here is that there’s no place for the state in the bedrooms of the nation. I think that what’s done in private between adults doesn’t concern the Criminal Code. When it becomes public this is a different matter, or when it relates to minors this is a different matter” (CBC, 2012). It was not until 2005 that same-sex couples were given the right to marry. Critical sociology asks why homosexuality, and other types of sexuality, have been the subject of persecution by the dominant heterosexual majority.

From a critical sociology point of view, a key dimension of social inequality based on sexuality has to do with the concept of “sexuality” itself. People’s sexual practices and inclinations caught up in the relationship between scientific knowledge and power. As noted above, the homosexual was first defined as a “kind of person” in the 19th century: the sexual “invert.” This definition was “scientific,” (at least in terms of the science of the time), but it was in no way independent of the cultural norms and prejudices of 19th century society. It was also not independent of the modern expansion of institutional powers over an increasing range of facets of the life of individuals. The early biologists, medical scientists, and psychologists viewed “sexuality” as a hidden, instinctual agency that defined the viability of an individual’s personality, and posed a threat at various levels to the survival and health of the population. Abnormal sexuality was associated with mental disease, threats to institutional stability, and biological pathologies within the reproduction of the species. The idea that there was a division between healthy normal sexualities and dangerous deviant sexualities — a division that required the expertise of the medical and psychological establishment to diagnose and determine — became a kind of “Trojan horse” in which the problem of sexuality entered into people’s lives. As a public concern, sexuality became a danger to be controlled, surveilled, corrected, and in the worst cases, institutionalized. As Foucault (1980) describes, the sexual lives of children, “perverts,” married couples and the population as a whole became increasingly subject to interventions by doctors, psychiatrists, police, government administrators, moral crusaders, and families.

Part of the power issue involved in having a sexuality or a gender therefore has to do with the *normality* of one’s sexual identity and who determines what is normal or not. The norms defined by social custom, moral tradition, and scientific knowledge determine the degree of ease in which people can live within their own bodies and assume gender and sexual identities. As noted above, having a gender or sexual identity is only experienced as normal or natural to the degree that one fits within the **dominant gender schema** — the ideological framework that states that there are only two possible sexes, male and female, and two possible genders, masculine and feminine. Sexuality is a component of the dominant gender schema in as far as — in heteronormative society — to be male is to be attracted to females and to be female is to be attracted to males. The dominant gender schema therefore provides the basis for the ways inequalities in power and status are distributed according to the degree that individuals conform to its narrow categories.

In contrast, Devor (2000) argues:

we live in a world which is far more diverse than any number of simplistic dichotomies can describe. I have become convinced that not only can men and women live in bodies of any sex, but that we, as a society, go against reality when we insist that there are only two genders, only two sexes, and only slight variations on two basic sexualities. I have learned from speaking with transgender and transsex people that we diminish ourselves as a society by failing to avail ourselves of the special gifts and lessons we can receive from the transgender, transsex and intermediately sexed people among us.

Queer Theory

Queer theory is a critical sociological perspective that problematizes the manner in which people have been taught to think about sexual orientation. By calling their discipline “queer,” these scholars are rejecting the effects of labeling; instead, they embrace the word “queer” to describe a perspective that comes from outside the dominant heteronormative discourses. Queer theorists reject the dominant gender schema and the dichotomization of sexual orientations into two mutually exclusive outcomes, homosexual or heterosexual. Rather, the perspective highlights the need for a more flexible and fluid conceptualization of sexuality — one that allows for change, negotiation, and freedom. The current schema used to classify individuals as either “heterosexual” or “homosexual” pits one orientation against the other. This mirrors other oppressive schemas in our culture, especially those surrounding gender and race (Black versus White, male versus female).

Queer theorist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick argued against North American society’s monolithic definition of sexuality — against its reduction to a single factor: the sex of one’s desired partner. Sedgwick identified dozens of other ways in which people’s sexualities were different, such as:

- Even identical genital acts mean very different things to different people.
- Sexuality makes up a large share of the self-perceived identity of some people, a small share of others.
- Some people spend a lot of time thinking about sex, others little.
- Some people like to have a lot of sex, others little or none.
- Many people have their richest mental/emotional involvement with sexual acts that they do not do, or do not even want to do
- Some people like spontaneous sexual scenes, others like highly scripted ones, others like spontaneous-sounding ones that are nonetheless totally predictable.
- Some people, whether homosexual, heterosexual, or bisexual, experience their sexuality as deeply embedded in a matrix of gender meanings and gender differentials. Others of each sexuality do not. (Sedgwick, 1990)

In the end, queer theory strives to question the ways society perceives and experiences sex, gender, and sexuality, opening the door to new scholarly understanding.

Symbolic Interactionism

Interactionists focus on the meanings associated with sexuality and with sexual orientation. Since femininity is devalued in North American society, those who adopt such traits are treated as subordinate; this is especially true for boys or men. Just as masculinity is the symbolic norm, so too has heterosexuality come to signify normalcy.

The experiences of gender and sexual outsiders — homosexuals, bisexuals, transsexuals, women who do not look or act “feminine,” men who do not look or act “masculine,” etc. — reveal the subtle dramaturgical order of social processes and negotiations through which all gender identity is sustained and recognized by others. From a symbolic interactionist

perspective, “passing” as a “normal” heterosexual depends on one’s sexual cues and props being received and interpreted by others as passable.

The coming out process of homosexuals is described by Vivienne Cass as a series of social stages that the individual is obliged to negotiate with others (Devor, 1997): first, a period of identity confusion in which the person attempts to deny or resist the growing suspicion that they are homosexual; second, a period of identity comparison in which the person examines the series of available identity options to see which one explains their sense of self best; third, a period of identity tolerance in which the person recognizes “I probably am gay” and seeks out more information and contacts; fourth, a period of identity acceptance in which the person carefully manages sexual information or claims public acknowledgment of their sexual identity; fifth, a period of identity pride in which the person identifies strongly with their reference group and minimizes the value of others; and sixth, a period of identity synthesis in which the person’s sexuality is naturalized, becoming “no big deal.” Of course the transition between these stages is not predetermined, and it is possible to remain stuck in one stage or even to go backwards. For the homosexual in a homophobic culture, these transitions are fraught with difficulty.

To what degree does the same process apply to heterosexuals? Although the idea of coming out as a heterosexual, or as a masculine man or a feminine woman, might seem absurd, this absurdity is grounded in the norms of heteronormative society that are so deeply entrenched as to make them appear natural. The social processes of acquiring a gender and sexual identity, or of “having” a gender or a sexuality, are essentially the same; yet, the degree to which society *accepts* the resulting identities differs.

Interactionists are also interested in how discussions of homosexuals often focus almost exclusively on the sex lives of gays and lesbians; homosexuals, especially men, may be assumed to be hypersexual and, in some cases, deviant. Interactionism might also focus on the slurs used to describe homosexuals. Labels such as “queen” and “fag” are often used to demean homosexual men by feminizing them. This subsequently affects how homosexuals perceive themselves. Recall Cooley’s “looking-glass self,” which suggests that self develops as a result of one’s interpretation and evaluation of the responses of others (Cooley, 1902). Constant exposure to derogatory labels, jokes, and pervasive homophobia would lead to a negative self-image, or worse, self-hate. The CDC reports that homosexual youths who experience high levels of social rejection are six times more likely to have high levels of depression and eight times more likely to have attempted suicide (CDC, 2011).

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, sociologists have examined the complexities of gender, sex, and sexuality. Differentiating between the concepts of sex, gender, and sexual orientation is an important first step to a deeper understanding and critical analysis of these issues. The cultural, historical and individual variability of gender and sexuality is relatively independent of the biological etiology of sex, which is shared as the genetic heritage of *homo sapiens* as a species. In particular, understanding the sociology of sex, gender, and sexuality will help to build awareness of the inequalities experienced by subordinate groups such as women, homosexuals, and transgender individuals.

Media Attributions

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- **Figure 12.24** [Two men in Florence kissing](#), by Bartolomeo Cesi (1556–1629) at the Uffizi Gallery, via Wikimedia Commons, is in the [public domain](#).

Chapter 12 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

bifurcated consciousness: The experience of a division between the directly lived, bodily world of women's lives and the dominant, masculine, abstract, institutional world to which they must adapt.

binary opposition: Deep and structures of language that take the form of paired terms and carry opposed or opposite meanings.

cisgender: A term that refers to individuals whose gender identity matches the gender and sex they were assigned at birth.

compulsory heterosexuality: A social condition in which heteronormativity is enforced by formal and informal measures that encourage heterosexuality and penalize sexual variation.

doing gender: The way people perform tasks based on assigned gender scripts and gendered feedback from significant others.

dominant gender schema: An ideological framework that states that there are only two possible sexes, male and female, and two possible genders, masculine and feminine.

double exploitation of women: Women are doubly exploited in capitalist society when they work outside the home for wages and within the home as unpaid domestic labour.

double standard: A concept that prohibits premarital sexual intercourse for women, but allows it for men.

emphasized femininity: The dominant styles of femininity, which express women's subordination to men within a particular culture at a particular time.

gender: A term that refers to social or cultural distinctions of behaviours that are considered male or female.

gender-based violence: Harmful acts directed at an individual based on their gender.

gender dysphoria: A psychiatric classification describing persons experiencing a strong and persistent incongruity between their anatomy (their sex) and the gender with which they identify.

gender identity: An individual's sense of being either masculine or feminine.

gender role: Society's concept of how men and women should behave.

gendered sexuality: Sexual orientation which takes into account both sexes and genders of people.

glass ceiling: An invisible barrier that prevents women from achieving positions of leadership.

hegemonic masculinity: The dominant male ideal within a particular culture at a particular time.

heteronormativity: The belief and practice that heterosexuality is the only normal sexual orientation.

homophobia: An extreme or irrational aversion to homosexuals.

intersex: Individuals with a mixture of male and female sexual organs or physical characteristics.

intimate partner violence: Emotional, sexual and physical violence by one intimate partner against another.

LGBTQ2+: Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or questioning, two spirited and other minority sexualities.

machismo: A style of masculinity characterized as virile, aggressive, intransigent, and hyper-masculine.

pariah femininity: A type of femininity, often stigmatized, defined by non-compliance with male domination.

pleasure principle: The principle that individuals are guided by instinctual drives for immediate gratification.

postgenderism: The idea of a society in which sex and gender distinctions no longer matter.

queer theory: A scholarly discipline that questions fixed (normative) definitions of gender and sexuality.

reality principle: The principle that individuals must regulate instinctual drives for gratification according to the reality of the restrictions, rules and moral codes of the social order.

sex: A term that denotes the presence of physical or physiological differences between males and females.

sexism: The prejudiced belief that one sex should be valued over another.

sexuality: A person's capacity for sexual feelings and the orientation of their emotional and sexual attraction to a particular sex (male or female).

socialization: The process wherein people come to understand societal norms and expectations, to accept society's beliefs, and to be aware of societal values.

stereotypes: Oversimplified ideas about groups of people.

transgender: A term that refers to individuals who identify with the behaviours and characteristics that are the opposite of their biological sex.

transsex: Transgender individuals who alter their bodies through medical interventions such as surgery and hormonal therapy.

Section Summary

[12.1 The Difference between Sex, Gender, and Sexuality](#)

The terms “sex” and “gender” refer to two different identifiers. Sex denotes biological characteristics differentiating males and females, while gender denotes social and cultural characteristics of masculine and feminine behaviour. Sex and gender are not always synchronous. Individuals who strongly identify with the opposing gender are considered transgender.

[12.2 Gender and Society](#)

Children become aware of gender roles in their earliest years. They come to understand and perform these roles through socialization, which occurs through four major agents: family, education, peer groups, and mass media. Socialization into narrowly prescribed gender roles results in the stratification of males and females. Each sociological perspective offers a valuable view for understanding how and why gender inequality occurs in our society.

[12.3 Sex and Sexuality](#)

When studying sex and sexuality, sociologists focus their attention on sexual attitudes and practices, not on physiology or anatomy. Norms regarding gender and sexuality vary across cultures. In general, Canada tends to be less conservative than the United States in its sexual attitudes. As a result, homosexuals still continue to face opposition and discrimination in most major social institutions, but discrimination based on sexual orientation is legally prohibited in

the Canadian constitution. Gays and lesbians are able to get married in Canada, and school boards across the country have instituted anti-bullying policies to prevent the targeting of LGBT students.

Questions

Quiz: Gender, Sex, and Sexuality

12.1 The Difference between Sex, Gender, and Sexuality

1. The terms “masculine” and “feminine” refer to a person's _____.
 - a. Sex.
 - b. Gender.
 - c. Both sex and gender.
 - d. None of the above.
2. _____ is/are an individual's self-conception of being male or female based on their association with masculine or feminine gender roles.
 - a. Gender identity
 - b. Gender bias
 - c. Sexual orientation
 - d. Sexual attitudes
3. Research indicates that individuals are aware of their sexual orientation _____.
 - a. At infancy.
 - b. In early adolescence.
 - c. In early adulthood.
 - d. In late adulthood.
4. A person who is biologically female but identifies with the male gender and has undergone surgery to alter her body is considered _____.
 - a. Transgender.
 - b. Transsex.
 - c. A cross-dresser.
 - d. Homosexual.
5. Which of following is correct regarding the explanation for transgenderism?
 - a. It is strictly biological and associated with chemical imbalances in the brain.
 - b. It is a behaviour that is learned through socializing with other transgender individuals.
 - c. It is genetic and usually skips one generation.

- d. Currently, there is no definitive explanation for transgenderism.

12.2 Gender and Society

6. Which of the following is the best example of a gender stereotype?
 - a. Women are typically shorter than men.
 - b. Men do not live as long as women.
 - c. Women tend to be overly emotional, while men tend to be level-headed.
 - d. Men hold more high-earning, leadership jobs than women.
7. Which of the following is the best example of the role peers play as an agent of socialization for school-aged children?
 - a. Children can act however they wish around their peers because children are unaware of gender roles.
 - b. Peers serve as a support system for children who wish to act outside of their assigned gender roles.
 - c. Peers tend to reinforce gender roles by criticizing and marginalizing those who behave outside of their assigned roles.
 - d. None of the above.
8. To which theoretical perspective does the following statement most likely apply: Women continue to assume the responsibility in the household along with a paid occupation because it keeps the household running smoothly (i.e., in a state of balance)?
 - a. Conflict theory
 - b. Functionalism
 - c. Feminist theory
 - d. Symbolic interactionism
9. Only women are affected by gender stratification.
 - a. True
 - b. False
10. According to the symbolic interactionist perspective, we “do gender” _____.
 - a. During half of our activities.
 - b. Only when it applies to our biological sex.
 - c. Only if we are actively following gender roles.
 - d. All of the time, in everything we do.

12.3 Sex and Sexuality

11. What Western country is thought to be the most liberal in its attitudes toward sex?
 - a. United States
 - b. Sweden
 - c. Mexico
 - d. Ireland

12. Compared to most Western societies, U.S. sexual attitudes are considered _____.
- Conservative.
 - Liberal.
 - Permissive.
 - Free.
13. Sociologists associate sexuality with _____.
- Heterosexuality.
 - Homosexuality.
 - Biological factors.
 - A person's capacity for sexual feelings.
14. Which theoretical perspective stresses the importance of regulating sexual behaviour to ensure marital cohesion and family stability?
- Functionalism
 - Conflict theory
 - Symbolic interactionism
 - Queer theory

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

12.1 The Difference between Sex, Gender, and Sexuality

- Why do sociologists find it important to differentiate between sex and gender? What importance does the differentiation have in modern society?
- How is children's play influenced by gender roles? Think back to your childhood. How "gendered" were the toys and activities available to you? Do you remember gender expectations being conveyed through the approval or disapproval of your playtime choices?

12.2 Gender and Society

- In what way do parents treat sons and daughters differently? How do sons and daughters typically respond to this treatment?
- What can be done to lessen the effects of gender stratification in the workplace? How does gender stratification harm both men and women?

12.3 Sex and Sexuality

- Identify three examples of how Canadian society is heteronormative.

6. Consider the types of derogatory labelling that sociologists study and explain how these might apply to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

Further Research

[12.1 The Difference between Sex, Gender, and Sexuality](#)

For more information on gender identity and advocacy for transgender individuals see the [Global Action for Trans Equality](#).

[12.2 Gender and Society](#)

For more gender-related statistics, see the [U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website](#) and browse through to pictures like “gender and education” and “gender and health.” (Include quotation marks when searching.)

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Solutions to Section Quiz

1 B, | 2 A, | 3 B, | 4 B, | 5 D, | 6 C, | 7 C, | 8 B, | 9 B, | 10 D, | 11 B, | 12 A, | 13 D, | 14 A, [\[Return to Quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 13. AGING AND THE ELDERLY



Figure 13.1 What does this sign mean? Why would there be a need for it on a street? What assumptions about senior citizens might this message be based on? (Photo courtesy of Ethan Prater/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Learning Objectives

13.1. Who Are the Elderly? Aging in Society

- Understand the difference between senior age groups (young-old, middle-old, and old-old).
- Describe the “greying of Canada” as the population experiences increased life expectancies.
- Examine aging as a global issue.

13.2. The Process of Aging

- Consider the biological, social, and psychological changes in aging.
- Describe the birth of the field of geriatrics.
- Examine attitudes toward death and dying and how they affect the elderly.
- Name the five stages of grief developed by Dr. Elisabeth Kübler-Ross.

13.3. Challenges Facing the Elderly

- Understand the historical and current trends of poverty among elderly populations.
- Recognize ageist thinking and ageist attitudes in individuals and in institutions.
- Learn about elderly individuals’ risks of being mistreated and abused.

13.4. Theoretical Perspectives on Aging

- Compare and contrast sociological theoretical perspectives on aging.

Introduction to Aging and the Elderly

At age 52, Bridget Fisher became a first-time grandmother. She worked in human resources (HR) at a scientific research company, a job she had held for 20 years. She had raised two children, divorced her first husband, remarried, and survived a cancer scare.

Her fast-paced job required her to travel around the country, setting up meetings and conferences. The company did not offer retirement benefits. Bridget had seen many employees put in 10, 15, or 20 years of service only to get laid off when they were considered too old. Because of laws against age discrimination, the company executives were careful to prevent any records from suggesting age as the reason for the layoffs.

Seeking to avoid the crisis she would face if she were laid off, Bridget went into action. She took advantage of the company's policy to put its employees through college if they continued to work two years past graduation. Completing evening classes in nursing at the local technical school, she became a registered nurse after four years. She worked two more years, then quit her job in HR, and accepted a part-time nursing job at a family clinic. Her new job offered retirement benefits. Bridget no longer had to travel to work, and she was able to spend more time with her family and to cultivate new hobbies.

Today, Bridget Fisher, 62, is a wife, mother of two, grandmother of three, part-time nurse, master gardener, and quilt club member. She enjoys golfing and camping with her husband and taking her terriers to the local dog park. She does not expect to retire from the workforce for five or ten more years, and though some government programs in Canada consider her a senior citizen, she does not feel old. In fact, while bouncing her grandchild on her knee, Bridget tells her daughter, 38, "I never felt younger."

Age is not merely a biological function of the number of years one has lived, or of the physiological changes the body goes through during the life course. It is also a product of the social norms and expectations that apply to each stage of life. Age represents the wealth of life experiences that shape whom we become. With medical advancements that prolong human life, old age has taken on a new meaning in societies with the means to provide high-quality medical care. However, many aspects of the aging experience also depend on social class, race, gender, and other social factors.

Media Attributions

- **Figure 13.1** [Street Sign: Watch for Senior Citizens](#) by Ethan Prater, via Flickr, is used under a [CC BY 2.0](#) licence.

13.1 Who Are the Elderly? Aging in Society

Think of the movies and television shows that have played recently. Did any of them feature older actors? What roles did they play? How were these older actors portrayed? Were they cast as main characters in a love story? Grouchy old people? How were older women portrayed? How were older men portrayed?

Many media portrayals of the elderly reflect negative cultural attitudes toward aging. In North America, society tends to glorify youth, associating it with beauty and sexuality. In comedies, the elderly are often associated with grumpiness or hostility. Rarely do the roles of older people convey the fullness of life experienced by seniors—as employees, lovers, or the myriad roles they have in real life. What values does this reflect?

One hindrance to society's fuller understanding of aging is that people rarely understand it until they reach old age themselves. (As opposed to childhood, for instance, which people can all look back on). Therefore, myths and assumptions about the elderly and aging are common. Many stereotypes exist surrounding the realities of being an older adult. While individuals often encounter stereotypes associated with race and gender and are thus more likely to think critically about them, many people accept age stereotypes without question (Levy et al., 2002). Each culture has a certain set of expectations and assumptions about aging, all of which are part of our socialization.

While the landmarks of maturing into adulthood are a source of pride, signs of natural aging can be cause for shame or embarrassment. Some people try to fight off the appearance of aging with cosmetic surgery. Although many seniors report that their lives are more satisfying than ever, and their self-esteem is stronger than when they were young, they are still subject to cultural attitudes that make them feel invisible and devalued.

Gerontology is a field of science that seeks to understand the process of aging and the challenges encountered as seniors grow older. Gerontologists investigate age, aging, and the aged. Gerontologists study what it is like to be an older adult in a society and the ways that aging affects members of a society. As a multidisciplinary field, gerontology includes the work of medical and biological scientists, social scientists, and even financial and economic scholars.

Social gerontology refers to a specialized field of gerontology that examines the social (and sociological) aspects of aging. Researchers focus on developing a broad understanding of the experiences of people at specific ages, such as mental and physical well-being, plus age-specific concerns such as the process of dying. Social gerontologists work as social researchers, counselors, community organizers, and service providers for older adults. Because of their specialization, social gerontologists are in a strong position to advocate for older adults.

Scholars in these disciplines have learned that aging reflects not just the physiological process of growing older, but also people's attitudes and beliefs about the aging process. Many have likely seen online calculators that promise to determine their "real age" as opposed to their chronological age. These ads target the notion that people may feel a different age than their actual years. Some 60-year-olds feel frail and elderly, while some 80-year-olds feel sprightly.

Equally revealing is that as people grow older, they define "old age" in terms of greater years than their current age (Logan, 1992). Many people want to postpone old age, regarding it as a phase that will never arrive. Some older adults even succumb to stereotyping their own age group (Rothbaum, 1983).

In North America, the experience of being elderly has changed greatly over the past century. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, many North American households were home to multigenerational families, and the experiences and wisdom of elders was respected. They offered wisdom and support to their children and often helped raise their grandchildren (Sweetser, 1984).

Today, with most households confined to the nuclear family, attitudes toward the elderly have changed. In 2011, of the 13,320,615 private households in the country, only about 400,000 of them (3.1%) were multigenerational (Statistics Canada, 2012b). It is no longer typical for older relatives to live with their children and grandchildren.

Attitudes toward the elderly have also been affected by large societal changes that have happened over the past 100 years. Researchers believe industrialization and modernization have contributed greatly to lowering the power, influence, and prestige the elderly once held.

The elderly have both benefited and suffered from these rapid social changes. In modern societies, a strong economy

created new levels of prosperity for many people. Health care has become more widely accessible, and medicine has advanced, allowing the elderly to live longer. However, older people are not as essential to the economic survival of their families and communities as they were in the past. While the average person now lives 20 years longer than they did 90 years ago (Statistics Canada, 2010), the prestige associated with age has declined.

Studying Aging Populations



Figure 13.2 How old is this woman? In modern North American society, appearance is not a reliable indicator of age. In addition to genetic differences, health habits, hair dyes, Botox, and the like make traditional signs of aging increasingly unreliable. (Photo courtesy of the Sean and Lauren Spectacular/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

The first census in Canada was conducted in 1666 on the colony's 3,215 inhabitants and included questions about age as well as sex, marital status, and occupation. Since the first national census in 1871, the Canadian government has been tracking age in the population every 10 years (Statistics Canada, 2013a). Age is an important factor to analyze with accompanying demographic figures, such as income and health. The population pyramid below shows projected age distribution patterns for the next several decades.




Figure 13.3 These population pyramids show the age distribution for 2011 and projected patterns for 2050 (Graph courtesy of the U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, 2014.) [Public Domain](#)

Statisticians use data to calculate the median age of a population, that is, the number that marks the halfway point in a group's age range. In Canada, the median age is about 40 (Statistics Canada, 2013b). That means that about half of Canadians are under 40 and about half are over 40. The median age of women is higher than men, 41.1 compared to 39.4, due to the persistent higher life expectancy of women (although the gap between genders has been diminishing).

Overall, the median age of Canadians has been increasing, indicating that the population is growing older. It is interesting to note, however, that the proportion of senior citizens in Canada is lower than most of the other G8 countries. In 2013, 15.3% of Canadians were over 65 while 25% of Japanese, 21% of Germans, 21% of Italians, 17% of French, and 16% of British were over 65. Only the United States (14%) and Russia (13%) had lower proportions (Statistics Canada, 2013c).

A **cohort** is a group of people who share a statistical or demographic trait. People belonging to the same age cohort were born in the same time frame. The population pyramids in Figure 13.3 show the different composition of age cohorts in the population, comparing the population in 2011 with figures projected for 2050. The bulge in the pyramid clearly becomes more rounded in the future, indicating that the proportion of senior cohorts will continue to increase with respect to the younger cohorts

in the population. Understanding a population's age composition can point to certain social and cultural factors and help governments and societies plan for future social and economic challenges. This is key to planning for everything from the funding of pension plans and health care systems to calculating the number of immigrants needed to replenish the workforce.

The population pyramid in Figure 13.4 compares the age distribution of the Aboriginal population of Canada in 2001 to projected figures for 2017. It is much more pyramidal in form than the graphs for the Canadian population as a whole (see Figure 13.3) reflecting both the higher birth rate of the aboriginal population and the lower life expectancy of aboriginal people. The aboriginal population is much younger than the Canadian population, with a median age of 24.7 years in 2001 (projected to increase to 27.8 in 2017). Sociological studies on aging might help explain the difference between Native American age cohorts and the general population. While Native American societies have a strong tradition of revering their elders, they also have a lower life expectancy because of lack of access to quality health care.




Figure 13.4 This population pyramid shows the age distribution for the Canadian Aboriginal population in 2001 and projected patterns for 2017. (Graph courtesy of Statistics Canada, 2005.) [Statistics Canada Open Licence](#)

Phases of Aging: The Young-Old, Middle-Old, and Old-Old

In Canada, all people over age 18 are considered adults, but there is a large difference between a person aged 21 and a person who is 45. More specific breakdowns, such as “young adult” and “middle-aged adult,” are helpful. In the same way, groupings are helpful in understanding the elderly. The elderly are often lumped together, grouping everyone over the age of 65. But a 65-year-old’s experience of life is much different than a 90-year-old’s.

The older adult population can be divided into three life-stage subgroups: the young-old (approximately 65–74), the middle-old (ages 75–84), and the old-old (over age 85). Today’s young-old age group is generally happier, healthier, and financially better off than the young-old of previous generations. In North America, people are better able to prepare for aging because resources are more widely available.

Also, many people are making proactive quality-of-life decisions about their old age while they are still young. In the past, family members made care decisions when an elderly person reached a health crisis, often leaving the elderly person with little choice about what would happen. The elderly are now able to choose housing, for example, that allows them some independence while still providing care when it is needed. Living wills, retirement planning, and medical powers of attorney are other concerns that are increasingly handled in advance.

However, the gender imbalance in the sex ratio of men to women is increasingly skewed toward women as people age. In 2013, 67% of Canadians over the age of 85 were women (Statistics Canada, 2013b). This imbalance in life expectancy has larger implications because of the economic inequality between men and women. The population of old-old women are the cohort with the greatest needs for care, but because many women did not work outside the household during their working years and those who did earned less on average than men, they receive the least retirement benefits.

The Greying of Canada



Figure 13.5 The Raging Grannies advocate for a national housing program at a rally in Vancouver. (Photo courtesy of Yaokcool/Flickr.) [CC BY NC 2.0](#)

What does it mean to be elderly? Some define it as an issue of physical health, while others simply define it by chronological age. The Canadian government, for example, typically classifies people aged 65 years old as elderly, at which point citizens are eligible for federal benefits such as Canada Pension Plan and Old Age Security payments. The World Health Organization has no standard, other than noting that 65 years old is the commonly accepted definition in most core nations, but it suggests a cut-off somewhere between 50 and 55 years old for semi-peripheral nations, such as those in Africa (World Health Organization, 2012). CARP (formerly the Canadian Association of Retired Persons, now just known as CARP) no longer has an eligible age of membership because they suggest that people of all ages can begin to plan for their retirement. It is interesting

to note CARP's name change; by taking the word “retired” out of its name, the organization can broaden its base to any older Canadians, not just retirees. This is especially important now that many people are working to age 70 and beyond.

There is an element of social construction, both local and global, in the way individuals and nations define who is elderly; that is, the shared meaning of the concept of elderly is created through interactions among people in society. This is exemplified by the truism that one is only as old as one feels.

Demographically, the Canadian population over age 65 increased from 5% in 1901 (Novak, 1997) to 14.4% in 2011. Statistics Canada estimates that by 2051 the percentage will increase to 25.5% (Statistics Canada, 2010). This increase has been called “the greying of Canada,” a term that describes the phenomenon of a larger and larger proportion of the population getting older and older.

There are several reasons why Canada is greying so rapidly. One of these is **life expectancy**: the average number of years a person born today may expect to live. When reviewing Statistics Canada figures that group the elderly by age, it is clear that in Canada, at least, people are living longer. Between 1983 and 2013, the number of elderly citizens over 85 increased by more than 100%. In 2013 the number of **centenarians** (those 100 years or older) in Canada was 6,900, almost 20 centenarians per 100,000 persons, compared to 11 centenarians per 100,000 persons in 2001 (Statistics Canada, 2013b).

Another reason for the greying of Canada can be attributed to the aging of the baby boomers. Nearly a third of the Canadian population was born in the generation following World War II (between 1946 and 1964) when Canadian families averaged 3.7 children per family (compared to 1.7 today) (Statistics Canada, 2012a). Baby boomers began to reach the age of 65 in 2011. Finally, the proportion of old to young can be expected to continue to increase because of the below-replacement fertility rate (i.e., the average number of children per woman). A low birth rate contributes to the higher percentage of older people in the population.

As noted above, not all Canadians age equally. Most glaring is the difference between men and women — as Figure 13.6 shows, women have longer life expectancies than men. In 2013, there were ninety 65-to-79-year-old men per one hundred 65- to 79-year-old women. However, there were only sixty 80+ year-old men per one hundred 80+ year-old women. Nevertheless, as the graph shows, the sex ratio increased over time, indicating that men are closing the gap between their life spans and those of women (Statistics Canada, 2013c).




Figure 13.6 Sex ratio by age group, 1983 and 2013, Canada. This Statistics Canada chart shows that women live significantly longer than men. However, over the past two decades, men have narrowed the percentage by which women outlive them. (Graph courtesy of Statistics Canada, 2013c.) [Statistics Canada Open Licence](#)

Baby Boomers

Of particular interest to gerontologists right now are the consequences of the aging population of **baby boomers**, the cohort born between 1946 and 1964 and just now reaching age 65. Coming of age in the 1960s and early 1970s, the baby boom generation was the first group of children and teenagers with their own spending power and therefore their own marketing power (Macunovich, 2000). The youth market for commodities such as music, fashion, movies, and automobiles was a major factor in creating a youth-oriented culture. As this group has aged, it has redefined what it means to be young, middle-aged, and now, old. People in the boomer generation do not want to grow old the way their grandparents did. The result is a wide range of products designed to ward off the effects – or the signs – of aging. Previous generations of people over 65 were “old.” Baby boomers are in “later life” or “the third age” (Gilleard and Higgs, 2007).

The baby boom generation is the cohort driving much of the dramatic increase in the over-65 population. As we can see in Figure 13.7, the biggest bulge in the population pyramid for 2011 (representing the largest population group) is in the age 45 to 55 cohort. As time progresses, the population bulge moves up in age. In 2011, the oldest baby boomers were just reaching the age at which Statistics Canada considers them elderly. In 2020, the baby boom bulge, as predicted, continued to rise up the pyramid, making the largest Canadian population group between 65 and 85 years old.




Figure 13.7 Portrait of generations, using the age pyramid, Canada, 2011. (Graph courtesy of Statistics Canada, 2012b.) [Statistics Canada Open Licence](#)

This aging of the baby boom cohort has serious implications for society. Health care is one of the areas most impacted by this trend. For years, hand-wringing has abounded about the additional burden the boomer cohort will place on the publicly funded health care system. The report by the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada noted in 2001 that the combined public and private expenditure per person each year for medical care was approximately three times as much for persons over 65 than for the average person (\$10,834 per person versus \$3,174). As health care costs increase with age, the reasoning is that more people entering the 65 and older age group will increase the cost of medical care dramatically. In fact, the cost to the health care system specifically due to aging is projected to be no more than 1% per year (Romanow, 2002). The main sources of cost increase to the health care system come from inflation, rising overall population, and advances in medical technologies (new pharmaceutical drugs, surgical techniques, diagnostic and imaging techniques, and end-of-life care). With respect to end-of-life care, the average Canadian now receives approximately one and a half times more health care services than the average Canadian did in 1975 (Lee, 2007). Even with modest economic growth, existing levels of health care service can be maintained without difficulty if the total increase in costs of health care from all sources, including aging, result in an annual increase in health care budget expenditures of 4.4% over the medium term as expected (Lee, 2007).

Other studies indicate that aging boomers will bring economic growth to the health care industries, particularly in areas like pharmaceutical manufacturing and home health care services (Bierman, 2011). Further, some argue that many of medical advances of the past few decades are a result of boomers' health requirements. Unlike the elderly of previous generations, boomers do not expect that turning 65 means their active lives are over. They are not willing to abandon work or leisure activities, but they may need more medical support to keep living vigorous lives. This desire of a large group of over-65-year-olds wanting to continue with a high activity level is driving innovation in the medical industry (Shaw, 2012). It is not until the final year of life that health care expenditures undergo a dramatic increase. Approximately one-third to one-half of a typical person's total health care expenditures occur in the final year of life (Lee, 2007). The implication is that with people living increasingly longer and healthier lives, the issue of the cost of health care and aging needs to be refocused on end-of-life care options.

The economic impact of aging boomers is also an area of concern for many observers. Although the baby boom generation earned more than previous generations and enjoyed a higher standard of living, they also spent their money lavishly and did not adequately prepare for retirement. According to a 2013 report from the Bank of Montreal, the

average baby boomer falls about \$400,000 short of adequate savings to maintain their lifestyles in retirement. The average senior couple spends approximately \$54,000 a year, requiring accumulated savings of \$1,352,000 to sustain themselves (not taking into account Canada Pension Plan and Old Age Pension payments). Canadian boomers anticipated they needed savings of \$658,000 to feel financially secure in retirement but had only saved an average of \$228,000. 71% of boomers said they plan to work part time in retirement (BMO Financial Group, 2013). This will have a ripple effect on the economy as boomers work and spend less.

Just as some observers are concerned about the possibility of the health care system being overburdened, the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans are also considered to be at risk given the longer life spans of seniors and low interest rates, according to the Auditor General's 2014 report (CBC News, 2014). The Canada and Quebec Pension Plans are government-run retirement programs funded primarily through payroll taxes. In addition, seniors receive support from the Old Age Security (OAS) program and the Guaranteed Income Supplement (for those with low incomes). Together the pension plans, OAS, and Guaranteed Income Supplements are credited with successfully reducing old age poverty. Poverty rates for elderly couples were reduced from 17.7% to 2.4% between 1976 and 2011, for single men over 65 from 55.9% to 12.2%, and for single women over 65, from 68.1% to 16.1% (MacKenzie, 2014). Observers acknowledge that the systems are run very well, but their payments do not cover cost-of-living expenses, and in the absence of adequate retirement savings, the economic situation of retirees is threatened. With the aging boomer cohort starting to receive pension benefits, and with fewer workers paying into the pension trust fund, it is estimated that by 2021 the fund will have to start drawing on its investment income in order to make payments (Davidson, 2013). As a result, the government has raised the retirement age (the age at which people could start receiving retirement benefits) from 65 to 67, and many are arguing that CPP payments should be increased to ensure the system's sustainability.

Aging Around the World

From 1950 to approximately 2010, the global population of individuals aged 65 and older increased by a range of 5 to 7% (Lee, 2009). This percentage is expected to increase and will have a huge impact on the **dependency ratio**: the number of productive working citizens to non-productive (young, with a disability, elderly) (Bartram and Roe, 2005). One country that will soon face a serious aging crisis is China, which is on the cusp of an “aging boom”: a period when its elderly population will dramatically increase. The number of people above age 60 in China today is about 178 million, which amounts to 13.3% of its total population (Xuequan, 2011). By 2050, nearly a third of the Chinese population will be age 60 or older, putting a significant burden on the labour force and impacting China's economic growth (Bannister, Bloom, and Rosenberg, 2010).

As health care improves and life expectancy increases across the world, elder care will be an emerging issue. Wienclaw (2009) suggests that with fewer working-age citizens available to provide home care and long-term assisted care to the elderly, the costs of elder care will increase.

Worldwide, the expectation governing the amount and type of elder care varies from culture to culture. For example, in Asia the responsibility for elder care lies firmly on the family (Yap, Thang, and Traphagan, 2005). This is different from the approach in most Western countries, where the elderly are considered independent and are expected to tend to their own care. It is not uncommon for family members to intervene only if the elderly relative requires assistance, often due to poor health. Even then, caring for the elderly is considered voluntary. In North America, decisions to care for an



Figure 13.8 Cultural values and attitudes can shape people's experience of aging. (Photo courtesy of Tom Coppen/Flickr) [CC BY 2.0](#)

elderly relative are often conditionally based on the promise of future returns, such as inheritance or, in some cases, the amount of support the elderly provided to the caregiver in the past (Hashimoto, 1996).

These differences are based on cultural attitudes toward aging. In China, several studies have noted the attitude of **filial piety** (deference and respect to one's parents and ancestors in all things) as defining all other virtues (Hamilton, 1990; Hsu, 1971). Cultural attitudes in Japan prior to approximately 1986 supported the idea that the elderly deserve assistance (Ogawa and Retherford, 1993). However, seismic shifts in major social institutions (like family and economy) have created an increased demand for community and government care. For example, the increase in women working outside the home has made it more difficult to provide in-home care to aging parents, leading to an increase in the need for government-supported institutions (Raikhola and Kuroki, 2009).

In North America, by contrast, many people view caring for the elderly as a burden. Even when there is a family member able and willing to provide for an elderly family member, 60% of family caregivers are employed outside the home and are unable to provide the needed support. At the same time, however, many middle-class families are unable to bear the financial burden of “outsourcing” professional health care, resulting in gaps in care (Bookman and Kimbrel, 2011). Chinese Canadians, for example, are thought to have a higher sense of filial responsibility and to perceive providing family assistance for the elderly as a more normal aspect of life than Caucasian Canadians (Funk, Chappell, and Liu, 2013). It is important to note that even within a country, not all demographic groups treat aging the same way. While most Americans are reluctant to place their elderly members into out-of-home assisted care, demographically speaking, the groups least likely to do so are Latinos, African Americans, and Asians (Bookman and Kimbrel, 2011).

Globally, Canada and other wealthy nations are well equipped to handle the demands of an exponentially increasing elderly population. However, peripheral and semi-peripheral nations face similar increases without comparable resources. Poverty among elders is a concern, especially among elderly women. The feminization of the aging poor, evident in peripheral nations, is directly due to the number of elderly women in those countries who are single, illiterate, and not a part of the labour force (Mujahid, 2006).

In 2002, the Second World Assembly on Aging was held in Madrid, Spain, resulting in the Madrid Plan, an internationally coordinated effort to create comprehensive social policies to address the needs of the worldwide aging population. The plan identifies three themes to guide international policy on aging: 1) publicly acknowledging the global challenges caused by, and the global opportunities created by, a rising global population; 2) empowering the elderly; and 3) linking international policies on aging to international policies on development (Zelenev, 2008).

The Madrid Plan has not yet been successful in achieving all its aims. However, it has increased awareness of the various issues associated with a global aging population, as well as raising the international consciousness to the way that the factors influencing the vulnerability of the elderly (social exclusion, prejudice and discrimination, and a lack of socio-legal protection) overlap with other developmental issues (basic human rights, empowerment, and participation), leading to an increase in legal protections (Zelenev, 2008).

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13.2 The Process of Aging

As human beings grow older, they go through different phases or stages of life. It is helpful to understand aging in the context of these phases as aging is not simply a physiological process. A **life course** is the period from birth to death, including a sequence of predictable life events such as physical maturation and the succession of age-related roles: child, adolescent, adult, parent, senior, etc. At each point in life, as an individual sheds previous roles and assumes new ones, new institutions or situations are involved, which require both learning and a revised self-definition. You are no longer a toddler; you are in kindergarten now! You are no longer a child; you are in high school now! You are no longer a student; you have a job now! You are no longer single; you are going to have a child now! You are no longer in mid-life; it is time to retire now! Each phase comes with different responsibilities and expectations, which of course vary by individual and culture. The fact that age-related roles and identities vary according to social determinations mean that the process of aging is much more significantly a social phenomenon than a biological phenomenon.

Children love to play and learn, looking forward to becoming preteens. As preteens begin to test their independence, they are eager to become teenagers. Teenagers anticipate the promises and challenges of adulthood. Adults become focused on creating families, building careers, and experiencing the world as an independent person. Finally, many adults look forward to old age as a wonderful time to enjoy life without as much pressure from work and family life. In old age, grandparenthood can provide many of the joys of parenthood without all the hard work that parenthood entails. As work responsibilities abate, old age may be a time to explore hobbies and activities that there was no time for earlier in life. But for other people, old age is not a phase looked forward to. Some people fear old age and do anything to “avoid” it, seeking medical and cosmetic fixes for the natural effects of age. These differing views on the life course are the result of the cultural values and norms into which people are socialized.

Through the phases of the life course, dependence and independence levels change. At birth, newborns are dependent on caregivers for everything. As babies become toddlers and toddlers become adolescents and then teenagers, they assert their independence more and more. Gradually, children are considered adults, responsible for their own lives, although the point at which this occurs is widely variable among individuals, families, and cultures.

As Riley (1978) notes, the process of aging is a lifelong process and entails maturation and change on physical, psychological, and social levels. Age, much like race, class, and gender, is a hierarchy in which some categories are more highly valued than others. For example, while many children look forward to gaining independence, Packer and Chasteen (2006) suggest that even in children, age prejudice leads both society and the young to view aging in a negative light. This, in turn, can lead to a widespread segregation between the old and the young at the institutional, societal, and cultural levels (Hagestad and Uhlenberg, 2006).

Making Connections: Classical Sociologists

Dr. Ignatz Nascher and the Birth of Geriatrics



Figure 13.9 Ignatz Leo Nascher (1863–1944) an Austrian-American doctor and gerontologist. He coined the term “geriatrics” in 1909. (Image courtesy of Wellcome Images/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 4.0](#)

In the early 1900s, an Austrian physician named Dr. Ignatz Nascher coined the term **geriatrics**, a medical specialty focusing on the elderly. The word combines two Greek words: *geron* (old man) and *iatrikos* (medical treatment). Nascher based his work on what he observed as a young medical student, when he saw many acutely ill elderly people who were diagnosed simply as “being old.” There was nothing medicine could do, his professors declared, about the syndrome of “old age.”

Nascher refused to accept this dismissive view, seeing it as medical neglect. He believed it was a doctor's duty to prolong life and relieve suffering whenever possible. In 1914, he published his views in his book *Geriatrics: The Diseases of Old Age and Their Treatment* (Clarfield, 1990). Nascher saw the practice of caring for the elderly as separate from the practice of caring for the young, just as pediatrics (caring for children) is different from caring for grown adults (Clarfield, 1990).

Nascher had high hopes for his pioneering work. He wanted to treat the aging, especially those who were poor and had no one to care for them. Many of the elderly poor were sent to live in "almshouses," or public old-age homes (Cole, 1993). Conditions were often terrible in these almshouses, where the aging were often sent and just forgotten.

As hard as it might be to believe today, Nascher's approach was considered unique. At the time of Nascher's death, in 1944, he was disappointed that the field of geriatrics had not made greater strides. In what ways are the elderly better off today than they were before Nascher's ideas?

Biological Changes



Figure 13.10 Aging can be a visible, public experience. Many people recognize the signs of aging and, because of the meanings that culture assigns to these changes, believe that being older means being in physical decline. Many older people, however, remain healthy, active, and happy. (Photo courtesy of Pedro Riberio Simoes/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Each person experiences age-related changes based on many factors. Biological factors such as molecular and cellular changes are called **primary aging**, while aging that occurs due to controllable factors such as lack of physical exercise and poor diet is called **secondary aging** (Whitbourne and Whitbourne, 2010).

Most people begin to see signs of aging after age 50 when they notice the physical markers of age. Skin becomes thinner, drier, and less elastic. Wrinkles form. Hair begins to thin and grey. Men prone to balding start losing hair. The difficulty or relative ease with which people adapt to these changes is dependent in part on the meaning given to aging by their particular culture. A culture that values youthfulness and beauty above all else leads to a negative perception of growing old. Conversely, a culture that reveres the elderly for their life experience and wisdom contributes to a more positive perception of what it means to grow old.

The effects of aging can feel daunting, and sometimes the fear of physical changes (like declining energy, food sensitivity, and loss of hearing and vision) is more challenging to deal with than the changes themselves. The way people perceive physical aging is largely dependent on how they were socialized. If people can accept the changes in their bodies as a natural process of aging, the changes will not seem as frightening.

According to the 2011 Canadian Community Health Survey, fewer people over 65 assessed their health as “excellent” or “very good” (46%) compared to the average of all Canadians aged 12 and older (60%) (Statistics Canada, 2013). The most frequently reported health issues for those over 65 included arthritis or rheumatism (44% of 65- to 74-year olds and 51% of 75+ year-olds), hypertension (40% of all seniors), cataracts (28% of 75+ year olds), back pain, and heart disease. Additionally, 480,600 people, or 1.5% of Canada’s population, suffered from some form of dementia such as Alzheimer’s, a figure predicted to rise to 1.13 million (or 2.8% of the Canadian population) by 2038 (Kembhavi, 2012). Parker and Thorslund (2006) found that while the trend is toward steady improvement in most disability measures, there is a concomitant increase in functional impairments (disability) and chronic diseases. At the same time, medical advances have reduced some of the disabling effects of those diseases (Crimmins, 2004).

Some impacts of aging are gender specific. Some of the disadvantages that aging women face rise from long-standing social gender roles. For example, the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) favours men over women, since women do not earn CPP benefits for the unpaid labour they perform as an extension of their gender roles. In the health care field, elderly female patients are more likely than elderly men to see their health care concerns trivialized (Sharp, 1995) and are more likely to have the health issues labelled psychosomatic (Munch, 2004). Another female-specific aspect of aging is that mass-media outlets often depict elderly females in terms of negative stereotypes and as less successful than older men (Bazzini and McIntosh, 1997).

For men, the process of aging—and society’s response to and support of the experience—may be quite different. The gradual decrease in male sexual performance that occurs as a result of primary aging is medicalized and constructed

as needing treatment (Marshall and Katz, 2002) so that a man may maintain a sense of youthful masculinity. On the other hand, aging men have fewer opportunities to assert the masculine identities in the company of other men (e.g., sports participation) (Drummond, 1998). Some social scientists have observed that the aging male body is depicted in the Western world as genderless (Spector-Mersel, 2006).



Figure 13.11 Aging is accompanied by a host of biological, social, and psychological changes. (Photo courtesy of Michael Cohen/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Social and Psychological Changes

Male or female, growing older means confronting the psychological issues that come with entering the last phase of life. Young people moving into adulthood take on new roles and responsibilities as their lives expand, but an opposite arc can be observed in old age. What are the hallmarks of social and psychological change?

Retirement — the idea that one may stop working at a certain age — is a relatively recent idea. Up until the late 19th century, people worked about 60 hours a week and did so until they were physically incapable of continuing. In 1889, Germany was the first country to introduce a social insurance program that provided relief from poverty for seniors. At the request of the German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, the German emperor wrote to the German parliament: “those who are excluded from work by age, disability, and invalidity have a well-grounded claim to care from the state” (U.S. Social Security Administration, N.d.). The retirement age was initially set at age 70. In Canada, early Labour MPs (a precursor to the CCF and then the NDP) agreed to support the minority Liberal government, elected in 1925, in exchange for the introduction of the first Old Age Pensions Act (1927). In 1951 the Old Age Security Act was passed, creating the

contemporary Old Age Security system, and in 1966 the Canada Pension Plan and Quebec Pension Plan were introduced. These plans continued to provide benefits to seniors at age 70, but by 1971 age 65 had been gradually phased in (Canadian Museum of History, N.d.).

In the 21st century, most people hope that at some point they will be able to stop working and enjoy the fruits of their labour. But do people look forward to this time or do they fear it? When people retire from familiar work routines, some easily seek new hobbies, interests, and forms of recreation. Many find new groups and explore new activities, but others may find it more difficult to adapt to new routines and loss of social roles, losing their sense of self-worth in the process.

Each phase of life has challenges that come with the potential for fear. Erik H. Erikson (1902–1994), in his view of socialization, broke the typical life span into eight phases. Each phase presents a particular challenge that must be overcome. In the final stage, old age, the challenge is to embrace integrity over despair. Some people are unable to successfully overcome the challenge. They may have to confront regrets, such as being disappointed in their children's lives or perhaps their own. They may have to accept that they will never reach certain career goals. Or they must come to terms with what their career success has cost them, such as time with their family or declining personal health. Others, however, are able to achieve a strong sense of integrity, embracing the new phase in life. When that happens, there is tremendous potential for creativity. They can learn new skills, practise new activities, and peacefully prepare for the end of life.

For some, overcoming despair might entail remarriage after the death of a spouse. A study conducted by Kate Davidson (2002) reviewed demographic data that asserted men were more likely to remarry after the death of a spouse and suggested that widows (the surviving female spouse of a deceased male partner) and widowers (the surviving male spouse of a deceased female partner) experience their postmarital lives differently. Many surviving women enjoyed a new sense of freedom, as many were living alone for the first time. On the other hand, for surviving men, there was a greater sense of having lost something, as they were now deprived of a constant source of care as well as the focus on their emotional life.

Aging and Sexuality



Figure 13.12 From the movie, *Harold and Maude*. What is your response to this picture, given that the two people are meant to be lovers, not grandmother and grandson? (Photo courtesy of Lucky Jackson/Flickr.)
[CC BY 2.0](#)

It is no secret that Canadians are squeamish about the subject of sex. When the subject is the sexuality of elderly people no one wants to think about it or even talk about it. That fact is part of what makes the 1971 cult classic movie, *Harold and*

Maude, so provocative. In this cult favourite film, Harold, an alienated, young man, meets and falls in love with Maude, a 79-year-old woman. What is so telling about the film is the reaction of his family, priest, and psychologist, who exhibit disgust and horror at such a match.

Although it is difficult to have an open, public national dialogue about aging and sexuality, the reality is that our sexual selves do not disappear after age 65. People continue to enjoy sex — and not always safe sex — well into their later years. In fact, some research suggests that as many as one in five new cases of AIDS occur in adults over 65 (Hillman, 2011).

In some ways, old age may be a time to enjoy sex more, not less. For women, the elder years can bring a sense of relief as the fear of an unwanted pregnancy is removed and the children are grown and taking care of themselves. However, while pharmaceutical companies have expanded the number of psycho-pharmaceuticals to address sexual dysfunction in men, it was not until very recently that the medical field acknowledged the existence of female sexual dysfunctions (Bryant, 2004).

Aging “Out:” LGBT Seniors

How do different groups in society experience the aging process? Are there any experiences that are universal, or do different populations have different experiences? An emerging field of study looks at how lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) people experience the aging process and how their experience differs from that of other groups or the dominant group. This issue is expanding with the aging of the baby boom generation; not only will aging boomers represent a huge bump in the general elderly population, but the number of LGBT seniors is expected to double by 2030 (Fredriksen-Goldsen et al., 2011).

A recent study titled *The Aging and Health Report: Disparities and Resilience among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Older Adults* finds that LGBT older adults have higher rates of disability and depression than their heterosexual peers. They are also less likely to have a support system that might provide elder care: a partner and supportive children (Fredriksen-Goldsen et al., 2011). Even for those LGBT seniors who are partnered, in the United States some states do not recognize a legal relationship between two people of the same sex, reducing their legal protection and financial options. In Canada, Supreme Court decisions in 2003 and the *Civil Marriage Act* in 2005 legalized same sex marriage.

As they transition to assisted-living facilities, LGBT people have the added burden of “disclosure management:” the way they share their sexual and relationship identity. In one case study, a 78-year-old lesbian lived alone in a long-term care facility. She had been in a long-term relationship of 32 years and had been visibly active in the gay community earlier in her life. However, in the long-term care setting, she was much quieter about her sexual orientation. She “selectively disclosed” her sexual identity, feeling safer with anonymity and silence (Jenkins et al., 2010). A study from the National Senior Citizens Law Center reports that only 22% of LGBT older adults expect they could be open about their sexual orientation or gender identity in a long-term care facility. Even more telling is the finding that only 16% of non-LGBT older adults expected that LGBT people could be open with facility staff (National Senior Citizens Law Center, 2011).



Figure 13.13 As same-sex marriage becomes a possibility, many gay and lesbian couples are finally able to tie the knot—sometimes as seniors—after decades of waiting. (Photo courtesy of Fibonacci Blue/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Same-sex marriage can have major implications for the way the LGBT community ages. With marriage comes the legal and financial protection afforded to opposite-sex couples, as well as less fear of exposure and a reduction in the need to “retreat to the closet” (Jenkins et al., 2010).

Death and Dying



Figure 13.14 A young man sits at the grave of his great-grandmother. (Photo courtesy of Sara Goldsmith/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

For most of human history, the standard of living was significantly lower than it is now. Humans struggled to survive with few amenities and very limited medical technology. The risk of death due to disease or accident was high in any life stage, and life expectancy was low. As people began to live longer, death became associated with old age.

For many teenagers and young adults, losing a grandparent or another older relative can be the first loss of a loved one they experience. It may be their first encounter with **grief**, a psychological, emotional, and social response to the feelings of loss that accompanies death or a similar event.

People tend to perceive death, their own and that of others, based on the values of their culture. While some may look upon death as the natural conclusion to a long,

fruitful life, others may find the prospect of dying frightening to contemplate. People tend to have strong resistance to the idea of their own death, and strong emotional reactions of loss to the death of loved ones. Viewing death as a loss, as opposed to a natural or tranquil transition, is often considered normal in North America.

What may be surprising is how few studies were conducted on death and dying prior to the 1960s. Death and dying were fields that had received little attention until psychologist Elisabeth Kübler-Ross began observing people who were in the process of dying. As Kübler-Ross witnessed people’s transition toward death, she found some common threads in their experiences. She observed that the process had five distinct stages: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. She published her findings in a 1969 book called *On Death and Dying*. The book remains a classic on the topic today.

Kübler-Ross found that a person’s first reaction to the prospect of dying is *denial*, characterized by not wanting to believe that they are dying, with common thoughts such as “I feel fine” or “This is not really happening to me.” The second stage is *anger*, when loss of life is seen as unfair and unjust. A person then resorts to the third stage, *bargaining*: trying to negotiate with a higher power to postpone the inevitable by reforming or changing the way they live. The fourth stage, psychological *depression*, allows for resignation as the situation begins to seem hopeless. In the final stage, a person adjusts to the idea of death and reaches *acceptance*. At this point, the person can face death honestly, regarding it as a natural and inevitable part of life and can make the most of their remaining time.

The work of Kübler-Ross was eye-opening when it was introduced. It broke new ground and opened the doors for sociologists, social workers, health practitioners, and therapists to study death and help those who were facing death. Kübler-Ross’s work is generally considered a major contribution to **thanatology**: the systematic study of death and dying.

Of special interests to thanatologists is the concept of “dying with dignity.” Modern medicine includes advanced medical technology that may prolong life without a parallel improvement to the quality of life one may have. In some cases, people may not want to continue living when they are in constant pain and no longer enjoying life. Should patients

have the right to choose to die with dignity? Dr. Jack Kevorkian was a staunch advocate for **physician-assisted suicide**: the voluntary or physician-assisted use of lethal medication provided by a medical doctor to end one's life. Physician-assisted suicide is slightly different from *euthanasia*, which refers to the act of taking someone's life to alleviate that person's suffering, but that does not necessarily reflect the person's expressed desire to commit suicide.

This right to have a doctor help a patient die with dignity is controversial. In the United States, Oregon was the first state to pass a law allowing physician-assisted suicides. In 1997, Oregon instituted the Death with Dignity Act, which required the presence of two physicians for a legal assisted suicide. This law was successfully challenged by U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in 2001, but the appeals process ultimately upheld the Oregon law. As of 2019, seven states and the District of Columbia have passed similar laws allowing physician assisted suicide.

In Canada, physician-assisted suicide or medical assistance in dying was illegal until 2016, although suicide itself had not been illegal since 1972. On moral and legal grounds, advocates of physician-assisted suicide argued that the law unduly deprived individuals of their autonomy and right to freely choose to end their own life with assistance; that existing palliative care could be inadequate to alleviate pain and suffering; that the law discriminated against people with disabilities who are unable, unlike able-bodied people, to commit suicide by themselves; and that assisted suicide was taking place already in an informal way, but without proper regulations. Those opposed argued that life is a fundamental value and killing is intrinsically wrong, that legal physician-assisted suicide could result in abuses with respect to the most vulnerable members of society, that individuals might seek assisted suicide for financial reasons or because services are inadequate, and that it might reduce the urgency to find means of improving the care of people who are dying (Butler, Tiedemann, Nicol, and Valiquet, 2013).

There are two main legal reference points for the issue in Canada. One is the case of Robert Latimer, the Saskatchewan farmer convicted in 1997 for the mercy killing (or euthanasia) of his 12-year-old daughter, Tracey Latimer, who had a severe form of cerebral palsy, and was unable walk, talk, or feed herself. The second case is that of Sue Rodriguez who sought the legal right to have a physician-assisted suicide because she suffered from ALS (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis). She argued in the Supreme Court that the law against physician-assisted suicide violated her right to "life, liberty, and security of the person" but lost her case in a five-to-four decision in 1992. She did choose physician-assisted suicide two years later from an anonymous physician. In 2012, however, a B.C. court found that the law did discriminate against those who are "grievously and irremediably ill" in the case of Gloria Taylor, another woman with ALS. The court granted a constitutional exemption to permit her to seek physician-assisted suicide while the constitutional challenge to the law is clarified. However, Taylor died from an infection in 2012. The constitutional challenge to the law remains unresolved.

In Quebec, the Select Committee on Dying with Dignity tabled a report in 2012 that supported assisted suicide. In 2013 a panel of experts appointed by the Quebec government agreed that in certain circumstances assisted suicide should be understood as part of the continuum of care (Butler et al., 2013). In 2014, Quebec became the first province in Canada to pass right-to-die legislation. Terminally ill adults of sound mind may request continuous palliative sedation that will lead to death (Seguin, 2014). In February 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in *Carter v. Canada* that parts of the *Criminal Code* would need to change to satisfy the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The parts that prohibited medical assistance in dying would no longer be valid (Government of Canada, 2021). In 2021, the Government of Canada announced that changes to Canada's medical assistance in dying (MAID) law were officially in force. The new law includes changes to eligibility, procedural safeguards, and the framework for the federal government's data collection and reporting regime.

The controversy surrounding death with dignity laws is emblematic of the way North American society tries to separate itself from death. Health institutions have built facilities to comfortably house those who are terminally ill. This is seen as a compassionate act, helping relieve the surviving family members of the burden of caring for the dying relative. But studies almost universally show that people prefer to die in their own homes (Lloyd, White, and Sutton, 2011). Is it people's social responsibility to care for elderly relatives up until their death? How do people balance the responsibility for caring for an elderly relative with their other responsibilities and obligations? As North American society grows older, and as new medical technology can prolong life even further, the answers to these questions will develop and change.

The changing concept of **hospice** is an indicator of our society's changing view of death. Hospice is a type of health

care that treats terminally ill people when cure-oriented treatments are no longer an option (Canadian Hospice Palliative Care Association, N.d.). Hospice doctors, nurses, and therapists receive special training in the care of the dying. The focus is not on getting better or curing the illness, but on passing out of this life in comfort and peace. Hospice centres exist as places where people can go to die in comfort, and increasingly, hospice services encourage at-home care so that someone has the comfort of dying in a familiar environment, surrounded by family (Canadian Hospice Palliative Care Association, N.d.). While many people would probably prefer to avoid thinking of the end of their lives, it may be possible to take comfort in the idea that when they do approach death in a hospice setting, it is in a familiar, relatively controlled place.

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13.3 Challenges Facing the Elderly

Aging comes with many challenges. The loss of independence is one potential part of the process, as are diminished physical ability and age discrimination. The term **senescence** refers to the aging process, including biological, emotional, intellectual, social, and spiritual changes. This section discusses some of the challenges people encounter during this process.

As already observed, many older adults remain highly self-sufficient. Others require more care. Because the elderly typically no longer hold jobs, finances can be a challenge. Due to cultural misconceptions, older people can be targets of ridicule and stereotypes. The elderly face many challenges in later life, but they do not have to enter old age without dignity.

Ageism

Driving to the grocery store, Peter, 23, got stuck behind a car on a four-lane main artery through his city's business district. The speed limit was 50 kilometres per hour, and while most drivers sped along at 60 to 70 kilometres per hour, the driver in front of him was going the speed limit. Peter tapped on his horn. He tailgated the driver. Finally, Peter had a chance to pass the car. He glanced over. Sure enough, Peter thought, a grey-haired old man guilty of "DWE," driving while elderly.

At the grocery store, Peter waited in the checkout line behind an older woman. She paid for her groceries, lifted her bags of food into her cart, and toddled toward the exit. Peter, guessing her to be about 80, was reminded of his grandmother. He paid for his groceries and caught up with her.

"Can I help you with your cart?" he asked.

"No, thank you. I can get it myself," she said and marched off toward her car.

Peter's responses to both older people, the driver, and the shopper, were prejudiced. In both cases, he made unfair assumptions. He assumed the driver drove cautiously simply because the man was a senior citizen, and he assumed the shopper needed help carrying her groceries just because she was an older woman.

Responses like Peter's toward older people are fairly common. He did not intend to treat people differently based on personal or cultural biases, but he did. **Ageism** is discrimination based on age. Dr. Robert Butler coined the term in 1968, noting that ageism exists in all cultures (Brownell, 2010). Ageist attitudes and biases based on stereotypes reduce elderly people to inferior or limited positions.

Ageism can vary in severity. Peter's attitudes are probably seen as mild, but relating to the elderly in ways that are patronizing can be offensive. When ageism is reflected in the workplace, in health care, and in assisted-living facilities, the effects of discrimination can be more severe. Ageism can make older people fear losing a job, feel dismissed by a doctor, or feel a lack of power and control in their daily living situations.



Figure 13.15 Are these street signs humorous or offensive? What shared assumptions make them humorous? Or is memory loss too serious to be made fun of? (Photo courtesy of Big City Signs/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0 \[Image Description\]](#)

In early societies, the elderly were respected and revered. Many preindustrial societies observed **gerontocracy**, a type of social structure wherein the power is held by a society's oldest members. In some countries today, the elderly still have influence and power and their vast knowledge is respected.

In many modern nations, however, industrialization contributed to the diminished social standing of the elderly. Today wealth, power, and prestige are also held by those in younger age brackets. The average age of corporate executives was 59 in 1980. In 2008, the average age had lowered to 54 (Stuart, 2008). Some older members of the workforce felt threatened by this trend and grew concerned that younger employees in higher-level positions would push them out of the job market. Rapid advancements in technology and media have required new skill sets that older members of the workforce are less likely to have.

Changes happened not only in the workplace but also at home. In agrarian societies, a married couple cared for their aging parents. The oldest members of the family contributed to the household by doing chores, cooking, and helping with child care. As economies shifted from agrarian to industrial, younger generations moved to cities to work in factories. The elderly began to be seen as an expensive burden. They did not have the strength and stamina to work outside the home. What began during industrialization, a trend toward older people living apart from their grown children, has become commonplace.

Mistreatment and Abuse

Mistreatment and abuse of the elderly is a major social problem. As expected, with the biology of aging, the elderly sometimes become physically frail. This frailty renders them dependent on others for care — sometimes for small needs like household tasks, and sometimes for assistance with basic functions like eating and toileting. Unlike a child, who also is dependent on another for care, an elder is an adult with a lifetime of experience, knowledge, and opinions — a more fully developed person. This makes the care providing situation more complex.

Elder abuse describes when a caretaker intentionally deprives an older person of care or harms the person in their charge. Caregivers may be family members, relatives, friends, health professionals, or employees of senior housing or nursing care. The elderly may be subject to many different types of abuse.

In a 2009 study on the topic led by Dr. Ron Acierno, the team of researchers identified five major categories of elder abuse: 1) physical abuse, such as hitting or shaking, 2) sexual abuse including rape and coerced nudity, 3) psychological or emotional abuse, such as verbal harassment or humiliation, 4) neglect or failure to provide adequate care, and 5) financial abuse or exploitation (Acierno, 2010).

The National Center on Elder Abuse (NCEA) in the United States also identifies abandonment and self-neglect as types of abuse. Table 13.1 (below) shows some of the signs and symptoms that the NCEA encourages people to notice.

Table 13.1. Signs of Elder Abuse. The National Center on Elder Abuse encourages people to watch for these signs of mistreatment.
(Chart courtesy of National Center on Elder Abuse).

Type of Abuse	Signs and Symptoms
Physical abuse	Bruises, untreated wounds, sprains, broken glasses, lab findings of medication overdose
Sexual abuse	Bruises around breasts or genitals, torn or bloody underclothing, unexplained venereal disease
Emotional/ psychological abuse	Being upset or withdrawn, unusual dementia-like behaviour (rocking, sucking)
Neglect	Poor hygiene, untreated bed sores, dehydration, soiled bedding
Financial	Sudden changes in banking practices, inclusion of additional names on bank cards, abrupt changes to will
Self-neglect	Untreated medical conditions, unclean living area, lack of medical items like dentures or glasses

How prevalent is elder abuse? In 2009, Statistics Canada's General Social Survey reported that 2% of men and 3% of women said that they had been emotionally or financially abused by a child, relative, friend, or caregiver in the

five years preceding the survey. Incidents of both self-reported violence and police-reported violence against elders are much lower than for other age groups in the population (Brennan, 2012). Some social researchers believe elder abuse is underreported and that the number may be higher. The risk of abuse also increases in people with health issues such as dementia (Kohn and Verhoek-Oftedahl, 2011). Older women were found to be victims of verbal abuse more often than their male counterparts.

In Acierno's study, which included a sample of 5,777 respondents aged 60 and older, 5.2% of respondents reported financial abuse, 5.1% said they'd been neglected, and 4.6% endured emotional abuse (Acierno, 2010). The prevalence of physical and sexual abuse was lower at 1.6 and 0.6%, respectively (Acierno, 2010).

Other studies have focused on the caregivers to the elderly in an attempt to discover the causes of elder abuse. Researchers identified factors that increased the likelihood of caregivers perpetrating abuse against those in their care. Those factors include inexperience, having other demands such as jobs (for those who were not professionally employed as caregivers), caring for children, living full time with the dependent elder, and experiencing high stress, isolation, and lack of support (Kohn and Verhoek-Oftedahl, 2011).

A history of depression in the caregiver was also found to increase the likelihood of elder abuse. Neglect was more likely when care was provided by paid caregivers. Many of the caregivers who physically abused elders were themselves abused — in many cases, when they were children. Family members with some sort of dependency on the elder in their care were more likely to physically abuse that elder. For example, an adult child caring for an elderly parent while, at the same time, depending on some form of income from that parent, would be considered more likely to perpetrate physical abuse (Kohn and Verhoek-Oftedahl, 2011).

A survey found that 60.1% of caregivers reported verbal aggression as a style of conflict resolution. Paid caregivers in nursing homes were at a high risk of becoming abusive if they had low job satisfaction, treated the elderly like children, or felt burnt out (Kohn and Verhoek-Oftedahl, 2011). Caregivers who tended to be verbally abusive were found to have had less training, lower education, and higher likelihood of depression or other psychiatric disorders. Based on the results of these studies, many housing facilities for seniors have increased their screening procedures for caregiver applicants.

Image Descriptions

Figure 13.15 Long Description: Five street signs are lined up on the side of the road. They each say “Senior Center” with an arrow pointing to the left. Underneath each sign is a different reminder. “Don’t forget.” “Remember to TURN!” “Wake up!” “Lunch only 4 dollars.” “TURN NOW!” [\[Return to Figure 13.15\]](#)

Media Attributions

- **Figure 13.15** [SeniorCenterSeniorCenter](#) by Big City Signs, via Flickr, is used under a [CC BY 2.0](#) licence.

13.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Aging

What roles do individual senior citizens play in your life? How do you relate to and interact with older people? What role do they play in neighbourhoods and communities, in cities and in provinces? Sociologists are interested in exploring the answers to questions such as these through a variety of different perspectives including functionalism, symbolic interactionism, and critical sociology.

Functionalism

Functionalists analyze how the parts of society work together to create a state of equilibrium. They gauge how each part of society functions to keep society running smoothly. How does this perspective address aging? Structural functionalists argue that each age performs a specific function in society. Much of the focus in this approach is on how the elderly, as a group, cope with the functional transition of roles as they move into the senior stage of life. How do individuals adapt to the different roles, norms, and expectations of old age, and to their changing physical and mental capacities?

Functionalists find that people with better resources who stay active in other roles adjust better to old age (Crosnoe and Elder, 2002). Three social theories within the functional perspective were developed to explain how older people might deal with later-life experiences.



Figure 13.16 Does being old mean disengaging from the world?
(Photo courtesy of Candida Performa/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

The earliest gerontological theory in the functionalist perspective is **disengagement theory**, which suggests that withdrawing from society and social relationships is a natural part of growing old. There are several main points to the theory. First, because everyone expects to die one day, and because people experience physical and mental decline as they approach death, it is natural to withdraw from individuals and society. Second, as the elderly withdraw, they receive less reinforcement to conform to social norms. Therefore, this withdrawal allows a greater freedom from the pressure to conform. Finally, social withdrawal is gendered, meaning it is experienced differently by men and women. Because men focus on work and women focus on marriage and family, when they withdraw, they will be unhappy and

directionless until they adopt a role to replace their accustomed role that is compatible with the disengaged state (Cumming and Henry, 1961).

The suggestion that old age was a distinct state in the life course, characterized by a distinct change in roles and activities, was ground-breaking when it was first introduced. However, the theory is no longer accepted in its classic form. Criticisms typically focus on the application of the idea that seniors universally naturally withdraw from society as they age, and that it does not allow for a wide variation in the way people experience aging (Hothschild, 1975).

The social withdrawal that Cumming and Henry recognized (1961), and its notion that elderly people need to find replacement roles for those they have lost, is addressed anew in **activity theory**. According to this theory, activity levels and social involvement are key to this process, and key to happiness (Havinghurst, 1961; Havinghurst, Neugarten, and Tobin, 1968; Neugarten, 1964). According to this theory, the more active and involved an elderly person is, the happier they will be. Critics of this theory point out that access to social opportunities and activity are not equally available

to all, so it over-emphasizes individual choice in its explanation. The theory proposes that activity is a solution to the well-being of seniors without being able to account for how the distribution of access to these social opportunities and activities reflects broader issues of power and inequality in society. Moreover, not everyone finds fulfillment in the presence of others or participation in activities. Reformulations of this theory suggest that participation in informal activities, such as hobbies, are what most affect later life satisfaction (Lemon, Bengtson, and Petersen, 1972).

According to a third approach, **continuity theory**, the elderly do not drastically change their lifestyles, behaviours, or identities. They make specific choices to maintain consistency in internal personality structures and beliefs, and external structures (e.g., relationships), remaining active and involved throughout their elder years. The focus of this approach is to examine how the elderly attempt to maintain social equilibrium and stability by making future decisions based on already developed social roles (Atchley, 1971; Atchley, 1989). One criticism of this theory is its emphasis on creating a model of “normal” aging, which is inadequate as a description of those with chronic diseases such as Alzheimer’s and tends to treat “non-normal” aging as pathological.

All three theories frame the issue of aging in terms of the function of role adaptation to the aging process. How do individuals adapt their role to the physiological and social effects of the aging process?

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

The Greying of North American Prisons



Figure 13.17 Would you want to spend your retirement here? A growing elderly prison population requires asking questions about how to deal with senior inmates. (Photo courtesy of Claire Rowland/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Earl Grimes is a 79-year-old inmate. He has undergone two cataract surgeries and takes about \$1,000 a month worth of medication to manage a heart condition. He needs significant help moving around, which he obtains by bribing younger inmates. He is serving a life prison term for a murder he committed 38 years — half a lifetime — ago (Warren, 2002).

Grimes' situation exemplifies the problems facing prisons today. According to the *Annual Report of the*

Office of the Correctional Investigator in 2011, more than 20% of prisoners are age 50 or older in the Canadian prison population. Age 50 is used as a benchmark of the elderliness of offenders because it is generally recognized that the aging process is accelerated by ten years in prison due to the effects of incarceration. These numbers represent a 50% rise over the last decade (Sapers, 2011). The main factor influencing today's aging prison population is the aging of the overall population. As discussed in the section on aging in Canada, the percentage of people over 65 is increasing each year due to rising life expectancies and the aging of the baby boom generation.

So why should it matter that the elderly prison population is growing so swiftly? As discussed in the section on the process of aging, growing older is accompanied by a host of physical problems, such as failing vision, mobility, and hearing. Chronic illnesses such as heart disease, arthritis, and diabetes also become increasingly common as people age, whether they are in prison or not. Unfortunately, prisons were not designed with the elderly in mind and those with physical mobility and sight impairments are particularly affected. There is also a threat to their physical well-being from younger inmates as the elderly have little social status within the institution. Ex-inmate Walter Noonan (aged 55) notes that respect for the elderly in prison has declined drastically over the last 10 years. Older inmates are isolated and often afraid of younger inmates who increasingly have drug and psychiatric problems or have gang affiliations and seek to make a name for themselves using violence (Edwards, 2014).

In many cases, elderly prisoners are physically incapable of committing a violent — or possibly any — crime. Is it ethical to keep them locked up for the short remainder of their lives? There seem to be many reasons, both financial and ethical, to release some elderly prisoners to live the rest of their lives — and die — in freedom. However, few lawmakers are willing to appear soft on crime by releasing convicted felons from prison, especially if their sentence was “life without parole” (Warren, 2002).

Critical Sociology



Figure 13.18 The Grandmothers to Grandmothers campaign has raised \$19.5 million to support African grandmothers caring for grandchildren orphaned by AIDs. (Photo courtesy of khym54/Flickr.)
[CC BY 2.0](#)

Theorists working the critical perspective view society as inherently unstable, based on power relationships that privilege the powerful wealthy few while marginalizing everyone else. According to the guiding principle of critical sociology, the imbalance of power and access to resources between groups is an issue of social justice that needs to be addressed on the basis of sociological knowledge. Applied to society's aging population, the principle means that the elderly struggle with other groups — for example, younger society members — to retain a certain share of resources. At some point, this competition may become conflict.

For example, some people complain that the elderly get more than their fair share of society's resources. In hard economic times, there is great concern about the huge costs of social security and health care. They argue that the medical bills of the nation's elderly population are rising dramatically, taking resources away from the needs

of other segments of the population like education. For example, while funding for education is cut back, funding for medical research increases. However, while there is more care available to certain segments of the senior community, it must be noted that the financial resources available to the aging can vary tremendously by race, social class, and gender.

There are three classic theories of aging within the critical perspective. **Modernization theory** (Cowgill and Holmes, 1972) suggests that the primary cause of the elderly losing power and influence in society are the parallel forces of industrialization and modernization. As societies modernize, the status of elders decreases, and they are increasingly likely to experience social exclusion. Before industrialization, strong social norms bound the younger generation to care for the older. Now, as societies industrialize, the nuclear family replaces the extended family. With increasingly precarious employment, the struggle to earn a living means that people often have to move away from family to work and the work itself consumes increasing time and energy that might be spent looking after family members. Societies become increasingly individualistic, and norms regarding the care of older people change. In an individualistic industrial or postindustrial society, caring for an elderly relative is seen as a voluntary obligation that may be ignored without fear of social censure.

The central reasoning of modernization theory is that as long as the extended family is the standard family, as in preindustrial economies, elders will have a place in society and a clearly defined role. As societies modernize, the elderly who are unable to work outside of the home will have less to offer economically and are seen as a burden. This model may be applied to both the developed and the developing world, and it suggests that as people age, they will be abandoned and lose much of their familial support since they become a non-productive economic burden.

Another theory in the critical perspective is **age stratification theory** (Riley, Johnson, and Foner, 1972). Though it may seem obvious now, with a contemporary awareness of ageism, age stratification theorists were the first to suggest that members of society might be stratified by age, just as they are stratified by race, class, and gender. The value of a person (i.e., their status or prestige in society) is determined by their age, which is an *ascribed* rather than an *achieved* characteristic. Because age serves as a basis of stratification, different age groups have varying access to social resources such as political and economic power. In this model, the privileges, independence, and access to social resources of seniors decreases based simply on their position within an age-category hierarchy. The elderly experience an increased dependence as they age and must increasingly submit to the will of others because they have fewer ways of compelling others to submit to them.

Moreover, within societies stratified by age, behavioural age norms, including norms about roles and appropriate behaviour, dictate what members of age cohorts may reasonably do. For example, it might be considered deviant for an elderly woman to wear a bikini because it violates norms denying the sexuality of older females. These norms are specific to each age strata, developing from culturally based ideas about how people should “act their age.” On the other hand, thanks to amendments to recent legislation in all provinces (except New Brunswick), Canadian workers no longer have to retire upon reaching a specified age. Age is one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination in employment across Canada.

Age stratification theory has been criticized for its broadness and its inattention to other sources of stratification and how these might intersect with age. Feminist theory argues that an older white male occupies a more powerful role, and is far less limited in his choices, than an older white female based on his historical access to political and economic power. In other words, gender is a key variable needed to understand the issues of aging. Women’s status has traditionally depended much more on youth and physical attractiveness than men’s, so the devaluation associated with aging affects them much more powerfully.

In addition, women’s earnings do not increase at the same rate as men’s in the latter half of their careers so more women enter retirement age with considerably fewer financial resources than men (Garner, 1999). In 2007, the low-income rate for senior, single, unattached women was 14%. About 123,000 senior women living on their own lived in poverty compared to 44,000 men (Townsend, 2009).

Finally, many senior women today were socialized in their experience as daughters and wives to grant the decision-making power to men, especially in the area of financial decision making. When they outlive their spouses, they are often suddenly burdened with decisions and tasks with which they have had no experience. This can be profoundly disempowering, particularly when adult children feel they need to step in and take over. As feminist critique is not simply about drawing attention to the injustice of women’s position in society, the question then becomes, how can senior women be empowered to develop new roles, recognize their strengths, and see themselves as valuable human beings (Garner, 1999)?



Figure 13.19 The subculture of aging theory posits that the elderly create their own communities because they have been excluded from other groups. (Photo courtesy of Ignacio Palomo Duarte/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Symbolic Interactionism

Generally, theories within the symbolic interactionist perspective focus on how society is created through the day-to-day interaction of individuals, as well as the way people perceive themselves and others based on cultural symbols. This microanalytic perspective proposes that if people develop a sense of identity through their social interactions, their

sense of self is dependent on those interactions. A woman whose main interactions with society make her feel old and unattractive may lose her sense of self. But a woman whose interactions make her feel valued and important will have a stronger sense of self and a happier life.

Symbolic interactionists stress that the changes associated with old age, in and of themselves, have no inherent meaning. The biological process of aging does not inherently lead to a specific or predetermined set of attitudes. Rather, attitudes toward the elderly are rooted in society and sustained by ongoing interactions with others.

One microanalytical theory is Rose's (1962) **subculture of aging theory**, which focuses on the shared community created by the elderly when they are excluded (due to age), voluntarily or involuntarily, from participating in other groups. This theory suggests that elders will disengage from society and develop new patterns of interaction with peers who share common backgrounds and interests. For example, a group consciousness may develop within such groups as CARP around issues specific to the elderly including health care, retirement security, continuing care, and elder abuse focused on creating social and political pressure to fix those issues. Whether brought together by social or political interests, or even geographic regions, elders may find a strong sense of community with their new group.

Another theory within the symbolic interaction perspective is **selective optimization with compensation theory**. Baltes and Baltes (1990) argue that successful personal development throughout the life course and subsequent mastery of the challenges associated with everyday life are based on the components of selection, optimization, and compensation. People's energy diminishes as they age, and they select (selection) personal goals to get the most (optimize) for the effort they put into activities, in this way making up for (compensation) the loss of a wider range of goals and activities. Though this happens at all stages in the life course, in the field of gerontology, researchers focus attention on balancing the losses associated with aging with the gains stemming from aging. In this theory, the physical decline postulated by disengagement theory may result in more dependence, but that is not necessarily negative, as it allows aging individuals to save their energy for the most meaningful activities. For example, a professor who values teaching sociology may participate in a phased retirement, never entirely giving up teaching, but acknowledging personal physical limitations that allow teaching only one or two classes per year. Here, aging is a process and not an outcome, and the goals (compensation) are specific to the individual.

Swedish sociologist Lars Tornstam developed a symbolic interactionist theory called **gerotranscendence**: the idea that as people age, they transcend the limited views of life they held in earlier times. Tornstam believes that throughout the aging process, the elderly become less self-centred and feel more peaceful and connected to the natural world. Wisdom comes to the elderly, Tornstam's theory states, and as the elderly tolerate ambiguities and seeming contradictions, they let go of conflict, and develop softer views of right and wrong (Tornstam, 2005).

Tornstam does not claim that everyone will achieve wisdom in aging. Some elderly people might still grow bitter and isolated, feel ignored and left out, or become grumpy and judgmental. Symbolic interactionists believe that, just as in other phases of life, individuals must struggle to overcome their own failings and turn them into strengths.

Finally, **exchange theory** (Dowd, 1975) suggests that one's status and role identity within social relationships depend on an ongoing exchange of social resources such as effort, time, money, support, and companionship. The norm of reciprocity dictates that what one gives in a relationship should be balanced by what one receives in return. There is an implicit cost/benefit analysis that underlies the dynamics of social relationships in which individuals calculate the costs of their contributions to the relationship (in terms of effort, etc.) against the benefits and rewards they receive in return. Inasmuch as relationships are based on mutual exchanges, as the elderly become less able to exchange resources, or their resources diminish in value, they see their social circles diminish. There is less benefit for others to exchange with them. In this model, the only means to avoid being discarded is to engage in resource management, such as maintaining a large inheritance or participating in social exchange systems via child care.

In fact, the theory may depend too much on the assumption that individuals are calculating. It is often criticized for affording too much credit to material exchange and devaluing nonmaterial assets such as love and friendship. Nevertheless, many tensions in elder care stem from the perception of an unequal exchange of resources, especially when the resources exchanged are of different types (Collins, 2008). Randall Collins describes the relationship between a caregiver, who acts out of love, sympathy, or altruism to care for an elderly person and thus receives rewards in the form of social esteem, and the elderly person who receives care but often has control over financial resources. Over

time the provision of care becomes routine, the caregiver gets reduced emotional rewards from playing the altruistic role (begins to burn-out) and begins to feel that the demands of care take away from other life activities. On the other side, a dependent elderly person might see the care-giver's attention waning and seek to exercise more control over them, just to have social interaction that is otherwise lacking, perhaps even by making the caregiver feel guilty about not living up to their altruistic self-image. A toxic social exchange pattern can build up leading to elder abuse.

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Chapter 13 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

activity theory: A theory which suggests that for individuals to enjoy old age and feel satisfied, they must maintain activities and find a replacement for the statuses and associated roles they have left behind as they aged.

age stratification theory: A theory which states that members of society are stratified by age, just as they are stratified by race, class, and gender.

ageism: Discrimination based on age.

baby boomers: Individuals born between approximately 1946 and 1964.

centenarians: People 100 years old or older.

cohort: A group of people who share a statistical or demographic trait.

continuity theory: A theory which states that the elderly make specific choices to maintain consistency in internal (personality structure, beliefs) and external structures (relationships), remaining active and involved throughout their elder years.

dependency ratio: The number of productive working citizens to non-productive (young, disabled, or elderly).

disengagement theory: A theory which suggests that withdrawing from society and social relationships is a natural part of growing old.

elder abuse: When a caretaker intentionally deprives an older person of care or harms the person in their charge.

exchange theory: A sociological paradigm that models human interaction based on calculated social exchanges of resources governed by a norm of reciprocity.

filial piety: Deference and respect to one's parents and ancestors in all things.

geriatrics: A medical specialty focusing on the elderly.

gerontocracy: A type of social structure wherein the power is held by a society's oldest members.

gerontology: A field of science that seeks to understand the process of aging and the challenges encountered as seniors grow older.

gerotranscendence: The idea that as people age, they transcend limited views of life they held in earlier times.

grief: A psychological, emotional, and social response to the feelings of loss that accompanies death or a similar event.

hospice: Health care that treats terminally ill people by providing comfort during the dying process.

life course: The period from birth to death, including a sequence of predictable life events.

life expectancy: The number of years a person is expected to live.

modernization theory: A theory which suggests that societies pass through a linear series of social transformations as they transform from traditional to industrial based forms of social organization.

physician-assisted suicide: The voluntary use of lethal medication provided by a medical doctor to end an individual's life.

primary aging: Biological factors such as molecular and cellular changes.

secondary aging: Aging that occurs due to controllable factors like exercise and diet.

selective optimization with compensation theory: The idea that successful personal development throughout the life course and subsequent mastery of the challenges associated with everyday life are based on the components of selection, optimization, and compensation.

senescence: The aging process, including biological, intellectual, emotional, social, and spiritual changes.

social gerontology: A specialized field of gerontology that examines the social aspects of aging.

subculture of aging theory: A theory that focuses on the shared community created by the elderly when they are excluded, voluntarily or involuntarily, from participating in other groups due to age.

thanatology: The systematic study of death and dying.

Section Summary

[13.1 Who Are the Elderly? Aging in Society](#)

The social study of aging uses population data and cohorts to predict social concerns related to aging populations. In Canada, the population is increasingly older (called “the greying of Canada”), especially due to the baby boomer segment. Global studies on aging reveal a difference in life expectancy between core and peripheral nations as well as a discrepancy in nations’ preparedness for the challenges of increasing elderly populations.

[13.2 The Process of Aging](#)

Old age affects every aspect of human life: biological, social, and psychological. Although medical technology has lengthened life expectancy, it cannot eradicate aging and death. Cultural attitudes shape the way a society views old age and dying, but these attitudes shift and evolve over time.

[13.3 Challenges Facing the Elderly](#)

As people enter old age, they face challenges. Ageism, which involves stereotyping and discrimination against the elderly, leads to misconceptions about their abilities. Some elderly people grow physically frail and, therefore, dependent on caregivers, which increases their risk of elder abuse.

[13.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Aging](#)

The three major sociological perspectives inform the theories of aging. Theories in the functionalist perspective focus on the role of elders in terms of adapting to the aging process. Theories in the critical perspective concentrate on how elders, as a group, are affected by power relationships in society. Theories in the symbolic interactionist perspective focus on how elders’ identities are created through their interactions.

Questions

Quiz: Ageing and the Elderly

13.1 Who Are the Elderly? Aging in Society

1. In most countries, elderly women _____ than elderly men.
 - a. Are mistreated less
 - b. Live a few years longer
 - c. Suffer fewer health problems
 - d. Deal with issues of aging better
2. Canada's baby boomer generation has contributed to all of the following except _____.
 - a. The financial vulnerability of the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans.
 - b. Improved medical technology.
 - c. The health care system being in danger of going bankrupt.
 - d. Rising health care budgets.
3. The measure that compares the number of men to women in a population is _____.
 - a. Cohort
 - b. Sex ratio
 - c. Baby boomer
 - d. Disengagement
4. The "greying of Canada" refers to _____.
 - a. The increasing percentage of the population over 65
 - b. Faster aging due to stress
 - c. Dissatisfaction with retirement plans
 - d. Trends in domestic and institutional paint
5. What is the approximate median age of Canada?
 - a. 85
 - b. 65
 - c. 40
 - d. 25

13.2 The Process of Aging

6. Thanatology is the study of _____.
 - a. Life expectancy
 - b. Biological aging

- c. Death and dying
 - d. Comic book super villains
7. In Erik Erikson's developmental stages of life, with which challenge must older people struggle?
- a. Overcoming despair to achieve integrity
 - b. Overcoming role confusion to achieve identity
 - c. Overcoming isolation to achieve intimacy
 - d. Overcoming limited views to achieve gerotranscendence
8. Who wrote the book *On Death and Dying*, outlining the five stages of grief?
- a. Ignatz Nascher
 - b. Erik Erikson
 - c. Elisabeth Kübler-Ross
 - d. Thich Nhat Hanh
9. For individuals in society, the life course is _____.
- a. The average age they will die.
 - b. The life lessons they must learn through socialization.
 - c. The length of a typical bereavement period.
 - d. The typical sequence of events in their lives.
10. In Canada, life expectancy rates in recent decades have _____.
- a. Continued to gradually rise.
 - b. Gone up and down due to global issues such as military conflicts.
 - c. Remained positive at all ages.
 - d. Stayed the same since the mid-1960s.

13.3 Challenges Facing the Elderly

11. Today in Canada the poverty rate of the elderly is _____.
- a. Increasing
 - b. Lower than at any point in history
 - c. Decreasing
 - d. The same as that of the general population
12. Which action reflects ageism?
- a. Celebrating youth
 - b. Speaking slowly and loudly when talking to someone over age 65
 - c. Believing that older people drive too slowly
 - d. Engaging in presentation rituals to show elders respect
13. Which factor most increases the risk of an elderly person suffering mistreatment?
- a. Social disorganization of neighbourhoods
 - b. Having been abusive as a younger adult

- c. Being frail to the point of dependency on care
 - d. The ability to bestow a large inheritance on survivors
14. If elderly people suffer abuse, it is most often perpetrated by _____.
- a. Spouses
 - b. Caregivers
 - c. Other elderly people
 - d. Strangers

13.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Aging

15. Which assertion about the aging role in men would be made by a sociologist following the functionalist perspective?
- a. Men view balding as representative of a loss of strength.
 - b. Men tend to have better retirement plans than women.
 - c. Men have life expectancies three to five years shorter than women.
 - d. Men who remain active after retirement play supportive community roles.
16. An older woman retires and completely changes her life. She is no longer raising children or working. However, she joins the YWCA to swim every day. She serves on the Friends of the Library board. She is part of a neighbourhood group that plays Bunco on Saturday nights. Her situation most closely illustrates the _____ theory.
- a. Activity
 - b. Continuity
 - c. Disengagement
 - d. Gerotranscendence
17. An older man retires from his job, stops golfing, and cancels his newspaper subscription. After his wife dies, he lives alone, loses touch with his children, and stops seeing old friends. His situation most closely illustrates the _____ theory.
- a. Activity
 - b. Continuity
 - c. Disengagement
 - d. Gerotranscendence
18. Modernization theory suggests _____.
- a. The elderly lose power and influence in society.
 - b. Life will be radically extended by molecular biotechnologies creating a new gerontocracy.
 - c. Elderly people stay healthier and more active if they keep up with modern trends.
 - d. Fewer elderly people are religious today.
19. Exchange theory suggests _____.
- a. People pass through stages of life by exchanging old roles for new roles
 - b. Age cohorts struggle over control of limited resources.

- c. Nonmaterial assets such as love and friendship govern social interactions
- d. Older people are more isolated because they have less resources to trade.

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

[13.1 Who Are the Elderly? Aging in Society](#)

1. Baby boomers have been a dominant force in North American culture since the 1960s. Do you know any baby boomers? In what way do they exemplify their generation? What is the significance of the boomers entering retirement?
2. What social issues involve age disaggregation (breakdowns into groups) of a population? What kind of sociological studies would consider age an important factor?
3. Conduct a mini-census by counting the members of your extended family, emphasizing age. Try to include three or four generations, if possible. Create a table and include total population plus percentages of each generation. Next, begin to analyze age patterns in your family. What issues are important and specific to each group? What trends can you predict about your own family over the next ten years based on this census? For example, how will family members' needs and interests and relationships change the family dynamic?

[13.2 The Process of Aging](#)

4. Test Elisabeth Kübler-Ross's five stages of grief. Think of someone or something you have lost. You might consider the loss of a relationship, possession, or aspect of your self-identity. For example, perhaps you dissolved a childhood friendship, sold your car, or got a bad haircut. For even a small loss, did you experience all five stages of grief? If so, how did the expression of each stage manifest? Did the process happen slowly or rapidly? Did the stages occur out of order? Did you reach acceptance? Try to recall the experience and analyze your own response to loss. Does your experience facilitate your empathizing with the elderly?
5. What do you think it will be like to be 10, 20, and 50 years older than you are now? What facts are your assumptions based on? Are any of your assumptions about getting older false? What kind of sociological study could you establish to test your assumptions?
6. What is your relationship to aging and to time? Look back on your own life. How much and in what ways did you change in 10 years and in 20 years? Does a decade seem like a long time or a short time in a life span? Now apply some of your ideas to the idea of aging. Do you think older people share similar experiences as they age?

[13.3 Challenges Facing the Elderly](#)

7. Make a list of all the biases, generalizations, and stereotypes about elderly people that you have seen or heard. Include everything, no matter how small or seemingly trivial. Try to rate the items on your list.

Which statements can be considered myths? Which frequently turn into discrimination?

8. Have you known any person who experienced prejudice or discrimination based on age? Think of someone who has been denied an experience or opportunity simply for being too old. Write the story as a case study.
9. Think of an older person you know well, perhaps a grandparent, other relative, or neighbour. How does this person defy certain stereotypes of aging? How do they exemplify certain stereotypes of aging?
10. Older people suffer discrimination, and often, so do teenagers. Compare the discrimination of the elderly to that of teenagers. What do the groups share in common and how are they different?

13.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Aging

11. Remember Bridget Fisher, the 62-year-old woman from the introduction? Consider her life experiences from all three sociological points of view. Analyze her situation as if you were a functionalist, a symbolic interactionist, and a critical sociologist.
12. Which lifestyle do you think is healthiest for aging people — activity, continuity, or disengagement? What are the pros and cons of the activity, continuity, and disengagement *theories*? Find examples of real people who illustrate the theories, either from your own experience or your friends' relationships with older people. Do your examples show positive or negative aspects of the theory they illustrate?

Further Research

13.1 Who Are the Elderly? Aging in Society

Gregory Bator founded the television show *Graceful Aging* and then developed a website offering short video clips from the show. The purpose of *Graceful Aging* is to both inform and entertain, with clips on topics such as sleep, driving, health, safety, and legal issues. Bator, a lawyer, works on counseling seniors about their legal needs. Log on to [Graceful Aging](#) for a visual understanding of aging.

13.2 The Process of Aging

Read the article “[A Study of Sexuality and Health among Older Adults in the United States](#)”, by (Tessler Lindau, Schumm, & Laumann, 2007), found online at the *New England Journal of Medicine*. How does it elaborate on themes discussed in the chapter?

The [Institute on Aging & Lifelong Health](#) is an interdisciplinary research institute based at the University of Victoria. Review their Research and Resources page to see examples of contemporary social research into aging in Canada.

13.3 Challenges Facing the Elderly

Elderly Canadians share certain aspects of life in common. To find information on public issues that elderly Canadians are engaged in visit the [CARP website](#) or look at a copy of *Zoomer* magazine.

Learn more about the [Grandmothers to Grandmothers Campaign](#), the organization supporting African grandmothers who are caring for AIDS-orphaned grandchildren.

13.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Aging

[New Dynamics of Aging](#) is a website produced by an interdisciplinary team at the University of Sheffield. It is supposedly the largest research program on aging in the United Kingdom to date. In studying the experiences of aging and factors that shape aging, including behaviours, biology, health, culture, history, economics, and technology, researchers are promoting healthy aging and helping dispel stereotypes. Learn more by logging onto its website.

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Solutions to Section Quiz

1 B, | 2 C, | 3 B, | 4 A, | 5 C, | 6 C, | 7 A | 8 C, | 9 D, | 10 A, | 11 B, | 12 B, | 13 C, | 14 B, | 15 D, | 16 A, | 17 C, | 18 A, | 19 D, | [\[Return to Quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 14. MARRIAGE AND FAMILY



Figure 14.1 French Canadian Habitant family playing at cards (1848). Léon Gérin (1863–1951), the first Canadian born social scientist, could be said to be the father of the Canadian sociology of the family when he articulated his concern about the decline of the traditional Quebecois family in the 19th and early 20th centuries. While some rural families were adapting well to industrialization, others “were losing their self-sufficiency, and, unable to withstand ‘l’attraction puissante du grand atelier,’ were in danger of ‘degenerating’” (Comacchio, 2000). The “family in decline” has been a central theme sociologists and social reformers since the 19th century. (Image courtesy of Library and Archives Canada, Item title: c000057k, ID: 2836668.) [Public Domain](#)

Learning Objectives

14.1 What Is Marriage? What Is a Family?

- Define the family and the difficulties sociologists have in formulating a substantive definition.

- Analyze historical and cross-cultural variations in marriage and family patterns.
- Outline the sociological approach to the dynamics of attraction and romantic love.
- Understand the effect of the family life cycle on the quality of the family experience.
- Describe micro, meso, macro and global approaches to the family.

14.2 Variations in Family Life

- Recognize variations in family life.
- Describe the different forms of the family, including the nuclear family, single-parent families, cohabitation, same-sex couples, and unmarried individuals.
- Discuss the functionalist, critical, and symbolic interactionist perspectives on the modern family.

14.3 Challenges Families Face

- Understand the social and interpersonal impact of divorce.
- Describe the problems of family abuse, and discuss whether corporal punishment is a form of abuse.

Introduction to Marriage and Family

Christina and James met in university and have been dating for more than five years. For the past two years, they have been living together in a condo they purchased jointly. While Christina and James were confident in their decision to enter into a commitment (such as a 20-year mortgage), they are unsure if they want to enter into *marriage*. The couple had many discussions about marriage and decided that it just did not seem necessary. Was it not just a piece of paper? Did not half of all marriages end in divorce?

Neither Christina nor James had seen much success with marriage while growing up. Christina was raised by a single mother. Her parents never married, and her father has had little contact with the family since she was a toddler. Christina and her mother lived with her maternal grandmother, who often served as a surrogate parent. James grew up in a two-parent household until age seven, when his parents divorced. He lived with his mother for a few years, and then later with his mother and her boyfriend until he left for college. James remained close with his father who remarried and had a baby with his new wife.

Recently, Christina and James have been thinking about having children and the subject of marriage has resurfaced. Christina likes the idea of her children growing up in a traditional family, while James is concerned about possible marital problems down the road and negative consequences for the children should that occur. When they shared these concerns with their parents, James's mom was adamant that the couple should get married. Despite having been divorced and having a live-in boyfriend of 15 years, she believes that children are better off when their parents are married. Christina's mom believes that the couple should do whatever they want but adds that it would "be nice" if they wed. Christina and James's friends told them, married or not married, they would still be a family.

Christina and James' dilemma is shared by many couples today. Zygmunt Bauman (2003) has argued that in late modernity, institutions, including marriage, have become increasingly fluid: uncertain, insecure, impermanent. In one's life one might expect to go through a number of career changes, a number of identities, as well as a number of intimate partners. Love and intimacy are anchors in an unpredictable and unfixed world, but they can also be fleeting and untrustworthy. To commit to another in marriage involves a gamble that the other, (and oneself), will remain committed to the relationship through time. Among other things, long term commitment closes the door on other romantic possibilities, which could prove more satisfying and fulfilling.

As Bauman puts it,

Interpersonal relationships with all their accompaniments – love, partnerships, commitments, mutually recognized rights and duties – are simultaneously objects of attraction and apprehension, desire and fear; sites of two-mindedness and hesitation, soul-searching, anxiety (Bauman, 2004).

Does this mean that the family is in crisis or decline?

Christina and James's scenario may be complicated, but it is representative of the lives of many young couples today, particularly those in urban areas. Statistics Canada (2019a) reports that the number of unmarried, common-law couples grew by 3 times between 1981 and 2016, to make up a total of 21.3% of all couples in Canada. This is much higher than in the United States where only 5.9% of couples cohabited outside of marriage in 2010, but about the same as the UK (20% in 2015) and lower than Sweden (29% in 2010). In Quebec, 39.9% of couples lived common law, whereas in Nunavut the figure was 50.3%.

While more married couples than ever reported having lived common-law before getting married in 2016 (39%), some common-law couples may never choose to wed (Statistics Canada, 2019b). The most common type of household in 2016 was in fact one-person households or singles (28.2%). With fewer couples marrying, the traditional Canadian family structure is becoming less common. Nevertheless, although the percentage of traditional married couples has declined as a proportion of all families, 56% of all people aged 25–64 were officially married in 2016, (compared to 15% living common law, 13% never married or lived common law, 6 per cent divorced, 8 per cent separated from common-law partner, and 1 per cent widowed). For people aged 25–64, marriage is still by far the predominant living arrangement in Canada.




Figure 14.2 Overview of Household Types, Canada, 2016. “Census family” here refers to married or common-law couples, with or without children, and lone-parent families. (Image courtesy of Statistics Canada, 2017b). [Statistics Canada Open Licence](#). [\[Image Description\]](#)

Image Descriptions

Figure 14.2 long description: Overview of Household Types, Canada, 2016.

Total private households: 14,1072,080 (100.0%)

- Non-census-family households: 4552,135 (32.3%)
 - One-person households: 3,969,795 (28.2%)
 - Non-census-family households of two or more persons: 582,345 (4.1%)
- Census family households: 9,519,945 (67.7%)
 - Couples without children: 2,627,185 (25.8%)
 - Couples with children: 3,728,375 (26.5%)
 - Lone-parent families: 1,250,190 (8.9%)
 - Multigenerational households: 403,810 (2.9%)
 - Other family households: 510,380 (3.6%) [\[Return to Figure 14.2\]](#)

Media Attributions

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14.1 What Is Marriage? What Is a Family?



Figure 14.3 Families and weddings in Selangor, Malaysia. The modern concept of family is far more encompassing than in past decades. How should sociologists define “family”? (Photo courtesy of Yusaini Usulludin/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

Marriage and family are key structures in most societies. While the two institutions have historically been closely linked in Canadian culture, their connection is becoming more complex. The relationship between marriage and family is often taken for granted in the popular imagination but with the increasing diversity of family forms in the 21st century their relationship needs to be reexamined.

What is marriage? Different people define it in different ways. Not even sociologists are able to agree on a single meaning. A straightforward definition of **marriage** is: a legally recognized social contract between two people, based on a sexual or intimate relationship, and implying cohabitation and a permanence of the union. But to create a more inclusive definition, sociologists might also consider variations, such as whether a formal legal union is required (think of common-law marriage and its equivalents), whether a sexual relationship is necessary (consider permanent intimate relationships between asexual individuals), or whether more than two people can be involved (consider polygamy, polyandry or polyamory). Other variations on the definition of marriage might include whether spouses are of opposite sexes or the same sex (regardless of local laws governing same-sex marriage), and how one of the traditional expectations of marriage, to produce children, is relevant to the question.

Interestingly, a court case in 1867, at the time of Confederation, might provide the basis for a truly “traditional” Canadian definition of marriage. In the 19th century marital unions between European fur traders and Aboriginal women were common, but also foreshadowed some of the complexity sociologists confront in defining marriage today.

European authorities, especially religious authorities, tended to define legitimate marriage based on European practices — monogamy, insolubility, holy sacrament, etc. — and insisted that Aboriginal people conform to them. There were also fears about “mixing blood” and racial “degeneration.” But in a context where marriage with Aboriginal women provided useful socioeconomic alliances, acculturation into frontier life, as well as the “many tender ties” of domestic life, European men often accepted Aboriginal practices, which included payment of bride price, polygamy, and divorce depending on the nation (Van Kirk, 2002; 1980). They were married “*en façon du pays*” or by the “custom of the country.”

This was the case with William Connolly and his Cree wife Suzanne, who married in 1803 at Rivière-aux-Rats (in now northern Manitoba), according to Cree customs, and lived together for 28 years, having 6 children. William then married his cousin Julia Woolrich in a Catholic ceremony. When William died and his estate went to Julia, one of his sons by Suzanne argued in court that the second marriage was null because William was still married to his mother. The question was whether their Cree marriage ceremony was legally valid, or, what definition of marriage applied to the inheritance of William’s estate. The court recognized the Cree marriage customs as valid and binding (Walter, 2017). The ruling of *Connolly v Woolrich* therefore defined marriage according to components of both European and Aboriginal marriage, emphasizing local custom and social recognition. As Van Kirk (2002) summarizes, “a marriage was defined as being openly recognized and characterized by mutual consent, cohabitation, and public repute as husband and wife.”

Sociologists are interested in the relationship between the institution of marriage and the institution of family because, historically, marriages are what legally and normatively create a family, and families are a primary social unit upon which society is built. Both marriage and family create status roles that are recognized, sanctioned and regulated by society.



Figure 14.4 Léon Gérin (1863–1951) adopted 19th c. French sociologist Frédéric le Play’s categorization of European families as patriarchal, stem and “unstable” or particularist (i.e., the nuclear family) in his detailed surveys of French Canadian family life in 19th and 20th century. (Image courtesy of Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec, reference number: P1000, S4, D83, PG28/Wikimedia Commons.)
[Public Domain](#)

So what is a family? Léon Gérin’s (1863–1951) early research on the family in transition in Quebec, noted the emerging dominance of the nuclear or “particularist” family in the late 19th century as families adapted to the urbanized, industrial economy (Comacchio, 2000). The nuclear ideal of a husband, a wife, and two biological children — maybe even a pet — served as the model for the “traditional” Canadian family for most of the 20th century. As Gérin noted, it supplanted the previous “traditional” **stem family**, which was generally large, rural, multi-generational and self-sufficient, in which one of the children married and remained in the family home while other siblings moved away. But what about families that deviate from these models, such as the single-parent household, the blended family or the homosexual couple, with or without children? Can a definition of family be formulated to include them as well?

The question of what constitutes a family is a prime area of debate in family sociology, as well as in contemporary politics and religion. Social conservatives tend to define the family in terms of a heterosexual, nuclear family structure with each family member filling a certain role (like father, mother, or child). As former Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper put it, “I have no difficulty with the recognition of civil unions for nontraditional relationships but I believe in law we should protect the traditional definition of marriage” (*Globe and Mail*, 2010). Others define family much more broadly as a group of intimates tied together by bonds of love and commitment. American Talk show host Oprah Winfrey defines family as “a marvelous, occasionally messy collection of partners, parents, exes, siblings, babies, and best friends—all bonded by that most powerful glue...love” (Winfrey, 2019).

Navigating between these different definitions, sociologists seek a *substantive definition* that can distinguish family groups from non-family groups. Rather than relying on definitions borrowed from specific religious or cultural traditions, they tend to define family more in terms of the manner in which members relate to one another. Therefore, **family** can be defined as a socially recognized group joined by blood relations, marriage, or adoption, that forms an emotional connection and serves as an economic unit of society.

Based on Georg Simmel's (1971 (1908)) distinction between the *form* and *content* of social interaction (see [Chapter 7. Groups and Organizations](#)), sociologists can analyze the family as a *social form* that comes into existence around five different *contents* or interests: sexual activity, economic cooperation, reproduction, socialization of children, and emotional support. As one might expect from Simmel's analysis, the types of family form in which all or some of these contents are expressed are diverse: nuclear families, polygamous families, extended families, same-sex parent families, single-parent families, blended families, and zero-child families, etc. However, the forms that families take are not random; rather, these forms are determined by cultural traditions, social structures, economic pressures, and historical transformations. They also are subject to intense moral and political debate about the definition of the family, the "decline of the family," or the policy options to best support the well-being of families.

Substantive definitions in sociology attempt to delineate the crucial characteristics that define what a social phenomenon is and is not. They can be contrasted with *functional definitions*, which define a social phenomenon by what it does or how it functions in society.

Marriage Patterns as Social Forms




Figure 14.5 Monogamous marriage became formal Christian doctrine after the Council of Hertford in 673 CE (Gullotta, 2019), but polygamy is also a Judeo-Christian tradition, as exemplified by King Solomon, who was thought to have had more than 700 wives. (Photo courtesy of Gustave Doré (1832–1883)/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Contemporary North Americans typically equate marriage and cohabitation with **monogamy**, when someone is married to only one person at a time. Following Simmel's sociological approach above, monogamy is a *social form* or relationship pattern that regulates sexual activity as a *content* of social relationships. It has consequences for the social forms that the other contents of “family” assume: economic cooperation, reproduction, socialization of children, and emotional support. In fact, who can marry whom, and who is permitted to have sex with whom, are key variables in distinguishing various types of **kinship system**, systems of social organization based on real or putative family ties (Carston, 1998). The most basic rule for all societies is the **incest taboo** — an individual may not have sex with or marry someone who is a close blood relative — but beyond this constraint there is great variation in kinship practices (Stebbins, 2013).

In a majority of cultures around the world (78%), **polygamy**, or being married to more than one person at a time, is accepted (Murdock, 1967), with most polygamous societies existing in Sub-Saharan Africa and Muslim dominant countries (Altman and Ginat, 1996). Instances of polygamy are almost exclusively in the form of polygyny. **Polygyny** refers to a man being married to more than one woman at the same time. The reverse, when a woman is married to more than one man at the same time, is called **polyandry**. It is far less common and only occurs in about 1 per cent of the world's cultures (Altman and Ginat, 1996).

While the majority of societies accept polygyny, the majority of people do not practice it. Often fewer than 10% (and no more than 25 to 35%) of men in cultures that accept polygamy have more than one wife. Having multiple wives is a sign of status and wealth for a man, but he usually must have the wealth and status before he can have more than one wife (Altman and Ginat, 1996).

In Canada, polygamy is considered by most to be socially unacceptable and it is illegal. The act of entering into marriage while still married to another person is referred to as **bigamy** and is prohibited by Section 290 of the Criminal Code of Canada (Minister of Justice, 2014). In precolonial times however, many Aboriginal peoples practiced polygyny, often as a means of establishing formal ties and mutual obligations between different groups. In societies where kinship is the dominant organizing structure, marital ties are central to economic accumulation and political alliances. Having more than one wife was an indicator of a man's status and also had practical benefits for the family unit, as the wives' labour was valuable in maintaining the household, accumulating wealth and producing children. Leading men among the Cree or Blackfoot, for example, often married sisters (the practice of *sororal polygyny*) or the wife of a deceased brother, usually in consultation and agreement with their first wife (Carter, 2008). Polygyny was seen to benefit both husbands and wives. Polyandry, while seemingly rare, was reported among the Cherokee, Seneca, and Pawnee nations (among others); sometimes as a case of one wife being married to brothers (*fraternal polyandry*), or sometimes as an indicator of a woman's high status in possessing land or resources (Stebbins, 2013; Broberg, 1984; Lesser, 1930).

The displacement of Aboriginal marriage traditions was one of the effects of colonialism. Legal, political, and missionary authorities determined that lifelong monogamy in the tradition of the Christian religion and English common law was the marriage model that symbolized the proper differences between the sexes and set the foundation for the way both sexes were to behave (Carter, 2008).

The criminalization of polygamy in 1890 was in fact a response to the immigration of polygamous Mormon sects to Alberta. Polygamy in Canada is often associated with those of the Mormon faith, although in 1890 the Mormon Church officially renounced polygamy. Fundamentalist Mormons, on the other hand, such as those in Bountiful, B.C. who follow the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (FLDS), still hold tightly to the historic Mormon beliefs and practices and allow polygamy in their sect.

In practice though, as Carter (2008) shows with regard to prairie Aboriginal communities, mandatory monogamy was applied to Aboriginal people through various coercive means as a way to “civilize” them, simultaneously undermining the traditional authority structures and status of leading men and the relative sexual freedoms and privileges of Aboriginal women. Lifelong monogamous “marriage was part of the national agenda in Canada—the marriage ‘fortress’ was established to guard the [Canadian] way of life.”



Figure 14.6 Blackfoot women and their husband, late 1870s. (Image courtesy of the Glenbow Archives/ now Blackfoot Digital Library). [Public Domain](#)

Residency and Lines of Descent

Another way in which the social forms of family differ is by practices determining lineage and inheritance. Sociologists identify different types of families based on how one enters into them. A **family of orientation** refers to the family into which a person is born. A **family of procreation** describes one that is formed through marriage. But where one ends up living, whose family one belongs to, which relations are closest or more distant, or who is regarded as blood kin (i.e., interdicted by the incest taboo) differs by kinship system. Societies vary when it comes to determining who is a member of one's family who one can go to for family support.




Figure 14.7 The North American kinship system in all of its marvelous complexity. Anthropologists still refer to the basic structure of this naming system, in which nuclear families are predominant and no distinction between patrilineal and matrilineal relatives is made, as the “Eskimo” system. It is one of six major kinship systems identified by Lewis Henry Morgan in *Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family* (1871). (Figure courtesy of Lane Genealogy/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/)

When considering their lineage, most North Americans look to both their father’s and mother’s sides. Both paternal and maternal ancestors are considered part of one’s family and inheritance passes from both sides to both male and female children. This pattern of tracing kinship is called **bilateral descent**. Note that **kinship** can be based on blood, marriage, or adoption. Sixty per cent of societies, mostly modernized nations, follow a bilateral descent pattern. **Unilateral**

descent (the tracing of kinship through one parent only) is practiced in the other 40% of the world's societies, with high concentration in pastoral cultures (O'Neal, 2006).

There are three types of unilateral descent: **patrilineal**, which follows the father's line only; **matrilineal**, which follows the mother's side only; and **ambilineal**, which follows either the father's only or the mother's side only, depending on the situation. In patrilineal societies, such as those in rural China and India, only males carry on the family surname. This gives males the prestige of permanent family membership while females are seen as only temporary members (Harrell, 2001). North American society assumes some aspects of patrilineal descent. For instance, most children assume their father's last name even if the mother retains her birth name.

In matrilineal societies, inheritance and family ties are traced to women. **Matrilineal descent** is common in Native American societies, notably among the Iroquois, Hopi, Navajo, Haida, Tsimshian and Tlingit nations. In these societies, children are seen as belonging to the women and, therefore, one's kinship is traced to one's mother, grandmother, great grandmother, and so on (Mails, 1996). In ambilineal societies, which are most common in South East Asian countries, parents may choose to associate their children with the kinship of either the mother or the father. This choice may be based on the desire to follow stronger or more prestigious kinship lines or on cultural customs, such as men following their father's side and women following their mother's side (Lambert, 2009).

Tracing one's line of descent to one parent rather than the other can be relevant to the issue of residence. In many cultures, newly married couples move in with, or near to, family members. In a **patrilocal residence** system it is customary for the wife to live with (or near) her husband's blood relatives (or family of orientation). Patrilocal residence is a key structure of patriarchal societies because it is a means by which women can be controlled and transferred like property or assets between their father's and husband's families. In particular, the control of women's sexuality and fertility is a means of ensuring paternity and paternal lineage. While it is relatively easy to know who a child's biological mother is, it is not so easy to be certain that children are biological offspring of the father. Women also become outsiders in the home and community, disconnected from their own blood relatives. In China, where patrilocal and patrilineal customs are common, the written symbols for maternal grandmother (*wáipá*) are separately translated to mean "outsider" and "women" (Cohen, 2011).



Figure 14.8 The Mosuo culture of the Himalayas is regarded as a classical example of matriarchal society. “When a girl reaches the age of sexual maturity, her mother prepares a room where she can invite a man to dine with her. If she chooses, she invites him to spend the night with her. Children produced from such unions become part of their mother’s maternal clan. The ‘fathering’ role is assumed by the uncles and brothers of the mother, while the mothering role is shared among sisters. If either member of a couple tires of their sexual relationship, they end it and seek other partners” (Christ, 2016). (Image courtesy of Rod Waddington/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

In **matrilocal residence** systems, it is customary for the husband to live with his wife’s blood relatives (or her family of orientation). Land and property are held by the maternal family and both men and women hold status through their maternal clan affiliation. Among the precolonial Iroquois nations for example, maternal clans lived in longhouses in the Great Lakes region and husbands joined their wives families. Clan membership as well as all goods, titles and rights passed through the maternal lineage. “Thus, in precolonial Iroquois society, a given household could be expected to consist of several nuclear families: a senior woman and her husband, her daughters and unmarried sons, her daughters’ husbands, and her daughters’ children” (Parmenter, 2010). Interestingly, in matrilineal/matrilocal societies there can be no illegitimate children, or questions about children’s legitimate lineage, because all children have mothers (Stone, 1976).

If patrilineal/patrilocal societies are patriarchal, are matrilineal/matrilocal societies “matriarchal”? They are not matriarchal in the sense of being the opposite of patriarchies, societies where women control and hold power over men. In matriarchal structures, typically both grandmothers and uncles hold power and governance is conducted through discussion, consensus and agreement of members (Christ, 2016). This was the case with consensus decision making in the “sachem” structure of the Iroquois Confederacy. These societies were matriarchal in the sense that elder women were heads of the family and selected male chiefs as sachems who represented the clans in the general council (Jefferson, 1994). **Matriarchy** in this sense refers to relatively egalitarian, small scale agricultural societies in which mothering is recognized as the central unifying structure (Goettner-Abendroth, 2009).

Confluent Love and Cohabitation

With single parenting and **cohabitation** (when a couple shares a residence but not a marriage) becoming more acceptable in recent years, people may be less motivated to get married. In a recent survey, 53% of Canadian respondents said that “marriage is simply not necessary” (Angus Reid Institute, 2017). Nearly three-quarters of 18-34-year-olds in the survey had never been married, and one-in-six in this group reported that they were not inclined to ever marry.

As Simmel (1971 (1908)) argues, before social forms become formalized and institutionalized, they remain in a process of reciprocity and mutual attunement. This also applies to new social forms of marriage and the family in the social flux of late modernity. Giddens (1992) analyses the emergence of **confluent love** as a new, non-institutionalized form of intimacy. He describes this as a form of “pure relationship,” not “sexually pure” but entered into purely “for its own sake,” without ulterior purposes like forging family alliances, satisfying parental expectations, having children, or establishing respectability in a career path, etc. Couples enter into a relationship that lasts only as long as the satisfaction it brings to both partners. This is a form of relationship which “presumes equality in emotional give and take,” where trust and stability are produced through a process mutual self-disclosure and appreciation of the other’s unique qualities. “Love here only develops to the degree to which intimacy does, to the degree to which each partner is prepared to reveal concerns and needs to the other and to be vulnerable to that other.” Moreover, if regulation of sexuality is a key element in the different types of marital relationship described above, confluent love “makes the achievement of reciprocal sexual pleasure a key element in whether the relationship is sustained or dissolved.” As a result, Giddens notes that

while confluent love can be deeply meaningful it is also intrinsically fragile. When the relationship is no longer mutually satisfactory, it dissolves.

Nevertheless, confluent love is a social form appropriate to late modern priorities of individual freedom, self-creation and self-actualization. It gives a specifically late modern shape to individual “contents” or desires for relationship, self-discovery and sexual and emotional intimacy. The institution of marriage is likely to continue, but some previous patterns of marriage will become outdated as new patterns emerge. In this context, cohabitation and confluent love contribute to the phenomenon of people getting formally married for the first time at a later age than was typical in earlier generations (Glezer, 1991). Furthermore, marriage will continue to be delayed as more people place education, career and “experiencing life” ahead of settling down.

Making Connections: Sociological Research

How Do Working Moms Impact Society?



Figure 14.9 Working mother at the end of a day. (Image courtesy of Thanh Mai Bui Duy/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

What constitutes a “typical family” in Canada has changed tremendously over the past decades. One of the most notable changes has been the increasing number of mothers who work outside the home. Earlier in Canadian history, most family households consisted of one parent working outside the home and the other being the primary child care provider. Because of traditional gender roles and family structures, this was typically a working father and a stay-at-home mom. Research shows that in 1951 only 21.6% of all

women worked outside the home. In 2015, 82% of all women did, and 69.5% of women with children younger than six years of age were employed (Moyser, 2017).

Sociologists interested in this topic might approach its study from a variety of angles. One might be interested in its impact on a child's development; another sociologist may explore its effect on family income; while a third sociologist might examine how other social institutions have responded to this shift in society. A sociologist studying the impact of working mothers on a child's development might ask questions about children raised in child care settings outside the home. How is a child socialized differently when raised largely by a child care provider rather than a parent? Do early experiences in a school-like child care setting lead to improved academic performance later in life? How does a child with two working parents perceive gender roles compared to a child raised with a stay-at-home parent? Another sociologist might be interested in the increase in working mothers from an economic perspective. Why do so many households today have dual incomes? Has this changed the income of families substantially? How do women's dual roles in the household and in the wider economy affect their occupational achievements and ability to participate on an equal basis with men in the workforce? What impact does the larger economy play in the economic conditions of an individual household? Do people view money — savings, spending, debt — differently than they have in the past?

Curiosity about this trend's influence on social institutions might lead a researcher to explore its effect on the nation's educational and child care systems. Has the increase in working mothers shifted traditional family responsibilities onto schools, such as providing lunch and even breakfast for students? How does the creation of after-school care programs shift resources away from traditional school programs? What would the effect be of providing a universal, subsidized child care program on the ability of women to pursue uninterrupted careers?

As these examples show, sociologists study many real-world topics. Their research often influences social policies and political issues. Results from sociological studies on this topic might play a role in developing federal policies like the Employment Insurance maternity and parental benefits program, or they might bolster the efforts of an advocacy group striving to reduce social stigmas placed on stay-at-home dads, or they might help governments determine how to best allocate funding for education. Many European countries like Sweden have substantial family support policies, such as a full year of parental leave at 80% of wages when a child is born, and heavily subsidized, high-quality daycare and preschool programs. The debate in Canada is often between the effectiveness of child tax benefits and family allowance payments vs. the provision of subsidized early childhood care. Sociologists might be interested in studying whether the benefits of the Swedish system — in terms of children's well-being, lower family poverty, and gender equality — outweigh the drawbacks of higher Swedish tax rates.

What is love (for a sociologist)?

Throughout most of history, erotic love or romantic love was not considered a suitable basis for marriage. Marriages were typically arranged by families through negotiations designed to increase wealth, property or prestige, establish ties, or gain political advantages. In modern individualistic societies on the other hand, romantic love is seen as the essential basis for marriage. In response to the question, “If a man (woman) had all the other qualities you desired, would you marry this person if you were not in love with him (her)?” only 4 per cent of Americans and Brazilians, 5 per cent of Australians, 6 per cent of Hong Kong residents, and 7 per cent of British residents said they would — compared to 49% of Indians and 50% of Pakistanis (Levine, Sato, Hashimoto, and Verma, 1995). Despite the emphasis on romantic love, it is also recognized to be an unstable basis for long-term relationships as the feelings associated with it are transitory.

What exactly is romantic love? Neuroscience describes it as one of the central brain systems that have evolved to ensure mating, reproduction, and the perpetuation of the species (Fisher, 1992). Alongside the instinctual drive for sexual satisfaction, (which is relatively indiscriminate in its choice of object), and companionate love, (the long term attachment to another which enables mates to remain together at least long enough to raise a child through infancy), romantic love is the intense attraction to a particular person that focuses “mating energy” on a single person at a single time. It manifests as a seemingly involuntary, passionate longing for another person in which individuals experience obsessiveness, craving, loss of appetite, possessiveness, anxiety, and compulsive, intrusive thoughts. In studies comparing functional MRI brain scans of maternal attachment to children and romantic attachment to a loved one, both types of attachment activate oxytocin and vasopressin receptors in regions in the brain’s reward system while suppressing regions associated with negative emotions and critical judgement of others (Bartels and Zeki, 2004; Acevedo, Aron, Fisher and Brown, 2012). In this respect, romantic love shares many physiological features in common with addiction and addictive behaviours.



Figure 14.10 “Psyche Revived by Cupid’s Kiss,” Antonio Canova (1777). In the Greek myth of Cupid and Psyche, Psyche is suddenly struck by passion when she accidentally wounds herself on one of Cupid’s arrows. (Image courtesy of Riccardo Cuppini/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)



Figure 14.11 The romance genre in popular culture reproduces a very powerful and common fantasy summarize by John Storey: “An intelligent and independent woman with a good sense of humour is overwhelmed, after much suspicion and distrust, and some cruelty and violence, by the love of a man, who in the course of their relationship is transformed from an emotional pre-literate to someone who can care for her and nurture her in ways that are traditionally expected only from a woman to a man” (Storey, 2012). (Image credited to Alice Kirkpatrick at Ace, courtesy of Comic Book+) [Public Domain](#)

In a historical context, romantic love is a product of what Williams (1977) calls a **structure of feeling** (see [Chapter 6. Social Interaction](#)). Narratives of chivalrous, romantic love became prominent in Europe in 12th century court poetry. They gradually became popularized as a general, societal way of feeling or experiencing love relationships. Islamic, Indian and East Asian cultures had similar literatures, but in the early romances of the story of Lancelot and Guenevere (of King Arthur fame) for example, love became codified in a specific romantic complex. This continues to inform Western popular culture and popular experience today. In the poetic narrative, spontaneous love, or love “at first sight,” is transformed into a spiritual quest in which the lovers struggle to reconcile sexual desire and moral virtue. The female object of desire is put on a pedestal, while the idolizing lover humbles himself to prove himself worthy of her through his deeds and devotion. At a time of gender inequality, arranged marriages and restrictive rituals of courtship, the poetic narrative appeared to free the expression of love from social conventions and obligations. It was “a love at once illicit and morally elevating, passionate and self-disciplined, humiliating and exalting, human and transcendent” (Newman, 1969). Giddens (1992) therefore distinguishes between **passionate love**, which refers to the giddy feelings of impulsive and pervasive sexual attraction or obsession with another, and romantic love which is a more historically and culturally specific structure of feeling.

In a sociological context, the physiological manifestations of romantic love are associated with a number of social factors. Love itself might be described as the general force of attraction that draws people together; a principle agency that enables society to exist. As Freud defined it, love in the form of *eros*, was the force that strove to “form living substance into ever greater unities, so that life may be prolonged and brought to higher development” (Freud cited in Marcuse, 1955). In this sense, as Erich Fromm put it, “[l]ove is not primarily a relationship to a specific person; it is an attitude, an orientation of character which determines the relatedness of a person to the world as a whole, not toward one ‘object’ of love”

(Fromm, 1956). Fromm argues therefore that love can take many forms: brotherly love, the sense of care for another human; motherly love, the unconditional love of a mother for a child; erotic love, the desire for complete fusion with another person; self-love, the ability to affirm and accept oneself; and love of God, a sense of universal belonging or union with a higher or sacred order.

Only when the object of love is individualized in another, does it come to form the basis of erotic or intimate relationships. In this sense, **romantic love** can be defined as the desire for emotional union with another person (Fisher, 1992). In Robert Sternberg’s (1986) **triangular theory of love**, romantic love consists of three components: *passion* or erotic attraction (limerance); *intimacy* or feelings of bonding, sharing, closeness, and connectedness; and *commitment* or deliberate choice to enter into and remain in a relationship. The three components vary independently in long term relationships: passion starts off at high levels but drops off as the partner no longer has the same arousal value, intimacy decreases gradually as the relationship becomes more predictable, while commitment increases gradually at first, then more rapidly as the relationship intensifies, and eventually levels off. This suggests that for couples who remain together, romantic love eventually develops into **companionate love** characterized by deep friendship, comfortable companionship, and shared interests, but not necessarily intense attraction or sexual desire.

Although romantic love is often characterized as an involuntary force that sweeps people away, mate selection nevertheless involves an implicit or explicit cost/benefit analysis that affects who falls in love with whom. In particular, people tend to select mates of a similar social status from within their own social group. The selection process is influenced by three sociological variables (Kalmijn, 1998). Firstly, potential mates assess each others’ *socioeconomic resources*, like income potential or family wealth, and *cultural resources*, like education, taste, worldview, and values,

to maximize the value or rewards the relationship will bring to them. Secondly, third parties like family, church, or community members tend to intervene to prevent people from choosing partners from outside their community or social group because this threatens group cohesion and homogeneity. Thirdly, demographic variables that effect “local marriage markets” – typically places like schools, workplaces, bars, clubs, and neighborhoods where potential mates can meet – will also affect mate choice. Due to probability, people from large or concentrated social groups have more chance to choose a partner from within their group than do people from smaller or more dispersed groups. Other demographic or social factors like war or economic conditions also affect the ratio of males to females or the distribution of ages in a community, which in turn affects the likelihood of finding a mate inside of one’s social group. Mate selection is therefore not as random as the story of Cupid’s arrow suggests.

Stages of Family Life

The concept of family has changed greatly in recent decades. Historically, it was often thought that most (certainly many) families evolved through a series of predictable stages. Developmental or “stage” theories played a prominent role in family sociology (Strong and DeVault, 1992). Today, however, these models have been criticized for their linear and conventional assumptions as well as for their failure to capture the diversity of family forms. What are the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches to family life?

The set of predictable steps and patterns families experience over time is referred to as the **family life cycle**. One of the first designs of the family life cycle was developed by Paul Glick in 1955. In Glick’s original design, he asserted that most people will grow up, establish families, rear and launch their children, experience an “empty nest” period, and come to the end of their lives. This cycle will then continue with each subsequent generation (Glick, 1989). Glick’s colleague, Evelyn Duvall, elaborated on the family life cycle by developing a chronology of these classic stages of family (Strong and DeVault, 1992):

Table 14.1. Stage Theory. This table shows one example of how a “stage” theory might categorize the phases a family goes through.

Stage	Family Type	Children
1	Marriage Family	Childless
2	Procreation Family	Children ages 0 to 2.5
3	Preschooler Family	Children ages 2.5 to 6
4	School-age Family	Children ages 6–13
5	Teenage Family	Children ages 13–20
6	Launching Family	Children begin to leave home
7	Empty Nest Family	“Empty nest”; adult children have left home

The family life cycle was used to explain the different processes that occur in families over time. Sociologists view each stage as having its own structure with different challenges, achievements, and accomplishments that transition the family from one stage to the next. The problems and challenges that a family experiences in Stage 1 as a married couple with no children are likely very different than those experienced in Stage 5 as a married couple with teenagers. Marital satisfaction of husbands and wives, for example, tends to be high at the beginning of the marriage and remain so into the procreation stage (children ages 0–2.5), falls as children age and reaches its lowest point when the children are teenagers, and then increases again when the children reach adulthood and leave home (Lupri and Frideres, 1981). The most maritally satisfied couples are those who do not have children and those whose children have left home (“empty nesters”), which is ironic considering people often get married to have children (Murphy and Staples, 1979). Some interpret this pattern as meaning simply that between couples “illusions disappear and disenchantment ensues,”

whereas the developmental approach of family stages suggests “that meanings couples attached to their relationship and their roles change over time and thus affect marital satisfaction” (Lupri and Frideres, 1981). The success of a family can be measured by how well they adapt to these challenges and transition into each stage.




Figure 14.12 Percentages of husbands and wives in each of seven stages of the family life cycle reporting “very satisfying” marriages. (Based on Lupri and Frideres, 1981.) CC BY 3.0. [\[Image Description\]](#)

These early “stage” theories have been criticized for generalizing family life and not accounting for differences in gender, ethnicity, culture, and lifestyle. Less rigid models of the family life cycle have been developed in an effort to be more inclusive. One example is the **family life course**, which recognizes the sequence of events that occur in the lives of families but views them as parting terms of a fluid course rather than in consecutive stages (Strong and DeVault, 1992). Family relationships and significant events are negotiated, interpreted and responded to in an open-ended manner. This type of model accounts for changes in family development, such as the fact that today, childbearing does not always occur with marriage. It also sheds light on other shifts in the way family life is practiced. Society’s modern understanding of family renders rigid “stage” theories questionable and is more accepting of new, fluid models.

In fact contemporary family life has not escaped the phenomenon that Zygmunt Bauman calls **fluid (or liquid) modernity**, a condition of continuous mobility and change in relationships (Bauman, 2000). In earlier periods of modernity, the stages and life course of the family were fixed by institutional structures, norms, as well as ritualized events like stag parties and baby showers, reinforced by the stability of work and career, schooling, extended family and face-to-face relationships in local neighbourhoods. In late modernity, families are far more open, flexible and fragile. They depend on enduring voluntary commitments (Giddens, 1991). In this context, one stage of family life does not neatly transition into the next. The course of family life unfolds in a series of “open experience thresholds,” which can develop in a number of directions. Researching the family life of Silicon Valley in the 1980s, Judith Stacey (1990) noted that the families in her study were often innovative and created new social forms of family relation in response to the uncertainty involved in family crises and transitions. **Divorce extended families** for example, emerge as a result of family breakdown in which new partners, ex-spouses, biological and stepchildren, friends, relatives, stepparents and ex in-laws are mobilized as a network of resources to draw from to manage precarious family life.

The Global, Macro, Meso and Micro Family

The family is an excellent example of an institution that can be examined at the micro, meso, macro and global levels of analysis.

At the global level, a key concern around families since the 1960s has been around family size and population growth. Population growth in mainly poor 3rd World countries has been presented as a global problem that threatens the carrying capacity of the planet. There is a debate here however. Firstly, industrialized countries with small families and only 25% of the world's population, are responsible for 50–90% of commodity consumption (Parikh and Painuly, 1994). Secondly, the causes of large family size in the 3rd World are poorly understood. High birth rates are often presented as the outcome of ignorance and irrational decision making, but in impoverished areas large families often make sense because they provide labour and social security for families (Hartmann, 2016). Thirdly, because of this poor understanding, one product of “population explosion” anxiety has been coercive, target driven population reduction programs like China's one-child policy and India's sterilization policy. In the 1990s, the Peruvian government sterilized 300,000 indigenous women without their consent. These policies have had tragic consequences.

Hartmann (2016) argues instead that the key global variable affecting overpopulation is the economic subordination of women. It both increases women's need for children and impedes their ability to practice birth control. Hartmann argues that a more effective population control strategy would be based on reproductive justice: promoting women's bodily integrity, health, and reproductive self-determination around the world. The reality is that “most countries have undergone a demographic transition to smaller families. Better living standards, improved access to education, health care, and social security, declines in infant and child mortality, rising costs of raising children, and improvements in women's status, including employment opportunities outside the home, all have encouraged smaller family size” (Hartmann, 2016). These are global level variables and patterns affecting family size on a global scale.

At the macro-level, functionalist and critical sociologists debate the rise of non-nuclear family forms as a phenomenon within societies. Macro-level analyses focus on the family in relationship to individual societies. Since the 1950s, the functionalist approach to the family has emphasized the importance of the **nuclear family** — a cohabiting man and woman who are married and have at least one biological child under the age of 18 — as the basic unit of an orderly and functional society. Although only 39% of families conformed to this model in 2006, in functionalist approaches, it often operates as a model of the normal family, with the implication that non-normal family forms lead to a variety of society-wide dysfunctions such as crime, drug use, poverty, and welfare dependency.



Figure 14.13 The nuclear family. (Image courtesy of bass_nroll/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

On the other hand, critical perspectives emphasize that family form responds to historical changes and struggles within the economic, political and legal structures of society. The contemporary diversity of family forms does not indicate the “decline of the family” (i.e., of the ideal of the nuclear family) but the diverse responses of the family form to the tensions of gender inequality and historical changes in the economy and society. The typically large, extended family of the rural, agriculture-based economy 100 years ago in Canada was very different from the single breadwinner-led “nuclear” family of the Fordist economy following World War II. It is different again from today’s families who have to respond to economic conditions of precarious employment, the need for dual incomes, and changing norms of gender and sexual equality. In the critical perspective, the nuclear family should be thought of less as a normative model for how families should be and more as an historical anomaly that reflected the specific social and economic conditions of the two decades following the Second World War. These are analyses that set out to understand the family within the context of macro-level processes or society as a whole.

At the meso-level, the sociology of mate selection and marital satisfaction reveal the various ways in which the dynamics of inter-group relations, or the family form itself, act upon the desire, preferences, and choices of individual

actors. At the meso-level, sociologists are concerned with interactions at the local level where multiple social roles and statuses interact simultaneously (e.g., family role, ethnicity, education, church, etc.). Since the spontaneity of romantic love and notions of individual “chemistry” have become so central to our concepts of mate selection in Western societies, it is interesting to note the social and group influences that impinge on what otherwise seems a purely individual choice: the appraisal of socially defined “assets” in potential mates, in-group/out-group dynamics in mate preference, and demographic variables that affect the availability of desirable mates (see discussion below).

Similarly, it is possible to speak of the life cycle of marriages independently of the specific individuals involved. This area of study is another meso-level analysis. Marital dissatisfaction and divorce peak in the 5th year of marriage and again between the 15th and 20th years of marriage. The presence or absence of children in the home also affects marital satisfaction — non-parents and parents whose children have left home have the highest level of marital satisfaction. Thus, the family form itself appears to have built-in qualities or dynamics regardless of the personalities, specific qualities, or micro-level interactions of family members.

At the micro-level of analysis, sociologists focus on the dynamics between individuals within families. One example, of which probably every married couple is acutely aware, is the interactive dynamic described by **exchange theory**. Exchange theory proposes that all relationships are based on giving and returning valued “goods” or “services.” Individuals seek to maximize their rewards in their exchanges with others. How do they weigh up who is contributing more, and who is contributing less, of the valuable resources that sustain the marriage relationship (such as money, time, chores, emotional support, romantic gestures, quality time, etc.)? What happens to the family dynamic when one spouse is a net debtor and another a net creditor in the exchange relationship?

In *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, the Czech novelist Milan Kundera describes the way every relationship forges an implicit contract regarding these exchanges within the first 6 weeks. It is as if a template has been established that will govern the nature of the conflicts, tensions, and disagreements between a married couple for the duration of their relationship. Kundera is writing fiction, but the dynamic he describes exemplifies a micro-level analysis in that this “contract” is a form created through the interaction between specific individuals. Afterwards, it acts as a structure that constrains their interaction. In the more severe cases of unequal exchange, domestic violence, whether physical or emotional, can be the result. The dynamics of “intimate terrorism” and “violent resistance” describe the extreme outcomes of unequal exchange.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

The Evolution of Television Families



Figure 14.14 Family photo of the Louds, who were the subject of a 12-part television documentary, *An American Family*, that aired on PBS stations in 1973. (Image courtesy of PBS–Public Broadcasting System/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Whether one grew up watching the Cleavers, the Waltons, the Huxtables, the Simpsons, or the Roses, most of the iconic families seen in television sitcoms included a father, a mother, and children cavorting under the same roof while comedy ensued. The 1960s was the height of the suburban American nuclear family on television with shows such as *The Donna Reed Show* and *Father Knows Best*. While some shows of this era portrayed single parents (*My Three Sons* and *Bonanza*, for instance), the single status almost always resulted from being widowed, not divorced or unwed.

Although family dynamics in real North American homes were changing, the expectations for families portrayed on television were not. North America's first reality show, *An American Family* (which aired on PBS in 1973) chronicled Bill and Pat Loud and their children as a “typical” American family. Cameras documented the typical coming and going of daily family life in true cinéma-vérité style. During the series, the oldest son, Lance, announced to the family that he was gay, and at the series' conclusion, Bill and Pat

decided to divorce. Although the Loud's union was among the 30% of marriages that ended in divorce in 1973, the family was featured on the cover of the March 12 issue of *Newsweek* with the title "The Broken Family" (Ruoff, 2002).

Less traditional family structures in sitcoms gained popularity in the 1980s with shows such as *Different Strokes* (a widowed man with two adopted African American sons) and *One Day at a Time* (a divorced woman with two teenage daughters). Still, traditional families such as those in *Family Ties* and *The Cosby Show* dominated the ratings. The late 1980s and the 1990s saw the introduction of the dysfunctional family. Shows such as *Roseanne*, *Married with Children*, and *The Simpsons* portrayed traditional nuclear families, but in a much less flattering light than those from the 1960s did (Museum of Broadcast Communications, 2011).

Over the past 10 years, the nontraditional family has become somewhat of a tradition in television. While most situation comedies focus on single men and women without children, those that do portray families often stray from the classic structure: they include unmarried and divorced parents, adopted children, gay couples, and multigenerational households. Even those that do feature traditional family structures may show less traditional characters in supporting roles, such as the brothers in the highly rated shows *Everybody Loves Raymond* and *Two and Half Men*. Even wildly popular children's programs as Disney's *Hannah Montana* and *The Suite Life of Zack & Cody* feature single parents.

In 2009, ABC premiered an intensely nontraditional family with the broadcast of *Modern Family*. The show follows an extended family that includes a divorced and remarried father with one stepchild, and his biological adult children — one of who is in a traditional two-parent household, and the other who is a gay man in a committed relationship raising an adopted daughter. While this dynamic may be more complicated than the typical "modern" family, its elements may resonate with many of today's viewers. "The families on the shows aren't as idealistic, but they remain relatable," states television critic Maureen Ryan. "The most successful shows, comedies especially, have families that you can look at and see parts of your family in them" (Respers France, 2010).

Image Descriptions

Figure 14.12 long description:

Marriage Satisfaction through the Stages.

	Number of men who rate their marriage as “very satisfying” (%)	Number of women who rate their marriage as “very satisfying” (%)
Stage 1: Childless	60	75
Stage 2: Children 0 to 2.5	66	84
Stage 3: Children 2.5 to 6	60	61
Stage 4: Children 6 to 13	37	30
Stage 5: Children 13 to 20	30	40
Stage 6: Children begin to leave home	21	20
Stage 7: “Empty Nest”	49	61 [Return to Figure 14.12]

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14.2 Variations in Family Life

The combination of husband, wife, and children that 80% of Canadians believes constitutes a family is not representative of the majority of Canadian families. According to 2011 census data, only 31.9% of all census families consisted of a married couple with children, down from 37.4% in 2001. Sixty-three per cent of children under age 14 live in a household with two married parents. This is a decrease from almost 70% in 1981 (Statistics Canada, 2012a). As noted above, this two-parent family structure is known as a *nuclear family*, referring to married parents and children as the nucleus, or core, of the group. Recent years have seen a rise in variations of the nuclear family with the parents not being married. The proportion of children aged 14 and under who live with two unmarried cohabiting parents increased from 12.8% in 2001 to 16.3% in 2011 (Statistics Canada, 2012a).

Single Parents

Single-parent households are also on the rise. In 2011, 19.3% of children aged 14 and under lived with a single parent only, up slightly from 18% in 2001. Of that 19.3%, 82% live with their mother (Statistics Canada, 2012a).

In some family structures a parent is not present at all. In 2016, 83,145 children (1.4 per cent of all children) lived with a guardian who was neither their biological nor adoptive parent. Of these children, about 4 in 10 lived with grandparents, less than 1 in 3 lived with other relatives, and 1 in 3 lived with non-relatives or foster parents (Statistics Canada, 2017). If families in which both parents and grandparents are present are included, (about 2.9 per cent of all private households), this family structure is referred to as the **extended family**, and may include aunts, uncles, and cousins living in the same home (Statistics Canada, 2019b). Foster children account for about 0.5 per cent of all children in private households.

In the United States, the practice of grandparents acting as parents, whether alone or in combination with the child's parent, is becoming more common (about 9 per cent) among American families (De Toledo and Brown, 1995). A grandparent functioning as the primary care provider often results from parental drug abuse, incarceration, or abandonment. Events like these can render the parent incapable of caring for their child. However, in Canada, census evidence indicates that the percentage of children in these “skip-generation” families remained more or less unchanged between 2001 and 2016 at 0.6 per cent (Statistics Canada, 2012a; 2017).

Changes in the traditional family structure raise questions about how such societal shifts affect children. Research, mostly from American sources, has shown that children living in homes with both parents grow up with more financial and educational advantages than children who are raised in single-parent homes (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). The Canadian data is not so clear. It is true that children growing up in single-parent families experience a lower economic standard of living than families with two parents. In 2008, female lone-parent households earned an average of \$42,300 per year, male lone-parent households earned \$60,400 per year, and two-parent families earned \$100,200 per year (Williams, 2010). However, in the lowest 20% of families with children aged four to five years old, single-parent families made up 48.9% of households while intact or blended households made up 51.1% (based on 1998/99 data). Single-parent families do not make up a larger percentage of low-income families (Human Resources Development Canada, 2003). Moreover, both the income (Williams, 2010) and the educational attainment (Human Resources Development Canada, 2003) of single mothers in Canada has been increasing, which in turn is linked to higher levels of life satisfaction.



Figure 14.15 One in five Canadian children live in a single-parent household. (Photo courtesy of Ross Griff/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

In research published from the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (a long-term study initiated in 1994 that is following the development of a large cohort of children from birth to the age of 25), the evidence is also ambiguous as to whether having single or dual parents has a significant effect on child development outcomes. For example, indicators of vocabulary ability of children aged four to five years old did not differ significantly between single- and dual-parent families. However, aggressive behaviour (reported by parents) in both girls and boys aged four to five years old was greater in single-parent families (Human Resources Development Canada, 2003). In fact, significant markers of poor developmental attainment were more related to the sex of the child (more pronounced in boys), maternal depression, low maternal education, maternal immigrant status, and low family income (To et al., 2004).

The data shows that the key factors in children's quality of life are the educational levels and economic condition of the family, not whether children's parents are married, common-law, or single. For example, young children in low-income families are more likely to have vocabulary problems, and young children in higher-income families have more opportunities to participate in recreational activities (Human Resources Development Canada, 2003). This is a matter related more to public policy decisions concerning the level of financial support and care services (like public child care) provided to families than different family structures per se. In Sweden, where the government provides generous paid parental leave after the birth of a child, free health care, temporary paid parental leave for parents with sick children, high-quality subsidized daycare, and substantial direct child-benefit payments for each child, indicators of child well-being (literacy, levels of child poverty, rates of suicide, etc.) score very high regardless of the difference between single- and dual-parent family structures (Houseknecht and Sastry, 1996).

Cohabitation

Living together before or in lieu of marriage is a growing option for many couples. Cohabitation, when a man and woman live together in a sexual relationship without being married, was practiced by an estimated 21.3% of all census families) in 2011, which shows an increase of 13.9% since 2006 (Statistics Canada, 2012a; Statistics Canada, 2019b). This surge in cohabitation is likely due to the decrease in social stigma pertaining to the practice. In Quebec in particular, researchers have noted that it is common for married couples under the age of 50 to describe themselves in terms used more in cohabiting relationships than marriage: *mon conjoint* (partner) or *mon chum* (intimate friend) rather than *mon mari* (my husband) (Le Bourdais and Juby, 2002). In fact, cohabitation or common-law marriage is much more prevalent in Quebec (39.9% of census families) and the Northern Territories (from 36.6% in Yukon to 50.3% in Nunavut) than in the rest of the country (an average of 15.7%, excluding Quebec and the three territories) (Statistics Canada, 2019b).

Cohabiting couples may choose to live together in an effort to spend more time together or to save money on living costs. Many couples view cohabitation as a “trial run” for marriage. In 2016, approximately 39% of men and women aged 25 to 64 cohabited before their first marriage (up from 25% in 2006). Those who had lived common law with their spouse had done so for an average of 3.6 years prior to marrying, up from 2.5 years in 2006 (Statistics Canada, 2019a).

While couples may use this time to “work out the kinks” of a relationship before they wed, research from 2006 showed that cohabitation has little effect on the success of a marriage. Of the 2 million Canadians who went through a breakup between 2001 and 2006, approximately half were ending a marriage and the other half were dissolving a common-law relationship. This was despite the fact that there were far fewer common-law couples than married couples in 2001 (Statistics Canada, 2012b). Those who do not cohabit before marriage have better rates of remaining married for more than 10 years. Those in common-law unions had lived together for an average of 4.3 years, whereas those in marriages had been together for an average of 14.3 years. Cohabitation may contribute to the increase in the number of men and women who delay marriage. The average age of first marriage has been steadily increasing. In 2008, the average age of first marriage was 29.6 for women and 31 for men, compared to 23 for women and 25 for men through most of the 1960s and 1970s (Milan, 2013). In the data for 2016, (which is not exactly comparable), the average age of entering into their

current marriage was 28 for women and 30 for men, but 31 for women entering into their *current* common-law union and 32 for men (Statistics Canada, 2019a).

Population pyramids of legal marital status by single year of age and sex, Canada, 1981 and 2011




Figure 14.16 As shown by these population pyramids of marital status, more young people are choosing to delay or opt out of marriage. (Milan, 2013, p. 2; Population pyramids courtesy of Statistics Canada, censuses of population, 1981 and 2011.) [Statistics Canada Open Licence](#)

Blended Families

Stepparents are an additional family element in two-parent homes. A **stepfamily** or *blended family* is defined as “a couple family in which at least one child is the biological or adopted child of only one married spouse or common-law partner and whose birth or adoption preceded the current relationship” (Statistics Canada, 2012). Among children living in two parent households in 2011, 10% lived with a biological or adoptive parent and a stepparent (Statistics Canada, 2012). In 2011, 12.6% of all Canadian families with children under the age of 25 were stepfamilies (Vézina, 2012).

Historically, stepfamilies formed most often because of the death of a spouse, like in the 1970s TV sitcom *The Brady Bunch*. Contemporary stepfamilies are more commonly the result of the conjugal break down in previous relationships. The introduction of no fault divorce in Canada in the 1980s and the increasing prevalence of common-law relationships, which are more unstable than formal marriages, contributed to the growth in numbers of the stepfamily. But since 1995, the number of parents living in stepfamilies has remained relatively stable (Vézina, 2012).

Stepfamilies come in two forms: simple and complex (Vézina, 2012). In simple stepfamilies, only one spouse has a child or children from a previous union. In complex stepfamilies, both spouses have at least one child from a previous union, or else children are born into a family with at least one child from a previous union. In 2011, 49% of stepfamily parents were members of simple stepfamilies and 51% lived in complex stepfamilies.

The stepfamily form is interesting to sociologists because of its relative newness and the particular social, economic, legal and family issues it poses. As Judith Stacey (1990) noted in her research on **divorce extended families** (see above), blended families are trail blazers when it comes to figuring out new norms of family life. The division of household assets, the sharing of household expenses, the apportionment of parenting duties (and who parents whom), the public identity and status of the family group, and the complexity of visitation arrangements for exes and both sets of children are issues that blended parents have to negotiate. Children also have to deal with what to call their new stepparents, how to relate to new siblings, and how to manage time and emotional life between at least two different households. These are all elements of daily family life that symbolic interactionists would say require negotiation and interpretation, sometimes under duress when court proceedings and their financial aftermath are involved.



Figure 14.17 Blended families became more common in the 1970s. (Photo courtesy of Adam/Flickr). [CC BY ND 2.0](#)

Same-Sex Couples

The number of same-sex couples has grown significantly in the past decade. The Civil Marriage Act (Bill C-38) legalized same sex marriage in Canada on July 20, 2005. Some provinces and territories had already adopted legal same-sex marriage, beginning with Ontario in June 2003. In 2011, Statistics Canada reported 64,575 same-sex couple households in Canada, up by 42% from 2006. Of these, about three in ten were same-sex married couples compared to 16.5% in 2006 (Statistics Canada, 2012a). These increases are a result of more coupling, the change in the marriage laws, growing social acceptance of homosexuality, and a subsequent increase in willingness to report it.

In Canada, same-sex couples make up 0.8 per cent of all couples. Unlike in the United States where the distribution

of same-sex couples nationwide is very uneven, ranging from as low as 0.29 per cent in Wyoming to 4.01 per cent in the District of Columbia (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011), the distribution of same-sex couples in Canada by province or territory is similar to that of opposite-sex couples. However, same-sex couples are more highly concentrated in big cities. In 2011, 45.6% of all same-sex couples lived in Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal, compared to 33.4% of opposite-sex couples (Statistics Canada, 2012). In terms of demographics, Canadian same-sex couples tended to be younger than opposite-sex couples. 25% of individuals in same-sex couples were under the age of 35 compared to 17.5% of individuals in opposite-sex couples. There were more male-male couples (54.5%) than female-female couples (Milan, 2013). Additionally, 9.4% of same-sex couples were raising children, 80% of whom were female-female couples (Statistics Canada, 2012a).

While there is some concern from socially conservative groups (especially in the United States) regarding the well-being of children who grow up in same-sex households, research reports that same-sex parents are as effective as opposite-sex parents. In an analysis of 81 parenting studies, sociologists found no quantifiable data to support the notion that opposite-sex parenting is any better than same-sex parenting. Children of lesbian couples, however, were shown to have slightly lower rates of behavioural problems and higher rates of self-esteem (Biblarz and Stacey, 2010).

Staying Single

Gay or straight, a new option for many Canadians is simply to stay single. In 2016, the most common type of household was the one-person households or single (28.2%).(Statistics Canada, 2019b). In 2011, never-married individuals accounted for 73.1% of young adults in the 25 to 29 age bracket, up from 26% in 1981 (Milan, 2013). More young men in this age bracket are single than young women — 78.8% to 67.4% — reflecting the tendency for men to marry at an older age and to marry women younger than themselves (Milan, 2013).

Although both single men and single women report social pressure to get married, women are subject to greater scrutiny. Single women have to deal with the stereotypes of the unhappy “spinster” or “old maid” who cannot find a man to marry them. Single men, on the other hand, are typically portrayed as lifetime bachelors who cannot settle down or simply “have not found the right girl.” Single women report feeling insecure and displaced in their families when their single status is disparaged (Roberts, 2007). However, single women older than 35 report feeling secure and happy with their unmarried status, as many women in this category have found success in their education and careers. In general, women feel more independent and more prepared to live a large portion of their adult lives without a spouse or domestic partner than they did in the 1960s (Roberts, 2007).

The decision to marry or not to marry can be based a variety of factors including religion and cultural expectations. In the United States, Asian individuals are the most likely to marry while Black North Americans are the least likely to marry (Venugopal, 2011). Additionally, individuals who place no value on religion are more likely to be unmarried than those who place a high value on religion. For Black women, however, the importance of religion made no difference in marital status (Bakalar, 2010). In general, being single is not a rejection of marriage; rather, it is a lifestyle that does not necessarily include marriage. By age 40, according to census figures, 20% of women and 14% of men will have never married (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011).



Figure 14.18 More and more Canadians are choosing lifestyles that do not include marriage. (Photo courtesy of Glenn Harper/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Theoretical Perspectives on Marriage and Family

Sociologists use a variety of theoretical perspectives to explain events that occur within and outside of the family. Structural functionalism, critical sociology, and symbolic interactionism have been prominent paradigms for gaining insight into the family.

Functionalism

When considering the role of family in society, functionalists uphold the notion that families continue to be an important social institution that plays a key role in stabilizing society. They also note that family members take on roles within a marriage or family, which are determined by the functions required to keep families operational and viable. The family and its members are functional components in a social system whose performance facilitates the continuity, prosperity and development of society.

Anthropologist George Murdock defined the family as “a social group characterized by common residence, economic cooperation, and reproduction,” which “includes adults of both sexes, at least two of whom maintain a socially approved sexual relationship, and one or more children” (Murdock, 1949). In a survey of 250 societies, Murdock determined that despite the wide variation and complexity of family forms, a nuclear family unit — two parents and their dependent children — was at the core of each kinship system. He further deduced that there were four universal functions of this nuclear family core: sexual, reproductive, educational, and economic. In each society, although the structure of the family varies, the family performs these four functions.

1. According to Murdock (1949), the nuclear family (which for him includes the state of marriage) regulates sexual relations between individuals. He does not deny the existence or impact of premarital or extramarital sex, but states that the family offers a socially legitimate sexual outlet for adults (Lee, 1985). Although societies differ greatly to the degree that they place limitations on sexual behaviour, all societies have norms governing sexual behavior. The function of the family is to regulate sexual behaviour according to the stated norms around sexual gratification.
2. This outlet for legitimate sexual relations gives way to reproduction, which is a necessary part of ensuring the survival of society. Each society needs to replace the older people with new generations of young people. Again,

the institution of the nuclear family provides a socially legitimate and regulated form in which children are produced and given recognized status in society. Societies which practice celibacy, like the religious community of the Shakers — an offshoot of the Quakers who believed in the second appearance of Jesus Christ — were dysfunctional in this regard as they were unable to maintain sufficient population to remain viable. By the 1920s there were only 12 Shaker communities left in the United States.

3. Once children are produced, the nuclear family plays a vital role in training them for adult life. As the primary agent of socialization, the family teaches young children the ways of thinking and behaving that follow social and cultural norms, values, beliefs, and attitudes. Parents teach their children manners and civility. A well-mannered child (presumably) reflects a well-mannered parent. In most societies, the family unit is responsible for establishing the emotional security and sense of personal self-worth of its members, which begins in childhood. When families fail to do this they are seen as dysfunctional.
4. The fourth function of the nuclear family Murdock identified is economic. The family is understood as a primary economic unit where the economic well-being of family members is provided. In premodern family forms, the extended family itself is the basis of the economy. As a unit it produces the basic needs of its members including food, shelter, health care, and comfort in general. In modern society, some of these economic functions, like production and health care, are taken over by other social institutions, but the family remains the principle unit of consumption. Family members coordinate their incomes to provide economically for the rest of the family. In Canada, this is institutionalized in the taxation system for example. Revenue Canada taxes the family as a single unit, rather than recognizing that some blended families and “confluent couples” seek to maintain the financial independence of wage earners. When the family fails to perform its economic function, the effect ripples out into the rest of the economy.

One of the socialization functions of the family is to teach children gender roles. Gender roles are also an important part of the economic functioning of a family. The functionalist Talcott Parsons (1943) emphasized that in each family, there is a division of labour that consists of instrumental and expressive roles. Men tend to assume the *instrumental* or breadwinning roles in the family, which typically involve work outside of the family that provides financial support and establishes family status. Women tend to assume the *expressive* or nurturing roles, which typically involve work inside the family, including providing emotional support and physical care for children (Crano and Aronoff, 1978). According to functionalists, the differentiation of the roles on the basis of sex ensures that families are well-balanced and coordinated. Each family member is seen as performing a specific role and function to maintain the functioning of the family as a whole. Each family member has a socially recognized role that reduces internal competition for status within the family, and ambiguity about the status of the family in the external community.

When family members move outside of these roles, the family is thrown out of balance and must recalibrate in order to function properly. For example, if the father assumes an expressive role, such as providing daytime care for the children, the mother must take on an instrumental role such as gaining paid employment outside of the home. Stay-at-home dads are becoming more common today but their non-traditional role still produces ambiguity and uncertainty in their claim to status in the community. Women often find themselves pulled in different directions between expectations from work and expectations that they continue their homemaker roles within the family.

Parsons (1943) argued that in modern North American society, the differentiation between these roles created tension or strain on individuals as they tried to adapt to the conflicting norms or requirements of the North American occupational and kinship systems. There was an “asymmetrical relation of the marriage pair to the occupational structure” (Parsons, 1943). In the North American kinship system, based on **bilateral descent**, spouses are regarded as equal and their roles are of equal value to the survival of the family. But this role equality in the family system was undermined by the inequality of role status in the occupational system between *paid* employment outside the home and *unpaid* domestic work inside the home. The asymmetrical relation of the marriage pair to the occupational structure created a tension within the family that needed to be resolved.

One result of this division, argued Parsons, was strain in relation to the patterning of sex roles. While men became narrow instrumental specialists, incapable of a full expressive life, women “neurotically” over-emphasized expressive tasks. To compensate for the untenable inequality between the occupational roles, women created a functional equivalent to demonstrate their skills and fundamental equality to their husbands, leading to the “glamour girl” pattern, compulsive domesticity, or exaggerated interest in fashion or taste.



Figure 14.19 At home fashions for hostess or homemaker from Sears Catalogue. Corduroy and Cotton (left): “This little outfit stays at home, in beautiful comfort.” (Image courtesy of Adam/Flickr.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

There is also, however, a good deal of direct evidence of tension in the feminine role. In the “glamour girl” pattern, use of specifically feminine devices as an instrument of compulsive search for power and exclusive attention are conspicuous. Many women succumb to their dependency cravings through such channels as neurotic illness or compulsive domesticity and thereby abdicate both their responsibilities and their opportunities for genuine independence. Many of the attempts to excel in approved channels of achievement are marred by garishness of taste, by instability in response to fad and fashion, by a seriousness in community or club activities which is out of proportion to the intrinsic importance of the task. In all these and other fields there are conspicuous signs of insecurity and ambivalence. Hence it may be concluded that the feminine role is a conspicuous focus of the strains inherent in our social structure, and not the least of the sources of these strains is to be found in the functional difficulties in the integration of our kinship system with the rest of the social structure (Parsons, 1949)

Critical Sociology

Critical sociologists adopt a historical perspective to examine the economic structures and power relationships that influence family forms and processes (Comacchio, 2000). Sociologists working in the Marxist tradition emphasize the ways in which family relationships are entwined with the changing structures of work. Firstly, until the 20th century families were the principle site of economic production and consumption. As economic activity separated from the home, families became dependent on the fluctuations of wage labour while still remaining a principle unit of consumption and economic collaboration. Secondly, families continued to play a key role in the reproduction of labour power — feeding, clothing, replenishing, raising, and socializing. The ability of family members to do work depends on the family, (see the discussion of Friedrich Engels’ *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884) in [Chapter 4. Society and Modern Life](#)). Dorothy Smith therefore described home and family as “integral parts of, and moments in, a mode of production” (Smith, 1985). For sociologists like Smith, the dynamics of home and family can not

be analyzed independently of the capitalist economic and political structures that organize them and give them their particular forms.

For example, work does not structure family in the same way for all families, nor for all family members (Comacchio, 2000). Class is a key social division in determining the nature of family life. In the separation of family and work over the 20th century, middle class family strategies increasingly focused on maintaining life style, respectability, standards of living, cultural capital and children's prospects rather than struggling for economic subsistence. By the mid-20th century, the middle class family became a prime candidate for various "technologies of normalcy" and the "cult of domesticity" that extolled the virtues of the single-breadwinner family. On the other hand, working class strategies of domestic management remained tied to subsistence and survival, "making do" and stretching resources during periods of joblessness and precarious employment. Their survival and reproduction depended on a family economy where all family members often had to work. The difficulties experienced by racialized families, who faced residential segregation and restrictions on where they could seek employment, impacted family structures even further. Black Caribbean families often adopted extended and matriarchal forms as they struggled to hold family units together (Christensen et al., 1993). Even as the concept of "the family" in the popular imagination and public policy came increasingly to resemble Parsons' breadwinner-homemaker model, in working class culture "the continued importance of mutual assistance among kin, children's contributions of wages or services, and the domestic production entailed in sewing, canning, vegetable and fruit growing and small animal husbandry, is notable even past the mid-point of the 20th century" (Comacchio, 2000).

Another development in the transition from the feudal family unit, as the basis of production and consumption, to the capitalist family, where economic life moves outside of the home, was the redefinition of public and private spheres. North American families came to be defined as private entities, the consequence of which (historically) has been to see family matters as issues concerning only those within the family. Serious issues including domestic violence and child abuse, inequality between the sexes, the right to dispose of family property equally, and so on, have been historically treated as being outside of state, legal, or police jurisdiction. The feminist slogan of the 1960s and 1970s — "the personal is the political" — indicates how feminists began to draw attention to the broad social or *public* implications of matters long considered private or inconsequential.

As women's roles had long been relegated to the private sphere, issues of power that affected their lives most directly were largely invisible. Speaking about the lives of white middle-class women in mid-century North America, Betty Friedan (1963) described this problem as "the problem with no name":

The problem lay buried, unspoken, for many years in the minds of American women. It was a strange stirring, a sense of dissatisfaction, a yearning that women suffered in the middle of the 20th century in the United States. Each suburban wife struggled with it alone. As she made the beds, shopped for groceries, matched slipcover material, ate peanut butter sandwiches with her children, chauffeured Cub Scouts and Brownies, lay beside her husband at night — she was afraid to ask even of herself the silent question — "Is this all?" (Friedan, 1963).

The problems were equally invisible but less vague for racialized women. Observing the current prevalence of lone parent families among Blacks in Canada for example, Livingstone and Weinfeld (2015) note that "many factors that militate against the formation and stability of unions may be at work: labour market inequalities; the pressures of racism; poverty and economic insecurity; immigrant stresses that lead to marital dissolution; the unequal sex ratio and inter-racial marriage patterns."

The focus of critical sociology therefore is to highlight the political-economic context of the inequalities of power in family life. Families replicate the power relations of patriarchy and capitalism. The family is often not a haven but rather an arena where the effects of societal power struggles are felt. This exercise of power entails the differentiation and performance of family status roles. Why are women expected to perform the "expressive" roles in the family while the men perform "instrumental" roles, and what are the implications of this division of labour? Critical sociologists therefore study conflicts as simple as the enforcement of rules from parent to child, or more serious issues such as domestic violence (spousal and child), sexual assault, marital rape, and incest, as products of power structures in broader society. Blood and Wolfe's classic (1960) study of marital power found that the person with the most access to value resources

held the most power. As money is one of the most valuable resources, men who worked in paid labour outside of the home held more power than women who worked inside the home. Disputes over the division of household labour tend also to be a common source of marital discord. Household labour offers no wages and, therefore, no power. Studies indicate that when men do more housework, women experience more satisfaction in their marriages, reducing the incidence of conflict (Coltrane, 2000).

The political and economic context is also key to understanding changes in the family form over the 20th and 21st centuries. The debate between functionalist and critical sociologists on the rise of non-nuclear family forms is a case in point. Since the 1950s, the functionalist approach to the family has emphasized the importance of the nuclear family – a married man and woman in a socially approved sexual relationship with at least one child – as the basic unit of an orderly and functional society. Although only 39% of families conformed to this model in 2006, in functionalist approaches, it often operates as a model of the *normal* family, with the implication that non-normal family forms lead to a variety of society-wide dysfunctions.

On the other hand, critical perspectives emphasize that the diversity of family forms does not indicate the “decline of the family” (i.e., of the ideal of the nuclear family) so much as the diverse response of the family form to the tensions of gender inequality and historical changes in the economy and society. The nuclear family should be thought of less as a normative model for how families should be, and more as an historical anomaly that reflected the specific social and economic conditions of the two decades following World War II. Major determinants of the diversification of the family form include the shift from the Fordist high-wage economy to Post-Fordist precarious economy in which survival on a single breadwinner’s wage becomes increasingly difficult for working class and middle class families alike. Demographic changes brought about by urbanization and the birth control pill have affected the size of families as well as the delays in getting married or cohabiting. The feminist movement, changes in the socioeconomic status of women and the laws governing property and divorce have realigned power structures and gender roles within the family and economy. Changing relations between the private sphere, represented by “the family,” and the public interest represented by the state, also result in public policies like healthcare, fertility options, senior care, childcare, parental leave, employment insurance, etc. that affect family strategies, decisions and domestic arrangements.

Symbolic Interactionism

Interactionists view the world in terms of symbols and the meanings assigned to them (LaRossa and Reitzes, 1993). The family itself is a symbol. To some, it is a father, mother, and children; to others, it is any union that involves respect and compassion. Interactionists stress that family is not an objective, concrete reality. Like other social phenomena, it is a social construct that is subject to the ebb and flow of social norms and ever-changing meanings.

Consider the meaning of other elements of family: “parent” was a symbol of a biological and emotional connection to a child. With more parent-child relationships developing through adoption, remarriage, or change in guardianship, the word “parent” today is less likely to be associated with a biological connection than with whoever is socially recognized as having the responsibility for a child’s upbringing. Similarly, the terms “mother” and “father” are no longer rigidly associated with the meanings of caregiver and breadwinner. These meanings are more free-flowing through changing family roles.

Interactionists also recognize how the family status roles of each member are socially constructed, which plays an important part in how people perceive and interpret social behaviour. Interactionists view the family as a group of role players or “actors” that come together to act out their parts in an effort to construct a family. These roles are up for interpretation. In the late 19th and early 20th century, a “good father,” for example, was one who worked hard to provide financial security for his children. Today, a “good father” is one who takes the time outside of work to promote his children’s emotional well-being, social skills, and intellectual growth – in some ways, a much more daunting task.

Symbolic interactionism therefore draws our attention to *how* the norms that define what a “normal” family is, and how it should operate, come into existence. The rules and expectations that coordinate the behaviour of family members

are products of social processes and joint agreement, even if the agreements are tacit or implicit. In this perspective, norms and social conventions are not regarded as permanently fixed by functional requirements or unequal power relationships. Rather, new norms and social conventions continually emerge from ongoing social interactions to make family structures intelligible in new situations, and to enable them to operate and sustain themselves.

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14.3 Challenges Families Face

As the structure of family changes over time, so do the challenges families face. Events like divorce and remarriage present new difficulties for families and individuals. Other long-standing domestic issues, such as abuse, continue to strain the health and stability of families.

Divorce and Remarriage

Divorce, while fairly common and accepted in modern Canadian society, was once a word that would only be whispered and was accompanied by gestures of disapproval. Prior to the introduction of the Divorce Act in 1968 there was no federal divorce law in Canada. In provincial jurisdictions where there were divorce laws, spouses had to prove adultery or cruelty in court. The 1968 Divorce Act broadened the grounds for divorce to include mental and physical cruelty, desertion, and/or separation for more than three years, and imprisonment. In 1986, the Act was amended again to make “breakdown of marriage” the sole ground for divorce. Couples could divorce after one year’s separation, and there was no longer a requirement to prove “fault” by either spouse.

These legislative changes had immediate consequences on the divorce rate. In 1961, divorce was generally uncommon, affecting only 36 out of every 100,000 married persons. In 1969, the year after the introduction of the Divorce Act, the number of divorces doubled from 55 divorces per 100,000 population to 124. The divorce rate peaked in 1987, after the 1986 amendment, at 362 divorces per 100,000 population. Over the last quarter century divorce rates have dropped steadily, reaching 221 divorces per 100,000 population in 2005 (Kelly, 2010). The dramatic increase in divorce rates after the 1960s has been associated with the liberalization of divorce laws (as noted above); the shift in societal makeup, including the increase of women entering the workforce (Michael, 1978); and marital breakdowns in the large cohort of baby boomers (Kelly, 2010). The decrease in divorce rates can be attributed to two probable factors: an increase in the age at which people get married, and an increased level of education among those who marry — both of which have been found to promote greater marital stability.

Table 14.2. Crude divorce rate per 100,000 people in Canada, provinces, and territories: 1961-2005. After peaking in 1987 there has been a steady decrease in divorce rates. (Source: Kelly (2010). Table courtesy of Statistics Canada) [\[Skip Table\]](#)

Province or Territory	1961	1968	1969	1985	1986	1987	1990	1995	2000	2005
Canada-wide	36.0	54.8	124.2	238.9	298.8	362.3	282.3	262.2	231.2	220.7
Newfoundland and Labrador	1.3	3.0	20.0	96.6	118.8	193.7	175.5	170.6	169.9	153.5
Prince Edward Island	7.6	18.2	91.9	166.3	154.5	213.1	214.4	191.0	197.0	204.8
Nova Scotia	33.2	64.8	102.1	263.3	292.4	307.8	265.1	244.6	218.2	209.5
New Brunswick	32.4	22.9	55.3	187.3	237.6	273.1	228.7	191.6	227.3	192.2
Québec	6.6	10.2	49.2	236.4	282.5	324.7	291.6	274.5	231.2	203.0
Ontario	43.9	69.3	160.4	223.4	290.7	403.7	280.2	264.4	223.8	229.4
Manitoba	33.9	47.9	136.3	213.3	272.6	356.5	252.4	235.3	212.0	206.9
Saskatchewan	27.1	40.0	92.1	187.3	240.0	286.4	233.9	228.4	214.7	194.1
Alberta	78.0	125.7	221.0	336.0	391.8	390.2	332.1	276.6	271.7	246.4
British Columbia	85.8	110.8	205.0	278.6	374.1	397.6	296.1	275.0	246.8	233.8
Yukon	164.1	200.0	262.5	389.9	379.6	546.6	289.0	371.9	222.4	350.2
Northwest Territories		36.7	96.8	130.8	171.6	195.8	115.0	142.8	229.8	152.5
Nunavut (included in the Northwest Territories before 2000)									25.5	33.3

So what causes divorce? While more young people are choosing to postpone or opt out of marriage, those who enter into the union do so with the expectation that it will last. A great deal of marital problems can be related to stress, especially financial stress. According to researchers participating in the University of Virginia's National Marriage Project, couples who enter marriage without a strong asset base (like a home, savings, and a retirement plan) are 70% more likely to be divorced after three years than are couples with at least \$10,000 in assets. This is connected to factors such as age and education level that correlate with low incomes.

The addition of children to a marriage creates added financial and emotional stress. Research has established that marriages enter their most stressful phase upon the birth of the first child (Popenoe and Whitehead, 2001). This is particularly true for couples who have multiples (twins, triplets, and so on). Married couples with twins or triplets are 17% more likely to divorce than those with children from single births (McKay, 2010). Another contributor to the likelihood of divorce is a general decline in marital satisfaction over time. As people get older, they may find that their values and life goals no longer match up with those of their spouse (Popenoe and Whitehead, 2004).

Divorce is thought to have a cyclical pattern. Children of divorced parents are 40% more likely to divorce than children of married parents. Children whose parents divorced and then remarried, the likelihood of their own divorce rises to 91% (Wolfinger, 2005). This might result from being socialized to a mindset that a broken marriage can be replaced rather than repaired (Wolfinger, 2005). That sentiment is also reflected in the finding that when both partners of a married couple have been previously divorced, their marriage is 90% more likely to end in divorce (Wolfinger, 2005).

Samuel Johnson is quoted as saying that getting married a second time was “the triumph of hope over experience.” In fact, according to the 2001 Statistics Canada General Social Survey, 43% of individuals whose first marriage failed married again, while 16% married again after the death of their spouse. Another 1 per cent of the ever-married population (people who have been married but may not currently be married), aged 25 and over, had been married more than twice (Clark and Crompton, 2006). American data show that most men and women remarry within five years of a divorce, with the median length for men (three years) being lower than for women (4.4 years). This length of time has

been fairly consistent since the 1950s. The majority of those who remarry are between the ages of 25 and 44 (Kreider, 2006).

Marriage the second time around (or third or fourth time around) can be a very different process than the first. Remarriage lacks many of the classic courtship rituals of a first marriage. In a second marriage, individuals are less likely to deal with issues like parental approval, premarital sex, or desired family size (Elliot, 2010). Clark and Crompton suggest that second marriages tend to be more stable than first marriages, largely because the spouses are older and more mature. At the time of the Statistics Canada General Social Survey, 71% of the remarried couples surveyed were still together and had been for an average of 13 years. Couples tend to marry a second time more for intimacy-based reasons rather than external reasons and therefore enjoy a greater quality of relationship (Clark and Crompton, 2006).

Wallerstein and Blakeslee's (1989) research on sixty sets of parents and children over a 10 year period indicate that marriage breakups endanger individuals' sense of security and well-being but also present opportunities for future happiness and self-development. Divorce is a crisis in the life course of family members that can cause enduring anxieties and psychological issues, but in the self-reflexive manner of late modernity, it also provided subjects possibilities to "grow emotionally," to "establish new competence and pride" and to "strengthen intimate relationships far beyond earlier capacities."

Making Connections: Sociological Research

Do Half of All Marriages End in Divorce?




Figure 14.20 Bartenders are among the professions with the highest divorce rates (38.4%). Other traditionally low-wage industries (like restaurant service, custodial employment, and factory work) are also associated with higher divorce rates. (Aamodt and McCoy, 2010). (Photo courtesy of Daniel Lobo/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

It is often cited that half of all marriages end in divorce. This statistic has made many people cynical when it comes to marriage, but it is misleading. A closer look at the data reveals a different story.

Using Statistics Canada data from 2008 that show a marriage rate of 4.4 (per 1,000 people) and a divorce rate of 2.11, it would appear that slightly less than one-half of all marriages failed (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2014a, 2014b). Similar United States data for 2003 showed more or less exactly 50% of marriages ending in divorce (Hurley, 2005). This reasoning is deceptive, however, because instead of tracing actual marriages to see their longevity (or lack thereof), this compares unrelated statistics. That is, the number of marriages in a given year does not have a direct correlation to the divorces occurring that same year. American research published in the *New York Times* took a different approach — determining how many people had ever been married, and of those, how many later divorced. The result? According to this analysis, American divorce rates have only gone as high as 41% (Hurley, 2005).

Another way to calculate divorce rates is the **total divorce rate**, which projects how many new marriages would be expected to fail after 30 years based on the divorce rate by marriage duration observed in a given year. In Canada, the total divorce rate figure reached a high of 50.6% in 1987, after the Divorce Act was amended to allow divorces after just one year of separation (rather than the mandatory three years previously). Since then, the total divorce rate has remained steady at between 35% and 42%. In 2008, 40.7% of marriages were projected to end before their 30th anniversary (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2014a).

Sociologists can also calculate divorce rates through a cohort study. For instance, research could determine the percentage of marriages that are intact after, say, five or seven years, compared to marriages that have ended in divorce after five or seven years. Sociological researchers must remain aware of research methods and how statistical results are applied. As illustrated, different methodologies and different interpretations can lead to contradictory, and even misleading results.

Children of Divorce and Remarriage

Divorce and remarriage can be stressful for partners and children alike. Divorce is often justified by the notion that children are better off in a divorced family than in a family with parents who do not get along. Others argue that parents who divorce sacrifice their children's well-being to pursue their own happiness.

Research suggests that separating out particular factors of the divorce, especially whether or not the divorce is accompanied by parental conflict, is key to determining whether divorce has a significant negative impact on children (Amato and Keith, 1991). Certainly while marital conflict does not provide an ideal childrearing environment, going through a divorce can also be damaging. Children are often confused and frightened by the threat to their family security. They may feel responsible for the divorce and attempt to bring their parents back together, often by sacrificing their own well-being (Amato, 2000). Only in high-conflict homes do children benefit from divorce and the subsequent decrease in conflict. The majority of divorces however come out of lower-conflict homes, and children from those homes are more negatively impacted by the stress of the divorce than the stress of unhappiness in the marriage (Amato, 2000).

On the other hand, Amato and Keith have argued that the overall the effect of divorce on children's well-being is relatively weak and has been declining over time. Children of divorces experience higher levels of well-being than children of intact, but highly conflictual marriages. Divorces that are not accompanied by parental conflict do less

harm to children (Amato and Keith, 1991). These findings would appear to lend credence to modern processes of *family mediation* in divorces where a neutral third party helps people to negotiate a settlement to their dispute (BC Ministry of Attorney General, 2003).

Children's ability to deal with a divorce may depend on their age. Research has found that divorce may be most difficult for school-aged children, as they are old enough to understand the separation but not old enough to understand the reasoning behind it. Older teenagers are more likely to recognize the conflict that led to the divorce but may still feel fear, loneliness, guilt, and pressure to choose sides. Infants and preschool-age children may suffer the heaviest impact from the loss of routine that the marriage offered (Temke, 2006).

Proximity to parents also makes a difference in a child's well-being after divorce. Boys who live or have joint arrangements with their fathers show less aggression than those who are raised by their mothers only. Similarly, girls who live or have joint arrangements with their mothers tend to be more responsible and mature than those who are raised by their fathers only. Nearly 70 per cent of the children of parents who are divorced have their primary residence with their mother, leaving many boys without a father figure residing in the home. Another 15% of the children lived with their father and 9 per cent moved back and forth between both parents equally (Sinha, 2014). Still, researchers suggest that a strong parent-child relationship can greatly improve a child's adjustment to divorce (Temke, 2006).

There is empirical evidence that divorce has not discouraged children in terms of how they view marriage and family. In a survey conducted by researchers from the University of Michigan, about three-quarters of high school students said it was "extremely important" to have a strong marriage and family life. Over half believed it was "very likely" that they would be in a lifelong marriage (Popenoe, and Whitehead, 2001). These numbers have continued to climb over the last 25 years.

Violence and Abuse

Violence and abuse are among the most disconcerting of the challenges that today's families face. Abuse can occur between spouses, between parent and child, as well as between other family members. The frequency of violence among families is difficult to determine because many cases of spousal abuse and child abuse go unreported. In any case, studies have shown that abuse (reported or not) has a major impact on families and society as a whole.

Domestic Violence

Domestic violence is a significant social problem in Canada. One in four victims of violent crime in Canada was victimized by a spouse or family member in 2010 (Sinha, 2012). Domestic violence is often characterized as violence between household or family members, specifically spouses. To include unmarried, cohabitating, and same-sex couples, sociologists have created the term **intimate partner violence (IPV)**. Women are the primary victims of intimate partner violence. It is estimated that 1 in 4 women has experienced some form of IPV in her lifetime (compared to 1 in 7 men) (Catalano, 2007). In 2011, women in Canada had more than double the risk of men of becoming a victim of police-reported family violence (Sinha, 2012). IPV may include physical violence, such as punching, kicking, or other methods of inflicting physical pain; sexual violence, such as rape or other forced sexual acts; threats and intimidation that imply either physical or sexual abuse; and emotional abuse, such as harming another's sense of self-worth through words or controlling another's behaviour. IPV often starts as emotional abuse and then escalates to other forms or combinations of abuse (Centers for Disease Control, 2012).



Figure 14.21 Over the past 30 years, the rate of spousal homicides against females has consistently been about three to four times higher than that for males (Statistics Canada, 2011). What does this statistic reveal about societal patterns and norms concerning intimate relationships and gender roles? (Photo courtesy of Kathy Kimpel/Flickr) [CC BY 2.0](#)

In 2010, of IPV acts that involved physical actions against women, 71% involved physical assault (57% were common assaults including punching, slapping, and pushing, while another 10% were major assaults involving a weapon or causing major bodily injury); 3 per cent involved sexual assault; 10% involved uttering threats; 5 per cent indecent or threatening phone calls; and 9 per cent criminal harassment or stalking (Sinha, 2012). This is slightly different than IPV abuse patterns for men, which show that 79% of acts of IPV take the form of physical violence, and less than 1 per cent involve sexual assault (Sinha, 2012). Interestingly, in 2011, a slightly larger proportion of physical assaults against male intimate partners resulted in injury (55%) compared to female intimate partners (51% (Sinha, 2013). IPV affects women at greater rates than men because women often take the passive role in relationships and may become emotionally dependent on their partner. Perpetrators of IPV work to establish and maintain such dependence in order to hold power and control over their victims, making them feel stupid, crazy, or ugly — in some way worthless. Between 2000 and 2010, nearly one-quarter of women who were murdered by their intimate partners were murdered for reasons of jealousy — compared to 10% of male victims (Sinha, 2012).

IPV affects different segments of the population at different rates. The rate of self-reported IPV for Aboriginal women is about 2.5 times higher than for non-Aboriginal women (Sinha, 2013). The severity of intimate partner violence also differed. Nearly 6 in 10 Aboriginal women reported injury as a result of IPV compared to 4 in 10 non-Aboriginal women. As a result, Aboriginal female victims were also much more likely to report that they feared for their lives as a result of IPV (52% compared to 31% of non-Aboriginal women) (Sinha, 2013). On the other hand, visible minority and immigrant groups do not have significantly different levels of self-reported spousal violence than the rest of the population (Statistics Canada, 2011).


Those who are separated report higher rates of abuse than those with other marital statuses, as conflict is typically higher in those relationships. Similarly, those who are cohabitating or living in a common-law relationship are more likely than those who are married to experience IPV (Statistics Canada, 2011). American researchers have found that the rate of IPV doubles for women in low-income disadvantaged areas when compared to IPV experienced by women who reside in more affluent areas (Benson and Fox, 2004). In Canada, the statistics do not bear this relationship out. Household income and education levels appear to have little effect on experiencing spousal violence. Regardless of income level, the proportion of reported spousal violence was between 1 and 2 per cent. However, rates of IPV were nearly double in rural Canada than in the major metropolitan areas (542 incidents per 100,000 population compared to

294). Overall, women ages 25 to 34 are at the greatest risk of physical or sexual assault by an intimate partner (Statistics Canada, 2011).

Accurate statistics on IPV are difficult to determine, as less than one-quarter of victims report incidents to the police (Statistics Canada, 2011). It is not until victims choose to report crimes that patterns of abuse are exposed. Two-thirds of victims in Statistics Canada self-reported victimization studies stated that abuse had occurred more than once prior to their first police report. Nearly 3 in 10 stated that they had been abused more than 10 times prior to reporting (Statistics Canada, 2011).

According to the Statistics Canada General Social Survey (2009), victims cite varied reasons why they are reluctant to report abuse, as shown in the table in Figure 14.22.

Reasons for not reporting spousal violence to police, by sex, 2009



Note(s): Includes legally married, common-law, same-sex, separated and divorced spouses. Figures do not add to 100% due to multiple responses. Excludes data from the Northwest Territories, Yukon and Nunavut.

Source(s): Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2009.

Figure 14.22 This chart shows reasons that victims give for why they fail to report abuse to police authorities. (Statistics Canada, 2011). [Statistics Canada Open Licence](#). [\[Image Description\]](#)

IPV has significant long-term effects on individual victims and on society. Studies have shown that IPV damage extends beyond the direct physical or emotional wounds. Extended IPV has been linked to unemployment among victims, as many have difficulty finding or holding employment. Additionally, nearly all women who report serious domestic problems exhibit symptoms of major depression (Goodwin, Chandler, and Meisel, 2003). Female victims of IPV are also more likely to abuse alcohol or drugs, suffer from eating disorders, and attempt suicide (Silverman et al., 2001).

IPV is indeed something that impacts more than just intimate partners. In a survey, 34% of respondents said they have witnessed IPV, and 59% said that they know a victim personally (Roper Starch Worldwide, 1995). Many people want to help IPV victims but are hesitant to intervene because they feel that it is a personal matter or they fear retaliation from the abuser — reasons similar to those of victims who do not report IPV.

Making Connections: Social Policy and Debate

Corporal Punishment



Figure 14.23 Corporal punishment.
(Image courtesy of HA! Designs –
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News reports in June 2013 broke the sensational story of dozens of children being apprehended by Child and Family Services from a small Old Order Mennonite community in southern Manitoba. Several members of the community were charged by police with assault when they received reports that children had been disciplined using a leather strap, whip, and cattle prod (Hitchen, 2013). At one point, all the children except for one 17-year-old had to be apprehended by authorities (CBC News, 2013). The 1892 law that permits the use of corporal punishment for children in Canada was upheld by a Supreme Court ruling in 2004 within certain restrictions, but corporal punishment remains a controversial issue in Canada (CBC News, 2004).

Physical abuse of children may come in the form of beating, kicking, throwing, choking, hitting with objects, burning, or other methods. Injury inflicted by such behaviour is considered abuse even if the parent or caregiver did not intend to harm the child. Other types of physical contact that are characterized as discipline (spanking, for example) are not considered abuse as long as no injury results. The Supreme Court ruling stated that teachers and parents can use reasonable corrective force against children between the ages of 2 and 12 years old as long as the force is “minor” and of “a transitory and trifling nature” (CBC News,

2004). The court ruled that it was unacceptable to strike a child with an object, like a strap or whip, and striking a child in the head was also unacceptable.

This issue is controversial among modern-day Canadians. While some parents feel that physical discipline, or corporal punishment, is an effective way to respond to bad behaviour, others feel that it is a form of abuse. According to a 2005 study of mothers with preschoolers in Manitoba and Ontario, 70% of respondents reported using corporal punishment. One-third of them used it at least once a week. A poll conducted by the *Globe and Mail* in 2007 found that 78% of Canadian parents with children under 18 believed that parents do not discipline their children enough, and another 42% believed spanking benefited child development (Pearce, 2012).

However, studies have shown that spanking is not an effective form of punishment and may lead to aggression by the victim, particularly in those who are spanked at a young age (Berlin, 2009). A meta-analysis of research conducted over two decades published in the *Canadian Medical Association Journal* found that spanking was no better than other parenting methods at eliciting compliance in children and was in fact linked not only to increased levels of childhood aggression but also to long-term effects such as depression, emotional and behavioural problems, and drug and alcohol use in adulthood (Durrant and

Ensom, 2012). This research led the editor-in-chief of the journal to call for the repeal of the spanking law from the Criminal Code. “It is time for Canada to remove this anachronistic excuse for poor parenting from the statute book” (Fletcher, 2012, p. 1339).

Child Abuse and Corporal Punishment

Children are among the most helpless victims of abuse. In 2010, more than 18,000 children and youth under the age of 17 were victims of police-reported family violence in Canada, accounting for nearly a quarter of all violent offences against children and youth (Sinha, 2012). Child abuse may come in several forms, the most common being neglect, followed by physical abuse, sexual abuse, psychological maltreatment, and medical neglect (Child Help, 2011). Whereas the overall rate of violent crime involving children and youth is lower than the rate for the population as a whole, the rate of sexual assault is five times higher (Sinha, 2012). Level 1 sexual assault (not involving a weapon or aggravated assault) comprised 75% of these offences, while child-specific sexual crimes including sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, luring a child via a computer, and corrupting children comprised another 22%. Girls were 37% more likely than boys to be the victim of family violence (and almost twice as likely by the time they reached ages 12 to 17 years). In large part, this is because girls are almost four times as likely to be a victim of sexual assault by a family member than boys are.

Twenty-five per cent of all violent crime against children and youth was perpetrated by a family member (parent, sibling, extended family member, or spouse), while another 54% involved an accused known to the victim (casual acquaintances, close friends, or dating partners) (Sinha, 2012). Fifty-nine per cent of family violence against children was committed by parents, 19% by siblings, and 22% by other family members (Statistics Canada, 2011). Understandably, these figures vary with the age of the child. As Sinha (2012) notes, “among youth aged 12 to 17 who had been victimized, about one in five (18%) were violently victimized by someone within their own family network. This compares to 47% of child victims aged 3 to 11 years, and 70% of infant and toddler victims under the age of 3 years.”

In terms of child abuse reported to provincial and territorial child welfare authorities, infants (children less than 1 year old) were the most victimized population with an incident rate of 52 investigations per 1,000 children, compared to 43 per 1,000 for 1- to 3-year-olds, the next highest category (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2010). Infants younger than 1 year are also the most vulnerable to family homicide, 98% of which were committed by parents (27 per million between 2000 and 2010, compared to 9 per million for 1-to 3-year olds, the next highest category) (Sinha, 2012). This age group is particularly vulnerable to neglect because they are entirely dependent on parents for care. Some parents do not purposely neglect their children; factors such as cultural values, standard of care in a community, and poverty can lead to hazardous levels of neglect. If information or assistance from public or private services are available and a parent fails to use those services, child welfare services may intervene (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2010).




Figure 14.24 The arrow indicates subdural hematoma or bleeding between the dura mater and the brain: one cause of death from shaken-baby syndrome. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Infants are also often victims of physical abuse, particularly in the form of violent shaking. This type of physical abuse is referred to as **shaken-baby syndrome**, which describes a group of medical symptoms such as brain swelling and retinal hemorrhage resulting from forcefully shaking or causing impact to an infant's head. A baby's cry is the number one trigger for shaking. Parents may find themselves unable to soothe a baby's concerns and may take their frustration out on the child by shaking him or her violently. Other stress factors such as a poor economy, unemployment, and general dissatisfaction with parental life may contribute to this type of abuse. Shaken-baby syndrome was attributed as the cause of nearly one-third (31%) of family-related homicides of infants less than 1 year between 2000 and 2010 (Sinha, 2012).

Image Descriptions

Figure 14.22 image description:

Reasons for not reporting spousal violence to police, by sex, 2009

Reason for not reporting spousal abuse	Percentage of men who did not report (%)	Percentage of women who did not report (%)
A personal matter	90	75
Dealt with another way	82	77
Not important enough	76	64
Didn't want to get involved with police	49	50
Didn't want spouse to get arrested	41	41
Didn't want anyone to find out	28	44
Police couldn't do anything	24	26
Police wouldn't help	15	12
No confidence in the criminal justice system	10	15
Fear of publicity	10	13
Fear of spouse	3	19 [Return to Figure 14.22]

Media Attributions

- **Figure 14.20** [Old Ebbitt Grill](#) by Daniel Lobo, via Flickr, is used under a [CC BY 2.0](#) licence.
- **Figure 14.21** [Creating the crime scene](#) by Kathy Kimpel [kkimpel], via Flickr, is used under a [CC BY 2.0](#) licence.
- **Figure 14.22** Chart 1.1 Victims of self-reported spousal violence within the past 5 years, by province, 2009, in [Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile \[PDF\]](#), Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85-224-X (p. 9), is used under the [Statistics Canada Open Licence](#). [Original data source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2009.]
- **Figure 14.23** [You've got to be cruel to be kind...](#) by HA! Designs – Artbyheather, is used under a [CC BY 2.0](#) licence.
- **Figure 14.24** [This CT scan is an example of Subdural haemorrhage caused by trauma](#), by [Glitzzy queen00](#) at [English Wikipedia](#), via Wikipedia, has been released into the [public domain](#) by its author.

Chapter 14 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

ambilineal: A type of unilateral descent that follows either the father's or the mother's side exclusively.

bigamy: The act of entering into marriage while still married to another person.

bilateral descent: The tracing of kinship through both parents' ancestral lines.

blended family: See *stepfamily*.

cohabitation: When a couple shares a residence but is not married.

confluent love: An intimate relationship that lasts only as long as the satisfaction it brings to both partners.

divorce extended family: A family whose members are connected by divorce rather than marriage, for example ex in laws, or ex spouse's new partners.

exchange theory: Social relationships are based on giving and returning valued goods or services. Individuals seek to maximize their rewards in their interactions with others.

extended family: A household that includes at least one parent and child as well as other relatives like grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins.

family: Socially Recognized groups of individuals who may be joined by blood, marriage, or adoption, and who form an emotional connection and an economic unit of society.

family life course: A sociological model of family that sees the progression of events as fluid rather than as occurring in strict stages.

family life cycle: A set of predictable steps and patterns that families experience over time.

family of orientation: The family into which one is born.

family of procreation: A family that is formed through marriage.

fluid modernity: A condition of constant mobility, unpredictability and change in relationships within contemporary society.

incest taboo: The social rule that an individual may not have sex with or marry someone who is a close blood relative.

intimate partner violence (IPV): Violence that occurs between individuals who maintain a romantic or sexual relationship; includes unmarried, cohabiting, and same-sex couples, as well as heterosexual married couples.

kinship: A person's traceable ancestry (by blood, marriage, and/or adoption).

kinship system: A system of social organization based on real or putative family ties.

liquid modernity: See *fluid modernity*.

marriage: A legally recognized contract between two or more people in a sexual relationship, who have an expectation of permanence about their relationship.

matriarchy: Relatively egalitarian, small scale agricultural societies in which mothering is recognized as the central unifying structure.

matrilineal descent: A type of unilateral descent that follows the mother's side only.

matrilocal residence: A system in which it is customary for a husband to live with his wife's family.

monogamy: When someone is married to only one person at a time.

nuclear family: A cohabiting man and woman who are married and have at least one biological child under the age of 18.

passionate love: A type of love which expresses the emotions of impulsive and pervasive sexual attachment to another.

patrilineal descent: A type of unilateral descent that follows the father's line only.

patrilocal residence: A system in which it is customary for a wife to live with (or near) her husband's family.

polyamory: The practice of sharing intimate relationships with more than one partner.

polyandry: A form of marriage in which one woman is married to more than one man at one time.

polygamy: The state of being committed or married to more than one person at a time.

polygyny: A form of marriage in which one man is married to more than one woman at one time.

pure relationship: A non-institutionalized form of intimacy in which couples enter into a relationship that lasts only as long as the satisfaction it brings to both partners.

shaken-baby syndrome: A group of medical symptoms, such as brain swelling and retinal hemorrhage, resulting from forcefully shaking or impacting an infant's head.

stem family: A large, rural, multi-generational, economically self-sufficient family, in which one of the children marries and remains in the family home while other siblings move away.

stepfamily: A couple family in which at least one child is the biological or adopted child of only one married spouse or common-law partner and whose birth or adoption preceded the current relationship.

structure of feeling: Large scale, societal patterns in people's feelings or emotional responses towards things.

total divorce rate: A projection of how many new marriages are expected to fail after 30 years, based on the divorce rate by marriage duration observed in a given year.

unilateral descent: The tracing of kinship through one parent only.

Section Summary

[14.1 What Is Marriage? What Is a Family?](#)

Sociologists view marriage and families as societal institutions that help create the basic unit of social structure. Both marriage and a family may be defined differently – and practiced differently – in cultures across the world. Families and marriages, like other institutions, adapt to social change.

[14.2 Variations in Family Life](#)

Canadians' concepts of marriage and family are changing. Increases in cohabitation, same-sex partners, and singlehood

are altering ideas of marriage. Similarly, single parents, same-sex parents, cohabitating parents, and stepparents are changing notions of what it means to be a family. While many children still live in opposite-sex, two-parent, married households, these are no longer viewed as the only or dominant type of family.

14.3 Challenges Families Face

Families face a variety of challenges, including divorce, domestic violence, and child abuse. While divorce rates have decreased in the last 25 years, many family members, especially children, still experience the negative effects of divorce. Children are also negatively impacted by violence and abuse within the home; 18,000 children are victimized by family violence each year.

Questions

Quiz: Marriage and Family

14.1 What Is Marriage? What Is a Family?

1. Sociologists tend to define family in terms of:
 - a. Relationships of people who are connected through blood, marriage, or adoption.
 - b. The connection of bloodlines and genetic descent.
 - c. The status roles of breadwinner, home-maker and dependent children that exist in a family structure.
 - d. Groups who share an emotional bond.
2. Examples of the social *form* and *content* of the family (respectively) would be:
 - a. Sexual activity and monogamy
 - b. Sexual activity and reproduction of the species
 - c. Patrilineal descent and sexual activity
 - d. The nuclear family and the father's role as breadwinner
3. A woman being married to two men would be an example of:
 - a. Headaches
 - b. Polygyny.
 - c. Polyandry.
 - d. Cohabitation.
4. A child who associates his line of descent with his father's side only is part of a _____ family.
 - a. Matrilocal
 - b. Bilateral
 - c. Matrilineal
 - d. Patrilineal

5. Which of the following is a criticism of the family life cycle model?
- a. It is too broad and accounts for too many aspects of family.
 - b. It is too narrowly focused on a sequence of stages.
 - c. It does not serve a practical purpose for studying family behaviour.
 - d. It is not based on comprehensive research.

14.2 Variations in Family Life

6. The majority of Canadian children live in _____.
- a. Two-parent households.
 - b. One-parent households.
 - c. No-parent households.
 - d. Multigenerational households.
7. The best example of a blended family in the following would be _____.
- a. Two unwed parents
 - b. A multiracial family
 - c. One grandparent; two married parents
 - d. A divorce-extended family
8. Couples who cohabitate before marriage are _____ couples who did not cohabitate before marriage to be married at least 10 years.
- a. Far more likely than
 - b. Far less likely than
 - c. Slightly less likely than
 - d. Equally as likely as
9. Same-sex couple households account for _____ per cent of Canadian households.
- a. 1
 - b. 10
 - c. 15
 - d. 30
10. The median age of first marriage has _____ in the last 50 years.
- a. Increased for men but not women
 - b. Decreased for men but not women
 - c. Increased for both men and women
 - d. Decreased for both men and women

14.3 Challenges Families Face

11. Current divorce rates are _____.
- a. At an all-time high
 - b. At an all-time low

- c. Steadily increasing
 - d. Neither increasing nor declining
12. Children of divorced parents are _____ to divorce in their own marriage than children of parents who stayed married.
- a. More likely
 - b. Less likely
 - c. Equally likely
 - d. Too traumatized
13. In general, children in _____ households benefit from divorce.
- a. Stepfamily
 - b. Fluid modernity
 - c. High-conflict
 - d. Low-conflict
14. Which of the following is true of intimate partner violence (IPV)?
- a. IPV victims are more frequently men than women.
 - b. One in 10 women is a victim of IPV.
 - c. Aboriginal women are nearly 2.5 times more likely to be a victim of IPV than non-Aboriginal women.
 - d. Sexual assault is the most common form of IPV.
15. Which type of child abuse is most prevalent in Canada?
- a. Physical abuse
 - b. Neglect
 - c. Shaken-baby syndrome
 - d. Internet stalking

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

14.1 What Is Marriage? What Is a Family?

1. Why is a *substantive definition* of the family difficult to nail down?
2. Explain the difference between bilateral and unilateral descent. Using your own association with kinship, explain which type of descent applies to you.
3. What is the relationship between romantic love and Western marriage?

14.2 Variations in Family Life

4. Describe the contemporary variations of family form. How do structural functionalists, critical sociologists, and symbolic interactionists explain this phenomenon differently?
5. What is the relationship between patterns of confluent love and cohabitation? What effect does cohabitation have on marriage?
6. What are the four universal functions of the nuclear family unit according to Murdock?

14.3 Challenges Families Face

7. Explain how financial status impacts marital stability. What other factors are associated with a couple's financial status?
8. Explain why more than half of intimate partner violence goes unreported. Why are those who are abused unlikely to report the abuse?

Further Research

14.1 What Is Marriage? What Is a Family?

For more information on family development and lines of descent, visit the Library and Archives Canada [Genealogy and Family History](#) website to find out how to research family genealogies in Canada.

14.2 Variations in Family Life

For more statistics on marriage and family, see the Statistics Canada report based on the 2011 census: [Portrait of Families and Living Arrangements in Canada: Families, households and marital status, 2011 Census of Population \[PDF\]](#).

14.3 Challenges Families Face

To find more information on child abuse, visit the [Canadian Child Welfare Research portal](#).

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Solutions to Section Quiz

1 A, | 2 C, | 3 C, | 4 D, | 5 B, | 6 A, | 7 D, | 8 C, | 9 A, | 10 C, | 11 D, | 12 A, | 13 C, | 14 C, | 15 B, [\[Return to Quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 15. RELIGION



Figure 15.1 The elephant-headed Ganesh, remover of obstacles, finds a home in Vancouver. Late modern society is characterized by strange and unexpected blending of the sacred and profane. (Photo courtesy of Rob Brownie.) Used with permission.

Learning Objectives

15.1 The Sociological Approach to Religion

- Explain the difference between substantial, functional, and family resemblance definitions of religion.
- Describe the four dimensions of religion: Belief, ritual, experience, and community.
- Understand classifications of religion, like animism, polytheism, monotheism, and atheism.
- Differentiate between the five world religions.
- Explain the differences between various types of religious organizations: Churches, ecclesia, sects, and cults.

15.2 Sociological Explanations of Religion

- Examine the nature of sociological explanations of religion.
- Compare and contrast theories on religion — Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Berger, Stark, Daly, and Woodhead.

15.3 Religion and Social Change

- Describe current global and Canadian trends of secularization and religious belief.
- Describe the current religious diversity of Canada and its implications for social policy.
- Explain the development and the sources of new religious movements.

15.4 Contemporary Fundamentalist Movements

- Outline the social and political issues associated with fundamentalist movements.
- Define the family resemblance between fundamentalisms in different religious traditions.
- Describe the process of fundamentalist radicalization from a sociological perspective.
- Explain the basis of contemporary issues of science and faith.

List of Contributors to Chapter 15: Religion

Introduction to Religion



Figure 15.2 Religion is defined by its unique ability to provide individuals with answers to the ultimate questions of life, death, existence, and purpose. (Photo courtesy of Ras67/Wikimedia.) [Public Domain Mark 1.0](#)

It is commonly said that there are only two guarantees in life – death and taxes – but what can be more taxing than the prospect of one’s own death? Ceasing to exist is an overwhelmingly terrifying thought and it is one which has plagued individuals for centuries. This ancient stressor has been addressed over time by several different religious explanations and affirmations. Arguably, this capacity to provide answers for fundamental questions is what defines religion. For instance, under Hindu belief one’s soul lives on after biological death and is reborn in a new body. Under Christian belief one can expect to live in a heavenly paradise once one’s time runs out on earth. These are just two examples, but the extension of the self beyond its physical expiration date is a common thread in religious texts.

These promises of new life and mystifying promise lands are not simply handed out to everyone, however. They require an individual to faithfully practice and participate in accordance

with the demands of specific commandments, doctrines, rituals, or tenants. Furthermore, despite one’s own faith in the words of an ancient text, or the messages of a religious figure, an individual will remain exposed to the trials, tribulations, and discomforts that exist in the world. During these instances a theodicy – a religious explanation for such sufferings – can help keep one’s faith by providing justification as to why bad things happen to good, faithful people. **Theodicy** is an attempt to explain or justify the existence of bad things or instances that occur in the world, such as death, disaster, sickness, and suffering. Theodicies are especially relied on to provide reason as to why a religion’s God (or God-like equivalent) allows terrible things to happen to good people.

Is there truly such a thing as heaven or hell? Can we expect to embody a new life after death? Are we really the creation of an omnipotent and transcendent Godly figure? These are all fascinating ontological questions – i.e., questions concerned with the nature of reality, our being and existence – and ones for which different religious traditions have different answers. For example, Buddhists and Taoists believe there is a life force that can be reborn after death, but do not believe there is a transcendent creator God, whereas Christian Baptists believe that one can be reborn once, or even many times, within a single lifetime. However, these questions are not the central focus of sociologists. Instead, sociologists ask about the different social forms, experiences, and functions that religious organizations evoke and promote within society. What is religion as a social phenomenon? Why does it exist? In other words, the “truth” factor of religious beliefs is not the primary concern of sociologists. Instead, religion’s significance lies in its practical tendency to bring people together and, in notable cases, to violently divide them. For sociologists, it is key that religion guides people to act and behave in particular ways. How does it do so?

Regardless if one personally believes in the fundamental values, beliefs, and doctrines that certain religions present, one does not have to look far to recognize the significance that religion has in a variety of different social aspects around the world. Religion can influence everything from how one spends their Sunday afternoon – singing hymns, listening to religious sermons, or refraining from participating in any type of work – to providing the justification for sacrificing one’s own life, as in the case of the Solar Temple mass suicide (Dawson & Thiessen, 2014). Religious activities and ideals are found in political platforms, business models, and constitutional laws, and have historically produced rationales for countless wars. Some people adhere to the messages of a religious text to a tee, while others pick and choose aspects of a religion that best fit their personal needs. In other words, religion is present in several socially significant domains and can be expressed in various levels of commitment and fervour.

In this chapter, classical social theorists Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and Max Weber provide the early insights

that have come to be associated with the critical, functionalist, and interpretive perspectives on religion in society. Interestingly, each of them predicted that the processes of modern secularization would gradually erode the significance of religion in everyday life. More recent theorists like Peter Berger, Rodney Stark (feminist), and John Caputo take account of contemporary experiences of religion, including what appears to be a period of religious revivalism. Each of these theorists contribute uniquely important perspectives that describe the roles and functions that religion has served society over time. When taken altogether, sociologists recognize that religion is an entity that does not remain stagnant. It evolves and develops alongside new intellectual discoveries and expressions of societal, as well as individual, needs and desires.

A case in point would be the evolution of belief in the Catholic Church. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Roman Catholic Church responded to the challenges brought forth by secularization, scientific reasoning, and rationalist methodologies with Pope Pius X's encyclical *Pascendi dominici gregis* (1907). This letter was circulated among all Catholic churches and identified the new “enemy of the cross” as the trend towards modernization. A secretive “Council of Vigilance” was established in each diocese to purge church teachings of the elements of modernism. The true faith “concerns itself with the divine reality which is entirely unknown to science.”

However, in the 21st century, the Catholic Church appears to be adapting its attitudes towards modernization. The 266th Roman Catholic Pope, Pope Francis, has made public statements such as, “If a person is gay and seeks God and has good will, who am I to judge?” (Reuters, 2013) and “We cannot limit the role of women in the Church to altar girls or the president of a charity, there must be more” (BBC News, 2013).

These statements seem to align the Church's position with contemporary attitudes towards homosexuality and gender. Pope Francis has also addressed contemporary issues of climate change. At the 2015 U.N. climate conference in Paris, France, he stated “[e]very year the problems are getting worse. We are at the limits. If I may use a strong word I would say that we are at the limits of suicide” (Pullella, 2015).



Figure 15.3 Pope Francis was named *Time* magazine's “Person of the Year” in 2013, where he was identified as “poised to transform a place [i.e., the Vatican] that measures change by the century” (Chua-Eoan & Dias 2013). What types of impact can the words of a religious leader have on society today? (Photo courtesy of Edgar Jiménez/Flickr.) [CC BY SA 2.0](#)

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15.1 The Sociological Approach to Religion

From the Latin *religio* (respect for what is sacred) and *religare* (to bind, in the sense of an obligation), the term religion describes various systems of belief and practice concerning what people determine to be sacred or spiritual (Durkheim, 1915/1964; Fasching and deChant, 2001). Throughout history, and in societies across the world, leaders have used religious narratives, symbols, and traditions in an attempt to give more meaning to life and understand the universe. Some form of religion is found in every known culture, and it is usually practiced in a public way by a group. Religious practice can include feasts and festivals, God or gods, marriage and funeral services, music and art, meditation or initiation, sacrifice or service, and other aspects of culture.

Defining Religion



Figure 15.4 Santo Daime is a syncretic religion founded in Brazil in the 1930s that draws on elements of Catholicism, spiritualism, and Indigenous animism. The entheogenic brew Ayahuasca (or “Daime”), shown here in bottles, is used in religious rituals that often last many hours. (Photo courtesy of Aiatee/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 3.0](#)

There are three different ways of defining religion in sociology — substantial definitions, functional definitions, and family resemblance definitions — each of which has consequences for what counts as a religion, and each of which has limitations and strengths in its explanatory power (Dawson and Thiessen, 2014). The problem of defining religion is not without real consequences, not least for questions of whether specific groups can obtain legal recognition as religions. In Canada there are clear benefits to being officially defined as a religion in terms of taxes, liberties, and protections from persecution. Guarantees of religious freedom under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms stem from whether practices or groups are regarded as legitimately religious or not. What definitions of religion do we use to decide these questions?

For example, the *Céu do Montréal* was established in 2000 as a chapter of the Brazilian *Santo Daime* church (Tupper, 2011). One of the sacraments specified in church doctrine and used in ceremonial rituals is ayahuasca, a psychedelic or entheogenic “tea” that induces visions when ingested. It must be imported from the Amazon rainforest where its ingredients are found. But because it contains N, N-dimethyltryptamine (DMT) and harmala alkaloids, it is a controlled substance under Canadian law.

Importing and distributing this substance is considered trafficking and subject to criminal charges. Nevertheless, because of ayahuasca’s role as a sacrament in the church’s religious practice, *Céu do Montréal* was able to apply to the Office of Controlled Substances of Health Canada for a legal, Section 56 exemption to permit its lawful ceremonial use. Other *neo-Vegetalismo* groups who use ayahuasca in traditional Amazonian healing ceremonies in Canada, but do not have affiliations with a formal church-like organization, are not recognized as official religions, and therefore their use of ayahuasca remains criminalized and underground.

The problem of any definition of religion is to provide a statement that is at once narrow enough in scope to distinguish religion from other types of social activity, while considering the wide variety of practices that are recognizably religious in any common sense notion of the term. **Substantial definitions** attempt to outline the crucial characteristics that define what a religion is and is not. For example, Sir Edward Tylor argued that “a minimum definition

of Religion [is] the belief in spiritual beings” (Tylor, 1871, cited in Stark, 1999), or as Sir James Frazer elaborated, “religion consists of two elements... a belief in powers higher than man and an attempt to propitiate or appease them” (Frazer, 1922, cited in Stark, *ibid.*). These definitions are strong in that they identify the key characteristic — belief in the supernatural — that distinguishes religion from other types of potentially similar social practice like politics or art. They are also easily and simply applied across societies, no matter how exotic or different the societies are. However, the problem with substantial definitions is that they tend to be too narrow. In the case of Tylor’s and Frazer’s definitions, emphasis on belief in the supernatural excludes some forms of religion like Theravadan Buddhism, Confucianism, or neo-paganism that do not recognize higher, spiritual beings, while also suggesting that religions are primarily about systems of *beliefs*, (i.e., a *cognitive* dimension of religion that ignores the emotive, ritual, or habitual dimensions that are often more significant for understanding actual religious practice).

On the other hand, **functional definitions** define religion by what it does or how it functions in society. For example, Milton Yinger’s definition is: “Religion is a system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group struggles with the ultimate problems of human life” (Yinger, 1970, cited in Dawson and Thiessen, 2014). A more elaborate functional definition is that of Mark Taylor (2007): religion is “an emergent, complex, adaptive network of symbols, myths, and rituals that, on the one hand, figure schemata of feeling, thinking, and acting in ways that lend life meaning and purpose and, on the other, disrupt, dislocate, and disfigure every stabilizing structure.” These definitions are strong in that they can capture the many forms that these religious problematics or dynamics can take — encompassing both Christianity and Theravadan Buddhism for example — but they also tend to be too inclusive, making it difficult to distinguish religion from non-religion. Is religion, for example, the only means by which social groups struggle with the ultimate problems of human life?

The third type of definition is the **family resemblance** model, in which religion is defined on the basis of a series of commonly shared attributes (Dawson and Thiessen, 2014). The family resemblance definition is based on the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ordinary language definition of games (Wittgenstein, 1958). Games, like religions, *resemble* one another — we recognize them as belonging to a common category — and yet it is difficult to decide precisely and logically what the rule is that subsumes tiddly winks, solitaire, Dungeons and Dragons, and ice hockey under the category “games.” Therefore, the family resemblance model defines a complex “thing” like religion by listing a cluster of related attributes that are distinctive and shared by different versions of that thing, while noting that not every version of the thing will have all the attributes. The idea is that a family — even a real family — will hold a number of physiological traits in common, for example, which can be used to distinguish them from other families, even though each family member is unique, and any family member might not have all of them. You can still tell that the member belongs to one family over another because of the traits they share.

It is also possible to define religion in terms of a cluster of attributes based on family resemblance. This cluster includes four attributes: types of belief, ritual, experience, and social form. This type of definition has the ability to capture aspects of both the substantive and functional definitions. It can be based on common sense notions of what religion is and is not, without the drawback of being overly exclusive. While the thing, “religion,” itself becomes somewhat hazy in this definition, it does permit the sociologist to examine and compare religion based on these four dimensions while remaining confident that they are dealing with the same phenomenon.

The Four Dimensions of Religion

The incredible amount of variation between different religions makes it challenging to decide upon a concrete definition of religion that applies to all of them. To facilitate the sociological study of religion it is helpful to turn our attention to four dimensions that seem to be present, in varying forms and intensities, in all types of religion: belief, ritual, spiritual experience, and unique social forms of community (Dawson & Thiessen, 2014).

The first dimension is one that comes to mind for most Canadians when they think of religion, some systematic form

of beliefs. Religious **beliefs** are a generalized system of ideas and values that shape how members of a religious group come to understand the world around them (see Table 15.1 and 15.2 below). They define the *cognitive* aspect of religion. These beliefs are taught to followers by religious authorities, such as priests, imams, or shamans, through formal creeds and doctrines, as well as more informal lessons learned through stories, songs, and myths. A **creed** outlines the basic principles and beliefs of a religion, such as the Nicene creed in Christianity (“I believe in the father, the son and the holy ghost...”), which is used in ceremonies as a formal statement of belief (Knowles, 2005).

Table 15.1 One way scholars have categorized religions is by classifying what or who they hold to be divine.

Religious Classification	What/Who Is Divine	Example
Polytheism	Multiple gods	Hinduism, Ancient Greeks, and Romans
Monotheism	Single god	Judaism, Islam, Christianity
Atheism	No deities	Atheism, Buddhism, Taoism
Animism	Nonhuman beings (animals, plants, natural world)	Indigenous nature worship, Shinto

Belief systems provide people with certain ways of thinking and knowing that help them cope with ultimate questions that cannot be explained in any other way. One example is Weber’s (1915) concept of **theodicy** — an explanation of why, if a higher power does exist, good and innocent people experience misfortune and suffering. Weber argues that the problem of theodicy explains the prevalence of religion in our society. In the absence of other plausible explanations of the contradictory nature of existence, religious theodicies construct the world as meaningful. He gives several examples of theodicies — including karma, where the present actions and thoughts of a person have a direct influence on their future lives, and predestination, the idea that all events are an outcome God’s predetermined will.



Figure 15.5 Prayer is a ritualistic practice or invocation common to many religions in which a person seeks to attune themselves with a higher order. One of the five pillars of Islam requires Salat, or five daily prayers recited while facing the Kaaba in Mecca. (Photo courtesy of Shaeekh Shuvro/Flickr.) [CC BY SA 2.0](#)

The second dimension, ritual, functions to anchor religious beliefs. **Rituals** are repeated physical gestures or activities, such as prayers and mantras, used to reinforce religious teachings, elicit spiritual feelings, and connect worshippers with a higher power. They reinforce the division between the sacred and the profane by defining the set of intricate processes and attitudes with which the sacred dimension of life can be approached.

A common type of ritual is a **rite of passage**, which marks a person's transition from one stage of life to another. Examples of rites of passage common in contemporary Canadian culture include baptisms, Bar Mitzvahs, and weddings. They sacralize the process of identity transformation. When these rites are religious in nature, they often also mark the spiritual dangers of transformation. The Sun Dance rituals of many Native American tribes are rites of renewal which can also act as initiation-into-manhood rites for young men. They confer great prestige onto the pledgers who go through the ordeal, but there is also the possibility of failure. The sun dances last for several days, during which young men fast and dance around a pole to which they are connected by rawhide strips passed through the skin of the chest (Hoebel, 1978). During their weakened state, the pledgers are neither the person they were, nor yet the person they are becoming. Friends and family members gather in the camp to offer prayers of support and protection during this period of vulnerable "liminality." Overall, rituals like this function to bring a group of people (although not necessarily just religious groups) together to create a common, elevated experience that increases social cohesion and solidarity.

From a psychological perspective, rituals play an important role in providing practitioners with access to spiritual "powers" of various sorts. In particular, they can access powers that both relieve or induce anxieties within a group depending on the circumstances. In relieving anxieties, religious rituals are often present at times when people face uncertainty or chance. In this sense they provide a basis of psychological stability. A famous example of this is Malinowski's study of the Trobriand Islanders of New Guinea (1948). When fishing in the sheltered coves of the islands very little ritual was involved. It was not until fishermen decided to venture into the much more dangerous open ocean in search of bigger and riskier catches that a rigorous set of religious rituals were invoked, which worked to subdue the fears of not only the fisherman but the rest of the villagers.

In contrast, rituals can also be used to create anxieties that keep people in line with established norms. In the case of **taboos**, the designation of certain objects or acts as prohibited or sacred creates an aura of fear or anxiety around them. The observance of rituals is used to either prevent the transgression of taboos or to return society to normal after taboos have been transgressed. For example, early hunting societies observed a variety of rituals in their hunting practices to return the soul of the animal to its supernatural "owner." Failure to observe these rituals was a transgression that threatened to unbalance the cosmological order and impact the success of future hunts. This failure could only be resolved through further specific rituals (Smith, 1982). In this example, sociologists would note that the taboo acts as a form of ritualized social control that encourages people to act in ways that benefit the wider society, such as the prevention of overhunting.

A third common dimension of various religions is the promise of access to some form of unique spiritual **experience** or feeling of immediate connection with a higher power. The pursuit of these indescribable experiences explains one set of motives behind the continued prevalence of religion in Canada and around the world. From this point of view, religion is not so much about *thinking* a certain way (i.e., a formal belief system) as about *feeling* a certain way. These experiences can come in several forms: the incredible visions or revelations of the religious founders or prophets (e.g., the experiences of the Buddha, Jesus, or Muhammed), the act of communicating with spirits through the altered states of consciousness used by tribal shamans, or the unique experiences of expanded consciousness accessed by individuals through prayer or meditation.




Figure 15.6 Michelangelo's "Conversion of Saul" (1542) depicts the overpowering nature of the transformative experience, or *mysterium tremendum*, that lies at the core of religion. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#). [\[Image Description\]](#)

While being exposed to a higher power can be awe inspiring, it can also be intensely overwhelming for those experiencing it. These experiences reveal a form of knowledge that is instantly transformative. The historical example of Saul of Tarsus (later renamed St. Paul the Apostle) in the Christian New Testament is an example. Saul was a Pharisee heavily involved in the persecution of Christians. While on the road to Damascus Jesus appeared to him in a life-changing vision.

And as he journeyed, he came near Damascus: and suddenly there shined round about him a light from heaven:
 And he fell to the earth, and heard a voice saying unto him, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?
 And he said, Who art thou, Lord? And the Lord said, I am Jesus whom thou persecutest: it is hard for thee to kick against the pricks.
 And he trembling and astonished said, Lord, what wilt thou have me to do? And the Lord said unto him, Arise,

and go into the city, and it shall be told thee what thou must do.

And the men which journeyed with him stood speechless, hearing a voice, but seeing no man.

And Saul arose from the earth; and when his eyes were opened, he saw no man: but they led him by the hand, and brought him into Damascus.

And he was three days without sight, and neither did eat nor drink (Acts 9:1-22).

The experience of divine revelation overwhelmed Saul, blinded him for three days, and prompted his immediate conversion to Christianity. As a result, he lived out his life spreading Christianity through the Roman Empire.

While specific religious experiences of transformation like Saul's are often the source or goal of religious practice, established religions vary in how they relate to them. Are these types of experiences open to all members, or just those spiritual elites like prophets, shamans, saints, monks, or nuns who hold a certain status? Are practitioners encouraged to seek these experiences, or are the experiences suppressed? Is it a specific cultivated experience that is sought through disciplined practice, as in Zen Buddhism, or a more spontaneous experience of divine inspiration, like the experience of speaking in tongues in Evangelical congregations? Do they occur quite often, or are they more rare/singular? Each religion has their own answers to these questions.

Finally, the fourth common dimension of religion is the formation of specific forms of social organization or **community**. Durkheim (1915/1964) emphasized that religious beliefs and practices “unite in one single community called a Church, all those who adhere to them,” arguing that one of the key social functions of religion is to bring people together in a unified moral community. Dawson and Thiessen (2014) elaborate on this social dimension shared by all religions. First, the beliefs of a religion gain their credibility through being shared and agreed upon by a group. It is easier to believe if others around you (who you respect) also believe. Second, religion provides an authority that deals specifically with social or moral issues, such as determining the best way to live life. It provides a basis for ethics and proper behaviours, which establish the normative basis of the community. Even as many Canadians move away from traditional forms of religion, many still draw their values and ideals from some form of shared beliefs that are religious in origin (e.g., “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”). Third, religion also shapes different aspects of social life, by acting as a form of social control, and supporting the formation of self-control that is vital to many aspects of a functional society. Fourth, although it may be on the decline in Canada, places of religious worship work as social hubs within communities, providing entertainment, socialization, and support.

By looking at religions in terms of these four dimensions — belief, ritual, experience, and community — sociologists can identify the important characteristics they share while taking into consideration and allowing for the great diversity of the world religions.

Table 15.2 The Religions of the World. [\[Skip Table\]](#)

World Religion	Origins	Beliefs	Rituals and Practices
Judaism Symbol: The star of David	<p>Judaism began in ancient Israel about 4,000 years ago. The prophet Abraham was the first to declare that there was to be only one true God. Moses, centuries later, then led the Jewish people away from slavery in Egypt, which was a defining moment for Judaism. Moses is credited with writing the Torah, the sacred Jewish texts, which consists of the five books of Moses.</p>	<p>Followers of Judaism are monotheistic, believing that there is only one true God. Israel is the sacred land of the Jewish people, and it is seen as gift to them – the children of Israel – from God. According to the Torah, Jewish believers must live a life of obedience to God because life itself is a gift granted by God to his disciples (Sanders, 2009).</p> <p>Followers of Judaism live in accordance with the ten commandments revealed to Moses by God on Mount Sinai. These commandments outline the instructions for how to live life according to God.</p>	<p>Judaism has many rituals and practices that followers of the faith carry out. Jewish people have strict dietary laws that originate in the Torah, called Kosher laws. The goal of these laws is not a concern for health, but for holiness. Examples of foods that are prohibited include, pig, hare, camel, and ostrich meat, and crustacean and molluscan seafood. Additionally, certain food groups are banned from being consumed when combined, for example, meat and dairy together (Tieman & Hassan, 2015).</p> <p>Other examples of Jewish rituals are the practices of circumcision and Bar and Bat Mitzvahs. These rites of passage for young boys (bar) and young girls (bat) mark the transition into manhood and womanhood. During these celebrations, the coming-of-age process is celebrated. Jewish followers also carry out multiple prayers each day, reaffirming and demonstrating their reciprocal love with God.</p>
Christianity Symbol: The Cross	<p>Christianity began in approximately 35 CE – i.e., the date of the crucifixion – in the Middle East, in an area now known as Israel. Christianity began with recognition of the divinity of Jesus of Nazareth (Dunn, 2003). A poor Jewish man, Jesus was unsatisfied with Judaism and took it upon himself to seek a stronger connection to the word of God defined by the prophets. Thus, Christianity initially developed as a sect of Judaism. It developed into a distinct religion as Jesus developed a stronger following of those who believed that he was the son of God. The crucifixion of Jesus was the first of many tests of faith of Christians (Guy, 2004).</p> <p>A division emerged within Christianity between Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism with the division of the Roman Empire into East and West. A second division occurred during the Protestant Reformation when Protestant sects emerged to challenge the authority of the Catholic church and Papacy to be intermediaries between God and Christian believers.</p>	<p>At the core, to be Christian is to believe in the trinity of father, son, and holy spirit as one God: The God of love. Out of love for humanity, God allowed his only son to be sacrificed in the crucifixion to expiate their sins. Christians are admonished to love God, and to love their neighbours and enemies “as themselves.” They believe in God’s love for all things, have faith that God is always watching over them, and that Jesus, the son of God, will return when the world is ready. Jesus is the exemplar of the religion, demonstrating the way in which to be a proper Christian. In the Christian faith, the theodicy, or the way Christianity explains why God allows bad things to happen to good people, is shown through faith in Jesus. If believers follow in Jesus’ footsteps, they will have access to heaven. Unfortunate occurrences are acts of God that test the faith of his followers. Therefore, by keeping their faith in God’s love, Christians can carry on with their lives when confronted with tragedy, injustice, and suffering.</p>	<p>There are many rituals and practices that are central to Christianity, known as the sacraments. For example, the sacrament of baptism involves the literal washing of the person with water to represent the cleansing of their sins. Today, the ritual of baptism has become less common, however, historically the process of baptism was considered an integral rite to christen the individual and to wipe away their ancestral or original sin (Hanegraaff, 2009). Other sacraments include the Eucharist (or communion), confirmation, penance, anointing the sick, marriage, and Holy Orders (or ordination). However, not all sects of Christianity follow these.</p> <p>One of the core qualities and practices of Christianity is caring for the poor and disadvantaged. Jesus, a poor man himself, fed and nurtured the poor, demonstrating care for all, and is thus seen to be the exemplar of morality (Dunn, 2003). Christian churches are often institutions that demonstrate how to follow Jesus, running charities and food banks, and housing the homeless and the sick.</p>

World Religion	Origins	Beliefs	Rituals and Practices
Islam Symbol: Crescent and the Star	<p>Originating in Saudi Arabia, Islam is a monotheistic religion that developed in approximately 600 CE. During this time, the society of Mecca was in turmoil. Muhammad, God's messenger, received the verses of the Quran directly from the Angel Gabriel during a period of isolated prayer on Mt. Hira. He developed a following of people who eventually united Arabia into a single state and faith through military struggle against polytheistic pagans. Followers of the Islamic faith are referred to as Muslims.</p> <p>Today, a division exists with Islam originating from disagreement about Muhammad's legitimate successor. These two groups are known as Sunni's and Shia's, the former making up the majority of Muslims.</p>	<p>Central to Islam is the belief that the God, Allah, is the only true God and that Muhammad is God's Messenger, otherwise known as the Prophet. God also demands that Muslims be fearful and subservient to him as He is the master, and the maker of law (Ushama, 2014).</p> <p>In Islamic faith, the Quran is the sacred text that Muslims believe is the direct word of God, dictated by the Angel Gabriel to Muhammad (Ushama, 2014).</p>	<p>Islam outlines five pillars that must be upheld by Islamic followers if they are to be true Muslims.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Daily recitation of the creed (Shahadah) which states that there is only one God and Muhammad is God's messenger; 2. Prayer five times daily; 3. Providing financial aid to support poor Muslims and to promote the practice of Islam; 4. Participation in the month long fast during the 9th month of the Islamic calendar; 5. Completion of a pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in their life ("Pillars of Islam," 2008).
Hinduism Symbol: Om or Aum	<p>Hinduism originated in India and Nepal; however, the exact origin of this widespread religion is highly contested. There is no known founder, differing strongly from the other religions discussed here, which have strong origin stories of the individuals that first posited the specific way of religious life (Flood, 1996).</p>	<p>The characteristic beliefs of Hinduism are a belief in reincarnation, and a belief that all actions have direct effects, referred to as Karma (Flood, 1996). In contrast with other world religions, Hinduism is not as strongly defined by what followers believe in but instead by what they do. The Dharma is what outlines a Hindu's duty in life, identifying individuals with a place within the dharmic social stratification system, or the caste system. This classification greatly dictates what a Hindu can and cannot do. Hindu followers believe in one God that is represented by a multitude of sacred forms known as deities (Flood, 1996). In Hindu religion, in death, only the body dies while the soul lives on. Individuals are reincarnated, surviving death to be reborn in a new form. This new form is believed to be dependent on the way in which the individual lived their life, with the proper way identified as acting in accordance with the duties of their caste position (Flood, 1996).</p>	<p>In the religion of Hinduism, practice is more important than belief. One ritualistic practice that is carried out by Hindu followers is the act of making offerings of incense to the deities. This act of offering is seen as a "mediation" to open to the lines of communication between the sacred and the profane, or the deity and the individual. This correspondence is of great significance to Hindu followers (Flood, 1996). Another widespread ritual practice is yoga, which is a practice of holding postures while focusing on one's breath. Yoga is used to silence the mind, allowing it to reflect the divine world. This practice brings the believer closer to unification with the divine.</p>

World Religion	Origins	Beliefs	Rituals and Practices
Buddhism Symbol: The Dharma Wheel (the eight spokes of this wheel represent the eightfold path).	Buddhism refers to the teachings of Siddhartha Gautama (Buddha). It originated in India in approximately 600 BCE. Buddha, originally a follower of the Hindu faith, experienced enlightenment, or Bodhi, while sitting under a tree. It was in this moment that Buddha was awakened to the truth of the world, known as the Dharma. Buddha, an ordinary man, taught his followers how to follow the path to Enlightenment. Thus, Buddhism does not believe in a divine realm or God as a supernatural being, but instead follows the wisdom of the founder (Rinpoche, 2001).	<p>Buddhists are guided through life by the Dharma, or four noble truths.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The truth that life is impermanent and therefore generates suffering such as sickness or misfortune; 2. The truth that the origin of suffering is due to the existence of desire or craving; 3. The truth that there is a way to bring this suffering to a halt and achieve release from the cycle of suffering and rebirth; 4. The truth of following the eight-fold path as a way to end this suffering (Tsering, 2005). 5. This path consists of the 'right' view to carry out one's life. <p>Buddhists believe in reincarnation, and that one will continue to be reborn, requiring them to continue the study of and dedication to the four noble truths and the eightfold path until Enlightenment is achieved. Only then will the cycle stop. Therefore, the end to suffering is only reached through the cessation of the craving or desire that drives the cycle of rebirth (Tsering, 2005).</p>	<p>The noble eight-fold path includes eight prescriptions: right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration. These outline the "middle path" between the extremes of sensualism and asceticism, which leads to true knowledge, peace, and enlightenment (Tsering, 2005). A key ritual practice of Buddhism is meditation. This practice is used by followers to learn detachment from desire and gain insight into the inner workings of their mind, coming to greater understandings of the truth of the world. In the Buddha's example, meditation on breath or on chanted mantras, which are often key passages of the Buddha's sutras (teachings), is a key practice to reach the place of Enlightenment or awakening.</p>

Making Connection: Social Policy and Debate

Residential Schools and the Church



Figure 15.7 Students from Fort Albany Residential School, Ontario, reading in class overseen by a nun, circa 1945. (Image courtesy of Edmund Metatawabin collection at the University of Algoma/Wikipedia.) [Public Domain](#)

Residential schools were a key institution responsible for the undermining of Aboriginal culture in Canada. Residential schools were run by the Canadian government alongside the Anglican, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, and United Churches (Blackburn, 2012). These schools were created with the purpose of assimilating Aboriginal children into North American culture (Woods, 2013).

In 1920, the government legally mandated that all Aboriginal children between the ages of seven and fifteen attend these schools (Blackburn, 2012). They took the children away from their families and communities to remove them from all influence of their Aboriginal identities that could inhibit their assimilation. Many families did not want their children taken away and would hide them, until it became illegal (Neeganagwedgin, 2014). Under the Indian Act, they were also not allowed lawyers to fight government action, which added greatly to the systemic marginalization of these people. The churches

were responsible for daily religious teachings and daily activities, and the government oversaw the curriculum, funding, and monitoring of the schools (Blackburn, 2012).

There were as many as 80 residential schools in Canada by 1931 (Woods, 2013). It was known early on in this system that there were flaws, but they persisted until the last residential school was abolished in 1996. As we now know, the experience of residential schools for Aboriginal children was traumatic and dreadful. Within the walls of these schools, children were exposed to sexual and physical abuse, malnourishment, and disease. They were not provided with adequate clothing or medical care, and the buildings themselves were unsanitary and poorly built.

The Roman Catholic Church created the most residential schools, with the Anglican Church second (Woods, 2013). There has been much debate surrounding the Church's involvement in these atrocious organizations. Former Primate and Archbishop Michael Peers apologized in 1993 for the Anglican Church's part in the residential schools. Canada's first Aboriginal Anglican Bishop Gordon Beardy forgave the Anglican Church in 2001.

By 2001, there were more than 8,500 lawsuits against the Churches and Canadian government for their role in the residential schools (Woods, 2013). Because of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, former students of the residential schools are now eligible for \$10,000, on top of \$3,000 for each year they attended the schools. A lawsuit filed by former students of the Alberni Indian Residential School was one of the first to get to the Supreme Court of Canada, and the first to consider both the government and church equally responsible.

On behalf of the churches involved in the residential schools, apologies are still being made, but the effects it has had on the Indigenous peoples and their culture are perpetuating today. The Christian churches and mission groups have done good things for societies, but their role in these residential schools was immoral and unjust to the Aboriginal people.

Types of Religious Organization

In every society, there are different organizational forms that develop for the practice of religion. Sociologists are interested in understanding how these different types of organization affect spiritual beliefs and practices. They can be categorized according to their size and influence into churches (ecclesia or denomination), sects, and cults. This allows sociologists to examine the different types of relationships religious organization has with the dominant religions in their societies and with society itself.

A **church** is a large, bureaucratically organized religious organization that is closely integrated into the larger society. Two types of church organizations exist. The first is the **ecclesia**, a church that has formal ties with the state. Like the Anglican Church of England, an ecclesia has most or all of a state's citizens as its members. As such, the ecclesia forms the national or state religion. People ordinarily do not join an ecclesia; instead, they automatically become members when they are born. Several ecclesiae exist in the world today, including Salafi Islam in Saudi Arabia, the Catholic Church in Spain, the Lutheran Church in Sweden, and, as noted above, the Anglican Church in England.

In an ecclesiastic society, there may be little separation of church and state, because the ecclesia and the state are so intertwined. Many modern states deduct tithes automatically from citizen's salaries on behalf of the state church. In some ecclesiastic societies, such as those in the Middle East, religious leaders rule the state as **theocracies** — systems of government in which ecclesiastical authorities rule on behalf of a divine authority — while in others, such as Sweden

and England, they have little or no direct influence. In general, the close ties that ecclesiae have to the state help ensure they will support state policies and practices. For this reason, ecclesiae often help the state solidify its control over the populace.

The second type of church organization is the **denomination**, a religious organization that is closely integrated into the larger society, but is not a formal part of the state. In modern religiously pluralistic nations, several denominations coexist. In Canada, for example, the United Church, Catholic Church, Anglican Church, Presbyterian Church, Christian and Missionary Alliance, and the Seventh-day Adventists are all Christian denominations. None of these denominations claim to be Canada's national or official church, but exist instead under the formal and informal historical conditions of separation between church and state.

In Canada, denominationalism developed formally as a result of the Treaty of Paris in 1763, which granted Roman Catholics the freedom to practice their religion. Denominationalism also developed informally from the immigration of people with different faiths during the expansion of settlement of Canada in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Under the model of denominationalism, many different religious organizations compete for people's allegiances, creating a kind of marketplace for religion. In the United States, this is a formal outcome of the Constitutional 1st Amendment protections: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." "Freedom of religion" was not constitutionally protected in Canada until the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982.



Figure 15.8 A 62-foot-tall Jesus sculpture – “King of Kings” – at the Solid Rock megachurch north of Cincinnati, Ohio. (Photo courtesy of Joe Shlabotnik/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

A relatively recent development in religious denominationalism is the rise of the so-called *megachurch* in the United States, a church at which more than 2,000 people worship every weekend on average (Priest, Wilson, & Johnson, 2010; Warf & Winsberg, 2010). These are both denominational and non-denominational (i.e., not officially aligned with any specific established religious denomination). About one-third are nondenominational, and one-fifth are Southern Baptist, with the remainder primarily of other Protestant denominations. Several dozen have at least 10,000 worshippers and the largest U.S. mega church, in Houston, has more than 35,000 worshippers, nicknamed a “gigachurch.” There are more than 1,300 mega churches in the United States – a steep increase from the 50 that existed in 1970 – and their total membership exceeds 4 million.

Compared to traditional, smaller churches, mega churches are more concerned with meeting their members’ non-

spiritual, practical needs, in addition to helping them achieve religious fulfillment. They provide a “one-stop shopping” model of religion. Some even conduct market surveys to determine these needs and how best to address them. As might be expected, their buildings are huge by any standard, and often feature bookstores, food courts, and sports and recreation facilities. They also provide day care, psychological counseling, and youth outreach programs. Their services often feature electronic music and light shows. Despite their popularity, they have been criticized for being so big that members are unable to develop close bonds with each other and with members of the clergy, which is characteristic of smaller houses of worship. On the other hand, supporters say mega churches bring many people into religious worship who would otherwise not be involved.

A **sect** is a small religious body that forms after a group breaks away from a larger religious group, like a church or denomination. Dissidents believe that the parent organization does not practice or believe in the true religion as it was originally conceived (Stark & Bainbridge, 1985). Sects are relatively small religious organizations that are not closely integrated into the larger society. They often conflict with at least some of its norms and values. The Hutterites are perhaps the most well-known example of a contemporary sect in Canada; an Anabaptist group — literally “one who baptizes again” — that broke away from mainstream Christianity in the 16th century. Their migration from Tyrol, Austria, due to persecution eventually led to their immigration to the Dakotas in the 19th century and then to the Canadian prairies, as conscientious objectors following WWI.

Typically, a sect breaks away from a larger denomination in an effort to restore what members of the sect regard as the original views of the religion. Because sects are relatively small, they usually lack the bureaucracy of denominations and ecclesiae, and often also lack clergy who have received official training. Their worship services can be intensely emotional experiences, often more so than those typical of many denominations, where worship tends to be more formal and restrained. Members of many sects typically proselytize and try to recruit new members into the sect. If a sect successfully attracts many new members, it gradually grows, becomes more bureaucratic, and ironically evolves into a denomination. Many of today’s Protestant denominations began as sects, as did the Hutterites, Mennonites, Quakers, Doukhobors, Mormons, and other groups.

A **cult** or **New Religious Movement** is a small religious organization that is at great odds with the norms and values of the larger society. Cults are similar to sects but differ in at least three respects. First, they generally have not broken away from a larger denomination and instead originate outside the mainstream religious tradition. Second, they are often secretive and do not proselytize as much. Third, they are at least somewhat more likely than sects to rely on charismatic leadership based on the extraordinary personal qualities of the cult’s leader.

Although the term “cult” raises negative images of crazy, violent, small groups of people, it is important to keep in mind that major world religions, including Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, and denominations such as the Mormons all began as cults. Cults, more than other religious organizations, have been subject to contemporary moral panics about brainwashing, sexual deviance, and strange esoteric beliefs. However, research challenges several popular beliefs about cults, including the ideas that they brainwash people into joining them and that their members are mentally ill. In a study of the Unification Church (Moonies), Eileen Barker (1984) found no more signs of mental illness among people who joined the Moonies than in those who did not. She also found no evidence that people who joined the Moonies had been brainwashed into doing so.

Another source of moral panic about cults is that they are violent. In fact, most are not violent. Nevertheless, some cults have committed violence in the recent past. In 1995 the Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth) cult in Japan killed 10 people and injured thousands more when it released bombs of deadly nerve gas in several Tokyo subway lines (Strasser



Figure 15.9 A Hutterite girl holding her baby sister in Southern Alberta, 1950s. (Image courtesy of Galt Museum & Archives/Wikimedia Commons.) No known copyright restrictions.

& Post, 1995). Two years earlier, the Branch Davidian cult engaged in an armed standoff with federal agents in Waco, Texas. When the agents attacked its compound, a fire broke out and killed 80 members of the cult, including 19 children; the origin of the fire is still unknown (Tabor & Gallagher, 1995).



Figure 15.10 The Reverend Jim Jones of the People's Temple: "We didn't commit suicide; we committed an act of revolutionary suicide protesting the conditions of an inhumane world." (Image courtesy of Nancy Wong/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 3.0](#)

A few cults have also committed mass suicide. More than three dozen members of the Heaven's Gate cult killed themselves in California, in March 1997, in an effort to communicate with aliens from outer space (Hoffman & Burke, 1997). Some two decades earlier, in 1978, more than 900 members of the People's Temple cult killed themselves in Guyana under orders from the cult's leader, the Reverend Jim Jones (Stoen, 1997). Similarly, in Canada, on the morning of October 4th, 1994, a blaze engulfed a complex of luxury condominiums in the resort town of Morin-Heights, Quebec. Firefighters found the bodies of a Swiss couple, Gerry and Collette Genoud, in its ruins. At first it was thought that the fire was accidental, but then news arrived from Switzerland of another odd set of fires at homes owed by the same men who owned the Quebec condominiums. All the fires had been set with improvised incendiary devices, which made the police

realize they were dealing with a rare incidence of mass murder suicide involving members of an esoteric religious group known as the Solar Temple. From the recorded and written messages left behind by the group, it is clear that the leaders felt it was time to affect what they called a transit to another reality associated with Sirius.

It is important to note that cults or new religious movements are very diverse. They offer spiritual options for people seeking purpose in the modern context of state secularism and religious pluralism. Being intense about one's religious views often breaks the social norms of largely secular societies, leading to misunderstandings and suspicions. Members of new religions run the risk of being stigmatized and even prosecuted (Dawson, 2007). Modern societies highly value freedom and individual choice, but not when exercised in a manner that defies expectations of what is normal.

Making Connections: Case Study

Brother XII and the Aquarian Foundation



Figure 15.11 Brother Twelve, the “devil from De Courcy Island.” (Image from brotherxii.com.) [Public Domain](#)

Born as Edward Arthur Wilson, the man known as Brother XII travelled the world as a sailor studying various religions. Even at a young age he claimed to be in touch with supernatural beings (Gorman, 2012). In 1927, having taken the name of Brother XII, Wilson established the Aquarian Foundation at Cedar-by-the-Sea, just south of Nanaimo on Vancouver Island, which expanded to include colonies on nearby De Courcy and Valdez Islands. At its height it had over 2000 followers around the world, many of whom sent over large sums of money.

The Aquarian Foundation was based on the teachings on the Theosophical Society, which was an organization formed in New York City in 1875. Theosophy had much in common with the beliefs of Buddhism and Hinduism, such as the belief in reincarnation. It was radically different than the dominant Christian belief of the time. Instead of a separation of the spiritual world and the natural world, spirit and nature were intertwined in people’s daily lives as one universal life force. Theosophy also promoted the idea that there was a spiritual world beyond death inhabited by evolved spiritual beings, whose wisdom could be accessed through the occult reading of esoteric signs and the

intervention of spiritual mediums (Scott, 1997).



Figure 15.12 Brother Twelve (with hat) at the center of a group of followers. “I am not a person filled with power, but a power using a personality,” he stated in a circular letter (cited in McKelvie, 1966). (Image from McKelvie, 1966.) [Public Domain](#)

At the time Brother XII’s ambitions seemed reasonable enough and many felt the foundation itself represented the promise of great spiritual renewal for an increasingly materialistic society. Brother XII had his followers build homes and cabins at the foundation’s headquarters at Cedar-by-the-Sea and on De Courcy Island. These isolated areas provided a place to get away from the social pressures of the outside world. However, an insurrection took place when Brother XII announced to his followers that he was the reincarnation of the Egyptian God Osiris. Between 1928 and 1933, a series of trials involving Brother XII occurred, which included allegations of misusing foundation funds and having extramarital affairs. News reports claimed that he used black magic to cause witnesses and several members of the audience to faint (Rutten, 2009).

In 1929, as rumours about Wilson’s behaviour spread, the B.C. provincial cabinet dissolved the foundation. Those who remained were subjected to Wilson’s paranoia and became increasingly isolated from the outside world. Wilson himself became increasingly authoritarian and used social pressure to convince members into performing gruelling physical labour that was virtually on the same level as slavery. He did this by telling them these activities were tests of fitness to advance their spirituality. In 1931, the group was finally dissolved, and Wilson disappeared from the Nanaimo area along with hundreds of thousands of dollars of Foundation money and Mabel Skottowe (one of the women with whom he was accused of having an extramarital affair). They reportedly left by tugboat and eventually made their way to Switzerland. Most reports say he died in Switzerland in 1934, though some say he was seen in San Francisco with his lawyer after his alleged death.

The story of Brother XII illustrates many themes from the sociology of New Religious Movements and cults. According to Cowan (2015), because most people have little direct knowledge of cults and mainly get their information through sensationalist media reports, cults are easily presented as targets of moral panic for being immoral, extreme, or dangerous. The three main accusations against cults are that they engage in brainwashing, acts of sexual deviance, and social isolationism. Each of these accusations applied to the media reports on the Aquarian Foundation although their dominant theme centered on the claim that Brother XII was a fraud.

Image Descriptions

Figure 15.6 Long Description: A painting of God in the sky, surrounded by his angels, with his hand pointed down and beam of light shining from it. Below, people look panicked and stare up at the sky. Many have fallen and one man has fainted. [\[Return to Figure 15.6\]](#)

Media Attributions

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15.2 Sociological Explanations of Religion

Many people think of religion as something individual because religious beliefs can be highly personal. For sociologists, religion is also a social institution. Social scientists recognize that religion exists as an organized and integrated set of beliefs, behaviours, and norms centred on basic social needs and values. Moreover, religion is a cultural universal found in all social groups. For instance, in every culture, funeral rites are practiced in some way, although these customs vary between cultures and within religious affiliations. Despite differences, there are common elements in a ceremony marking a person's death, such as announcement of the death, care of the deceased, disposition, and ceremony or ritual. These universals, and the differences in how societies and individuals experience religion, provide rich material for sociological study. But why does religion exist in the first place?

Evolutionary Psychology

“Blind Pharisee, cleanse first that [which is] within the cup and platter, that the outside of them may be clean also”
(Matthew 23:26, King James Bible).

“Let the (husband) employ his (wife)...in keeping clean, in religious duties, in the preparation of his food, and in looking after the household utensils” (9:11, Hindu Laws of Manu).

Despite the conflict that has accompanied religion over the centuries, it continues to exist, and in some cases thrive. How do we explain the origins and continued existence of religion? We will examine sociological theories below, but first we turn to evolutionary and psychological explanations.

Many psychologists explain the rise and persistence of religion in terms of **Darwinian evolutionary theory**. For this argument, they provide a psychological definition of the core religious experience or state of being common to all religion's diverse social forms and settings. Psychologist Roger Cloninger (1993) defines this core religious experience as the disposition towards self-transcendence. It has three measurable components: self-forgetfulness (absorption in tasks and the ability to lose oneself in concentration), transpersonal identification (perception of spiritual union with the cosmos and the ability to reduce boundaries of self vs. other), and mysticism (perception or acceptance of things that cannot be rationally explained). The argument is that because this is a universal phenomenon, it must have a common physiological or genetic basis that is passed on between generations that enhances human survival.




Figure 15.13 “The place where heaven and earth meet.” Psychologists approach religion as a product of the individual capacity for experiences of self-transcendence. Is this ability wired into our genes? (Image from Camille Flammarion’s *Latmosphère: météorologie populaire*, 1888/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

According to Charles Darwin all species are involved in a constant battle for survival, using adaptations as their primary weapon against an ever-changing, and hostile environment. Adaptions are genetic or behavioral traits shaped by environmental pressures and genetic variation. By dissecting religion to a core set of purposes, it can be categorized as an adaption that increases the chances of human survival. All adaptations successfully passed on to future generations aided at one point either in reproduction or survival because the genes that selected for them were passed on. This is the rule of natural selection (Darwin, 1859).

Much of evolutionary psychology aims at explaining the possible environments in which certain adaptations were selected. Although religion has the potential to cause unwanted side effects, such as wars, it still provides much greater benefits, by responding to numerous survival problems through collective religious processes. A very specific benefit, for example, is disease prevention. Many historic religions placed an emphasis on cleanliness, comparing it to spiritual purity. Consequently, there is also an evolutionary benefit to this religious virtue. During a period where disease was a constant threat to survival, idealizing cleanliness helped minimize communicable diseases from food, animals, and even humans.

Although disease prevention has been an important byproduct of religious practices around the world, evolutionary psychologists argue that the main benefit religion has provided to human survival is the mutual support provided by fellow members. More specifically, religion creates a framework for social cohesion and solidarity, even during times of loss, and grief, which has been a crucial competitive strategy of the human species. Rather than each individual being exclusively concerned with their own survival — in a kind of “survival of the fittest” logic — the religious disposition to self-transcendence provides a mechanism that explains the altruistic core of religious practice and the capacity of individuals to sacrifice themselves for the group or for abstract beliefs.

Dean Hamer (2005) for example describes a specific gene that correlates with the capacity for self-transcendence. After his research team isolated an association between the VMAT2 gene sequence and populations who scored high on psychological scales for self-transcendence, Hamer noted these genes were connected to the production of neurotransmitters known as monoamines. The effects of monoamines on the meso-limbic systems in the human body were similar to many stimulant drugs: feelings of euphoria and positive well-being. Moreover, his findings suggested that 40-50% of self-transcendence was heritable. What is striking about this evidence is the implication that evolution has favoured genes that are often displayed in religious populations. Hamer extends the evolutionary argument to suggest that religion, grounded genetically in a neuro-chemical ability for self-transcendence, provides competitive advantages for the human species in the forms of community well-being (higher rates of reciprocity and social welfare) and longevity (reduction of maladaptive behaviours and increased cleanliness).

Many similar effects can be observed in the present environment. Strawbridge, Sherna, Cohen, and Kaplan, (2001) conducted a 30-year longitudinal study on religious attendance and survival. Although they found that weekly religious attendance more often assisted in targeting and reducing maladaptive behaviors such as smoking, it also aided in maintaining social relations, and marriage (Strawbridge et al., 2001). Similar studies show correlations between religious affiliation to Christianity, and the self-perceived happiness of German students (Francis, Robbins, & White, 2003). Evolutionary psychology argues that these modern tendencies to feel happiness during a church congregation to reduce maladaptive behaviours are innate, sculpted by centuries of exposure to religion.

Evolutionist Richard Dawkins hypothesized a similar reason why religion has created such a lasting impact on society. His theory is explained by the creation of ‘memes’. Comparable to genes, memes are bits of information that can be imitated and transferred across cultures and generations (Dawkins, 2006). Unlike genes, which are physically contained within the human genome, memes are the units or “genetic material” of culture. As a vocal proponent of atheism, Dawkins believes the idea of God is a meme, working in the human mind the same way as a placebo effect. The God meme has tangible benefits to human society such as answers to questions about human transcendence and superficial comfort for daily difficulties, but the idea of God itself is a product of the human imagination (Dawkins, 2006). Although a human creation, the God meme is incredibly appealing, and as a result, has continually been passed on through cultural transfusion.

The logic of evolutionary psychology suggests that it is possible for religion to be replaced by another mechanism that is more beneficial to human survival. Just as Dawkins hypothesized that religious memes colonized societies around the world, this process could also be applied to secular memes. Modern secular countries provide public institutions that create the same social functions as religion, without the disadvantages of “irrational” religious restrictions based on unverifiable beliefs. The secularization thesis predicts that as societies become modern, religious authority will be replaced with public institutions. As Canada, and other countries develop, perhaps evolution will continue to favour secularization, demoting religion from its central place in social life, and religious conflicts to history textbooks and motel night tables.

Karl Marx



Figure 15.14 “When bachelor dens cast over waking hours a loneliness so deep.” Marx would have drawn from popular images of opium dens in formulating his famous phrase: “Religion is the opium of the people.” (Image courtesy of the Library of Congress.) [Public Domain](#)

Where psychological theories of religion focus on the aspects of religion that can be described as products of individual subjective experience — the disposition towards self-transcendence, for example — sociological theories focus on the underlying social mechanisms religion sustains or serves. They tend to suspend questions about whether religious world views are true or not — e.g., does God exist? Is enlightenment achievable through meditation? etc. — and adopt some version of W.I. Thomas’s (1928) *Thomas Theorem*: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.”

From the point of view of the classical theorists in sociology, Thomas’s theorem was already implicit in the premise that the relationship to religion was a key variable needed to understand the transition from traditional society to modern society. Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and other early sociologists lived in a time when the validity of religion had been put into question. Traditional societies had been thoroughly religious societies, whereas modern society corresponded to the declining presence and influence of religious symbols and institutions. Nationalism and class replaced religion as a source of identity. Religion became increasingly a private, personal matter with the separation of church and state. In traditional societies the religious attitude towards the world had

been “real in its consequences” for the conduct of life, for institutional organization, for power relations, and all other aspects of life. However, modern societies seemed inevitably to be on the path towards secularization in which people would no longer define religion as real. The question these sociologists grappled with was whether societies could work without the presence of a common religion.

Karl Marx explained religion as a product of human creation: “man makes religion, religion does not make man” (Marx, 1844/1977). In his theory, there was no “supernatural” reality or God. Instead, religion was the product of a projection. Humans projected an image of themselves *onto* a supernatural reality, which they then turned around and submitted to in the form of a superhuman God. It is in this context that Marx argued that religion was “the opium of the people” (Marx, 1844/1977). Religious belief was a kind of narcotic fantasy or illusion that prevented people from perceiving their true conditions of existence, firstly as the creators of God, and secondly as beings whose lives were defined by historical, economic and class relations. The suffering and hardship of people, central to religious mythology, were products of people’s location within the class system, not of their relationship to God, nor of the state of their souls. Their suffering was real, but their explanation of it was false. Therefore “religious suffering is at the same time an expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering.”

However, Marx was not under the illusion that the mystifications of religion belief would simply disappear, vanquished by the superior knowledge of science and political-economic analysis. The problem of religion was in fact the central problem facing all critical analysis: the attachment to explanations that *compensate* for real social problems but do not allow them to be addressed. As he said, “the criticism of religion is the supposition [or beginning of] of all criticism” (Marx, 1844/1977). Until humans were able to recognize their power to change their circumstances in “the here and now” rather than “the beyond,” they would be prone to religious belief. They would continue to live under conditions of social inequality and grasp at the illusions of religion to cope. The critical sociological approach he proposed would be to thoroughly *disillusion* people about the rewards of the afterlife and bring them back to earth where real rewards could be obtained through collective action.

The demand to give up the illusions about their condition is a demand to give up a condition that requires illusion.... Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers from the chains not so that man may bear chains without any imagination or comfort, but so that he may throw away the chains and pluck living flowers. The criticism of religion disillusioned man so that he may think, act, and fashion his own reality as a disillusioned man come to his senses; so that he may revolve around himself as his real sun. Religion is only the illusory sun which revolves around man as long as he does not revolve around himself (Marx, 1844/1977).

Nevertheless, if Marx's analysis is correct, it is a testament both to the persistence of the social conditions of suffering and to the comforts of holding to illusions, that religion not only continues to exist 170 years after Marx's critique, but in many parts of the world appears to be undergoing a revival and expansion.

Émile Durkheim

Émile Durkheim (1859-1917) explained the existence of religion in terms of the functions it performs in society. Like Marx, therefore, he argued that it was necessary to examine religion as a product of society, rather than as a product of a transcendent or supernatural presence (Durkheim, 1915/1964). Unlike Marx, however, Durkheim argued that religion fulfills real needs in each society; namely, to reinforce certain mental states, sustain social solidarity, establish basic rules or norms, and concentrate collective energies. These can be seen as the universal social functions of religion that underlie the unique natures of different religious systems all around the world, past and present (Sachs, 2011). He was particularly concerned about the capacity of religion to continue to perform these functions as societies entered the modern era in the 19th and 20th centuries. Durkheim hoped to uncover religion's future in a new world that was breaking away from the traditional social norms that religion had sustained and supported (Durkheim, 1915/1964).

The key defining feature of religion for Durkheim was its ability to distinguish sacred things from profane things. In his last published work, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, he defined religion as: "a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them" (Durkheim, 1915/1964). **Sacred** objects are things said to have been touched by divine presence. They are set apart through ritual practices and viewed as forbidden to ordinary, everyday contact and use. **Profane** objects on the other hand are items integrated into ordinary everyday living. They have no religious significance. From Durkheim's social scientific point of view, it is the act of setting sacred and profane apart which contributes to their spiritual significance and reverence, rather than anything that actually inheres in them.

This basic dichotomy creates two distinct aspects of life, that of the ordinary and that of the sacred, that exist in mutual exclusion and in opposition to each other. This is the basis of numerous codes of behavior and spiritual practices. Durkheim argues that all religions, in any form and of any culture, share this trait. Therefore, a belief system, regardless of whether it encourages faith in a supernatural power, is identified as a religion if it outlines this divide and creates ritual actions and a code of conduct of how to interact with and around these sacred objects.

Durkheim examined the social functions of the division of the world into sacred and profane by studying a group of




Figure 15.15 "Divine love always has met and always will meet every human need." Mary Baker Eddy, founder of the Christian Science Church in 1879, describes divine love in terms similar to Durkheim's functionalist theory of religion (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Australian Aboriginals that practiced totemism. He described **totemism** as the most basic and ancient forms of religion, and therefore the core of religious practice itself (Durkheim, 1915/1964). A **totem**, such as an animal or plant, is a sacred “symbol, a material expression of something else” such as a spirit or a god. Totemic societies are divided into clans based on the different totemic creatures each clan revered. In line with his argument that religious practice needs to be understood in sociological terms rather than supernatural terms, he noted that totemism existed to serve some very specific social functions. For example, the sanctity of the objects venerated as totems infuse the clan with a sense of social solidarity because they bring people together and focus their attention on the shared practice of ritual worship. They function to divide the sacred from the profane thereby establishing a ritually reinforced structure of social rules and norms, they enforce the social cohesion of the clans through the shared belief in a transcendent power, and they protect members of the society from each other since they all become sacred as participants in the religion.

In essence, totemism, like any religion, is merely a product of the members of a society projecting themselves and the real forces of society onto ‘sacred’ objects and powers. In Durkheim’s terms, all religious belief and ritual function in the same way. They create a collective consciousness and a focus for collective effervescence in society. **Collective consciousness** is the shared set of values, thoughts, and ideas that come into existence when the combined knowledge of a society manifests itself through a shared religious framework (Mellor & Shilling, 1996). **Collective effervescence**, on the other hand, is the elevated feeling experienced by individuals when they come together to express beliefs and perform rituals together as a group: the experience of an intense and positive feeling of excitement (Mellor & Shilling, 2011). In a religious context, this feeling is interpreted as a connection with divine presence, as being filled with the spirit of supernatural forces, but Durkheim argues that it is the material force of society itself that emerges when people come together and focus on a single object. As individuals actively engage in communal activities, their belief system gains plausibility, and the cycle intensifies. In worshipping the sacred, people worship society itself, finding themselves together as a group, reinforcing their ties to one another and reasserting solidarity of shared beliefs and practices (Mellor & Shilling, 1998).

The fundamental principles that explain the most basic and ancient religions like totemism, also explain the persistence of religion in society as societies grow in scale and complexity. However, in modern societies where other institutions often provide the basis for social solidarity, social norms, collective representations, and collective effervescence, will religious belief and ritual persist?

In his structural-functional analysis of religion, Durkheim outlined three functions that religion still serves in society, which help to explain its ongoing existence in modern societies. First, religion ensures social cohesion through the creation of a shared consciousness form participation in rituals and belief systems. Second, it formally enforces social norms and expectations of behavior, which serve to ensure predictability and control of human action. Third, religion serves to answer the most universal, ‘meaning of life’ questions that humans have pondered since the dawn of consciousness. As long as needs remain unsatisfied by other institutions in modern social systems, religion will exist to fill that void.

Making Connections: Classical Sociology

Émile Durkheim on Religion



Figure 15.16 Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Durkheim's father was the eighth in a line of father-son rabbis. Although Émile was the second son, he was chosen to pursue his father's vocation and was given a good religious and secular education. He abandoned the idea of a religious or rabbinical career, however, and became very secular in his outlook. His sociological analysis of religion in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1915/1964) was an example of this. In this work he was not interested in the theological questions of God's existence or purpose, but in developing a very secular, sociological question: Whether God exists or not, how does religion *function socially* in a society?

He argued that beneath the irrationalism and the “barbarous and fantastic rites” of both the most primitive and the most modern religions is their ability to satisfy real social and human needs (Durkheim, 1915/1964). “There are no religions which are false,” he said. Religion performs the key function of providing social solidarity in a society. The rituals, the worship of icons, and the belief in supernatural beings “excite, maintain or recreate certain mental states” that bring people together, provide a ritual and symbolic focus, and unify them. This type of analysis became the basis of the functionalist perspective in sociology. He explained the existence and persistence of religion based on the necessary function it performed in unifying society.

Max Weber

If Marx's analysis represents the classical sociological formulation of the critical perspective on religion, and Durkheim's the functionalist formulation, Max Weber's analysis represents the classical formulation of the interpretive perspective on religion within sociology. His approach was to determine the *meaning* of religion in the conduct of life for members of society. Three key themes concerning religion emerge from his work: the concept of theodicy, the disenchantment of the world, and the Protestant Ethic.

One of Weber's explanations for the origin and persistence of religion in society concerns its role in providing a meaningful explanation for the unequal "distribution of fortunes among men" (Weber, 1915/1958). As described earlier in the chapter, this is religion's unique ability and authority to provide a **theodicy**: an explanation for why all-powerful Gods allow suffering, misfortune, and injustice to occur, even to "good people" who follow the moral and spiritual practices of their religion. Religious theodicies resolve the contradiction between "destiny and merit" (Weber, 1915/1958). They give *meaning* to why good or innocent people experience misfortune and suffering. Religions exist, therefore, because they successfully claim the authority to provide such explanations.

Weber describes three dominant forms of theodicy in world religions: **dualism**, predestination, and karma. In dualistic religions like Zoroastrianism, the power of a god is limited by the powers of evil — "the powers of light and truth, purity and goodness coexist and conflict with the powers of darkness and falsehood" (Weber, 1915 (1958)) — and therefore suffering is explained as a consequence of the struggle between the dual powers of good and evil, gods and demons, in which evil occasionally wins out. The doctrine of **predestination**, which became very important in Weber's theory of Calvinism and the Protestant Ethic (see below), explains suffering as the outcome of a destiny that a god has pre-assigned to individuals. God's reasoning is invisible to believers and therefore inscrutable. Therefore, believers must accept that there is a higher divine reason for their suffering and continue to strive to be good. Finally, the belief in **karma**, central to religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism, explains suffering as a product of acts one committed in their former lives. Individuals must struggle in this life to rectify the evils accumulated from their previous lives. Each form of theodicy provides "rationally satisfying answers" to persistent questions about why gods permit suffering and misfortune without undermining the obligation of believers to pursue the religion's values.

Weber's analysis of religion was concerned not only with why religion exists, but with the role it played in social change. In particular, he was interested in the development of the modern worldview which he equated with the widespread processes of *rationalization*: the general tendency of modern institutions and most areas of life to be transformed by the application of technical reason, precise calculation, and rational organization. Again, central to his interpretivist framework, *how* people interpreted and saw the world provided the basis for an explanation of the types of social organization they created. In this regard, one of his central questions was to determine why rationalization emerged in the West and not the East. Eastern societies in China, India, and Persia had been in many respects more advanced culturally, scientifically, and organizationally than Europe for most of world history. However, they did not take the next step towards developing thoroughly modern, rationalized forms of organization and knowledge. Their relationship to religion formed a key part of his answer.

One component of rationalization was the process Weber described as the **disenchantment of the world**, which refers to the elimination of a superstitious or magical relationship to nature and life. Weber noted that many societies



Figure 15.17 Here the Christian devil is depicted in a detail of *The Last Judgement* by Jacob de Backer (circa 1580s) as a composite of goat, ram, and pig. (Image courtesy of Jacob de Backer (circa 1540/1545–1591/1600)/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

prevented processes of rationalization from occurring because of religious interdictions and restrictions against certain types of development. He describes, for example, the way Chinese geomancy interfered with the construction of railroads in China because building structures “on certain mountains, forests, rivers, and cemetery hills” threatened to “disturb the rest of the spirits” (Weber, 1966). A contemporary example might be the beliefs concerning the sacredness of human life, which serve to restrict experimenting with human stem cells or genetic manipulation of the human genome. In modernity, the fundamental orientation to the world becomes increasingly disenchanted in the sense that “mysterious incalculable forces” of a spiritual or sacred nature no longer “come into play” in peoples understanding of it. Rather, “one can, in principle, master all things by calculation.” When the world becomes disenchanted, “one need no have recourse to magical means to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means and calculations perform the service” (Weber, 1919/1958). For Weber, disenchantment was one source for the rapid development and power of Western society, but also a source of irretrievable loss.

A second component of rationalization, particularly as it applies to the rise of capitalism as a highly rationalized economic system, was the formation of the **Protestant Ethic**. This will be discussed more fully below. The key point to note here is that Weber makes the argument that a specific ethic or way of life that developed among a few Protestant sects on the basis of religious doctrine or belief, (i.e., a way of interpreting the world and the role of humans within it), became a central material force of social change. The restrictions that religions imposed on economic activities and prevented them from being pursued in a purely rational, calculative manner, were challenged or subverted by the emergence and spread of new, equally religious, forms of belief and practice. However, the irony that Weber noted in the relationship between the Protestant sects and the rise of capitalism was that while the Protestant’s “duty to work hard in one’s calling” persisted, the particular beliefs in God that produced this “ethic” were replaced by secular belief systems. Capitalist rationality dispensed with religious belief but remained “haunted by the ghosts of dead religious beliefs” (Weber 1904/1958).

Making Connections: Classical Sociology

Max Weber on the Protestant Work Ethic



Figure 15.18 Max Weber (1864–1920). (Photo courtesy of Alfred Bischoff (1882–1946)/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Weber is known best for his 1904 book, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. He noted that in modern industrial societies, business leaders and owners of capital, the higher grades of skilled labour, and the most technically and commercially trained personnel were overwhelmingly Protestant. He also noted the uneven development of capitalism in Europe, and how capitalism developed first in those areas dominated by Protestant sects. He asked, “Why were the districts of highest economic development at the same time particularly favourable to a revolution in the Church?” (i.e., the Protestant Reformation, 1517–1648) (Weber 1904/1958). His answer focused on the development of the **Protestant Ethic**—the duty to “work hard in one’s calling”—in particular Protestant sects such as Calvinism, Pietism, and Baptism.

As opposed to the traditional teachings of the Catholic Church in which *poverty* was a virtue and labour simply a means for maintaining the individual and community, the Protestant sects began to see hard, continuous labour itself as a spiritual end. Hard labour was firstly an ascetic technique of worldly renunciation and a defense against temptations and distractions such as an unclean life, sexual temptations, and religious doubts. Secondly, the doctrine of predestination among the Protestant sects believed that God’s disposition toward the individual was predetermined and could never be known or influenced by traditional Christian practices like confession, penance, and buying indulgences. However, one’s chosen occupation was a “calling” given by God, and the only sign of God’s favour or recognition in this world was to receive good fortune in one’s calling. Thus, material success and the steady accumulation of wealth through personal effort and prudence was seen as a sign of an individual’s state of grace. Weber argued that

the *ethic*, or way of life, that developed around these beliefs was a key factor in creating the conditions for both the accumulation of capital, as the goal of economic activity, and for the creation of an industrious and disciplined labour force.

In this regard, Weber has often been seen as presenting an interpretivist explanation of the development of capital, as opposed to Marx's historical materialist explanation. It is an element of *cultural belief* that leads to social change rather than the concrete organization and class struggles of the economic structure. It might be more accurate, however, to see Weber's work building on Marx's analysis of capitalism and to see his Protestant Ethic thesis as part of a broader set of themes concerning the *process of rationalization*: the general tendency of modern institutions and most areas of life to be transformed by the application of instrumental reason—rational bureaucratic organization, calculation, and technical reason—and the overcoming of “magical” thinking (which we earlier referred to as the “disenchantment of the world”). As the impediments toward rationalization were removed, organizations and institutions were restructured on the principle of maximum efficiency and specialization, while older, traditional (i.e., inefficient) types of organization were gradually eliminated because they could not compete.

The irony of the Protestant Ethic as one stage in this process is that the rationalization of capitalist business practices and organization of labour eventually dispensed with the religious goals of the ethic. At the end of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber pessimistically describes the fate of modern humanity as an “iron cage.” The iron cage is Weber's metaphor for the condition of modern humanity in a technical, rationally defined, and “efficiently” organized society. Having forgotten the spiritual (and other) goals of life, humanity succumbs to the goals of pure efficiency: an order “now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production” (Weber 1904/1958). The modern subject in the iron cage is “only a single cog in an ever-moving mechanism which prescribes to him [or her] an essentially fixed route of march” (Weber 1922/1958).

Peter Berger



Figure 15.19 Peter Berger (1929–). (Image courtesy of the Pew Research Center.) [Pew Research Center Use Policy](#)

Peter Berger's *The Sacred Canopy* (1967) is a modern sociological attempt to create a comprehensive explanation of religion. Berger's approach to religion is based on the phenomenological perspective in sociology. **Phenomenology** seeks to describe the way in which all phenomena, including religion, arise as perceptions within the immediate sensorial experience and awareness of individual subjects. Phenomenologists study the ways in which the world, and us within it, first come to presence in experience and only later become separate objects, social structures, or selves. The founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl argued that only by “returning to things themselves” at this primary level of experience could the ground of scientific knowledge be established (Abram, 1997). For Berger, prior to the division of the

world into subjects and objects and prior to any specific “knowledge” we form about it, religion also comes to presence

as an awareness which only later takes on the specific qualities and meanings of the sacred. Religion is only secondarily a structure, institution, practice, or set of beliefs. Berger's question was, how does it come to do so for different individuals in a consistent manner? How do humans go from the flux of immediate perception to a religious worldview?

For Berger, religion is a particular type of culture (Berger 1967). Like culture, it is a human creation that develops in response to the fundamental human condition: humans lack in-borne biological programming to help them cope with the problems of physical survival. Berger explains that, unlike other animals, human survival depends on creating cultural knowledges, techniques, and technologies, and passing them down from generation to generation. For humans to survive, the world must be culturally prepared as a world in which things and people have stable meanings. Whereas animals might simply be able to smell that certain mushrooms are poisonous, children must learn the difference between what is poisonous and non-poisonous based on their culture's taxonomy of plants. Culture, Berger argues, exists therefore as an artifice that mediates between humans and nature and provides needed stability and predictability in human life. From the phenomenological point of view, culture enables both the ongoing creation of the world as a stable, objective social reality *outside* the subject and the simultaneous creation, or interiorization, of social roles and social expectations *within* the subject. Based on the cultural processes of objectification and interiorization, a stable, regular, predictable, taken for granted, reassuring world — or **nomos** (i.e., normative order) — is created.

Religion develops because the stability of culture is inherently fragile. Just as the immediate experience of the individual is subject to flux and change, so is the foundation of the ordered, meaningful world of culture. Cultural meanings tend to be fixed and rigid through time, whereas the underlying reality they describe is not. Events occur that are not explainable. They fall outside the categories and threaten to put the whole cultural framework or *nomos* into question. Berger states that “every *nomos* is an edifice erected in the face of the potent and alien forces of chaos” (Berger, 1967). Religion comes into existence as a solution to this problem. Religion can resolve the threat of instability and terror of *anomie* by postulating a supernatural agency or cosmological view of the world, which are unaffected by everyday inconstancy and uncertainty. In a religious cosmology the order described by culture is the natural order, that is, it is the way the gods have decided things must be. Things that occur that cannot be explained in human terms are explained as the products of divine will.

For Berger, religion therefore provides an “ultimate shield” for humanity — a **sacred canopy** — because it protects the meaningful world of the cultural order and fixes it in place by reference to a divinity that exists outside of the fragile human order. Religion is therefore a source of **ultimate legitimation** because it provides the social order with an unquestionable foundation of legitimacy: the way things are is the will of the gods. From a phenomenological point of view however, the price of this religious solution is a mode of forgetfulness and alienation. For the legitimation effect of religion to work and be plausible, humans must forget that they themselves have created religion. They must forget that religion is a *human* accomplishment.

In *The Sacred Canopy*, Berger argued that the processes of secularization will eventually erode the plausibility of religious belief. For religion to function as a sacred canopy and ultimate legitimation, it must supply the foundation for a shared belief system. In modern societies however, other types of knowledge and expert systems like science assume greater authority to describe the nature of the world and our role within it. Modern societies become more pluralistic as well, in the sense that a multiplicity of cultural and religious systems compete to provide meaning and orientation in peoples lives. Berger also noted the tendency for religion to become “privatized” in modern society. With the separation of church and state in the modern state system, religion has been increasingly seen as a matter of private, individual choice or a matter of private, family belief rather than the center of collective or public life. Therefore, because (a) pluralism undermines the ability of any single religion to offer an ultimate source of stability for society and because (b) the isolated, private beliefs of individuals cannot be the basis of a common shared cosmological order, religion will undergo a crisis in plausibility from which it is unlikely to recover. However, as we will see in Section 15.3, Berger (1999) felt obliged to revise his prediction about the demise of religion in the face of the contemporary religious revivals by Pentecostals, Muslims, and others.

Rodney Stark

In the 1980's American sociologist Rodney Stark developed another significant and influential theory of religion. He, along with his colleague William Bainbridge, set out to create a systematic and predictive theory of religion that could be empirically tested based on the principles of rational choice theory (Stark & Bainbridge, 1985, [1987] 1996). Despite the dominant expectation that modern societies were becoming ever more secular, Stark believed that religion was, and would continue to be, an important and influential factor for individuals and society. "[S]o long as humans intensely seek certain rewards of great magnitude that remain unavailable through direct actions, they will be able to obtain credible compensators only from sources predicated on the supernatural" (Stark & Bainbridge, 1985).

For the last two centuries sociologists have been predicting religion's ultimate demise in the face of modernity, but Stark argues that this has simply not happened (Stark & Bainbridge, 1996). He contends that "the vision of a religionless future is but illusion" (Stark & Bainbridge, 1985). Stark notes that church membership and new religious movements have actually increased in the United States as the country modernized. In Europe, where religious participation is relatively low, levels of individual belief nevertheless remain high, and participation has not undergone a long-term decline (Stark, 1999b). What explanation can be provided for the persistence of religion?

Stark begins with the stipulation that the importance of the supernatural must be recognized when studying religion. Belief in a higher force or power is the feature that distinguishes religions from non-religious beliefs and organizations. Any theory of religion must take this into account. Yet the question inevitably arises: *why* do people in a rational, material world continue to hold these 'irrational' beliefs in the supernatural?

Stark attempts to answer this question by proposing a number of basic, general rules about humans and their behavior. The most fundamental of these is from **rational choice theory**, namely that humans seek rewards and avoid costs (Stark & Bainbridge, 1985). Rational choice theory states that the most basic human motive is individual self-interest, and that all social activities are a product of rational decision making in which individuals continuously weigh the benefits of choices against their costs (Scott, 2014). A person who has a choice between two jobs, for example, would weigh the rewards of each one such as higher pay or better benefits against the possible costs of longer work hours or further commutes. Individuals will on balance choose the course of action that maximizes their rewards and minimizes their costs.

Of course, an individual's attempt to make rational choices is confined by their personal knowledge, understanding, and beliefs about the available options. In this sense, even seemingly irrational decisions or beliefs can be understood as rational choices from the point of view of the individual decision maker (Stark, 1999a). Religious belief in the supernatural may seem irrational from an outside perspective because it involves an orientation to invisible, supernatural powers that affect the everyday material world through unobservable mechanisms. However, for the religious believer whose worldview is shaped by this assumption, it is completely rational that they would choose to worship and make offerings to these supernatural powers in the hopes of gaining rewards and avoiding wrath or misfortune. Moreover, by participating in religious practice, people also surround themselves with other believers who make the rationality of supernatural choices even more plausible.

According to Stark, the rewards people desire most intensely are often scarce or not available at all, such as an end to suffering or eternal life. Consequently, when such rewards cannot be attained through direct means, humans will create and exchange **compensators**. These are promises or IOUs of a reward at an unspecified future date, along with



Figure 15.20 Walmart in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Rodney Stark argues that people use the same process of rational calculation in choosing their spiritual beliefs as they do in making everyday purchases. (Image courtesy of Mark Trammell/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

an explanation of how they can be acquired. The individual accepts the promise of a future reward like eternal life after death in compensation for not being able to have it here and now, but “pays” for it upfront so to speak through the “costs” of a lifetime of religious devotion, ritual observance, self-denial, and faith (Stark & Bainbridge, 1985).

Stark argues that rewards such as these are so monumental and scarce that they can only be provided through a supernatural source. “Systems of thought that reject the supernatural lack all means to credibly promise such rewards as eternal life in any fashion” (Stark & Bainbridge, 1985). This is why religious belief persists. In other words, a person must believe that a supernatural power exists which is capable of providing this reward to rationally believe that it is attainable. In this sense, religious belief and practice are rational choices humans make to get the most coveted rewards of human existence. Religious organizations function to provide compensators for these rewards by claiming to provide access to supernatural powers or deities.

For Stark, this is the root of why religion continues to exist in the modern world, and why it will continue to persist. For as long as people desire solutions to the most essential human questions, and these are not provided by other sources, there will be a rational cost/benefit analysis that favours the choice to exchange religious devotion and practice for future spiritual “pay offs.”

From there Stark develops his theory, aptly referred to as the “rational choice theory of religion,” to generate 344 deductive, testable propositions which offer explanations to nearly every aspect of religion. For example, he proposes that “as societies become older, larger and more cosmopolitan they will worship fewer gods of greater scope” (Stark & Bainbridge, 1996). By using a positivist approach, Stark creates a theory where every proposition, including this one, can in principle be tested. The proposition above could be verified by examining the number of gods and their powers in the religions of small, traditional societies and comparing that to the number of gods worshipped in more established, modern ones.

In reality, many of the propositions are difficult to test because the concepts he uses are hard to measure or compare between religions. How does one empirically quantify the scope of a certain god and compare it to that of an unrelated god from a different religion? His theory has also been critiqued for having an inherent bias towards monotheistic and particularly Protestant Christian measures of religion (Carroll, 1996). In other words, he places higher value on measures of religiosity that fit the Protestant model, such as belief and adherence to doctrine, over those that better describe other religions, such as the ritual aspects of Hinduism or Catholicism. His work may then implicitly suggest that Protestants are more religious than the others based on these skewed measures of religiousness. Despite these criticisms, Stark’s theory continues to hold merit for its systematic and broad approach to looking at all facets of religion to explain the reasons for the persistence of religious beliefs today.

Feminist Approaches to Religion



Figure 15.21 Fertility Goddess from Cypress (3000 BCE). Merlin Stone's *When God was a Woman* (1976) traces the pre-history of European society back to feminine-centred cultures based on fertility and creator goddesses. It was not until the invasions of the Kurgans from the northeast and Semites from the south in the fifth millennium BCE that hierarchical and patriarchal religions became dominant. (Image courtesy of Dave & Margie Hill/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

Feminist theories of religion analyze and critique the ways in which sacred texts and religious practices portray and subordinate — or empower — women, femininity, and female sexuality (Zwissler, 2012). Theorists within this area of study look at religion's contribution to the oppression or empowerment of women within society, as well as provide analyses of the challenges that women face within different religious practices. The crucial insight into religion that forms the basis for feminist research is the *gendered nature* of religion (Erikson, 1992). Women's place and experience within religious traditions differ significantly from men. Feminists therefore argue that questions about gender are essential for a meaningful analysis and explanation of religion.

In one line of inquiry, feminist theorists of religion have analyzed the representation of women within sacred religious texts, identifying and critiquing the way women are portrayed. For example, the gender of the deity is an issue for women, particularly in the monotheistic Abrahamic religions such as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism (Zwissler, 2012). God, within these religious beliefs, is usually understood as male. Mary Daly (1973), a feminist theologian, famously stated, “if God is male, then the male is God.” Individuals within these religious practices are socialized to see men and the qualities of masculinity as having greater importance than women and the qualities femininity, thus perpetuating the rationales and gender ideologies that legitimate women's subordination in society. The question this raises is whether religion is therefore the direct cause of **misogyny**—the aversion or distaste for people of the female sex, including belittling, sexual objectification, sexual violence, and discrimination against women—or whether male-dominated religious practices are the product of broader gendered inequalities and societal norms outside of religion (Zwissler, 2012)?



Figure 15.22 Where are the women? Feminist theorists focus on gender inequality and promote leadership roles for women in religion. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

A second line of inquiry focuses on why power relationships within religious institutions are typically gendered (Erikson, 1992). Feminist theorists note that women are often prevented from holding positions of power within religious practice. Ministers, imams, rabbis, buddhas, and Brahmin priests are positions within religious hierarchies which have traditionally excluded women. Despite this, cross-culturally women are proportionately more religious than men. Surveys across North America and Europe demonstrate that more women identify as being religious than men, have deeper levels of religiosity than men, and attend church more regularly than men by a ratio of 3:2 (Dawson & Thiessen, 2014). This can be seen as a paradox within feminist religious studies. In an ideal meritocracy, spiritual elites would be chosen from those with the most spiritual “experience,” but this is not the case.

Linda Woodhead's (2007) research seeks to examine the question of why more women than men identify as being religious when religions are typically patriarchal, both in their contents and their institutional hierarchies. Her key insight is that women's position in patriarchal religion is not monolithic. Women differ in how they “negotiate” their gender status and their religious practice. Placed along two axes (see Figure 15.23), Woodhead identifies four distinct religious “strategies” women adopt to position themselves within the dominant religious narrative (“mainstream” or “marginal”) and with respect to the religious status quo (“confirmatory” or “challenging”):

1. The *consolidating strategy* of women who accept the existing gendered distribution of power within their religion as a means of affirming and consolidating the security and predictability that traditional gender roles provide.

2. The *tactical strategy* of women who take part in and use religion in order to have the intimate interaction and support of other women.
3. The *questing strategy* of women who seek out different forms of religion like New Age spiritualities, meditation, or Wicca to find fulfilment through an inner spiritual quest (rather than addressing the social power structures of religion directly).
4. The *counter-cultural strategy* of women that reject traditional religion and create religious communities that focus on empowering women (e.g., the goddess feminist movement of Starhawk and others).

The challenges faced by women are different within each religion, and therefore the strategies women of faith use to change or work within their respective religion may vary. Woodhead's model emphasizes however that women are not simply manipulated by religious traditions but exercise agency, albeit with different orientations and goals (Woodhead, 2007).




Figure 15.23 Linda Woodhead's diagram mapping the different strategic positions of women with regard to patriarchal religion. (Woodhead, 2007)

Being an interdisciplinary perspective, feminism brings a diversity of voices into the discussion, illuminating critical issues of inequality, oppression, and power imbalance, all of which are of great importance to the study of sociology. Analysis of the gender structures within religious practices worldwide promotes a deeper understanding of how diverse cultures and traditions function. The understanding that women often do not identify as being oppressed by their religion is an important insight in trying to fully understand the nature of gendered religious practice on a global scale.

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15.3 Religion and Social Change

Religion has historically been a major impetus to social change. In early Europe, the translation of sacred texts into everyday, non-scholarly language empowered people to shape their religions. Disagreements between religious groups and instances of religious persecution have led to mass resettlement, war, and even genocide. To some degree, the modern sovereign state system and international law might be seen as products of the conflict between religious beliefs as these were founded in Europe by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which ended the Thirty Years War. As outlined below, Canada is no stranger to religion as an agent of social change. Nevertheless, debate continues in sociology concerning the nature of religion and social change particularly in three areas: secularization, religious diversity, and new religious movements.

Secularization




Figure 15.24 The philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche's (1844–1900) parable of the madman in the market is the source of one of the most famous slogans of secularization: “God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him... There has never been a greater deed; and whoever is born after us – for the sake of this deed he will belong to a higher history than all history hitherto” (Nietzsche, 1882/1974). (Image courtesy of Friedrich Hermann Hartmann (1822–1902)/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Loek Halman and Erik van Ingen (2015) argue that “[f]or centuries, religion was regarded as a more or less obvious pillar of people’s moral views,” but since the 19th century it steadily lost significance in society while the sources of people’s opinions and moral values became more diverse. **Secularization** refers to the decline of religiosity as a result of the modernization of society. More precisely, secularization “refers to the process by which religion and the sacred gradually have less validity, influence, and significance in society and the lives of individuals” through the impact of modern processes like rationalization, pluralism, and individualism (Dawson and Thiessen, 2014). For example, while in 1957 82% of Canadians were official members of church congregations, only 29% were in 1990 (Bibby, 1993). According to Statistics Canada’s 2011 census, 7,850,605 Canadians had no religious affiliation, making them the second largest group after Catholics at 12,810,705. This is a large increase from the 202,025 Canadians who claimed no religious affiliation in the 1971 Statistics Canada census (Statistics Canada, 2015).

Sociologists suggest it is important to distinguish between three types of secularization: societal secularization, organizational secularization, and individual secularization. Karel Dobbelaere (2002) defines **societal secularization** as “the shrinking relevance of the values, institutionalized in church religion, for the integration and legitimation of everyday life in modern society.” In Quebec until the early 1960s for example, the Catholic Church was the dominant institution in the province, providing health care, education, welfare, municipal boundaries (parishes), records of births and deaths as well as religious services, but with the modernization programme of the LaSalle government during the “Quiet Revolution” the state took over most of these tasks. **Organizational secularization** refers to the “modernization of religion” from within, namely the efforts made by religious organizations themselves to

update their beliefs and practices to reflect changes in contemporary life. The move to ordinate female ministers to reflect the growing gender equality in society or the use of commercial marketing techniques to attract congregations are examples. **Individual secularization** is the decline in involvement in churches and denominations or the decline in belief and practice of individual members.

As we saw earlier in the chapter, the equation of secularization with modernity has been the view of many important sociologists including Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. But in recent years there has been a growing number of sociologists who question the universality of the process of secularization and propose that contemporary society is going through a period of religious revitalization. Peter Berger (1999) for example reversed the secularization thesis he proposed in *The Sacred Canopy* (1967), when he noted that most of the world is as “furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever.” A religious resurgence is evident in the growth of Islam around the world, as well as the growth and export of Pentecostalism in and from the United States. Similarly, Fink and Stark (2005) have argued that Americans, at least, became more religious as American society modernized. Even in Europe, where church attendance is very low, they suggest that religious practice is stable rather than in long term decline and that people still hold religious beliefs like the belief in God or life after death.

However, Canada, like most of Europe, appears to be an exception to the trend of religious resurgence, meaning there has been less of an emergence of new and revived religious groups, as opposed to the U.S. and the rest of the world. Prior to the 1960s Canada was a more religious nation than the United States, now it is much less religious by any standard measure. Nevertheless, Reginald Bibby’s research (2011) on religiosity in Canada describes a situation that is more complicated than the secularization thesis suggests. Rather than a progressive and continuous process of secularization, Bibby argues that there have been three consecutive trends in Canada since the 1960s: secularization, revitalization, and polarization. After a period of steady secularization between the 1950s and 1990 (measured by levels of church attendance), Bibby presents evidence of revitalization in the 1990s including small increases in weekly or monthly attendance for different age groups. He also notes the four fold increase of non-Christians (Muslims, Buddhists, Jews) in Canada since the 1950s, the high level of spiritual belief among people who do not attend church, the way that many people retain connections with churches for special occasions, and surveys that report that many would consider attending regularly if organizational or personal factors could be addressed. Since the 1990s, Bibby describes a third trend of polarization, with the public increasingly divided into opposite poles of the highly religious and the non-religious. However, according to Dawson and Thiessen, this last trend identified by Bibby does not take into account the almost 50% of the population who are in the middle (i.e., neither highly religious nor completely non-religious), nor the fact that longitudinal measures of religious belief and religiosity show the trend to continued decreases among the highly religious and increases to the non-religious (Dawson and Thiessen, 2014).

Overall, it can be said that understanding secularization and desecularization is an essential part of the sociological analysis of religion. Knowing the relationship between modernity and religion provides insight into the complex dynamics of the late modern world and allows sociologists to predict what is to come for religion in the future. The question is whether secularization necessarily accompanies modernization or whether there is a cyclical process between secularization and religious revivalism. Are secular or non-secular societies the exceptions to the dominant trend of modern society? The revised thesis that Peter Berger offers is perhaps the most promising solution to the conflicting data: “Modernity does not necessarily produce secularity. It necessarily produces pluralism, by which I mean the coexistence in the same society of different worldviews and value systems” (Berger quoted in Thuswaldner, 2014). In other words, in modern societies there is neither a steady one-way process of secularization nor a religious revitalization, but a growing diversity of belief systems and practices.

Religious Diversity

The practice of religion in Canada is ever changing and has recently become increasingly diverse. **Religious diversity** can be defined as a condition in which a multiplicity of religions and faiths co-exist in a given society (Robinson, 2003). Because of religious diversity, many speculate that Canada is turning into a **Post-Christian society**, in the sense that Christianity has increasingly become just one among many religious beliefs, including the beliefs of a large number of people who claim no religion. For those who report having a Christian heritage, only a minority can articulate the basic

elements of Christian doctrine or read the bible on a regular basis. To an ever-greater extent, Christianity no longer provides the basic moral foundation for Canadian values and practices. Canada appears to be moving towards a much more religiously plural society. This is not without its problems, however.

Religious diversity in Canada has accelerated in the last twenty years due to globalization and immigration. Until 1951, Canada was overwhelmingly a Christian nation with about 96% of the population a member of either a Protestant denomination (50%) or Catholic (46%) (Statistics Canada, 2001). There were only a handful of members from the other main world religions. Other religions during this time such as Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, and Hindus only made up a negligible percentage of the population. With the opening up of immigration to non-Europeans in the 1960s, this began to change.

In the 21st century, religion in Canada has become increasingly diverse. Including the various Protestant denominations Statistics Canada surveyed 80 different religious groups in Canada in 2011 (Statistics Canada, 2011). Those who identified as Christian had gone down by nearly 22% since the 1970's from 88% to 66% or two-thirds of the population. The percentage of other religions like Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism, Judaism and Eastern Orthodox Christianity increased from 4% to 11% of the population (Pew Research Center, 2013).

Religious diversity does not only include the increased number of people who participate in non-Christian religions. Instead, the group that identifies themselves as **religious “nones”** has become increasingly significant in society. A religious none refers to a person who chooses the category “none” on surveys about religious affiliation. They consist of atheists, agnostics, and people who simply say they subscribe to no religion in particular (Statistics Canada, 2011). It was not until the 1980's that the group of religious nones became prevalent. During its first appearance, approximately four per cent of the population in Canada identified as religiously unaffiliated. By 2011, that number had increased nearly a quarter, rising to about 24% (Pew Research Center, 2013).

Canadians have had varying responses to religious diversity. On an individual level, while many accept religious beliefs other than their own, others do not. Individuals are either open to embracing these differences or intolerant of the varying viewpoints surrounding them. Wuthnow (2005) describes three types of individual response to religious diversity. Firstly, there are those who fully embrace the religious practices of others, to the point of creating hybrid beliefs and practices. Christians might practice yoga or Eastern meditation techniques, for example. Secondly, there are those who tolerate other religions or accept the value of other religious beliefs while keeping religious distinctions intact. Finally, there are those who reject the value of other religious beliefs or feel that other religions are a threat to the integrity of “Christian” society. This can manifest in the range of negative individual responses to Muslim women who wear a hijab or headscarf for example.

On a societal level, there are three main types of social response to religious diversity: exclusion, assimilation, and pluralism. **Exclusion** occurs when the majority population does not accept varying or non-traditional beliefs, and therefore believe that other religions should be denied entry into their society. The exclusionary response tends to happen when a society that identifies with a previously homogeneous faith community is confronted with the spread of religious diversity. Some of the early religious diversity in Canada was a product of faith groups like the Hutterites and Doukhobors immigrating to Canada after being excluded and persecuted in Russia, Europe, and the United States based on their beliefs. On the other hand, the Canadian policy towards Jews was exclusionary until relatively recently. Universities like McGill and the University of Toronto had quota systems that restricted the number of Jewish students until the 1960s. Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany in the 1930s were brutally turned away by Canadian officials. Today issues of *Islamophobia*, “fear, hatred or prejudice against Islam and Muslims,” have been prevalent since the threat of *jihadi* terrorism became a widespread concern in Canada (International Civil Liberties Alliance, 2013).

A step beyond exclusion is assimilation. **Assimilation** occurs when people of all faiths are welcomed into the majority culture, but on the condition that they leave their beliefs behind and adopt the majority's faith as their own. An example of assimilation in Canada is the history of Aboriginal spiritual practices like the sun dance, spirit dance and sweat lodge ceremonies. Between 1880 and mid-20th century these practices were outlawed and suppressed by both the Canadian state and Church organizations. They were seen as counter to the project of assimilating First Nations people into Christian European society and a settled, agricultural way of life (Waldram, Herring and Young, 2006). In 1885 and 1906, first a pass system and then an outright ban on leaving reserves were imposed on Plains Indian people to prevent them

from congregating for Sun Dances, where they sought to honour the Great Spirit and renew their communities. The man who was eventually the deputy superintendent of Indian Affairs in Ottawa, Duncan Campbell Scott, wrote that the sun dances “cause waste of time, interfere with the occupations of the Indians, unsettle them for serious work, injure their health [and] encourage them in sloth and idleness... they should not be allowed to dissipate their energies and abandon themselves to demoralizing amusements” (Scott quoted in Waldram et al., 2006).

The most accommodating response to religious diversity is pluralism. **Pluralism** is the idea that every religious practice is welcome in a society regardless of how divergent its beliefs or social norms are. This response leads to a society in which religious diversity is fully accepted (Berry, 1974). Today pluralism is the official response to religious diversity in Canada and has been institutionalized through the establishment of Multicultural policy and the constitutional protections of religious freedoms. However, some thorny issues remain when the values of different religious groups clash with each other or with the secular laws of the criminal code. The right to follow Sharia law for Muslims, the right to have several wives for Mormons, the right to carry ceremonial daggers to school for Sikhs, the right to refuse to marry homosexual couples for Christian Fundamentalists, are all issues that pit fundamental religious freedoms against a unified sovereign law that applies to all equally. The acceptance of religious diversity in the pluralistic model is not without its problems.

For example, one pluralistic strategy for managing the diversity of beliefs has been to regard religious practice as a purely private matter. To avoid privileging one religious belief system over another in the public sphere, (e.g., in government agencies or public schools), governments have tried to equally ban all religious expressions in public spaces. From the relatively trivial use of the term “holiday season” to replace “Christmas” in public schools to the more ambitious attempt to implement the Quebec Charter of Values, which would have banned the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols or face coverings for all public personnel in the Province of Quebec, the idea is to solve the problem of religious diversity by “privatizing” religious belief and practice. All religious faiths and practices are equal, included and accommodated as long as they remain private. However, people’s religious identities and commitments are often part of their public persona as well as their private and inform their political and social engagement in the public sphere. In the guise of implementing pluralism, the attempt to secularize the public sphere artificially restricts it (Connelly, 1999).

Religious freedom and diversity keep the religious life of Canadians interesting. The full acceptance of religious differences may take some time; however, studies show that Canadians are moving in this direction. The evidence is that as people become more exposed to religious diversity and interact with people of other religions more frequently, they become more accepting of beliefs and practices that diverge from their own (Dawson and Thiessen, 2014).

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

Muslim Women – The Niqab, Hijab, and Burka

Table 15.3 What style of dress is appropriate for women? The results of the Middle Eastern Values Study, University of Michigan Population Studies Center, 2013. (Image courtesy of [PEW Research Center](#)) [\[Skip Table\]](#)

Countries	Burka	Niqab	Chador	al-Amira	Hijab	None
Tunisia	1%	2%	3%	57%	23%	15%
Egypt	1%	9%	20%	52%	13%	4%
Turkey	0%	2%	2%	46%	17%	32%
Iraq	4%	8%	32%	44%	10%	3%
Lebanon	2%	1%	3%	32%	12%	49%
Pakistan	3%	32%	31%	24%	8%	2%
Saudi Arabia	11%	63%	8%	10%	5%	3%
Median	2%	8%	8%	44%	12%	4%

While veiling continues to be practiced by Muslim women and is more often associated with Islam than with other religious traditions, the practice of veiling has been integral to all three monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). Christian and Jewish women wear headscarves as a cultural practice or commitment to modesty or piety, particularly in religious sects and cultural traditions like the Amish or Hutterites for example.

The word hijab is the Arabic word for a “screen” or “cover.” Today, we know the hijab to be worn as a headscarf covering the whole head and neck, while leaving the face uncovered. The niqab is a veil for the face that leaves the area around the eyes clear and is worn accompanying the hijab. The burka is a one-piece loose fitting garment that covers the head, the face and entire body, leaving a mesh screen to see through.

There is a widely-held belief among Muslims and non-Muslims alike that Islam dictates veiling upon Muslim women. Furthermore, there is a parallel belief among both Muslims and non-Muslims that the prescription of veiling is stated clearly in the Koran, the Holy Book of Islam. As to the question of whether it is obligatory for women to wear hijab, the Koran states that women should cover their bosoms and wear long clothing but does not specifically say that they need to cover their faces or hair (Koran, 24:31). The best dress according to the Koran is the garment of righteousness, which is not a garment in a literal sense, but a commitment to live in a manner that pleases God: “O children of Adam, we have provided you with garments to cover your bodies, as well as for luxury. But the best garment is the garment of righteousness. These are some of God’s signs, that they may take heed” (Koran, 7:26). The hijab as we know it today, is not mentioned specifically in the Koran. The prophet Mohammed was once asked by a woman if it was okay for women to go to prayers without their veils. His reply to her was, “She should cover herself with the veil of her companion and should participate in the good deeds and in the religious gathering of the Muslims.”

Critics of the veiling tradition argue that women do not wear the veil by choice, but are forced to cover

their heads and bodies. The veil represents a larger, patriarchal gendered division of privileges and freedoms that severely restrict women's choices and movements while liberating men. The tradition of "purdah" in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan for example requires women to be either secluded within the home or veiled when in public to protect the family's honour (Moghadam, 1992). Purdah is part of the Pashtunwali or customary law in which women are regarded as the property of men. Similar arguments can be made for the wearing of the veil in Saudi Arabia and Iran, where Islamist governments impose a dress code and restrictions on women's movements by law. It is significant that following the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the seizing of power in Afghanistan by the Taliban in 1996, the new Islamist governments forced unveiled women to wear the hijab (in Iran) and the burqa (in Afghanistan) as one of the first policies enacted to signal the Islamization of cultural practices. Raheel Raza (2015), president of the Council for Muslims Facing Tomorrow, argues that as such "the niqab and burka have nothing to do with Islam. They're the political flags of the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, the Taliban, al-Qaida, and Saudi Arabia. "The salience of this criticism may be due to the significant influence the media has on the western world in particular.

Muslim women who choose to wear coverings are seen as oppressed and without a voice. However, Muslim women choose to wear the hijab or other coverings for a variety of reasons. Many daughters of Muslim immigrants in the West contend that they choose to wear the veil as a symbol of devotion, piety, religious identity, and self-expression. (Zayzafoon, 2005). Through their interpretation of the Koran, they believe that God has instructed them to do so as a means of fulfilling His commandment for modesty, while others wear it as a fashion statement. Furthermore, studies have shown that for some women, the hijab raises self-esteem and is used as form of autonomy. Some Muslim women do not perceive the hijab to be obligatory to their faith, while others wear the hijab as a means of visibly expressing their Muslim identity.

Particularly since 9/11, the hijab is perceived to be synonymous with Islam. Unfortunately, this association has also occasionally resulted in the violent assaults of Muslim women who are wearing the hijab. By making assumptions about the reasons women have for veiling, the freedom of these women to wear what they feel is appropriate and comfortable is taken away.

Most people view the hijab as cultural or religious, but for some, it carries political overtones. Muslim women who wear the hijab to communicate their political and social alliance with their birth country do so by challenging the prejudices of the Western world. (Zayzafoon, 2005). Wearing hijab is also used as a tool to protest Western feminist movements which present hijab-wearing women as oppressed or silenced. Although the principles of modesty are distinctly outlined in the Koran, some Muslim women perceive wearing the headscarf as a cultural interpretation of these scriptures and choose to shift their focus internally to build a deeper spiritual relationship with God. While wearing hijab granted women in the past to engage outside the home without bringing attention to them, the headscarf in modern Western society has an adverse effect by attracting more attention to them which ultimately contradicts the hijab's original purpose. Overall, most Muslim women agree that it is a woman's choice whether she wears the hijab.

New Religious Movements and Trends



Figure 15.25 New Age spirituality is an example of the new forms of spiritual orientation in Late Modernity. (Image courtesy of Temari 09/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

Despite the assumptions of secularization theory and some of the early classical sociologists that religion is a static phenomenon associated with fixed or traditional beliefs and lifestyles, it is clear that the relationship of believers to their religions does change through time. We discussed the emergence of the **New Religious Movements** or **cults** above for example. Especially in the 1960s and 1970s, cults represented particularly intense forms of religious experimentation that spoke to widespread feelings of dissatisfaction with materialism, militarism, and conventional religiosity. They were essentially new religious social forms. Below we will examine the rise of **fundamentalism** as another new religious social form that responds to issues of globalization and social diversity. Here we will broaden the concept of “new religious movements” beyond the cult phenomenon to discuss what exactly has been “in movement” in the relationship of believers to their religions in contemporary society.

Sociologists note that the decline in conventional religious observance in Canada, Europe and elsewhere has not necessarily entailed a loss of religious or spiritual practices and beliefs *per se* (Dawson and Thiessen, 2014). One aspect of this phenomenon has been the development of a new religious sensibility, which Grace Davie (1994) referred to as “**believing without belonging**.” People, especially young people, often say that they are ‘not religious, but they are spiritual.’ What does this mean for contemporary religious belief and practice? Firstly, surveys show that people retain fairly high levels of belief in God or supernatural forces, or belief in the efficacy of prayer or other ritual practices, even though they might never attend conventional churches or services. Secondly, the *orientation* to these beliefs and practices has also changed. People are seeking more holistic, flexible, ‘spiritual growth’ oriented types of religious experience (Beckford, 1992). **New Age spirituality** — the various forms and practices of spiritual inner-exploration that draw on non-Western traditions (e.g., Buddhism, Hinduism, Indigenous spirituality) or esoteric Western traditions (e.g., witchcraft, Gnosticism) — is emblematic of this new religious sensibility but it also increasingly characterizes people with otherwise conventional religious affiliations.

Dawson (1998) has characterized this new religious sensibility in terms of six key characteristics:

- *Individualistic*: unlike conventional religious beliefs and moral codes which focus on transcendent or external spiritual beings, in the new religious sensibility the locus of the sacred is found within. The goal of religious practice is therefore not to conform to externally imposed codes of behaviour but to express the inner authenticity of personal identity.
- *Experiential*: rather than focusing on formal religious beliefs, doctrines, and ritual practices, the emphasis is on attaining direct spiritual experiences through practices of spiritual transformation such as meditation or yoga.
- *Pragmatic*: the approach to religious authority is not one of submission but of pragmatic evaluation of the authority's ability to facilitate spiritual transformation
- *Relativistic*: rather than exclusive adherence to a particular doctrine or tradition, the attitude is one of tolerance and acceptance towards other religious perspectives, even to the point of syncretistically borrowing and blending the appealing elements of a variety of different traditions.
- *Holistic*: unlike the dualisms of conventional religious belief (God/human, spirit/body, good/evil, human/nature, etc.), the emphasis is on the holistic interconnectness of all things.
- *Organizationally open and flexible*: instead of the traditional commitments to a religious organization or faith, there is a tendency to model the interaction in the form of clients seeking and receiving services to maximize individual choice in how the spiritual practice is pursued.

What this appears to suggest is that a significant number of people in contemporary society retain an interest in or “need” for what religions provide, but seek it through individualistic, non-dogmatic, non-institutional frameworks of spiritual practice. This has led to increasingly individual, subjective, and private forms of religiosity, which conform to the dominant emphasis on the autonomy of the individual in late modern society (Hervieu-Léger, 2006). Religious practices are not only subject to a kind of “do-it-yourself” assembly of multiple religious “symbolic stocks” that are now accessible through globalized media and interaction, but if they do not bring tangible, immediate benefits to individuals they are quickly abandoned. At the same time, the basic questions of fate, suffering, illness, transformation and meaning have not been satisfactorily answered by science or other secular institutions, which creates a continued demand for religious or spiritual solutions.

Making Connections: Case Study

Is Rastafarianism a Religion?



Figure 15.26 “Until the philosophy which holds one race superior and another inferior is finally and permanently discredited and abandoned, everywhere is war, me say war” (Bob Marley “War,” citing Haile Selassie’s speech to the United Nations in 1963). (Image courtesy of monosnaps/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

Most Canadians, if asked what a Rastafarian (“Rasta”) is, will answer that it is a person who lives in the Caribbean, wears clothing in green, red, and gold, has dreadlocks in their hair, listens to reggae music and smokes a lot of cannabis. With the above stereotypes, it is easy to overlook the beliefs, rituals, and origins of Rastafarianism as a religion. Through the popularization of reggae music and artists like Bob Marley, the style of Rastafarianism has globalized though many do not know there is more to the movement than the outward appearance of its members. Today, most followers of Rastafarianism are in Jamaica, although smaller populations can be found in several countries including Canada, Great Britain, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Israel.

Rastafarianism developed during the 1920’s when the political founder of the movement, Marcus Garvey, urged Jamaicans to look to Africa for the return of a Black King and new spiritual leader. He said that a King would soon be crowned to liberate black people from the oppression caused by slavery. On November 2, 1930, soon after Garvey’s prophecy, ‘Ras Tafari Makonnen’ — the Emperor Haile Selassie I — was crowned as the emperor of Ethiopia (Stanton, Ramsamy, Seybolt, and Elliot; 2012).

This was an event with more than just political significance. Many black Jamaicans regarded the coronation of Ras Tafari Makonnen as the inauguration of a new era of spiritual redemption for dispossessed Africans after centuries of colonization, cruelty, oppression, and slavery. The followers of

Garvey, known as Rastas, believed the redemption of the black race would involve the fulfillment of biblical and secular prophecies concerning the imminent downfall of “Babylon,” which was equated with the corrupt, colonial, slavery-based world created by the “white man” (Hedbig, 1997). With the fall of Babylon, Rastas believed there would be a reversal in slavery-based social hierarchy. Black people would then take their place as spiritual and political leaders the way God (Jah) intended them too.

One of the central religious beliefs of Rastafarians is that the Christian Bible describes the history of the African race (Waters, 1985). To Rastas, Ethiopia is the biblical promised land, the “City of David” referred to as Zion (2 Samuel, 5:7). In the prophecy of Zion, Rastas strive to return to Zion to leave the oppressive, exploitative, materialistic western world (of Babylon) where they will attain a life of heaven on earth, a place of unity, peace, and freedom.

However, like many of the spiritual movements of late modernity, Rastafarianism does not emphasize doctrine, church attendance, or being a member of a congregation. It focuses on the individual’s direct experience of God (Jah) as a “positive vibration” enabling him or her to live in harmony with nature (Bone, 2014). There are several key sacraments or religious rituals that Rasta practice to achieve this direct experience. Groundation Day is celebrated on April 21st to remember the day that Haile Selassie 1 (sacred Ethiopian emperor) visited Jamaica. On this day Rastafarians chant, pray, feast, and create music as celebration. The music (or Nyabingi) Rasta’s create that day combines traditional chanting and drumming to reach a higher spiritual consciousness. This is similar to the music and meditation practices used to achieve higher states of consciousness and clarity during regular “reasoning sessions” in which Rastas gather for sessions of intense dialogue to discuss communal issues. Achieving higher consciousness through ritual means enables participants in reasoning sessions to re-evaluate their positions, overcome the confines of their false sense of self (or ego), and reach higher truths through consensus.

Smoking Cannabis (Ganja) also plays an important role in many Rastafarian rituals, although it is not mandatory. It is described as a “holy herb”. Rastafarians cite biblical passages like Psalms 104:14 (“He causeth the grass for the cattle, and the herb for the services of man”) as reference for its sacramental value. Cannabis use is considered sacred and is usually accompanied with biblical study and meditation. The purpose of this sacrament is to cleanse the body and mind, heal the soul, bring a heightened consciousness, promote peacefulness and calm, and bring Rasta’s closer to Jah (Murrell et al, 1998).

The custom of wearing dreadlocks — long, uncombed locks of hair — also has religious significance to Rastafarians (Stanton, Ramsamy, Seybolt, and Elliot, 2012). Dreadlocks (dreads) have political significance as a protest against Babylon because they symbolize the natural, non-industrial lifestyle of the Rastas (Fisher, 1994). Dreadlocks also have several spiritual meanings. They conform to the style worn by traditional Ethiopian warriors and priests and thus represent the power of their African ancestors. They resemble a lion’s mane, again symbolizing Africa but also the biblical lion of the tribe of Judah and the messianic end of days when the lion will lie down with lambs (Stanton, Ramsamy, Seybolt, and Elliot, 2012). Rastafarians also point to the holy vows of consecration of the Nazarites of the Hebrew bible: “During the entire time of his dedication, he is not to allow a razor to pass over his head until the days of his holy consecration to The LORD have been fulfilled. He is to let the locks on his head grow long” (Numbers 6:5, International Standard Version).

From a sociological point of view, Rastafarianism must be understood as a New Religious Movement (broadly defined) in the context of the social and racial conditions of Jamaica in the 20th century. It is significant that it blends spiritual motifs of dread and redemption from the Christian bible with the anti-colonial, anti-racist politics of Third World activists like Marcus Garvey. Contemporary Rastafarians

typically come from disadvantaged backgrounds and until the rise of reggae music as a worldwide phenomenon the term “Rasta” was used as a term of contempt or insult (Hedbig, 1997). The belief system therefore provides a religious inflection to the material circumstances black Jamaicans face due to the history of colonial oppression. It is a claim to status as much as a path to spiritual transformation. Rastafarianism mobilizes black people to “free their minds from mental slavery,” resist the restrictions of social hierarchies, and step into their role as leaders like Haile Selassie I, the way God (Jah) intended them to.

Media Attributions

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- **Figure 15.26** [Bob Marley](#) by Monosnaps, via Flickr, is used under a [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#) licence.

15.4 Contemporary Fundamentalist Movements



Figure 15.27 Here we see a young man sharing his religious affiliation through biblical signage at a widely attended sporting event. Adopting the methods of the 1960's protest movements, displays such as this are a common method in which fundamentalists make their core beliefs known to the public. Themes of being “doomed” or “damned” are projected towards those who are not aligned with the projected faith. (Photo courtesy of Saraware/Wikimedia.) [CC by 3.0](#)

During her walk to school, an eight-year-old girl, Naama Margolese, became the subject of the ignominious side of religious fundamentalism when she was spat on and called a “whore” by a group of Ultra-Orthodox Jewish Men in Beith Shemesh, Israel. This group of men wished to enforce their “strict interpretation of modesty rules” (Kershner, 2011) even though Margolese was wearing long sleeves and a skirt. Another extreme fundamentalist group, the Westboro Baptist Church, picket the funerals of fallen military personnel (Hurdle, 2007), of the victims of the Boston Marathon bombings (Linkins, 2013), and even of the brutal greyhound bus stabbing in Winnipeg, Canada (CBC News, 2008). They interpret these tragic events as demonstrations of God’s discontent and of society’s rejection of fundamentalist interpretations of gay marriage, divorce, and abortion. The public demonstrations of the Ultra-Orthodox men and the Westboro Baptist Church provide a platform for these groups to disseminate their beliefs, mobilize supporters and recruit new followers. However, the controversial protests also attack routine norms of civility — the right of eight-year-old girls to walk to school unmolested by adult men; the solemnity of funeral rites and the mourning processes of the bereaved — and lead to communal disruption and resentment, as well as the alienation of these groups from broader society.

One of the key emblems of the contemporary rise of religious fundamentalism is that conflicts, whether they are playground disagreements or extensive political confrontations, tend to become irreconcilable when fundamental beliefs are at the core of said disputes. These types of issue are one of the defining features of the contemporary era. Unlike discussions

relating to secular business or political interests, fundamentalist beliefs associated with religious ideology seem non-negotiable and therefore prone to violent conflict. In an increasingly globalized and diverse world, where people are obliged to live in proximity with “Others” who hold different truths, the militant insistence on ultimate religious truths seems problematic.

The rise of fundamentalism also poses problems for the sociology of religion. For many decades theorists such as Berger (1967), Wilson (1982; 1985) and Bruce (1999) argued that the modernization of societies, the privatization of religion, and the global spread of religious and cultural pluralism meant that societies would continue to secularize, and levels of religiosity would steadily decline. However, other theorists such as Hadden (1987; 1989), Stark (1994; 1999) and Casanova (1994; 1999) have recently begun to reconsider the secularization thesis. They argue that religious diversity and pluralism have sparked new interpretations of religion and new revivals of religiosity. Dawson (2006) observes that the inability of late modern societies to produce concrete answers to basic questions about the existential experiences of human life or provide meaningful responses to miraculous or tragic events “has implicitly kept the door open to religious worldviews” (pp. 113–14). In other words, these new sociological interpretations of religion propose that rather than withering away, fundamentalist groups will continue to thrive because they offer individuals answers to ultimate questions and give meaning to a complicated world.

Interestingly enough, in his later works, Berger (1999) abandoned his original theory of secularization. Even though contemporary society is increasingly modern — globally linked, diverse, technologically sophisticated, capitalist — it is as “furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more than ever” (1999). Berger gives the example of the “Islamic upsurge” as an “impressive revival of emphatically religious commitments” (1999) and presents the worldwide adoption

of evangelicalism as “breathtaking in scope” (1999). The growth of evangelical Protestantism is noted to have gained a substantial number of converts all around the world, but most prominently in Latin America, which Berger identifies as having “between forty and fifty million Evangelical Protestants south of the U.S. border” (1999, p. 8), many of which are assumed to be of first-generation.

The Pew Research Center has recently presented some interesting findings that can also provide a general sense of what the future for religious fundamentalism may hold. First, Pew (2015a) identifies that in the United States, one of the most modern societies in the world, “[s]ix-in-ten adults — and three-quarters of Christians — believe the Bible or other holy scripture is the word of God.” In addition to this “[r]oughly three-in-ten adults (31%) and four-in-ten Christians (39%) go a step further and say the Bible should be interpreted literally, word for word.” Second, Pew (2015b) identified Islam as the fastest growing religion in the world, and suggested that by 2050 “the number of Muslims will nearly equal the number of Christians around the world.” While it is not clear from this research how many Muslims hold fundamentalist beliefs per se (e.g., Wahhabi, Salafi, etc.), this is of interest because the more or less equal distribution of the two most popular world religions could result in an intensification of fundamentalist support. In other words, the anxieties around the encounter with the beliefs of the “Other” that leads people to seek out the “certainties” of fundamentalist belief systems, are likely to intensify once Christianity’s spot as the world’s most popular religion is threatened.

Defining and Explaining Fundamentalism




Figure 15.28 A 1924 Christian Fundamentalist cartoon illustrates the progressive abandonment of fundamental Christian beliefs associated with modernist thinking. Can the origins of fundamentalism be explained as a response to the social changes of the 19th and 20th centuries? (Photo courtesy of E.J. Pace/Luinjana/Wikimedia.) [Public Domain Mark 1.0.](#) [\[Image Description\]](#)

How does the sociology of religion explain the rise of fundamentalist belief in an increasingly modern, global society then? The answer that sociologists have proposed is that fundamentalism and religious revivalism are modern. Rather than seeing it as a return to traditionalism, Ruthven (2005) defines fundamentalism as a modern religious movement that could only emerge under modern conditions: “a shrinking ‘globalized’ world where people of differing and competing faiths are having to live in close proximity with each other.” The encounter between faiths initiated by a globalized world provokes the fundamentalist reaction because, in the face of a bewildering diversity of ways to live, fundamentalism provides individuals with an opportunity to consolidate their identity around a core of “ultimate” beliefs which relieve anxiety and provide comfort and reassurance. In this way, Ruthven (2005) defines the common core of **fundamentalism** in different faith traditions as “a religious way of being that manifests itself in a strategy by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or a group in the face of modernity and secularization.”

The use of the term “fundamentalism” has its origin in the early 20th century Christian Evangelical and Pentecostal movements in Southern California. Oil tycoons, Milton and Lyman Stewart, sponsored a series of widely distributed

pamphlets titled *The Fundamentals: A Testimony of Truth*, which presented a core set of beliefs said to be fundamental to Christianity:

- Biblical inerrancy: The inerrancy and infallibility of the Bible
- Creationism: God's direct creation of the world
- Divine intervention: The existence of miracles
- Divinity of Christ: The virgin birth of Jesus as the son of God
- Redemption: The redemption of the sins of humanity through Jesus' crucifixion and resurrection
- Dispensational premillenarianism (or premillennialism): The Second Coming of Jesus, the end times, and the rapture

These pamphlets were not a return to pre-modern traditionalism. They were an explicit response to *modern* forms of rationality, including the trend towards historical and scientific explanations of religious certainties. They also addressed the desire for clarity and simplification of religion in a complex "market" of diverse, competing religious doctrines and theologies. The Stewart's pamphlets can therefore be interpreted as both a response to, and the product of, modernity. A response, because of their defensively orientated motivation to challenge the modernist movement; and a product, because of their use of modern techniques of mass communication and commercial promotion to transmit a particular set of beliefs in a clear and concise manner to a mass audience.

To expand the concept of fundamentalism beyond this specific usage in the context of 20th century Christian Protestantism poses some analytical problems. In a strict definition its use would be limited to this specific, early 20th century religious movement in the United States: "those who were prepared to do battle for *The Fundamentals*" (Ruthven, 2005). However, its use in popular culture today has expanded far beyond this narrow reference. Fundamentalism not only refers to similar movements in other faiths like Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, but it is also common to hear the term applied to "market fundamentalism," "secular fundamentalism," or "musical fundamentalism," in non-religious contexts. It is even possible to describe New Age fundamentalisms, like *est* or the *Landmark Forum*, which promise to strip participants of their old and useless, counter-productive psychological defenses (or "rackets") and return them to their core moral purpose: to "take responsibility" for themselves.

In this expanded usage, fundamentalism loosely refers to the return to a core set of indisputable and literal principles derived from ancient holy, or at least unchallengeable, texts. However, even if we restrict the use of the term fundamentalism to a religious context, there are several problems of application. For example, the emphasis on the literalism of holy texts would not be able to distinguish between fundamentalist Islamic movements and mainstream Islam, because both regard the Koran to be the literal, and therefore indisputable word of God communicated to the prophet Mohamed by the Arch Angel Gabriel. On the other hand, the fundamentalist movements of Hinduism do not have a single, authoritative, holy text like the Bible or Koran to take as the literal word of God or Brahman.

In response to these problems, Ruthven (2005) proposes a **family resemblance definition** (see [Section 15.1](#) above) composed of a number of characteristics shared by most, but not all religious fundamentalisms:

- A return to the roots or core of scripture: a common style of reading holy texts.
- The use of religious texts as blueprints for practical action rather than simply spiritual or moral inspiration.
- A search for secure foundations of personal identity and cultural authenticity in a modern pluralistic world.
- A rejection of cultural pluralism and diversity in favour of religious monoculture.
- The projection of period of ignorance prior to the revelation of belief and the myth of a Golden Age when norms of religious tradition held sway.
- A *theocratic* ideal of a political order ruled by God.

- A belief in Messianism or end times when the divine will return to Earth.
- A reaffirmation of traditional, patriarchal principles including the subordination of women and strict, separate gender roles.

In this respect, the common sociological feature that unites various religious fundamentalisms, is their very *modern* reinvention of traditions in response to the complexity of social change brought about by globalization and the diversification of human populations. Globalization and late modernity introduce an anxiety-laden, plurality of life choices (including religious choices) where none existed before. As Ruthven (2005) puts it, “fundamentalism is one response to the crisis of faith brought on by awareness of differences.” It seeks to secure the certainty of individual or collective selfhoods by defining their roots in an all-encompassing, unquestioned, supernatural source of “ultimate referentiality” as Peter Berger described (see Section 15.2 above).

Fundamentalism and Women

If religious fundamentalist movements primarily serve and protect the interests and rights of men, why do women continue to support and practice these religions in larger numbers than men? This is a difficult question that has not been satisfactorily answered. In the feminist view, women’s subordinate role with respect to the leadership roles of men in religion is a manifestation of patriarchy. Women’s place in these movements subjects them to oppressive religious social norms and prevents them from achieving social mobility or personal success. On the other hand, the traditional gender roles promoted by fundamentalist movements are seen by some women to provide a welcome clarity about men’s and women’s roles and responsibilities in the family and elsewhere in a period of late modernity when gender roles appear increasingly diverse and uncertain (Woodhead, 2007). From another angle, Mahmood (2005) has argued on the basis of her ethnographic research into the Da’wa or “Mosque Movement” among Egyptian Muslim women, that from the women’s point of view, leading chaste, pious, disciplined lives of ritual practice apart from men and secular life is a form of spiritual exercise that actually *empowers* them and gives them strength. Strict observance of the rules of ritual observance is a choice women make to bring themselves closer to God.

Control over female sexuality is a primary focus of all fundamentalist movements. Through fundamentalist religious beliefs, men are “reclaiming the family as a site of male power and dominance” in the face of modern challenges to male privilege and confining gender roles (Butler, 1998). For example, in Islamic fundamentalism, it is seen as shameful and dishonourable for women to expose their bodies. Under the Pashtunwali (customary law), Afghan women are regarded as the property of men and the practice of Purdah (seclusion within the home and veiling when in public) is required to protect the honour of the male lineage (Moghadam, 1992). In both Islamic and Hindu fundamentalism, women’s equality rights are stripped from them through laws and regulation. For example, in 1986, the Indian parliament passed a bill that would disallow women to file for divorce. There have also been many significant instances of violence against women (physical and sexual) perpetrated by men to maintain their social dominance and control (Chhachhi, 1989). In Saudi Arabia, rape can only be proven in court if the perpetrator confesses or four witnesses provide testimony (Dumato, 2010). Christian fundamentalists in the United States have pressed for decades for the reversal of the Roe v. Wade decision that guaranteed women’s reproductive rights and were partially successful in achieving their goal with George Bush’s signing of the “partial-birth abortion” law in 2003 (Kaplan, 2005).

One purpose of fundamentalist movements therefore is to advantage men and reinforce ideals of patriarchal power in a modern context, in which women have successfully struggled to gain political, economic, and legal powers that were historically denied them. The movements’ efforts to shape gender relations through enacting new social and political limitations on women leads Riesebrodt (1993) to define fundamentalism as a “patriarchal protest movement.” What is necessary to keep in mind however, especially with respect to the controversies of fundamentalist Islamic or Hindu religions, is that it can also become an oppressive act for Westerners to attempt to speak on behalf of non-Western

women. The role of women in Muslim or Hindu traditions is so different from that in Western religions and culture that characterizing it as inferior or subservient in Western terms risks distorting the actual experience or the nature of the role within the actual fabric of life in these traditions (Moaddel, 1998). To properly study women in Fundamentalist movements, it is imperative to gather the perspectives and ideas of the women in the movements themselves to eradicate the Orientalist stigma and bias towards non-Western religions and cultures.

The Veil and the Iranian Revolution



Figure 15.29 Women protesting during Iranian Revolution in 1979. (Image courtesy of Khabar/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

After the 1979 Revolution in Iran, the law that made veiling mandatory for all women emerged as one of the most important symbols of the new, collective Iranian national and religious identity. It was a means of demonstrating resistance against Western values and served symbolically to mark a difference from the pre-revolutionary program of modernization that had been instituted by the deposed Shah. Many women demonstrated against this law and against other legal discrimination against women in the new post-revolutionary juridical system. However, this dissent did not last long. As Patricia Higgins (1985) stresses, these demonstrations were not supported by the majority of Iranian women. The number of supporters of the demonstrations also decreased when Ayatollah Khomeini — the religious leader of Islamic revolution — mentioned his support of compulsory veiling for women. So, it appears the majority of Iranian women accepted the new rules or at least did not oppose them.

To explain the main reasons why most Iranian women accepted compulsory veiling after the revolution, it is important to distinguish between women's "rights and duties" and their actual behaviour patterns (Higgins, 1985). In the prerevolutionary regime of the Shah, there had been a state-lead attempt to change the juridical system and the public sphere to promote the rights of Iranian women in a manner similar to their western peers. Nevertheless, the majority of Iranian women, especially in the rural areas and margins of the cities, still wore their traditional and religious clothing. Veiling was part of the traditional or customary dress of Iranian women. It was only when the veil was used as a *political*

symbol that it was transformed from a traditional element of women's fashion into a political sign of resistance against western values, emblematic of the ideology of the main Islamic parties.

However, an equally important fact, which is always less stressed in the dominant narrative about the Iranian revolution is that this transformation of veiling from traditional custom to political symbol first occurred in 1930s, when King Reza Pahlavi banned veiling for all women in the public sphere. To be clear, veiling was a custom or fashion in clothing for women, but not mandatory in law. Nevertheless, 40 years before the 1979 revolution, King Reza Pahlavi made *unveiling mandatory in law for all women in Iran*. What were the main reasons beneath this radical change which was imposed on Iranian society by the King Reza government?

Reza Pahlavi can be recognized as the founder of new modern state in Iran. Just as his peer in Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, he wished to rapidly transform Iranian society from a traditional, religious society into a modern, coherent nation state. To a certain extent he was successful, especially in building the main transportation and new economic and bureaucratic structure. In this vein, the veiling of women was recognized as one of the most important symbols of Iranian traditional culture which needed to be removed, even violently, if modernization was to succeed. But did the significance of veiling arise from its place in religious texts and the strict customs of traditional ways of life or did it arise only as the outcome of the *modern reading* of these religious and traditional rules?

It has been argued that fundamentalist movements represent a claim for recognition by beleaguered religious communities. They are a means by which traditional ways of life become aware of themselves as “different” and therefore threatened (Ruthven, 2005). However, in the case of the Hijab or veiling in contemporary Iran, the irony is that from the beginning it was not the religious scholars, traditional leaders or *Olama* who emphasized veiling as central to the distinction between traditional, religious Iranian culture and western culture. Rather, the equation of traditional Iranian religious society and veiling originated with secular intellectuals and politicians. As Chehabi (1993) states, “When upper-class Iranian men began traveling to Europe in larger numbers in the nineteenth century, they felt self-conscious about their looks and gradually adopted European clothing. Upon their return to Iran, many maintained their European habits, which had come to *symbolize progress*” (italics added). Reza Shah, the modern leader who identified these symbolic qualities of religious identity, could never be regarded as a religious fundamentalist. However, he was the first head of state to recognize and highlight veiling as an important symbol of the traditional religious way of life, albeit in a negative way. It was Reza Shah who initiated the project to rid Iranian society of fanaticism and ‘backward’ cultural traditions by banning veiling for women.

The second irony is that, apart from upper-middle-class urban women who embraced the active role of unveiled women in the public sphere, this process of cultural modernization and unveiling was not noticeably successful. Most Iranian women were subject to traditional and religious restrictions whose authority rested with the family and religious leaders, not state laws (Higgins, 1985: 490). However, during the Iranian revolution, the political process of *Islamization* was not monolithically conservative or fundamentalist. At the moment of revolution, the dominant Islamic discourse included accepting and internalizing some parts of modern and western identity while criticizing other parts. It was argued that veiled woman should participate in society *equally*, even if motherhood should be their priority. At this point in time, veiling was not seen so much as a return to traditional conservative gender roles, but as a means of neutralizing sexual differences in the public sphere. If they complied with wearing the veil, (as noted above, most Iranian women already did wear veils voluntarily), women could leave their confinement within the patriarchal family and participate in public social activities, even without permission of their father or husband. Veiling was ironically a means of women's liberation.

In this context, during and after the revolution, the leader Ayatollah Khomeini frequently asked women to participate in demonstrations against the Shah's monarchy even without the permission of their family. At this specific historical moment, the religious authorities treated women as free, independent individuals, whereas previously they had been under the strict authority of their families. Veiling, within the political narrative of the revolution, was seen as the feminine expression of the resurgence of pure Islam, a flag of the critique of western values by Iranian society. After the revolution consolidated into the Iranian Islamic state, this modern, leftist version of Islam was displaced by a more fundamentalist conservative narrative. Even so, at its inception the *meaning* of compulsory veiling, as a symbol of traditional religious values, was not the product of the traditional values of religious society itself but a product of the

way religious society was represented by *secular* scholars and politicians. Modern secularization was the process that established the symbolic significance of the veil for fundamentalism in Iran.

Making Connections: Social Policy and Debate

The Case of *Sati*




Figure 15.30 The Sati of Ramabai, Wife of Madhavrao Peshwa. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

One of the most internationally publicized and controversial instances of sati was that of Roop Kanwar on September 4, 1987. It occurred in the small town of Deorala in the state of Rajasthan. Roop Kanwar was a well-educated eighteen-year-old Rajput woman who had married twenty-four-year-old Mal Singh just eight months before. Her husband died unexpectedly of gastroenteritis, although some speculate it was a suicide by poisoning (Hawley, 1994a). The next day, Roop Kanwar stepped onto the funeral pyre with her deceased

husband, put his head in her hands as is the custom, and burned alive with his body. This illegal event was witnessed by a few hundred people but there were conflicting reports as to what had actually happened. Pro-sati supporters said that Roop Kanwar had voluntarily decided to become sati and underwent the process with purpose and calm. Those who opposed sati argued that she had not acted of her own free will and was instead drugged into submission by her in-laws who had economic motives for her death. Some reported that she had tried to jump off the pyre, but was pushed back onto it (Hawley, 1994b).

The practice of Sati offers another look at the complicated relationship between fundamentalism and women. Sati is a Hindu ritual in which a widow sacrifices herself by being burned alive on the funeral pyre of her deceased husband. It is a religious funeral rite practiced or endorsed primarily by Hindu groups rooted in the aristocratic Rajput caste in the Rajasthan state of India. Sati is therefore not central to Hinduism, but is practiced by a portion of the population, both men and women, who can be seen as Hindu fundamentalists.

While the Western and English understanding of the word sati is as the practice of widow burning, in the Hindi language it refers to the woman herself. A woman who is sati is a good, virtuous woman who is devoted to her husband (Hawley, 1994a). The Rajput belief is that a woman who freely chooses to become sati is protecting her husband in his journey after death. The power of her self-sacrifice cancels out any bad karma that he may have accrued during his lifetime. She also provides blessings to all those who witness the event (Hawley, 1994b).

The term “sati” comes from the Hindu myth of the goddess Sati who was the wife of the deity Shiva. After her father humiliates Shiva by excluding him from a sacrifice, Sati kills herself in front of him as an act of loyalty to her husband. Supporters see the modern version of sati as a manifestation of this same sacrificial power used by the goddess Sati (Hawley, 1994a). However, while sati is seen as a traditional practice, most of the early Hindu religious texts do not recognize sati at all, and it is only mentioned occasionally in later texts. In a manner consistent with other forms of fundamentalism, certain verses have been cited as scriptural justification of the practice by supporters, but their interpretation and translation have been contested by scholars and there is no definitive, unambiguous endorsement of sati (Yang, 1989).

Although this Hindu practice has never been widespread, it happened with enough frequency to catch the attention and revulsion of the British in the nineteenth century while India was under British rule. In 1829 British officials made the practice illegal and a punishable offence for anyone involved (Yang, 1989). The practice has continued to occur very infrequently since then, but the worship and glorification of sati is still a major aspect of the religious belief system of some Rajput Hindus (Harlan, 1994). The criminalization of sati has also become a rallying point for Hindu fundamentalists in their larger battle against the secular state. Its persecution is seen as an infringement by the state into the domain of religion causing the fight for sati to become a fight for religious freedom (Hawley, 1994a).

While previous instances of sati went relatively unnoticed outside the local area, the rise of women's rights activism by feminists and other liberals caused the story of Roop Kanwar to gain major attention. Twelve days after her death by immolation, a chunari celebration was held at the funeral site to honor and praise her sacrifice. Although the Rajasthan High Court legally prohibited this gathering and any other “glorification of sati” after pressure from women's rights groups, between 200,000 to 300,000 people from throughout the province attended (Hawley, 1994a). Further gatherings and sati endorsement by both religious and political organizations continued in the months that followed and eclipsed smaller protests held by opponents of sati.

The sati of Roop Kanwar triggered a number of larger social debates regarding the intertwining threads of

religion, gender, and the state. Some Indian feminists saw sati as a “ritualized instance of violence against women” and paralleled it with female infanticides and dowry deaths also practiced in India (Hawley, 1994b). For them, the religious significance given to sati is nothing more than a guise to aid the oppression of women. Meanwhile supporters said that sati is a deeply spiritual event where the power of a women’s self-sacrifice and devotion to her husband causes the woman to become “a manifestation of divinity” (Hawley, 1994b). Roop Kanwar’s case questioned whether sati is truly a voluntary undertaking, or if it is decided by family members for religious or economic motives. Sati also became a battleground in the struggle between the religious freedom of Hindus and the secular Indian State. Conservative Hindu organizations said that the state had “no business interfering in matters of religion” (Hawley, 1994b) and that by criminalizing sati their religion was being unfairly targeted.

The pro-sati movement that followed Roop Kanwar’s sati has several features which are characteristic of fundamentalism, and it is this event that first led to the wide usage of the term “Hindu fundamentalism” (Hawley, 1994b). First is the reactionary nature of this Hindu movement against the perceived threat to traditional religious beliefs and values. Demonstrations by sati supporters signified a resistance to the modernization, secularization, and liberalization of India, particularly regarding the place of women. The sati debate manifested into a war between traditional, patriarchal beliefs and liberal feminist ideas about women’s rights. The denouncement of sati was seen by fundamentalists as a “condemnation of chastity and virtue” and feminists were portrayed as modern, westernized women condoning loose morality (Narasimhan, 1992). Sati also reinforces another commonality among fundamentalist religions: the notion that a woman’s principle place and religious duty is to serve her husband and her family. When a woman becomes a sati, she is performing the ultimate act of devotion to her husband and is sacrificing herself for the betterment of her family and the wider community. In other words, a woman’s power is gained through her service to others, and more specifically to men. (Hawley, 1994b). While sati has become a very rare occurrence in modern times, the debate it has caused between conservative Hindu beliefs and liberal or secular thoughts on women’s rights is representative of the larger picture of religion in India, and arguably of the relationship between fundamentalism and women in all societies.

Science and Faith

For most of history every aspect of life in society revolved around some form of religious practice. In many cultures, prior to contact with the Western world, religion was so ingrained into every part of life that there was no specific word for it. Religion in ancient times can be thought of as having a similar role to that of contemporary laws (Müller, 1873). It was how life was regulated and made purposeful. The modern shift towards secularization and the scientific worldview is a recent phenomenon.

As we saw earlier in the chapter, Weber (1919/1958) characterized the transition to a secular, rationalized, scientific worldview as the **disenchantment of the world**. Explanations for events of everyday life were no longer based on the notion of mysterious or supernatural powers. Everything, in principle, could be reduced to calculation. However, the transition from a world based on religion to one that gives the ultimate authority to scientific discovery has not been without its issues. Contemporary creationists reject Darwinian evolutionary theory because they believe everything came into being as a result of divine creation, as described by religious texts such as the Bible. Similarly, many Christian fundamentalists continue to deny that climate change is a real threat to our planet, because recognizing climate change as a problem, and taking preventative action, would be to question God’s plan and ultimate authority.



Figure 15.31 Portrait of Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) by Ottavio Leoni. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

One historic example of such a conflict is that between the astronomer Copernicus and the Catholic Church (Russel, 1989). When Copernicus proposed a heliocentric model of the solar system based on his empirical astronomic observations, (i.e., in which the sun is the immobile center), he opposed the Earth-centric model of Ptolemy endorsed by the Church. This claim, originally made in 1543, did not immediately attract the attention of the Church. However, almost a century later, in 1610, when Galileo confirmed its validity based on evidence he had collected using a telescope, he was tried for heresy. Because his model was in direct contradiction with Holy Scripture, he was forced to denounce his support of heliocentric theory. He lived out the rest of his life under house arrest, although the ideas he championed were later proven to be scientifically correct.

What is the underlying source of the conflict between science and religion and what are the implications? Berman (1981) argues that the Scientific Revolution created a division between the worlds of fact and the worlds of value. This was the basis for a profound shift in worldview. Humans went from being part of a rich and meaningful natural order to being the alienated observers of a mechanistic and empty object-world. Questions concerning the value of things or why

things were, which had been addressed by religion, were replaced with questions about what things are and how things work. Modes of knowledge that had been relied on to produce a sense of purpose and meaning for people for centuries were incapable of producing the new knowledge needed to effectively manipulate nature to satisfy human material needs (for food, shelter, health, profit, etc.) (Holtzman, 2003).

This shift to an empirical, objective, evidence based knowledge was democratic or “communalistic”, in the sense that science is freely available, shared knowledge, open to public discussion and debate (recall the principles of CUDOS from [Chapter 2. Sociological Research](#)). It was a threat to the hierarchical power of religion whose authority was based on its claim to have unique access to sacred truths. However, at the same time, Weber (1919/1958) also argued that “science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question important for us: ‘What shall we do and how shall we live?’” In fact, Weber predicted that the outcome of the disenchantment of the world and the dominance of the scientific worldview would be a condition of “ethical anarchy.” Science could answer practical questions of how to do things effectively or efficiently, but could not answer the “ultimate” human questions of value, purpose, and goals. These questions would be answered by other sources, but without any authoritative means of distinguishing which was correct. In particular, it is unlikely that those who practice different religions will come to answer the ultimate questions in the same way. To the question, “which of the warring gods should we serve?” Weber argued there could be no definitive or unifying answer. The different sets of values of modern society cannot be reconciled into a singular, cohesive system to guide society.

Nevertheless, while science and religion may differ at the most fundamental level, disagreement between the two is not as common as many may think. A recent study found that there was no difference in the likelihood of religious or non-religious people to seek out scientific knowledge, even though many Protestants and conservative Catholics will side with religious explanations when there is a conflict. The debates over evolution and the history of the universe are a case in point (Evans, 2011). What this suggests firstly is that conflicts do not arise because religion completely rejects everything scientific (or vice versa), but that conflict arises only if competing claims are made, (as seen in the case of Galileo above). It was not that the Church completely rejected everything scientific, but that Galileo's claims were in direct contradiction of what was stated in the Holy Scripture. Secondly, conflicts arise when the morality of science is being questioned by religion. For example, embryonic stem cell research is rejected by some religious leaders for moral reasons. For the most part, science is broadly accepted, as many religions adapt to the challenges of modernity. It is only in a few cases that there are major disputes between religion and science.

Creationism and Darwinian Evolutionary Theory



Figure 15.32 The Scopes Trial or “Monkey Trial” in Dayton Tennessee, 1925, tested an obscure Tennessee state law that banned the teaching of evolutionary theory in schools. It became a major media event that dramatized the conflict between the beliefs of Fundamentalists and the science of modern biology. (Image from Literary Digest, July 25, 1925, courtesy of Mike Licht/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Creationism versus Darwin’s Evolutionary Theory remains one of the most hotly contested debates in the field of academia and religious studies. This debate pits American Protestant fundamentalists against the field of natural science (McCalla, 2007, p. 547). Specifically, this debate has caused extensive issues when it comes to education in the middle school and high school years, as creationists lobby for an education that does not acknowledge evolutionary theory (Bleifeld, 1983). After many decades of education taught from the perspective of the field of objective natural sciences, the recent rise of Protestant fundamentalism has lead to conflict over the lack of emphasis in schools on creationist theory. The debate however involves people from both sides arguing at cross-purposes over very different things. It is therefore necessary to clarify the beliefs and arguments stemming from both creationists and evolutionary theorists.

The debate between creationism and Darwin’s evolutionary theory can be explained simply. Charles Darwin proposed that the complex nature of life on earth could be explained by genetic mutations and small changes that over time, that, due to their effect on the capacities of species survive and compete for limited resources, resulted in a process of “natural selection.” On this basis, Darwin proposed that humans were also essentially biological animals who had formed through an evolutionary process over millennia from primitive primate ancestors to contemporary *Homo sapiens*. This is **Darwinian evolutionary theory**. Scientists and advocates of Darwin’s evolutionary theory posit, based on evidence of fossil morphology, carbon dating and genetics, that the world as we know it today and the inhabitants of earth have come to be as they are through a long history of evolution, forming from primitive beings, into more complex organisms through a mechanism of survival of the fittest (Wilson, 2002).

This presented a cosmology that certain Christian sects found to be fundamentally at odds with the notion of human divinity found in the bible. The idea that humans were “apes” seemed to directly contradict the idea that they were

created “in the image of God” (Genesis 1:27). As a result, **creationism** began to gain momentum in the 19th century as a struggle against new science-based evidence of evolutionary theories. It found its support in the turn to literal or inerrant readings of the bible. The Protestant fundamentalists argued that to be Christian, one must hold everything in the Bible as completely true in a factual sense. Evolutionary theory therefore caused problems for many Christians because in the Bible the narratives in Genesis highlighted that God created the universe in 6 days and that later the Great Flood destroyed all life except for the occupants of the Ark (McCalla, 2007, p.548). Evolution contradicted the creation story, “the notion that the world was created by God *ex nihilo*, from nothing” (Ayala, 2006, p. 71). The earth and everything in it was created by God as is, not through a process of evolution, and to dispute this goes against everything the Bible stands for (Ayala, 2006). This fundamental difference in cosmology has pitted creationists and evolutionists against one another.

The context of the turn to biblical inerrancy was not evolutionary theory however, but the challenge of the “higher criticism” of the Bible developed by German theologians and scholars in the early 19th century. Biblical criticism recognized that the Bible was not a suprahuman text that transcends history. Using contemporary techniques of textual analysis, they demonstrated that the bible was a historical document composed by multiple human beings at different times and various places (McCalla, 2007, p. 548). Liberal-minded Christians and Biblical theologians were able to except the higher criticism while continuing to hold the Bible as a source of moral and spiritual guidance. Therefore, both naturalists and educated Christians largely were able to accept the evidence for biological evolution in the years following the publication of Charles Darwin’s *Origin of Species* (1859). Liberal Christians were able to assimilate the findings of natural science into their religious practice because they had already accepted that Genesis was a mythic story with symbolic truth, not literal truth. Fundamentalist Protestants had a harder time agreeing to any of this (McCalla, 2007, p. 549).

The first fundamentalist leader to link biological evolution with the higher criticism was the Baptist William Bell Riley who denounced “theories of organic evolution as unsubstantiated speculations that assert hypothetical historical reconstructions of the Bible and of life in place of God’s plain word” (McCalla, 2007, p. 549). Ultimately this led into the field of creation science. The attempt to discredit the evolution model and to support the creation model defines creation science by asserting “that the evolution model is riddled with guesses, errors, and inconsistencies” (McCalla, 2007, p. 550). Creationists base this argument on four basic claims: “the radiometric and other dating techniques that give an immense age to the universe, the Earth, and life are mere guesses as nobody was around to confirm that the assumptions on which they are built held true in the prehistoric past; the basic laws of physics, and particularly the first and second laws of thermodynamics, flatly contradict the evolution model; the principles of mathematical probability demonstrate its extreme unlikelihood; and evolutionists frequently disagree among themselves, thereby proving that what they have to offer is not science but opinion” (McCalla, 2007, p. 551).

The creation-evolution controversy has led to many disagreements on what should and should not be allowed in required educational curriculum (Allgaier, 2010). Specifically, where this debate and controversy takes place heavily is in the more southern regions of the United States. In the 1980s states such as Arkansas and Louisiana passed legislation mandating that the biblical account of creation be taught in science classes in conjunction with the teaching of evolution (Bleifeld, 1983, p. 111). Christian fundamentalists continue to lobby to reintroduce creationism into the education system, and where they fail they often set up parallel private school systems or home-schooling networks. Opponents argue that a common educational basis is an essential component to democratic society because it lays the foundation for evidence-based decision making and rational debate. From a scientific point of view, Creationism has no scientific validity (Allgaier, 2010). That being said, the creationist versus evolutionary theory debate is an issue that must be handled delicately to respect peoples’ deeply held beliefs.

Image Descriptions

Figure 15.28 long description: A cartoon entitled, “The Descent of the Modernists.” Three men walk down a staircase. Each stair represents a rejection of a fundamental christian belief. From top to bottom, the stairs read, “Christianity,” “Bible not infallible,” “Man not made in God’s image,” “No miracles,” “No virgin birth,” “No deity,” “No atonement,” “No resurrection,” and “Agnosticism.” The last stair is labeled “Atheism.” [\[Return to Figure 15.28\]](#)

Media Attributions

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- **Figure 15.29** [Women protesting during Iranian Revolution in 1979](#) by Khabar, via Wikimedia Commons, is in the [public domain](#).
- **Figure 15.30** [The Sati of Ramabai, Wife of Madhavrao Peshwa](#) by Anonymous, via Wikimedia Commons, is in the [public domain](#).
- **Figure 15.31** [Galileo Galilei](#), 1624, by Ottavio Leoni (1578–1630), via Wikimedia Commons, is in the [public domain](#).
- **Figure 15.32** [Anti-Evolution League, at the Scopes Trial, Dayton Tennessee](#), by Mike Licht, from *Literary Digest*, July 25, 1925, via Wikimedia Commons, is used under a [CC BY 2.0](#) licence.

Chapter 15 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

animism: The religion that believes in the divinity of nonhuman beings, like animals, plants, and objects of the natural world.

assimilation: A response to religious diversity that welcomes people of different faiths into the majority culture on the condition that they leave their beliefs behind and adopt the majority's faith as their own.

atheism: A belief in no deities.

church: A large, bureaucratically organized religious organization that is closely integrated into the larger society.

collective consciousness: The combined mental contents of a society that manifests itself through a religious framework.

collective effervescence: A feeling experienced by individuals when they come together to express beliefs and perform rituals together as a group.

compensator: A promise of a reward at a later, unspecified date.

creationism: The religious belief that the Universe and life originated "from specific acts of divine creation." For young Earth creationists, this includes a biblical literalist interpretation of the Genesis creation narrative and the rejection of the scientific theory of evolution.

cult or New Religious Movement: A small religious organization that is at great odds with the norms and values of the larger society.

Darwinian evolutionary theory: A theory stating that all species of organisms arise and develop through the natural selection of small, inherited variations that increase individual organism's ability to compete, survive, and reproduce.

deity: A god or a goddess.

denomination: A religious organization that is closely integrated into the larger society but is not a formal part of the state.

disenchantment of the world: The process by which magical and superstitious understandings of the world are replaced by scientific calculation and technical control.

dualist theodicy: Suffering is explained as a consequence of the struggle between the dual powers of good and evil, gods and demons, in which evil occasionally wins out.

ecclesia: A church that has formal ties with the state.

exclusion: A response to religious diversity which denies new religions entry into society.

family resemblance definition: A type of definition that defines a phenomenon based on a series commonly shared attributes or family resemblances — not all family members equally share these attributes or resemblances.

functional definition: A type of definition that defines a phenomenon by what it does or how it functions in society.

individual secularization: The decline in religious belief and practice of individuals.

karma: The accumulated effects of acts committed in former lives and their influence on fortunes and suffering in this life.

Mecca: The birthplace of Muhammad; a city located in Hejaz, in what is now known as South Arabia; the holiest city of the Islamic religion, and is the center of Islamic faith.

monotheism: A religion based on belief in a single deity.

misogyny: A hatred of women.

new religious movement (NRM): See “cult.”

nomos: (In sociology) a stable, predictable, and normative order.

organizational secularization: The efforts made by religious organizations to update their beliefs and practices, to reflect changes in contemporary life.

phenomenology: A sociological perspective that argues that all phenomena appear spontaneously and immediately within the experience and awareness of individual subjects before they become the basis for subjective and objective reality.

pluralism: A response to religious diversity that welcomes every religious practice regardless of how divergent its beliefs or social norms.

polytheism: A religion based on belief in multiple deities.

post-Christian society: A previously Christian society in which Christianity becomes just one among many religious beliefs.

predestination: The belief that the gods predetermine the fate of individuals.

profane: Everyday objects, states of being or practices that do not hold any spiritual or religious significance.

Protestant ethic: The duty to “work hard in one’s calling.”

rational choice theory: A theory which states that human action is motivated by individual self-interest and that all social activities are a product of rational decision making that weighs costs against benefits.

religion: A system of beliefs, values, and practices concerning what a person holds to be sacred or spiritually significant.

religious beliefs: Specific ideas that members of a particular faith hold to be true.

religious diversity: A condition in which a multiplicity of religions and faiths co-exist in a given society.

religious experience: The conviction or sensation that one is connected to “the divine.”

religious nones: Persons who choose the category “none” on surveys about religious affiliation.

religious rituals: Behaviours or practices that are either required for or expected of the members of a particular group.

sacred: Objects, states of being, or practices that are set apart and considered forbidden because of their connection to divine presence.

sacred canopy: A divinely grounded cultural system.

sati: The Hindu ritual in which a widow sacrifices herself by burning alive on the funeral pyre of her deceased husband.

sect: A small religious body that forms after a group breaks away from a larger religious group like a church or denomination.

secularization: The process by which religion and the sacred gradually have less validity, influence, and significance in society and the lives of individuals.

societal secularization: The shrinking relevance of institutionalized religion for the integration and legitimation of everyday life in modern society.

substantial definition: A type of definition that delineates the substantial or crucial characteristics that define what a phenomenon is and is not.

theocracy: A system of government in which ecclesiastical authorities rule on behalf of a divine authority.

theodicy: An explanation for why the Gods allow suffering, misfortune, and injustice to occur.

totem: A plant, animal, or object that serves as a symbolic, material expression of the sacred.

totemism: The most basic, ancient form of religion based on reverence for totemic animals or plants.

ultimate legitimation: An unquestionable foundation that establishes the legitimacy of a social order.

Section Summary

[15.1 The Sociological Approach to Religion](#)

Religion describes the beliefs, values, and practices related to sacred or spiritual concerns. Religion is a social institution because it includes beliefs and practices that serve the needs of society. Religion is also an example of a cultural universal because it is found in all societies in one form or another. Sociological terms for different kinds of religious organizations are, in order of decreasing influence in society, ecclesia, denomination, sect, and cult. Religions can be categorized according to what or whom its followers worship. Some of the major types of religion include polytheism, monotheism, atheism, animism, and totemism.

[15.2 Sociological Explanations of Religion](#)

Whereas psychology defines and explains religion in terms of the nature of *individual* religious experience, sociology explains it in terms of the underlying *social* relationships it sustains or serves. Social theorist Émile Durkheim defined religion as a “unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things” (1964 [1915]). Max Weber believed religion could be a force for social change. Karl Marx viewed religion as a tool used by capitalist societies to perpetuate inequality.

[15.3 Religion and Social Change](#)

Many of the classical sociological theories predicted that levels of religiosity in Western societies would decline due to the process of secularization. However, while society has certainly become more secular, a large majority of people in Canada still claim religious affiliation. Religion has become more pluralistic in nature in Canada, both in the number of religions that Canadians practice and in the style of religious or spiritual practice they engage in.

[15.4 Contemporary Fundamentalist Movements](#)

The clash of secular and religious values in modern society produces issues that are difficult to resolve. The fundamentalist form that many different religions have adopted today makes these issues even more intransigent.

Questions

Quiz: Religion

15.1 The Sociological Approach to Religion

1. What are theodicies?
 - a. The study of religious truths.
 - b. The justifications provided as to why God allows bad things happen to good people.
 - c. The “rules” that a Catholic must follow in order to get into heaven.
 - d. Types of questions that are concerned with the nature of reality, being and existence.
2. Which of the four dimensions of religion explains how religion is experienced as a social phenomenon?
 - a. community
 - b. belief
 - c. unique spiritual experience
 - d. ritual
3. Which of the following options is NOT one of the 5 pillars of Islam?
 - a. Daily prayer five times a day.
 - b. Month long fast on the 9th month of the Islamic calendar.
 - c. Making offerings to the deities.
 - d. Pilgrimage to Mecca.
4. A sect:
 - a. Has generally grown so large that it needs new buildings and multiple leaders.
 - b. Often believes it must split from the larger group to return to important fundamentals.
 - c. Is another term for a cult.
 - d. All of the above.
5. The main difference between an ecclesia and a denomination is:
 - a. The number of followers or believers is much larger for denominations.
 - b. The geographical location varies for ecclesia versus denominations.
 - c. Ecclesia are state-sponsored and considered an official religion.
 - d. There are no important differences; the terms are interchangeable.
6. Some controversial groups that may be mislabelled as cults include:
 - a. Scientology and the Hare Krishna.
 - b. The Peoples Temple and Heaven’s Gate.
 - c. The Branch Davidians and the Manson Family.
 - d. Quakers and Pentecostals.

15.2 Sociological Explanations of Religion

7. What is the reason for the origins of religion according to evolutionary psychology?
 - a. Religion enhances human survival.
 - b. Religion is a meme.
 - c. The origins of religion are unique to each culture.
 - d. Religion is a product of tacit social agreements.
8. The Protestant work ethic was viewed in terms of its relationship to:
 - a. Evolution and natural selection.
 - b. Capitalism.
 - c. Determinism.
 - d. Prejudice and discrimination.
9. Which of the following *social* functions does religion NOT serve in society?
 - a. Determines the magnitude of your sinfulness and judges you accordingly.
 - b. Ensures social cohesion.
 - c. Enforces norms and expected behaviors.
 - d. Answers universal questions that other institutions cannot answer.
10. Which of the following statements is incorrect according to Rodney Stark's theory of religion?
 - a. Religions can be distinguished from non-religious organizations by their belief in a supernatural power or force.
 - b. Religion is on a slow but steady decline and will eventually become extinct.
 - c. A religious compensator is an IOU written by God.
 - d. Religious belief is a rational choice made by humans seeking scarce rewards.
11. Mary Daly's proposition that "if God is male, then the male is God," suggests that:
 - a. All sacred texts were written by males.
 - b. All Gods, irrespective of religion, are male.
 - c. All individuals are socialized within their respective religions to see gender in specific ways.
 - d. All men are liars.

15.3 Religion and Social Change

12. Secularization refers to a number of interrelated trends including:
 - a. The Protestant work ethic.
 - b. Television ministries.
 - c. Separation of church and state.
 - d. Liberation theology.
13. The percentage of people in Canada claiming a religious affiliation is:
 - a. 50%
 - b. 12%
 - c. 95%

- d. 80%

15.4 Contemporary Fundamentalist Movements

14. What are “The: Fundamentals: A Testimony of Truth”?
 - a. A religious film which highlighted the core values of Christian Fundamentalism in the early 20th century.
 - b. A famous legal case that took place in Tennessee in 1925 which made it illegal to teach evolution in the
 - c. American public education system.
 - d. A widely distributed pamphlet that listed the basic values of Protestantism in the 20th century.
 - e. The title of Pope Pius’s encyclical condemning the modernization of the Catholic church.
15. Scientific knowledge replaced religion because it was able to fulfill society’s _____ needs:
 - a. ultimate
 - b. social
 - c. material
 - d. spiritual
16. Which group of Christians believe and accept evolutionary theory, while still maintaining their faith and religious followings of the Bible?
 - a. Protestant Fundamentalists
 - b. Naturalists
 - c. Liberal Christians
 - d. Evangelicals
17. Which of the following statements is INCORRECT regarding the practice of sati?
 - a. Sati was outlawed in India by British officials in 1829.
 - b. The word sati refers both to the act of a widow burning on her husband’s funeral pyre and the widow (i.e., a “sati”) herself.
 - c. All Hindu sacred texts make mention of sati and condone the practice.
 - d. Roop Kanwar’s sati in 1987 was used to both mobilize and condemn a fundamentalist version of Hinduism.

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

15.1 The Sociological Approach to Religion

1. What aspects of religion are sociologists primarily interested in?
2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of substantial and functional definitions of religion? Do family resemblance definitions resolve these weaknesses?
3. What are some sacred items that you're familiar with? Are there some objects, such as cups, candles, or clothing, that would be considered profane in normal settings but are considered sacred in special circumstances or when used in specific ways?
4. What are the four dimensions of religion?
5. What are the four noble truths of Buddhism?
6. What is your understanding of monotheism, polytheism, and animism? What are examples of these belief systems in Canada? How do these different belief systems affect relationships to the environment, sexuality, and gender?

15.2 Sociological Explanations of Religion

7. From an evolutionary psychology point of view, how does religion aid in human survival?
8. How does the collective practice of ritual contribute to social solidarity?
9. According to Rodney Stark's theory, how is religious belief in the supernatural based on rational choices made by humans?
10. Why is a feminist perspective important to the study of religion?

15.3 Religion and Social Change

11. Do you believe Canada is becoming more secularized or more fundamentalist?
12. Comparing your generation to that of your parents or grandparents, what differences do you see in the relationship between religion and society?
13. Why do you think Canada differs from the United States in the role that religion plays in public and political life?

15.4 Contemporary Fundamentalist Movements

14. How can we explain the rise of religious fundamentalism in contemporary societies?
15. The example of Galileo is one well-known historical example of a clash between religion and science. Can you think of other, more recent, examples? What, for example, is the main debate or controversy between creationists and evolutionists?
16. What characteristics of fundamentalism can be seen in the pro-sati movement that followed Roop Kanwar's immolation?

Further Research

15.1 The Sociological Approach to Religion

For more discussion on the study of sociology and religion, check out [The Immanent Frame](https://tif.ssrc.org/) (<https://tif.ssrc.org/>), a forum for the exchange of ideas about religion, secularism, and society by leading thinkers in the social sciences and humanities.

PBS's *Frontline* explores [The life of Jesus and the rise of Christianity](#) in this in-depth documentary.

The Theology Pathfinder website can help clarify the [different Christian denominations](#).

Ayahuasca (“the vine of the soul”) is a ceremonial tea used traditionally in animistic healing practices in the Amazonian basin. It is an entheogen that induces visions. For more on how ayahuasca ceremonies have come to the attention of North Americans and Europeans as a promising healing modality, see the CBC *Nature of Things* episode [Jungle Prescription](#).

[15.2 Sociological Explanations of Religion](#)

Read more about [functionalist views on religion](#) and [women in the clergy](#).

Some would argue that the Protestant work ethic is still alive and well in North America. Read British historian Niall Ferguson’s, [Work Ethic & Work Ethic](#), on the PBS website, which is an excerpt from his book *Civilization: The West and the Rest*.

[15.3 Religion and Social Change](#)

What are megachurches and how are they changing the face of religion? Read Scott Thumma’s online article [Exploring the Megachurch Phenomena: Their Characteristics and Cultural Context](#) on the Hartford Institute for Religion Research website.

Secularization is an ambiguous trend, not least because the concept of secularization suggests that being secular or being religious is an either/or proposition. For an exploration of contemporary relationship between secularism and religion see the CBC *Ideas* series [“After Atheism: New Perspectives on God and Religion”](#).

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List of Contributors to Chapter 15: Religion

Introduction to Religion – Benjamin Wilson

15.1 The Sociological Approach to Religion

The Four Dimensions of Religion – Hannah Mitchell

Table 15.2 The Religions of the World – Mikaiya Austin

Residential Schools and the Church – Courtney Locker

Types of Religious Organization – Marvin Moses Omoding

Brother XII and the Aquarian Foundation – Robyn Erickson

15.2 Sociological Explanations of Religion

Evolutionary Psychology – Tahir Chatur

Émile Durkheim – Emma Keene

Rodney Stark – Allegra Wolansky

Feminist Approaches to Religion – Mikaiya Austin

15.3 Religion and Social Change

Secularization – Shirin Souzanchi

Religious Diversity – Samantha Ballew

Muslim Women: The Niqab, Hijab and Burka – Zubaida Khan

Is Rastafarianism a Religion? – Jeff Nishima Miller

15.4 Contemporary Fundamentalist Movements

Introduction – Benjamin Wilson

Fundamentalism and Women – Katrina Kelly

The Veil and the Iranian Revolution – Sara Nadiri

The Case of Sati – Allegra Wolansky

Science and Faith – Hannah Mitchell

Creationism and Darwinian Evolutionary Theory – Gary Brett Armbrust

Solutions to Section Quiz

1 B, | 2 A, | 3 C, | 4 B, | 5 C, | 6 D, | 7 A, | 8 B, | 9 A, | 10 B, | 11 C, | 12 C, | 13 D, | 14 D, | 15 C, | 16 C, | 17 C, [\[Return to Quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 16. MEDIA AND POPULAR CULTURE



Figure 16.1 The virtual idol Hatsune Miku, (which translates as “the first sound of the future”), performing “live” to a concert audience. Hatsune Miku is a Vocaloid software voicebank presented as a “holographic” anime projection. Fans are able to generate songs and fan-made animations using the software. Her immediate success in Japan on video streaming networks propelled her into the status of an international cyber celebrity, blurring the divide between reality and mediated reality. “What is real” seems increasingly uncertain in mediated societies. (Image courtesy of Keripo/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

Learning Objectives

16.1 Media and Society

- Define the “bias of communication” and its impact on society.
- Distinguish between mass media and digital media and their impact on society.

- Describe the evolution and current role of different media, like newspapers, television, and new media.

16.2 Sociological Frameworks for Understanding Media

- Contrast positivist, critical, and interpretive approaches to media.
- Examine violence in the media as an example of a media effect.
- Isolate five different social functions of the media.
- Examine ideology, stereotyping, and gatekeeping as exercises of power through the media.
- Describe the concentration of corporate ownership of media in Canada and its impact on traditional mass media and new digital media.
- Analyze the propaganda model of media bias.
- Describe the circuit of meaning construction in the media — from media encoding to audience to coding.
- Describe three general frameworks in which audiences interpret media representations.

16.3 Media and Postmodern Culture

- Explain the advantages and concerns of media globalization.
- Understand the globalization of technology.

Introduction to Media and Mediated Life




Figure 16.2 Marshall McLuhan's *Understanding Media* (1964). "The immediate prospect for literate, fragmented Western man [sic] encountering the electric implosion within his own culture is his steady and rapid transformation into a complex and depth-structured person emotionally aware of his total interdependence with the rest of human society" (McLuhan, 1964). (Image courtesy of Alan Levine/Flickr). [Public Domain](#).

A **medium** is a means or channel of communication. In large modern societies, the **mass media** — newspapers, radio, television, social media platforms, etc. — are central agencies for the circulation of information or "messages." This is interesting to sociologists for a variety of reasons, but top of the list has to be the way in which contemporary life has become thoroughly *mediated*. Instead of face-to-face communication and traditions of oral story telling, people's experience of the world is largely through the media.

One way of thinking about this is to consider the impact of different types of media on society. As Canadian media theorist Marshall McLuhan put it in 1964, "the medium is the message," meaning that the specific contents (or messages) presented by the media are less important than the *technological* form in which they are presented (McLuhan, 1964). McLuhan saw technologies as extensions of various human capacities, and media therefore as an extension of human perception.

McLuhan was especially interested in the social and cultural implications of the transition from print media to electronic media as the dominant source of information in the mid 20th century. Whereas print media were "extensions of the eye" — distancing the reader from what they read, arranging information in linear sequences on the page, lending themselves to categorizing, compartmentalizing and critical analysis — the electronic media like television and radio were "extensions of the human nervous system." Rather than separating people from the world, the electronic media created an immersive mediascape in which people directly "sensed into" or "felt" the world. Rather than distancing, they were *involving*. For McLuhan,

this described a new *mediated* relationship of the individual to an increasingly available, global society, one of "total social involvement instead of individual separateness or points of view" (McLuhan, 1964).

For McLuhan, media are literally human prosthetics (like artificial limbs) that extend people's abilities while altering the organization of their senses. Print media privilege seeing, the objectifying gaze of the eye; electronic media privilege feeling, the "instant, total field-awareness" of the extended nervous system. The type of media shapes the way people connect to the world and structures the nature of their emotional, affectual existence. The media create a sensual environment in which the world is experienced.

"All media work us over completely. They are so pervasive in their personal, political, economic, aesthetic, psychological, moral, ethical, and social consequences that they leave no part of us untouched, unaffected, unaltered" (McLuhan and Fiore, 1967).

Media Representations

It is not necessary to go as far as McLuhan to get a sense of how profoundly the media affect people's sense of the world and their place within it. Another way of thinking about mediated life is the degree to which people access the world through **representations**, the use of signs and symbols that stand in for directly lived experiences or referents (Hall,

1997). As the term suggests, much of the world that people interact with on a daily basis is not immediately present or directly experienced, but rather *re-presented* through images, texts, and narratives, etc. circulated through the media.

The media continually *re-present* people to themselves; define a society's collective memory, its present, and its future; name people's fears, joys, desires, and aspirations; stage what is visible and invisible, what is happening and what is forgotten. They transform the *immediacy* of life into *mediacy* by translating real-life events into media "texts" (images, books, films, newspaper articles, television shows, tweets, internet memes), which can be distributed anywhere.

The media are also a communications industry. As a byproduct of the entertainment, news, and information products they sell, they produce mediated forms of proximity and intimacy. They bring people together *virtually*. **Virtuality** is the quality of having the attributes of something without sharing its real or imagined physical form. But virtual proximity and intimacy are still real in their effects on people's lives and social reality. Hatsune Miku is a *real* virtual idol who motivates people to go out to "see her live" and participate with others in complicated choreographed dance moves.

What are the consequences for social life and social organization when communication moves from the direct face-to-face communications engaged in by humanity for millennia to communications that are mediated by various communications technologies like newspapers and TV, or texting or tweeting? What happens to human proximity and intimacy when communications are sold as commodities in the competitive marketplace, used as "data points" in the collection of personal information, or promoted like in advertising or political messaging?

Questions about media and mediated society can be examined from different sociological perspectives. *Positivist approaches* tend to discuss **media effects** — what effects or impacts do media have on audiences? For example, does violence in the media have a measurable effect on audiences? Can McLuhan's argument about the effects of the shift from print media to electronic media be empirically proven? Positivists who focus on the *social functions* of media in society would ask: what functions do different media perform in society — social solidarity, social coordination, entertainment, socialization, or social control? *Interpretive approaches* tend to focus on the construction of meaning in the media and the processes whereby audiences interpret or receive those meanings. For example, interpretive sociologists would examine the **codes** that operate in media representations, since these codes often are the means by which racial and gender stereotypes, ideologies, or commercial messages are transmitted in the guise of news, information, or entertainment. *Critical sociological approaches* examine the exercise of power through the media. For example, the sociological focus on media concentration and corporate ownership of the media is a question concerning *whose* ideas or codes are being transmitted and *whose* are not.

Media Attributions

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- **Figure 16.2** [McLuhan on a dime](#) by Alan Levine, via Flickr, is in the [public domain](#).

16.1 Media and Society

WILLIAM LITTLE AND RON MCGIVERN



Figure 16.3 Petroglyphs carved into sandstone at Writing-on-Stone/Áísinaí'pi in Alberta. Plains Indigenous people used the sandstone to recount important events or communicate with the spirit world. Consequently, it is a commonly held mistake to think that North American Indigenous people had no recorded history (Belshaw, 2015). Between petroglyphs, pictographs and oral traditions, writing and historic accounts were widespread and central to the continuity of Indigenous societies. (Figure courtesy of the Government of Alberta/ Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

The Bias of Communication

Forms of communication and media have a powerful role in the way societies are structured. Oral cultures that pass stories and history down by way of mouth produce different societal structures than cultures which communicate through symbols and languages imprinted in stone or clay. Both types of culture differ from societies that communicate through writing on paper. The dominant media used to communicate in a society is profoundly linked to its material foundations of life, time, and space.

In his 1951 book, *The Bias of Communication*, the Canadian historian Harold Innis (1894–1952) argued that forms of communication bias societies towards two types of configurations: time-binding societies or space-binding societies. The **bias of communication** in this sense refers to how a form of communication orients the institutional framework of a society toward either the control of time or the control of space (Innis, 1951).

Time-biased media were forms of communication that sought to transcend or “bind” time. They were imprinted into durable materials like clay or stone which had long lifespans and were difficult to transport, such as Sumerian cuneiforms, Egyptian hieroglyphics, or Indigenous rock paintings (pictographs) and rock carvings (petroglyphs). Or they took the form of speech and story telling in oral culture, passing down ancestral memories, values, and traditional

knowledges from generation to generation. In both cases, Innis argued, time-biased media *bound* the past in a continuous line to the present and future. In purely oral story telling cultures this encouraged dialogue and equality, but durable media (clay, stone, etc.) favoured hierarchical societies. The power of elite groups like the Egyptian or Babylonian priests, or the Catholic clergy of the Middle Ages, was based on their exclusive access to sacred knowledge. But both oral and durable media supported civilizations that were rooted in specific locales and based on historical continuity of local customs, rather than centralized civilizations that controlled large expanses of territory.

Space-biased media were forms of communication more suited to transmission over distances. They made it possible to transcend geographical boundaries to *bind* space. Historically they were printed on paper or papyrus, which were impermanent media but easily transportable, making them ideal for administrating large empires or conducting long distance trade. Innis (1950) argued for example that “the conquest of Egypt by Rome gave access to supplies of papyrus, which became the basis of a large administrative empire.” It gave the Romans and eventually modern colonial empires the ability to pass instructions along lengthy chains of communication. Writing, and later radio, television, and mass circulation newspapers, are ephemeral media that facilitate the transmission of practical administrative information (as opposed to sacred values and experiences) and the expansion of political and economic empires. They thereby supported less hierarchical, (in the sense that access to paper media was more widespread), but administratively centralized societies that extended over vast spaces.

Mass Media




Figure 16.4 The modern printing press is an example of the industrial production of messages mass consumption. (Photo courtesy of Newspaper Club/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

The development of modern **mass media** such as television, radio, newspapers, and books, has different implications for the structure of societies. The term *media* means that the communication is not direct, or face-to-face, but mediated through the intervention of an agency or sender that produces messages and distributes them through different technologies. The term *mass* means that the communication is received by many people. Mass media are forms of communication that pass from a centralized location to the masses. They are one of many forms of communication.

The mass media therefore have three characteristics. First, they tend to be one way and hierarchical, (i.e., messages go from the TV studio or newspaper publisher to the audience, but not back again). Second, their messages are undifferentiated; everyone in the audience receives the same message, program, or story regardless

of their location, social background, or specific interests. Finally, they are media that address a **mass**: a large and disperse group, lacking self-awareness and self-identity, whose members are largely unknown to one another, and who are incapable of acting together in a concerted way to achieve objectives. The masses addressed by mass media are characterized by anonymity and passivity.

This led 20th century critics, like Horkheimer and Adorno (2002/1947), to be concerned about mass media products — TV, Hollywood movies, pop music, pulp fiction, sensationalist newspapers, etc. — that were pitched to the lowest common denominator to have the widest commercial appeal. The commercial mass media produced standardized products like the TV sitcom or the three-chord pop song that could be consumed without thought or critical reflection. They distracted audiences from real problems and created a mass culture of conformity by integrating audiences into the commercial circuit of media production and consumption. As Lowenthal (1961) put it, **culture industry** products

are characterized by “standardization, stereotype, conservatism, mendacity [and] manipulated consumer goods.” As a result, they affirmed the power structures of society and depoliticized the audience while providing them with easy to consume pleasures, wish-fulfillments, and diversions.

But others, like C. W. Mills (1956) argued that the mass media play an important function in democracy and modern citizenship. The mass media not only address a *public*, but construct it in crucial respects. They extend the reach of information in large populations where people do not have direct access to sources and provide facts and opinions necessary for rational debate. A healthy functioning democracy is predicated on the electorate making informed choices and this in turn rests on the quality of information that they receive (Mwengenmeir, 2014). In this regard, modern professional news media have been described as society’s **fourth estate**, a watchdog that monitors the government of society by exposing excesses and corruption, and holding those in power accountable. This role in creating a public or citizenry extends to other media of popular culture like film, fashion, celebrity, and popular music where people gain access to trends, images, ideas, values, and identities.

The debate centers on whether society is like a mass or a public. Whereas communication to a *mass* tends to be one way and top down, like a broadcast that delivers a message to potentially millions of separate listeners, in a *public* there is the expectation that people will engage with and respond to information. They can and will “answer back” (Mills, 1956). This is the foundation of Habermas’ concept of the **public sphere**, the open “space” of public debate and deliberation in democratic societies where public opinion can be formed (See [Chapter 17. Government and Politics](#)). As Habermas puts it, “a portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body” (Habermas, 1974). The mass media provide a common framework for people in large societies to recognize and debate common issues. Is this a form of manipulation, or is this the basis of public engagement and citizenship?

Information Society



Figure 16.5 Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells (1942–), author of the 3-volume series, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*. (Image courtesy of Jorge Gonzales/ Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

Manuel Castells (2010/1996) describes an **information society** as one in which the sources of economic productivity and political power are based on new information technologies (e.g., micro-electronic computers, digital communications technologies, gene editing) and the generation, processing and transformation of information. Exchange of information has always been important but in an information society technological development and information itself become fundamental drivers of social processes, productivity, and profits.

Information society is the condition for the formation of global society as a unit operating in simultaneous real time (see [Chapter 10. Global Society](#)) and the realignment of social organization towards fluid and flexible network structures. Increasingly tasks are not accomplished through bureaucratic organization but through loose networks of actors: a “specific set of linkages [are] organized ad hoc for a specific project, and dissolve/reform after the task is completed” (Castells, 1997). It is supported by the development of **digital media** or computer mediated communication networks. “Digital” means that messages, images or pieces of information are translated into series of digits in a computer code, which can be transmitted instantaneously through global cable, wireless and satellite networks, and reconstituted as consumable, machine-readable media (social media, email, streams, gaming, 3D printing, word/image/sound processing, etc.). This also enables communications to be stored, processed, and manipulated by mathematical operations like algorithms, encryption, and artificial intelligence.

The communication system of information societies is not characterized by the hierarchical, one-way, undifferentiated messages of the mass media, but rather “targeted messages to specific segments of audience” (Castells, 1997). For example, advertising or suggested content can be catered to the specific history of an audience member’s browses, searches, “likes” and views. Whereas the mass media communicate from the one to the many, digital media can communicate one-to-one, one-to-many and many-to-many. They are *interactive* media, enabling dialogues through two-way or many-way messages.

A product of this is a medium of communication or a *mediascape* of **virtuality**. The framework for local and global interaction is digitally simulated reality. If virtuality is the quality of having the attributes of something without sharing its real or imagined physical form, it is nevertheless as real as physical reality in its consequences for the conduct of everyday social life. The emotions experienced and the hours spent playing a video game or responding to trolls on social media are as real as in other activities, even if the virtual stimulus is never actualized or tangible.

Castells sums up the effects of digital media on societies:

Media are extraordinarily diverse, and send targeted messages to specific segments of audiences and to specific moods of the audiences.... Instead of a global village we are moving towards mass production of customized cottages. While there is oligopolistic concentration of multimedia groups around the world, there is at the same time, market segmentation, and increasing interaction by and among the individuals that break up the uniformity of a mass audience. These processes induce the formation of what I call the culture of real virtuality. It is so, and not virtual reality, because when our symbolic environment is, by and large, structured in this inclusive, flexible, diversified hypertext, in which we navigate every day, the virtuality of this text is in fact our reality, the symbols from which we live and communicate (Castells, 1997).

At the same time, Castells notes that digital technology is not equally distributed around the world, nor within societies. This is the aspect of the **digital divide**, the uneven access to the new technologies along race, class, and geographic lines. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines the digital divide as “the gap between individuals, households, businesses and geographic areas at different socio-economic levels with regard to both their opportunities to access information and communication technology (ICTs) and to their use of the Internet for a wide variety of activities” (OECD, 2001). As with any technological development in human society, not everyone has equal access. Technology, in particular, often creates changes that lead to ever greater inequalities. In short, the gap gets wider faster leading to not only unequal access to the dominant forms of digital communication but also a **knowledge gap**, an ongoing and increasing gap in information for those who have less access to technology. This process of technological stratification has led to a complicated set of questions about how to ensure better access for all.

Making Connections: Big Picture

Bias of Communication: Timeless Time and the Spaces of Flows




Figure 16.6 Canada is divided into six time zones, part of the standardization and globalization of time that defined modern era. International standards of clock time enabled local activities to be coordinated globally, disembedding them from the flow of life in specific locals and reconstituting them “virtually,” outside of any particular time or location. Instantaneous “timeless time” amplifies this process. (Image courtesy of MapGrid/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

To return to the *bias of communication* theme, Innis (1951) showed how media of communication affect

the meaning of time and space and how these meanings manifest in social practice and the formation of societies. Castells (1997) argues that digital media create a different relationship to time and space than the other types of historical media: they are the source of “timeless time” and “spaces of flows.”

Although Castells notes that the effect of digital media does not spread evenly and leads to new types of social exclusion, the relationship to time in information societies has fundamentally altered as processes become instantaneous, while space is reorganized on a global basis through digitally mediated linkages between distant locales.

In the era of digital media, the biological time of human life and seasonal cycles, and the measured clock time of the industrial age and mass media scheduling, collapse into the instantaneous time of nanoseconds. Digital media create the experience of time as a perpetual present or “now.” The barriers of time — the length of time it takes to do something, for example — are continually eliminated as communication becomes instant and tasks can be done in a moment through computation and artificial intelligence. The 24-hour news cycle, microblogging feeds, and streaming television are examples of how people’s media consumption has shifted away from the “morning newspaper” and competition between TV shows in “prime time” to a situation where everything is available in the “now” all of the time.

In this regard, Castells (1997) argues that time becomes “timeless” to the degree that the ordinary sequencing of time — the division of past, present, and future, or the succession of things that define time — is eliminated. Like a film in which the scenes have been shot out of order and then reassembled into a sequence or story line in the editing studio, the time of everyday procedures and processes can also be reassembled through digital technologies. In the information society, all dominant processes are reorganized around **timeless time**: the accumulation of capital through instantaneous financial transactions, the blurring of the lifecycle through new reproductive techniques, the restructuring of work tasks and schedules through a global division of labour and production processes, and so on.

As with time, space is also altered through digital media. The concept of a **space of flows** captures the way in which dominant processes like market transactions, circulation of global media, the production of knowledge, technological processes, etc. operate through electronic networks and information systems that link distant locations, bypass boundaries, and establish a pattern of uninterrupted flows information exchange. The way the world was divided up into discrete, distinct geographical locations and independent institutional units is surpassed by digitally mediated linkages of circuits and continuous flows of information. This reconfigures the space of everyday life by removing the physical dimension of space. For example, people and things still share “real time,” in the sense of interacting at the same time. They just do not have to be physically together in the same location to do so because information can flow freely between them at a distance. Thus the “space of flows is the material organization of time-sharing social practices that work through flows” (Castells, 1997).

Both timeless time and the space of flows are unevenly distributed throughout the world, leading to some characteristic sources of conflict in the information society. This is an aspect of the **digital divide** in access to technology. Timeless time describes the dominant economic processes and the privileged social groups who benefit from them, while most people in the world are still subject to seasonal time, biological time, and clock time. Similarly, people still live in specific places, bounded by geographical, physical, and cultural borders. However, the logic of the space of flows dominates, structures, and shapes the space of these places. Shifts in global investment can suddenly make a local industry redundant or put the price of housing beyond the means of locals to afford. Electronic networks that allow people to be employed in a central

business district while working from home or in suburban satellite offices can mean that poor urban neighbourhoods or entire regions and countries are bypassed and further impoverished.

Types of Media and Technology

Technology and the media are interwoven, and neither can be separated from contemporary society. From the time the printing press was created (and even before), technology has influenced how and where information is shared. Today, it is impossible to discuss media and the ways that societies communicate without addressing the fast-moving pace of technology. Thirty years ago, if a person wanted to share news of their baby's birth or a job promotion, they phoned or wrote letters. They might tell a handful of people, but would not call up several hundred, including their old high school chemistry teacher, to let them know. Now, by posting their big news, the circle of communication is wider than ever.

Technology creates media. The comic book a parent bought their daughter at the drugstore is a form of media, as is the movie they streamed for family night, the app they used to order dinner online, the billboard they saw on the way to get that dinner, and the news feed they read while waiting to pick up your order. Without technology, modern media would not exist.

Media and technology have evolved hand in hand, from early print to modern publications, from radio to television to social media. New media emerge constantly, changing the media landscape people move through and the mediated ways in which they are connected with others.

Print Newspaper



Figure 16.7 Misinformation and distorted news coverage are not new problems in the press. “Yellow journalism” refers to news coverage that presents little evidence-based news but relies on sensationalized, eye-catching headlines for increased sales. The term originally described the use of sensationalized news in the circulation war between Joseph Pulitzer’s and William Randolph Hearst’s New York newspapers as both papers ran a popular comic strip, “The Yellow Kid.” Illustration shows William Randolph Hearst as a jester tossing newspapers with headlines such as “Appeals to Passion, Venom, Sensationalism, Attacks on Honest Officials, Strife, Distorted News, Personal Grievance, [and] Misrepresentation” to a crowd of eager readers. (Image by L.M. Glackens/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Early forms of print media, found in ancient Rome, were hand-copied onto boards and carried around to keep the citizenry informed. With the invention of the printing press, the way that people shared ideas changed, as information could be mass produced and stored. For the first time, there was a way to spread knowledge and information more efficiently. Many credit this development as leading to the Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation and ultimately the formation of a unique public sphere during the Age of Enlightenment. This is not to say that newspapers of old were more trustworthy than the *Weekly World News* and *National Enquirer* are today. Sensationalism abounded, as did censorship that forbade any subjects that would incite the populace.

The invention of the telegraph, in the mid-1800s, changed print media almost as much as the printing press. Suddenly information could be transmitted in minutes. As the 19th century became the 20th, American publishers such as Hearst redefined the world of print media and wielded an enormous amount of power to socially construct national and world events. Of course, even as the Canadian media empires of Max Aitken (Lord Beaverbrook) and Roy Thomson or the U.S.

empires of William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer were growing, print media also allowed for the dissemination of counter-cultural or revolutionary materials. Internationally, Vladimir Lenin’s *Irksa* (*The Spark*) newspaper was published in 1900 and played a role in Russia’s growing communist movement (World Association of Newspapers, 2004). Nevertheless, the flourishing working class press in Britain in the early 19th century was eliminated by the industrialization of the press and the rise of the new daily local newspaper, which required massive capital investments and profits to sustain new technology, machinery, and mass circulation (Herman and Chomsky, 2008).

With the invention and widespread use of television in the mid-20th century, newspaper circulation steadily dropped off, and in the 21st century with the advent of social media, circulation has dropped further as more people turn to internet news sites and other forms of digital media to stay informed. This shift away from newspapers as a source of information has profound effects on societies. When the news is given to a large diverse conglomerate of people, it must maintain some level of broad-based reporting and balance to appeal to them and keep them subscribing. As newspapers decline, news sources become more fractured, so that the audience can choose specifically what it wants to hear and what it wants to avoid. This creates the problem of silos and the spread of non-fact checked misinformation, which undermines the role of the public sphere in democratic decision making.

But the real challenge to print newspapers is that revenue sources are declining much faster than circulation is dropping. “Revenue from all sources, and inclusive of both “daily” and “community” papers, peaked between 2006 and 2008 at just a little over \$4.8 billion. It has plunged ever since, except for ... 2020 and 2021 ... when a bottom of sorts seems to have been reached at \$1.9 billion — forty per cent of what it was a decade-and-a-half earlier” (Winseck, 2022). Unable to compete with digital media, large and small newspapers are closing their doors across the country. Digital media has downloaded much of the costs of producing and distributing printed newspapers onto the consumer through personal technology purchases.

Television and Radio

Radio programming obviously preceded television, but both shaped people's lives in a similar way. In both cases, information (and entertainment) could be enjoyed at home, with a kind of immediacy and community that newspapers could not offer. Prime Minister Mackenzie King broadcast the first network radio message out to the entire country in 1927 using telegraph and telephone lines to hook up the 57 private radio stations that were in operation at that time. He later used radio to promote economic cooperation in response to the international crisis of capitalism in the 1930s (McGivern, 1990).

Radio was the first “live” mass medium. People heard about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as it was happening. Hockey Night in Canada was first broadcast live in 1932. Even though people were in their own homes, media allowed them to share these moments in real time. Unlike newspapers, radio has unique qualities that have allowed it to survive the disruptions of the digital media era. As O'Reilly asserts, radio survives “because it is such a ‘personal’ medium. Radio is a voice in your ear. It is a highly personal activity.” He also points out that “radio is local. It broadcasts news and programming that is mostly local in nature. And through all the technological changes happening around radio, and in radio, be it AM moving to FM moving to satellite radio and internet radio, basic terrestrial radio survives into another day” (O'Reilly, 2014).

The introduction of Canadian television in the 1940s and 1950s has always reflected a struggle with the influence of U.S. television dominance, the language divide, and strong federal government intervention into the industry for political purposes. There were thousands of televisions in Canada receiving U.S. broadcasting a decade before the first two Canadian stations began broadcasting in 1952 (Filion, 1996). Public television, in contrast, offered an educational nonprofit alternative to the sensationalization of news spurred by the network competition for viewers and advertising dollars. Those sources — the CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation), PBS (Public Broadcasting Service) in the United States, and the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) — which straddled the boundaries of public and private, garnered a worldwide reputation for quality programming and a global perspective. Al Jazeera, the publicly owned Arabic-language international news network of Qatar, has joined this group as a similar media force that broadcasts to people worldwide.

The impact of television on North American society is hard to overstate. By the late 1990s, 98% of homes had at least one television set. As of May 2022, TV reached around 85.3% of Canadians aged 2 and older every week (Stoll, 2022). All this television has a powerful socializing effect, with these forms of visual media providing reference groups while reinforcing social norms, values, and beliefs.

Film

The film industry took off in the 1930s, when colour and sound were first integrated into feature films. Unlike the private consumption of television from the home, film involves a directly communal experience: As people gathered in theatres to watch new releases, they would laugh, cry, and be scared together. Movies also act as time capsules or cultural touchstones for society. From tough-talking Clint Eastwood to the biopic of Facebook founder and Harvard dropout Mark Zuckerberg, movies illustrate society's dreams, fears, and experiences. The film industry in Canada has struggled to maintain its identity while at the same time embracing the North American industry by actively competing for U.S. film production in Canada. Today, a considerable number of the recognized trades occupations requiring apprenticeship and training are in the film industry. While many North Americans consider Hollywood the epicentre of moviemaking, India's Bollywood actually produces more films per year, speaking to the cultural aspirations and norms of Indian society.

Digital Media

Digital media encompass all forms of computer mediated interaction and information exchange. This usually takes place on online **platforms**, where one-to-one, one-to-many and many-to-many forms of mediated communication prevail. These include browsers, search engines, online shopping, social networking sites, blogs, podcasts, wikis, and virtual worlds. The list grows almost daily.

On one hand, digital media tend to break down the hierarchical structure of the mass media and level the playing field in terms of who is producing and receiving messages (i.e., creating, publishing, distributing, and accessing information) (Lievrouw and Livingstone, 2006). Digital media also offer alternative forums to groups unable to gain access to traditional political platforms, such as the groups associated with the Arab Spring protests or conspiracy theorists (van de Donk et al., 2004). On the other hand, new media are dominated by a handful of media platforms like Google, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok, which generate profits through selling targeted advertising space based on surveillance of users. There is also no guarantee of the accuracy of the information offered. In fact, the instantaneous communication of digital media coupled with lack of oversight and anonymity of sources means that people must be more careful than ever to ensure their news and information is coming from accurate sources.

Making Connections: Sociological Research

Just “Friend” Me: Students and Social Networking




Figure 16.8 Facebook does more than expand one's circle of friends from a few dozen to a few hundred. It is a form of mediated intimacy. (Photo courtesy of Gustavo da Cunha Pimenta/Flickr.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

The phenomenon known as Facebook was designed specifically for students. Whereas earlier generations wrote notes in each other's printed yearbooks at the end of the academic year, modern technology, smart phones and the internet ushered in dynamic new ways for people to interact socially. Instead of having to meet up on campus, students could post, text, and video chat from their dorm rooms or off campus rentals. Instead of a study group gathering weekly in the library, online collaborative software and chat rooms help learners connect virtually. The availability and immediacy of computer technology has forever changed the ways students engage with each other.

Now, after several social networks have vied for primacy, a few have established their place in the market, and some have attracted niche audiences. While Facebook launched the social networking trend geared

toward teens and young adults, today it is often seen as the older generation's social media. In Canada, over 80% of Facebook users were older than aged 25 in 2022 (Dixon, 2023), whereas 43% of TikTok users were between 18 and 30 (Ceci, 2022a). The dominant social networks in Canada are Facebook (79% of social media users), YouTube (68%), Instagram (54%), TikTok (32%), and Twitter (31%) (Kunst, 2023).

These new modes of social interaction have also spawned questionable consequences, such as cyberbullying and what some call FAD, or Facebook addiction disorder (Andreassen et al., 2012). In an international study of smartphone users aged 18 to 30, 60% say they are “compulsive” about checking their smartphones and 42% admit to feeling “anxious” when disconnected; 75% check their smartphones in bed; more than 33% check them in the bathroom and 46% email and check social media while eating (Cisco, 2012). Similarly, Canadians reported spending 4.22 hours per day engaging with mobile apps in 2021 and 45% said they could not live without their smart phone (Ceci, 2022b). The most popular online activities via mobile device for Canadians were social media (42% of users), email (40%) and instant messaging (29%).

An International Data Corporation (IDC, 2012) study of 7,446 smartphone users aged 18 to 44 in the United States in 2012 found that:

- Half of the U.S. population have smartphones and of those 70% use Facebook. Using Facebook is the third most common smartphone activity, behind email (78%) and web browsing (73%).
- 61% of smartphone users check Facebook every day.
- 62% of smartphone users check their device first thing on waking up in the morning, and 79% check within 15 minutes. Among 18- to 24-year-olds the figures are 74% and 89%, respectively.
- Smartphone users check Facebook approximately 14 times a day.
- 84% of the time using smartphones is spent on texting, emailing, and using social media like Facebook, whereas only 16% of the time is spent on phone calls. People spend an average of 132 minutes a day on their smart phones including 33 minutes on Facebook.
- People use Facebook throughout the day, even in places where they are not supposed to: 46% use Facebook while doing errands and shopping; 47% when they are eating out; 48% while working out; 46% in meetings or class; and 50% while at the movies.

The study noted that the dominant feeling the survey group reported was “a sense of feeling connected” (IDC, 2012). Yet, in the international study cited above, two-thirds of 18- to 30-year-old smartphone users said they spend more time with friends online than they do in person.

All these social networks demonstrate emerging ways that people interact, whether positive or negative. Sociologists ask whether there might be long-term effects of replacing face-to-face interaction with social media. In an interview on the *Conan O'Brien Show* that ironically circulated widely through social media, the comedian Louis CK described the use of smartphones as “toxic.” They do not allow for children who use them to build skills of empathy, because children do not interact face-to-face or see the effects their comments have on others. Moreover, he argues, they do not allow people to be alone with their feelings. “The thing is, you need to build an ability to just be yourself and not be doing something. That’s what the phones are taking away” (NewsComAu, 2013). This is still an open question. How do social media like Facebook and TikTok and communication technologies like smartphones change the way we communicate? How could this question be studied?

Media Attributions

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16.2 Sociological Frameworks for Understanding Media

WILLIAM LITTLE AND RON MCGIVERN

The theme of how different sociological paradigms or perspectives frame research into the specific topics of sociology has been developed throughout this textbook. Studying the effects of media and the nature of mediated society is no different. Positivist approaches tend to formulate the research in terms of cause-and-effect relationships between measurable variables. These causal relationships can also be modelled on the different social functions that media perform in supporting and perpetuating the processes of society. Critical sociological approaches focus on the influence of power structures on media, particularly the ideological messaging of media gatekeepers, the circulation of damaging stereotypes in the media, and the effects of turning communications into commodities. The interpretive approaches emphasize the ongoing processes in which meanings are actively constructed in the media and then actively deciphered by audiences.

Positivism and Functionalism

Media Effects

A glance through popular video game, television and movie titles geared toward children and teens shows the vast spectrum of violence that is displayed, condoned, and acted out. It may harken back to Popeye and Bluto beating up on each other, or Bugs Bunny getting the better of Elmer Fudd, but the graphics and actions have moved far beyond the Loony Tunes brand of slapstick violence.

When 20-year-old Adam Lanza shot more than two dozen students and staff members of Sandy Hook Elementary School as well as his own mother in 2012, an old debate about the influence that violent video games has on young people was reignited. The free online game, *Kindergarten Killers*, a game Lanza played, was blamed: playing violent games makes people violent. But others argue that it is people with violent tendencies that are drawn to violent games. The question remains: are violent video games the cause of violent behaviour or are they merely the manifestation of violent tendencies?

This is essentially the same debate people have about **media effects** in general. Historically, it has been regarded as intuitive that media has a tremendous effect on audiences, not only in the case of violent media, but



Figure 16.9 A fan's charcoal drawing of the hero of the video game *Metal Gear Solid 4: Guns of the Patriots*. Game action directly involves gamers in the video violence as it is presented from an over-the-shoulder camera viewpoint for aiming the weapons, or optional first-person shooter viewpoint. However, the fan artist (Kevin Wong) addresses the ambiguity of violent video games by saying, "Despite it being an action game and having the player engage in graphically violent actions, the game has a strongly underlying tone of pacifism. Topics discussed through the series include war's futility, the effects of war on civilians, nuclear proliferation, deterrence, and the absurdity of considering a person to be an "enemy"." (Image courtesy of Kevin Wong/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

also with respect to political propaganda, advertising, moral panics, pornography, racial stereotyping, and other influential media content. The positivist model of explanation is drawn from behaviourism — a linear sequence of sender/message/receiver in which the message is a stimulus and the reception is a measurable response in the audience: effects, uses, gratifications, behaviours, etc.

For example, George Gerbner proposed a cultivation model of violent media effects: the more people watch television and are exposed to its violent content, the more likely they will be to perceive their society or the world around them as being more violent than it really is (Gosselin et al., 1997). Violent television cultivates a perception of the world as violent. Research has shown that establishing causation is not as easy as it seems, however.

Children's play has often involved games of aggression — from cops [police] and robbers, to water-balloon fights at birthday parties, to acts of social aggression (social exclusion, public humiliation, and personal rejection). Where does this aggression come from and how do media influence it?

Gosselin et al. (1997) studied Canadian television in the 1990s and found that children's programs were more violent than adult programs. They contained four times more violent scenes per hour, and 76.9% of these programs contained violence compared to only 58.9% for adult programs. Moreover, the violence shown to children originated almost exclusively from cartoons. Of these, 79.5% contained violence, averaging 24.8 violent scenes per hour. In addition, 57.7% of the main cartoon characters were violent.

The media effects approach links violent media and violent behaviour. Reviewing three major American studies spanning 30 years, Alter (1997) reports that violence on television has been associated with three different types of effect: viewers exhibiting increased aggression or violence toward others (the aggressor effect); increased fearfulness about becoming a victim of violence (the victim effect); and increased insensitivity about violence among others (the bystander effect).

Similarly, psychologists Anderson and Bushman (2001) reviewed 40+ years of research on children's violent video game use and aggression. They found that children who had just played a violent video game demonstrated an immediate increase in hostile or aggressive thoughts, an increase in aggressive emotions, and physiological arousal that increased the chances of acting out aggressive behaviour (Anderson, 2003). They found that repeated exposure to this kind of violence leads to increased expectations regarding violence as a solution, increased violent behavioural scripts, and making violent behaviour more cognitively accessible (Anderson, 2003). In short, people who play these games find it easier to imagine and access violent solutions than nonviolent ones, and are less socialized to see violence as a negative.

However, subsequent re-evaluations of this literature have shown that the correlations are weak, non-existent, or sometimes contradictory. Gosselin et al.'s (1997) study of university students self-reporting on the effects of watching violent television showed television viewing did not have any influence on the emotion people feel about the surrounding world (i.e., fear), but did affect their cognitive beliefs about the level of violence in society. A recent meta-analysis of the literature on violent video games and aggression showed negligible relationships between violent games and aggressive behavior, small relationships with aggressive emotions and cognitive beliefs, and stronger relationships with desensitization to violence (Ferguson et al. 2020). Similarly, the American Psychological Association has acknowledged that violent video games strongly correlate with aggressive behavior, as well as anti-social behavior, but distinguishes between aggression and violence. They conclude that there is little evidence for a causal or correlational connection between playing violent video games and actually committing criminal violence, but that violent game use is a risk factor for violence (APA Task Force on Violent Media, 2015).

Establishing causation is extremely difficult in media research due to the multiple factors that are present. Most media research relies on content analysis and surveys where the subjects are asked to self-report. This has been criticized as unreliable, and at best can only establish a correlation. To demonstrate causation, all other factors must be controlled. Usually this can only take place under laboratory conditions and not in a real-life context where factors are complex and unpredictable.

Media Functions

Structural functionalism focuses on how media performs key social functions that contribute to smooth operation of society. A good place for students to begin to understand this perspective is to write a list of functions they perceive media to perform for them. The list might include the ability to find information on the internet, the entertainment provided by going to movies, or how advertising algorithms uncannily guess what products they are searching for. Students might also think about the **latent functions** media perform by communicating social norms of fitness, attractiveness, heroism, and knowledgeability. These latent functions often take the form of creating a common *collective consciousness* in which, like it or not, people come to share a common perception of attractive body types, racial stereotypes, desirable status symbols, moral vs. immoral behaviour, etc.

Social Solidarity Function



Figure 16.10 “There exists a social consciousness of which individual consciousnesses are, at least in part, only an emanation. How many ideas or sentiments are there which we obtain completely on our own? Very few. Each of us speaks a language which he has not himself created: we find it ready made” (Durkheim, 1978/1885). (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY SA 4.0](#)

Emile Durkheim argued that “essentially social life is made up of representations,” however “these collective representations are of quite another character from those of the individual” (Durkheim, 1952/1897). The collective representations that are shared and circulate through the media — media stories, images, narratives, musical expressions, celebrity characters, film clips, etc — are part of a **collective conscience**, “the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society” (Durkheim, 1937/1895). Like other *social facts* he describes (see [Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology](#)), the collective conscience “forms a determinate system which has its own life,” independent of the private thoughts and mental images of individuals (Durkheim, 1937/1895).

The contemporary media function to create this shared space of **collective representations** of the world — all “the ways in which the group conceives of itself in relation to objects which affect it” (Durkheim, 1937/1895). One element that made the collective conscience distinct from the isolated minds of individuals was its “unusual intensity.” “Sentiments created and developed in the group have a greater energy than purely individual sentiments” (Durkheim, 1985). This is evident to anyone who has attended a lively hockey game, a large wedding, or a spiritual ceremony. Whatever any individual feels about these events, the feelings are inevitably amplified by sharing them with others. Similarly, it is one thing to suspect shady goings-on and secret conspiracies and another to discover a corner of the internet where many people share these beliefs and have one’s beliefs affirmed.

This is the source of the function of the collective conscience in social life: to overcome the tendency towards individual isolation and dispersion in society and create **social solidarity**. Collective representations are a means of binding individuals together in coordinated action and perception through the power of shared ideas, beliefs, and feelings. “[F]ollowing the collectivity, the individual forgets himself [sic] for the common end and his conduct is directed by reference to a standard outside himself” (Durkheim, 1985). When an element of collective conscience determines an individual’s conduct, “we do not act in our personal interest; we pursue collective ends” (Durkheim, 1985). The media creates a collective conscience that functions to integrate individuals into societal goals.

Durkheim was writing in the late 19th and early 20th century when newspapers and other print forms were the

dominant media, so his tendency was to examine their function in creating social solidarity at a national or societal level. Today the role of new media forms in reaching and penetrating the consciousness of individuals seems even more powerful and widespread. The new media create a common, thoroughly mediated, experience of the world that is global in scope. Arjun Appadurai (1996) describes the formation of a global **mediascape**. Like a landscape, the mediated environment of the global citizen creates a common stock of media images, celebrities and news events that circulate around the world through digital and other media.

Mediascapes, whether produced by private or state interests, tend to be image-centered, narrative-based accounts of strips of reality, and what they offer to those who experience and transform them is a series of elements (such as characters, plots, and textual forms) out of which scripts can be formed of imagined lives, their own as well as those of others living in other places (Appadurai, 1996).

Mediascapes are also like landscapes in the sense that they look different depending on where someone is situated, but are nevertheless composed of the same fields, hills, and sky. In this analogy, mediascapes are the common, *imagined* worlds created by the global circulation of images in the media. However, the function of creating social solidarity through collective representations can be thoroughly ambiguous. It is through these shared imaginings of the other and of the shared global condition, that people in distant parts of the planet can band together to recognize the dignity of universal human rights or the existential threat of climate change, but they also circulate false or inflammatory information that leads to burning Korans in Denmark and fierce global counter-protests.

Social Coordination Function

As discussed earlier in the chapter, mediated forms of communication function to coordinate the activities of society, especially when they get too large or complex for face-to-face communication to be effective. Harold Innis (1951) separated the militaristic societies that sought to control vast areas of space from the religious societies that sought to control vast periods of time by how their dominant forms of communication functioned. Light and ephemeral paper media were suited to distributing administrative messages over space, while durable and permanent stone or clay media were suited to supporting the transmission of eternal values and connection to the ancestors through time. The mass media of the 19th and 20th centuries were key to creating the public spheres and common sources of information needed for the formation of democracy and national societies. In a huge, regionally distinct and disperse country like Canada, the mass media functioned as key institutions in creating a common sense of Canadian citizenship. In similar fashion, Castells (2010 [1996]) described the way that new digital technologies of media functioned to enable contemporary networked forms of global coordination to function.

Another example of the social coordination function of media is advertising. Companies that wish to connect with consumers find television and digital media irresistible platforms to promote their goods and services. Television and internet advertising are highly functional ways to meet a market demographic where it lives and thus coordinate circuit of commodity production, distribution, sale, and consumption more effectively and efficiently. In the era of television, sponsors used the sophisticated data gathered by network and cable television companies about their viewers to target their advertising accordingly. They used advertising to sell to audiences. Today the way they reach consumers is changing. It might be more accurate to say that the big social media platforms not only sell to audiences, but sell audiences themselves, i.e., their demographic information, likes, preferences, browsing history, searches, on-line shopping habits, etc. The trend towards niche marketing to small but valuable consumer groups becomes ever more customized as consumer preferences and decisions become more accurately modeled and predictable based on the vast amounts of data accumulated by social media platforms. Consumers know that they are thoroughly integrated into the cycle of commodity production when the advertising algorithms know what they want before they do themselves.



Figure 16.11 Advertisement is a form of communication that functions to coordinate the commodity circuit from the production of goods to the consumer purchase. Ads also make rhetorical appeals to persuade consumers that they need products, often promoting common anxieties about personal inadequacies, inferiority and social comparisons. The **latent function** of weight loss advertising therefore supports gendered norms about “proper” appearance, weight, and beauty standards. (Image courtesy of Jamie/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Entertainment Function

An obvious manifest function of media is its entertainment value. Most people, when asked why they watch television, go to the movies or stream YouTube clips, would answer that they enjoy it. Media function to give people pleasure, to allow them to relax, or to provide means of escape from the grind and obligations of everyday life. In their entertainment function, media provide forms of popular culture that do not require much effort to access, consume or digest. One YouTube clip leads to another and pretty soon a couple hours have gone by. In this form, their function is not practical — in the sense of building useful work skills or academic knowledge — nor is it self-cultivating and self-expressing, but it may provide stress relief.

The easily digestible format of most media entertainment allows people to release tension and replenish their energy to return to the challenging tasks of work, family life, relationships with others and so on. This can enable people to find balance in their lives, but as noted earlier in the chapter, critics of the **culture industry** point to the passive, uncritical attitude of “distraction and inattention” in which most media entertainment is consumed (Adorno, 1991/1941). This does not lead to a sustainable enjoyment of life, let alone critical examination of the reasons for stressful and unsatisfying work or family conditions. Instead, it leads people to simply adjust psychically and submit to the world as it is.

On the media technology side, as well, there is some ambiguity to the entertainment factor of the use of new innovations. From online gaming to chatting with friends on Facebook, technology offers new and more exciting ways for people to entertain themselves. Of course, the downside to this ongoing information flow is the near impossibility of disconnecting from technology, leading to an expectation of constant convenient access to information and people. Such a fast-paced dynamic is not always to people’s benefit. Some sociologists assert that this level of media exposure leads to **narcotizing dysfunction**, a term that describes when people are too overwhelmed with media input to really care about the issue, so their involvement becomes defined by awareness instead of by action about the issue at hand (Lazerfeld and Merton, 1948).

Socialization Function



Figure 16.12 Television functions as an agent of socialization. What norms, values, and beliefs does it pass along to the next generation? (Photo courtesy of Dennis Yang/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Even while the media is often seen as a means of escape, it also serves to socialize people, functioning to enable societies to pass along norms, values, and beliefs to the next generation. In fact, people are socialized and resocialized by media throughout their life course. All forms of media teach people what is good and desirable, how they should speak, how they should behave, and how they should react to events. The division of fictional or non-fictional characters into heroes and villains for example conveys powerful messages about what is morally admirable or despicable in a society. Media also provide people with cultural touchstones during events of national or global significance. They announce what is important or historical for societies. How many older relatives still recall watching the first landing of astronauts on the moon on the first colour televisions, or the 1972 Canada-USSR Summit Series? How many of them saw the events of September 11, 2001, unfold on television? How many readers of this textbook saw the Russian invasion of Ukraine on television or clips on the internet?

Where the family remains a key institution of socialization, family members often spend more time with media than with each other. In 2021, Canadians 18 years and older spent an average of five hours and 26 minutes with digital media each day and four hours and 48 minutes with traditional media (TV, magazines, newspapers, and radio) (Guttman, 2023). Children between 2 years and 11 years watched 10.5 hours of TV a week and teenagers watched 10 hours (Stoll, 2022). While teenagers only accounted for 2.5% of all social media users in Canada in


2021 (Dixon, 2022), a Statistics Canada survey from 2018 showed that 92% of teenagers were regular internet users (Schimmele et al., 2021).

It is clear from watching people emulate the styles of dress and talk that appear in media that media has a socializing influence. Sometimes this has a positive effect in expanding people's horizons. Other media influences, like social media "challenges" to eat packages of detergent or to drink enough Benadryl to become delirious, seem more dubious. Digital media in particular is especially engrossing and influential on identity formation. Twenge, Spitzberg and Campbell (2019) observe that adolescents in the "iGeneration" (those born in the 1990s) are spending less time on in-person social activities than previous generations of adolescents — a change that parallels the increases in time spent on digital media. This raises questions about whether these new media of communication are *functional* or *dysfunctional* as agents of socialization. According to the authors, feelings of loneliness are comparatively higher among adolescents in the iGeneration. The highest levels of loneliness are found among youth with low amounts of in-person social contact and high amounts of social media use.

The findings of Statistics Canada's 2018 Canadian Internet Use Survey also show that intense smart phone use was associated with anxiety/depression, feelings of envy, and frustration/anger (see Figure 16.13 below). This casts doubt about the extent to which online social relationships are a source of companionship, emotional sustenance, and social support that contribute to mental health and wellbeing, particularly in the absence of face-to-face interactions

(Helliwell and Huang 2013). In other words, it raises questions about ability of smart phones and digital media to socialize teenagers and young adults effectively.

Chart 2
Percent of social media users attributing selected outcomes to their use of social media, by age group and smart phone use, Canada, 2018



Source: Statistics Canada, 2018 Canadian Internet Use Survey.

Figure 16.13 Data on the adoption and use of digital technologies from Statistics Canada's 2018 Canadian Internet Use Survey based on a nationally representative sample of almost 14,000 Canadians. "Intense" smartphone users were defined as individuals who own a smartphone and report that they check it every 30 minutes or less, and report that checking their phone is the last thing they do before going to sleep. Intense smartphone users made up about one-third of the sample. "Other" refers to all other respondents, including those who do not own a smartphone. Intense smart phone users had higher levels of anxiety/depression, feelings of envy, and frustration/anger than others for all age groups. (Bargraph courtesy of Schimmele et al., 2021)/Statistics Canada.) [Statistics Canada Open Licence](#)

Making Connections: Sociological Research

Socialization and Social Media: Risk Factors



Figure 16.14 Social media is a functional tool for interacting with friends and relatives, maintaining relationships across distance, and facilitating scheduling and communication among household members, but also has risks and dysfunctions as a medium of socialization. (Image courtesy of cloud.shepherd/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Schimmele et al. (2021) summarize the literature on the positive and negative outcomes associated with social media use, and their associated risk factors:

Age has been viewed as a risk factor for a number of reasons. A comparative lack of self-regulation among children and adolescents may impede their ability to avoid risks such as overuse of social media or use at inappropriate hours (Keles, McRae and Grealish, 2020). Both sleep duration and sleep quality have been linked to daily time spent on social media and nighttime use, which tend to be higher among adolescents and young adults than among older individuals (Reid Chassiakos et al.,

2016; Woods and Scott, 2016). In general, lost sleep has been found to contribute to daytime dysfunction, such as having trouble concentrating (Reid Chassiakos et al., 2016). Furthermore, disrupted sleep has been found to be a key link between the quantity of time that youth spend on social media and depressive symptoms (Kelly et al., 2018; Reid Chassiakos et al., 2016). Disrupted sleep may also be an outcome of poor-quality interactions on social media such as exposure to online harassment or bullying, which are also negatively correlated with mental wellbeing (Kelly et al., 2018; Pew Research Center, 2018).

The age of social media users also matters as a risk factor for negative outcomes given developmental processes underway through adolescence. Identity formation is one such process and involves social comparison and feedback-seeking (Nesi and Prinstein, 2015). Social media is a unique interpersonal environment in this context as it can provide a near-continuous flow of interactions and an immense basis for social comparison and feedback (Vogel et al., 2014). Evidence suggests that social media has increased the influence of peer groups on the wellbeing of adolescents, facilitating and magnifying the effects of self-comparison at this age (Kelly et al., 2018; Seabrook, Kern and Rickard, 2016). In addition, users on social media platforms may strive for “positive self-presentation” using flattering images and information about exciting activities, material success and personal accomplishments (Tandoc, Ferruci and Duffy, 2015; Verduyn et al., 2015). For browsers, frequent exposure to, and comparison with, such representations can lead to idealized perceptions of other peoples’ lives, with increased potential for negative social comparisons and feelings of social deprivation, lower self-esteem and unhappiness (Georges, 2009; Nesi and Prinstein, 2015; Primack et al., 2017; Tandoc, Ferrucci, and Duffy, 2015;). Nesi and Prinstein (2015) report that social comparison poses a greater threat to the mental wellbeing of adolescent girls than boys, possibly because girls place more emphasis on social comparison when assessing their self-worth.

While most studies of social media impacts have focused on negative outcomes, others have documented positive outcomes. Social media is an efficient tool for interacting with friends and relatives, maintaining relationships across distance, and facilitating scheduling and communication among household members. Social networking sites connect individuals with shared interests, values, and activities, and enable individuals to interact with extended networks that would be difficult to maintain in an offline context (Boyd and Ellison, 2007; Verduyn et al., 2017). Some studies report that having a large number of online contacts predicts higher levels of life satisfaction and self-perceived social integration (Manago, Taylor and Greenfield, 2012; Seabrook, Kern and Rickard, 2016; Verduyn et al., 2017). Social networking sites can also reduce barriers to social participation (Ellison, Steinfield and Lampe, 2007). Several studies have documented correlations between social media and positive outcomes, such as emotional support and diminished social isolation and loneliness (Ellison, Steinfield and Lampe, 2007; Keles, McRae and Grealish, 2020; Oh, Ozkaya and LaRose, 2014).

Literature review by Schimmele et al. (2021), used under the [Statistics Canada Open Licence](#).

Social Control Function

Like the functions of social solidarity, social coordination and socialization, media perform the function of producing conformity to social norms and are thereby a means of exercising social control over populations. As noted in [Chapter 8. Deviance, Crime, and Social Control](#), all societies practice **social control**, the regulation and enforcement of norms. Social control can be defined broadly as an organized action intended to change or correct people's behaviour (Innes, 2003). The underlying goal of social control is to maintain **social order**, the ongoing, predictable arrangement of practices and behaviours on which society's members base their daily lives.

A prime example of this function of the media is the “true crime” show, which often sensationally reiterates and reinforces the qualities of heroic law enforcement and villainous criminality. By showing law enforcement, victims and model citizens in the best light and criminality in the worst light, this genre of media reinforces social beliefs about who deserves punishment and who deserves rewards. Similarly, true crime podcasts like *Someone Knows Something* that re-investigate cold cases, the lives of serial killers, child abductions, the procurement techniques of cults and so on, draw on the minutia of transgressions surrounding major crimes like murder to reinforce the need for societal vigilance. Vicary and Fraley's (2010) research shows that women in particular are drawn to the true crime genre because of “the potential life-saving knowledge” they provide. “For example, by understanding why an individual decides to kill, a woman can learn the warning signs to watch for in a jealous lover or stranger” (Vicary and Fraley, 2010).

Media are also direct means of surveillance and social control. The **panoptic surveillance** envisioned by Jeremy Bentham and later analyzed by Michel Foucault (1975) is increasingly realized in the form of technology used to monitor people's every move. This surveillance was imagined as a form of complete visibility and constant monitoring in which the observation posts are centralized and the observed are never communicated with directly. Today, digital security cameras capture people's movements, satellite technologies track people through their cell phones, and police forces around the world use facial-recognition software.




Figure 16.15 True Gangster Crime magazine from the 1940s featuring “true stories of America’s No. 1 criminals and their gun molls” (Courtesy of Library and Archives Canada/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Critical Sociology




Figure 16.16 Page from *Deutsche Jugend – Ein Mal und Aufstellbuch*, a Nazi propaganda booklet for young children, published in Nazi Germany in the 1930s, with cut-out illustrations depicting members of the Nazi Party's youth organizations. **Propaganda** is one way that media like children's books are used to manipulate populations and manufacture consent for social inequality in society. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

In contrast to theories in the positivist perspective, the critical perspective focuses on the creation and reproduction of power relations and inequality through the media – social processes that tend to destabilize society and create conflict rather than contribute to its smooth operation. The focus of critique is to provide the conditions for positive change that address systematic patterns of inequality and exclusion.

A key concept of the critical approach is the critique of **ideology**, the presentation of a partial view of the world as objective and universal. As Karl Marx put it, “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” (Marx and Engels, 1998/1846). The media present an image or idea of the world from the narrow point of view of the wealthy and powerful, or dominant class. For Marx this was at odds with the worldview and the interests of the working class who

form the vast majority of a society's population. "The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, consequently, also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it" (Marx and Engels, 1998/1846).

As the media, as "means of mental production" are mostly privately owned, the critical sociological focus on media concentration and corporate ownership of the media is largely a question concerning *whose* ideas, messages and points of view are being transmitted and whose are not. This does not mean that the media *only* present the world view of the ruling class. Just as the power of the ruling class is contested in society as a whole, media representations are also contested. The key point is that in sociology the term ideology does not refer simply to a set of ideas (like conservatism, liberalism, socialism, racism, environmentalism, etc.) but to a set of ideas that conceal, distort, or justify power relations in a society. **Ideology critique** is the practice critical sociologists use in the study of media to analyze and challenge the underlying ideological assumptions of media texts.




Figure 16.17 A camera obscura or pinhole camera projects an exterior image upside down. Marx and Engels (1998/1846) used it as analogy to describe the distortion of ideological representations: "in all ideology men and their relations appear upside down as in a camera obscura." Capitalists often present themselves as the creators of wealth, but for Marx and Engels this is upside down. For them only the labour of workers produces economic value. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

For example, news coverage concerning the economy often focuses on stock markets, corporate takeovers, quarterly earnings, interest rates, commodity prices and the like. Economic "growth" is a good news story, whereas economic "contraction" or "stagnation" is a bad news story. This is a picture of the economy from the point of view of large investors of capital. From their point of view, this is the way the economy works, and these are the events that interest them. In other words, it is a *partial* view of the economy, which is very different from the lived experience of most people who go to work, are seeking jobs, or live off a wage or salary. Moreover, from Marx's point of view, it is a picture of the economy *conceals* or *distorts* the reality of the actual economy that most people experience because the everyday social relations of class, concerns with precarious employment and making ends meet, quality of work life, hyper exploitation and global inequality, environmental destruction, etc. are simply not part of the picture.

Critical sociologists also look at who controls the media, and how media promotes the norms of upper-middle-class white demographics while minimizing the presence of the working class, marginalized groups, and racialized minorities.

For example, a study from Gilchrist (2010) showed a large disparity in the amount and content of coverage in a sample of white and Indigenous women who were missing and suspected victims of violent crimes. Newspapers gave the Indigenous women three and a half times less coverage; their articles were shorter and were less likely to appear on the front page. The white women were often described in news reports as being "gifted" or "cherished," while Indigenous women were describe as being "pretty" or "shy." The amount of personal information included in accounts of the White women far outweighed the amount and depth of information presented about the Indigenous women. The overall effect, Gilchrist argues, is that "the systematic exclusion, trivialization, and marginalization of missing/murdered Aboriginal women can be described as symbolic annihilation" (Gilchrist, 2010). Whereas the white women's lives were represented as newsworthy — "legitimate, worthy, and innocent" — Indigenous women's victimization was represented as routine and their lives were erased. Moreover, "the lack of coverage might also create a vicious cycle, whereby inattention to Aboriginal women's victimization by the police and community is reinforced by the lack of coverage" (Gilchrist, 2010).

This is also a problem of **stereotypes** used in the media to present oversimplified ideas about groups of people based on rigid generalizations. They do not bear up under close examination but are repeated often enough to become shorthand ways to characterize whole groups of people. The white women Gilchrist studied fell into well established and romanticized representations of white womanhood — purity, cleanliness, vulnerability, and virginity (Dyer, 1997) — but the Indigenous women were represented with colonial stereotypes of the “squaw” — uncivilized, dirty, lazy, degraded, easily sexually exploited and incapable of rescue (Gilchrist, 2010).

Similarly generalizing stereotypes are used to characterize young Black males in Canada: the gangsta image, which characterizes Black males as dangerous, defiant and criminal, and the entertainer image, which characterizes them as athletic or musically and theatrically talented (Manzo and Bailey, 2008). One young Black offender interviewed by Manzo and Bailey described representations of Blacks in the media:

They look like — like criminals and stuff like that. Only some, only some 'cause some Black people are talented and positive people, you know, sometimes. But sometimes they just, I don't know, sometimes they look bad. Like I know like when you're sitting watching TV and stuff, they make them look like people from the ghetto and stuff like that all the time. Like every Black person's from the ghetto and stuff, and do a lot of crime and stuff like that. . . . lots of people think of Black people as thugs and robbing people and stuff, you know Like some people think that a Black person's not normal. They just think — like how there's a lot of crime and stuff because of movies and stuff, you know, and how Black people that are in the movies, they all live in ghettos and stuff and all do crime and stuff like that. I just think that that's how people see us (Manzo and Bailey, 2008).

Manzo and Bailey (2008) note that, “[m]ass-cultural images of Black Canadians, it would seem, not only motivate stereotyping on the part of those who are not Black: they ... also influence racial identities and related self-concepts among Black persons themselves.”



Figure 16.18 “The ‘squaw’ imagery was the binary opposite of the Indian Princess/Pocahontas who was lauded for being cooperative with colonial efforts to settle/usurp Native lands, easily ‘assimilated’ into Christian Euro-Canadian settler culture, and for possessing idealized virtues of middle-class White womanhood such as delicacy and submissiveness... The “squaw” by contrast was stigmatized as “uncivilized” and incapable of “rescue” by Christianity” (Gilchrist, 2010). (Photo by W. Soule courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Gatekeeping and Media Ownership

Powerful individuals and social institutions have a great deal of influence over what kind of media is available for popular consumption and what messages circulate in society, a form of gatekeeping. Shoemaker and Voss (2009) define **gatekeeping** as the sorting process by which thousands of messages are shaped into a mass media-appropriate form and reduced to a manageable amount. In other words, the people in charge of the media decide what the public is exposed to, which, as C. Wright Mills (2000/1956) famously noted, is the heart of media's power.

Media is also big business, and the underlying motive of the commercial media is to profit from the circulation of media content. The **network media economy** includes communication infrastructure companies (wired and wireless telecoms, Internet services, cable, satellite, and fibre TV), digital and traditional media (TV, radio, newspapers, and magazines) and internet application companies (online advertising, search, social platforms). This sector generated \$94.6 billion in Canada in 2021, up from \$89 billion in 2019 (Winseck, 2022).




Figure 16.19 The three sectors of the network media economy in Canada. (Winseck, 2022.) [CC BY 4.0](#)

Since the 1990s, corporate mergers and consolidation have led to the concentrated ownership of the Canadian media into six multimedia companies: Bell, Telus, Rogers, Québecor, the CBC and Corus. These six Canadian companies accounted for 69% of network media economy revenue in 2021 (Winseck, 2022). When media ownership is highly concentrated like this, the concern about *gatekeeper* power is that a few dominant players can limit competition and control news and media content.

1. *Bell Media Inc.* Owned by Bell Canada (BCE) and based in Montreal. Its operations include telecoms (Bell Canada, Bell Mobile), television broadcasting and production, radio broadcasting, digital media and Internet properties. Bell Media owns 35 local television stations led by CTV, Canada's most-watched television network, and the French-language Noovo network in Québec; and 27 specialty channels, including leading specialty services TSN, MTV Canada, and Much. It owns Crave TV and the Montreal Canadiens hockey team. Its revenue was reported as \$23.96 billion 2019.
2. *Rogers Communications Inc.* Owned by the Rogers family and based in Toronto. Its operations are primarily in the fields of wireless communications, cable television, and Internet services, with significant additional mass media companies. Rogers owns City TV, 13 local TV stations, sports channels (Sportsnet), network and satellite-to-cable programming and 55 radio stations across the country. It owns the Toronto Blue Jays baseball team. In 2023, it bought Shaw Communications, which had been the third largest media corporation in Canada, and was able to expand its home telecommunications services to Western Canada. Its revenue was reported as \$13.9 billion in 2020, but adding Shaw Communications, which reported a revenue of \$5.5 billion in 2021, will make it the second largest media conglomerate in the country.
3. *Telus Corp.* Owned by the Bank of Montreal (as largest shareholder) and based in Vancouver. Its operations are primarily in the fields of telecommunications products and services including internet access, voice, entertainment, healthcare, video, smart home automation and IPTV (internet protocol) television. Its revenue was

reported as \$15.34 billion in 2020.

4. *Québecor*. Owned by the Péladeau family and based in Montreal. Québecor Media Group has a significant hold on French Québec media and is the largest owner of French-language media in Canada. Québecor owns TVA, *Le Journal de Montréal*, *Le Journal de Québec*, 24 hrs, and Videotron. It acquired Freedom Mobile from Shaw Communications as part of the regulatory approval of the Rogers/Shaw merger. Its revenue was reported as \$4.122 billion in 2017.
5. *CBC/Radio Canada*. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) is Canada's public broadcaster. Created by an Act of Parliament in 1936, the government-owned company provides services in both of Canada's official languages, English and French. All told, the CBC operates two television networks, four radio networks, a cable television service, an international shortwave radio service and a commercial-free audio service. CBC operates approximately 100 radio and television stations across Canada. Its revenue was reported as \$1.9 billion (including approximately \$1.4 billion in government subsidy) in 2021.
6. *Corus Entertainment*. Owned by the Shaw family and based in Toronto. Not included in the sale of Shaw Communications to Rogers, Corus Entertainment owns Global News and Global TV, which is Canada's second most watched television network after CTV. The Television segment is comprised of 33 specialty television networks, 15 conventional television stations, digital assets, a social media digital agency, a social media creator network, technology and media services, and the Corus content business. The Radio segment includes 39 radio stations, situated primarily in urban centres in English Canada, with a concentration in the densely populated area of Southern Ontario (Institute for Quantitative Social Science, 2023). Its revenue was reported at \$1.65 billion in 2018.

Also notable in terms of dominant media content producers in Canada are the PostMedia Network, owned by US private equity firm Chatham Asset Management (who also own the *National Enquirer* in the US), and Thomson Reuters, owned by the Thomson family who are reportedly Canada's richest family (Institute for Quantitative Social Science, 2023). Postmedia own *The National Post*, *The Financial Post*, *The Montreal Gazette*, *The Calgary Herald* and *Sun*, *The Vancouver Sun*, *The Ottawa Citizen*, *London Free Press*, *Edmonton Journal*, canada.com and canoe.com, whereas Thomson Reuters own the *Globe and Mail* and the global news service Reuters.

One of the unique features of Canadian media ownership is its high level of **vertical integration**, which is when a corporation owns different businesses in the same chain of production and distribution. In Canada this means that the biggest media content producers (television, radio, newspapers, etc.) are owned by the biggest communication infrastructure corporations (wired and wireless telecoms, Internet services, cable, satellite and fibre TV). In a report on global media ownership published in 2016, Canada had the third highest level of vertical integration out of the 28 countries examined (Winseck, 2022).

Apart from the CBC, Postmedia, and Thomson Reuters, the digital and traditional audiovisual content media in Canada provide only a small percentage of overall corporate revenue, suggesting that the production of media content has largely become "ornamental" in the overall corporate strategies. This does not necessarily affect their gatekeeping role, but does emphasize that whatever media content is produced, the bottom line for the corporate media is to maximize profits. Winseck (2022) argues that content producing media "are important, but their real purpose seems to be to drive the take-up of the companies' vastly more lucrative wireless, broadband Internet, and cable, satellite and IPTV services." For Bell, Rogers and Québecor, 80–90% of their revenue flows from the communications infrastructure/services side of their business rather than from media content services.

Gatekeeping and Digital Media




Figure 16.20 The Top 50 Most Visited Websites in the World (2022). (Image courtesy of Visual Capitalist.) [Visual Capitalist](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/)

Increasingly however, the domestic, vertically integrated media conglomerates find themselves in competition for Canadian audiences, consumers and advertising revenue with the US-based internet corporations Google, Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Microsoft, who had 15.3% of network media economy revenue in 2021 (Winseck, 2022). Smaller players in Canada are Twitter, Snapchat and TikTok.

Some argue that media ownership concentration is therefore no longer a problem because the range of information sources and the ways people communicate have expanded significantly (Public Policy Forum, 2017). As an example, the

rise in TV concentration seen between 2010 and 2014 has since reversed on account of the rise of online video services such as Netflix, Amazon Prime Video and Disney+ (Winseck, 2022). Moreover, as the new digital media evolved from the 1990s on, they displaced many traditional forms of “legacy media” (broadcast television, radio, newspapers, and magazines). The traditional mass media were centralized, one-to-many media, allowing a culturally diverse society to be dominated by one race, gender, or class. In ideological fashion, the media could impose the dominant group’s worldview as a societal norm. Digital media appear to render the gatekeeper role less of a factor in information distribution. Any citizen who has an internet connection and a computer or smart phone can produce mediated content.

On the other hand, even though digital and social media enable one-to-one, one-to-many and many-to-many forms of discourse, the economic model of the world’s most popular websites works through a mechanism similar to traditional mass media: selling the attentive capacities of audiences to advertisers. This is done in a much more targeted way however, which has implications for the new media’s gatekeeping power.

There are an estimated 2 billion websites in 2023 but they are obviously not all equal (Visual Capitalist, 2023). Using traffic rankings, Figure 16.20 shows the 50 most popular websites in 2022. The top 10 are: Google, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Baidu, Wikipedia, Yandex, Yahoo, and WhatsApp. Aside from Wikipedia, the online encyclopedia which is managed by the Wikimedia foundation and is a not-for-profit entity, every other site on the list is a profit making privately owned entity, most of whom generate funds through extracting user data and selling targeted advertising (Sytaffel, 2014).

The corporations which own these Websites, such as Google (Google and YouTube), Meta (Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp) and XCorp (Twitter) are all multibillion dollar private companies, whose economic model is underpinned by the creation of **platforms**: websites or applications that enable two or more individuals or groups to interact (users, content creators, customers, advertisers, service providers, producers, suppliers, and even physical objects with 3D printing). This is the basis of **platform capitalism**, a business model in which value and competitive advantage are extracted from the data of platform users (Srnicek, 2017a). “By providing the infrastructure and intermediation between different groups, platforms place themselves in a position in which they can monitor and extract all the interactions between these groups. This positioning is the source of their economic and political power” (Srnicek, 2017b).

By controlling the digital platforms through which communication and information is exchanged, the media’s gatekeeper power has evolved and changed focus. At the level of communications networks and digital platforms, gatekeeper power works to *shape* people’s access to news and media content (Winseck, 2022). Digital platforms are themselves “gates.” (1) Because media content increasingly passes through them, it means that already financially precarious news and entertainment media become further dependent on the digital corporations to distribute this content on the internet. These transactions then become a means to harvest and use personal information to sell to advertisers (and back to the content producers), which is the basis of the business model. (2) In addition, the more powerful internet, communication, and media companies become, the greater their ability to influence government regulation and set exploitative privacy and data protection policy norms that differ from what people say they want. (3) Finally, gatekeeper power stays intact to the degree that (a) the platforms’ algorithms sort, rank, recommend, or personalize information for users. As increased traffic means increased revenue, one effect of this has been to magnify divisive political and social positions which attract views and create algorithmically generated, self-confirming “echo chambers.” This has radically altered the nature of discourse in the public sphere and undermined evidence-based decision making. (b) The platforms also regulate which content and apps gain access to their operating systems and online retail spaces. “These are the ‘hidden levers of power’ that determine whether Alex Jones, Donald Trump or adult content on Tumblr stay up, come down, or are limited in their visibility” (Winseck, 2022).

Media Bias

Media bias refers to the bias of media content in the selection of the events and stories that are reported and how they are covered. Sometimes media bias is defined by explicit promotion of a particular political position, lack of objectivity

and “balance,” the personal subjective bias of the content producer, or a transgression of professional standards. In critical sociology however, the focus is on the ways that bias in media messaging supports dominant economic and political structures of power while marginalizing dissent.

One prominent approach to media bias in critical sociology is Herman and Chomsky's (2008) **propaganda model**. They argue that “the media serve, and propagandize on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control and finance them” (Herman and Chomsky, 2008). The authors argue that:

The mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behaviour that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society. In a world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interest, to fulfil this role requires systematic propaganda (Herman and Chomsky, 2008).



Figure 16.21 Noam Chomsky (1928–). (Image courtesy of Andrew Rusk/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

As Noam Chomsky (Achbar & Wintonick, 1992) clarifies, “all of this has nothing to do with liberal or conservative bias. According to the propaganda model, both liberal and conservative wings of the media, whatever those terms are supposed to mean, fall within the same framework of assumptions.” The focus of this critique of media bias is not on conservative vs. liberal media, but on how the dominant media discourses serve to “manufacture consent” to social inequality, corporate power and state interests.

Sometimes the bias of the news media is explicit, as with Fox News in the US. However, Herman and Chomsky (2008) describe a series of more subtle mechanisms or **media filters** through which “the powerful are able to fix the premise of discourse, to decide what the general populace is allowed to see

hear and think about.” Specifically, they describe five filters:

1. **Ownership:** The dominant media firms are large, concentrated corporate conglomerates. They have common interests with other major corporations, banks, and government, including the commitment to an economic system of market driven profit. These interests influence and constrain journalists, editors and media content.
2. **Advertising:** The economic model of the media is based on generating revenue from advertising, giving advertisers the power to influence content. The media's dependence on advertising makes it less likely that media will produce content that advertiser's find offensive.
3. **Sourcing:** The reliance on “trusted sources,” press releases, and news conferences often means using government or corporate spokespeople who spend vast sums on public relations, spin and lobbying. Using unofficial sources requires more work and these sources are often only consulted for reactions to, or minority positions on, news stories rather than being the primary source.
4. **Flak:** Flak is the ability of financially or politically privileged actors to attack or legally harass journalists and sources who have provided critical media coverage or challenged official and corporate points of view.
5. **Ideology:** The use of ideological filters like “anticommunism” during the Cold War period (1945–1989) mobilize the population against an enemy and are fuzzy enough to frame any criticism or alternate viewpoint of the system as an “Us versus Them” issue. Contemporary examples include the belief in the “the free market,” post 9–11 anti-terrorism discourses or attacking “wokeness.” Herman and Chomsky (2008) note that whenever the ideological filter is triggered, the normal requirement for rigorous journalistic evidence is suspended and charlatans, informers, and other opportunists can thrive as evidential sources and experts, even after their lack of credentials or truthfulness has been exposed.

Quantitative analyses of media have tried to see how changes in media ownership affect media content, particularly in relation to the issue of media bias (Winseck, 2022). Evidence regarding the link between media ownership and bias is “mixed and inconclusive” (Soderlund, Brin, Miljan & Hildebrandt, 2012), however, the research is premised on the idea that different owners will have different biases. The consistent finding of “no effect” between ownership and bias might be better seen as emblematic of how the media preserves the status quo (Gitlin, 1978), which is what Herman and Chomsky predict.

Another type of criticism of the propaganda model has to do with the degree to which the public is manipulated by the media. The focus on the production of biased media content tends to obscure the diverse range of audience responses to the information and perspectives they receive in the media. To be fair, Chomsky and Herman are clear that they are not discussing *media effects* – the idea that a biased media will necessarily produce a biased population – but *media structure* and *performance* – what the media does and what constraints it faces. “The propaganda model describes forces that shape what the media does; it does not imply that any propaganda emanating from the media is always effective” (Herman and Chomsky, 2008). Sociologists can turn to interpretive sociology to concentrate on the processes by which audiences take or create meaning from media texts.

Interpretive Sociology



Figure 16.22 Vulcan cosplayer at the Phoenix Comicon in Phoenix, Arizona. Cosplay (costume play), fandom, fan fiction and mashups are various ways in which audiences actively interpret, consume and transform media and popular culture products. (Image courtesy of Gage Skidmore/Flickr.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/)

In contrast to positivist and critical approaches to the media, interpretive sociology emphasizes the processes by which media producers and audiences *actively* create and interpret meanings in the media. As Brym et al. (2013) explain, “people are not just empty vessels into which the mass media pour a defined assortment of beliefs, values, and ideas.” Interpretive approaches to media emphasize that both media production and interpretation are social processes. Media producers take an active role in deciding how an event, idea or thing will be represented. Media audiences take an active role in figuring out what the meaning of a media product is and how they will “use” or incorporate it into their daily life. This approach contrasts with the *functionalist* and *critical* traditions that tend to see the media as a monolithic source of culture that either reinforces the core values of society or imposes an ideologically distorted representation of society.

In mediated societies, the media have become central agents in the creation and spread of symbols that become the basis for a shared understanding of society. Sociologists working in the symbolic interactionist perspective focus on this **social construction of reality** as an ongoing process of social interactions in which people subjectively create and understand reality. Media representations provide a key source of images, identities, characters, and ideas through which this social construction is accomplished. Consider kids enthusiastically acting out scenes from a TV show or movie they liked or a family watching the news and making comments on the events as they are reported.

Media and audiences construct reality in a number of interactive ways. For some audience members, the people they watch on a screen or meet with on social media forums can become a *primary group*: the small informal groups of people like families who are closest to them and most influential. For others, media provide *reference groups*: groups to which an individual compares himself or herself, and by which they judge their successes and failures. (See [Chapter 5. Socialization](#) on media as an agent of socialization).

Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) describe the **two-step flow of communication** in which an intermediary — an opinion leader or influencer — intervenes between the sender of a message and the audience. People do not simply change their attitudes and behaviours or go out and buy a product because the media tells them to. Instead, the influence often comes from a third party, usually a person of status seen as having greater access to information. The **influencer** is an authority able to filter, interpret and explain media messages to an audience (Mwengenmeir, 2014). It is the credibility of the film critic or Rotten Tomatoes rating that persuades the individual to shell out money to see a movie. It is a favourable impression by social media “thought leaders,” late show TV hosts, or religious leaders who expound on the messages released by politicians that sway people’s political beliefs.

Thought leaders and influencers have in fact become the center of a multibillion-dollar influencer marketing industry. **Influencer marketing** is a form of social media marketing that involves product placements and endorsements from online personalities who use their social media followers as a ready-made market. Internet stars on platforms such as Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok are used to promote brand visibility, drive engagement, and impact purchasing decisions for millions of users. Global spending on influencer marketing stood at \$16.4 billion U.S. in 2022, having more than doubled since 2019 (Dencheva, 2023). A key component of the influencer’s role in the two-step flow of communication is the establishment of their **authenticity** — a form of charismatic authority to make lifestyle suggestions to followers based on the perceived “realness” or truth of their messages (Hund, 2023). The influencer’s ability to express themselves “authentically” is typically not based on their credentials, expertise or training but by their perceived sincerity and ability to follow through on claims they make about themselves. In a mediated society where authenticity, trust and “realness” are elusive, and influence is sold as a commodity, the study of what makes an influencer authentic is a fascinating sociological topic.

Media Representations



Figure 16.23 The Marlboro cigarette ad campaign used representations of rugged cowboys in nature to encode messages about masculinity and cigarette smoking. The subtext of the ads was that real men do not worry about Surgeon General's warnings. Unfortunately, five men who appeared in Marlboro-related advertisements died of smoking-related diseases, showing the divide that can open up between reality and mediated reality. (Image courtesy of Cezary Piwowarsk/Wikimedia Commons.) [GNU Free Documentation Licence](#)

Media representations are the main way in which people access information about the world beyond their immediate milieu. **Representations** refer to media “texts” (images, books, films, newspaper articles, television shows, tweets, internet memes, etc.) that use signs and symbols to stand in for, or *re-present*, directly lived experiences. The process of translation from “thing” to representation is central to understanding the role of media as an institution of cultural transmission. As Stuart Hall puts it, an “event must become a story before it can become a communicative event” (Hall, 1980). How do events become media stories and what happens to them when they do?

For example, in March 2013, two high school football players in Steubenville, Ohio, were convicted of sexually assaulting a 16-year-old girl who was drunk at a party. A reporter covering the trial described the verdict in terms of the damage done, not to the girl, but to the “two young men who had such promising careers” (Scowen, 2013). This is a case in which the raw event of the sexual assault, captured on film by bystanders and broadcasted on social media, was turned into a story about the young athletes and their promising careers, rather than a story about the crime committed against the young girl or sexual violence against women more generally.

The important point is that the story is not factually “untrue” or even deliberately biased; it can be taken to represent the reporter’s honest emotional reaction to the events. However, encoded into the story were messages about the

importance of athletes in American society, the class background of the young men (i.e., their “promising careers”), and the stigmatized status of the young woman who had been drunk at the party. Not told in the story was an alternative set of meanings that would have focused more appropriately on the seriousness of sexual assault as a crime, the effect of assault as a traumatic experience on the victim, and the cultural attitudes that permitted the young men to think about the young woman in this way in the first place.

With respect to this example, the crucial point regarding the nature of the audience’s mediated experience of the event is that in the shift from the reporter’s immediate, emotional response to seeing the young men sentenced in court to the production and broadcast of the event as a media story is a process of **encoding** or messaging. Encoding is enacted in the decisions that the reporter and the media producers made about how to *re-present* the event as a story. Encoding is the act whereby the events or raw reality depicted in a story are turned into messages that convey specific cultural meanings or emphases. In a mediated culture, the audience often does not have direct access to the event; the audience only has access to the codes that turned the event into a story.

Making Connections: Big Picture

Codes of Violence



Figure 16.24 *Dirty Harry* (1971) is emblematic of films that represent the excessive use of violence as a heroic quality. (Image courtesy of Paul/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#). **Figure 16.25** Sylvester, Barnyard and Foghorn Leghorn in *Crowing Pains* (1947). Episodes of the Looney Tunes cartoons involve violent slapstick comedy, including beatings, eye poking, falling off cliffs, etc. (Image courtesy of Warner Brothers/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Earlier in the chapter, the idea that violence in the media impacts audiences was discussed as a **media effect**. This framework is based on a positivist or causal model of explanation in which media content is the independent variable or stimulus and audience response is the dependent variable. Generally, the evidence presented in research on media effects is statistical in nature, meaning that to the degree that a media effect can be demonstrated, not everyone who watches a violent program will become more aggressive,

fearful, or insensitive. Instead the research shows an overall pattern of effects or tendencies that emerge across the sample. On balance, viewers become more aggressive, fearful, or insensitive.

The causal model of explanation is drawn from behaviouralism — a linear sequence of sender/message/receiver in which the message is a *stimulus*, and the reception is a measurable *response* in the audience. The interpretive approach has a different focus. For a media “effect” to take place it has to pass through the processes whereby the meanings of media texts are firstly created by the sender and secondly interpreted by the receiver. In other words, rather than modelling media effects as stimulus and response, interpretive sociology examines the processes of meaning construction and interpretation.

In interpretive sociology violence in the media can be examined with regard to the process of encoding. Hall (1980) writes, “representations of violence on the TV screen ‘are not violence but messages about violence.’” There is a difference between violent imagery as a stimulus and violent imagery as a meaning or message.

It could be argued that *Dirty Harry* and *Foghorn Leghorn* are equally violent in terms of the number of acts of violence they depict, but the messages about violence they convey are quite different. The violence is encoded differently. In the *Dirty Harry* movies of the 1970s, where the violence is drawn from the tradition of Hollywood film noir and action thrillers, the message is that a “true man” must follow his convictions, even by violence. Other styles of masculinity that involve non-violence, reason, internal reflection, duty, rational discussion, compromise, and respect for the law are somehow not true to the core of manhood. In the *Foghorn Leghorn* cartoons, where the violence is drawn from the tradition of carnival and slapstick comedy, the message of the violence is that those who are overly pompous or conceited will be cut down to size. The effect of these codes is to show violence as means of comic reversal in the fortunes of the characters.

Would the audience enjoy the violence in the *Dirty Harry* movies or identify with the hero, if they were fully conscious of their connection to toxic codes of masculinity or if the violence was real? Are viewers able to laugh at *Foghorn Leghorn* getting a kick in the butt if all they see is a painful or violent act, or a bad role model for children?

Decoding and Audience Reception




Figure 16.26 Encoding/decoding from Stuart Hall (1980).

It is worthwhile to pursue Hall's (1980) ideas a little further to get at the entire circuit of a media message (see Figure 16.x). The first step of the circuit describes the process of translation from event to story in a particular media outlet as a process of *encoding*. The events or raw reality depicted by the story are turned into messages that convey specific cultural meanings or emphases. These are the *meaning structures 1* in Figure 16.26. Hall notes that this process takes place under specific conditions including the *frameworks of knowledge* used by the encoders (background knowledge that affects how they see or interpret the story), the *relations of production* of the encoders (workplace conditions, assigned tasks, market pressures, etc.), and the *technical infrastructure* used by the encoders (the types of media and technology used to present and circulate the story). These conditions all affect how the message is encoded.

Through the process of encoding the audience does not have *direct* access to the raw event through the media; they have access to a story *about* the event. The terms "event" and "story" are most appropriate to the discussion of media news stories, but the same principles apply to the creation of fictional stories about imagined events, the production of social media memes or the selection and presentation of visual images of actual people or places, etc. In each case, people are not only told what things *are* but what they *mean*. If a **code** is like a set of instructions for how to assemble the elements of a story into a coherent whole that makes sense to an audience (the *programme as 'meaningful' discourse* in Figure 16.26), in making choices about *how* to tell a story, the media can be seen to encode certain messages into their texts while excluding others.

On the other side of the process is **audience reception**: how the audience receives the media messages. Hall describes **decoding** as the process whereby the audience actively interprets or *decodes* the meaning of the story or media text. Sometimes this occurs through the intermediary of influencers, as discussed above, and sometimes not. In either case, the audience is not a passive recipient of media messages. Audiences are active in producing and receiving codes; they actively use codes to decode the messages in the media, receiving some messages and rejecting others. These are the *meaning structures 2* in Figure 16.26.

These audience-produced codes are not necessarily the same as those used by the media producers. The audience uses its own *frameworks of knowledge* to interpret media texts and programs. These vary according to both individual factors such as sense of humour, perceptiveness, cultural knowledge, and social factors such as class (“relations of production” in Figure 16.26), gender, ethnicity, education, age, rural/urban location, etc.). By no means is it certain that the messages encoded by the media are those that are received by the audience. For example, a massive Twitter and Facebook reaction arose to the story about the sentencing of the young athletes in Steubenville, Ohio. For most of these commentators, the media’s focus on the damaged futures of the young men was a gross injustice considering the actual damage done to the young woman.



Figure 16.27 Watching TV is often thought as passive but can be an intensely social activity. In early ethnographic studies of TV audiences, Katz and Liebes (1984) noted that: “during and after the program people discuss what they have seen, and come to collective understandings. . . . Viewers selectively perceive, interpret, and evaluate the program in terms of local cultures and personal experiences, selectively incorporating it into their minds and lives.” (Image courtesy of Wonderlane/ Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

As a result, Hall (1980) describes the power of the media as a “complex structure in dominance.” While the media is a means of circulating the “dominant or preferred meanings” of a society, as both positivist and critical sociology suggest, there is no guarantee that these meanings are received, accepted, or reproduced by the audience. He suggests that there are at least three “hypothetical positions from which decodings of a televisual discourse can be constructed” (Hall, 1980). In other words, there are three general frameworks in which audiences interpret what they view on TV or other media:

1. The **dominant-hegemonic position**: When the viewer decodes the media text in terms of the dominant or preferred meanings of society. These are often the meanings that seem natural or common sense in a society. For example, in watching a political debate the viewer might lean one way or another in terms of their political party preference but accept the underlying premise that lowering corporate taxes to attract business investment to Canada is in the national interest. Or, they might watch a show in which Muslim characters are presented as fanatics and terrorists and not question the stereotypes because they fit an image reinforced by news reports or anti-terrorism ideological “filters,” not to mention the history of action thriller villains.
2. The **negotiated position**: When the viewer largely accepts the dominant or preferred meanings of society but makes exceptions to the rule based on specific situations or local conditions. For example, the viewer might accept that attracting business investment to Canada is the goal of government at the level of the national interest but remember that subsidies and tax credits did not work to keep their local mill in operation. As a result, their politics “on the ground” might be quite different than the political positions they accept during national debates. Similarly, they might accept stereotypes about Muslims in the media they consume but not connect these stereotypes with the friendships they have with their Muslim neighbours or work colleagues.
3. The **oppositional position**: When the viewer rejects the dominant or preferred meanings of society and replaces them with a set of oppositional meanings or an alternative frame of reference. For example, when the viewer who listens to the debate on the need to attract business investment interprets every mention of the ‘national interest’

as 'ruling class interest' they are decoding the debate from an oppositional position. Or, every time they see Muslims represented as fanatics and terrorists in a movie or TV show, they reinterpret the plot in terms of the history of colonization of the Middle East and Asia.

Making Connections: Sociological Research

Functionalist, Critical, and Interpretive Approaches to Advertising Images



Figure 16.28 “I want you for U.S. Army: Nearest recruiting station” WW1 recruitment poster by James Montgomery Flagg, (1917). (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#). **Figure 16.29** British WW1 war recruitment poster – “Britons [Lord Kitchener] wants you” – by Alfred Leete (1914) (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#). **Figure 16.30** Canadian WW1 war bonds promotion poster – “Buy Your Victory Bonds” (1914–1918). (Image courtesy of Library and Archives Canada, Acc. No. 1983-28-963.) [Public Domain](#)

Advertisement is a specific type of media representation. It uses language and visual imagery to persuade an audience to do something, usually to buy a product, but in the posters above to enlist in the army or buy war bonds. As **rhetoric** is the art of using language to persuade or influence others, Roland Barthes (1977) refers to using photographs in advertising as “the rhetoric of the image.” This emphasizes that advertisement uses images to make an intentional or calculated message. Advertisers try to use the image to convey a specific set of messages to an audience about a product or campaign with the goal of convincing them to take action or hold some sort of belief. How can sociologists analyze the relationship between media and society through the study of advertising images?

Howard Becker (1974) argues that photographs contain a wealth of information of interest to sociologists.

“Every part of the photographic image carries some information that contributes to its total statement; the viewer’s responsibility is to see, in the most literal way, everything that is there and respond to it. To put it another way, the statement the image makes — not just what it shows you, but the mood, moral evaluation and causal connections it suggests — is built up from those details. A proper “reading” of a photograph sees and responds to them consciously.”

How might this approach to reading photographs be applied to reading advertisement communications? Functional, critical and interpretive sociologists would frame their reading in different ways.

The structural functionalist analysis focuses on identifying the functions of advertising. In commercial advertising the main function of ads is to inform consumers about a product to integrate the production of goods with their sale on the market (the social integration function). This is a key function in making a market economy work. In addition the ads perform other functions, like creating a consensus about the meaning of the product (solidarity function), socializing the audience about the norms and values of society (socialization function), or controlling the behaviour of audiences and consumers, i.e., to buy one product and not another (social control function).

In the three propaganda posters above the functions are similar except that instead of selling a product, they are performing the function of mobilizing the population to support the war effort through enlistment or buying war bonds. In each case, a fictional or real figure has been chosen to stand in for or symbolically embody the country or nation — Uncle Sam for the US, Lord Kitchener for the UK, a Canadian infantryman (Tommy Canuck) for Canada — and to bring out feelings of solidarity, unanimity and patriotic duty. It is interesting that the Canadian poster relied on an anonymous “everyman” figure as opposed to the mythic Uncle Sam or Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener. The infantryman serves as an emblem for sacrifice, nobility and purity but also Canadian modesty it would seem. Canada was a young country at the beginning of WW1, less than 50 years old, and did not have an established national identity or set of unifying “great” national traditions or symbols to draw from. In fact, many historians have argued that Canada’s experience in WW1 was a pivotal moment in the function of nation-building: the birth of Canada as an independent nation (Vance, 1997). The function of the Tommy Canuck image was to align the population with a unifying national identity and mobilize them to support the war effort.

Critical sociological approaches would examine the use of propaganda, nationalism and patriotism in these posters. They are instances of larger discourses of power in which the bottom line is citizens sacrificing their lives to obtain state objectives. In democracies, state objectives including war are represented as the will of the people, but when this will conflicts with instincts of self-preservation it has to be constructed and reinforced through propaganda and other means. The use of Uncle Sam, Lord Kitchener, and the Canadian infantryman to symbolize the unity of the nation, national interest and duty is one way to secure this consent. Instead of seeing WW1 as a struggle between rival European imperial powers over colonial expansion, a bloody war in which 61,000 Canadians died and 172,000 were wounded (Canadian War Museum, 2017), it becomes a war in which a “We” is threatened by a “Them.” Rather than a matter of critically examining the causes of the war, the stern pointing finger of each of the figures frames the issue of enlistment or war bonds at an emotional level as a matter of duty and heroic sacrifice. The pointing fingers imply that non-compliance would be an act of cowardliness and shirking. Contemporary efforts to describe WW1, or specific events like Vimy Ridge, as the birth of a nation, have also been used ideologically in attempts to rebrand Canada as a “warrior nation” rather than a “peacekeeper nation,” a

precedent that would set Canada on the path to participating in future foreign wars rather than promoting diplomatic solutions (McKay and Swift, 2012).

Interpretive approaches focus on the different variables involved in interpreting and decoding the messages in the posters. Each poster addresses a “You,” both in the text and with the pointing finger. But who is the “You” who is being addressed exactly? The audience is not unified. Different segments of the population interpret the message differently according to their dominant, negotiated and oppositional positions. For example, the Uncle Sam figure, portrayed as a white northern Yankee, might alienate racialized Americans and southerners rather than unify them. Women would interpret the three posters differently than men because it was only men who were being asked to enlist or buy bonds. In fact, when mandatory conscription was announced in Canada in 1917, women’s support had to be enticed with the “Wartime Elections Act,” which allowed female relatives of soldiers to vote in federal elections. Women were in the position of having to witness the casualties of war, and they feared for the lives of partners and sons who were forced to enlist in the Canadian army. In Canada there were also deep divisions between the French in Quebec who felt no allegiance to defending Great Britain in the war, rural Canadians who needed human labour to work the fields, and English-speaking urban Canadians who largely supported the war. Each group interpreted the poster with a different set of concerns and meanings.

Finally, as images enter into popular culture and circulate they take on different meanings and associations. Fans of zombie movies might read a different set of meanings into the Tommy Canuck image in “Buy Your Victory Bonds” because of its remarkable resemblance to the zombie character played by Donald Sutherland in the final scene of *Invasion of the Body Snatchers* (1978). Zombie films have been used as metaphors for a variety of contemporary social issues, from the hazards of contemporary biotechnologies, to mindless consumerism, to the social disintegration of modern society. A zombie reading of Tommy Canuck might suggest that the mindless, devouring walking dead are symbols of patriotism and nationalism.

Media Attributions

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16.3 Media and Postmodern Culture

WILLIAM LITTLE AND RON MCGIVERN

The relationship between media and postmodern culture is complex and multifaceted. Postmodern culture is characterized by (1) a fragmentation of knowledge, (2) simulation, or a blurring of the boundaries between reality and representation, and (3) a skepticism of grand narratives and universal truths. Media, in turn, plays a crucial role in constructing and disseminating cultural narratives, images, and symbols. Media has the power to shape perceptions of reality, values, and identities, and it does so through representations that remove media consumers from direct experience of the world. In the thoroughly mediated society of the 21st century, “what is real,” “what is unifying” and “what is true” seem increasingly uncertain.

Postmodern Fragmentation of Knowledge

The postmodern **fragmentation of knowledge** refers to the degree to which members of a society no longer share a single, unified universe of meaning and understanding. This fragmentation of knowledge means that people no longer share a single *collective consciousness* as described by Durkheim, but rather multiple divergent and heterogeneous “tribal” consciousnesses distributed throughout a society (see [Chapter 4. Society and Modern Life](#)). The unity of knowledge historically provided by religion and then by science provided certainty and a collective point of reference on which people could rely and generate expectations and hope for the future. In the absence of these shared points of reference people can live in different worlds even when they live on the same street. It is possible for those who believe in the power of science to solve the problems confronting humanity to live side by side with fundamentalists who anticipate immanent Armageddon, flat-earthers who argue that the world is not round and conspiracy theorists who believe paedophiles are operating out of the basement of a pizza restaurant. Consequently, cultural analyst Frederic Jameson (1984) describes the situation of the postmodern citizen as complex to map out. There has been a breakdown of **cognitive mapping**; the ability to locate oneself within a meaningful whole or mental map of the social world.

This fragmentation is heavily influenced by media. Take, for example, the effect of social media algorithms on the creation of information silos, echo-chambers and filter bubbles. An **information silo** is an information management system in which one component is not able to freely communicate or share information with another component. If the internet is an information management system, algorithms which sort information and make recommendations based on relevance to the user typically connect the user to others who are similar to them. They create network clusters (Zignani et al.,2014; Su et al.,2016). This tends to “silo” the information and creates **echo chambers** where individuals only see beliefs or opinions that align with their own. Their existing views are reinforced or uncritically confirmed back to them and exposure to alternative ideas is inhibited. Similarly, algorithms that personalize or filter an individual’s online experience create **filter bubbles** in which users encounter only information and opinions that align with and confirm their existing beliefs.

The **algorithmic society** — a global society in which digital platforms and their proprietary algorithms organize the social distribution of attention and information (Burrell and Fourcade, 2021) — is therefore a technological factor in the creation of the postmodern fragmentation of knowledge. The massive quantity of information, which people are supposed to figure out and interpret on their own, “often provoke[s] paranoid and otherwise speculative forms of public knowledge and participation” (Hong, 2020). Algorithmic sorting reinforces this by limiting users access to diverse individuals and information, producing conditions of polarization and isolation, and perpetuating societal stereotypes (Burrell and Fourcade, 2021).




Figure 16.31 A flow chart displaying the algorithm behind a recommendation engine. (Image courtesy of J. Jacobi, E. Benson, and G. Linden/Wikipedia Commons.) [CC0 1.0](#)

Postmodern Simulation

Postmodern **simulation** refers to the blurring of the boundaries between reality and representation through the creation, dissemination, and consumption of media products. A simulation is typically thought of as a model of reality that scientists, for example, might use to compute different scenarios for weather patterns or test wind resistance on airplane fuselages. Sociologists might use simulations in experiments to study people’s reactions to different situations, like the Asch experiments on “groupthink” (see [Chapter 7. Groups and Organizations](#)). However, media representations that simulate reality such as reality TV, immersive video games, computer generated images, artificial intelligence, or 3D virtual reality increasingly have the ability to crossover from simply representing or modelling reality to generating realities that have never actually existed. This creates a culture context or mediascape that makes the distinction between reality and representation radically uncertain (Baudrillard, 1994). Is the artificial intelligence really “thinking” when it gives a realistic answer to a question? It is difficult to say.



Figure 16.32 Live digital projection of Tupac performing at the Coachella music festival. Why should a celebrity's death or lack of bodily existence interfere with the live experience of going out to a hip hop concert to hear them? Or, do fans need to revise their concept of "live" to get their heads around this? (Image courtesy of Evsmitty/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

One example of simulation can be found in the phenomenon of the holographic resurrection of dead pop stars or the creation of virtual popstars like Hatsune Miku (described at the beginning of the chapter). Crowds rocked out to Tupac Shakur's holographic hip hop performance with Snoop Dogg and Dr. Dre at the Coachella music festival in 2012, even though Tupac had died in 1996. The Tupac image was generated from a catalogue of gestures and mannerisms that were identifiably Tupac, but were not simply stock footage. It was an original, never seen before performance. The live projection was generated from a model of Tupac so convincing that it could be consumed as a live performance, rippling with the aura of authentic hip hop subversion and excess, yet entirely pre-programmed and controlled.

Similarly, the reality TV phenomenon represents itself as being about unscripted, real people who are put in a scenario, like surviving on a desert island, or going about their everyday lives, yet captured on camera. Would the reality unfold in the same way if the camera and audience were not there? As an early example of reality TV, the 1973 program *An American Family* followed the day-to-day lives of the "typical middle class" Loud family over a period of seven months in Santa Barbara, California. At the end of the series the parents divorced, raising the question of whether the filming simply captured the reality of the family or whether marriage breakdown would have happened if the TV cameras were not present (Baudrillard, 1994).

While reality TV in the 2020s does not draw audiences the way it once did, the emergence of reality social media and internet celebrities and influencers like PewDiePie, Huda Kattan and Grumpy Cat also change the nature of people's relationship to reality. Most often, the social media personalities present themselves as simply living life, sharing their authentic reality-of-the-day on podcasts, YouTube or TikTok. But how is this successful authenticity of "just being oneself" created? Those aspiring to be internet celebrities need to model and present their "authentic" lives according to what works on social media in order to find an audience. Their lives are modelled according to the parameters of the media representation. This confuses real life with the model in a way that makes separating them difficult.

There is also the issue the changing nature of celebrity in the era of reality TV and social media. **Parasocial** relationships affect traditional notions human intimacy as the line between celebrities and fans is fades. Parasocial relationships are essentially one-sided relationships between celebrities and audiences. Typically, the celebrity remains unaware of their impact on fans, while fans dedicate significant time and energy in getting to know the celebrity. Within the realm of social media platforms such as YouTube, TikTok, and Instagram, influencers and celebrities strive to build a bond with their followers and viewers, attempting to cultivate and create a sense of "relationship." "In parasocial relationships, a fan responds to a media figure as if he or she were a personal acquaintance" (Nouri, 2018). Today, people can constantly connect with celebrities and follow their daily lives and activities through smartphones and other devices 24 hours a day. This constant exposure can lead to an unhealthy and obsessive preoccupation with various celebrities, including sports stars, musicians, actors, and popular social media influencers. "...Internet celebrity, consumed and reproduced by the society and fueled by modern day information and communication technology, has continued to captivate people's mind as celebrity has been materialized by society ..." (Juntiwassarakij, 2018). The fan's sense of intimacy with someone who is unaware of their existence is both real — in the sense that it is really experienced — but also simulated — in the sense that there is in fact no actual relationship in the traditional sense of intimacy.

(3) Postmodern culture is also characterized by skepticism towards **grand narratives** and universal truths. As noted in [Chapter 3. Culture](#), Jean Francois Lyotard (1984) defined the postmodern condition as a pervasive "incredulity toward meta-narratives," meaning that people no longer really believe in the grand (i.e., "meta" or organizing) narratives of social progress. The discourses of scientific knowledge, universal morality, social emancipation, rational organization and

planning, or national destiny provided overarching narratives that unified the modern era. These presented an image of modern society as having a historical direction, a unity, and a universality. If people were still unscientific, religious, irrational, or parochial in their outlook, they would eventually catch up. However, postmodernists seem increasingly skeptical of the claims that scientific knowledge leads to progress, that political change can create human emancipation, or that universal rights, morality, and truth can set people free.

Again, contemporary digital and social media have had a profound role in generating this skepticism towards grand narratives. They amplify the “little” narratives or alternative narratives that had previously been invisible or marginalized. On social media platforms where one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many forms of mediated communication have become possible, everyone has the ability to publish and publicize their own opinions. Because the business model of social media corporations depends on the number of “clicks” and interactions of posts rather than their quality or factual content, algorithms tend to draw users towards sites of controversy and conflict. This has given “alternative” science, conspiracy theories, disinformation, hate speech and other challengers to the progressive grand narratives of modernity unprecedented publicity and access to audiences. As an illustration of the power of media *simulation*, people stake their identities on taking positions which often appear to have little relationship to their directly lived experiences and more on the fabulated constructs of the media world. As a result, collective efforts to address public health emergencies, climate change, Indigenous reconciliation and civil rights increasingly meet with belligerent and entrenched resistance that seems impervious to factual evidence or moral persuasion.

At the same time, postmodern culture has also had a profound impact on media. The rise of postmodernism has led to a proliferation of media forms that challenge modernist notions of representation and meaning. The modern grand narratives of progress and a better future were supported by media forms that emphasized dramatic contests to reveal truths, experimentalism with forms, authentic expression and sincerity, critique of superficiality, seriousness of intent, hopefulness and romanticism. In contrast, postmodern media forms include the use of pastiche, irony, and self-referentiality, as well as a greater emphasis on intertextuality and the blurring of the boundaries between high and low culture. These are forms that tend to undermine or distance themselves from grand narratives.

Pastiche: A literary, artistic, musical, or architectural work that imitates the style of previous work or genre, like *South Park*, *The Simpsons*, or Quentin Tarrantino's *Kill Bill*. While often meant to be funny or lighthearted, the intent of pastiche is to honour the earlier work rather than parodying it or mocking it.

Irony: The use of speech or expression to indicate the opposite of what is said.

Self-referentiality: Media forms that reveal the contrivances of their own production by self-consciously referring to their own creative process or use of creative techniques, like when a narrator steps out of a story to address the audience.

Intertextuality: Media forms that consciously use or acknowledge other texts in their creation through quotation, allusion, links, pastiche or parody.

Blurring of the boundaries between high and low culture: Various sorts of mashups of elite high culture and popular or commercial culture such as serious classical literature combined with themes from zombie movies, symphony orchestras performing the soundtracks of cartoons, or detailed and erudite histories of toothpaste or skiffle music (See [Chapter 3. Culture](#)).




Figure 16.33 Flat earth meme. Alternative narratives tend to thrive in the postmodern condition where grand narratives are discredited and there is a lack of trusted information. (Image courtesy of AJ Wilson/Flickr.) [Public Domain Mark 1.0](#)

On one hand the outcome of the postmodern skepticism towards grand narratives is a culture without a consensus on common goals, values or the need for social progress. On the other hand, the outcome has led to a pluralization of discourse, an ambivalence toward centralized institutions of authority, a weakening of attachments to the dominant culture, a loosening of social bonds and a perception of increased freedom. Postmodernity witnesses the emergence of a plurality of different voices that had been relegated to the margins. Culture moves away from homogeneous sameness and uniformity to heterogeneous diversity.

Overall, the relationship between media and postmodern culture is one of mutual influence and interdependence. Media plays a crucial role in constructing and disseminating cultural narratives and symbols, while postmodern culture has had a profound impact on the way that media products are created, consumed, and interpreted.

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Chapter 16 Resources and Activities

WILLIAM LITTLE AND RON MCGIVERN

Key Terms

algorithmic society: A global society in which digital platforms and their proprietary algorithms organize the social distribution of attention and information.

audience reception: The process by which an audience receives and decodes media messages.

authenticity: A quality of charismatic authority based on the perceived sincerity, “realness” or truth of their messages.

bias of communication: The influence of a form of communication on the organization of society.

code: A set of instructions for how to assemble signifying elements into a message that communicates meaning and makes sense to an audience.

cognitive mapping: The ability to locate oneself within a meaningful whole or mental map of the social world.

collective conscience: The shared beliefs, morals, attitudes or mental life of a society.

collective representations: The meanings, symbols, concepts, categories, and images shared by a social collectivity.

culture industry: The collection of media corporations and commercial enterprises that produce standardized cultural goods — films, radio programmes, TV, pop music, magazines, etc. — that are used to transform audiences into a mass of passive consumers.

decoding: The process whereby an audience actively interprets or deciphers the meaning of a media text or representation.

digital divide: The uneven access to technology around race, class, and geographic lines.

digital media: Computer mediated communication networks.

dominant-hegemonic position: The standpoint of a media audience member who interprets a media text in terms of the dominant or preferred meanings of society.

echo chamber: A social media environment in which a person only see beliefs or opinions that align with their own, so that their existing views are reinforced or uncritically confirmed back to them and exposure to alternative ideas is inhibited.

encoding: The process whereby events or raw reality depicted in a representation are turned into messages that convey specific cultural meanings.

filter bubble: A social media condition created by algorithms that personalize or filter an individual's online experience in which users encounter only information and opinions that align with and confirm their existing beliefs.

fourth estate: The watchdog role of the professional news media that monitors the government of society by exposing excesses and corruption, and holding those in power accountable.

fragmentation of knowledge: The condition in which members of a society no longer share a single, unified universe of meaning and understanding.

gatekeeping: The sorting process by which thousands of possible messages are shaped into a mass media — appropriate form and reduced to a manageable amount.

grand narratives: Overarching narratives of that give order, meaning and direction to a society.

ideology: A set of ideas that conceal, distort, or justify power relations in a society.

ideology critique: The critical practice of revealing, analyzing, and challenging the underlying ideological assumptions of social discourses.

influencer: An authority able to filter, interpret, and explain media messages to an audience.

influencer marketing: A form of social media marketing that involves product placements and endorsements from online personalities who use their social media following as a ready made and motivated market.

information silo: An information management system in which one component is not able to freely communicate or share information with another component.

information society: A society in which the sources of economic productivity and political power are based on new information technologies (e.g., micro-electronic computation, digital communications technologies, genetic engineering) and the generation, processing, and transformation of information.

knowledge gap: The gap in information that develops through unequal access to digital technology.

latent functions: The unrecognized or unintended consequences of a social process.

mass: A large and disperse group, lacking self-awareness and self-identity, whose members are largely unknown to one another, and who are incapable of acting together in a concerted way to achieve objectives.

mass media: Forms of communication like newspapers, radio, television, social media platforms, that pass from from a centralized location to the masses.

media: All print, digital, and electronic means of communication.

media bias: A prejudice in favour of a particular viewpoint in the selection of the events and stories that are reported and how they are covered.

media effects: The outcomes of a causal relationship between media content and audience behaviour.

media filters: Mechanisms like ideology, sourcing, and flak in which media messages are crafted to present and support the interests of dominant groups in society.

mediascape: The mediated environment of a society based on the circulation of media images, messages, news stories, and representations.

medium: A means or channel of communication.

narcotizing dysfunction: When people are too overwhelmed with media input to really care about the issue, their involvement becomes defined by awareness instead of by action about the issue at hand.

negotiated position: The standpoint of a media audience member who interprets a media text in terms of the dominant or preferred meanings of society but makes exceptions to the dominant interpretation based on specific situations or local conditions.

network media economy: The combined economic activity of communication infrastructure companies, digital and traditional media, and internet application companies.

new media: All interactive forms of information exchange.

oppositional position: The standpoint of a media audience member who interprets a media text by rejecting the dominant or preferred meanings of society and replacing them with a set of oppositional meanings or alternative frame of reference.

panoptic surveillance: A form of constant monitoring from centralized observation posts in which the the observed is never communicated with directly.

parasocial: One-sided relationships between celebrities and audiences in which the celebrity remains unaware of their impact on fans, while fans dedicate significant time and energy in getting to know the celebrity.

platform: A website or application that enables two or more individuals or groups to interact.

platform capitalism: A form of capital accumulation in which value and competitive advantage are extracted from the data of platform users.

propaganda model: A framework for understanding the role of the media as means of manufacturing consent to the rule of powerful corporate interests.

public sphere: An open democratic space for public debate and deliberation.

representations: The use of signs and symbols to stand in for referents: experiences, events, things, ideas, and people, for example.

rhetoric: The art of using language to persuade or influence others.

simulation: The blurring of the boundaries between reality and representation through the creation, dissemination, and consumption of models of reality.

social construction of reality: The way in which an understanding of what is real is created through human interaction and communication with others.

social control: The regulation and enforcement of norms.

social order: An arrangement of regular, predictable practices and behaviours on which society's members base their daily lives and expectations.

social solidarity: The degree to which a group of people cohere or are bound together through shared consciousness, qualities or social ties.

space-biased media: Forms of communication using impermanent but easily transportable materials like paper or papyrus that are suited to transmission of messages over distances.

space of flows: A reconfiguration of space through digitally mediated linkages and continuous flows of information that bypass traditional geographical, state and institutional boundaries.

stereotypes: Oversimplified ideas about groups of people based on rigid generalizations.

time-biased media: Forms of communication using durable materials like clay tablets, carved stone or pictographs that sustain a consistent message through time.

timeless time: The degree to which the sequencing of time into a clearly demarcated succession of past, present and future is eliminated through the use of instantaneous media communication technologies.

two-step flow of information: A communication model in which the effectiveness of the message is enabled by an influential intermediary between the sender of a message and the audience.

vertical integration: An organization structure in which a corporation owns different businesses within the same chain of production and distribution.

virtuality: The quality of having the attributes of something without sharing its real or imagined physical form.

Section Summary

16.1 Media and Society

Forms of communication and media have a powerful role in the way societies are structured. Time biased media, space biased media, mass media and digital media all affect the organization of society. Over the last 150 years, societies have seen change in their dominant media of communication from the print newspaper and photographs, to film, radio and television, to the platforms of digital media today. Changes in media technology continuously transform the media landscape people move through and the mediated ways in which they are connected with others.

16.2 Sociological Frameworks for Understanding Media

Questions about media and mediated society can be examined from different sociological perspectives. *Positivist approaches* tend to discuss the effects or impacts media have on audiences. Structural functionalists focus on the *social functions* of media in society: social solidarity, social coordination, entertainment, socialization or social control. *Critical sociological approaches* examine the exercise of power through the media. For example, the sociological focus on media concentration and corporate ownership of the media is largely a question concerning *whose* ideas and worldview are being transmitted and whose are marginalized. *Interpretive approaches* tend to focus on the construction of meaning in the media and the processes whereby audiences interpret or receive those meanings. For example, interpretive sociologists would examine the **codes** that operate in media representations, since these codes often are the means by which racial and gender stereotypes, ideologies, or commercial messages are transmitted in the guise of news, information, or entertainment.

16.3 Media and Postmodern Culture

The relationship between media and postmodern culture revolves around the effects of living in a thoroughly mediated society in which people base their opinions, identities, information and connection to the world on media representations rather than direct experience. Postmodern culture is characterized by (1) a fragmentation of knowledge, (2) simulation, or a blurring of the boundaries between reality and representation, and (3) a skepticism of grand narratives and universal truths. Forms of contemporary media such as social media, digital technologies and algorithms amplify or promote these aspects of postmodern culture. In the thoroughly mediated society of the 21st century, “what is real,” “what is unifying” and “what is true” seem increasingly uncertain.

Questions

Quiz: Media and Popular Culture

16.1 Media and Society

1. McLuhan's insight that "the medium is the message" means _____.
 - a. The eye is an extension of the human nervous system.
 - b. The technological form of the media is less important than the messages presented in the media.
 - c. The messages presented in the media are less important than the technological form of the media.
 - d. Oracles do not need advertising.
2. In the sociological study of media, "representations" are _____.
 - a. Arguments made by media lawyers.
 - b. Signs and symbols that stand in for directly lived experiences or referents.
 - c. Ideal forms used to model aspects of mediated experience.
 - d. Biases of the ruling class.
3. An example of time-biased media is _____.
 - a. Papyrus
 - b. A smoke signal
 - c. Email
 - d. A petroglyph
4. An example of mass media is a _____.
 - a. Magazine
 - b. Telephone
 - c. Megaphone
 - d. Written order
5. The products of the culture industry are characterized by _____.
 - a. Avant garde art, heteroglossic literature and 12 tone scales.
 - b. Advertizing, sourcing and flak.
 - c. Standardization, stereotype and conservatism.
 - d. Democratic "talk back," accountability and rational discourse.
6. An information society is one in which the sources of economic productivity and political power are based on _____.
 - a. Mass communications and marketing.
 - b. New information technologies.

- c. Social media branding, industrial productivity and profits.
 - d. All of the above.
7. Digital media are _____.
- a. Based on series of digits in a computer code.
 - b. Conducive to ad hoc networks of actors.
 - c. Sources of virtual mediascapes.
 - d. All of the above.
8. Which of the following is not a form of digital media?
- a. Cable television
 - b. A cooking blog
 - c. Facebook
 - d. All of the above
9. Digital media communicate _____.
- a. From the one-to-many.
 - b. From one-to-one.
 - c. From many-to-many.
 - d. All of the above.

16.2 Sociological Frameworks for Understanding Media

10. The hypothesis that violent media content will desensitize audiences to violence in society is an example of a model of _____:
- a. Media effects
 - b. Decoding effects
 - c. Media bias
 - d. Narcotizing dysfunction
11. When it comes to media and technology, a functionalist would focus on _____.
- a. The symbols created and reproduced by the media
 - b. The association of technology and technological skill with men
 - c. The way that various forms of media socialize users
 - d. The digital divide between the technological haves and have-nots
12. Age is a risk factor for negative outcomes associated with social media use including:
- a. Lack of self-regulation among children and adolescents may impede their ability to avoid risks such as overuse of social media or use at inappropriate hours
 - b. Over-posting on Facebook among seniors may lead to lost sleep and contribute to daytime dysfunction, such as having trouble concentrating.
 - c. Social comparison poses a greater threat to the mental wellbeing of middle age women than men, possibly because middle age women place more emphasis on social comparison when assessing their self-worth.

- d. Younger demographics in developing countries are more exposed to the “timeless time” of dominant, digitally mediated economic processes, leading to generational conflict with older demographics who are still subject to seasonal time, biological time and clock time.
13. The use of the term ideology in sociology refers to _____.
- a. A set of ideas that define a social perspective like conservatism, liberalism, socialism, racism, environmentalism, etc.
 - b. A set of ideas that socially construct the experience of reality.
 - c. The collective conscience of a society.
 - d. A set of ideas that conceal, distort, or justify power relations in a society.
14. When all media sources report a simplified version of the environmental impact of hydraulic fracturing, with no effort to convey the hard science and complicated statistical data behind the story, _____ is probably occurring.
- a. The digital divide
 - b. Gatekeeping
 - c. Vertical integration
 - d. Platform capitalism
15. Three of the media filters described in the propaganda model of media bias include:
- a. Sourcing, advertising and flak.
 - b. Ideology, ownership and algorithms.
 - c. Panoptic surveillance, gatekeeping and censorship.
 - d. Granular, molar and molecular.
16. Influencers’ ability to filter, interpret and explain media messages to an audience is an example of _____.
- a. Interpretive redundancy or re-presentation.
 - b. The dominant-hegemonic position.
 - c. The social integration function of the mass media.
 - d. The two-step flow of communication.
17. The use of Facebook to create an online persona by only posting images that match your ideal self exemplifies the _____ that can occur in forms of digital media.
- a. Social construction of reality
 - b. Ability to express authenticity
 - c. Tracking of personalized data
 - d. Virtual idolatry

16.3 Media and Postmodern Culture

18. Three qualities of postmodern culture are _____.
- a. Neo-Luddites, technophiles and cyberfeminism
 - b. Fragmentation of knowledge, simulation and skepticism toward grand narratives.

- c. Cognitive mapping, critique of superficiality and belief in progress
 - d. Artificial intelligence, algorithms and 3D virtual reality technology
19. A parasocial relationship is _____.
- a. An attraction towards French umbrellas.
 - b. An online or mediated relationship such as online dating
 - c. A one way relationship between a celebrity and an audience member.
 - d. A shared identity with an online tribe.
20. Pastiche refers to _____.
- a. A postmodern media form that imitates the style of previous work or genre.
 - b. A delicious egg based meal.
 - c. The use of speech or expression to indicate the opposite of what is said.
 - d. Media forms that reveal the contrivances of their own production.

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

16.1 Media and Society

1. Where and how do you get your news? Do you watch network television? Read the newspaper? Go online? How about your parents or grandparents? Do you think it matters where you seek out information? Why or why not?
2. Do you believe digital media allows for the kind of unifying moments that television and radio programming used to? If so, give an example.
3. Where are you most likely to notice advertisements? What causes them to catch your attention?
4. How has digital media changed social interactions? Do you believe it has deepened or weakened human connections? Defend your answer.
5. Conduct sociological research. Google yourself. How much information about you is available to the public? How many and what types of companies offer private information about you for a fee? Compile the data and statistics you find. Write a paragraph or two about the social issues and behaviours you notice.

16.2 Sociological Frameworks for Understanding Media

6. Contrast positivist, critical and interpretive approaches to media. What does each approach focus on?
7. Contrast a functionalist viewpoint of digital surveillance with a critical perspective viewpoint.
8. In what ways has the internet affected how you view reality? Explain using a symbolic interactionist perspective.
9. The issue of media ownership has changed focus with the rise of digital media. How and why?

10. Select an advertisement and describe the codes used to convey a meaning about the product being sold. What background knowledge do you rely on to decode the meaning of the ad? Compare how a functionalist, critical sociologist and interpretive sociologist would understand how the ad “works.”

16.3 Media and Postmodern Culture

11. As we now have access to media products like TV or film from different eras, it is possible to compare different styles of media. Is there something distinct about contemporary pop culture that distinguishes it from pop culture of the 1970s or 1950s? Would you call this distinction postmodern? Why?
12. Compare your media feed or recommendations on Google, YouTube, Instagram, or similar social media platform with your parents’ feed. How do algorithms affect what you and your parents see on social media? Do you think that they they create an echo chamber or filter bubble?
13. Some have argued that there has been a reaction against postmodern irony and pastiche, which has taken the form of a desire for meaning, sincerity, hope and progress (sometimes referred to as “metamodernism”). What do you think? Has postmodernism run its course? Is there a post-postmodernism?

Further Research

16.1 Media and Society

For a general survey of media studies from a Canadian perspective see Media-Studies.ca.

For more on the work and legacy of Marshall McLuhan see the website of Centre for Culture and Technology at the University of Toronto.

To learn more about the digital divide and why it matters, check out the Learning Portal on digital citizenship.

16.2 Sociological Frameworks for Understanding Media

Noam Chomsky has spent a career developing critical analyses of media and public policy that goes beyond the propaganda model of the media. Read his work at Chomsky.Info: The Noam Chomsky Website.

To explore the implications of panoptic surveillance, review some surveillance studies at the free, open source Surveillance and Society website.

The interpretive sociology of coding and decoding is based on the field of study known as semiotics. For an introduction to the concepts and terminology of semiotics see Daniel Chandler’s Semiotics for Beginners.

16.3 Media and Postmodern Culture

See reports of virtual pop star Hatsune Miku’s holographic concert in Toronto in 2016 on CBC Radio’s q review: q review: Enter Hatsune Miku’s hologram concert.

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Solutions to Section Quiz

1 C, | 2 B, | 3 D, | 4 A, | 5 C, | 6 B, | 7 D, | 8 A, | 9 D, | 10 A, | 11 C, | 12 A, | 13 D, | 14 B, | 15 A, | 16 D, | 17 A, | 18 B, | 19 C, | 20 A, [\[Return to Quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 17. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS



Figure 17.1 In 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest the humiliation of having the goods from his street vending stall confiscated, sparking the Tunisian revolution of 2011 and the Arab Spring. How did this act of desperation become a pivotal political act? (Photo taken January 22, 2011, courtesy of Niawag/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

Learning Objectives

17.1 Power and Authority

- Define and differentiate between government, power, and authority.
- Identify and describe the three types of authority.

17.2 Democratic Will Formation

- Explain the significance of the difference between direct democracy and representative democracy.
- Describe the dynamic of political demand and political supply in determining the democratic “will of the people.”

17.3 The De-Centring of the State: Terrorism, War, Empire, and Political Exceptionalism

- Identify and describe factors of political exception that affect contemporary political life.

17.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Government and Power

- Understand how functionalists, critical sociologists, and symbolic interactionists view government and politics.

Introduction to Government and Politics

In one of Max Weber’s last public lectures — “Politics as a Vocation” (1919) — he asked, what is the meaning of political action in the context of a whole way of life? (More accurately, he used the term *Lebensführung*: what is the meaning of political action in the context of a whole *conduct* of life, a theme the chapter returns to in the next section). He asked, what is actually *political* about political action and what is the place of political action in the ongoing conduct of social life?

Until recently students of political sociology might have been satisfied with an answer that examined how various political institutions and processes function in society: the state, the government, the civil service, the courts, the democratic process, etc. However, in the 21st century, among many other examples sociologists could cite, the events of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain (2010–2012) put seemingly stable political institutions and processes into question. Through the collective action of ordinary citizens, the long-lasting authoritarian regimes of Ben Ali, Gadhafi, Mubarak, and Saleh were brought to an end through what some called “revolution.” Not only did the political institutions all of a sudden not function as they had for decades, [but] they were also shown not to be at the center of political action at all. What do sociologists learn about the place of politics in social life from these examples?

Revolutions are often presented as monumental, foundational political events that happen only rarely and historically: the American revolution (1776), the French revolution (1789), the Russian revolution (1917), the Chinese revolution (1949), the Cuban revolution (1959), the Iranian revolution (1979), etc. But the events in North Africa remind us that revolutionary political action is always a possibility, not just a rare political occurrence. Samuel Huntington defines **revolution** as:

a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies. Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups, and wars of independence (Huntington 1968, p. 264).

What is at stake in revolution is also, therefore, the larger question that Max Weber was asking about political action. In a sense, the question of the role of politics in a whole way of life asks how a whole way of life comes into existence in the first place.

How do revolutions occur? In Tunisia, the street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire after his produce cart was confiscated. The injustice of this event provided an emblem for the widespread conditions of poverty, oppression, and humiliation experienced by a majority of the population. In this case, the revolutionary action might be said to have originated in the way that Bouazizi’s act sparked a radicalization in people’s sense of **citizenship** and power: their

internal feelings of individual dignity, rights, and freedom and their capacity to act on them. It was a moment in which, after living through decades of deplorable conditions, people suddenly felt their own power and their own capacity to act. Sociology is interested in studying the conditions of such examples of citizenship and power.

Media Attributions

- **Figure 17.1** [Mohamed Bouazizi](#) by Niawag, via Flickr, is used under a [CC BY-NC 2.0](#) licence.

17.1 Power and Authority



Figure 17.2 The Parliament Buildings in Ottawa symbolize the authority of the Canadian state. (Courtesy of West Annex News/Flickr.) [CC BY SA 2.0](#)

The nature of political control — what sociologists define as **power** and **authority** — is an important part of society.

Sociologists have a distinctive approach to studying governmental power and authority that differs from the perspective of political scientists. For the most part, political scientists focus on studying how power is distributed in different types of political systems. They would observe, for example, that the Canadian political system is a constitutional monarchy divided into three distinct branches of government (legislative, executive, and judicial), and might explore how public opinion affects political parties, elections, and the political process in general. Sociologists, however, tend to be more interested in **government** more generally; that is, the various means and strategies used to direct or *conduct* the

behaviour and actions of others (or of oneself). As Michel Foucault described it, government is the “conduct of conduct,” the way some seek to act upon the conduct of others to change or channel that conduct in a certain direction (Foucault 1982, pp. 220–221). Government is not so much a specific institution, but the *process* of governing exercised in various sites throughout society.

Government implies that there are *relations of power* between rulers and ruled, but the context of rule is not limited to the state. Government in this sense is in operation whether the power relationship is between states and citizens, institutions and clients, parents and children, doctors and patients, employers and employees, masters and dogs, or even oneself and oneself. Think of the training regimes, studying routines, or diets people put themselves through as they seek to change or direct their lives in a particular way. These are exercises of self-government. The role of the state and its influence on society (and vice versa) is just one aspect of governmental relationships.

On the other side of governmental power and authority are the various forms of resistance to being ruled. Foucault (1982) argues that without this latitude for resistance or independent action on the part of the one over whom power is exercised, there is no relationship of power or government. There is only a relationship of violence or force. One central question sociological analysis asks therefore is: Why do people obey, especially in situations when it is not in their objective interests to do so? “Why do men fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?” as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari once put it (Deleuze and Guattari 1977). This entails a more detailed study of what is meant by **power**.

Making Connections: Social Policy and Debate

Neoliberalism as Style of Government




Figure 17.3 The study of government as a practice – the “conduct of conduct” – rather than a “thing” is key to understanding the different ways in which people with disabilities are governed or treated (Image courtesy of GDS Infographics/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Neoliberalism is fascinating sociologically because, aside from being a type of economic policy (see [Chapter 4. Society and Modern Life](#)), it signals a new way of governing individuals. This has broad implications outside of the narrow parameters of neoliberal policies like tax cuts, deregulation, and reducing the state’s role in the economy. Neoliberalism also refers to a more general strategy of governing individual conduct in several different areas including health, employment, education, security, and crime control. In an interesting way, it governs individuals through their exercise of freedom and free choice. Whereas the welfare state was frequently criticized by neoliberals for fostering a culture of welfare dependency and a “one size fits all” concept of government services, the new types of neoliberal strategies emphasize various ways to create active and independent entrepreneurial citizens (Rose, 1999). Thus, the idea of markets is important because markets are mechanisms that regulate and discipline people through the free choices that they make. If they make good choices they profit; if they make bad choices they pay.

One thing the “neo” (or “new”) in neo-liberalism signifies is the extension of the idea of the market into areas of life where no markets existed before. For example, the provision of care for people with disabilities

used to be provided through state institutionalization. Today, it is common to find a model of care like “individualized funding” (See, for example, Community Living BC, 2013). The state provides families of people with disabilities with direct payments that they use to pay for care providers who they choose after doing their own research on appropriate therapies or treatments. A market for caregivers and therapists is created, based on an assumption that this is a more efficient model for matching the skills of care contractors with the needs of people with disabilities. Rather than care being provided as needed, individuals or families are encouraged or *obliged* to become active consumers of therapeutic services and to make calculative decisions from an array of market choices. The families need to demonstrate their competent use of the money through formal mechanisms like budgets, audits, targets, minimal standards, and contracts but otherwise are free to choose the services they want.

In practice these policies are often means to further reduce the overall amount of state expenditure for people with disabilities and their families, but as a method for governing the lives of individuals, they represent a fundamental shift from the notion of individuals as citizens with rights to individuals as agents who must independently exercise free choice, enterprise, and self-responsibility. Even though these types of policies, when properly funded, have positive features for those with the wherewithal to take advantage of the expansion of choice (Sandborn, 2012), they represent a significant shift in the strategies of government by downloading risks and responsibilities onto individuals. Thus, neoliberalism is both a macro-level economic policy, but it is also a strategy designed to change the type of relationship people have with themselves and the concept of themselves as citizens.

What Is Power?

For centuries, philosophers, politicians, and social scientists have explored and commented on the nature of power. Pittacus (c. 640–568 BCE) opined, “The measure of a man is what he does with power,” and Lord Acton perhaps more famously asserted, “Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely” (1887). Indeed, the concept of power can have decidedly negative connotations, and the term itself is difficult to define. There are at least two definitions of power, which are designated below as power (1) and power (2).

As noted above, power relationships refer in general to a kind of strategic relationship between rulers and the ruled: a set of practices by which states seek to govern the life of their citizens, managers seek to control the labour of their workers, parents seek to guide and raise their children, dog owners seek to train their dogs, doctors seek to manage the health of their patients, chess players seek to control the moves of their opponents, individuals seek to keep their own lives in order, etc. These practices are *strategic* in the sense that they anticipate resistance on the part of the governed and therefore plan various ways to overcome resistance to achieve their goals.



Figure 17.4 Prince William is in the line of succession to become head of state in Canada and Great Britain, but he will have limited involvement in the day-to-day operations of government. (Photo courtesy of Herry Lawford/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Many of these sites of the exercise of power fall outside our normal understanding of power because they do not seem “political” — they do not address fundamental questions or disagreements about a “whole way of life” — and because the relationships between power and resistance in them can be very fluid. There is a give and take between the attempts of the rulers to direct the behaviour of the ruled and the attempts of the ruled to resist those directions. In many cases, it is difficult to see relationships as power relationships at all unless they become fixed or authoritarian. This is because the conventional understanding of power is that one person or one group of people *has power over* another. In other words, when people think about somebody, some group, or some institution having power over them, they are thinking about a relation of *domination*.




Figure 17.5 Max Weber’s “Politics as a Vocation” (1919). (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Max Weber defined **power (1)** as “the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action” (Weber 1919a). It is the varying degrees of ability a person or persons have to exercise their will over others. When these “chances” become structured as forms of **domination**, the give and take between power and resistance is fixed into more or less permanent hierarchical arrangements. They become institutionalized. As such, power affects more than personal relationships; it shapes larger dynamics like social groups, professional organizations, and governments. Similarly, a government’s power is not necessarily limited to control of its own citizens. A dominant nation, for instance, will often use its power to influence or support other governments or to seize control of other nation states. Efforts by the Canadian government to wield power in other countries have included joining with other nations to form the Allied forces during World Wars I and II, entering Afghanistan in 2001 with the NATO mission to topple the Taliban regime, and imposing sanctions on the government of Russia in the hopes of constraining its invasion of Ukraine.

Endeavours to gain power and influence do not necessarily lead to domination, violence, exploitation, or abuse. Leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi, for example, commanded powerful movements that affected positive change without military force. Both men organized nonviolent protests to combat corruption and injustice and succeeded in inspiring major reform. They relied on a variety of nonviolent protest strategies such as rallies, sit-ins, marches,

petitions, and boycotts.

It is therefore important to retain the distinction between domination and power. Politics and power are not “things” that are exclusively properties of the **state** or properties of an individual, ruling class, or group. At a more basic level, **power (2)** is a *capacity* or *ability* that each person has to create and act, individually or collectively. It is a power of action. As a result, power and politics must also be understood as the *collective capacities* people have to create and build new forms of community or “commons” (Negri, 2004). Power in this sense is the power one thinks of when people speak of an *ability* to do or create something — a potential. Just as a carpenter has the potential to build a house, people have the ability to build community and collectively accomplish goals. It is the way in which people collectively give form to the communities that they live in, whether at a very local level or a global level. Power establishes the things that people can do and the things that people cannot do.

The Greek philosopher Aristotle’s original notion of politics is the idea of a freedom people grant themselves to rule

themselves (Aristotle, 1908). Therefore, power is not *in principle* domination. It is the give and take people experience in everyday life as they come together to construct a better community — a “good life” as Aristotle put it. When Deleuze and Guattari (1977) ask why people obey even when it is not in their best interests, they are asking about the conditions in which power is exercised as domination. Thus, the critical task of sociology is to ask how people might free themselves from the constraints of domination to engage more actively and freely in the creation of community.

Making Connections: Big Picture

Did Facebook and Twitter Cause the Arab Spring?

Recent movements and protests that were organized to reform governments and install democratic ideals in North African and the Middle East have been collectively labelled “Arab Spring” by journalists. In describing the dramatic reform and protests in these regions, journalists have noted the use of internet platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, some even implying that this technology has been instrumental in spurring these reforms. In states with a strong capacity for media censorship, social sites provided an opportunity for citizens to circumvent authoritarian restrictions (Zuckerman, 2011).

As social movement activists in North Africa used the internet to communicate, it provided them with an invaluable tool: anonymity. John Pollock (2011), in an authoritative analysis published in MIT’s *Technology Review*, gave readers an intriguing introduction to two transformative revolutionaries named “Foetus” and “Waterman,” who are leaders in the Tunisian rebel group Takriz. Both men relied heavily on the internet to communicate and even went as far as to call it the “GPS” (Global Positioning System) for the revolution (Pollock, 2011). Before the internet, meetings of protestors led by dissidents like Foetus and Waterman often required participants to assemble in person, placing them at risk of being raided by government officials. Thus, leaders would more likely have been jailed, tortured — and perhaps even killed — before movements could gain momentum.

The internet also enabled widespread publicity about the atrocities being committed in the Arab region. The fatal beating of Khaled Said, a young Egyptian computer programmer, provides a prime example. Said, who possessed videos highlighting acts of police corruption in Egypt, was brutally killed by law enforcement officers in the streets of Alexandria. After Said’s beating, Said’s brother used his cell phone to capture photos of his brother’s grisly corpse and uploaded them to Facebook. The photos were then used to start a protest group called “We Are All Khaled Said,” which now has more than a million members (Pollock, 2011).



Figure 17.6 Young people and students were among the most ardent supporters of democratic reform in the recent Arab Spring. Social media also played an important role in rallying grassroots support. (Photo courtesy of Chris Belsten/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Numerous other videos and images, similarly appalling, were posted on social media sites to build awareness and incite activism among local citizens and the larger global community.

Of course, the internet has also been used by states and other powerful actors to spread disinformation and propaganda and to undermine resistance movements. During the Arab Spring, authoritarian states seemed unprepared to respond to the effective use of social media by social media activists. But Pollock (2017) reports on the increasing “weaponization of information” by state actors. For example, following the shooting down of the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over Ukraine by Russian anti-aircraft missiles in 2014, the Russian response was to use social media to deny responsibility and to invent and circulate counternarratives. “Russia’s tactics ... rely on ... ‘the 4D approach’: ‘Dismiss, distort, distract, dismay. Never confess, never admit—just keep on attacking.’ Critics are besmirched, sometimes in an official announcement, sometimes through proxies, sometimes through anonymous sources quoted in state media; then paid trolls and highly automated networks of bots add scale” (Pollock, 2017). Social media platforms are increasingly used in this way to weaponize information and circulate misinformation as a way to neutralize processes of democratic will formation.

Politics and the State



Figure 17.7 The ancient Acropolis in Athens, Greece (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY SA 2.5](#)

What is politics? What is political? The words *politics* and *political* refer back to the ancient Greek *polis* or city-state. For the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 BCE), the polis was the ideal *political form* that collective life took. Political life was life oriented toward the “good life” or toward the collective achievement of noble qualities. The term “politics” referred simply to matters of concern to the running of the polis.

Behind Aristotle’s idea of the polis is the concept of an autonomous, self-contained community in which people rule themselves. The people of the polis take it upon themselves to collectively *create* a way of living together that is conducive to the achievement of human aspirations and good life. Similar to the definition of power, there are at least two definitions of politics, which are designated below as politics (1) and politics (2).

Politics (1) is the means by which form is given to the life of a people. Citizens give themselves the responsibility to create the conditions in which the good life can be achieved. For Aristotle, this meant that there was an ideal size for a polis, which he defined as the number of people that could be taken in a single glance (Aristotle 1908). The city-state was for him therefore the ideal form for political life in ancient Greece.

Today people think of the **nation-state** as the form of modern political life. A nation-state is a political unit whose boundaries are co-extensive with a society, that is, with a cultural, linguistic, or ethnic *nation*. Politics is the sphere of

activity involved in running the state. As Max Weber defines it, **politics (2)** is the activity of “striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state” (Weber 1919b). This might be too narrow a way to think about politics, however, because it often makes it appear that politics is something that only happens far away in “the state.” It is a way of giving form to politics that takes control out of the hands of people.

Max Weber: Classical definitions of politics and the state

“A ‘ruling organization’ will be called ‘political’ in so far as its existence and order is continuously safeguarded within a given territorial area by the threat and application of physical force on the part of the administrative staff. A compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called a ‘state’ in so far as administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order. Social action, especially organized action, will be spoken of as ‘politically oriented’ if it aims at exerting influence on the government of a political organization; especially at the appropriation, expropriation, redistribution or allocation of powers of government” (Weber 1978).



Figure 17.8 Weber’s definitions of politics and the state seem straightforward in the modern age but would have been surprising to people living before the 18th century. How do they apply to contemporary concepts of failed states or states that are at war? (Image courtesy of Wikipedia.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

In fact, the modern nation-state is a relatively recent political form.

Foraging societies had no formal state institution, and prior to the modern age, feudal Europe was divided into a complex patchwork of small overlapping jurisdictions. Feudal secular authority was often at odds with religious authority. It was not until the Peace of Westphalia (1648) at the end of the Thirty Years War that the modern nation-state system can be said to have come into existence. Even then, Germany, for example, did not become a unified state until 1871. Prior to 1867, most of the colonized territory that became Canada was owned by one of the earliest corporations: the Hudson’s Bay Company. It was not governed by a state at all. If politics is the means by which form is given to the life of a people, then it is clear that this is a type of activity that has varied throughout history. Politics is not exclusively about the state or a property of the state. The question is, why do people come to think that it is?

The modern state is based on the principle of **sovereignty** and the sovereign state system. **Sovereignty** is the political form in which a single, central “sovereign” or supreme lawmaking authority governs within a clearly demarcated territory. The **sovereign state system** is the structure by which the world is divided up into separate and indivisible sovereign territories. At present there are 193 member states in the United Nations (United Nations, 2013). The entire globe is thereby divided up into separate states except for the oceans and Antarctica.



Figure 17.9 The frontispiece from Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651). The Leviathan was a sea monster in the Bible but is here shown in the form of a crowned monarch whose body is composed of individuals. (Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.)
[Public Domain](#)

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) is the early modern English political philosopher whose *Leviathan* (1651) established modern thought on the nature of sovereignty. Hobbes argued that social order, or what sociologists would call today “society” — “peaceable, sociable and comfortable living” (Hobbes 1651) — depended on an unspoken *contract* between the citizens and the “sovereign” or ruler. In this contract, individuals give up their natural rights to use violence to protect themselves and further their interests and cede them to a sovereign. In exchange, the sovereign provides law and security for all (i.e., for the “commonwealth”). For Hobbes, there could be no society in the absence of a sovereign power that stands above individuals to “over-awe them all” (Hobbes, 1651). Life would otherwise be in a “state of nature” or a state of “war of everyone against everyone.” People would live in “continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man [would be] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

It is worthwhile to examine these premises, however, because they continue to structure contemporary political life even if the absolute rule of monarchs has been replaced by the democratic rule of the people in many states. (An **absolute monarchy** is a government wherein a monarch has absolute or unmitigated power). The implication of Hobbes’s analysis is that the people must acquiesce to the absolute power of a single sovereign or sovereign assembly, which, in turn, cannot ultimately be held to any standard of justice or morality outside of its own guarantee of order. Who or what would have the power to enforce that standard? Therefore, democracy always exists in a state of tension with the authority of the sovereign state. Similarly, while order is maintained by “the sovereign” *within* the

sovereign state, *outside* the state or between states there is no sovereign to “over-awe them all.” The international sovereign state system is always *potentially* in a state of war of all against all. It offered a neat solution to the problem of confused and overlapping political jurisdictions in medieval Europe, but is itself inherently unstable (Walker, 1993).

Hobbes' definition of sovereignty is also the context of Max Weber's definition of the state. Weber defines the **state**, not as an institution or decision-making body, but as "a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory*" (Weber 1919b). Weber's definition emphasizes the way in which the state is founded on the control of territory through the use of force. In his lecture "Politics as a Vocation," he argues, "The decisive means for politics is violence" (Weber 1919b). However, as noted above, power is not always exercised through the use of force. Nor would a modern sociologist accept that it is conferred through a mysterious "contract" with the sovereign, as Hobbes argued. Therefore, why do people submit to rule? "When and why do men obey?" (Weber 1919b). Weber's answer is based on a distinction between the concepts of power and authority.

Types of Authority



Figure 17.11 Nazi leader Adolf Hitler (right) was one of the most powerful and destructive dictators in modern history, pictured here with fascist Benito Mussolini of Italy. Both Hitler and Mussolini were regarded as popular charismatic leaders. (Photo courtesy of U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, National Archives Identifier (NAID) 540151/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

beneficial, or true.

A citizen's interaction with a police officer is a good example of how people react to authority in everyday life. For instance, a person who sees the flashing red and blue lights of a police car in their rearview mirror usually pulls to the side of the road without hesitation. Such a driver most likely assumes that the police officer behind him serves as a legitimate source of authority and has the right to pull a driver over. As part of the officer's official duties, they have the power to issue a speeding ticket if the driver was driving too fast. If the same officer, however, were to command the



Figure 17.10 May 1968 protest poster from Paris, France, decrying the use of force by state authorities. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

The protesters in Tunisia and the civil rights protesters of Mahatma Gandhi's day had influence apart from their position in a government. Their influence came, in part, from their ability to advocate for what many people held as important values. Government leaders might have this kind of influence as well, but they also have the advantage of wielding power associated with their position in the government. As this example indicates, there is more than one type of authority in a community.

If Weber defined *power* as the ability to achieve desired ends despite the resistance of others (Weber, 1919a), *authority* is when power or domination is perceived to be legitimate or justified rather than coercive. **Authority** refers to accepted power — that is, power that people agree to follow. People listen to authority figures because they feel that these individuals are worthy of respect. Generally speaking, people perceive the objectives and demands of an authority figure as reasonable and

driver to follow the police car home and mow their lawn, the driver would likely protest that the officer does not have the authority to make such a request.

Not all authority figures are police officers or elected officials or government authorities. Besides formal offices, authority can arise from tradition and personal qualities. Max Weber realized this when he examined individual action as it relates to authority, as well as large-scale structures of authority and how they relate to a society's economy. Based on this work, Weber developed a classification system for authority. His three types of authority are traditional authority, charismatic authority, and rational-legal authority (Weber 1922).

Table 17.1 Max Weber identified and explained three distinct types of authority.

	Traditional	Charismatic	Rational-Legal
Source of authority	Legitimized by long-standing custom	Based on a leader's personal qualities	Authority resides in the office, not the person
Authority Figure/Figures	Patriarch	Dynamic personality	Bureaucratic officials
Examples	Patrimonialism (traditional positions of authority)	Jesus Christ, Hitler, Martin Luther King, Jr., Pierre Trudeau	Parliament, Civil Service, Judiciary

Traditional authority is usually understood in the context of premodern power relationships. According to Weber, the power of **traditional authority** is accepted because that has traditionally been the case; its legitimacy exists because it has been accepted for a long time. People obey their lord, church, or parent because it is customary to do so. The authority of the aristocracy or the church is conferred on them through tradition, or the “authority of the ‘eternal yesterday’” (Weber 1919b). Britain's Queen Elizabeth, for instance, occupies a position that she inherited based on the traditional rules of succession for the **monarchy**, a form of government in which a single person, or monarch, rules until that individual dies or abdicates the throne. People adhere to traditional authority because they are invested in the past and feel obligated to perpetuate it. However, in modern society it would also be fair to say that obedience through tradition is in large part a function of a customary or “habitual orientation to conform,” in that people do not generally question or think about the power relationships in which they participate. It is just “the way things are done.”

For Weber, modern authority is better understood to oscillate between the latter two types of legitimacy: rational-legal and charismatic authority. On one hand, as he puts it, “organized domination” relies on “continuous administration” (Weber, 1919) and in particular, the rule-bound form of administration known as bureaucracy. Power made legitimate by laws, written rules, and regulations is termed **rational-legal authority**. In this type of authority, power is vested in a particular system, not in the person implementing the system. However irritating bureaucracy might be, people generally accept its legitimacy because they have the expectation that its processes are conducted in a neutral, disinterested fashion, according to explicit, written rules and laws. Rational-legal types of rule have authority because they *are* rational; that is, they are unbiased, predictable, and efficient.

On the other hand, people also obey because of the charismatic personal qualities of a leader. In this respect, it is not so much a question of obeying as following. Weber saw charismatic leadership as a kind of antidote to the machine-like rationality of bureaucratic mechanisms. It was through the inspiration of a charismatic leader that people found something to believe in, and thereby change could be introduced into the system of continuous bureaucratic administration. The power of **charismatic authority** is accepted because followers are drawn to the leader's personality. The appeal of a charismatic leader can be extraordinary, inspiring followers to make unusual sacrifices or to persevere in the midst of great hardship and persecution. Charismatic leaders usually emerge in times of crisis and offer innovative or radical solutions. They also tend to hold power for only short durations because power based on charisma is fickle and unstable.

The combination of the administrative power of rational-legal forms of domination and charisma have proven to be extremely dangerous, as the rise to power of Adolf Hitler shortly after Weber's death demonstrated. Sociologists might also point to the distortions that the value of charisma introduces into the contemporary political process. There is increasing emphasis on the need to create a public “image” for leaders in electoral campaigns, both by “tweaking” and manufacturing the personal qualities of political candidates — Stephen Harper's sudden propensity for knitted sweaters,

Jean Chretien's "little guy from Shawinigan" persona, Jack Layton's moustache — and by character assassinations through the use of negative advertising — Stockwell Day as "scary, narrow-minded fundamentalist," Paul Martin's "Mr. Dithers" persona, Michael Ignatieff's "the fly-in foreign academic" tag, Justin Trudeau's "cute little puppy" moniker. **Image management**, or the attempt to manage the impact of one's image or impression on others, is all about attempting to manipulate the qualities that Weber called charisma. However, while people often decry the lack of rational debate about the facts of policy decisions in image politics, it is often the case that it is only the political theatre of personality clashes and charisma that draws people in to participate in political life.



Figure 17.12 Pierre Elliott Trudeau (left) was seen as a charismatic leader in the 1960s and 1970s. Does his son Justin (right) have the same qualities of charismatic leadership? Or have the conditions of contemporary public life and image politics changed the nature of charisma and politics? (Images courtesy of Victoria Times Colonist (left) and Wikimedia Commons (right).) [Public Domain](#) and [CC BY-SA 2.5](#)

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17.2 Democratic Will Formation



Figure 17.13 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865). “Politics is the science of liberty: man’s government of his fellow-man, no matter the name under which it lurks, is oppression: society’s highest perfection lies in the marriage of order and anarchy” (1840, p. 54). (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Most people presume that **anarchy**, or the absence of organized government, does not facilitate a desirable living environment for society. They have in the back of their minds the Hobbesian view that the absence of sovereign rule leads to a state of chaos, lawlessness, and war of all against all. However, anarchy literally means “without leader or ruler.” **Anarchism** therefore refers to the political principles and practice of organizing social life without formal or state leadership. As such, the radical standpoint of anarchism provides a useful standpoint from which to examine the sociological question of why leadership in the form of the state is needed in the first place. This question will be addressed again in the final section of this chapter.

The tradition of anarchism developed in Europe in the 19th century in the work of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865), Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876), Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921) and others. It promoted the idea that states were both artificial and malevolent constructs, unnecessary for human social organization (Esenwein 2004). Anarchists proposed that the natural state of society is one of self-governing collectivity, in which people freely group themselves in loose affiliations with one another rather than submitting to government-based or state-made laws. They had in mind the way rural farmers came together to organize farmers’ markets or the cooperative associations of Swiss watchmakers in the Jura mountains. For the anarchists, anarchy was not violent chaos but the cooperative, egalitarian society that would emerge when state power was destroyed.

The anarchist program was (and still is) to maximize the personal freedoms of individuals by organizing society on the basis of voluntary social arrangements. These arrangements would be subject to continual renegotiation. As opposed to right-wing libertarianism, which focuses only on minimizing state intervention, the anarchist tradition argued that the conditions for a cooperative, egalitarian society were the destruction of both the power of the state and of private property (i.e., capital). Libertarian critique tends to leave the market, the power of corporations and other institutional hierarchies, like religion, intact, whereas one of Proudhon’s famous anarchist slogans was “Private property is theft!” (Proudhon 1840).

In practice, 19th century anarchism had the dubious distinction of inventing modern political **terrorism**, or the use of violence on civilian populations and institutions to achieve political ends (Coulter, 2011). This was referred to by Mikhail Bakunin as “propaganda by the deed” (1870). Clearly not all or even most anarchists advocated violence in this manner, but it was widely recognized that the hierarchical structures and institutions of the old society had to be destroyed before the new society could be created.

Nevertheless, the principle of the anarchist model of government is based on the participatory or **direct democracy** of the ancient Greek Athenians. In Athenian direct democracy, decision making, even in matters of detailed policy, was conducted through assemblies made up of all citizens. These assemblies would meet a minimum of forty times a year (Forrest 1966). The root of the word democracy is *demos*, Greek for “people.” **Democracy** is therefore *rule by the people*. Ordinary Athenians directly ran the affairs of Athens. Of course, “all citizens,” for the Greeks, meant all adult men and excluded women, children, and slaves.

Direct democracy can be contrasted with modern forms of **representative democracy**, like that practiced in Canada. In representative democracy, citizens elect representatives (MPs, MLAs, city councillors, etc.) to promote policies that stand for their interests rather than directly participating in decision making themselves. It is based on the idea of *representation* rather than direct citizen *participation*.

Critics note that the representative model of democracy enables distortions to be introduced into the determination of the will of the people: elected representatives are typically not socially representative of their constituencies, as they are dominated by white men and elite occupations like law and business; corporate media ownership and privately funded advertisement campaigns enable the interests of privileged classes to be expressed in politics rather than those of average citizens; and lobbying and private campaign contributions provide access to representatives and decision-making processes that is not afforded to the majority of the population. The distortions that intrude into the processes of representative democracy – for example, whose interests really get represented in government policy? – are no doubt behind the famous comment of the former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who once declared to the House of Commons, “Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government ... except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time” (Shapiro 2006).

Democracy however is not a static political form. Three key elements constitute democracy as a dynamic system: the **institutions of democracy** (parliament, elections, constitutions, rule of law, etc.), **citizenship** (the internalized sense of individual dignity, rights, and freedom that accompanies formal membership in the political community), and the **public sphere** (or open “space” for public debate and deliberation). On the basis of these three elements, rule by the people can be exercised through a process of **democratic will formation**.

Jürgen Habermas (1998) emphasizes that democratic will formation in both direct and representative democracy is reached through a deliberative process. The general will or decisions of the people emerge through the mutual interaction of citizens in the public sphere. The underlying *norm* of the democratic process is what Habermas (1990) calls the **ideal speech situation**. An ideal speech situation is one in which every individual is permitted to take part in



Figure 17.14 In 1894, the anarchist Emile Henry blew up a bomb in the Café Terminus in Paris where wealthy patrons were known to gather, killing 1 and wounding 20. When asked in court why he wanted to kill innocent civilians he responded, “There are no innocent bourgeois” (CBC Radio 2011). (Photo courtesy of Osvaldo Tofani/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

public discussion equally: to question assertions and introduce ideas. Ideally no individual is prevented from speaking (not by arbitrary restrictions on who is permitted to speak, nor by practical restrictions on participation like poverty or lack of education). To the degree that everyone accepts this norm of openness and inclusion, free debate provides a forum where the best ideas will “rise to the top” and be accepted by the majority. On the other hand, when the norms of the ideal speech situation are violated, the process of democratic will formation becomes distorted and open to manipulation.

Political Demand and Political Supply




Figure 17.15 The outcome of political party competition in the 2011 election. (Image courtesy of Noname224/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY SA 2.5](#)

In practice democratic will formation in representative democracies takes place largely through political party

competition in an electoral cycle. Two factors explain the dynamics of democratic party systems: **political demand** and **political supply** (Kitschelt, 1995).

Firstly, **political demand** refers to the underlying societal factors and social changes that create constituencies of people with common interests. People form common political preferences and interests on the basis of their position within the social structure. For example, changes in the types of jobs generated by the economy will affect the size of electoral support for labour unions and labour union politics.

Secondly, **political supply** refers to the strategies and organizational capacities of political parties to deliver an appealing political program to particular constituencies. For example, the Liberal Party of Canada often attempts to develop policies and political messaging that will position it in the middle of the political spectrum where the largest group of voters potentially resides. In the 2011 election, due to leadership issues, organizational difficulties, and the strategies of the other political parties, they were not able to deliver a credible appeal to their traditional centrist constituency and suffered a large loss of seats in Parliament (see Figure 17.15). In the 2015 election, the Conservative Party's program and messaging consolidated its "right wing" constituency of social conservatives and free market proponents but failed to appeal to a sufficient number of people in the center of the Canadian political spectrum to maintain control of government (see Figure 17.15).




Figure 17.16 The outcome of political party competition in the 2015 election. (Image courtesy of Noname2/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY SA 2.5](#)

In the 2019 and 2021 federal elections minority parliaments were elected, meaning that none of the parties won sufficient seats to hold a majority. In part this appears to be a product of the first-past-the-post electoral system, regionalism, and the fragmentation of political supply in the centre and centre-left parties, where approximately 60% of the population divided its vote between Liberals, Bloc Québécois, NDP, and Greens. In both the 2019 and 2021 elections, the Conservatives had difficulty in providing leadership, a platform, and clear messaging, and failed to balance their appeal to both the centrist constituency and the right wing. One product of this was the emergence of a small white nationalist, libertarian constituency to the right of the Conservatives between the 2019 and 2021 elections, which consolidated around the People's Party but without securing any seats.




Figure 17.17 The outcome of political party competition in the 2021 election. (Image courtesy of Eric0892/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

The relationship between political demand and political supply factors in democratic will formation can be illustrated by mapping out constituencies of voters on a left/right spectrum of political preferences (Kitschelt, 1995; see Figure 17.17). While the terms “left wing” and “right wing” are notoriously ambiguous (Ogmundson, 1972), they are often used in a simple manner to describe the basic political divisions of modern society.

In Figure 17.17, one central axis of division in voter preference has to do with the question of how scarce resources are to be distributed in society. At the right end of the spectrum are economic conservatives who advocate minimal taxes

and a purely spontaneous, competitive market-driven mechanism for the distribution of wealth and essential services (including health care and education), while at the left end of the spectrum are socialists who advocate progressive taxes and state redistribution of wealth and services to create social equality or “equality of condition.”

A second axis of division in voter preference has to do with social policy and collective decision modes. At the right end of the spectrum is authoritarianism (law and order, limits on personal autonomy, exclusive citizenship, hierarchical decision making, etc.), while at the left end of the spectrum is individual autonomy or expanded democratization of political processes (maximum individual autonomy in politics and the cultural sphere, equal rights, inclusive citizenship, extra-parliamentary democratic participation, etc.).

Along both axes or spectra of political opinion, one might imagine an elliptically shaped distribution of individuals, with the greatest portion in the middle of each spectrum and far fewer people at the extreme ends. The dynamics of *political supply* in political party competition follow from the way political parties try to position themselves along the spectrum to maximize the number of voters they appeal to while remaining distinct from their political competitors.




Figure 17.18 The space of political competition in public will formation. (Adapted from Kitschelt, 1995, by H. Anggraeni, 2021, Thompson Rivers University.)

Sociologists are typically more interested in the underlying social factors contributing to changes in political demand than in the day-by-day strategies of political supply. One influential theory proposes that since the 1960s, contemporary political preferences have shifted away from older, materialist concerns with economic growth and physical security (i.e., survival values) to **postmaterialist** concerns with quality-of-life issues: personal autonomy, self-expression, environmental integrity, women’s rights, gay rights, the meaningfulness of work, habitability of cities, etc. (Inglehart 2008). From the 1970s on, postmaterialist social movements seeking to expand the domain of personal autonomy and free expression have encountered equally postmaterialist responses by neoconservative groups advocating the return to traditional family values, religious fundamentalism, submission to work discipline, and tough-on-crime initiatives. This has led to a new postmaterialist cleavage structure in political preferences.

Figure 17.17 represents this shift in political preferences in the difference between the ellipse centred on the free-market/state redistribution axis and the ellipse centred on the free-market-social-conservatism/ redistribution-social-liberalism axis (Kitschelt, 1995). As a result of the development of postmaterialist politics, the “left” side of the political spectrum has been increasingly defined by a cluster of political preferences defined by redistributive policies, social and multicultural inclusion, environmental sustainability, and demands for personal autonomy, etc., while the

“right” side has been defined by a cluster of preferences including free-market policies, tax cuts, limits on political engagement, “tough” on crime policy, and social conservative values, etc.

What explains the emergence of a postmaterialist axis of political preferences? Again, sociologists focus on how the effects of globalization, changes in economic structure, factors such as immigration, and emergent issues like climate change and Aboriginal reconciliation affect political demand. Arguably, the experience of citizens for most of the 20th century was defined by economic scarcity and depression, the two World Wars, and the Cold War resulting in the materialist orientation toward the economy, personal security, crime issues and military defence in political demand. The location of individuals within the industrial class structure is conventionally seen as the major determinant of whether they preferred working-class-oriented policies of economic redistribution or capitalist-class-oriented policies of free-market allocation of resources.

In the advanced capitalist or postindustrial societies of the 21st century, the underlying class conditions of voter preference are not so clear. Certainly, the working class does not vote en masse for the traditional working-class party in Canada, the NDP, and voters from the big business, small business, and administrative classes are often divided between the Liberals and Conservatives (Ogmundson, 1972). Some have argued that the shift from Keynesian, welfare state economic policies of the post-War period to neoliberal policies of the 1980s–2000s has itself begun to shift to an uncertain *post-neoliberal* politics of authoritarian populism on one side (Davies and Gane, 2021) and a “Green New Deal” (Osberg, 2021) on the other.

Kitschelt (1995) notes two distinctly influential dynamics in Western European social conditions that can be applied to the political demand dynamics of the Canadian situation. Firstly, in the era of globalization and free trade agreements people (both workers and managers) who work in and identify with sectors of the economy that are exposed to international competition (non-quota agriculture, manufacturing, natural resources, finances) are likely to favour free market policies that are seen to enhance the global competitiveness of these sectors, while those who work in sectors of the economy sheltered from international competition (public-service sector, education, and some industrial, agricultural and commercial sectors) are likely to favour redistributive policies. Secondly, in the transition from an industrial economy to a postindustrial service and knowledge economy, people whose work or educational level promotes high levels of communicative interaction skills (education, social work, health care, cultural production, etc.) are likely to value personal autonomy, free expression, quality of life and increased democratization, whereas those with more instrumental task-oriented occupations (manipulating objects, documents, and spreadsheets) and lower or more skills-oriented levels of education are likely to find authoritarian and traditional social settings more natural. In Figure 17.17, new areas of political preference are shown opening up in the shaded areas labelled Space A and Space B.

The implication Kitschelt draws from this analysis is that as the conditions of political demand shift, the strategies of the political parties (i.e., political supply) need to shift as well (see Figure 17.17). Social democratic parties like the NDP need to be mindful of the general shift to the right under conditions of globalization and global competition (especially as the industrial work force in Canada diminishes), but to the degree that they move to the centre (2) or the right (3), like British Labour under Tony Blair (from 1997 to 2007), they risk alienating much of their traditional core support in the union movement, new social movement activists, and young people. The Green Party is also positioned (1) to pick up NDP support if the NDP move right. On the other side of the spectrum, the Conservatives do not want to move so far to the right (5) that they lose centrist voters to the Liberals or NDP (as was the case in the federal elections in 2015, 2019 and 2021). However, to the degree they move to the centre they risk being indistinguishable from the Liberals and a space opens up to the right of them on the political spectrum, which can be exploited by a party like the People’s Party. The demise of the former Progressive Conservative party after the 1993 election was precipitated by the emergence of postmaterialist conservative parties further to the right (Reform and the Canadian Alliance).

This model of democratic will formation in Canada is not without its problems. For one thing, Kitschelt’s model of the spectrum of political party competition is based on European politics. It does not take into account the importance of regional allegiances that cut across the left/right division and make Canada an atypical case (in particular the regional politics of Quebec and Western Canada). Similarly, the argument that political preferences have shifted from materialist concerns with economic growth and distribution to postmaterialist concerns with quality-of-life issues is belied by opinion polls which consistently indicate that Canadians rate the economy, employment and housing affordability as

their greatest concerns, (although climate change and health care often rank highly as well). On the other hand, it is probably the case that postmaterialist concerns are not addressed effectively in current formal political processes and political party platforms. Canadians have been turning increasingly to nontraditional political activities like protests and demonstrations, signing petitions, and boycotting to express their political grievances and aspirations.

With regard to the distinction between direct democracy and representative democracy, it is interesting to note that in the current era of fluctuating voter participation in elections, people (especially young people) are turning to more direct means of political engagement (See Table 17.2). Where typically these extra-parliamentary protest movements have mobilized younger people around “left-wing” concerns like social justice, racial inclusion, patriarchy and environmental issues, increasingly “right-wing” groups have mobilized older people in direct actions to promote white nationalism or anti-taxation, anti-carbon pricing and anti-vaccine mandates, framed as libertarian individualist issues.

Table 17.2 The nature of Canadians’ political participation varies by age group (Milan, 2005). At 59%, Canadians aged 15 to 21 had the highest participation rate in non-conventional political activities (albeit by a very slim margin). (Table courtesy of Statistics Canada).
[Skip Table]

Types of Political Participation	Total	15 to 21	22 to 29	30 to 44	45 to 64	65 or older
Follow news and current affairs daily	68*%	35*%	51%	66*%	81*%	89*%
Voted in at least one election	77*%	N/A	59%	71*%	85*%	89*%
Voted in the last federal election	74*%	N/A	52%	68*%	83*%	89*%
Voted in the last provincial election	73*%	N/A	50%	66*%	82*%	88*%
Voted in the last municipal or local election	60*%	N/A	35%	52*%	70*%	79*%
At least one non-voting political behaviour	54*%	59%	58%	57%	56%	39*%
Searched for information on a political issue	26*%	36%	32%	26*%	25*%	17*%
Signed a petition	28*%	27*%	31%	31%	29%	16*%
Boycotted a product or chose a product for ethical reasons	20*%	16*%	25%	25%	21*%	8*%
Attended a public meeting	22*%	17%	16%	23*%	25*%	20*%
Expressed their views on an issue by contacting a newspaper or a politician	13*%	8%	9%	13*%	16*%	12*%
Participated in a demonstration or march	6*%	12*%	8%	6%	6*%	2*%
Spoke out at a public meeting	8*%	4%	5%	9*%	10*%	7*%
Volunteered for a political party	3%	2%	3%	2%	4*%	4%

Note. Voting rates will differ from those of Elections Canada, which calculates voter participation rates based on number of eligible voters. N/A = not applicable. *Statistically different from 22- to 29-year-olds ($p < 0.05$). Source: General Social Survey (Statistics Canada, 2003).

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17.3 The De-Centring of the State: Terrorism, War, Empire, and Political Exceptionalism



Figure 17.19 *Dawn of the Planet of the Apes* (2014), like many Hollywood thrillers since 9/11, takes war and political exceptionalism as its theme. (Photo courtesy of Global Panorama/Flickr.) [CC BY SA 2.0](#)

In *Dawn of the Planet of the Apes* (2014), the post-apocalyptic narrative of brewing conflict between the apes — descendants of animal experimentation and genetic manipulation — and the remaining humans — survivors of a human-made ape virus pandemic — follows a familiar political story line of mistrust, enmity, and provocation between opposed camps during a time of crisis. The film may be seen as a science fiction allegory of any number of contemporary cycles of violence, including the 2014 Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which was concurrent with the film's release. In the first part of the movie, the two communities co-exist in a kind of pre-political state, struggling in isolation from one another in an effort to survive. There is no real internal conflict or disagreement within them that would have to be settled politically. The communities have leaders, but leaders who are listened to only because of the respect accorded to them. However, when the two communities come into contact unexpectedly, a political dynamic begins to emerge in which the question

becomes whether the two groups will be able to live in peace together or whether their history and memory of hatred and disrespect will lead them to conflict. It is a story which asks whether it is going to be the regulative moral codes that govern everyday social behaviour or the friend/enemy dynamics of politics and war that will win the day. The underlying theme is that when the normal rules that govern everyday behaviour are deemed no longer sufficient to conduct life, politics as an exception in its various forms emerges.

The concept of politics as exception has its roots in the origins of sovereignty (Agamben, 1998). It was articulated most clearly in the 1920s in the work of Carl Schmitt (1922) who later became juridical theorist aligned with the German Nazi regime in the 1930s. Schmitt argued that the authentic activity of politics — the sphere of “the political” — only becomes clear in moments of crisis when leaders are obliged to make a truly political decision, (for example, to go to war). This occurs when the normal rules that govern decision making, or the application of law appear to be no longer adequate or applicable to the situation confronting society. Specifically, a **state of exception** exists when the law or the constitution is temporarily suspended during a time of crisis so that the executive leader can claim emergency powers. Schmitt eventually applied this principle to justify the German National Socialist Party's suspension of the Weimar constitution in 1933, as well as the *Führerprinzip* (principle of absolute leadership) that characterized the dictatorship of Adolf Hitler. Nevertheless, political exceptionalism is a reoccurring theme in politics and as situations of crisis have become increasingly normal in recent decades — the war on terror, failed states, the erosion of sovereign power under globalism, pandemics, climate change, etc. — it becomes necessary for sociologists to examine the role of politics under conditions of social crisis.

A subplot in *Dawn of the Planet of the Apes* involves the relationship between the leader of the apes, Caesar, and Koba, whose life as a victim of medical experimentation leads him to hate humans and challenge Caesar's attempts to find reconciliation with them. Until the moment of contact, the apes are able govern themselves by a moral code and mutual agreement on decisions. It is an ideal, peaceful pre-political society. One central rule of the apes' moral identity was that “ape does not kill ape,” unlike the humans whose society disintegrated into violent conflict following the global pandemic. However, when Koba's betrayal of Caesar leads to a war with the humans that threatens the apes' survival, Caesar is forced to make an impossible decision: break the moral code and kill Koba, or risk further betrayal and dissension that will undermine his ability to lead. Caesar's solution is to kill Koba but only after making a crucial declaration that keeps the apes' moral code intact: “Koba not ape!” He essentially declares that Koba's transgression of the apes' way of life was so egregious that he could no longer be considered an ape and therefore he can be killed. Koba was declared to be an *Other*, outside the protection of the law.

This is an example of political exceptionalism. In this case, Caesar suspends the law of the apes and dispenses with Koba in his first act of emergency power. Caesar decides who is and who is not an ape, and who is and who is not protected by ape law. The law is preserved, but it is revealed to be radically fluid and dependent on Caesar's decision.

This possibility of the state of exception is built into the structure of the modern state. The modern state system, based on the concept of state sovereignty, came into existence after the Thirty Years War in Europe (1618–1648) as a solution to the problem of continual, generalized states of war. The principle of state sovereignty is that within states, peace is maintained by a single rule of law, while war (i.e., the absence of law) is expelled to the margins of society as a last resort in times of exception. The concept of “society” itself, as a peaceable space of normative interaction, depends on this expulsion of violent conflict to the borders of society (Walker, 1993). When society is threatened however, from without or within, the conditions of a temporary state of exception emerge. Constitutional governments often provide a formal mechanism for declaring a state of exception or emergency powers, like the Canadian Emergencies Act. Many observers of contemporary global conflict have noted, however, that what were once *temporary* states of exception — wars between states, wars within states, wars by non-state actors, and wars or crises resulting in the suspension of laws — have become increasingly permanent and normalized in recent years. The exception is increasingly becoming the norm (Agamben 2005; Hardt and Negri, 2004).

Several phenomena of current political life allow sociologists to examine political exceptionalism: global terrorism, the contemporary nature of war, the re-emergence of Empire, and the routine use of states of exception.

Terrorism: War by Non-State Actors

Since 9/11, the role of terrorism in restructuring national and international politics has become apparent. As defined earlier, *terrorism* is the use of violence on civilian populations and institutions to achieve political ends. Typically, this violence is a product of non-state actors seeking radical political change by resorting to means outside the normal political process. They unilaterally suspend the law when they challenge the state's legitimate monopoly over the use of force in a territory. Al-Qaeda for example is an international organization that had its origin in American-funded efforts to organize an insurgency campaign against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Its attacks on civilian and military targets, including the American embassies in East Africa in 1998, the World Trade Center in 2001, and the bombings in Bali in 2002, are means to demand the end of Western influence in the Middle East and the establishment of fundamentalist Wahhabi Islamic caliphates. On a much smaller scale, in the 1960s the FLQ (*Front de libération du Québec*) resorted to bombing mailboxes, the Montreal Stock Exchange, and kidnapping political figures to press for the independence of Quebec.

Terrorism is an ambiguous term, however, because the definition of who or what constitutes a terrorist differs depending on who does the defining. There are three distinct phenomena that are defined as terrorism in contemporary usage: (a) the use of political violence as a means of political action by non-state actors against a legitimate government, (b) the use of political violence by governments themselves in contravention of national or international codes of human rights, and (c) the use of violence in war that contravenes established rules of engagement, including violence against civilian or non-military targets, i.e., war crimes (Hardt and Negri, 2004). Noam Chomsky argues, for example, that the United States government is the most significant terrorist organization in the world because of its support for illegal and irregular wars, its backing of authoritarian regimes that use illegitimate violence against their populations, and its history of destabilizing foreign governments and assassinating foreign political leaders (Chomsky, 2001; Chomsky and Herman, 1979).

War: Politics by Other Means

Even before there were modern nation-states, political conflicts arose among competing societies or factions of people. Vikings attacked continental European tribes in search of loot, and later, European explorers landed on foreign shores to claim the resources of Indigenous peoples. Conflicts also arose among competing groups within individual sovereign territories, as evidenced by the bloody English and American civil wars and the Riel Rebellion in Canada. Nearly all conflicts in the past and present, however, are spurred by basic desires: the drive to protect or gain territory and wealth, and the need to preserve liberty and autonomy. They are driven by an inside/outside dynamic that provides the underlying political content of war. **War** is defined as a form of organized group violence between politically distinct groups. Like the other forms of political exception, it involves the suspension of peacetime law and the implementation of emergency measures. As the 19th century military strategist Carl von Clausewitz (1832) said, war is the continuation of politics by other means.



Figure 17.20 Although military technology has evolved considerably over the course of history, the fundamental causes of organized violent conflict remains essentially the same. The difference is in the number of deaths due to armed conflict. (Photo courtesy of Jordon R. Beesley, US Navy/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

In the 20th century, nine million people were killed in World War I and another 61 million people were killed in World War II. The death tolls in these wars were of such magnitude that the wars were considered at the time to be unprecedented. World War I, or “the Great War,” was described as the war that would end all wars, yet the manner in which it was settled led directly to the conditions responsible for the declaration of World War II. In fact, the wars were not unprecedented. Since the establishment of the modern centralized state system in Europe, there have been six European wars involving alliances between multiple nation-states at approximately half-century intervals. Prior to World War I and World War II, there was the Thirty Years War (1618–1648), the War of Spanish Succession (1702–1713), the Seven Years War (1756–1763), and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815) (Dyer, 2014). The difference in the two 20th century world wars is that advances in military technology and the strategy of *total war*

(involving the targeting of civilian as well as military targets) led to a massive increase in casualties. The total dead in 20th century wars is estimated at 111 million, approximately two-thirds of the 175 million people killed in total in war in the thousand years between 1000 and 2000 CE (Tepperman, 2010).

War is typically understood as armed conflict that has been openly declared between or within states. However recent warfare, like Canada’s involvement in the NATO mission in Afghanistan (from 2001 to 2014), more typically takes the form of asymmetrical conflict between professional state armies and insurgent groups who rely on guerilla tactics (Hardt and Negri, 2004). **Asymmetrical warfare** is defined by the lack of symmetry between the sides of a violent military conflict. There is a significant imbalance of technical and military means between combatants, which has been referred to by American military strategists as *full spectrum dominance*. This shifts the nature of the conflict to insurgency and counter-insurgency tactics in which the dominant, professional armies aim their efforts of deterrence against both the military operations of their opponents and the potentially militarized population. Counter-insurgency strategies seek not only to defeat the enemy army militarily but to control it with social, political, ideological, and psychological weapons. The Canadian army’s “model village” clear, hold, and build strategy in Afghanistan is an example of this, combining conventional military action with humanitarian aid and social and infrastructure investment (Galloway, 2009). On the other side, the insurgent armies compensate for their military weakness with the unpredictable tactics of guerilla war in which maximum damage can be done with a minimum of weaponry (Hardt and Negri, 2004).

One of the outcomes of contemporary warfare has been the creation of a condition of global **post-security** in which, as Hardt and Negri put it, “lethal violence is present as a constant potentiality, ready always and everywhere to erupt” (Hardt and Negri, 2004). Partly as a reaction to this phenomenon and partly as a cause, sociologists can speak of the development of *war systems*, or the **normalization of militarization**. This is “the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence” (Geyer, 1989). This process involves an intensification of the conceptual division between the outsides and insides of nation-states, the demonization of enemies who threaten “us” from the outside (or the inside), the normalization of military ways of thinking and military perspectives on policy, and the propagation of ideologies that romanticize, sanitize, and validate military violence as a solution to problems or as a way of life (Graham, 2011). As commentators have noted, Canada’s relationship to military action has shifted during the Afghan operation from its Lester Pearson era of peacekeeping to a more militant stance in line with the normalization of militarization (Dyer, 2014).

Empire

The breakdown of states due to warfare or internal civil conflict is one way in which the sovereign nation-state is undermined in times of exception. Another way in which the sovereignty of the state and rule of law has been undermined is through the creation of supra-state forces like global capitalism and international trade agreements that reduce or constrain the decision-making abilities of national governments. When these supranational forces become organized on a formal basis, sociologists can begin to speak about the re-emergence of *empires* as a type of political exception.

Empires have existed throughout human history, but arguably there is something unique about the formation of the contemporary global Empire. In general, an **empire (1)** refers to a geographically widespread organization of individual states, nations, and people that is ruled by a centralized government, like the Roman Empire of antiquity or the Austro-Hungarian Empire until WWI. However, some argue that the formation of a contemporary global order has seen the development of a new unbounded and centre-less type of empire. **Empire (2)** today refers to a supra-national, global form of sovereignty whose territory is the entire globe and whose organization forms around the nodes of a network form of power (on networks, see [Chapter 7. Groups and Organizations](#)). These nodes include the dominant nation-states, supranational institutions (the UN, IMF, GATT, WHO, G7, etc.), major capitalist corporations, and international Non-Governmental Organizations or NGOs (*Medecins San Frontieres*, Amnesty International, CUSO, Oxfam, etc.) (Hardt and Negri, 2000).

As a result of the formation of this type of global empire, war, for example, is increasingly not fought between independent sovereign nation-states but as a kind of global-scale *police* action in which several states — or “coalitions of the willing” — intervene on humanitarian or security grounds to suppress dissent or conflict in different parts of the globe. Key to this shift in the nature of the use of force is the way in which military action, traditionally understood as armed combat *between* sovereign states, is reconceptualized as police action, traditionally understood as the legitimate use of force *within* a sovereign state. As the borders between states erode, the entire globe is redefined as a single, vast, internal sovereign state to be managed and governed as a domestic problem.

Normalization of Exception

As noted above, a state of exception refers to a situation when the law or the constitution is temporarily suspended during a time of crisis so that the executive leader can claim emergency powers. During warfare for example, it is typical for governments to temporarily suspend the normal rule of law and institute martial law. However, when times of crisis become the norm, this modality of power is resorted to more frequently and more permanently both on a large scale and small scale. Perhaps the most famous example of normalized political exceptionalism was the suspension of the Weimar Constitution by the Nazis in Germany between 1933 and 1945. On the basis of Hitler's *Decree for the Protection of the People and the State*, the personal liberties of Germans were “legally” suspended, making the concentration camps for political opponents, the confiscation of property, and the Holocaust, in some sense, lawful actions. Under Alfredo Stroessner's regime in Paraguay in the 1960s and 1970s, this form of legal illegality was taken to the extreme. Citing the state of emergency created by the global Cold War struggle between communism and democracy, Stroessner suspended Paraguay's constitutional protection of rights and freedoms permanently except for one day every four years when elections were held (Žižek 2002).

On a smaller scale, albeit with global implications, U.S. President George Bush's 2001 military order that authorized the trial by military tribunal and indefinite detention of “unlawful combatants” and individuals suspected of being involved in terrorist activities enabled a similar suspension of constitutional and international laws. The U.S. detention centre at

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where individuals were tortured and held without trial or due process, is a legally authorized space that is nevertheless outside of the jurisdiction and protection of the law (Agamben 2005).

Canada's most famous incident of peacetime state of exception was Pierre Trudeau's use of the War Measures Act in 1970 during the October Crisis. The War Measures Act was used to suspend civil liberties and mobilize the military in response to a state of "apprehended insurrection" following the FLQ's kidnapping of Quebec politician Pierre Laporte and British diplomat James Cross. During the period of the War Measures Act, 3,000 homes were searched, and 497 individuals were arrested without due process, including several people in Vancouver who were found distributing the FLQ's manifesto. Only sixty-two people were ever charged with offences, and the FLQ cells responsible for the kidnappings did not number more than a handful of individuals (Clément 2008). Although this incident is the most famous example of political exceptionalism in Canada, there are a number of pieces of legislation and processes that involve the mechanism of localized suspension of the law, notably the use of Ministerial Security Certificates under the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act, which enables the indefinite detention of suspected terrorists; the Public Works Protection Act, which was used to detain protesters at the Toronto G20 Summit in 2010; and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2002), which enables the routine confinement and detention of stateless refugees and "boat people" arriving in Canada.

Not all political exception results from political violence.

Natural disasters and contagious epidemics or pandemics have

also resulted in declarations of emergency and the implementation of emergency measures. In the case of disease outbreaks, historically many states have laws that enabled them to evoke extraordinary powers to order quarantines, detain the sick, and seize assets as required. In Canada, the global COVID-19 pandemic, declared in March 2020, resulted in several provinces declaring a state of emergency for limited periods of time. Rather than total quarantine, what this entailed in practice was a series of temporary measures including requiring infected persons or travelers arriving from other countries to self-isolate, closing schools and places of indoor gathering (restaurants, bars, gyms, arenas, etc.), requiring masks for places of indoor gathering, requiring vaccines for certain categories of employment and entry to places of indoor gathering, as well as restrictions on non-necessary travel and contact with people outside one's immediate social bubble (Lawson et al., 2022).

The federal government also enacted the Emergency Act in 2022 to grant police extra powers to seize assets and remove anti-mask and anti-vaccine activists from their occupation of Ottawa and several blockades of U.S./Canada border crossings. Although the powers granted under public order emergencies like this are limited compared to the former War Measures Act (see text box below), it serves as an interesting example of the normalization of exception after a period of prolonged public health emergency. With the role of disinformation and conspiracy theories, the state and the protesters did not appear to share a common factual basis to engage in political dialogue. To the degree that democratic discourse becomes fragmented in this way, it is probable that evidence-based decision making and the norm of the **ideal speech situation** discussed earlier in the chapter will be ineffective, making the declaration of political exceptions and use of emergency measures more likely over time.



Figure 17.21 "FLQ Oui" (FLQ Yes) spray-painted on a postal drop box several months after the 1970 October Crisis ended (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY SA 3.0](#)

Making Connections: Big Picture

What are the Powers of the Federal *Emergencies Act*?



Figure 17.22 The *Emergencies Act* was evoked on February 14, 2022, to grant police extra powers to disperse a protest over public health measures in Ottawa. (Image courtesy of Maksim Sokolov (Maxergon)/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

The *Emergencies Act* is the law that grants the federal government emergency powers in times of crisis. It replaced the *War Measures Act* that the Pierre Trudeau government used during the October Crisis of 1970. Before it can be evoked, the federal government is required to consult with provinces and territories.

The act defines a national emergency as “an urgent and critical situation of a temporary nature” that:

- Seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal with it; or
- Seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve the sovereignty, security,

and territorial integrity of Canada (Government of Canada, 1985).

It gives special powers to the Prime Minister or Cabinet to respond to (1) public welfare emergencies like natural disasters and disease outbreaks, (2) public order emergencies like threats to the security of Canada, (3) international emergencies involving threat of violence and (4) war.

In a public-order emergency, like the occupation of Ottawa and border crossings in 2022, the federal cabinet is authorized to give five types of orders:

- The ability to regulate or prohibit public assembly that may reasonably be expected to lead to a breach of the peace, travel, or the use of property.
- The ability to designate and secure protected places.
- The ability to assume the control, restoration and maintenance of public utilities and services.
- The ability to authorize or direct the provision of essential services or the provision of reasonable compensation.
- The ability to impose on summary conviction a fine not exceeding \$500 or imprisonment not exceeding six years; or on indictment a fine not exceeding \$5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding five years (Government of Canada, 1985).

Media Attributions

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17.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Government and Power




Figure 17.23 American structural functionalist Talcott Parsons: “I conceive of political organization as functionally organized about the attainment of collective goals, i.e., the attainment or maintenance of states of interaction between the system and its enviroining situation that are relatively desirable from the point of view of the system” (1961, p. 435). (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) CC BY-SA 4.0

There has been considerable disagreement among sociologists about the nature of power, politics, and the role of the state in society. This is not surprising as any discussion of power and politics is bound to be political itself, that is to say divisive or “politicized.” It is arguably the case that sociologists are better positioned today, after a period of prolonged political exceptionalism, to see the nature of power and the state more clearly than during periods of peace or *détente*. It is during moments when the regular frameworks of political practice and behaviour are disrupted — through crisis, revolution, suspension of the law, the failure of states, war, or counter-insurgency — that the underlying basis of the relationship between the social and the political, or society and the state can be revealed and rethought.

Earlier in this chapter, it was noted that the radical standpoint of anarchism provides a useful standpoint from which to examine the sociological question of the state. A key sociological question posed by anarchism is: Why is government in the form of the state needed in the first place? Could people not do just as well without state government? What is the state for? On these questions, the organizational frameworks or paradigms that characterize the sociological tradition, including structural functionalism, critical sociology, and symbolic interactionism, provide different approaches and answers.

Structural Functionalism

Talcott Parsons, in a classic statement of structural functionalism, wrote: “I conceive of political organization as functionally organized about the attainment of collective goals, i.e., the attainment or maintenance of states of interaction between the system and its enviroining situation that are relatively desirable from the point of view of the system” (Parsons, 1961). From the *viewpoint of the system*, the “polity” exists to perform specific functions and meet certain needs generated by society. In particular, it exists to provide a means of attaining “desirable” collective goals by being the site of collective decision making. According to functionalism, modern forms of government have four main purposes: planning and directing society, meeting collective social needs, maintaining law and order, and managing international relations.

The abstractness of Parsons’s language is both a strength and weakness of the functionalist approach to government and the state. It is a strength in the sense that it enables functionalist sociologists to abstract from particular societies to examine how the function of collective decision making and goal attainment is accomplished in different manners in various types of society. It does not presuppose that there is a “proper” institutional structure that defines government *per se*, nor does it presuppose what a society’s collective goals are. The idea is that the social *need* for collective goal attainment is the same for all societies, but it can be met in a variety of ways.

In this respect it is interesting to note that many nomadic or hunter-gather societies developed mechanisms that specifically *prevent* formal, enduring state organizations from developing. The typical “headman” structure in hunter-gatherer societies is a mechanism of collective decision making in which the head man takes a leadership role, but only provisionally on the basis of his prestige remaining recognized, his ability to influence or persuade, and his attunement with the group’s desires. The polity function is organized in a manner that actively fends off the formation

of a permanent state institution (Clastres, 1989). Similarly, Parsons's own analysis of the development and differentiation of the institutions of the modern state (legislative, executive, judiciary) shows how political organization in Western societies emerged from a period of "religio-political-legal unity" in which the functions performed by church and state were not separate.

The weakness in Parsons's abstraction is that it allows functionalists to speak about functions and needs from the "point of view of the system" as if the system had an independent or neutral existence. The system is a self-perpetuating, neutral, spontaneously generated entity that determines functions and needs independently of human agency. A number of important aspects of power disappear from view by a kind of sleight of hand when sociologists attempt to take this viewpoint.

One dominant functionalist framework for understanding why the state exists is **pluralist theory**. In pluralist theory, society is made up of numerous competing interest groups — capital, labour, religious fundamentalists, feminists, LGBTQ+, communities of colour, immigrants, small business, homeless people, taxpayers, elderly, military, pacifists, etc. — whose goals are diverse and often incompatible. In democratic societies, power and resources are widely distributed, albeit unevenly, so no one group can attain the power to permanently dominate the entire society. Therefore, the state or government has to act as a neutral mediator to negotiate, reconcile, balance, find compromise, or decide among the divergent interests. From the point of view of the system, it maintains equilibrium between competing interests so that the functions of social integration and collective goal attainment can be accomplished. In this model, the state is an autonomous institution that acts on behalf of society as a whole. It is independent of any particular interest group.

On one hand, the pluralist model seems to conform to commonsense understandings of democracy. Sometimes one group wins, sometimes another. Usually there are compromises. Everyone has the potential to have input into the political decision-making process. However, critics of pluralist theory note that what disappears from an analysis that attempts to take the neutral point of view of the system and its functions is, firstly, the fact that the system itself is not disinterested — it is structured to maintain inequality; secondly, that some competing interests are not reconcilable or balanceable — they are fundamentally antagonistic; and, thirdly, that *politics* is not the same as administration or government — it is *in essence* disruptive of systems and equilibrium.

The difficulty Parsons has in accounting for these aspects of political life comes out in his discussion of the use of force to maintain the state's legally sanctioned normative order (i.e., "the highest order of norms regulating the behaviour of units within the society"). Parsons writes,

No society can afford to permit any other normative order to take precedence over that sanctioned by "politically organized society." Indeed, the promulgation of any such alternative order is a revolutionary act, and the agencies responsible for it must assume the responsibility of political organization (Parsons, 1961).

He suggests that an alternative normative order is not simply the product of a competing social interest that might be balanced with others, but a revolutionary threat to the entire system. From the "point of view of the system," an alternative normative order is inadmissible and must be either violently suppressed or permitted to take responsibility for founding a new political organization of society. But from the point of view of the system, it is also not clear where, how or why such alternative normative orders can arise.

Critical Sociology

The question of why the state exists has been answered in a variety of ways by critical sociologists. In the Marxist tradition, the power of the state is principally understood as a means by which the economic power of capital is exercised and maintained. The state itself is in many respects subservient to the interests of capital. As Marx and Engels (1848) put it in *The Communist Manifesto*, "The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the

common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.” While the state appears to be the place where power is “held,” the power of the state is secondary to the power of capital.

In the analysis of Nicos Poulantzas (1973), the state performs a key role in maintaining the integration of capitalist society, which is otherwise threatened by class conflict and even conflict within the capitalist class itself. In particular, the state performs three functions that serve the interests of the dominant classes: an **accumulation function** in which the state maintains the economic conditions for sustained capitalist investment and profitability, a **legitimation function** in which the state promotes the legitimacy of the social order (including the legitimacy of inequality and power structures) and secures social harmony and the consent of the public to be ruled, and (3) a **coercive function** in which, “in the last instance,” the state intervenes by use of force to repress sources of social unrest and disorder (Panitch 1977). Poulantzas emphasizes, however, that the state is not under the *direct* control of the capitalist class. He is not describing a conspiracy theory. Rather the state often intervenes in ways that seem to contradict the immediate interests of capitalists, especially when it implements taxes, welfare provisions, unemployment insurance, labour union rights, environmental protections, etc., or promotes policies that privilege one sector of the economy over another (e.g., resource extraction over manufacturing). Poulantzas notes that whereas the immediate interests of specific corporations might be to maximize profits in the short term, the role of the state is to maintain the long-term interests of capital as a whole (i.e., the stability of the *system* of private property and the future assurance of private accumulation of profit).

A second type of critical sociology is feminism. Catherine MacKinnon argued that “feminism has no theory of the state” (MacKinnon 1989). The feminist understanding of the state’s role in society and gender hierarchies is ambiguous. That is in part because the state has at times been an important ally for addressing feminist concerns and at other times an important mechanism for maintaining patriarchal power. One of the central organizational forums in the development of second-wave feminism in Canada was the formation of Status of Women committees that pressed the Lester Pearson government in the 1960s to establish the Royal Commission on the Status of Women (1970). The founding of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women, as a “big tent” organization that included many different women’s groups, can be seen as a result of the Royal Commission in that it formed to lobby subsequent governments to implement the commission’s recommendations (Rebick 2005). In this case, the state is regarded as an institution that can be used to transform gender relations through legislation on sexual equality, parental leave, access to birth control, reproductive rights, childcare, etc. The consciousness raising around the Royal Commission was also a pivotal event in which the private troubles of women were collectively recognized as public issues of social structure.

On the other hand, the state has a history of family and sexual policy that has reinforced women’s unpaid labour in the household, their subordinate status outside the household, and the intense moral regulation of women’s lives. This is not an accidental circumstance. MacKinnon (1982) argues, for example, that state power is in crucial respects sexual power, a power that institutionalizes male domination by enforcing the assumptions and social requirements of heterosexuality. While instances of overt male sexual abuse and coercion like rape, incest, sexual harassment, child pornography, and procurement for prostitution are subject to prosecution, this is only to protect the underlying male sexual dominance and female subordination of heterosexual relationships. “[T]he state protects male power [by] appearing to prohibit its excesses when necessary to its normalization” (MacKinnon 1989, p. 167). MacKinnon argues that the dominant concepts of jurisprudence that regulate the relation of law and life (i.e., the neutrality of the law, the protection of abstract rights and freedoms, etc.) have to be challenged from the point of view of women’s concrete experience of everyday gender inequality. For example, protecting the pornographer’s “freedom of speech” enables the continued exploitation, use, and abuse of actual girls and women who often do not have a meaningful choice to refuse such “employment.”



Figure 17.24 Michel Foucault: “In political thought and analysis we still have not cut off the head of the king” (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY SA 3.0](#)

A third critical sociological perspective on the state can be found in the work of Michel Foucault who argues that the idea of the state is an abstraction that conceals a far more widespread and pernicious operation of power. The power of the state, understood to operate through the formulation and enforcement of rights and laws, relies on an order that is in fact produced by a multitude of non-state “micro-power” relationships that extend throughout society. These power relationships are disciplinary in nature, focused on fostering the capacities of human “life and what it can do” through the implementation of regimens or practices of improvement: in schools, hospitals, armies, families, prisons, etc. Foucault (1980a) argues that the focus on the state as a site of centralized power, “allow[s] a system of right to be superimposed upon the mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures, the element of domination inherent in its techniques, and to guarantee to everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of the state, the exercise of his proper sovereign rights...[T]his democratization of sovereignty [is] fundamentally determined by and grounded in mechanisms of disciplinary coercion.” The challenge to power must not be addressed towards the state, Foucault argues, but to the local sites, practices, relationships, discourses, and institutions where the effects of power are directly experienced. “In political thought

and analysis we still have not cut off the head of the king” (1980b, pp. 88–89).

Symbolic Interactionism

Other sociologists study government and power by relying on the framework of symbolic interactionism, which is grounded in the works of Max Weber and George H. Mead. In this school, the meaning of the state and politics emerges through processes of communicative interaction. Only on the basis of the meanings attributed to politics can coherent political courses of action and behaviour be undertaken individually or collectively.

Symbolic interactionism, as it pertains to government, therefore focuses its attention on figures, emblems, or individuals that represent power and authority. Many diverse entities in larger society can be considered symbolic: trees, doves, wedding rings. Images that represent the power and authority of Canada include the Parliament Buildings, the beaver, and the Canadian flag. The Canadian national anthem, sung at sports events and official assemblies, incites respect and reverence in many Canadians. The symbolic nature of political discourses and political emblems are of course open to manipulation, which is often referred to as *image politics*. In fact the Canadian media theorist Marshall McLuhan proposed that “Politics will eventually be replaced by imagery. The politician will be only too happy to abdicate in favour of his image, because the image will be much more powerful than he could ever be” (Newman, 1971, p. 42).

Overall, symbolic interactionists are not interested in large structures such as “the government” or “the state” as if they existed independently of the ongoing interactions that constitute them. One side of this, as discussed the “Politics and the Image” textbox (below), is their attention to the ongoing creation of symbols that give meaning to political life and activity. But as micro-sociologists, they are also interested in the face-to-face aspects of politics. In reality, much of politics consists of face-to-face backroom meetings and lobbyist efforts. What the public often sees is the front

stage of politics that is sanitized by the media through gatekeeping. Symbolic interactionists are most interested in the meaningful interaction between the small groups who make decisions, or in the case of some recent parliamentary committees, who demonstrate the inability to interact meaningfully. The heart of politics is the result of small-scale exchanges between individuals and small groups over periods of time.

The long-standing complaint of increasing incivility in House of Commons debates, question period, and committee work points to the way that give-and-take interactions between parliamentarians have been severely curtailed in recent years (Samara 2011). These interactions are essential for creating mutual understanding and consensus as well as producing new meanings and perspectives that individuals use to make sure there are future interactions. To the degree that they break down or communication becomes dysfunctional, the elementary components that enable the legislative function of government to perform its activity independent of direct control by the Office of the Prime Minister (i.e., the executive function) are threatened and democracy itself is curtailed.

Making Connections: Social Policy & Debate

Politics and the Image



Figure 17.25 Is the staging of image events a legitimate tactic in contemporary politics? (Image courtesy of Visible Hand/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0 \[Image Description\]](#)

Politicians, political parties, and other political actors are also motivated to claim symbolic meanings for themselves or their issues. A Canadian Taxpayer Federation report noted that the amount of money spent on communication staff (or “spin doctors”) by the government in 2014 approached the amount spent on the total House of Commons payroll (\$263 million compared to \$329 million per year) (Thomas, 2014). While most sectors of the civil service have been cut back, “information services” have continued to expand. This practice of calculated symbolic work, through which political actors attempt to control or manipulate the impressions they make on the public, is known as **image management** or image branding. Erving Goffman (1972) described the basic processes of image management in the context of small scale, face-to-face settings (See [Chapter 6. Social Interaction](#)). In social encounters, he argued, individuals present a certain “face” to the group — “this is who I am” — by which they lay claim to a “positive social value” for themselves. It is by no means certain that the group will accept the face the individual puts forward, however. Individuals are therefore obliged during the course of interactions to continuously manage the impression they make in light of the responses, or *potential* responses of others — making it consistent with the “line” they are acting out. They continually make adjustments to cover over

inconsistencies, incidents, or gaffs in their performance and use various props like clothing, hair styles, hand gestures, demeanour, forms of language, etc. to support their claim. The key point that Goffman makes is that one’s identity, face, or impression is not something intrinsic to the individual but is a socially mediated phenomenon. The fate of one’s “face” is radically in the hands of others and the “presentation of self in everyday life” is a tricky and uncertain business. On the political stage, especially in the age of mass-mediated interactions, image management and party branding are subject to sophisticated controls, calculations, and communications strategies. In effect, **political image management** is the process by which concrete, living historical events and processes — what politicians actually say and do in the public sphere day-to-day, how government policies are implemented, and what their effects on stakeholders and social processes are — are turned into ahistorical, “mythic” events and qualities: heroic struggles of good versus evil, prudence versus wastefulness, change versus stagnation, renewal versus decline. Political narratives draw on archetypal symbols of personal integrity, moral fortitude, decisiveness, toughness, feistiness, wisdom, tenacity, etc. Politicians and political parties claim a “positive social value” for themselves by attempting to plant a symbolic, mythic image in the minds of the public and then carefully scripting public performances to support that image. As Goffman points out with respect to face-to-face interactions, however, it is by no means certain that the public or the news media will accept these claims. The Canadian Alliance leader Stockwell Day’s Jet Ski photo op during the 2000 federal election undermined his credibility as potential prime ministerial material, just as Progressive Conservative leader Robert Stanfield’s football fumble on the airport tarmac in the 1974 federal election undermined his bid to appear more youthful

(Smith, 2012). Critics point to the way the focus on image in politics replaces political substance with superficial style. Using image to present a political message is seen as a lower, even fraudulent form of political rhetoric. Symbolic interactionists would note however that the ability to attribute persuasive meaning to political claims is a communicative process that operates at multiple levels. Determining what is and what is not a “substantial” issue is in fact a crucial component of political communication. Deluca (1999) argues that as a result of being locked out of the process of political communication, groups like environmental social movements can effectively bring marginalized issues into the public debate by staging **image events**. In the language of Greenpeace founder Robert Hunter, these are events that take the form of powerful visual imagery. They explode “in the public’s consciousness to transform the way people view their world” (cited in Deluca, 1999, p. 1). Greenpeace’s use of small inflatable Zodiac boats to get between whaling vessels and whales is one prominent example of an image event that creates a visceral effect in the audience. Similarly, the occupation of Ottawa in 2022 by protesters opposed to mask and vaccine mandates during the COVID-19 pandemic re-purposed semi-trucks as political emblems of wounded white privilege. Commenting on singer-songwriter Neil Young’s 2014 “Honour the Treaties” tour in Canada, Gill notes that the effectiveness of this type of image event is in the emotional resonance it establishes between the general public and Indigenous groups fighting tar sands development. “Plainly put, our governments don’t fear environmentalists, even icons like David Suzuki. But governments fear emotion, which they can’t regulate, and who but our artists are capable of stirring our emotions, giving them expression, and releasing the trapped energy in our national psyche?” (Gill, 2014). So, do image politics, political image management, and image events necessarily make democratic will formation less substantial and less issues oriented? As Deluca puts it, “To dismiss image events as rude and crude is to cling to ‘presuppositions of civility and rationality underlying the old rhetoric,’ a rhetoric that supports those in positions of authority and thus allows civility and decorum to serve as masks for the protection of privilege and the silencing of protest” (Deluca, 1999).

Image Descriptions

Figure 17.25 long description: Three mannequins are positioned upside down with their heads in the dirt in front of the Telus Convention Centre. Each is labeled as a particular Albertan politician. A sign reads, “Get your heads out of the tar sands.” [\[Return to Figure 17.25\]](#)

Media Attributions

- **Figure 17.23** [Talcott Parsons \(1902-1979\)](#) is in [CC BY-SA 4.0](#) licence.
- **Figure 17.24** [Michel Foucault](#) used under [CC BY SA 3.0](#) licence.
- **Figure 17.25** [Get your head out of the Tarsands](#) by Visible Hand, via Flickr, is used under a [CC BY 2.0](#) licence.

Chapter 17 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

absolute monarchy: A political state in which a monarch has absolute or unmitigated power.

accumulation function: The role of the state in maintaining the economic conditions for sustained capitalist investment and profitability.

anarchism: The political principles and practice of social organization without formal or state leadership

anarchy: The absence of any organized government.

asymmetrical warfare: Violent military conflict in which there is a significant imbalance of technical and military means between combatants.

authority: Power that people accept because it comes from a source that is perceived as legitimate.

charismatic authority: Power legitimized on the basis of a leader's exceptional personal qualities.

citizenship: The internalized sense of individual dignity, rights, and freedom that accompanies formal membership in the political community.

coercive function: The role of the state in maintaining social order by use of force.

constitutional monarchy: A political state in which a monarch is head of state but whose powers are limited by a legal constitution.

democracy: Rule by the people.

democratic will formation: The deliberative process by which the will or decisions of the people are determined.

direct democracy: A form of government in which decision making, even in matters of detail, is conducted through assemblies made up of all citizens.

domination: A situation in which power and resistance are fixed into a more or less permanent hierarchical arrangement.

empire: (1) A geographically widespread organization of individual states, nations, and peoples that is ruled by a centralized government; (2) The contemporary global network form of power whose territory is the entire globe and whose network nodes include the dominant nation-states, supranational institutions, and major capitalist corporations.

government: The various means and strategies used to direct the behaviour and actions of others (or of oneself).

ideal speech situation: The ideal norm of democratic discussion in which every subject is permitted to take part in public discussion, to question assertions, to introduce assertions, and to express attitudes, desires, and needs; no subject can be prevented from speaking.

image event: An event staged using primarily visual symbols as a means of public persuasion.

image management: The process of controlling the impact of one's appearance to others.

institutions of democracy: The institutions that organize the regular processes of democracy including parliament, the civil service, electoral procedures, constitutions, rule of law, etc.

legitimation function: The role of the state in securing social harmony and the consent of the public to be ruled.

monarchy: A form of government in which a single person, or monarch, rules until that individual dies or abdicates the throne.

nation-state: A political unit whose boundaries are co-extensive with a cultural, linguistic or ethnic nation.

neoliberalism: A style of government which governs individuals through their exercise of freedom and free choice

normalization of militarization: The social process in which civil society organizes itself for military action and the production of violence as a routine practice of everyday life.

pluralist theory: The state acts as a neutral mediator to balance the competing interests and demands of divergent interest groups in society.

politics: (1) The means by which form is given to the life of a people; (2) The activity of striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state.

political demand: The underlying societal factors and social changes that create constituencies of people with common interests.

political image management: The process in which political messaging is subject to sophisticated controls, calculations, and communications strategies.

political supply: The strategies and organizational capacities of political parties to deliver an appealing political program to particular constituencies.

postmaterialist: Concerns with quality-of-life issues: personal autonomy, self-expression, environmental integrity, women's rights, gay rights, the meaningfulness of work, habitability of cities, etc.

post-security: A condition in which lethal violence is present as a constant potentiality, always and everywhere ready to erupt.

power: (1) The ability to exercise one's will over others; (2) The capacity to create and act.

public sphere: An open democratic space for public debate and deliberation.

rational-legal authority: Power that is legitimized by rules, regulations, and laws.

representative democracy: A government wherein citizens elect officials to represent their interests.

revolution: A rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the way of life, social structure, and political institutions of a society.

sovereign state system: The system by which the world is divided up into separate and indivisible sovereign territories or states.

sovereignty: The political form in which a single, central, supreme lawmaking authority governs within a clearly demarcated territory.

state: A human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.

state of exception: A condition of crisis in which the law or the constitution is temporarily suspended so that the state can claim emergency powers.

terrorism: The use of violence on civilian populations and institutions to achieve political ends.

traditional authority: Power legitimized on the basis of long-standing customs.

war: A violent armed conflict between politically distinct groups.

Section Summary

[17.1 Power and Authority](#)

Sociologists examine government and politics in terms of their impact on individuals and larger social systems. Power refers to both an individual's ability to control or direct others and the capacity each person has to act and create. Forms of domination occur when the give and take between these two types of power become fixed into permanent hierarchies. Modern states are institutions that organize relationships of power and domination according to the principle of sovereignty and the modern state system, which divides the world into exclusive sovereign territories. Authority is influence that is predicated on perceived legitimacy. Max Weber studied power and authority, differentiating between the two concepts and formulating a system for classifying types of authority: traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic.

[17.2 Democratic Will Formation](#)

States are governed by different political systems, including monarchies, oligarchies, dictatorships, and democracies. Democracies are based on the principle of rule by the people, although how democratic will formation is achieved and implemented has changed from the original direct democracy of the Greeks to modern forms of representative democracy. Three components are central to the understanding of democratic societies: the institutions of democracy, the internalized sense of citizenship, and the public sphere. Sociologists model the process of democratic will formation and political party competition by examining social factors that affect political demand and political supply.

[17.3 The De-Centring of the State: Terrorism, War, Empire, and Political Exceptionalism](#)

The modern state system emerged in Europe in response to the instability that arose through conflict between competing authorities and overlapping jurisdictions and powers. The ability of the state to regularize social life and provide a stable container for society is undermined however by states of exception such as terrorism and war or the formation of supra-national entities such as empires. The challenges to state authority have intensified in recent years, leading to the observation that states of exception have become the norm.

[17.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Government and Power](#)

Sociologists use different theoretical paradigms to gain perspective on data and observations related to the study of power and government. Durkheim's functionalism suggests that societal power and structure is predicated on balancing competing interests in a pluralist state structure. Critical sociology asserts that the state and politics are means by which dominant social groups exercise power over subordinate groups. Symbolic interactionism examines the role of symbols of power and image management in the ongoing conduct of political life.

Questions

Quiz: Government and Politics

17.1 Power and Authority

1. Which statement best expresses the difference between Max Weber's definitions of power and authority?
 - a. Authority involves intimidation.
 - b. Authority is more subtle than power.
 - c. Authority is based on the perceived legitimacy of the individual in power.
 - d. Authority is inherited, but power is seized by military force.
2. Which of the following types of authority does not reside primarily in a leader?
 - a. Dictatorial
 - b. Traditional
 - c. Charismatic
 - d. Rational-legal
3. Sociology studies government and governmental relationships as _____.
 - a. The exercise of power by the state.
 - b. The strategies some use to direct the behaviour and actions of others.
 - c. The institutionalization of legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the state.
 - d. The means by which permanent hierarchies are established and enforced.
4. Pierre Trudeau used his relative youth, flair, intelligence, and magnetism to call for Canada to become a "just society." He is an example of a(n) _____ leader.
 - a. Traditional
 - b. Charismatic
 - c. Rational-legal
 - d. Image-managed
5. Sovereignty can be defined as the principle of _____.
 - a. Ancient Greek democracy.
 - b. The state's legitimate monopoly over the use of force in a territory.
 - c. The network form of Empire.
 - d. The Queen's role as head of the Canadian state.
6. The emphasis on image management in contemporary politics is a product of the central role of _____ in political party competition.
 - a. Barbers

- b. Political demand
- c. Charisma
- d. Democratic debate

17.2 Democratic Will Formation

7. Anarchists believed that states were _____.
 - a. A necessary evil.
 - b. Artificial constructs.
 - c. Withering away.
 - d. Instruments of democratic will formation.
8. The difference between direct democracy and representative democracy is the difference between _____.
 - a. Rule by individuals and rule by MPs.
 - b. Rule by the people and rule by the oligarchs.
 - c. Rule through referenda and rule through proportional representation.
 - d. Rule through direct action political protests and rule through petitions and letter-writing campaigns.
9. Citizenship refers to _____.
 - a. Holding a Canadian passport.
 - b. Formal membership in a political community.
 - c. An internalized sense of individual dignity, rights, and freedom.
 - d. All of the above.
 - e. None of the above.
10. Political demand and political supply refer to _____.
 - a. The role of economic market forces in determining public policy.
 - b. Social factors that affect the distribution of political opinion and the ability of political actors to satisfy political opinion.
 - c. The problem of excessive democracy and the inability of political leaders to meet unrealistic democratic demands.
 - d. The natural limits on public expenditures determined by the tax base of a nation.
11. Which is *not* a characteristic of young people's engagement in politics today?
 - a. Higher-than-average non-voting political behaviours.
 - b. Higher-than-average voting turnouts.
 - c. Lower-than-average consumption of news and current events.
 - d. Higher-than-average concern with postmaterialist issues.
12. Which statement best expresses the shift to postmaterialism?
 - a. People are more concerned today with Buddhist-inspired lifestyles than with consumerism.
 - b. People are more concerned today with Green politics than with social conservatism.

- c. People are more concerned today with the quality-of-life issues than with economic growth and security.
- d. People are more concerned today with lowering taxes than with the decline of the welfare state.

17.3 The De-Centring of the State: Terrorism, War, Empire, and Political Exceptionalism

13. A state of exception refers to _____.
 - a. The legitimate monopoly on the use of force within a territory.
 - b. The suspension of laws to respond to crisis.
 - c. A rogue state.
 - d. A period when states are not at war or threatened by terrorist violence.
14. Which of the following is *not* an act of terrorism?
 - a. The use of tear gas to suppress public looting.
 - b. The use of violence by non-state actors to achieve political ends.
 - c. The use of secretive security agencies to assassinate leaders of foreign governments.
 - d. The indiscriminate destruction of civilian property to attain military objectives.
15. Carl von Clausewitz said that war is _____.
 - a. Perpetuated by the military-industrial complex.
 - b. A form of organized group violence between politically distinct groups.
 - c. The inevitable product of the modern state system.
 - d. The continuation of politics by other means.
16. Asymmetrical war is _____.
 - a. A war that is disproportionately fought by both sides using advanced weaponry like unmanned drones instead of having “boots on the ground.”
 - b. A war using guerilla tactics against superior forces.
 - c. A war between nation-states of different sizes.
 - d. A theoretical war using computer simulations to predict outcomes.
17. The FLQ crisis was an example of a state of exception because it involved _____.
 - a. Irresolvable conflict between the Governor General and the Canadian Parliament.
 - b. A referendum in which Quebecers voted on withdrawing from the Canadian state.
 - c. A condition of global post-security.
 - d. An apprehended insurrection.

17.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Government and Power

18. Which concept corresponds best to the functionalist analysis of the state?
 - a. Greatest good for the greatest number
 - b. Goal attainment
 - c. Power
 - d. Symbols of authority

19. Which sociologist is not associated with critical sociology?
- a. Catherine MacKinnon
 - b. Michel Foucault
 - c. Karl Marx
 - d. Erving Goffman
20. Karl Marx believed the state evolves out of _____.
- a. Political supply and demand.
 - b. Pluralism.
 - c. The needs of capital.
 - d. Proletarian revolution.
21. The Greens, Occupy Wall Street protests, and the Tea Party movement have the following in common:
- a. They are products of class struggle.
 - b. They are examples of competing interest groups whose demands are weighed by the state.
 - c. They can only occur in a representative democracy.
 - d. They are part of the legitimization function of the state.
22. Which is not one of functionalism's four main purposes of government?
- a. Maintaining law and order
 - b. Meeting social needs
 - c. Equally distributing resources
 - d. Planning and directing society
23. The processes of successful image management are studied from a _____ perspective.
- a. Critical sociology
 - b. Symbolic interactionist
 - c. Functionalist
 - d. Feminist
24. Which of the following statements represent a symbolic interactionist perspective on the state?
- a. The state is a means of managing the affairs of the bourgeoisie.
 - b. The state is made up of meaningful interactions of small groups of people.
 - c. The state is made up of meaningful interactions of small groups of men.
 - d. The state is a means of attaining societal goals.

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

17.1 Power and Authority

1. In what ways is government exercised outside of the context of state-citizen relationships? What compels people to follow governmental direction in these situations?
2. Explain why leaders as divergent as Hitler and Jesus Christ are categorized as charismatic authorities.
3. Bureaucracy is a form in which rational-legal authority is exercised. Review the characteristics of bureaucracy in [Chapter 7. Groups and Organizations](#) and describe why they fit the definition of rational-legal authority. Think of examples of when bureaucratic authority is accepted as legitimate and examples when it is not accepted. What is the difference between these examples and what do they say about the effectiveness of rational-legal authority?

17.2 Democratic Will Formation

4. Do you feel that Canada is a true democracy? Does Canadian society reflect the will of the people? Why or why not?
5. Would you characterize your main political concerns as materialist or postmaterialist? Why?
6. What sociological factors do you think will influence the political preference formation in the next federal election? To which specific groups or classes do the federal parties address their platforms? What might lead an individual to vote for a political party that does *not* represent the traditional concerns of their socioeconomic group in society?

17.3 The De-Centring of the State: Terrorism, War, Empire, and Political Exceptionalism

7. How has the end of the Cold War affected the nature of geopolitical politics and conflicts? What types of conflict characterize the world today?
8. In what ways has the sovereignty of the state been undermined during the period of globalization? In what ways have the activities of supranational agencies, economic agreements, and military alliances been responsible for the decline of sovereignty? Does it make sense to describe this process as a new global empire?
9. Do some research online to study the October Crisis and the use of the War Measures Act in 1970. Why do you think this was popular in 1970? Would it be popular today under similar circumstances? What happened to the War Measures Act?

17.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Government and Power

10. How would functionalists criticize critical sociology and symbolic interactionism, and vice versa?
11. What is the significance of the different analyses of the state by Marxists, feminists, and Foucaultians?
12. How important is image in politics? Is politics about anything other than image?

Further Research

17.1 Power and Authority

Want to learn more about sociologists at work in the real world? Read this blog posting "[Regimes and Movements: Thoughts on Contentious Politics and the Arab Spring](#)" by Atef Said (2014) on the Mobilizing Ideas website to learn more about the roles sociology scholars played in the midst of the Arab Spring uprising.

17.2 Democratic Will Formation

The Occupy Wall Street movement has addressed the constraints on meaningful democracy in North America. They argue that democracy is becoming more oriented toward serving the rich than the general population. Visit [Occupy Wall Street](#) website to find out more about its activities and agenda.

17.3 The De-Centring of the State: Terrorism, War, Empire, and Political Exceptionalism

Noam Chomsky has long been a critic of the role of Western nations in creating a culture of terrorism. Watch the video [Prof Noam Chomsky – How to create a terrorist...](#) by Renegade Inc. (2013) on YouTube to hear his views.

17.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Government and Power

Functionalism is a complex philosophical theory that pertains to a variety of disciplines beyond sociology. Visit the entry devoted to [Functionalism on Stanford University's Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](#) by Janet Levin (2023) on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy website for a more comprehensive overview.

Anarchists have had one of the most thorough critiques of power and the state but their arguments have largely been misunderstood. Examine the theories, history, and solutions proposed by anarchists in this three-part CBC *Ideas* series, [“Against the State”](#).

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Solutions to Section Quiz

1 C, | 2 D, | 3 B, | 4 B, | 5 B, | 6 C, | 7 B, | 8 A, | 9 D, | 10 B, | 11 B, | 12 C, | 13 B, | 14 A, | 15 D, | 16 B, | 17 D, | 18 B, | 19 D, | 20 C, | 21 B, | 22 C, | 23 A, | 24 B, [\[Return to Quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 18. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE



Figure 18.1 Aboriginal and environmentalist protestors join together to protest old growth logging at Fairy Creek on Vancouver Island. (Photo courtesy of Joshua Wright/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

Learning Objectives

18.1 Collective Behaviour

- Describe different forms of collective behaviour: the crowd, the mass, the public, and the social movement.
- Differentiate between types of crowds: Casual, conventional, expressive and acting crowds.
- Review different explanations of collective behaviour: emergent norm, value-added, and assembling analyses.

18.2 Social Movements

- Review examples of social movements on local, regional, national, and global levels.
- Distinguish between different types of social movements: reform, revolutionary, redemptive, alternative, and resistance movements.
- Identify stages of social movements: preliminary, coalescence, institutionalization and decline stages.
- Explore theoretical perspectives on social movements: resource mobilization, framing, and new social movement theory.
- Summarize structural functionalist, critical and symbolic interactionist approaches to social movements.

18.3 Social Change

- Explain how technology can bring about social change.
- Define technology and describe its evolution.
- Understand technological inequality and issues related to unequal access to technology.
- Describe the role of planned obsolescence in technological development.

Introduction to Social Movements and Social Change



Figure 18.2 An 8-track tape player with AM/FM radio. The 8-track was a popular medium for prerecorded music from the late 1960s to the early 1980s but now lives in the “dustbin of history” and collections of curiosities. (Image courtesy of Randy Robertson/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

One of modern life’s main characteristics is incessant change. As noted in [Chapter 3. Culture](#) and [Chapter 4. Society and Modern Life](#), the cultural life of **modernity** can be described as a series of successive “nows” or “presents,” each of which defines what is *modern*, new or fashionable for a brief time before fading away into obscurity like the 78 rpm record, the 8 track tape and the CD. Marx and Engels summed up the culture of capitalist society in a phrase, “All that is solid melts into air...” (1848). From the ghost towns that dot the Canadian landscape to the expectation of having a lifetime career, every element of modern social life seems “transient, fleeting and contingent,” as the poet Charles Baudelaire (1863) once put it. Everything in modernity moves or is in a state of movement. What accounts for social change and social movement?

Emile Durkheim (1859–1917) described the phenomena of social life as falling along a continuum from solid to fluid. Some things like geography, availability of natural resources, population density, buildings and roads, machinery and physical artifacts are relatively fixed and unchanging. Other things, like the formal norms and rules established by institutional life, are subject to periodic revision and change, but tend to last through time as they address enduring social concerns and needs (i.e., social functions). Finally, Durkheim used an electrical metaphor to describe **social currents**, “great movements of enthusiasm, indignation, and pity” that “carry us away in spite of ourselves” (Durkheim, 1937). Social currents describe aspects of social life that change all the time. Similarly, a society’s **collective representations** — all “the ways in which the group conceives of itself in relation to objects which affect it” (Durkheim, 1937) — are much more

susceptible to change, fads and flux than institutions and social infrastructure.

Thus Durkheim conceptualized a continuum of social phenomena from the most crystallized “morphological” features of social life, to the normative sphere where life becomes institutionalized and rule bound, to the least crystallized, most ephemeral phenomena of collective representations, social trends, fashion, temporary enthusiasms and fleeting products of collective imagination.

1. Morphological qualities (substratum): population, territorial topography, divisions and resources, social infrastructure, material objects
2. Institutions (normative sphere): (a) formal rules and norms, legal procedures, moral codes, religious dogmas, etc.; (b) informal customs, collective habits, social obligations
3. Collective representations (symbolic sphere): (a) values, ideals, representations, language, stories, symbols; (b) free currents of social life: collective feelings, public opinion and trends, i.e., social creation in the process of emerging and not yet caught in a definite mould (Thompson, 2002).

Durkheim sums up the idea of a continuum of social stability and variation by noting, “[t]here is thus a whole series of degrees without a break in continuity between the facts of the most articulated structure and those free currents of social life which are not yet definitely moulded. The differences between them are, therefore, only differences in the degree of consolidation they present. Both are simply life, more or less crystallized” (Durkheim, 1937). Social life is caught up in differing degrees of movement and consolidation. Some aspects move slowly and become contained and solidified; other aspects move quickly, caught up in the continuous variation of social currents.

For example, when something “trends” on social media, it becomes a social current in contemporary social life. It is not something that just one person or a few people notice and remark on; it becomes part of a collective awareness. Through likes and shares, people’s attention and feelings turn toward it and it becomes a focus of the collective consciousness, albeit usually temporarily. How would a Durkheimian sociologist analyze it?

Current events, major film releases, celebrity scandals, etc. are likely to trend on social media and then be forgotten almost immediately. They capture momentary enthusiasms and then disappear. However, other trends and social currents prove to be more enduring and find “legs” and purchase in society. The Black Lives Matter movement started as a viral hashtag #BlackLivesMatter when the killer of 17 year old Trayvor Martin was acquitted of murder in 2013 (Ransby, 2018). Similarly, the #metoo movement gained collective attention as a social media hashtag, initially in response to multiple accusations of sexual assault against American film producer Harvey Weinstein in 2017 (Rech, 2019). It invited women to share stories sexual assault and harassment and became a global **social movement**, involving demonstrations, community work, public debates, prosecutions and policy initiatives. The social media trend created broad social awareness of the issue that lead to a significant increase in the number of women coming forward to report of sexual abuse in Canada. It lead to reviews of workplace harassment policies and of police and prosecutor practices in processing sexual assaults. In both Black Lives Matter and Me Too, a potentially ephemeral social media trend “crystallized” and solidified to become the basis for social movements and institutional change.

Social currents can also crystallize into the most solid, morphological features of social life. Concerns and public opinion about discrimination against non-binary genders can lead to architectural changes, such as provisions for unisex washrooms. After the Great Depression of the 1930s and a period of declining birthrates, the post World War Two trend towards having larger numbers of children earlier in marriage lead to the collective phenomenon of the baby boom. The demographic effects of the baby boom had a profound impact on the built environment (the building



Figure 18.3 Twitter tag cloud for April 18, 2022 showing the most popular topics in large print. Which of these topics are remembered today? (Image courtesy of Trends24.) [Trends24 Terms](#)

of schools and community centers, the suburbanization of cities, the dependence on automobiles and automobile infrastructure), the creation of new social policy and planning as the baby boomers moved through their life cycle (education systems, employment insurance, public healthcare, senior care), and the youth orientation of popular culture (the birth of rock and roll, TV cartoons, youth subcultures, consumer society) (Foot and Cooper, 2013).

It is interesting that the invention of social media themselves constituted a new normative or institutional form of social interaction. Norms are built in to the software of the media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Youtube, TikTok, etc. The software establishes the forms and networks of communication, including the social connection between users (networks), the contractual relationship between media companies and users, the format of expression (Facebook posts or Twitter's 240 character limit, for eg.) and software functions such as "likes" and "shares," which aid in the circulation and overall popularity of posts. They also establish a vast network of surveillance in which trillions of "data points" about individuals lives are accumulated by private corporations and used to sell advertising, suggest objects for attention, and "nudge" or influence behaviour. These factors define the norms of communication in the social media era. These norms are subject to revision and innovation, but also solidify to become habit forming and institutional.

Beneath the trends, software and norms of social media is the morphological infrastructure of digital technology. Fibre optic cables, satellite networks, smart phones and computer chips determine the structure of informational civilization. They have profound effects on the nature of personal privacy and public life, as well as who has access to digital information, where and with how much bandwidth.

The social media example illustrates two aspects of the sociology of social movements and social change discussed in this chapter. What accounts for social change and social movement? Social change can take place through the informal and spontaneous structures of collective behaviour and through the formal and organized structures of social movements. Media trends can become the basis of changes in collective behaviours and social movements when they become channeled and institutionalized. Social change can also be produced by technological innovations, which affect the morphological structure of society. The creation of an informational civilization is the product of the invention, circulation and integration of digital technologies into social life. Both aspects describe the way a society moves and changes.

As the philosopher Gilles Deleuze says, what is most interesting about a society is what moves and what escapes its structures: "the movements of flight" which break from established norms, categories and patterns of behaviour (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007). These define the places where societies evolve and transform.




Figure 18.4 The philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). "One might say in a certain sense that what is primary in a society are the lines, the movements of flight" (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007). (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 3.0](#)

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18.1. Collective Behaviour

WILLIAM LITTLE AND RON MCGIVERN

Flash Mobs



Figure 18.5 Is this a good time had by all? Some flash mobs may function as political protests, while others are for fun. This flash mob pillow fight's purpose was to entertain. (Photo courtesy of MattwilSON./Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

People sitting in a café in a touristy corner of Rome might expect the usual sights and sounds of a busy city. They might be more surprised when, as they sip their espressos, hundreds of young people start streaming into the picturesque square clutching pillows, and when someone gives a signal, they start pummeling each other in a massive free-for-all pillow fight. Spectators might lean forward, coffee forgotten, as feathers fly and more and more people join in. All around the square, others hang out of their windows or stop on the street, transfixed, to watch. After several minutes, the spectacle is over. With cheers and the occasional high-five, the crowd disperses, leaving only destroyed pillows and clouds of fluff in its wake.

This is a **flash mob**, a large group of people who gather together in a spontaneous activity that lasts a limited amount of time before returning to their regular routines.

Technology plays a big role in the creation of a flash mob:

select people are texted or emailed, and the message spreads virtually until a crowd has grown. But while technology might explain the “how” of flash mobs, it does not explain the “why.” Flash mobs often are captured on video and shared on the internet; frequently they go viral and become well known. So what leads people to want to flock somewhere for a massive pillow fight? Or for a choreographed dance? Or to freeze in place? Why is this appealing? In large part, it is as simple as the reason humans have bonded together around fires for storytelling, or danced together, or joined a community holiday celebration. Humans seek connections and shared experiences that break the moulds of daily routine. A flash mob, pillows included, provides a way to make that happen.

Flash mobs also illustrate the ways in which digital technologies and social media increasingly orchestrate contemporary social life. The darker side of public pillow fights and spontaneous choir performances is exemplified by the orchestrated protest and counter-protest over the purported “Islamization of Texas” in Houston Texas in 2016. The event was orchestrated remotely by Russian actors based in St. Petersburg (U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence, 2018). The U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee reported that the confrontation that drew dozens of individuals was organized as a Facebook event through two fake Facebook pages — The Heart of Texas and the United Muslims of America — operated by a Russian “Troll Factory” called the Internet Research Agency thousands of miles away.

Russia trolls were encouraging both sides to battle in the streets and create division between real Americans. Ironically, one person who attended stated, “The Heart of Texas promoted this event, but we didn’t see one of them.” We now know why. It’s hard to attend an event in Houston, Texas, when you’re trolling from a site in St. Petersburg, Russia. Establishing these two competing groups, paying for the ads, and causing this disruptive event in Houston cost Russia about \$200 (U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence, 2018).

Again, it is important to ask what leads people to want to rally for an issue that has no basis in reality? Why is this appealing? What is the draw?

Forms of Collective Behaviour

Flash mobs are examples of **collective behaviour**, non-institutionalized activity in which several people voluntarily engage. Other examples of collective behaviour can include anything from a group of commuters traveling home from work to the trend toward adopting the Justin Bieber hair flip. In short, it can be any group behaviour that is not mandated or regulated by an institution. Four primary forms of collective behaviour include the crowd, the mass, the public, and social movements.

It takes a fairly large number of people in close proximity to form a **crowd** (Lofland, 1993). Examples include a group of people attending a Neil Young concert, attending Canada Day festivities, or joining a worship service. Turner and Killian (1993) identified four types of crowds. **Casual crowds** consist of people who are in the same place at the same time, but who are not really interacting, such as people milling around in a popular public square. **Conventional crowds** are those who come together for a scheduled event, like a religious service or a hockey game. **Expressive crowds** are people who join together to express emotion, often at funerals, weddings, or the like. The final type, **acting crowds**, focus on a specific goal or action, such as a protest movement or riot.

In addition to the different types of crowds, collective groups can also be identified in two other ways (Lofland, 1993). A **mass** is a relatively large and dispersed number of people with a common interest, but whose members are largely unknown to one another and who are incapable of acting together in a concerted way to achieve objectives. In this sense, the audience of the television show *Bridgerton* or of any mass medium (TV, radio, film, books) is a mass. A **public**, on the other hand, is an unorganized, relatively diffused group of people who engage with issues that are important for them. They are the basis of citizenry.

While these two types of group are similar, they are not the same. In his 1956 book, *The Power Elite*, Sociologist C. Wright Mills (1956) described the difference between a public and a mass based on their different forms of communication. In a public, communication is a conversation between equals where “virtually as many people express opinions as receive them” and “communications are so organised that there is a chance immediately and effectively to answer back to any opinion expressed in public” (Mills, 1956). People have the ability to “answer back.” This is the foundation of Habermas’ concept of a **public sphere**, the open “space” of public debate and deliberation in democratic societies where public opinion can be formed (See [Chapter 17. Government and Politics](#)). As Habermas puts it, “a portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body” (Habermas, 1974).

In a mass, communication tends to be one way and top down, like a broadcast that delivers a message to potentially millions of separate listeners, who are otherwise unconnected. As Mills describes, in a mass “far fewer people express opinions than receive them; for the community of publics becomes an abstracted collectivity of individuals who receive impressions from the mass media” (Mills, 1956). Communication is one way. There is little provision for individuals to answer back to the messages they receive, whereas a public can potentially translate its opinions into action. Sometimes this translation entails forming *social movements*.

Social movements (discussed in the next section) are purposeful, organized groups striving to work toward a common goal. These groups might be attempting to create change (Black Lives Matter, #Metoo, Idle No More), to resist change (Luddites, anti-globalization movement, fundamentalists, anti-vaxxers), or to provide a political voice to those otherwise disenfranchised (anti-poverty movements, Grandmothers to Grandmothers, Live Aid). Unlike the crowd, the mass and the public, social movements are understood as *intentional* and *organized*. They emerge and develop specific goals to create (or resist) social change.

Theoretical Perspectives on Collective Behaviour



Figure 18.6 French sociologist Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931). (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Early collective behaviour theories (Blumer, 1969; Le Bon, 1895) focused on the irrationality of crowds. Gustave Le Bon saw the tendency for crowds to break into riots or, for example, anti-Semitic pogroms, as a product of the properties of crowds themselves: anonymity, contagion, and suggestibility. On their own, each individual would not be capable of acting in this manner, but as anonymous members of a crowd they were easily swept up in dynamics that carried them away. Crowds made ordinarily independent, rational thinking individuals susceptible to suggestion and irrational crowd behaviour.

Eventually, those theorists who viewed crowds as uncontrolled groups of irrational people were supplanted by theorists who viewed the behaviour of some crowds as the rational behaviour of logical beings.

Emergent-Norm Perspective

Sociologists Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian (1993) built on earlier sociological ideas and developed what is known as emergent norm theory. They believe that the norms experienced by people in a crowd may be disparate and fluctuating. They emphasize the importance of these norms in shaping crowd behaviour, especially those norms that shift quickly in response to changing external factors. **Emergent norm theory** asserts that, in this circumstance, people perceive and respond to the crowd situation with their particular (individual) set of norms, which may change as the crowd experience evolves. This focus on the individual component of interaction reflects a symbolic interactionist perspective.

For Turner and Killian, the process begins when individuals suddenly find themselves in a new situation, or when an existing situation suddenly becomes strange or unfamiliar. For example, think about human behaviour during Hurricane Katrina in 2005. New Orleans was decimated and people were trapped without supplies or a way to evacuate. In these extraordinary circumstances, what outsiders saw as “looting” was defined by those involved as seeking needed supplies for survival. Normally, individuals would not wade into a corner gas station and take canned goods without paying, but given that they were suddenly in a greatly changed situation, they established a norm that they felt was reasonable.

Once individuals find themselves in a situation ungoverned by previously established norms, they interact in small groups to develop new guidelines on how to behave. According to the emergent-norm perspective, crowds are not viewed as irrational, impulsive, uncontrolled groups. Instead, norms develop and are accepted as they fit the situation.



Figure 18.7 According to the emergent-norm perspective, people have their own reasons for joining a parade. (Photo courtesy of Infrogmation of New Orleans/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

While this theory offers insight into why norms develop, it leaves undefined the nature of norms, how they come to be accepted by the crowd, and how they spread through the crowd.

Value-Added Theory

Neil Smelser's (1962) meticulous categorization of crowd behaviour, called **value-added theory**, is a perspective within the functionalist tradition based on the idea that several conditions must be in place for collective behaviour to occur. Each condition adds to the likelihood that collective behaviour will occur.

The first condition is *structural conduciveness*, which describes when people are collectively aware of a problem and have the opportunity to gather, ideally in an open area. *Structural strain*, the second condition, refers to people's expectations about the situation at hand being unmet, causing tension and strain. The next condition is the *growth and spread of a generalized belief*, wherein a problem is clearly identified and attributed to a person or group. Fourth, *precipitating factors* spur collective behaviour; this often involves the emergence of a dramatic event. The fifth condition is *mobilization for action*, when leaders emerge to direct a crowd to action. The final condition relates to action by the agents of social control to suppress or disperse the crowd. Called *social control*, it is the only way to end a collective behaviour episode according to Smelser (1962).



Figure 18.8 Agents of social control bring collective behaviour to an end. (Photo courtesy of Eric Hossinger/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

A real-life example of these conditions occurred after the fatal police shooting of teenager Michael Brown, an unarmed eighteen-year-old African American, in Ferguson, MO on August 9, 2014. The shooting drew national attention almost immediately. A large group of mostly Black, local residents assembled in protest—a classic example of structural conduciveness. When the community perceived that the police were not acting in the people's interest and were withholding the name of the officer, structural strain became evident. As the crowd of protesters were met with heavily armed police in military-style protective uniforms accompanied by an armored vehicle, a growing generalized belief evolved that the police would not properly investigate the shooting. The precipitating factor of the arrival of the police spurred greater collective behavior as the residents mobilized by assembling a parade down the street. Ultimately they were met with tear gas, pepper spray, and rubber bullets used by the police acting as agents of social control. The element of social control escalated over the following days until August 18, when the governor called in the National Guard.

While value-added theory addresses the complexity of collective behaviour, it also assumes that such behaviour is inherently negative or disruptive. In contrast, collective behaviour can be non-disruptive, such as when people flood to a place where a leader or public figure has died to

express condolences or leave tokens of remembrance. People also forge temporary alliances with strangers in response to natural disasters. Some of the same principles apply, like structural conduciveness, growth and spread of a generalized belief, and mobilization for action, even when conflict and disruption is absent.

Assembling Perspective

Symbolic interactionist sociologist Clark McPhail (1991) developed the **assembling perspective**, another system for understanding collective behaviour that credited individuals in crowds with being rational agents. Unlike previous theories, this theory refocuses attention from collective behaviour to collective action. Whereas collective behaviour is a voluntary non-institutional or spontaneous gathering, **collective action** involves concerted behaviour based on a shared interest. A number of people come together to achieve some common objective. His theory focuses primarily on the processes associated with crowd behaviour, plus the life cycle of gatherings.

McPhail noted that the concept of crowd behaviour suggests a unanimity of motives and actions that empirical observation does not bear out. In temporary gatherings, an assembling process brings people into a common location and a dispersing process terminates the gathering, but in between what people do alone and in relation to others varies considerably. He and his students identified several different types of convergent or collective behaviour within gatherings, as shown on the chart below.

Table 18.1. Clark McPhail identified various circumstances of convergent and collective behaviour (McPhail 1991). [\[Skip Table\]](#)

Type of crowd	Description	Example
Convergence clusters	Family and friends who travel together	Carpooling parents take several children to the movies
Convergent orientation	Group all facing the same direction	A semi-circle around a stage
Collective vocalization	Sounds or noises made collectively	Screams on a roller coaster
Collective verbalization	Collective and simultaneous participation in a speech or song	Singing “O Canada” at a hockey game
Collective gesticulation	Using body parts to form symbols	The YMCA dance or the human wave.
Collective manipulation	Objects collectively moved around	Holding signs at a protest rally
Collective locomotion	Coordinating direction and speed of movement	Children running to an ice cream truck

Also, contrary to the idea of the anonymous crowd, McPhail observed that typically most people in a gathering either arrive with, or have made arrangements to meet one or more acquaintances with whom they remain for the duration. Temporary gatherings are therefore assemblages composed of some singles and many small primary groups. This is significant for crowd behaviour because if members of a gathering know each other they also take responsibility for each other and exercise influence over each other.

As useful as this is for understanding the components of how crowds come together, many sociologists criticize its lack of attention on the large cultural context of the described behaviours, instead focusing on individual actions.

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18.2 Social Movements

WILLIAM LITTLE AND RON MCGIVERN

Social movements are purposeful, organized groups striving to work toward a common social goal. While most students learn about social movements in social studies classes, people tend to take for granted the fundamental changes in society they have produced: the rise of capitalism through the early modern bourgeois movements, the splintering of Christianity through the Protestant movements, the development of democracy through revolutionary social movements (the English, French and American revolutions), the development of fascism through white supremacist and nationalist movements, the recognition of gender equality through the Suffragette movements, the transformation of working conditions and provision of social and health security through workers movements, the end of slavery through the abolitionist movements, the extension of civil liberties to various racialized, ethnic and sexual minorities through civil rights movements, etc. Many of the fundamental aspects of modern society no longer appear to be in movement because of the success of social movements. Many other fundamental issues are still being contested. But from the anti-tobacco movement that has worked to outlaw smoking in public spaces, to the environmental movement that is replacing the fossil fuel economy with renewable resources, contemporary movements create social change on a global scale.

Levels of Social Movements

Movements happen at the level of towns, regions, nations and the world. The following examples of social movements range from local to global. No doubt students can think of others on all of these levels, especially since modern technology has provided a near-constant stream of information about the quest for social change around the world. Some movements capture a moment only to fade away, whereas others persist or refocus their activities and remain in the public eye.

Local

Winnipeg's inner city is well known for its poor Aboriginal population, low levels of income and education, and concerns about drugs, gangs, and violence. Not surprisingly, it has been home to a number of social movements and grassroots community organizations over time (Silver, 2008). Currently, the Winnipeg Boldness Project is a social movement focused on providing investment in early childhood care in the Point Douglas community to try to break endemic cycles of poverty. Statistics show that 40% of Point Douglas children are not ready for school by age five and one in six are apprehended by child protection agencies. Through programs that support families and invest in early childhood development, children could be prepared for school and not be forced into the position of having to catch up to their peers (Roussin, Gill, and Young, 2014). The organization seeks to “create new conditions to dramatically transform the well-being of young children in Point Douglas” (Winnipeg Boldness Project, 2014).

Regional

At the other end of the political spectrum from the Winnipeg Boldness Project is the legacy of the numerous conservative and extreme right social movements of the 1980s and 1990s that advocated the independence of Western Canada from the rest of the country. The Western Canada Concept, Western Independence Party, Confederation of Regions Party, and Western Block were all registered political parties representing social movements of western alienation.

The federal government's National Energy Program of 1980 was one of the key catalysts for this movement because it was seen as a way of securing cheap oil and gas resources for central Canada at the expense of Alberta.

However, the seeds of western alienation developed much earlier in the century with the legitimate perception that Canadian federal politics was dominated by the interests of Quebec and Ontario. The independent farmer parties and the federal Progressive Party of the 1920s and 1930s were based on radical, socialist prairie farmer's groups that initially united against federal tariff structures that hurt farmer's livelihoods and hindered the marketing of agricultural products (Bell, 2002; 2007).

One of the more infamous leaders of the Western Canada Concept was Doug Christie who made a name for himself as the lawyer who defended the Holocaust-deniers Jim Keegstra and Ernst Zundel in well-publicized trials in the 1980s. Part of the program of the Western Canada Concept, aside from western independence, was to end non-European immigration to Canada and preserve Christian and European culture. In addition to these extreme-right concerns, however, were many elements of democratic reform and fiscal conservatism, such as mandatory balanced-budget legislation and provisions for referenda and recall legislation (Western Canada Concept, N.d.), which later became central to the federal Reform Party. The Reform Party was western based but did not seek western independence. Rather it sought to transform itself into a national political party eventually forming the Canadian Alliance Party with other conservative factions. The Canadian Alliance merged with the Progressive Conservative Party to form the Conservative Party of Canada in 2003, but the problem of regionalism and Western Canada representation remains a source of instability within the party.

The western alienation movements of the 1980s consolidated an amalgam of concerns recognizable in the 21st century as the white nationalist movement.




Figure 18.9 The flag of the Western Independence Party, one of several regional social movements that advocated separation from Canada, represents Western Canada. (Photo courtesy of Harley King/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY SA 3.0](#)

National



Figure 18.10 The Idle No More movement. (Photo courtesy of AK Rockefeller/Flickr.) [CC BY SA 2.0](#)

A prominent national social movement in recent years is Idle No More. A group of aboriginal women organized an event in Saskatchewan in November 2012 to protest the Conservative government's C-45 omnibus bill. The contentious features of the bill that concerned aboriginal people were the government's lack of consultation with them in provisions that changed the Indian Act, the Navigation Protection Act, and the Environmental Assessment Act. A month later Idle No More held a national day of action and Chief Theresa Spence of the Attawapiskat First Nation began a 43-day hunger strike on an island in the Ottawa River near Parliament Hill. The hunger strike galvanized national public attention on aboriginal issues, and numerous protest events such as flash mobs and temporary blockades were organized

around the country.

One of Chief Spence's demands was that a meeting be set up with the prime minister and the Governor General to discuss aboriginal issues. The inclusion of the Governor General — the Queen's representative in Canada — proved to be the sticking point in arranging this meeting, but was central to Idle No More's claims that aboriginal sovereignty and treaty negotiations were matters whose origins preceded the establishment of the Canadian state. Chief Spence ended her hunger strike with the signing of a 13-point declaration that demanded commitments from the government to review Bills C-45 and C-38, ensure aboriginal consultation on government legislation, initiate an inquiry into missing aboriginal women, and improve treaty negotiations, aboriginal housing, and education, among other commitments (CBC, 2013a; 2013b).

Comparisons between Idle No More and the recent Occupy Movement emphasized the diffuse, grassroots natures of the movements and their non-hierarchical structures. Idle No More emerged outside, and in some respects in opposition to, the Assembly of First Nations. It was more focused than the Occupy Movement in the sense that it developed in response to particular legislation (Bill C-45), but as it grew it became both broader in its concerns and more radical in its demands for aboriginal sovereignty and self-determination. It was also seen to have the same organizational problems as the Occupy movement in that the goals of the movement were left more or less open, the leadership remained decentralized, and no formal decision-making structures were established. Some members of the Idle No More movement were satisfied with the 13-point declaration, while others sought more radical solutions of self-determination outside the traditional pattern of negotiating with the federal government.

It is not clear that Idle No More, as a social movement, will move toward a more conventional social-movement structure or whether it will dissipate and be replaced by other aboriginal movements (CBC, 2013c; Gollom, 2013). Taiaiake Alfred's post-mortem of the movement was that "the limits to Idle No More are clear, and many people are beginning to realize that the kind of movement we have been conducting under the banner of Idle No More is not sufficient in itself to decolonize this country or even to make meaningful change in the lives of people" (2013). Instead of the focus on demonstrations, media publicity and making representations to the federal government, which "has not responded or felt the need to address [the movement] in any way," Alfred argues for a more direct approach. "Our focus should be on restoring our presence on the land and regenerating our true nationhood. These go hand in hand and one cannot be achieved without the other" (Alfred, 2013).

Global

Global social movements are networks of social movement actors who collaborate across state borders to address shared global concerns. Increasingly they become powerful forces in global governance, including impacting United Nations Climate Change Conferences, establishing Fair Trade initiatives, and working to resettle refugees and migrants.

Greta Thunberg's one person school strike against government inaction on climate change spread first in Sweden and then around the world, inspiring a teenager-led global climate strike movement sometimes referred to as Fridays for Future. Twenty thousand students – from Canada to Japan – had skipped school to protest the lack of urgency by governments by December, 2018 (Carrington, 2018). As a spokesperson who presents the climate change issue from the perspective of youth's stolen future, she presents a powerful social movement *frame* to castigate world leaders and impact global policy. World leaders have had "26 COPs [Conference of the Parties on climate change], they have had decades of blah, blah, blah – and where has that got us?" (Thunberg, cited in Kraemer, 2021).

Despite their successes in bringing forth change on controversial topics, global social movements are not always about volatile politicized issues. For example, the global movement called Slow Food focuses on how we eat as means of addressing contemporary quality-of-life issues. Slow Food, with the slogan "Good, Clean, Fair Food," is a global grassroots movement claiming supporters in 150 countries. The movement links community and environmental issues back to the question of what is on our plates and where it came from. Founded in 1989 in response to the increasing existence of fast food in communities that used to treasure their culinary traditions, Slow Food works to raise awareness of food choices (Slow Food, 2011). With more than 100,000 members in 1,300 local chapters, Slow Food is a movement that crosses political, age, and regional lines.



Figure 18.11 Greta Thunberg's "School Strike for Climate." Addressing the 2019 U.N. Climate Action Summit in New York she said, "This is all wrong. I shouldn't be up here. I should be back in school on the other side of the ocean. Yet you all come to us young people for hope? How dare you! You have stolen my dreams and my childhood with your empty words. And yet I'm one of the lucky ones. People are suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are collapsing. We are in the beginning of a mass extinction. And all you can talk about is money and fairytales of eternal economic growth. How dare you!" (Thunberg, 2019). (Image courtesy of Anders Hellberg/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

Types of Social Movements

Social movements occur on the local, regional, national and global stages; often on all four stages simultaneously. Are there other patterns or classifications that can help to understand them? Sociologist David Aberle (1966) addresses this question, developing categories that distinguish among social movements based on what they want to change and how much change they want. **Reform movements** seek to change something specific about the social structure. Examples include anti-nuclear groups, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), and the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC). **Revolutionary movements** seek to completely change every aspect of society. These would include Cuban 26th of July Movement (under Fidel Castro), the 1960s counterculture movement, as well as Antifa (short for anti-fascism) and other anarchist collectives. **Redemptive movements** are "meaning seeking," and their goal is to provoke inner change or spiritual growth in individuals. Organizations promoting these movements might include Alcoholics Anonymous, New Age, or Christian fundamentalist groups. **Alternative movements** are focused on self-improvement and limited, specific changes to individual beliefs and behaviour. These include groups like the Slow Food movement,

Planned Parenthood, and barefoot jogging advocates. **Resistance movements** seek to prevent or undo change to the social structure. The Ku Klux Klan, white nationalist, anti-vaxxer and pro-life movements fall into this category.

Stages of Social Movements

Sociologists also study the life cycle of social movements — how they emerge, grow, and in some cases, die out. Blumer (1969) and Tilly (1978) outline a four-stage process. In the *preliminary stage*, people become aware of an issue and leaders emerge. This is followed by the *coalescence stage* when people join together and organize in order to publicize the issue and raise awareness. In the *institutionalization stage*, the movement no longer requires grassroots volunteerism: it is an established organization, typically peopled with a paid staff. When people fall away, adopt a new movement, the movement successfully brings about the change it sought, or people no longer take the issue seriously, the movement falls into the *decline stage*. Each social movement discussed earlier belongs in one of these four stages. Where do they belong on the list?

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

Social Media and Social Change: A Match Made in Heaven?



Figure 18.12 Black Lives Matter protest in London's Oxford Circus. The aim of the marchers was to highlight the low value seemingly placed on black lives in response to the fatal shootings by U.S. police officers of Philando Castile, a 32 year old cafeteria supervisor in St. Paul, Minnesota and Alton Sterling, a 37 year old father of five in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. (Image courtesy of Alisdare Hickson/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, social media is a widely used mechanism in social movements. For example, Tarana Burke first used “Me Too” in 2006 on a major social media venue of the time (MySpace). The phrase later grew into a massive movement when people began using it on Twitter to drive empathy and support regarding experiences of sexual harassment or sexual assault. In a similar way, Black Lives Matter began as a social media message after George Zimmerman was acquitted in the shooting death of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin, and the phrase sparked a formal (though decentralized) social movement.

Social media has the potential to dramatically transform how people get involved in movements ranging from local school district decisions to presidential campaigns. As discussed above, movements go through several stages, and social media adds a dynamic to each of them. In the *preliminary stage*, people become

aware of an issue, and leaders emerge. Compared to movements of 20 or 30 years ago, social media can accelerate this stage substantially. Issue awareness can spread at the speed of a click, with thousands of people across the globe becoming informed at the same time. In a similar vein, those who are savvy and engaged with social media may emerge as leaders, even if, for example, they are not great public speakers.

At the next stage, the *coalescence stage*, social media is also transformative. Coalescence is the point when people join together to publicize the issue and get organized. US President Obama's 2008 campaign was a case study in organizing through social media. Using Twitter and other online tools, the campaign engaged volunteers who had typically not bothered with politics. Combined with comprehensive data tracking and the ability to micro-target, the campaign became a blueprint for others to build on. The US 2020 elections featured a level of data analysis and rapid response capabilities that, while echoing the Obama campaign's early work, made the 2008 campaign look quaint. The campaigns and political analysts could measure the level of social media interaction following any campaign stop, debate, statement by the candidate, news mention, or any other event, and measure whether the tone or "sentiment" was positive or negative. Political polls are still important, but social media provides instant feedback and opportunities for campaigns to act, react, or—on a daily basis and in "real time"—ask for donations based on something that had occurred just hours earlier (Knowledge at Wharton, 2020).

Interestingly, social media can have interesting outcomes once a movement reaches the *institutionalization stage*. In some cases, a formal organization might exist alongside the hashtag or general sentiment, as is the case with Black Lives Matter. At any one time, BLM is essentially three things: a structured organization, an idea with deep and personal meaning for people, and a widely used phrase or hashtag. It is possible that users of the hashtag are not referring to the formal organization. It is even possible that people who hold a strong belief that Black lives matter do not agree with all of the organization's principles or its leadership. In other cases, people may be very aligned with all three contexts of the phrase. Social media is still crucial to the social movement, but its interplay is both complex and evolving.

In a similar way, MeToo activists, including Tarana Burke herself, have sought to clarify the interweaving of different aspects of the movement. She told the Harvard Gazette in 2020:

I think we have to be careful about what we're calling the movement. And I think one of the things I've learned in the last two years is that folks don't really understand what a movement is or how it's defined. The people using the hashtag on the internet were the impetus for Me Too being put into the public sphere. The media coverage of the viralness of Me Too and the people being accused are media coverage of a popular story that derived from the hashtag. The movement is the work that our organization and others like us are doing to both support survivors and move people to action (Walsh 2020).

Sociologists have identified high-risk activism, such as the civil rights movement, as a "strong-tie" phenomenon, meaning that people are far more likely to stay engaged and not run home to safety if they have close friends who are also engaged. The people who dropped out of the movement—who went home after the danger became too great—did not display any less ideological commitment. But they lacked the strong-tie connection to other people who were staying. Social media had been considered "weak-tie" (McAdam and Paulson, 1993; Brown, 2011). People follow or friend people they have never met. Weak ties are important for contemporary networked social structure, but they seem to limit the level of risk people will take on their behalf. For some people, social media remains that way, but for others it can relate to or build

stronger ties. For example, if people, who had for years known each other only through an online group, meet in person at an event, they may feel far more connected at that event and afterward than people who had never interacted before. Social media itself, even if people never meet, can bring people into primary group status, forming stronger ties.

Another way to consider the impact of social media on activism is through something that may or may not be emotional, has little implications regarding tie strength, and may be fleeting rather than permanent, but still be one of the largest considerations of any formal social movement: money. The 2022 “Trucker’s Convoy” that occupied Ottawa and several border crossings to protest COVID-19 public health mandates raised \$10 million internationally in a matter of days through a GoFundMe campaign, even though it was not clear what the money would be used for or who was leading the movement. The money was eventually frozen and returned to donors when the criminal and harassing behaviours of the protests violated the terms of GoFundMe service. In general however, 55 per cent of people who engage with nonprofits through social media take some sort of action; and for 60 per cent of them (or 33 per cent of the total) that action is to give money to support the cause (Nonprofit Source 2020).

Theoretical Perspectives on Social Movements

Most theories of social movements are called **collective action** theories, indicating the purposeful nature of this form of collective behaviour. The following three theories are but a few of the many classic and modern theories developed by social scientists. **Resource mobilization theory** focuses on the practical, organizational strategies that social movements need to engage in to successfully mobilize support, compete with other social movements and opponents, and present political claims and grievances to the state. **Framing theory** focuses on the way social movements make appeals to potential supporters by framing or presenting their issues in a way that aligns with commonly held values, beliefs, and commonsense attitudes. **New social movement** theory focuses on the commonalities shared by many social movements that emerged from the 1960s onwards. These movements shifted focus from the materialist or economic struggles of the 19th and 20th century labour movements, for example, to shed light on new areas concerning the livability or quality of life: environmental integrity, peace and disarmament, holistic health, decolonization, reconciliation, recognition of diversity and opportunities for self-actualization (Habermas, 1981).

Resource Mobilization

Social movements will always be a part of society as long as there are aggrieved populations whose needs and interests are not being satisfied. However, grievances do not become social movements unless social movement actors are able to create viable organizations, mobilize resources and funds, and attract large-scale followings. As people will always weigh their options and make rational choices about which movements to follow, social movements necessarily form under finite competitive conditions: competition for attention, financing, commitment, personnel, organizational skills, etc. Not only will social movements compete for the public’s attention with many other concerns — from the basic (people’s jobs or their need to feed themselves) to the entertaining (video games, sports, or television) — but they also compete with each other. For any individual, it may be a simple matter to decide whether they want to spend their time and money on animal shelters, international disaster relief or fighting public health measures during a pandemic. The

question is, however, which animal shelter, which disaster, or which “personal freedom” issue? To be successful, social movements must develop the organizational capacity to attract attention, mobilize resources (money, people, and skills) and compete with other organizations to reach their goals.




Figure 18.13 Multiple social movement organizations concerned about the same issue form a social movement industry. A society's many social movement industries comprise its social movement sector. With so many options, how do supporters decide who they will give their time or money to? (Image courtesy of Liying Zhang, 2021.) [CC BY 3.0 \[Image Description\]](#)

McCarthy and Zald (1977) conceptualize **resource mobilization theory** as a way to explain a movement's success in terms of its ability to acquire resources and mobilize individuals to achieve goals and take advantage of political opportunities. Whatever the emotional or other substantive reasons people have for joining or creating social movements, in this approach social movements are conceptualized as rational, calculating, goal-oriented social institutions. How groups organize to mobilize resources is at the center of the analysis. Resources in this context include:

1. Material Resources such as financing, property, office space, equipment, and supplies.
2. Human Resources such as activists, volunteers, staff, as well as their experience, skills, and expertise.
3. Social-Organizational Resources such as public infrastructure, digital infrastructure, social networks, and organizational structures.
4. Moral Resources such as beliefs and values that movements can draw on and appeal to in order to create legitimacy, solidarity, and sympathetic support for the movement's goals.
5. Cultural Resources such as collective understanding of the issues, social movement “know-how,” and organizational templates.

For example, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) is a **social movement organization** (SMO) in competition for these five types of resource with Greenpeace and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), two other social movement organizations engaged with animal rights.

Taken together, along with all other social movement organizations working on animals rights issues, these similar organizations constitute a **social movement industry**. In keeping with the economic analogy of resource mobilization, a social movement industry is similar to the many industrial categories of firms that compose an economy. Where resources are limited, there is competition between social movement organizations.

Whether we study revolutionary movements, broad or narrow social reform movements, or religious movements, we find a variety of SMOs or groups, linked to various segments of supporting constituencies (both institutional and individual), competing amongst themselves for resources and symbolic leadership, sharing facilities and resources at other times, developing stable and many times differentiated functions, occasionally merging into unified *ad hoc* coalitions, and occasionally engaging in all – out war against each other (Zald and McCarthy, 1987).

Multiple social movement industries in a society, though they may have widely different constituencies and goals, constitute a society's **social movement sector**. Every **social movement organization** (a single social movement group) within the social movement sector is competing for the public's attention, time, and resources. The chart in Figure 18.13 shows the relationship between these components.

Framing/Frame Analysis

The sudden emergence of social movements that have not had time to mobilize resources, or vice versa, the failure of well-funded groups to achieve effective collective action, calls into question the emphasis on resource mobilization as an adequate explanation for the formation of social movements. Over the past several decades, sociologists have developed the concept of *frames* to explain how individuals identify and understand social events and which norms they should follow in any given situation (Benford and Snow, 2000; Goffman, 1974; Snow et al., 1986).

Frames are ways in which experience is organized conceptually. They are “schemata of interpretation,” which allow individuals to make sense of situations, information, or experiences. As Goffman describes, “each primary framework allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms” (Goffman, 1974).

Imagine a framed painting in an art gallery. The painting’s frame is what separates the artwork from the wall and makes it stand out. The frame says essentially, “Look at this, this is significant, this is art.” It draws the viewer’s attention to specific details and provides the viewer with a behaviour template about how to approach the painting, the attitude to take, the state of mind to be in to receive the painting’s meaning or message, etc. It frames a piece of experience, which the artist has depicted, and invites the viewer to see their own life and experience through it. Similarly, social movements must actively engage in realigning collective social frames so that the movements’ interests, ideas, values, and goals become congruent with those of potential members. The movements’ goals have to make sense to people to draw new recruits into their organizations.

Successful social movements use three kinds of frames (Snow and Benford, 1988) to further their goals. The first type, **diagnostic framing**, states the social movement problem in a clear, easily understood way. When applying diagnostic frames, there are no shades of grey: instead, there is the belief that what “they” do is wrong and this is how “we” will fix it. The anti-gay marriage movement is an example of diagnostic framing with its uncompromising insistence that marriage is only between a man and a woman. Any other concept of marriage is framed as sinful or immoral. **Prognostic framing**, the second type, offers a solution and states how it will be implemented. When looking at the issue of pollution as framed by the environmental movement, for example, prognostic frames could include direct legal sanctions like fines on polluters, enforcement of strict government regulations on polluting activities, or the imposition of carbon pricing or cap-and-trade mechanisms to make environmental damage more costly. There may be many competing prognostic frames even within social movements adhering to similar diagnostic frames. Finally, **motivational framing** is the call to action: what should an individual do once they agree with the diagnostic frame and believe in the prognostic frame? These frames are action-oriented. In the aboriginal justice movement, a call to action might encourage people to join a blockade on contested aboriginal treaty land or contact their local MP to express their viewpoint that aboriginal treaty rights be honoured.

With so many similar diagnostic frames, some groups find it best to join together to maximize their impact. When social movements link their goals to the goals of other social movements and merge into a single group, a **frame alignment process** (Snow et al., 1986) occurs — an ongoing and intentional means of recruiting a diversity of participants to the movement. For example, Carroll and Ratner (1996) argue that using a *social justice* frame makes it possible for a diverse group of social movements — union movements, environmental movements, aboriginal justice movements, gay rights movements, anti-poverty movements, etc. — to form effective coalitions even if their specific goals do not typically align.

This frame alignment process involves four aspects: bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation. *Bridging* describes a “bridge” that connects uninvolved individuals and unorganized or ineffective groups with social movements that, though structurally unconnected, nonetheless share similar interests or goals. These organizations join together creating a new, stronger social movement organization. What are some examples of different organizations with a similar goal that have banded together?

In the *amplification* model, organizations seek to expand their core ideas to gain a wider, more universal appeal. By expanding their ideas to include a broader range, they can mobilize more people for their cause. For example, the Slow

Food movement extends its arguments in support of local food to encompass reduced energy consumption and reduced pollution, plus reduced obesity from eating more healthfully, and other benefits.

In extension, social movements agree to mutually promote each other, even when the two social movement organization's goals do not necessarily relate to each other's immediate goals. This often occurs when organizations are sympathetic to each others' causes, even if they are not directly aligned, such as women's equal rights and the civil rights movement.




Figure 18.14 Extension occurs when social movements have sympathetic causes, like women's rights and racial equality which unite around the issue of human rights. Carroll and Ratner (1996) argue that using a social justice frame makes it possible for a diverse group of social movements – union movements, environmental movements, aboriginal justice movements, gay rights movements, anti-poverty movements, etc. – to form effective coalitions even if their specific goals do not typically align. (Photos (a) and (b) courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Transformation involves a complete revision of goals. Once a movement has succeeded, it risks losing relevance. If it wants to remain active, the movement has to change with the transformation or risk becoming obsolete. For instance, when the women's suffrage movement gained women the right to vote, they turned their attention to equal rights and campaigning to elect women. In short, it is an evolution to the existing diagnostic or prognostic frames generally involving a total conversion of movement.

New Social Movement Theory

New social movement theory emerged in the 1970s to explain the proliferation of new movements that focused on quality of life issues and were difficult to analyze using

traditional social movement theories (Melucci, 1989; Habermas, 1981). Rather than being based on the grievances of particular groups striving to influence political outcomes or redistribute material resources, new social movements (NSMs) like the peace and disarmament, environmental, and 2nd/3rd wave feminist movements focus on goals of autonomy, identity, self-realization, and quality-of-life: who people are, how people live. As the German Green Party slogan of the 1980s suggests – “We are neither right nor left, but ahead” – the appeal of the new social movements also tends to cut across traditional class, party politics, and socioeconomic affiliations to contest aspects of everyday life traditionally seen as outside politics. Moreover, the movements themselves are more flexible, diverse, shifting, and informal in participation and membership than the older social movements, often preferring to adopt nonhierarchical modes of organization and unconventional means of political engagement (such as direct action).

Melucci (1994) argues that the commonality that designates these diverse social movements as “new” is the way in which they respond to systematic encroachments on the **lifeworld**, the shared inter-subjective meanings and common understandings that form the backdrop of daily existence and communication. The dimensions of existence that were formally considered *private* (e.g., the body, sexuality, interpersonal affective relations), *subjective* (e.g., desire, motivation, and cognitive or emotional processes), or *collective commons* (e.g., nature, urban spaces, language, information, and communicational resources) are increasingly subject to social control, manipulation, commodification, and administration. However, as Melucci (1994) argues,

These are precisely the areas where individuals and groups lay claim to their autonomy, where they conduct their search for identity...and construct the meaning of what they are and what they do (Melucci, 1994).

Foucault (1994) summarizes the common features of the new social movements:

- They are *transversal* movements, not limited to one country or to a particular political or economic form of government
- They target the direct experience of the exercise of power. For example, alternative health movements do not

criticize the medical profession because it makes profit from people's illnesses, but because of the ways it directly exercises power over people's bodies and health.

- They are therefore focused on immediate issues, criticizing types of power exercised directly on individuals rather than distant or mediated sources of power like the state or the capitalist class, and seek immediate and practical solutions rather than complete liberation or revolutionary transformation at a later date.
- They are struggles about the status of the individual in society: the right to be different and to pursue self-actualization; the rejection of disciplinary practices that separate, isolate, mould and institutionalize individuals.
- They challenge the use of expert knowledge and science in the exercise of power.
- They focus on the question: Who are we? They assert a right to self-identify and reject scientific or administrative definitions that determine who one is.

As Foucault puts it, the new social movements are movements that are principally concerned with the various means by which individuals are directly *subjected* to power today. "There are two meanings of the word "subject": subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge" (Foucault, 1994). In other words, people form new social movements to address distinct concerns in the areas of gender, health, the administration of life, etc., because of the various ways in which modern power relations undermine their sense of autonomy and attempt to regulate their personal life and subjectivity. They are not easily categorized into the "right" and "left" categories that have characterized the political spectrum since the democratic revolutions of the 18th century.

Summary: Functionalist, Critical, and Interpretive Perspectives on Social Movements

What do ISIS, Antifa, old growth logging protests, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), the anti-globalization movement, and white nationalists have in common? Not much, one might think. But although they may be left-wing or right-wing, radical or conservative, highly organized or very diffused, they are all examples of social movements that create change in society.

Consider the effect of the 2010 Enbridge oil spill on the Kalamazoo River in Michigan. This disaster exemplifies how an aging pipeline infrastructure, coupled with inadequate pipeline technology, combined with anti-oil sentiment in social movements and social institutions, led to changes in oil pipeline policies. Subsequently, in an effort to support the cleanup of the Kalamazoo River and to prevent similar disasters, changes to pipeline safety and spill response occurred. From Aboriginal movements that challenge the use of traditional territories as conduits for petroleum products, to environmental movements who protest further pipeline and fossil fuel development in a period of climate change, to municipal governments who respond to residents concerned with the local risks of oil spills, organizations develop and shift to meet the changing needs of the society. Just as with the Kalamazoo River oil spill and the 10 year project to dredge and rehabilitate the river, social movements have, throughout history, influenced societal shifts. Sociology looks at these moments through the lenses of three major perspectives.

The structural functionalist perspective looks at society as a social system, focusing on the way that all aspects of society have functions that are integral to the continued health and viability of the whole. A functionalist might focus on why social movements develop, why they continue to exist, and what social purposes they serve. On one hand, social movements emerge when there is a dysfunction in the relationship between components of the social system. The union movement developed in the 19th century when the organization of the economy persistently failed to distribute wealth and resources in a manner that provided adequate sustenance for workers and their families. On the other hand, when studying social movements themselves, functionalists observe that movements must change their goals as initial aims are met or they risk dissolution. To function, they must adapt. Several organizations associated with the anti-polio movement folded after the creation of an effective vaccine that made the disease virtually disappear. In the

absence of strong advocates of vaccines, segments of the population forgot about the dangers of infectious diseases. Yet, contemporary organizers of the anti-vaccine and anti-masking movement achieved their greatest organizational success with the “Freedom Convoy” in early 2022, just weeks before governments removed public health measures due to declining public health risks. They achieved success at the moment they were no longer relevant. How do social movement organizations adapt and keep their movements alive when their issues are no longer top of mind?

Critical sociology focuses on the creation and reproduction of inequality and power relations in society. Someone applying the critical perspective would likely be interested in how social movements are generated as responses to systematic inequality or marginalization. They would see social change as unavoidable because unresolved conflict is built in to society’s structures. Conflict drives social change. For example, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was founded in the United States in 1908. Partly created in response to the horrific lynchings occurring in the southern United States, the organization fought to secure the constitutional rights guaranteed in the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments, which established an end to slavery, equal protection under the law, and universal male suffrage (NAACP, 2011). While those formal legal goals have been achieved, the organization remains active today advocating for changes in policy and law because inequalities in civil rights and discriminatory practices have not disappeared. Its efforts can be supplemented by emergent social movements like Black Lives Matter, which are better positioned to channel outrage in response to events like Trayvon Martin and George Floyd’s murders. Whereas the conflict over racial discrimination endures through time because it remains unresolved, it can become more urgent and focused at times, opening a space for social movement innovations.

The interpretive perspective studies how the meanings and frames of social movements evolve. This includes the day-to-day processes and interactions of social movements, the meanings individuals attach to involvement in such movements, and the individual experience of social change. A symbolic interactionist studying social movements might address the emergence of social movement norms and tactics as well as the formation of individual motivations in concert with others. For example, social movements might be generated through a collective experience of deprivation or discontent embedded in the power relations of society, but how does deprivation get framed in a way that motivates people to take risks to confront power structures? On the other hand, people might actually join social movements for a variety of reasons that have nothing to do with the cause. They might want to feel part of something important, or they might know someone in the movement they want to support, or they might just feel an affinity with the subculture of rebellion. Students might ask themselves whether they have ever been motivated to show up for a rally or sign a petition because their friends invited them? Would they have been as likely to get involved otherwise?

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

The Rise of White Nationalism



Figure 18.15 White nationalist themes of individual freedom, aggrieved privilege and anti-government sentiment were prominent in the trucker convoy protests in Ottawa against public health measures in 2022 and carbon-pricing or “carbon taxes” in 2019. (Image courtesy of Maksim Sokolov/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

Contemporary white nationalism is a complex social movement that emerged in the 1980s but has become especially prominent in the 21st century across Europe and North America. From overtly racial attacks and hate speech, to counter-protesting Antifa and the Black Lives Matter movements, to loose coalitions with anti-vaxxers and anti-taxation movements to defend “freedom,” white nationalism is firmly part of 21st century society’s **social movement sector**. It resembles historical white supremacist, reactionary, fascist and populist movements but also diverges from them significantly.

In Wendy Brown’s (2019) analysis, white nationalism represents a new formation of subjectivity and politics that has to be understood in the context of contemporary populist politics, neoliberal economic restructuring, aggrieved white privilege and culture. She describes it as a “curious combination of libertarianism, moralism, authoritarianism, nationalism, hatred of the state, Christian conservatism, and racism;” curious because many of these ideas seem to contradict one another. She identifies three key elements that define what is new and unique about contemporary white nationalism: the economic context globalization, the neoliberal **framing** of threats to personal liberty and the unprecedented public social disinhibition and aggression of the movement.

The economic context of the rise of white nationalism is the global neoliberal restructuring of economic life. Neoliberalism emphasizes the use of “free market” mechanisms to regulate society (see [Chapter 4](#).

[Society and Modern Life](#), [Chapter 10. Global Society](#), and [Chapter 17. Government and Politics](#)). The unrestricted global flows of capital investment and disinvestment produce economic and political inequalities and instability: the dismantling of Fordist era livable incomes, job security, retirement provisions, and publicly funded education, services, and other social goods. The wealth inequality of neoliberal privatization has “more deeply penetrated into everyday life than at any time since feudalism” (Brown, 2019). Especially hard hit in North America have been the manufacturing industries, which had provided well paying, often unionized jobs, for a largely male labour force with limited education. The uneven effects of neoliberal restructuring provide a source of hardship, uncertainty, discontent and grievance, especially among white workers who perceive racialized Others as either “stealing” jobs by working for low wages or unfairly “getting ahead” through preferential hiring and affirmative action programs.

The second element is the **diagnostic framing** of neoliberalism: the libertarian idea that personal freedom and liberty are threatened by the state or by historically marginalized groups demanding justice and equality. This leads to the **prognostic framing** or solution that “the personal protected sphere must be extended” (Brown, 2019). Neoliberal theorists like Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992) and Milton Friedman (1912-2006) argue that both markets and religious or moral traditions were spontaneously generated sources of social order. Both were components of a private personal sphere of activity that should be protected from external interference, public policy and even democratic decision making. So while freedom, as the unregulated personal licence of the individual, seems to contradict submission to customary prejudices and traditional authorities (moral, religious, familial, etc.), in neoliberalism both are components of the sphere of private life that need to be extended and protected. Authoritarianism and freedom can thereby be reconciled. In white nationalism, the nation itself becomes an extended personal sphere — a “Chez Nous” as French National Front leader Marie Le Pen calls it — that needs to be defended, even by authoritarian means, against threatening outsiders or those within who do not belong.



Figure 18.16 Members of the Alberta-based neo-nazi group Aryan Guard stage a counter-protest, at an anti-racism rally. They are seen here on the Southwest corner of Kensington Road and 10 Street Northwest in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. (Image courtesy of Thivierr/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 3.0](#)

This framing appeals especially to the segment of the population who have enjoyed **white privilege** (see [Chapter 11. Race and Ethnicity](#)) because they regard their everyday personal freedoms as normal and any perceived challenge to them is threatening, as opposed to minorities and subordinated populations who have historically not had access to freedom, or routinely see their freedoms arbitrarily suspended or denied.

This leads to the third element of white nationalism in Brown’s analysis, which is the affective or emotional tone of the movement; its celebration of disinformation, its amoral and uncivil conduct, and its disinhibition and aggression. The underlying emotion of the movement is the feeling of *resentment*, “suffering experienced as wrongful victimization” (Brown, 2019). The source what she calls the movement’s “politics of resentment” stems

from a feeling of powerlessness amongst formally dominant segments of the population. “This politics of

ressentiment emerges from the historically dominant as they feel that dominance ebbing—as whiteness, especially, but also masculinity provides limited protection against the displacements and losses that forty years of neoliberalism have yielded for the working and middle classes” (Brown, 2019). The uninhibited rage directed against something relatively trivial like taking a vaccine shot or wearing a mask during a pandemic makes sense as an act of “taking a stand” simply to feel having power over something when world affirmation or world building are unavailable.

Image Descriptions

Figure 18.13 long description: The social movement sector is made of various social movement industries. Social movement industries are made up of related social movement organisations. To show the relationship:

1. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) are social movement organizations within the Animal Rights Industry.
2. The Humans Rights Campaign and the National Organization for Marriage are social movement organizations within the Marriage Rights Industry.
3. The Slow Food Movement and the Locavore Movement are social movement organizations within the Food Movement organizations. [\[Return to Figure 18.13\]](#)

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18.3 Social Change

WILLIAM LITTLE AND RON MCGIVERN

The dynamics of collective behaviour and social movements are just two of the forces driving **social change**, which is the change in society created through social movements as well as external factors like environmental shifts or technological innovations. Essentially, any disruptive shift in the status quo, be it intentional or random, human-caused or natural, can lead to social change.

In other chapters of the textbook, various causes of social change have been discussed. Karl Marx explained social change as a product of struggles and inequalities over the control and distribution of resources in societies. Emile Durkheim described the increasing specialization and differentiation of social institutions as a product of the increased “moral density” of populations (i.e., increased contact and interaction among people) and corresponding competition for scarce resources. Max Weber emphasized the introduction of rationalization and technology as processes of organizational efficiency that had profound effects on all areas of life. Other chapters will discuss the effect of population dynamics and ecological processes on social change.

This chapter ends by focusing on the impact of technological innovation on social change.

What is Technology?

It is easy to look at the latest sleek tiny Apple product and think that technology is only recently a part of our world. But from the steam engine to the most cutting-edge robotic surgery tools, **technology** describes the application of science to address the problems of daily life. Students might look back at the enormous and clunky computers of the 1970s that had about as much storage as an iPod Shuffle and roll their eyes in disbelief. But chances are 30 years from now today's skinny laptops and sleek Bluetooth speakers will look just as archaic.

Technology is therefore not merely a product of the modern era. For example, fire, stone tools and aquaculture were important forms of technology developed during the Stone Age. Archaeological evidence shows early humans innovating on their stone tools from the earliest sharpened stones to Levallois stone knives to geometric microliths (Clark, 1969). Just as the availability of digital technology shapes how people live today, the creation of stone tools changed how premodern humans lived, adapted to changes in the environment and climate, and how well they ate.



Figure 18.17 The stirrup greatly increased the knight's ability to stay in the saddle and control the mount, increasing the animal's usefulness in warfare. (Image courtesy of Frielp/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

From the first calculator, invented in 2400 BCE in Babylon in the form of an abacus, to the predecessor of the modern computer, created in 1882 by Charles Babbage, technological innovations often follow lines of development which make advancements on previous iterations. These define **technological lineages** that have profound effects on human society.

For example, White (1962) describes the adoption of the stirrup in early medieval Europe from China as an event that revolutionized warfare and created the conditions for the emergence of the feudal system (see [Chapter 4. Society and Modern Life](#)). During the period of the Roman Empire and expansion to Northern Europe, wars had been fought mainly on foot. The stirrup allowed warfare to be conducted effectively on horseback, enabling tactical mobility and speed, and creating a

lineage of rapid attack military technology from the cavalry of the middle ages to the motorized tank troupes of the 20th and 21st century.

This development had a profound impact on the formation of feudal society. White notes that, as effective as the mounted fighter with stirrups was as an instrument of war, these fighters were also extremely expensive, both in terms of the armour and large horses required, as well as the amount of training needed to master the skills of mounted warfare. To maintain a mounted army, the aristocracy was obliged to distribute land in compensation. The technological innovation of the stirrup thus contributed to the development of the feudal property system whereby vassals or knights were granted manors and estates by the aristocracy in return for their military service.

Marshall McLuhan (1964) defined technologies as extensions of the body. They amplify or accelerate functions originally performed by the human organism unaided, ultimately taking over and transforming these functions. The wheel is an extension of the foot, amplifying its capacity for transport; clothing is an extension of the skin, amplifying its capacity to regulate body heat and protect from abrasions; the electronic media are extensions of the human nervous system, amplifying its sensorium and capacity to feel to the entire world. For McLuhan, a human being in the electronic age is quite literally “an organism that now wears its brain outside its skull and its nerves outside its hide” (McLuhan, 1964).

As a result, McLuhan argued that the users of technology are “perpetually modified by it” (McLuhan, 1964). Humans shape tools and technology, which thereafter shape humans and human social life. As McLuhan put it,

This is merely to say that the personal and social consequences of any medium—that is, of any extension of ourselves—result from the new scale that is introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new technology (McLuhan, 1964).

Today all aspects of life are influenced by technology. In agriculture, the introduction of machines that can till, thresh, plant, and harvest greatly reduced the need for manual labour, which in turn meant there were fewer rural jobs, which led to the urbanization of society, as well as lowered birthrates because there was less need for large families to work the farms. In the criminal justice system, the ability to ascertain innocence through DNA testing has saved the lives of people on death row but has also opened the prospect of a new biological criminology in which prospective criminals could be identified by genetic predispositions or neural brain scans and confined in advance of committing any crime. The examples are endless: technology plays a role in absolutely every aspect of social life.

Categorizing Technology

There is no one way of dividing technology into categories. Whereas once it might have been simple to classify innovations such as machine-based or drug-based or the like, the interconnected strands of technological development mean that advancement in one area might be replicated in dozens of others. For simplicity's sake, one can look at how the U.S. Patent Office, which receives patent applications for nearly all major innovations worldwide, addresses patents. This regulatory body patents three types of innovation. **Utility patents** are the first type. These are granted for the invention or discovery of any new and useful process, product, or machine, or for a significant improvement to existing technologies. The second type of patent is a **design patent**. Commonly conferred in architecture and industrial design, this means someone has invented a new and original design for a manufactured product. **Plant patents**, the final type,



Figure 18.18 The book is an extension of the eye (McLuhan and Fiore, 1967). (Image courtesy of Leandra Plaza Santa/Flickr.)
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recognize the discovery of new plant types that can be asexually reproduced. While genetically modified food is the hot-button issue within this category, farmers have long been creating new hybrids and patenting them. A more modern example might be food giant Monsanto, which patents corn with built-in pesticide (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 2011).

Such evolving patents have created new forms of social organization and disorganization. Efforts by Monsanto to protect its patents have led to serious concerns about who owns the food production system, and who can afford to participate globally in this new agrarian world. This issue was brought to a head in a landmark Canadian court case between Monsanto and Saskatchewan farmer Percy Schmeiser. Schmeiser found Monsanto's genetically modified "Roundup Ready" canola growing on his farm. He saved the seed and grew his own crop, but Monsanto tried to charge him licensing fees because of their patent. Dubbed a true tale of David versus Goliath, both sides are claiming victory (Mercola, 2011; Monsanto, N.d.). What is important to note is that through the courts, Monsanto established its right to the ownership of its genetically modified seeds even after multiple plantings. Each generation of seeds harvested still belonged to Monsanto. For millions of farmers globally, such a new market model for seeds represents huge costs and dependence on a new and evolving corporate seed supply system.

Anderson and Tushman (1990) suggest an **evolutionary model of technological change**, in which a breakthrough in one form of technology leads to a number of variations. Once those are assessed, a prototype emerges, and then a period of slight adjustments to the technology, interrupted by a breakthrough. For example, floppy disks were improved and upgraded, then replaced by zip disks, which were in turn improved to the limits of the technology and were then replaced by flash drives. This is essentially a generational model for categorizing technology, in which first-generation technology is a relatively unsophisticated jumping-off point leading to an improved second generation, and so on.

Technology and Social Change

Modernization describes the processes that increase the amount of specialization and differentiation of structure in societies resulting in the move from an undeveloped society to developed, technologically driven society (Irwin, 1975). By this definition, the level of modernity within a society is judged by the sophistication of its technology, particularly as it relates to infrastructure, industry, and the like.

Some would say that improving technology has made lives easier. Imagine what the day would be like without the internet, the automobile, or electricity. In *The World Is Flat*, Thomas Friedman (2005) argues that technology is a driving force behind globalization, while the other forces of social change (social institutions, population, environment) play comparatively minor roles. He suggests that sociologists can view globalization as occurring in three distinct periods. First, globalization was driven by military expansion, powered by horsepower and windpower. The countries best able to take advantage of these power sources expanded the most, exerting control over the politics of the globe from the late 15th century to around the year 1800. The second shorter period, from approximately 1800 CE to 2000 CE, consisted of a globalizing economy. Industrial technologies like steam and rail power were the guiding forces of social change and globalization in this period. Finally, Friedman describes the post-millennial era. In this period of globalization, change is driven by digital technology, particularly the internet (Friedman, 2005). In *Hot, Flat, and Crowded 2.0* (2009), Friedman also discusses the possibility of a green transition as a distinct era of globalization lead by the introduction of renewable resource technologies in an effort slow climate change.

But also consider that technology can create change in three other forces social scientists link to social change: population, environment, institutional structures. Advances in medical technology allow otherwise infertile women to bear children, indirectly leading to an increase in population. Advances in agricultural technology have allowed food corporations to genetically alter and patent food products, changing the environment in innumerable ways. From the way teachers educate children in the classroom to the way farmers grow the food people eat, technology has impacted all aspects of modern life.

Of course there are drawbacks. The increasing gap between the technological haves and have-nots — sometimes

called the **digital divide** — occurs both locally and globally. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines the digital divide as “the gap between individuals, households, businesses and geographic areas at different socio-economic levels with regard to both their opportunities to access information and communication technology (ICTs) and to their use of the Internet for a wide variety of activities.” (OECD, 2001). There are two forms of digital technology stratification. The first is differential class-based access to technology in the form of the digital divide. This digital divide has led to the second form, a knowledge gap, which is, as it sounds, an ongoing and increasing gap in information for those who have less access to technology. For example, students in well-funded schools receive more exposure to technology than students in poorly funded schools. Those students with more exposure gain more proficiency, which makes them far more marketable in an increasingly technology-based job market and leaves our society divided into those with technological knowledge and those without. Even as we improve access, we have failed to address an increasingly evident gap in e-readiness—the ability to sort through, interpret, and process knowledge (Sciadas, 2003).

Further, there are added security risks: the loss of privacy, the risk of total system failure (like the Y2K panic at the turn of the millennium), and the added vulnerability created by technological dependence. Think about the technology that goes into keeping nuclear power plants running safely and securely. What happens if an earthquake or other disaster, as in the case of Japan’s Fukushima plant, causes the technology to malfunction, not to mention the possibility of a systematic cyber or military attack on a society’s relatively vulnerable technological infrastructure?

Making Connections: Big Picture

Planned Obsolescence: Technology That’s Built to Crash



Figure 18.19 People have trouble keeping up with technological innovation. But people may not be to blame, as manufacturers intentionally develop products with short life spans. (Photo courtesy of Troy Kelly/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Chances are that one mobile phone company, as well as the makers of one’s various digital devices, are all counting on these products to fail. Not too quickly, of course, or consumers would not stand for it — but frequently enough that consumers might find that when the built-in battery on their iPod dies, it costs far more to fix it than to replace it with a newer model. Or they find that the phone company emails them to tell them that they are eligible for a free new phone because theirs is a whopping two years old. Appliance repair people say that while they might be fixing some machines that are 20 years old, they generally are not fixing the ones that are seven years old; newer models are built to be thrown out. This is called **planned obsolescence**, and it is the business practice of planning for a product to be obsolete or unusable

from the time it is created (*The Economist*, 2009).

To some extent, this is a natural extension of new and emerging technologies. After all, who is going to cling to an enormous and slow desktop computer from 2000 when a few hundred dollars can buy one that is significantly faster and better? But the practice is not always so benign. The classic example of planned obsolescence is the nylon stocking. Women's stockings — once an everyday staple of women's lives — get “runs” or “ladders” after a few wearings. This requires the stockings to be discarded and new ones purchased. Not surprisingly, the garment industry did not invest heavily in finding a rip-proof fabric; it was in their best interest that their product be regularly replaced.

Those who use Microsoft Windows might feel that they, like the women who purchase endless pairs of stockings, are victims of planned obsolescence. Every time Windows releases a new operating system, there are typically not many changes that consumers feel they must have. However, the software programs are upwardly compatible only. This means that while the new versions can read older files, the old version cannot read the newer ones. Even the ancillary technologies based on operating systems are only compatible upward. In 2014, the Windows XP operating system, off the market for over five years, stopped being supported by Microsoft when in reality it had not been supported by newer printers, scanners, and software add-ons for many years.

Ultimately, whether one is getting rid of their old product because they are being offered a shiny new free one (like the latest smartphone model), or because it costs more to fix than to replace (like an iPod), or because not doing so leaves one out of the loop (like the Windows system), the result is the same. It might just make one nostalgic for the old Sony Walkman and VCR.

But obsolescence gets even more complex. Currently, there is a debate about the true cost of energy consumption for products. This cost would include what is called the embodied energy costs of a product. **Embodied energy** is the calculation of all the energy costs required for the resource extraction, manufacturing, transportation, marketing, and disposal of a product. One contested claim is that the energy cost of a single cell phone is about 25% of the cost of a new car. People love their personal technology but it comes with a cost. Think about the incredible social organization undertaken from the idea of manufacturing a cell phone through to its disposal after about two years of use (Kedrosky, 2011).

Technological Globalization

Technological globalization is impacted in large part by **technological diffusion**, the spread of technology across borders. In the last two decades, there has been rapid improvement in the spread of technology to peripheral and semi-peripheral nations, and a 2008 World Bank report discusses both the benefits and ongoing challenges of this diffusion. In general, the report found that technological progress and economic growth rates were linked, and that the rise in technological progress has helped improve the situations of many living in absolute poverty (World Bank, 2008). The report recognizes that rural and low-tech products such as corn can benefit from new technological innovations, and that, conversely, technologies like mobile banking can aid those whose rural existence consists of low-tech market vending. In addition, technological advances in areas like mobile phones can lead to competition, lowered prices, and concurrent improvements in related areas such as mobile banking and information sharing.

However, the same patterns of social inequality that create a digital divide in the West also create digital divides in peripheral and semi-peripheral nations. While the growth of technology use among countries has increased dramatically over the past several decades, the spread of technology within countries is significantly slower among peripheral and semi-peripheral nations. In these countries, far fewer people have the training and skills to take advantage of new technology, let alone access it. Technological access tends to be clustered around urban areas, leaving out vast swaths of peripheral-nation citizens. While the diffusion of information technologies has the potential to resolve many global social problems, it is often the population most in need that is most affected by the digital divide. For example, technology to purify water could save many lives, but the villages in peripheral nations most in need of water purification do not have access to the technology, the funds to purchase it, or the technological comfort level to introduce it as a solution.



Figure 18.20 The United Nations estimates that Canadians generated 25 kg of electronic waste per person in 2012 (StEP, 2012). About 70% of e-waste is either illegally disposed of or rudimentarily processed in poorer Asian and African countries. Workers in e-waste salvage operations are constantly exposed to toxic substances like lead, mercury, cadmium, arsenic, and flame retardants that are byproducts of dismantling components. (Photo courtesy of Curtis Palmer/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Making Connections: Big Picture

The Dystopian Techno-Future: From *A Brave New World* to Cyberpunk



Figure 18.21 Is the glass half empty or half full when it comes to social change? Fiction writers explore both sides of the issue through fantasy futuristic novels like the Mars Trilogy by Kim Stanley Robinson or *The Handmaid's Tale* by Margaret Atwood. (Photo courtesy of Victoria Pickering/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

Canadians have long been interested in science fiction and space travel. Many readers in the 1950s were eager to see the invention of jet packs and flying cars, just as many today imagine warp drives, artificial enhancements and non-toxic sources of energy. But part of this futuristic fiction trend is much darker and less optimistic.

In 1932, when Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* was published, there was a cultural trend toward seeing the future as golden and full of opportunity. In his novel set in 2540, there is a more frightening future. He imagines a totally administered world of well adjusted citizens built upon the principles of Henry Ford's automobile assembly line: mass production, homogeneity, predictability, and consumption of disposable consumer goods. Citizens are grown in artificial wombs, indoctrinated through sleep learning and assigned into castes based on intelligence and labour.

Since then, there has been an ongoing stream of dystopian novels, or books set in the future after some kind of apocalypse has occurred and totalitarian and restrictive societies have taken over. Margaret Atwood's *Handmaid's Tale* (1985) and *The Testaments* (2019) describe the dystopian Republic of Gilead where religious fundamentalists have seized power in the United States and stripped women of their ability to own money and control their own bodies. Suzanne Collins's *Hunger Games* trilogy for young adults describes

Panem, a transformed version of North America with 12 districts ruled by a cruel and dictatorial capitol. Connotations of gladiator games and video games come together in this world, where children from each district are thrown into a created world where they must fight to the death for the amusement of the audience. In the cyberpunk genre of near future dystopias, writers like Philip K. Dick (*Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*, 1968; the basis of the Ridley Scott film *Blade Runner*, 1982), William Gibson (*Neuromancer*, 1984) and Bruce Sterling (*Schismatrix*, 1985) describe worlds where digital, robotic and genetic technologies are widely distributed, but large segments of the human population have become surplus and redundant. Governments and democracy have disappeared, or become irrelevant, and been replaced by sinister artificial intelligences, unaccountable corporations and crime syndicates.

In these visions of the future the technological wonders never cease. From meals that appear at the touch of a button to mutated government-built creatures that track and kill, the future world of dystopian science fiction is a mix of modernization fantasy and nightmare. So what is it about technological innovation and contemporary society that makes looking forward so fearsome?

Science fiction extrapolates from contemporary trends and imagines what types of society will be built around them in the future. One common element in these pessimistic visions of future society combines the idea that the byproducts of technological change are dangerous and unpredictable with a lack of confidence in democratic institutions to cope with crisis. The social fabric of society and the capacity for people to collectively care for one another is presented as fragile and ephemeral. This is a commentary on well founded concerns about society's capacity to respond to the massive scale of social change. As Wendy Brown (2019) puts it, "As the social vanishes from our ideas, speech, and experience, it vanishes from our visions of the future, both utopian and dystopian. We imagine authoritarian nationalist futures, virtually networked futures, technocratic futures, anarchist futures, transnational cosmopolitan futures, and fascist futures." To the degree that the social fabric of contemporary society is eroded, the ability to imagine a democratic future is compromised.

When thinking about technological innovation and social change, it is interesting to look at this world of fiction for sources of insight into where and how society is moving. When people today think of the future, do they view it as a wonderful place, full of technological marvels and opportunity? Or as a horrifying dictatorship of total surveillance, subjugating the individual to the rule of unaccountable and distant authorities? Do people today view technological innovation as something to look forward to or something to avoid? How does science fiction influence these views?

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Chapter 18 Resources and Activities

WILLIAM LITTLE AND RON MCGIVERN

Key Terms

acting crowds: Crowds of people who are focused on a specific action or goal.

alternative movements: Social movements that limit themselves to self-improvement changes in individuals.

assembling perspective: A theory that credits individuals in crowds as behaving as rational thinkers and views crowds as engaging in purposeful behaviour and collective action.

casual crowds: People who share close proximity without really interacting.

collective action: Concerted behaviour in which a number of people come together on the basis of a shared interest to achieve some common objective.

collective behaviour: A non-institutionalized activity in which several people voluntarily engage.

collective representations: The shared meanings, symbols, concepts, categories and images of a social group or society.

conventional crowds: People who come together for a regularly scheduled event.

crowd: A fairly large number of people sharing close proximity.

design patents: Patents that are granted when someone has invented a new and original design for a manufactured product.

diagnostic framing: When the social problem that concerns a social movement is stated in a clear, easily understood manner.

digital divide: The increasing gap between the technological haves and have-nots.

embodied energy: The sum of energy required for a finished product including the resource extraction, transportation, manufacturing, distribution, marketing, and disposal.

emergent norm theory: A perspective that emphasizes the importance of social norms in crowd behaviour.

evolutionary model of technological change: A breakthrough in one form of technology that leads to a number of variations, from which a prototype emerges, followed by a period of slight adjustments to the technology, interrupted by a breakthrough.

expressive crowds: Crowds that share opportunities to express emotions.

flash mob: A large group of people who gather together in a spontaneous activity that lasts a limited amount of time.

frame: A way or perspective in which experience is organized conceptually.

frame alignment process: Using bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation as an ongoing and intentional means of recruiting participants to a movement.

global social movements: Networks of social movement actors who collaborate across state borders to address shared global concerns.

lifeworld: The shared inter-subjective meanings and common understandings that form the backdrop of daily existence and communication.

mass: A relatively large group with a common interest, even if the group members may not interact or be in close proximity.

modernity: The cultural form of capitalist societies characterized by constant change and transformation.

modernization: The process that increases the amount of specialization and differentiation of structure in societies.

motivational framing: When the social problem that concerns a social movement is stated as a call to action.

new social movement theory: Theory that analyzes why the common features contemporary social movements are concerns with quality of life issues rather than traditional materialist issues.

planned obsolescence: When a technology company plans for a product to be obsolete or unable to be repaired.

plant patents: Patents that recognize the discovery of new plant types that can be asexually reproduced.

prognostic framing: When social movements state a clear solution to their issue.

public: An unorganized, relatively diffuse group of people who interact and debate ideas.

redemptive movements: Movements that work to promote inner change or spiritual growth in individuals.

reform movements: Movements that seek incremental change to the social structure.

resistance movements: Movements that seek to prevent or undo change to the social structure.

resource mobilization theory: Theory that explains social movements' success in terms of their ability to acquire resources and mobilize individuals.

revolutionary movements: Movements that seek to completely change every aspect of society.

social change: Any significant alteration over time in behavior patterns, social relationships, institutions, cultural values and norms.

social currents: Movements of collective feeling, public expression and social creation that are in the process of emerging and not yet caught in a definite mould.

social movement: A purposeful, organized group that works toward a common social goal.

social movement industry: A collection of social movement organizations that are striving toward similar goal.

social movement organization: A single social movement group.

social movement sector: The collection of social movements in a society.

technological diffusion: The spread of technology across borders.

technological lineage: Lines of development of technological innovations which make advancements on previous iterations

technology: An application of knowledge to solve problems in daily life.

utility patents: Patents that are granted for the invention or discovery of any new and useful process, product, or machine.

value-added theory: A functionalist perspective theory that posits that several preconditions must be in place for collective behaviour to occur.

White privilege: The benefits people receive simply by being part of the dominant group of racialized “whites.”

Section Summary

[18.1 Collective Behaviour](#)

Collective behaviour is non-institutionalized activity in which many people voluntarily engage. There are four different forms of collective behaviour: crowd, mass, public, and social movement. There are three main theories of collective behaviour. The first, the emergent-norm perspective, emphasizes the importance of social norms in crowd behaviour. The next, the value-added theory, is a functionalist perspective that states that several preconditions must be in place for collective behaviour to occur. Finally the assembling perspective focuses on collective action rather than collective behaviour, addressing the processes associated with crowd behaviour and the life cycle of various categories of gatherings.

[18.2 Social Movements](#)

Social movements are purposeful, organized groups with the goal of pushing toward change, giving political voice to those without it, or gathering for some other common purpose. Social movements intersect with environmental changes, technological innovations, and other external factors to create social change. There are myriad catalysts that create social movements, and the reasons that people join are as varied as the participants themselves. Sociologists look at both the macro- and microanalytical reasons that social movements occur, take root, and ultimately succeed or fail.

[18.3 Social Change](#)

There are numerous and varied causes of social change. A key cause of social change, as recognized by social scientists, is technological innovation. Technology is the application of science to address the problems of daily life. The fast pace of technological advancement means the advancements are continuous, but that not everyone has equal access. The gap created by this unequal access has been termed the digital divide. The knowledge gap refers to an effect of the “digital divide”: the lack of knowledge or information that keeps those who were not exposed to technology from gaining marketable skills.

Questions

Quiz: Social Movements and Social Change

18.1 Collective Behaviour

1. Which of the following organizations is not an example of a social movement?
 - a. Canadian Football League
 - b. White nationalism
 - c. Greenpeace
 - d. National Action Committee on the Status of Women
2. Durkheim conceptualized a continuum of social phenomena that varied from fixed to fluid including _____.
 - a. Casual, conventional, expressive and acting crowds.
 - b. Social structures, social functions, social strains.
 - c. Morphological features, institutions and social currents.
 - d. Masses, publics, social movements, crowds.
3. Which of the following is an example of collective behaviour?
 - a. A soldier questioning orders
 - b. A group of people interested in hearing an author speak
 - c. A class going on a school field trip
 - d. Going shopping with a friend
4. The protesters at the anti-Covid measures “Freedom Convoy” rally were _____.
 - a. A casual crowd.
 - b. A conventional crowd.
 - c. A mass.
 - d. An acting crowd.
5. According to emergent-norm theory, crowds are _____.
 - a. Irrational and impulsive.
 - b. Infiltrated by security agents who manipulate crowd behaviour.
 - c. Able to develop their own definition of the situation.
 - d. Prone to a series of developments beginning with structural conduciveness.
6. A boy throwing rocks during a demonstration might be an example of _____.
 - a. Structural conduciveness.
 - b. Structural strain.
 - c. Precipitating factors.
 - d. Mobilization for action.

18.2 Social Movements

7. If sociologists divide social movements according to their competition for attention in a society, they are using the _____ theory to understand social movements.
 - a. Framing

- b. New social movement
 - c. Resource mobilization
 - d. Value-added
8. While PETA is a social movement organization, taken together, the animal rights social movement organizations PETA, ALF, and Greenpeace are a _____.
- a. Social movement industry.
 - b. Social movement sector.
 - c. Global social movement.
 - d. All of the above.
9. Social movements are _____.
- a. Free currents of social life in the process of emerging and not yet caught in a definite mould.
 - b. Any collection of at least two people who interact with some frequency and who share some sense of aligned identity.
 - c. The collective action of individuals working together in an attempt to achieve goals.
 - d. All of the above.
10. When the League of Women Voters successfully achieved its goal of women being allowed to vote, they had to undergo frame _____ to ensure continuing relevance.
- a. Alignment
 - b. Amplification
 - c. Bridging
 - d. Transformation
11. New social movements principle focus is _____.
- a. Postmaterialism.
 - b. Subjectivity and identity.
 - c. Quality of life issues.
 - d. All of the above.

18.3 Social Change

12. Children in peripheral nations have little to no daily access to computers and the internet, while children in core nations are constantly exposed to this technology. This is an example of _____.
- a. The digital divide.
 - b. Human ecology.
 - c. Modernization theory.
 - d. Technological determinism.
13. When sociologists think about technology as an agent of social change, which of the following is not an example?
- a. Population growth

- b. Medical advances
 - c. The internet
 - d. Genetically engineered food
14. China is undergoing a shift in industry, increasing labour specialization and the amount of differentiation present in the social structure. This exemplifies _____.
- a. Human ecology.
 - b. Dependency theory.
 - c. Modernization.
 - d. Critical perspective.
15. The fact that your cell phone is using outdated technology within a year or two of purchase is an example of _____.
- a. Caveat emptor.
 - b. Conspicuous consumption.
 - c. Modernization.
 - d. Planned obsolescence.
16. If the U.S. Patent Office were to issue a patent for a new type of tomato that tastes like a jellybean, it would be issuing a _____ patent?
- a. Plant
 - b. Utility
 - c. Design
 - d. Abomination

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Exercises

18.1 Collective Behaviour

1. Discuss the differences between a mass and a crowd. What is an example of each? What sets them apart? What do they share in common?
2. Can you think of a time when your behaviour in a crowd was dictated by unplanned circumstances? How did you figure out what to do? Give an example of emergent-norm perspective, using your own experience.
3. Discuss the differences between an acting crowd and a collective crowd. Give examples of each.
4. Imagine you are at a rally protesting nuclear energy use. Walk us through the hypothetical rally using the value-added theory, imagining it meets all the stages.

18.2 Social Movements

5. Think about a social movement industry dealing with a cause that is important to you. How do the different social movement organizations of this industry seek to engage you? Which techniques do you respond to? Why?
6. Do you think social media is an important tool in creating social change? Why or why not? Defend your opinion.
7. Describe a social movement in the decline stage. What is its issue? Why has it reached this stage?

18.3 Social Change

8. Consider one of the classical social movements of the 20th century, from the 1960s civil rights in the United States to Gandhi's nonviolent protests in India. How would technology have changed it? Would change have come more quickly or more slowly? Defend your opinion.
9. Discuss the digital divide in the context of modernization. Is there a real concern that poorer communities are lacking in technology? Why or why not?
10. Do you think that the technologies that have defined modern society have been good or bad? Explain, using examples.

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Solutions to Section Quiz

1 A, | 2 C, | 3 B, | 4 D, | 5 C, | 6 C, | 7 C, | 8 A, | 9 C, | 10 D, | 11 D, | 12 A, | 13 A, | 14 C, | 15 D, | 16 A, [\[Return to Quiz\]](#)


CHAPTER 19. THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE BODY: HEALTH AND MEDICINE

HISTORY OF PANDEMICS

PAN-DEM-IC (of a disease) prevalent over a whole country or the world.

THROUGHOUT HISTORY, as humans spread across the world, infectious diseases have been a constant companion. Even in this modern era, outbreaks are nearly constant.

Here are some of history's most deadly pandemics, from the Antonine Plague to COVID-19.



DEATH TOLL [HIGHEST TO LOWEST]

200M
Black Death (Bubonic Plague)
1347-1351

56M
Smallpox

40-50M

30-50M

WHO officially declared COVID-19 a pandemic on Mar 11, 2020.

It is hard to calculate and forecast the impact of COVID-19 because the disease is new to medicine, and data is still coming in.

*Johns Hopkins University estimates

Figure 19.1 Some of the world's most deadly pandemics, from the Antonine Plague to COVID-19. (Photo courtesy of Nicholas LePan and Harrison Schell/ Visual Capitalist.) [Visual Capitalist](#)

Learning Objectives

[19.1 The Sociology of the Body and Health](#)

- Examine the relationship between the body and society.
- Understand the term biopolitics as a relationship between the body and modern forms of power.
- Understand how medical sociology describes illness and health as social and cultural constructions.

[19.2 Global Health](#)

- Define the field of social epidemiology.
- Understand how health issues are affected by the global distribution of wealth.

[19.3 Health in Canada](#)

- Understand how social epidemiology can be applied to the distribution of health outcomes in Canada.
- Explain disparities of health based on gender, socioeconomic status, race, and ethnicity.
- Give an overview of mental health and disability issues in Canada.
- Explain the terms stigma and medicalization.

[19.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Health and Medicine](#)

- Apply functionalist, critical, and symbolic interactionist perspectives to health issues.

Introduction to Health and Medicine

The COVID-19 virus began to infect humans in 2019 and by March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization had declared it a global pandemic. The virus includes severe acute respiratory syndrome and death among its most serious symptoms. In its first year, the pandemic caused between 1.8 and 3 million deaths worldwide, making it one of the deadliest in history. The common flu generally causes 290 to 650 thousand respiratory deaths each year (WHO, 2022a; WHO, 2022b). In Canada, COVID-19 became the third leading cause of death in 2020, with the loss of 16,151 Canadian lives attributed directly to it (Statistics Canada, 2022).

Like all virus pandemics, the contagion process was social. The virus primarily spreads between people through close social contact. Transmission is via aerosols and respiratory droplets that are exhaled when talking and breathing, as well as those produced from coughs or sneezes (Government of Canada, 2021). *Social interaction* is the **disease vector** that carries and transmits the infectious pathogen from person to person.

But this sociological component of the virus was perhaps overshadowed by another social phenomenon: social conflict over the public health measures deployed to combat it. A key part of the COVID-19 pandemic was the rise to prominence of **vaccine hesitancy**. The World Health Organization defines vaccine hesitancy as a “delay in acceptance

or refusal of vaccines despite availability of vaccination services” (MacDonald, 2015). Vaccine hesitancy is not a new phenomenon, however.

In 2012, a pertussis (whooping cough) outbreak in B.C., Alberta, Ontario, and New Brunswick sickened 2,000 people and resulted in an infant death in Lethbridge. In the United States, where there were 18,000 cases and nine deaths, it was the worst outbreak in 65 years (Picard, 2012). Researchers, suspecting the primary cause of the outbreak was the waning strength of pertussis vaccines in older children, recommended a booster vaccination for 11–12-year-olds and pregnant women (Zacharyczuk, 2011). Pertussis is most serious for babies — one in five must be hospitalized, and since they are too young for the vaccine themselves, it is crucial that people around them be immunized (Centers for Disease Control 2011). In response to the outbreak, health authorities in various parts of Canada offered free vaccination clinics for parents with infants under one.

Typically Canadian children are vaccinated for whooping cough, diphtheria, and tetanus (a combined vaccine known as DTaP) at ages 2, 4, 6, and 18 months, and then again at ages 4 to 6 years and 14 to 16 years (Picard, 2012). But what of people who do not want their children to have this vaccine, or any other? That question is at the heart of a debate that has been simmering for years. Vaccines are biological preparations that improve immunity against a certain disease. Vaccines have contributed to the eradication and weakening of many infectious diseases in human populations, including smallpox, polio, mumps, chicken pox, and meningitis.

However, many people express concern about potential negative side effects from vaccines. These concerns range from fears about overloading the child's immune system to contentious reports about devastating side effects of the vaccines. One misapprehension is that the vaccine itself might cause the disease it is supposed to be immunizing. Another commonly circulated concern is that vaccinations, specifically the MMR vaccine (MMR stands for measles, mumps, and rubella), are linked to autism.

The autism connection has been particularly controversial. In 1998, two British physicians, Andrew Wakefield and John Walker-Smith, published a study in Great Britain's *Lancet* magazine that linked the MMR vaccine to bowel disease and autism. The report received a lot of media attention, resulting in British immunization rates decreasing from 91% in 1997 to almost 80% by 2003, accompanied by a subsequent rise in measles cases (Devlin, 2008). A prolonged investigation by the *British Medical Journal* proved the link in the study was nonexistent, and that Dr. Wakefield had falsified data to support his claims (CNN, 2011). Both Dr. Wakefield and Dr. Walker-Smith were discredited and stripped of their licenses, but the doubt still lingers in many parents' minds. A later ruling in 2012 by the British High Court stated that the British General Medical Council's charges of misconduct against the two physicians were without basis and that they had never claimed that vaccines caused autism (Aston 2012).

Many parents in Canada still believe in the now-discredited MMR-autism link and refuse to vaccinate their children. Autism is a complex condition of unclear origin, yet the symptoms of its onset occur roughly at the same time as MMR vaccinations. In the absence of clear biomedical explanations for the condition, parents draw their own conclusions or seek alternative explanations. They feel forced to make a risk assessment between the dangers of measles, mumps, and rubella on one side and autism on the other.

Other parents choose not to vaccinate for various reasons like religious or health beliefs. In the United States, a boy whose parents opted not to vaccinate returned home after a trip abroad; no one yet knew he was infected with measles. The boy exposed 839 people to the disease and caused 11 more cases of measles, all in other unvaccinated children, including one infant who had to be hospitalized. According to a study published in *Pediatrics*, the outbreak cost the public sector \$10,376 per diagnosed case. The study further showed that the intentional non-vaccination of those infected occurred in students from private schools, public charter schools, and public schools in upper-socioeconomic areas (Sugerman et al., 2010).

Should parents be forced to immunize their children? What might sociologists make of the fact that most of the families who chose not to vaccinate were of a higher socioeconomic group? How does this story of vaccines in a high-income region compare to that in a low-income region, like sub-Saharan Africa, where populations are often eagerly seeking vaccines rather than refusing them?

Media Attributions

- **Figure 19.1** [Visualizing the History of Pandemics](#) by *NICHOLAS LEPAN AND* Harrison Schell (graphic design), is used by permission of [Visual Capitalist](#).

19.1 The Sociology of the Body and Health



Figure 19.2 What are the limits of the human body? (Image courtesy of Donald Jusa/Flickr.)

Whereas human bodies have not changed radically since the evolution of *Homo sapiens* 200,000 years ago, humans' relationship to their bodies has. Due to this change over the last 150 years — in biomedical knowledge, nutrition, hygiene, or sanitation, for example — people, on average, are healthier, taller, and live longer than their ancestors lived. In turn, these changes have had direct consequences for social organization.

[Chapter 13. Aging and the Elderly](#) discussed how the phenomenon of the aging population has forced governments, institutions, and individuals to rethink everything from pension plans, health care provisions, and mandatory retirement ages, to the bias towards youth in popular culture and marketing. As a political constituency, seniors are both significant in numbers and more engaged than young people. They are also healthier and live longer on average than previous generations of seniors. They can press the government to shift resources away from young people's concerns to meet their own interests: for example, away from funding education to investing in medical research.

In his science fiction novel *Holy Fire* (1996), Bruce Sterling extrapolates from this phenomenon to imagine a future **gerontocracy** where seniors hold all the wealth and power, as well as the resources to invest in radical medical procedures, which extend their lives and health indefinitely. Young people are excluded from meaningful participation in society, and youth culture is no longer celebrated, but seen as reckless and irresponsible. The primary interest of the gerontocrats is their continued health, so their lifestyle involves a strict regimen of exercise, diet, avoidance of intoxicants, and aversion to risk. Sterling raises the question of a future epoch of *post-humanity*, i.e., a period in which the mortality that defined the human condition for millennia has effectively been eliminated through the technologies of life preservation.

Is this the postnatural future of humanity? How malleable is the human body? To what degree can it be redesigned to suit human purposes? In what way is the human body a sociological phenomenon as well as a physiological phenomenon?

The Sociology of the Body

Michel Foucault (1979) has argued that the shift in the way people related to their bodies in the 18th and 19th centuries is central to the formation of modern institutions and societies. In monastic practices, military discipline, factory organization, hospital design, prison rehabilitation, and educational programs, the individual body was redefined as something that needed to be trained, disciplined, and transformed. For the first time in history, the body became the center of numerous detailed procedures designed to improve its performance in a variety of institutional contexts. At the same time, the qualities of the life of the population as a whole came to be seen as a concern for government: public health, sanitary conditions in cities, the rate of population increase, and the need for a productive workforce, for example.

Foucault calls this the era of **biopolitics**: “the entry of life into history” or the moment when “the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life” became the priority in the organization of social life (Foucault, 1980). Authorities and individuals themselves began to seek ways to foster life and improve the body’s capacity for efficiency, health, learning, skills, and responsiveness. Today, preserving and fostering life might be the one central unifying value that underlies all contemporary politics and contemporary social policy concerns.

Foucault cites a military ordinance of 1764 with regard to the military training of recruits:

Recruits become accustomed to ‘holding their heads high and erect; to standing upright, without bending the back, to sticking out the belly, throwing out the chest and throwing back the shoulders; and, to help them acquire the habit, they are given this position while standing against a wall is such a way that the heels, the thighs, the waist and the shoulders touch it, as also do the backs of the hands, as one turns the arms outwards, without moving them away from the body . . . Likewise, they will be taught never to fix their eyes on the ground, but to look straight at those they pass . . . to remain motionless until the order is given, without moving the head, the hands or the feet . . . lastly to march with a bold step, with knee and ham taut, on the points of the feet, which should face outwards.’ (Foucault, 1979, pp. 135–136)

The military was one of the first institutions to take a detailed interest in training and modifying the human body. If before the 18th century, the individual’s body and the life of the population were matters of indifference to authorities, it is possible to argue that all institutional life after the 18th century became focused on disciplining and improving the individual body and collective life.

It is in this context that the concept of the **norm** became so important. A norm is a socially defined rule that distinguishes between what conforms to accepted standards and what does not. In the biopolitical era, norms are typically understood less as moral rules about what is *morally* correct or good and more based on calculated averages that define what is *statistically* normal behaviour or characteristic and what deviates from the norm (Ewald, 1990). In school, for example, norms define what level of knowledge each grade should attain. Within each grade level, students’ performance is judged in relationship to these norms, and as a result, they receive A, B, C, . . . letter grades so they know where they stand academically with each other and with respect to *normal* expectations for their grade or age level. The whole learning operation depends on the detailed control of the students’ bodies and minds, as they must learn to physically read and write, sit quietly, listen to instruction, organize routines around a fixed schedule, and take steps to improve their abilities.

The same can be said about the norms of health in the medical system, the norms of productivity in the workplace, the norms of soldiering in the military, and the norms of “good behaviour” in the prison system. In each case, a disciplinary




Figure 19.3 Nicolas Andry, *Orthopedics or the art of preventing and correcting deformities of the body in children*, 1741. (Image courtesy of Nicolas Andry (engraver unknown)/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

procedure is instituted to improve the individual's abilities so that they can become normal (e.g., to enjoy normal health or work at a normal level of productivity). Therefore, regarding the establishment of norms, and what Foucault called the **normalizing society**, the problem of deviance became more prominent in the 19th and 20th centuries.

The problem of **disabilities** is a good example of *medicalized* deviance. Those with disabilities do not fit within the norms of the healthy body and therefore, beginning in the 19th century, scientists and reformers sought their rehabilitation through medical, technological, therapeutic, and educational interventions. This is discussed further below.

Today, the relationship to the body has become even more complex. People are still obliged by different institutions to act on their bodies in specific ways: to be more efficient at work, to recover from injury or illness through the health care system, to develop good study habits at school, and so on. However, people are also increasingly concerned about improving their bodies on a voluntary basis. Individually, people turn to experts in a variety of fields who advise them on different **practices of the self** or procedures to act upon their bodies, such as exercise regimes, dieting, cosmetic surgery, skin care products, meditation techniques, yoga, sex therapy, life coaching, and martial arts. A vast amount of information about life improvement and numerous competing options is available.

Increasingly modern societies enter an era of **medical pluralism**, in which no one model of health practice can successfully claim to provide the definitive truth for how to attain health. But as Zygmunt Bauman (2005) argues, the increased capacity people must control their bodies in the absence of certainty about which way is best, only increases their anxiety (2005). This is a key factor in contemporary debates about vaccines for example.

In addition, the control of the body has become increasingly “molecularized” through the advances of genetic and bio-chemical research (see [Chapter 4. Society and Modern Life](#)). That is, people attempt to act upon and change their bodies at the level of primary biochemical, cellular, molecular processes like ribosomic protein synthesis. Nikolas Rose (2007) has argued that this leads to entirely new forms of somatic (bodily) existence and genetic risk in which people come to define themselves by their genetic markers. People seek to not only cure illness or forestall congenital dispositions to disease but to *optimize* their existence through genetic engineering, designer pharmaceuticals, and epigenetic therapies.

Making Connections: Big Picture

The Biopolitics of Infectious Disease




Figure 19.4 D'Arcy Island near Victoria BC was the site of a leper colony from 1891–1906 where Chinese persons with leprosy (“lepers”) were exiled without medical care (Lamoureux, 2018). Provisions were delivered every three months, but the occupants had to fend for themselves. At the same time, non-Asian people were interned in a leper colony on Tracadie Island, New Brunswick, which featured a hospital and cook. (Photo courtesy of BC Archives/Royal BC Museum, D-04783.) [Public Domain](#)

Michel Foucault describes the history of Western society's response to infectious disease in terms of three different biopolitical models of control: the **exclusion of the sick**, the discipline and rehabilitation of the sick, and the management of risks posed by the sick (Sarasin, 2020). Historically, these three models emerged in response to three different types of infectious disease: leprosy, plague, and smallpox. Biopolitical implications for the organization of modern societies, however, extend far beyond the response to illness.

Leprosy (from the Greek for “scaly man”) is caused by the transmission of a bacteria that causes damage to the nerves, respiratory tract, skin, and eyes. In medieval Europe, people with leprosy, then referred to as “lepers”, were thought to be unclean and morally corrupt. They were segregated from society in infirmaries or *leprosaria*, or expelled beyond city limits and abandoned. Leper colonies, like D'Arcy Island near Victoria,

BC, were maintained even into the 20th century. Foucault's *History of Madness* (2006) describes how the model of excluding and confining people with leprosy began at the end of the middle ages to be more broadly applied, as a way to control the poor, vagabonds, the sick, and the mentally ill. These groups were interned together indiscriminately, without concern for dealing with or recognizing their distinct issues and needs. The *leprosaria* became the first houses for the poor, while also functioning as mental asylums. The term "mental asylum" refers to an inpatient psychiatric hospital for people living with mental illness, and may be offensive today. The exclusionary response to leprosy characterizes a model of power that separates deviants from "normals," or the sick from the healthy, and abandons them outside society's care.

In early modernity, the response to the bubonic plague provided a new model of control, which Foucault (1979) refers to as **disciplinary power** (see [Chapter 8. Deviance, Crime and Social Control](#)). Plague victims were no longer simply excluded and abandoned, but quarantined. To control the spread of plague, cities and towns were locked down, and citizens were subjected to a system of continuous surveillance and inspection, strict control of movement, and confinement to their homes. The plague model included uninterrupted *surveillance* of the population, *normalization* to distinguish the sick from the healthy and restore them to health, and *examination* to make certain families were abiding by quarantine measures and not hiding sick family members. This became the model for modern disciplinary institutions, including the prison system, the school, the workplace, the hospital, and the military. Rather than simply exclude and abandon individuals, disciplinary power seeks to discipline, transform, or rehabilitate them through close observation, the development of specialized knowledges (like medicine, psychology, and sociology), and continuous correction of behaviour.

The third biopolitical model developed as a **risk management** approach to smallpox epidemics. Beginning in the 18th century, Europeans responded to smallpox by tabulating statistics on the occurrence of illness in the population and attempting to protect the population through inoculation. By the 19th century, this became the basis for public health measures (such as sanitation, medical campaigns, and public cleanliness) and vaccination programs. This differed from the lock-down approach of disciplinary power, because it sought to manage the risk of the disease in the entire population, leaving ordinary daily life intact as far as possible, and relied largely on the voluntary compliance of the public with inoculation measures.

As Foucault (2007) put it,

The fundamental problem [is not] the imposition of discipline, although discipline may be called on to help, so much as the problem of knowing how many people are infected with smallpox, at what age, with what effects, with what mortality rate, lesions or after-effects, the risks of inoculation, the probability of an individual dying or being infected by smallpox despite inoculation, and the statistical effects on the population in general. In short, it [is not] the problem of exclusion, as with leprosy, or of quarantine, as with the plague, but of epidemics and the medical campaigns that try to halt epidemic or endemic phenomena.

In other words, the risk management model of social control, developed in the case of smallpox, attempts to manage the risk of a disease in the general population, while not undermining people's freedom, which social systems rely on to operate effectively. Only in the most severe outbreaks did it resort to local disciplinary measures and quarantine.

Sarasin (2020) notes that Foucault's three models of biopower can be used to study the implications of the responses to the COVID-19 pandemic:

1. There are transitions and overlaps between the different forms of power. The complete lockdown of Wuhan rigorously followed the plague model, and every curfew ultimately does so, too. Only when systematic tests supply massive amounts of data about infected and non-infected people, as occurred in South Korea or Singapore, was it possible for governments to transition to the risk management model. Then they could restrict themselves to isolating the infected and recommend caution for the rest of the population, without however having to impose a lockdown.
2. The plague model remains a danger to societies based on constitutional freedoms. Emergency measures that suspend ordinary laws and rights were used in many jurisdictions, including Canada, and once used the danger is that these could be extended or used more easily and frequently in the future. Moreover, the storage and evaluation of movement data of everyone carrying a mobile phone in some areas during the crisis expands the capacity of surveillance technology, which could be put to disciplinary purposes at a future date.
3. The smallpox or risk management model of power was the dominant form of control used in North America and Europe, despite the differences between types of government. The strategy to “flatten the curve,” for example, is a risk management strategy that does not seek to eradicate the virus, but extends its distribution over time so that the health system can handle it. The strategies of wearing masks, prohibiting gatherings of several people, and the call to observe rules of “social distancing” were not disciplinary measures to control individual behaviour in a detailed and continuous way. They were narrowly focused, temporary social guidelines designed to decrease the risk of contagion while relying on voluntary compliance. While a collective means to manage risks, they rely on individuals taking the initiative to care for and protect themselves, but also create forms of neighbourly or solidary organization themselves.
4. The leprosy model lurks in the background. It emerges in the occasional idea that we should let old people die “to save the economy,” or it becomes factual reality when retirement and nursing homes are abandoned, and their inmates die locked up and alone — as was reportedly the case in some homes in Ontario and Quebec in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Medical Sociology and the Social Construction of Health

The sociology of health encompasses social epidemiology, disease, mental health, disability, and medicalization. The principal insight of sociology is that health and illness cannot be simply regarded as biological or medical phenomena. They are perceived, organized, and acted on in a political, economic, cultural, and institutional context. Moreover, the way people relate to them is in constant evolution. As medical science learns to control existing diseases, new diseases develop. Similarly, as societies become global, the ways in which disease spreads evolve with them.

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), **health** “is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (WHO, 2014). What does “health” mean to people? How does the WHO definition relate to contemporary issues of health? Are there too many people taking medications in Canadian society? Is there reason to be skeptical about people claiming they are “addicted” to gambling or “addicted” to sex? Are there historical diseases or conditions now considered within a spectrum of normality? Or are there conditions that have recently become known as a disease, but were previously considered evidence of laziness, moral weakness, or other

character flaws? How do people decide whether children should receive vaccinations? These are questions examined in the sociology of health.

If sociology is the systematic study of human behaviour in society, **medical sociology** is the systematic study of how humans manage issues of health and illness, disease and disorders, and health care for both the sick and the healthy. Medical sociologists study the physical, mental, and social components of health and illness. Major topics for medical sociologists include the doctor-patient relationship, the structure and socioeconomics of health care, and how culture impacts attitudes toward disease and wellness.

The social construction of health is a major research topic within medical sociology. At first glance, the concept of a social construction of health may not make sense. After all, if disease is a measurable, physiological problem, then there can be no question of socially constructing disease, right? In fact, it is not that simple. The idea of the social construction of health emphasizes the socio-cultural aspects of the discipline's approach to physical, objectively definable phenomena. Sociologists Conrad and Barker (2010) offer a comprehensive framework for understanding the major findings of the last 50 years of development in this concept. Their summary categorizes the findings in the field under three subheadings: the cultural meaning of illness, the social construction of the illness experience, and the social construction of medical knowledge.

The Cultural Meaning of Illness

Many medical sociologists contend that illnesses have both a biological and experiential component, and that these components exist independently of each other. Culture, not biology, dictates which illnesses are stigmatized, which are considered disabilities, and which are deemed contestable (meaning some medical professionals may find the existence of this ailment questionable) as opposed to definitive (illnesses that are unquestionably recognized in the medical profession) (Conrad and Barker, 2010).

For instance, sociologist Erving Goffman (1963) described how social stigmas hinder individuals from fully integrating into society. A **stigma** in general is defined by a “mark” of difference (e.g., a physiological “deformity,” personality “defect,” or status category like race, nationality, or religion) that defines a socially undesirable characteristic. Goffman elaborates:

an individual who might have been received easily in ordinary social intercourse possesses a trait that can obtrude itself upon attention and turn those of us whom he meets away from him, breaking the claim that his other attributes have on us (Goffman, 1963).

In other words, stigma works to define a person by a single attribute that makes them seem less than fully human and therefore subject to discriminatory practices, often unthinkingly. In meeting a stigmatized person, people construct a *stigma theory* that explains their inferiority and provides an account of the difference, threat, or danger they represent.

The **stigmatization of illness** often has the greatest effect on the patient and the kind of care they receive. Many contend that contemporary society and even health care institutions discriminate against certain diseases — like mental disorders, AIDS, venereal diseases, and skin disorders (Sartorius, 2007). Facilities for these diseases may be sub-par; they may be segregated from other health care areas or relegated to a poorer environment. This is a product of the stigma associated with the condition rather than the biology of the condition itself. As a result, the stigma may keep people from seeking help for their illness, making it worse than it needs to be.

Contested illnesses are those that are questioned or found questionable by some medical professionals. Disorders like fibromyalgia or chronic fatigue syndrome may be either true illnesses or only in the patients' heads, depending on the opinion of the medical professional. This dynamic can affect how a patient seeks treatment and what kind of treatment they receive.

The Social Construction of the Illness Experience

The idea of the social construction of the illness experience is based on the concept of reality as a social construction. In this perspective, there is no objective reality independent of people's own perceptions of it. The social construction of the illness experience deals with such issues as the way some patients control the way they reveal their disease, and the lifestyle adaptations patients develop to cope with their illnesses.




Figure 19.5 The Wong-Baker Faces Pain Rating Scale for assessment of pain in children helps health care providers assess an individual's level of pain. What might a symbolic interactionist observe about this method? [\[Image Description\]](#) (Photo courtesy of Lord Belbury/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

In terms of constructing the illness experience, culture, and individual personality both play a significant role. For some people, a long-term illness can have the effect of making their world smaller, more defined by the illness than anything else. For others, illness can be a chance for discovery, for re-imaging a new self (Conrad and Barker, 2010). Culture plays a huge role in how an individual experiences illness. Widespread diseases like AIDS or breast cancer have specific cultural markers that have changed over the years and that govern how individuals — and society — view them.

Today, many institutions of wellness acknowledge the degree to which individual perceptions shape the nature of health and illness. Regarding physical activity, for instance, the Public Health Agency of Canada recommends that individuals use a standard level of exertion to assess their physical activity. This rating of perceived exertion (RPE) gives a more complete view of an individual's actual exertion level, since heart rate or pulse measurements may be affected by medication or other issues (CSEP, N.d.). Similarly, many medical professionals use a comparable scale for perceived pain to help determine pain management strategies.

The Social Construction of Medical Knowledge

Conrad and Barker (2010) show how medical knowledge is socially constructed; that is, it can both reflect and reproduce inequalities in gender, class, race, and ethnicity. They use the example of the social construction of women's health and how medical knowledge has changed significantly in the course of a few generations. For instance, in the early 20th century, pregnant women were discouraged from driving or dancing for fear of harming the unborn child, much as they are discouraged from smoking or drinking alcohol today. Medical knowledge is used to reinforce ideas "about women's 'proper' (i.e., subordinate) place in society, as well as moral assumptions about women's sexuality and femininity more generally" (Conrad and barker, 2010).

Medicalization (discussed below in more detail) is also an aspect of the social construction of medical knowledge.

Medicalization “occurs when human problems or experiences become defined as medical problems, usually in terms of illnesses, diseases, or syndromes” (Conrad and Barker, 2010). Again, the medicalization of Pre-Menstrual Syndrome (PMS) or menopause in women is an example in which natural reproductive functions of women are treated as disorders or medical conditions in need of medication. On the other hand, the renaming of male “impotence” as “erectile dysfunction” was part of medicalized branding exercise that coincided with the introduction of Pfizer’s pharmaceutical product Viagra. Originally targeted to older men, Pfizer quickly began promoting Viagra to a much larger audience as a means of enhancing male’s (or male partner’s) sexual experience, effectively medicalizing sexuality itself.

A social constructionist approach to medical knowledge provides a critical basis to examine how certain problems come to be defined in medical terms and how this translates into public policy.

Image Descriptions

Figure 19.5 long description: The Wong-Baker pain rating scale goes from 0 to 10. 0 is no pain, 2 is mild, 4 is discomforting, 6 is distressing, 8 is horrible and 10 is excruciating or the worst pain imaginable. The scale also used cartoon faces to illustrate the different levels of pain. 0 is smiling, 2 is a small smile, 4 is a straight face, 6 is a slightly sad face, 8 is a big sad face, 10 is a bigger sad face that is crying. [\[Return to Figure 19.5\]](#)

Media Attributions

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- **Figure 19.3** [Andry tree](#) by Nicolas Andry, via Wikimedia Commons, is in the [public domain](#). Original from Orthopedics or the art of preventing and correcting deformities of the body in children, 1741, engraver unknown.
- **Figure 19.4** [Item D-04783 – Chinese Lepers At D’Arcy Island, circa 1890s](#) from the BC Archives (Archives code(s): HP067703; 193501-001), via Royal BC Museum, is in the [public domain](#).
- **Figure 19.5** [Emoji representation of the Wong-Baker Faces Pain Rating Scale for assessment of pain in children](#) by Lord Belbury, via Wikimedia Commons, is used under a [CC BY-SA 4.0](#) licence.

19.2 Global Health

Social epidemiology is the study of the causes and distribution of diseases. Social epidemiology can reveal how social problems are connected to the health of different populations. These epidemiological studies show that the health problems of high-income nations differ greatly from those of low-income nations. Some diseases, like cancer, are universal. But others, like obesity, heart disease, respiratory disease, and diabetes, are much more common in high-income countries, and are a direct result of a sedentary lifestyle combined with a poor diet. High-income nations also have a higher incidence of depression (Bromet et al., 2011). In contrast, low-income nations suffer significantly from malaria and tuberculosis.

How does health differ around the world? Some theorists differentiate between three types of countries: core nations, semi-peripheral nations, and peripheral nations (see [Chapter 10. Global Society](#)). Sociologists describe core nations as highly developed or industrialized; semi-peripheral nations are often developing or newly industrialized; and peripheral nations are relatively undeveloped. While the most pervasive issue in the Canadian care system is timely access to health care and access to family doctors, semi-peripheral and peripheral nations face a host of additional concerns. Reviewing the status of global health offers insight into the various ways that politics and wealth shape access to health care, and it shows which populations are most affected by health disparities.

One clear trend that emerged in the social epidemiological literature is the shift in the type of diseases and health issues that affect populations as societies modernize. The **epidemiologic transition** or “health transition” refers to the long-term change in a population’s dominant health problems or profile, from acute infectious diseases to chronic, degenerative diseases, as societies modernize and develop (Omram, 1971; Young, 1988). **Infectious diseases**, like measles, influenza, chronic diarrhea, tuberculosis, and plague, refer to diseases caused by micro-organisms such as bacteria or viruses, and are often communicable, leading to epidemic outbreaks. These are diseases common to sedentary societies exposed to water-borne pathogens, human waste, the diseases of domesticated animals, nutritional deficits, and periodic famine. **Chronic diseases**, like cancer, heart disease, diabetes, hypertension, and obesity, are non-communicable and characterized by the slow onset of symptoms. They are more characteristic of the causes of death in societies that have higher standards of living, better access to a regular supply of nutritious food, public sanitation measures, and immunization programs to control infectious diseases. They have often been referred to therefore as “diseases of modernization” or “Western diseases” because they are symptomatic of effects of modernization on longevity and lifestyle.

Health in High-Income Societies

Obesity can be used as an example to illustrate the issue of chronic diseases in high-income societies. Obesity is on the rise in high-income nations and has been linked to many diseases, including cardiovascular problems, musculoskeletal problems, diabetes, and respiratory issues. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2013), obesity rates are rising in all countries, with the greatest gains being made in the highest-income countries. The United States has the highest obesity rate for adults, while Canada rated fifth. Wallace Huffman and his fellow researchers (2006) contend that several factors are contributing to the rise in obesity in developed countries:

1. Improvements in technology and reduced family size have led to a reduction of work to be done in household production.
2. Unhealthy market goods, including processed foods, sweetened drinks, and sweet and salty snacks are replacing home-produced goods.
3. Leisure activities are growing more sedentary; for example, computer games, web surfing, and television viewing.

4. More workers are shifting from active work (agriculture and manufacturing) to service industries.
5. Increased access to passive transportation has led to more driving and less walking.

Obesity and weight issues have significant societal costs, including lower life expectancies and higher shared health care costs.

While ischemic heart disease caused by narrowed heart arteries is the single most prevalent cause of death in higher-income countries, cancers of all types combine to be a higher overall cause of death. Cancer accounts for twice as many deaths as cardiovascular disease in higher-income countries (Mahase 2019).

High-income countries also have higher rates of depression than less affluent nations. A recent study (Bromet et al., 2011) shows that the average lifetime prevalence of major depressive episodes in the 10 highest-income countries in the study was 14.6%; this compared to 11.1% in the eight low- and middle-income countries. The researchers speculate that the higher rate of depression may be linked to the greater income inequality that exists in the highest-income nations. “The poorest respondents in France, Germany, New Zealand and the USA had an approximately twofold increased odds of MDE compared with those in the highest income group” (Bromet et al., 2011).

Health in Low-Income Societies



Figure 19.6 In low-income countries, malnutrition, and lack of access to clean water contribute to a high child mortality rate. (Photo courtesy of Steve Evans/ Flickr) [CC BY-NC 2.0](#)

In peripheral nations with low per capita income, it is not the cost of health care that is the most pressing concern; rather, low-income countries must manage such problems as infectious disease, high infant mortality rates, scarce medical personnel, and inadequate water and sewer systems. Such issues, which high-income countries rarely even think about, are central to the lives of most people in low-income nations. Due to such health concerns, low-income nations have higher rates of infant mortality and lower average life spans.

One of the biggest contributors to medical issues in low-income countries is a lack of access to clean water and basic sanitation resources. According to a 2011 UNICEF report, almost half of the developing world's population lacks improved sanitation facilities. The World Health Organization (WHO) tracks health-related data for 193 countries. In their 2021 World Health Statistics report, they document the following statistics:

1. Globally in 2019, the rate of mortality for children under five was 38 per 1,000 live births, which is a dramatic change from previous decades. In 1990, the rate was 93 deaths per 1,000 births. In low-income countries, however, that rate is much higher. The child mortality rate in low-income nations was 11 times higher than that of high-income countries—76 deaths per 1,000 births compared to 7 deaths per 1,000 births. To consider it regionally, the highest under-five mortality rate remains in the WHO African Region (74 per 1000 live births), around 9 times higher than that in the WHO European Region (8 per 1000 live births) (World Health Organization, 2021).
2. The most frequent causes of death in children under five years old are pneumonia, diarrhea, congenital anomalies, preterm birth complications, birth asphyxia/trauma, and malaria, all of which can be prevented or treated with affordable interventions including immunization, adequate nutrition, safe water and food, and quality care by a trained health provider when needed (World Health Organization, 2021).
3. The availability of doctors and nurses in low-income countries is one-tenth that of nations with a high income. Challenges in access to medical education and access to patients exacerbate this issue for would-be medical professionals in low-income countries (World Health Organization, 2011).

Media Attributions

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19.3 Health in Canada

Health in Canada is a complex and often contradictory issue. On the one hand, as one of the wealthiest nations, Canada fares well in health outcomes with respect to the rest of the world. The publicly funded health care system in Canada also compares well to the noted issues of the private for-profit system in the United States (especially in terms of overall cost and who gets access to medical care). On the other hand, it is also behind many European countries in terms of key health care indicators such as access to family doctors and wait times for critical procedures. Choices about the model for delivering health care are one of the key variables affecting people's health in a society.

The following sections look at different social determinants of health in Canada. The **social determinants of health model** emphasizes that social variables influence health outcomes for individuals and populations. Health and illness are not randomly distributed in a society. Their occurrence and prevalence are linked to the social organization of the society, particularly in terms of social inequality.

Social variables including race and ethnicity, gender, early childhood experiences, education, employment and working conditions, housing, income, social security policies, and access to health care produce different consequences for individual health. These variables impact health by affecting life chances, lifestyles, and life experiences. Social inequality determines who has access to resources such as adequate nutrition, satisfying work, recreation, and housing. As Navarro et al. (2004) argue, “a society's socio-economic, political, and cultural variables are the most important factors in explaining the level of population health.”

Health by Race and Ethnicity

Unlike the United States, where strong health disparities exist along racial lines, differences in Canadians' health between non-Indigenous visible minorities and Canadians of European origin disappear once socioeconomic status and lifestyle are taken into account. Moreover, new and recent immigrants from non-European countries tend to have better health than the average native-born Canadian (Kobayashi, Prus, and Lin, 2008).

Indigenous Canadians unfortunately continue to suffer disproportionately from serious health problems.

It is estimated that in the 1500s, prior to contact, there were 500,000 Indigenous people living in Canada, although estimates range from 200,000 to 2,000,000 (O'Donnell, 2008). Through epidemics of contagious Euro-Asian diseases such as smallpox, measles, influenza, and tuberculosis, Indigenous populations suffered an estimated 93% decline.

Conditions in the late 19th century to the mid-20th century did not improve markedly after Indigenous people were moved to reserves. Often lacking adequate drinking water, sanitation facilities, and hygienic conditions, these were ideal settings for the spread of communicable diseases. Death rates from tuberculosis (TB), for example, remained very high for First Nations peoples into the 1950s, long after the use of antibiotics brought TB under control in the rest of Canada. In 2005, the TB rate was still 27 active cases per 100,000 population for Indigenous people, while it was only five active cases per 100,000 for the rest of the population.

Part of the problem is that the percentage of Indigenous people living in overcrowded housing on reserves and in the north is five to six times higher than for the general population (Statistics Canada, 2011). The crises in Attawapiskat, Ontario, and other First Nations communities with respect to housing, drinking water, and lack of proper water purification systems indicate that these issues have not been resolved (Stastna, 2011).

Life Expectancy, Registered Indians, Canada, 1980, 1990 and 2000




Figure 19.7 Life expectancy of Indigenous men and women in Canada has improved but remains significantly lower than for the rest of the population. (Graph courtesy of Health Canada, 2005.) [Statistics Canada Open Licence](#) [\[Image Description\]](#)

Figure 19.7 shows that life expectancy for Indigenous people (specifically Registered Indians) has improved. However, it remains significantly lower than for the average population: Indigenous men and women could expect to live 8.1 and 5.5 fewer years respectively than the average Canadian man and woman (Health Canada, 2005). While infectious diseases are largely regarded now as being under control in Indigenous populations (albeit at higher rates than the Canadian population), Indigenous people suffer disproportionately from chronic health problems like diabetes, heart disease, obesity, respiratory problems, and HIV (Statistics Canada, 2011).

The health conditions of off-reserve Indigenous people are also significantly worse than for the average population. While nearly 59% of non-Indigenous people in Canada over the age of 20 rated their health as “excellent or very good” in 2006–2007, only 51% of First Nations, 57% of Métis, and 49% of Inuit living off-reserve did so. Similarly, 74% of non-Indigenous Canadians reported they had no physical limitations due to ill health, while only 58, 59, and 64% of off-reserve First Nations, Métis, and Inuit, respectively, did so (Garner, Carrière, and Sanmartin, 2010). While some of the difference between Indigenous and non-Indigenous health conditions can be explained by financial, educational, and individual lifestyle variables, even when these were considered statistically, disparities in health remained. Garner, Carrière, and Sanmartin (2010) report that “[s]uch findings point to the existence of other factors contributing to the greater burden of morbidity among First Nations, Métis and Inuit people.”

Health by Socioeconomic Status

Ximena de la Barra, senior urban advisor to UNICEF, wrote in 1998 that “being poor is in itself a health hazard; worse, however, is being urban and poor” (de la Barra, 1998). The context of her statement was global urban poverty, but her conclusions apply to the relationship between poverty and health in Canada as well.

Residents of poorer urban areas within Canadian cities have significantly higher hospitalization rates and lower self-reported quality of health than residents of average or wealthy urban areas (see Figures 19.8 and 19.9).

Pan-Canadian Age-Standardized Hospitalization Rates by Socio-Economic Status Group*




Figure 19.8 Hospitalization rates by socio-economic status based on data from 2003–2004 to 2005–2006. Figures reflect admissions to acute care facilities for chronic and acute health problems. COPD refers to Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease affecting lungs and ACSD refers to Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions, which could be treated without hospitalization. (Figure courtesy of the Canadian Population Care Initiative, 2008.) [Government of Canada Terms](#)

Pan-Canadian Age-Standardized Self-Reported Health Percentages by Socio-Economic Status Group*




Figure 19.9 Statistics Canada Canadian Community Health Survey from 2003 and 2005 tabulates the percentage of people reporting “excellent” or “very good” health, as well as reporting certain health-related behaviours such as smoking and alcohol binging. “Risk Factors” refers to an index composed of 3 risk factors affecting health: physical inactivity, self-reported overweight or obesity, smokers, and alcohol binging. (Image courtesy of the Canadian Population Care Initiative, 2008.) [Government of Canada Terms](#)

Living and growing up in poverty is linked to lower life expectancy, and chronic illnesses such as diabetes, mental illness, stroke, cardiovascular disease, central nervous system disease, and injury (Canadian Population Health Initiative, 2008). In fact, clinical medical care accounts for only about a quarter of health outcomes, while one-half of a person’s ability to recover from illness is determined by socioeconomic factors, including income, education, and living conditions (CBC, 2014).

In an interesting study of 17, 350 British civil servants, it was found that differences in even relatively small disparities of wealth and power between civil service employment grades led to significantly better health outcomes for the privileged. The more authority one has, the healthier one is (Marmot, Shipley, and Rose, 1984). These social determinants of health led the Canadian Medical Association to argue that providing adequate financial resources might be the best medical treatment that can be provided to poor patients. Inner city doctor, Gary Bloch stated, “Treating people at low income with a higher income will have at least as big an impact on their health as any other drugs that I could prescribe them.... I do see poverty as a disease” (CBC, 2013).

It is important to remember that economics are only part of the socioeconomic status (SES) picture; research suggests that education also plays an important role. Phelan and Link (2003) note that many behaviour-influenced diseases like lung cancer (from smoking), coronary artery disease (from poor eating and exercise habits), and AIDS initially were

widespread across SES groups. However, once information linking habits to disease was disseminated, these diseases decreased in high SES groups and increased in low SES groups. This illustrates the important role of education initiatives regarding a given disease, as well as possible inequalities in how those education initiatives effectively reach different SES groups.

Health by Gender

Women continue to live longer than men do on average, but women have higher rates of disability and disease. In each age group, men have higher rates of fatal disease, whereas women have higher rates of non-fatal chronic disease. “Women get sicker but men die quicker” might be a way of summing this up (Lorber, 2000). For example, while 4% of Canadian men suffer from chronic illnesses, these illnesses affect 11% of Canadian women, particularly conditions such as multiple sclerosis, lupus, migraines, hypothyroidism, and chronic pain (Spitzer, 2005).

Men’s lower life expectancy is often attributed to three factors: their tendency to engage in riskier behaviour or riskier work than women, their lower use of the health care system (which prevents symptoms from being diagnosed earlier), and their innate biological disposition to higher mortality at every stage of life. It is not as clear why chronic disease affects women in higher proportions. Spitzer (2005) notes that gender roles and relations lead to different responses and exposures to stressors, different access to resources, different responsibilities regarding domestic work and caregiving, and different levels of exposure to domestic violence, all of which might account for chronic health issues in women disproportionately.

Women are also affected adversely by institutionalized sexism in health care provision. An example of institutionalized sexism is the way that women are more likely to be diagnosed with certain kinds of mental disorders than men are. Psychologist Dana Becker notes that 75% of all diagnoses of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) are for women according to the *Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*. This diagnosis is characterized by instability of identity, of mood, and of behaviour, and Becker argues that it has been used as a catch-all diagnosis for too many women. She further decries the pejorative connotation of the diagnosis, saying that it predisposes many people, both within and outside of the profession of psychotherapy, against women who have been so diagnosed (Becker, N.d.).

Many critics also point to the medicalization of women’s issues as an example of institutionalized sexism. As noted earlier, **medicalization** refers to the process by which previously normal aspects of life are redefined as deviant and needing medical attention to remedy. Medicalization is therefore a form of disciplinary power in which doctors and medical knowledge become agents of social control (see discussion of disciplinary power in [Chapter 8. Deviance, Crime and Social Control](#)). Being under medical care means submitting to a regime of therapeutic intervention under the supervision of medical experts.

Historically and currently, many aspects of women’s lives have been medicalized, including menstruation, premenstrual syndrome, pregnancy, childbirth, and menopause. The medicalization of pregnancy and childbirth has been particularly contentious in recent decades, with many women opting against the medical process and choosing a more natural childbirth. Fox and Worts (1999) find that all women experience pain and anxiety during the birth process, but that social support relieves both as effectively as medical support. In other words, medical interventions are no more effective than social ones at helping with the difficulties of pain and childbirth. Fox and Worts further found that women with supportive partners ended up with less medical intervention and fewer cases of postpartum depression. Of course, access to quality birth care outside of the standard medical models may not be readily available to women of all social classes.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

Medicalization of Sleeplessness



Figure 19.10 Many people fail to get enough sleep. But is insomnia a disease that should be cured with medication? (Photo courtesy of Love Krittaya/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

How is your “sleep hygiene?” Sleep hygiene refers to the lifestyle and sleep habits that contribute to sleeplessness or insomnia. Bad habits that can lead to sleeplessness include inconsistent bedtimes, lack of exercise, late-night employment, napping during the day, and sleep environments that include noise, lights, or screen time (National Institutes of Health, 2011a).

According to the Toronto-based University Health Network, examining sleep hygiene is the first step in trying to solve a problem with sleeplessness (Bernstein and Durkee, 2008).

For many North Americans, however, making changes in sleep hygiene does not seem to be enough. According to a 2006 report, sleeplessness is an under-recognized public health problem

affecting up to 70 million people. It is interesting to note that in the months (or years) after this report was released, advertising by the pharmaceutical companies behind Ambien, Lunesta, and Rozerem (three pharmaceutical sleep aids) averaged \$188 million weekly promoting these drugs (Gellene, 2009).

According to Moloney, Konrad, and Zimmer (2011), prescriptions for sleep medications increased dramatically from 1993 to 2007. While complaints of sleeplessness during doctor’s office visits more than doubled during this time, insomnia diagnoses increased more than sevenfold, from about 840,000 to 6.1 million. The authors of the study conclude that sleeplessness has been medicalized as insomnia, and that “insomnia may be a public health concern, but potential overtreatment with marginally effective, expensive medications with nontrivial side effects raises definite population health concerns” (Moloney, Konrad, and Zimmer, 2011). Indeed, a study published in 2004 in the *Archives of Internal Medicine* shows that cognitive behavioural therapy, not medication, was the most effective sleep intervention (Jacobs, Pace-Schott, Stickgold, and Otto, 2004).

A century ago, people who could not sleep were told to count sheep. Now, they pop a pill, and all those pills add up to a very lucrative market for the pharmaceutical industry. Is this industry behind the medicalization of sleeplessness, or are they just responding to a need?

Mental Health and Disability

The treatment received by those defined as mentally ill or disabled varies greatly from country to country. In 21st century Canada, those who have never experienced such a disadvantage take for granted the rights Canadian society guarantees for each citizen. However, access to things like education, housing, or transportation that most people take for granted, are often experienced very differently by people with disabilities.

Mental Health

People with **mental disorders** have a condition that makes it more difficult to cope with everyday life. People with **mental illness** have a severe, lasting mental disorder that requires long-term treatment. In addition to the effects of the conditions, both must cope with social stigmas which impede full participation in social life.

According to the 2012 Canadian Community Health Survey, the most common mental disorders in Canada are **mood disorders** (major depression, bipolar disorder). Over 11% of Canadians reported experiencing major episodes of depression in their lifetime (4.7% in the previous year), while 2.6% reported bipolar disorder in their lifetime (1.5% in the previous year) (Pearson, Janz, and Ali, 2013). Major mood disorders are depression, bipolar disorder, and dysthymic disorder. Depression might seem like something that everyone experiences at some point, and it is true that most people feel sad or “blue” at times in their lives. A truly depressive episode, however, is more than just feeling sad for a short period; it is a long-term, debilitating illness that usually needs treatment to cure. Bipolar disorder is characterized by dramatic shifts in energy and mood, often affecting the individual's ability to carry out day-to-day tasks. Bipolar disorder used to be called *manic depression* because of the way that people would swing between manic and depressive episodes.

The second most common mental disorders in Canada are **anxiety disorders**. Almost 9% of Canadians reported experiencing generalized anxiety disorder in their lifetime (2.6% in the previous year) (Pearson, Janz, and Ali, 2013). Like depression, it is important to distinguish between occasional feelings of anxiety and a true anxiety disorder. Anxiety is a normal reaction to stress that people all feel at some point, but anxiety disorders are feelings of worry and fearfulness that last for months at a time. Anxiety disorders include obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), panic disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and both social and specific phobias.

Depending on what definition is used, there is some overlap between mood disorders and **personality disorders**. Canadian data on the prevalence of personality disorders is lacking but estimates in the United States suggest they affect 9% of Americans yearly. In Canada, epidemiological research reporting on antisocial personality disorder shows that about 1.7% of the population experience this specific disorder yearly (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2002). In the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual on Mental Disorders (DSM)*, personality disorders are defined as “an enduring pattern of inner experience and behaviour that deviates markedly from the expectations of the culture of the individual who exhibits it” (National Institute of Mental Health). In other words, personality disorders cause people to behave in ways that are seen as abnormal to society but seem normal to them. They manifest in constellations of maladaptive personality disorders including antisocial, avoidant, borderline, dependent, histrionic, narcissistic, obsessive-compulsive, paranoid, schizoid, and schizotypal personality traits.



Figure 19.11 Medication is a common option for children with ADHD. (Photo courtesy of Deviation56/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Another commonly diagnosed mental disorder is attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), which American statistics suggest affects 9% of children and 8% of adults on a lifetime basis (National Institute of Mental Health, 2005). The *New York Times* reported American Centers for Disease Control data showing that the diagnosis of children with ADHD had increased by 53% over the last decade, raising issues of overdiagnosis and overmedication (Schwarz and Cohen, 2013). Recent data from Canada confirm the increasing rate of prescribed medications and ADHD diagnosis in Canada, although the rates are much lower than those reported in the United States (3% for all children aged three to nine, but 4% for boys and 5% for school-aged children in this age range) (Brault and Lacourse, 2012). ADHD is one of the most common childhood disorders, and it is marked by difficulty paying attention, difficulty controlling behaviour, and hyperactivity. The significant increase in diagnosis and the use of medications such as Ritalin have prompted social debate over whether such drugs are being overprescribed (American Psychiatric Association, N.d.). In fact, some critics question whether this disorder is as widespread as it seems, or if it is a case of overdiagnosis.

Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have also gained a lot of attention in recent years. The term ASD encompasses a group of developmental brain disorders that are characterized by “deficits in social interaction, verbal and nonverbal communication, and engagement in repetitive behaviours or interests” (National Institute of Mental Health, 2011b). A report from the American Centers for Disease Control (CDC) suggests that 1 in every 68 children is born with ASD (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014). This diagnosis is up by 30% from the previous estimate that 1 in 88 children is born with ASD. In Canada, a national tracking system is being set up, but a report from the National Epidemiologic Database for the Study of Autism in Canada found increases in diagnosis in Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland and Labrador, and southeastern Ontario ranging from 39 to 204 percent, depending on the region. As an example of social construction of disorders, much of the increase in diagnosis is believed to be due to increased awareness of the disorder rather than actual prevalence, with doctors diagnosing autism more frequently and with children with less severe problems (NEDSAC, 2012).

The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) distinguishes between serious mental illness and other disorders. The key feature of serious mental illness is that it results in “serious functional impairment, which substantially interferes with or limits one or more major life activities” (National Institute of Mental Health, 2005). Thus, the characterization of “serious” refers to the effect of the illness (functional impairment), not the illness itself.

Some researchers associated with the **anti-psychiatry movement** have argued that mental illness is a myth. For example, in *Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Analysis* (1963), Thomas Scheff argues that **residual deviance** — a violation of social norms not covered by any specific behavioural expectation — is what actually results in people being labelled mentally ill. Scheff proposed that what psychiatrists described as mental illnesses were in fact deviant behaviors that

had become recognizable, definable, and stable through the practice of labelling. A “residual” deviance differed from “ordinary” deviance because they were norm violations that fell outside of normal moral, legal or folkway categories. They violated social norms that seem so universal and natural to a particular community that they were “neither verbalized nor explicitly taught” (Scheff, 1963).

Most norm violations do not cause the violator to be labelled as mentally ill, but as ill-mannered, ignorant, sinful, criminal, or perhaps just harried, depending on the type of norm involved. (Or potential definers may deny that the deviance even warrants labelling.) After exhausting these categories . . . there is always a residue of the most diverse kinds of violations for which the culture provides no explicit label. These are unnameable and unthinkable forms of deviance. . . . For convenience these violations are lumped together into a residual category: witchcraft, spirit possession, or, in our own society, mental illness (Scheff, 1963).

Similarly, in *The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct* (1961), Thomas Szasz asks if there is such a thing as mental illness at all, and then argues that there is not. Rather, mental illness is a deviation from what others view as normal, with no parallel to biological disease or illness. He was concerned about the institutional implications for individuals who deviated from societal norms or moral conduct. The tendency to forcibly detain, treat, or excuse individuals who simply violated behavioural codes undermined personal rights, personal dignity, and moral responsibility.

Disability



Figure 19.12 The handicapped accessible sign indicates that people with disabilities can access the facility. The Canadian Human Rights Act includes a “duty to accommodate” access for persons with disabilities. (Photo courtesy of Ltjltlj/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Disability refers to a reduction in one’s ability to perform everyday tasks. The World Health Organization makes a distinction between the various terms used to describe disabilities. They use the term **impairment** to describe physical limitations, while reserving the term *disability* to refer to the social limitation. In 2012, 3.8 million Canadians, or 13.7% of Canadians aged 15 and over, reported having a disability — a long-term condition or health-related problem — that limited their ability to perform daily tasks. Twenty-six per cent of these Canadians had a disability classified as “very severe” (Statistics Canada, 2013).

Lyn Jongbloed (2003) notes that conceptions of disability have gone through several shifts in Canada since the 19th century, leading to significant shifts in public policy on disabilities. In the early 19th century, persons with intellectual impairments were either cared for at home or jailed alongside criminals, suggesting that the distinction between crime and disability was not significant, at least from the point of view of public policy. People with physical disabilities were not regarded as disruptive so they were not institutionalized. Then between 1860 and 1890, the asylum model of care was

developed specifically for people with disabilities, (including older persons with senility, intellectually impaired, mentally ill, or syphilis patients), in large part to protect them or others from harm.

This *law-and-order* approach was gradually replaced by *medical and economic* models that conceptualized disability as a biological reality that called for practices such as **rehabilitation**. Rehabilitation focused on interventions to treat or cure disabilities so that people with disabilities could earn a livelihood and reintegrate into “normal” society. As

Jongbloed suggests, “Helping people become economically independent is consistent with the North American ideology of individualism. The economic model of disability is predicated on an individual’s inability to participate in the paid labour force” (2003).

Finally, since the 1970s, the medical and economic model has been gradually supplanted, or supplemented, by a sociopolitical model that argues that disability results from a failure of the social environment rather than individual impairment. This led to rights-based challenges of barriers to people with disabilities and a deinstitutionalization movement that saw the dismantling of the asylum system and its replacement with a community model of care.

Before the passage of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, which specifically designated individuals with disabilities as one of four disadvantaged groups protected by the Charter, Canadians with disabilities were often routinely excluded from opportunities and social institutions that many able-bodied persons take for granted. This occurred not only through employment and other kinds of discrimination, but through casual acceptance by most Canadians of a world designed for the convenience of the able-bodied. Imagine being in a wheelchair and trying to use a sidewalk without the benefit of wheelchair-accessible curbs. Imagine a blind person trying to access information without the widespread availability of Braille. Imagine having limited motor control and being faced with a difficult-to-grasp round door handle.

Ableism refers to both direct discrimination against persons with disabilities and the unintended neglect of their needs. It is not the physiological, mental, or medical nature of impairment that disables so much as the way the social world has been constructed to enable some, while disabling others.

Ableism is linked to the enduring legacy of stigmatizing persons with disabilities. People with disabilities are stigmatized by the perception that they are, in some manner, ill or less than fully human. The belief is that people with disabilities are incapable of living a full or good human life. As noted earlier in the chapter, Erving Goffman (1963) describes **stigmatization** as the process in which a person’s identity becomes “spoiled;” based on a difference in ability, they are labelled as wholly different, discriminated against, and sometimes even shunned. They are categorized and ascribed a master status, becoming “the blind girl” or “the boy in the wheelchair” instead of someone afforded a full identity by society. This can be especially true for people who are living with mental illness or if they are mentally impaired.

In response, many groups have begun to assert that they are not disabled, but *differently enabled*. Their condition is not a form of deviance from the norm, but a different form of normality. As Rod Michalko argues, blindness for example is only seen as a problem or disability from the point of view of sightedness and a world organized for the sighted (Michalko, 1998). Similarly, with respect to cognitive disabilities like autism spectrum disorders, groups with disabilities have proposed to replace stigmatization with a **neurodiversity** paradigm which emphasizes the fact of neurocognitive variation among the human species. Rather than an individual medical pathology, those who fall outside neurocognitive norms should be seen as “neuro-minorities” who have been marginalised by a “neuronormative” organisation of society in favour of the “neurotypical” (Chapman, 2020).

In a lecture to parents with Autism Spectrum children entitled “Don’t Mourn for Us”, autistic activist Jim Sinclair (2012) stated:

Autism isn’t something a person has, or a “shell” that a person is trapped inside. There’s no normal child hidden behind the autism. Autism is a way of being. It is pervasive; it colours every experience, every sensation, perception, thought, emotion, and encounter, every aspect of existence. It is not possible to separate the autism from the person — and if it were possible, the person you’d have left would not be the same person you started with.

As discussed in the section on mental health, many mental health disorders can be debilitating, affecting a person’s ability to cope with everyday life. This can affect social status, housing, and especially employment. According to the Canadian Human Rights Commission’s *Report on Equity Rights of People with Disabilities* (2012), people with a disability had a higher rate of unemployment than people without a disability: 8.6% to 6.3% (2006 data). Men and women with disabilities are also 8.6% and 6.5% more likely to be *underemployed* than men and women without disabilities (respectively). People with disabilities were also only half as likely to complete a university education as those without

disabilities (20.2% versus 40.7%, respectively), and are earning or earned significantly less (\$9,557 less per year for men and \$8,853 less for women). Note, this data does not consider non-binary genders.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

Obesity: The Last Acceptable Prejudice



Figure 19.13 Obesity is considered the last acceptable social stigma. (Photo courtesy of Tony Alter/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

What is the typical reaction to the picture in Figure 19.13? Compassion? Fear? Disgust? Many people will look at this picture and make negative assumptions about the man based on his weight. According to a study from the Yale Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity, large people are the object of “widespread negative stereotypes that overweight and obese persons are lazy, unmotivated, lacking in self-discipline, less competent, noncompliant, and sloppy” (Puhl and Heuer, 2009).

Historically, in Canada and elsewhere, it was considered acceptable to discriminate against people based on prejudiced opinions. Even after the colony status of Canada formally ended with the formation of the Canadian state in 1867, the next 100 years of Canadian history saw institutionalized racism and prejudice against Indigenous people. In an example of **stereotype interchangeability**, the same insults that are flung today at the overweight and obese population (lazy, for instance), have been flung at various racial and ethnic groups in earlier history. Of course, no credible person gives voice to these kinds of views in public now, except when talking about obese people.

Why is it considered acceptable to feel prejudice toward — even to hate — obese people? Puhl and Heuer suggest that these feelings stem from the perception that obesity is preventable through self-control, better diet, and more exercise. Highlighting this contention is the fact that studies have shown that people’s perceptions of obesity are more positive when they think the obesity was caused by non-controllable factors like biology (a thyroid condition, for instance) or genetics.

Even with some understanding of non-controllable factors that might affect obesity, obese people are still subject to stigmatization. Puhl and Heuer's study is one of many that document discrimination at work, in the media, and even in the medical profession. Obese people are less likely to get into college than thinner people, and they are less likely to succeed at work.

Stigmatization of obese people comes in many forms, from the seemingly benign to the potentially illegal. In movies and television shows, overweight people are often portrayed negatively, or as stock characters who are the butt of jokes. One study found that in children's movies "obesity was equated with negative traits (evil, unattractive, unfriendly, cruel) in 64% of the most popular children's videos. In 72% of the videos, characters with thin bodies had desirable traits, such as kindness or happiness" (Hines and Thompson, 2007). In movies and television for adults, the negative portrayal is often meant to be funny. "Fat suits" –inflatable suits that make people look obese – are commonly used in a way that perpetuates negative stereotypes. Think about the parallel with white people putting on "blackface" or the way obese people are portrayed in movies and on television. Is there any other subordinate group that can be openly denigrated in such a way? It is difficult to find a parallel example.

Image Description

Figure 19.7 long description:

Life expectancy, Registered Indians, Canada, 1980, 1990, and 2000		
Date	Male life expectancy	Female life expectancy
1980	60.9 years	68.0 years
1990	66.9 years	74.0 years
2000	68.9 years	76.6 years [Return to Figure 19.7]

Media Attributions

- **Figure 19.7** [Life Expectancy, Registered Indians, Canada, 1980, 1990 and 2000](#) from Health Canada (2005). Data source: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2001, Basic Departmental Data 2001, Catalogue no. R12-7/2000E. This reproduction is a copy of an [earlier version](#). [Statistics Canada Open Licence](#)
- **Figure 19.8.** [Figure 3A. Pan-Canadian Age-Standardized Hospitalization Rates by Socio-Economic Status Group \[PDF\]](#), from Canadian Population Care Initiative (2008), is used according to the [Government of Canada Terms](#).
- **Figure 19.9.** [Figure 3B. Pan-Canadian Age-Standardized Self-Reported Health Percentages by Socio-Economic Status Group \[PDF\]](#), from Canadian Population Care Initiative (2008), is used according to the [Government of Canada Terms](#).
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- **Figure 19.12** [Handicapped Accessible sign](#) by Ltljltlj, via Wikimedia Commons, is in the [public domain](#) because it comes from the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, sign number D9-6.
- **Figure 19.13** [Epidemic](#) by [Tony Alter](#) on Flickr under a [CC BY 2.0](#) licence.

19.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Health and Medicine

Each of the three major sociological perspectives approaches the topics of health, illness, and medicine differently.

Positivist Sociology and Functionalism

Positivist approaches that seek to explain health outcomes from a sociological framework developed **social epidemiology** and the **social determinants of health model**, which predict health outcomes from background variables such as income, education, racialization, and other indicators of socioeconomic status. The Whitehall study in Britain in the 1960s was one of the first large scale empirical studies that indicated that inequality itself was a direct factor in determining a gradient of health outcomes (Marmot et. al., 1978). In a study of 17, 350 British civil servants, it was found that differences in even relatively small disparities of wealth and power between civil service employment grades led to significantly better health outcomes for the privileged. The more authority one has, the healthier one is.

Summarizing the social determinants of health model, Marmot and Wilkinson (1999) cite five findings from this research:

1. “Differences in health between population groups are due to characteristics in society, not differences in health care.”
2. “When people change social and cultural environments, their disease risks change.”
3. “The health gradient is not a function of poverty alone” (meaning poor health for the poor and good health for the rest), rather it is a “...problem across the entire socioeconomic spectrum—as one moves down the social hierarchy, life expectancy gets shorter and mortality rates are higher.”
4. The health gradient can change (and change quickly) with interventions.
5. “The health gradient is not a matter of selection”—“...health does not determine social position, rather, social position determines health” (Marmot and Wilkinson, 1999)

Diverging from this quantitative approach, functionalism explains the social dynamics of health and illness in terms of social roles designated for those who are defined as ill compared to those who are defined as healthy. According to the functionalist perspective, health is vital to the stability of society, and therefore sickness is a form of deviance. Like other forms of deviance, it also has a function that determines the social role of the sick in society, regardless of the biological underpinnings of the illness. Talcott Parsons (1951) was the first to discuss this in terms of the **sick role**: patterns of expectations that define appropriate behaviour for the sick and for those who take care of them.

According to Parsons, the sick person has a specific social role with both rights and responsibilities. To start with, in the context of modern norms of individualism and individual responsibility, it is recognized that a person has not chosen to be sick and should not be treated as responsible for their condition. The sick person also has the right to be exempt from normal social roles; the person is not required to fulfill the obligation of a well person and can avoid normal responsibilities without censure. However, this exemption is temporary and relative to the severity of the illness. The exemption also requires **medical legitimation** by a physician; that is, a physician must certify that the illness is genuine.

The responsibility of the sick person is twofold: to try to get well and to seek technically competent help from a physician. If the sick person stays ill longer than is appropriate (malingers), they may be stigmatized.

Parsons argues that since the sick are unable to fulfill their normal societal roles, their sickness weakens society. Therefore, it is sometimes necessary for various forms of social control to bring the behaviour of a sick person back in

line with normal expectations. In this model of health, doctors serve as gatekeepers, deciding who is healthy and who is sick — a relationship in which the doctor has all the power. The question of whether it is appropriate to allow doctors so much power over deciding who is sick typically falls outside the parameters of functionalist analysis.

Functionalists have traditionally assumed that medical diagnosis is universally accepted as legitimate, yet recent history reveals broad patterns of dissent from the authoritative positions of medical science. Similarly, there is the problem of people who become sick, but are unwilling to leave their normal positions for any number of reasons (personal/social obligations, financial need, or lack of medical insurance, for instance). Within the functional parameters of the sick role, the social structures that are responsible for providing health care can easily generate dysfunctional consequences that have disastrous impacts on individuals' lived experience of illness.

Critical Sociology

Many explanations using the critical perspective suggest that issues with the health care system, as with most other social problems, are rooted in the power structures of capitalist society. A World Health Organization report studying the social determinants of health stated,

Poor and unequal living conditions are, in their turn, the consequence of deeper structural conditions that together fashion the way societies are organized – poor social policies and programmes, unfair economic arrangements, and bad politics. These 'structural drivers' operate within countries under the authority of governments, but also, increasingly over the last century and a half, between countries under the effects of globalization. This toxic combination of bad policies, economics, and politics is, in large measure, responsible for the fact that a majority of people in the world do not enjoy the good health that is biologically possible (W.H.O., 1988).

The reports' authors noted that the crucial variable affecting health was not so much the overall wealth of a society, but of the equability of the distribution of wealth within societies.

Alongside the health disparities created by class inequalities, there are a number of health disparities created by racism, sexism, ageism, and heterosexism. The poor and socially excluded are more likely to experience illness caused by poor diet, physiological and psychological stress, living and working in unhealthy environments, and are less likely to challenge the system. In Canada for example, Indigenous people have been disproportionately marginalized from economic power, so they bear a great deal of the burden of poor health. In the critical approach, the empirical relationship between social determinants and health outcomes has to be understood in the broader context of historical formations of power and social inequality.

According to critical sociology, capitalism and the pursuit of profit also lead to the problematic **commodification of health**: the transformation of something not generally thought of as a commodity into something that can be bought and sold in a marketplace. In this view, corporations, private insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies and investors have a disproportionate influence over how the health care system is run and funded, which type of diseases are researched, whether cheaper generic versions of patented drugs can be sold, the delivery model and nature of the health care, and even how the physiology of the human body is understood.

One outcome of this is that corporate interests also influence the terms in which debates about **public health care** are discussed. Corporate think tanks like the Fraser Institute and the CD Howe Institute have long advocated free-market, profit-driven, American-style models rather than publicly funded models to deliver health care in Canada (Carroll and Shaw, 2001). The language with which they approach health care emphasizes "taxpayer rights," critiques concerning the financial sustainability of public health care, and the role of unnamed "vested interests" in promoting an "outdated" 1960s-era system. Even though Canadians persistently state that public, **universal health care** is their central priority, corporate and neoliberal messaging on health care has become increasingly influential over the last three decades.



Figure 19.14 Expectant mother awaiting childbirth in North Korean maternity ward. Michel Foucault describes the origin of the modern hospital as one of the key social technologies used to give order to complex social multiplicities: “how one was to distribute patients, separate them from one another, divide up the hospital space and make a systematic classification of diseases” (Foucault, 1979). (Figure courtesy of Roman Harak/Flickr). [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

A different critical approach to health and illness focuses on analyzing the emergence of **biopolitics** in the 18th and 19th centuries (Foucault, 1980). As noted earlier in the chapter, biopolitics refers to the relationships of power that emerge when the task of fostering and administering the “life” of the population becomes central to the focus government (see also [Chapter 17. Government and Politics](#)). In a variety of different levels and sites in society — from implementing society-wide public health programs, sanitation procedures and population controls to various forms of disciplinary power exercised directly over the individual bodies of patients, soldiers, children, women, students, and prisoners — modern scientific knowledge on the functioning of the body establishes new power relations between experts (e.g., doctors, psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, social workers) and subjects. As a result, numerous forms of discipline and regulation emerge that seek to act upon the living body and the living population to maximize their potential for health, productivity, efficiency, and

docility.

Modern **biomedicine**, for example, is a system of medical practice that defines health and illness in terms of the mechanics of the physical, biological systems of the human body. Its origin is in modern science’s division of mind and body as separate “substances.” This leads the individual to experience and inhabit their body and its problems in a certain way and to submit, voluntarily or involuntarily, to the expertise of doctors when bodily function deviates from biomedical norms. It is on the basis of doctors’ claim to biomedical knowledge about bodies that individuals submit to more or less mortifying exercises of power and discipline: from dieting and exercise regimes to pharmaceutical drug treatments to caesarean births to chemotherapy and gene therapy. See the discussion in [Chapter 3. Culture](#) of the “pop gene” for example.

It is interesting in this respect to note the various ways in which the knowledge and authority of doctors and the medical establishment are being challenged in contemporary society. People are increasingly researching and becoming more knowledgeable about their health concerns in a manner that permits them to engage with doctors and medical authorities on a more equal basis. They are also engaging with an expanding range of alternatives to conventional biomedicine: health practices and knowledge such as yoga, fitness training, dieting, acupuncture, traditional Chinese medicine, chi gong, naturopathy, homeopathy, chiropractic, and Indigenous healing practices.

This turn to a model of individualized **care for the self** — i.e., ways of acting independently upon the self to attain a certain mode of being such as “health” (Foucault, 1997) — has a number of competing implications, however. On the one hand, it enables practices of autonomy and self-formation freed from the power relations of the medical establishment. On the other hand, it can feed into intensified concerns and anxieties with the body that deepen rather than loosen submission to authorities and authoritative knowledge — dieting fads, esoteric knowledge and practices, and nontraditional healers, for example. As Zygmunt Bauman notes, when individuals take on the responsibility for knowledge about their own bodies and health in a **pluralistic medical culture** in which there are numerous competing and contradicting claims about treatment, the outcome for the individual can be paralyzing rather than liberating (Bauman, 2005).

Interpretive Sociology

According to theorists working in the interpretive perspective, health and illness are both socially constructed in crucial respects. As discussed in the beginning of the chapter, interpretive sociologists focus on the specific meanings and causes people attribute to illness. The **medicalization of deviance** is a prime example. As noted earlier, it refers to the social process that changes “bad” behaviour into “sick” behaviour, often to bring it under the social control of medical authorities. A related process is **demedicalization**, in which “sick” behaviour is normalized again by a social process of redefinition. Medicalization and demedicalization are examples that illustrate how understanding the variable meaning of illness requires an understanding of its social context. They affect who is considered to be a “patient,” who responds to the patient, how people respond to the patient, and how people view the personal responsibility of the patient (Conrad and Schneider, 1992).

Underlying the social construction of health and illness is an elemental distinction between what **phenomenologists** call **Körper** and **Leib**, or the physiological body and the lived body (Aho and Aho, 2008). *Körper* refers to the physical, externally observable body; what people are as physiological, neurological, and skeletal beings. *Leib* refers to the way in which the body is experienced from within, as well as how the world and physical existence are experienced sensually through the body. This applies to the distinction between a **disease** and an **illness**, although these terms are frequently used interchangeably in ordinary usage. A disease, therefore, refers to an organic based pathology which can in principle be measured through clinical or laboratory procedures. **Illness**, on the other hand, refers to the more unquantifiable subjective experience of ‘not feeling well.’

Phenomenologists argue that prior to the biomedical division of mind and body is the lived experience of the body. This distinction has implications for how interpretive sociologists study health and illness. Whereas science and biomedical research typically focus on the objective and measurable physiological characteristics of bodily life, people’s experiences of their bodies and bodily conditions can be at odds with these objective measures. For example, the same disease can be experienced as an illness in different ways or not experienced as an illness at all. A cancer can create debilitating discomfort and pain or not even be noticed until it is too late. One may be extremely ill with something like irritable bowel syndrome or chronic fatigue, but without any evident organic cause that would explain it in disease terms. Because these experiences of illness are typically unquantifiable, they require systematic interpretation to get a handle on.

As Aho and Aho (2008) elaborate:

If *Körper* is the abstract body-in-general, one object among others that is simply “there,” *Leib* is my body in particular, my life here and now, what I am as a volitional, sensing person.... however helpful the objective metrics of *Körper* may be—that is, in assessing caloric intake, blood pressure, lipid profiles, prostate specific antigens, and the like—they are inadequate when it comes to capturing the everyday experiences of appetite, stress, chest pain, or frequent nightly urination. The scientific measurement of the body, in other words, overlooks the actual lived experience of embodiment.

One key distinction that follows from this is the difference between being healthy or healed and being medically normal or cured. While these conditions often correspond, health refers to a much broader experience of wholeness, completeness, and balance, (implied in its linguistic association with the word “holiness”), than medical normality, which is more narrowly defined as the absence of disease. The World Health Organization’s (2014) definition of **health**, cited earlier in the chapter, is: “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” Recognizing this distinction enables sociology to expand the understanding of human health and illness beyond the framework of biomedicine to capture the patterns and nuances of people’s bodily experience.

Making Connections: Big Picture

Medicalization of Alcoholism and Demedicalization of Drapetomania



Figure 19.15 In this engraving from the 19th century, “King Alcohol” is shown with a skeleton on a barrel of alcohol. The words “poverty,” “misery,” “crime,” and “death” hang in the air behind him. (Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress/Wikimedia Commons.)

Another example of the medicalization of deviance is illustrated by the history of how Canadian society views alcohol and alcoholism. In general, medicalization is a social process that defines what behaviours and conditions are considered problematic in the first place, who is defined as a “patient,” who responds to the patient, how medical authorities and the general population respond to the patient, and how people view the personal responsibility of the patient (Conrad and Schneider, 1992). These processes of “problematization” apply to the evolution of how alcoholism has been defined historically in Canada.

During the 19th century, people who drank too much were considered bad, lazy people. They were called drunks, and it was common for them to be arrested or run out of a town. Drunks were not treated in a sympathetic way because, at that time, alcoholism was thought of as a moral failing; it was their own fault that they could not stop drinking.

By the late 19th century however, excessive drinking became regarded as a “disease of the will” — a defect in the will that undermined the ability to moderate or stop drinking (Valverde, 1997). This was

a paradoxical illness that required the patient to use will power to actively engage in their own treatment, even though the nature of the disease was defined by a pathology of the will.

In the 20th century, people who drank too much were increasingly defined as alcoholics: people with a psychological dependence, physiological disease, or a genetic predisposition to addiction who were not responsible for their drinking. With alcohol use disorder defined as a psycho-physiological illness instead of a personal choice or matter of will power, dependence on alcohol came to be viewed with more compassion and understanding, although the paradox the “disease of the will” for recovery therapies for alcohol use disorder remained. Thus “badness” was transformed into “sickness” and a series of interventions, from group counseling (such as Alcoholics Anonymous) to medically supervised detox and withdrawal programs to pharmaceutical treatments, was devised to address it as an illness.

There are numerous examples of *demedicalization* in history as well. During the Civil War era in the

United States, slaves who frequently ran away from their owners were diagnosed with a mental disorder called *drapetomania*. This has since been reinterpreted as a completely appropriate response to being enslaved. A more recent example is homosexuality, or same-gender attraction, which was labelled a mental disorder or a sexual orientation disturbance by the American Psychiatric Association until 1973. Similarly, in the 19th century, wealthy women were subject to frequent fainting spells, emotional shock, and attacks of *hysteria*, which disappeared once corsets and norms of female “delicacy” went out of fashion.

While interpretive sociology emphasizes the constructed nature of medical diagnosis, it is important to remember who most benefits when a behaviour becomes defined as illness. Pharmaceutical companies make billions treating illnesses such as fatigue, insomnia, and hyperactivity that may not actually be illnesses in need of treatment, but opportunities for companies to make more money. Moreover, the gradual medicalization and psychiatrization of the criminal justice system in the 19th and 20th centuries, as Michel Foucault (1979) has described, is an example of the establishment of a new center of authority and expertise. These extend the power of authorities and institutions to intervene into even more aspects of social life.

Media Attributions

- **Figure 19.14** [North Korea – Maternity hospital](#) by Roman Harak, via Flickr, is used under a [CC BY-SA 2.0](#) licence.
- **Figure 19.15** [King Alcohol and his Prime Minister](#), uploaded by , via Wikimedia Commons, is in the [public domain](#). (Original uploader was JoeSmack).

Chapter 19 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

ableism: Discrimination against persons with disabilities or the unintended neglect of their needs.

anti-psychiatry movement: A social movement skeptical of the scientific basis and effectiveness of psychiatric treatment, which considers psychiatry to be based on a power relationship between doctor and patient and the institutional authority of the diagnostic process.

anxiety disorders: Feelings of worry and fearfulness that last for months at a time.

biomedicine: A system of medical practice that defines health and illness in terms of the mechanics of the physical, biological systems of the human body.

biopolitics: The relationships of power that emerge when the task of fostering and administering the life of the population becomes central to government.

care for the self: Ways of acting upon the self to transform the self to attain a certain mode of being (e.g., “health”).

chronic diseases: Non-communicable diseases like cancer, heart disease, diabetes, hypertension, and obesity, characterized by the slow onset of symptoms.

commodification of health: The transformation of health and health services into products that can be bought and sold in the marketplace.

contested illnesses: Illnesses that are questioned or considered questionable by some medical professionals.

demedicalization: The social process that normalizes “sick” behavior.

disease: An organic based pathology which can in principle be measured through clinical or laboratory procedures.

disease vector: Any living agent that carries and transmits an infectious pathogen to another living organism.

disability: An impairment in cognitive, developmental, physical, sensory, and mental abilities, compounded by social barriers that hinder full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.

disciplinary power: Detailed continuous training, control, observation, correction, and rehabilitation of individuals to improve their capabilities (or health).

epidemiologic transition: The long-term change in a population’s dominant health problems or profile from acute infectious diseases to chronic, degenerative diseases as societies go through the process of industrialization.

exclusion of the sick: A model of power that separates deviants from “normals,” or the sick from the healthy, and abandons them outside the care of society.

gerontocracy: Rule by old people.

health: A state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.

illness: The subjective experience of 'not feeling well.'

impairment: The physical limitations a less-able person faces.

infectious diseases: Communicable diseases caused by micro-organisms such as bacteria or viruses.

Körper: The physiological body, or what people are as physiological, neurological, and skeletal beings.

Leib: The lived body, or the way in which the body experiences the world and is itself experienced from within.

medical legitimization: When a physician certifies that an illness is genuine.

medical pluralism: A situation in which no one model of health practice can successfully claim to provide the definitive truth for how to attain health.

Medical Sociology: The systematic study of how humans manage issues of health and illness, disease and disorders, and health care for both the sick and the healthy.

medicalization: The process by which aspects of life that were considered bad or deviant are redefined as sickness and needing medical attention to remedy.

medicalization of deviance: The process that changes "bad" behaviour into "sick" behavior.

mental disorder: A condition that makes it more difficult to cope with everyday life.

mental illness: A severe, lasting mental disorder that requires long-term treatment.

mood disorders: Long-term, debilitating illnesses like depression and bipolar disorder.

neurodiversity: Neurocognitive variation among the human species

norm: A socially defined standard measure which allows us to distinguish between what conforms to a rule and what does not.

normalizing society: A society organized around the definition of norms used to discipline bodies and regulate populations.

personality disorders: Disorders that cause people to behave in ways that are seen as abnormal to society but seem normal to them.

phenomenology: The study of social structures and processes based on a systematic description of the contents of subjective experience.

pluralistic medical culture: See medical pluralism.

practice of the self: See care for the self.

public health care: Health insurance that is funded or provided by the government.

sick role: The pattern of expectations that define appropriate behaviour for the sick and for those who take care of them.

rehabilitation: Interventions to treat or cure disabilities in order to reintegrate disabled persons into "normal" society.

residual deviance: A violation of social norms not covered by any specific behavioural expectation.

risk management: Strategies to restructure the environment or context of problematic behaviour in order to minimize the risks to the general population.

social determinants of health model: A framework that describes the social variables that influence health outcomes for individuals and populations.

social epidemiology: The study of the causes and distribution of diseases.

stereotype interchangeability: When stereotypes don't change, they get recycled for application to a new subordinate group.

stigma: A “mark” of difference that defines a socially undesirable characteristic.

stigmatization: When someone's identity is spoiled; they are labelled as different, discriminated against, and sometimes even shunned due to an illness or disability.

stigmatization of illness: When people are discriminated against because of illnesses and sufferers are looked down upon or even shunned by society.

universal health care: A system that guarantees health care coverage for everyone.

vaccine hesitancy: A delay in acceptance or refusal of vaccines despite availability of vaccination services.

Section Summary

19.1 The Sociology of the Body and Health

Medical sociology is the systematic study of how humans manage issues of health and illness, disease and disorders, and health care for both the sick and the healthy. The social construction of health explains how society shapes, and is shaped by, medical ideas.

19.2 Global Health

Social epidemiology is the study of the causes and distribution of diseases. From a global perspective, the health issues of high-income nations tend toward diseases like cancer as well as those that are linked to obesity, like heart disease, diabetes, and musculoskeletal disorders. Low-income nations are more likely to contend with infectious disease, high infant mortality rates, scarce medical personnel, and inadequate water and sanitation systems.

19.3 Health in Canada

Despite the Canadian population having generally good health compared with less-developed countries, Canada is still facing challenging issues such as a prevalence of obesity and diabetes. Moreover, Canadians of historically disadvantaged Indigenous groups, socioeconomic status, and gender, experience higher levels of chronic health issues. Mental health and disability are health issues that are significantly impacted by medical definitions of normalcy.

19.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Health and Medicine

While the functionalist perspective looks at how health and illness define specific roles in society, the critical perspective is concerned with how health and illness fit into the structures of power in society. The interactionist perspective is concerned with how social interactions construct ideas of health and illness.

Questions

Quiz: The Sociology of the Body: Health and Medicine

19.1 The Social Construction of Health

1. Who determines which illnesses are stigmatized?
 - a. Therapists
 - b. The patients themselves
 - c. Society
 - d. All of the above
2. Chronic fatigue syndrome is an example of _____.
 - a. A stigmatized disease.
 - b. A contested illness.
 - c. A disability.
 - d. Demedicalization.
3. The Rating of Perceived Exertion (RPE) is an example of _____.
 - a. The social construction of health.
 - b. Medicalization.
 - c. Disability accommodations.
 - d. A contested illness.

19.2 Global Health

4. What is social epidemiology?
 - a. The study of why some diseases are stigmatized and others are not.
 - b. The study of why diseases spread.
 - c. The study of the mental health of a society.
 - d. The study of the causes and distribution of diseases.
5. Core nations are also known as _____.
 - a. High-income nations.
 - b. Newly industrialized nations.
 - c. Low-income nations.
 - d. Developing nations.
6. Many deaths in high-income nations are linked to _____.
 - a. Lung cancer.
 - b. Obesity.

- c. Mental illness.
 - d. Lack of clean water.
7. According to the World Health Organization, what was the most frequent cause of death for children under five years in low-income countries?
- a. Starvation
 - b. Thirst
 - c. Pneumonia and diarrheal diseases
 - d. All of the above

19.3 Health in Canada

8. Which of the following statements is not true?
- a. The life expectancy of Indigenous males in Canada is approximately eight years shorter than for non-Indigenous males.
 - b. The rate of tuberculosis for Indigenous Canadians is more than five times higher (per 100,000) than it is for non-Indigenous Canadians.
 - c. Indigenous people have lower rates of chronic disease than non-Indigenous people have.
 - d. Recent visible minority immigrants have lower levels of health than native-born Canadians have.
9. The process by which aspects of life that were considered bad or deviant are redefined as sickness and needing medical attention to remedy is called _____.
- a. Deviance.
 - b. Medicalization.
 - c. Demedicalization.
 - d. Intersection theory.
10. What are the most commonly diagnosed mental disorders in Canada?
- a. ADHD
 - b. Anxiety disorders
 - c. Autism spectrum disorders
 - d. Mood disorders
11. Sidewalk ramps and Braille signs are examples of _____.
- a. Disabilities.
 - b. Accommodations required by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
 - c. Forms of accessibility for people with disabilities.
 - d. Both b and c.
12. The high unemployment rate among people with disabilities may be a result of _____.
- a. Medicalization.
 - b. Obesity.
 - c. Stigmatization.
 - d. All of the above.

19.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Health and Medicine

13. Which of the following is not part of the rights and responsibilities of a sick person under the functionalist perspective?
 - a. The sick person is not responsible for their condition.
 - b. The sick person must try to get better.
 - c. The sick person can take as long as they want to get better.
 - d. The sick person is exempt from the normal duties of society.
14. The class, race, and gender inequalities in our healthcare system support the _____ perspective.
 - a. Critical
 - b. Interactionist
 - c. Functionalist
 - d. All of the above
15. The removal of homosexuality from the DSM is an example of _____.
 - a. Medicalization.
 - b. Deviance.
 - c. Interactionist theory.
 - d. Demedicalization.

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

19.1 The Social Construction of Health

1. Pick a common illness and describe which parts of it are medically constructed, and which parts are socially constructed.
2. What diseases are the most stigmatized? Which are the least? Is this different in different cultures or social classes?

19.2 Global Health

3. If social epidemiologists studied Canada in the colonial period, what differences would they find between now and then?
4. What do you think are some of the contributing factors to obesity-related diseases in Canada?

19.3 Health in Canada

5. What factors contribute to the disparities in health among ethnic, socioeconomic, and gender groups in Canada?

6. Do you know anyone with a mental disorder? How does it affect their life?

19.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Health and Medicine

7. Which theoretical perspective do you think best explains the sociology of health? Why?
8. What examples of medicalization and demedicalization can you think of?

Further Research

19.1 The Sociology of the Body and Health

Spend some time on the two websites below. How do they present differing views of the vaccination controversy?

- [Vaccination: Defending Your Right to Know and Freedom to Choose](#)
- [Shot by Shot: Story Gallery](#)

19.2 Global Health

Study this [2000–2015 W.H.O. map on global life expectancies](#). What trends do you notice?

19.3 Health in Canada

Is ADHD a valid diagnosis and disease? Some think it is not. This 2014 infosheet from the B.C. HeretoHelp website, and the Canadian Mental Health Association (CMHA) discusses [ADHD in children and youth \[PDF\]](#)

19.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Health and Medicine

Read and watch a dissenting view: [Should alcoholism and other addictions be medicalized?](#)

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Solutions to Section Quiz

1 C, | 2 B, | 3 A, | 4 D, | 5 A, | 6 B, | 7 C, | 8 C, | 9 B, | 10 D, | 11 D, | 12 C, | 13 C, | 14 A, | 15 D [\[Return to Quiz\]](#)

CHAPTER 20. POPULATION, URBANIZATION, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Learning Objectives

20.1 Demography and Population

- Understand demographic measurements, such as fertility, mortality, migration and growth rates.
- Use population pyramids to visualize and compare population tendencies of different countries.
- Compare demographic theories of population growth, including Malthusian, cornucopian, zero population growth, and demographic transition theories.
- Describe current population trends and patterns.

20.2 Urbanization

- Describe the history and process of urbanization in Canada.
- Distinguish between different types of cities, including industrial, corporate, postmodern, megalopolis, slum and global cities.
- Understand the formation of suburbs, exurbs, gentrification, transition zones and concentric zones within cities.
- Analyze urbanization from various sociological perspectives, including social ecology, critical sociology, and interpretive sociology.

20.3 The Environment and Society

- Outline the different sociological dimensions of the human relationship to the environment.
- Apply the concepts of carrying capacity and the tragedy of the commons to the analysis of the human/environment relationship.
- Analyze climate change from a sociological perspective, including the causes and impacts of climate change, the solutions to climate change, and the socio-political dynamics surrounding climate change.

Introduction to Population, Urbanization, and the Environment

The Anthropocene

The **Anthropocene** is the current geologic age the planet is living through. It follows upon the Holocene that began with the end of the last ice age 11,700 years ago. It is called “Anthropo” because it has been produced by the impact of human activity on the biosphere (Crutzen, 2002).

Whereas the 4.5 billion year history of the earth passed through numerous geologic ages and has seen the arrival and extinction of different classes of species, like the dinosaurs and giant megafauna, the Anthropocene is the first caused by the technological activities of a living species. Crutzen (2002) observed that the “Anthropocene could be said to have started in the latter part of the eighteenth century, when analyses of air trapped in polar ice showed the beginning of growing global concentrations of carbon dioxide and methane.” Due to human emissions of greenhouse gases, global climate may deviate significantly from its natural patterns for thousands of years to come.

The Anthropocene raises fundamental sociological questions about the relationship between societies and the natural environment (Moore, 2016). What is the role of humans in the interconnected ecosystem of life? How have human institutions and activities, such as states, empires, global markets, urbanization, and more, impacted the entire planet? How can the goals of environmental sustainability and planetary survival be reconciled with resource exploitation and capitalist accumulation?



Figure 20.2 Fort McMurray, Alberta, is the hub that services the Athabasca tar sands. Its population grew by 23% between 2001 and 2006, and 29% between 2006 and 2011, but only by 9% between 2011 and 2016 and 1.3% between 2016 and 2021 (Statistics Canada, 2023). This volatility in the community reflects the effect of the boom and bust cycle of oil as a global commodity. As oil is an export commodity whose price depends on global market values, it is a fundamentally unstable source of capital accumulation. (Photo courtesy of Kris Krüg/Flickr.) [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#)

Extractivism and Environmental Sustainability

The development of the tar sands in Northern Alberta is a good example of these problems. The Alberta tar sands (or bituminous sands) in the northeast of the province have been recognized as an important petroleum resource since the 19th century, when the first extensive surveys were made. They cover about 140,000 square kilometres of boreal forest and muskeg, largely in the Athabasca River basin. The petroleum is in the form of crude bitumen, which is a dense, tar-like substance mixed with sand and clay (hence the name “tar sands”). Extracting bitumen and heavy oils from the tar sands requires pit mining or surface mining; processing the ore with water, steam, and caustic soda; and storing the toxic by-products in tailing ponds.

In 1967, when Suncor began the first intensive commercial development of the tar sands, oil was just over \$3 a barrel, and the high cost of extracting oil from bitumen limited the rate at which the resource was developed. In 1967, Suncor produced 15,000 barrels per day. Jumping forward to the 21st century, from 2008 to 2011, at prices that sometimes exceeded \$100 a barrel, production was projected to double, from 1.9 million barrels per day in 2010 to 3.8 million barrels per day by 2023. Industry projected that eventually 9 million barrels of bitumen would be produced per day (Gosselin et al. 2010; Grant, Angen, and Dyer 2013). Even with the crash of the oil market in 2014, crude bitumen production continued to climb and totaled about 3.3 million barrels per day in 2021 (Government of Alberta, 2023). Canada is

producing more oil and gas than ever before, yet fossil fuels are a major contributor to global temperature increase from accumulated carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (Lee, 2021).

The controversy over developing the tar sands sets two competing logics against one another: environmental sustainability versus capital accumulation. **Environmental sustainability** is the degree to which a human activity can be sustained without damaging or undermining basic ecological support systems. Environmental critics of the tar sands development note that the bitumen extraction process requires vast amounts of energy, fresh water, and land, while producing significant environmental impacts in the form of greenhouse gases, reduction in air quality, destruction of peat bogs and wetlands, and accumulation of toxic waste in tailing ponds (Grant, Angen, and Dyer 2013). There are also health impacts: local Indigenous groups have experienced a 30% greater risk of cancer over the total expected cancer rates since 1998 (Droitsch and Simieritsch, 2010). These are factors in addition to the basic problem of sustainability — they involve human reliance on fossil fuels in the face of potentially catastrophic climate change.

On the other hand, Canada has a capitalist economy based on private investment and **capital accumulation** (although both the federal and provincial governments have invested in tar sands development at various times). Capital accumulation refers to the reinvestment of profit to increase private capital assets (i.e., rather than for any specific public good). A sizable portion of the Canadian economy depends on a capital accumulation strategy of **extractivism**: the accelerated extraction of oil from bitumen to satisfy a global demand for fossil fuels and to provide economic growth and tax revenue. Five corporations with tremendous power to influence public policy dominate the sector: Suncor Energy, Canadian Natural Resources Limited, Cenovus Energy, Imperial Oil, and Husky Energy (Hussey et al., 2021). In 2017, these five corporations had a revenue of over \$115.2 billion, a net income of more than \$13.7 billion, and assets valued in excess of \$278.8 billion. Extracting hydrocarbons from bitumen is an energy intensive process that increases greenhouse gas emissions (in addition to the atmospheric carbon from burning the fossil fuels themselves). But with large sections of the working class, financial institutions like banks and pension funds, and governments currently dependent on the carbon economy and its long-term return on investment, it is difficult to see a path to meeting Paris Accords and “net zero” commitments to significantly reduce carbon emissions.

Hussey et al. (2021) describe the dilemma of the two competing logics:

Over the past decade or so, concerns about “peak oil” — fears that the supply of oil is running out — have largely waned. As the climate crisis deepens, however, a world dependent on fossil fuels has been confronted with a new problem: oil that can be extracted from known reserves but cannot subsequently be burned.... If the Paris Agreement’s 2°C limit to global warming is to be met, some 60% to 80% of global fossil fuel reserves must remain underground, thereby becoming stranded assets.

A “stranded asset” is as untenable for capital accumulation as continued burning of fossil fuels is for environmental sustainability.

How does sociological research help us understand and respond to these issues?

As the competing frameworks for understanding the Alberta tar sands illustrate, there are important societal issues connected to humans’ relationship to the environment. These affect how and where people live, as well as the sustainability of how and where people live. Sociologists begin to examine these issues through **demography** (the study of population dynamics), **urban sociology** (the study of the growth of cities), and **environmental sociology** (the study of human interaction with natural ecosystems).

Today, humans are at a point of conflict with the carrying capacity of the planet. The world’s population has recently reached 8 billion (United Nations, 2022). Can the planet sustain such a population? Is this the right question to ask?

Just from the point of view of the waste generated by human consumption, the problems seem insurmountable. Humans in the global north generate more trash than ever, from Tim Hortons’ coffee cups to single-use plastics, to obsolete cell phones with toxic chemicals, to food waste that could be composted. Where is it all going? Until it

developed the Green Lane landfill site, the city of Toronto sent up to 140 garbage trucks a day across the border to Michigan State. When the Green Lane site is full in 2027, it is unclear where the trash will go (Hasham 2013).

Moreover, the location of the landfill is a prime example of **environmental racism**: the unequal access to a clean environment and basic environmental resources based on race. The landfill was purchased from private property that neighbored the Oneida Nation. In an agreement with the city of Toronto, the Oneida Nation receives a percentage of the revenue from the landfill, but residents still have to put up with smell and rats (Albert, 2018). Cities and city-living create new challenges for both society and the environment. Interactions between people and places are critically important to understanding social issues.

On the other hand, out of the 8 billion human inhabitants of the world, “two thirds of people were living in places where fertility rates had fallen below the so-called ‘replacement level’ of 2.1 births per woman” (United Nations Population Fund, 2023). This would suggest that the idea of a “population bomb” or crisis of exponential population growth is not the main problem. When it comes to the carrying capacity of the planet, it is the wealthy who produce the most emissions per capita and have the most impact on climate change. Out of the total population of 8 billion individuals, approximately 5.5 billion people earn less than \$10 per day, which limits their ability to consume and have a significant impact on emissions, if they have any impact at all. In fact, in places like Europe and North America where fertility is low, *underpopulation* is increasingly seen as the problem as populations age and labour forces diminish. This feeds into fears about immigration, the decline of traditional national identities, and the proliferation of conspiratorial thinking like the “great replacement” theory about the extinction of the “white race.”

Structural Functionalism

How do sociologists approach these issues? Structural functionalists note that one of the primary functions that any society needs to perform to ensure its survival is to adapt to the environment. In Talcott Parsons’ AGIL schema (see [Chapter 1. Introduction](#)), *adaptation* is the first of the primary “needs” that a society has to satisfy (1961). For Parsons, the economic system is the human structure that performs the function of adapting to the natural environment in order to provide for human needs. In a functionalist analysis, when the operation of one system — like the economic system — conflicts with the other systems (like the planetary ecological system on which human society depends), disequilibrium and dysfunction are felt throughout society.

In the 1982 film *Koyaanisqatsi*, this point was illustrated by showing contrasting images of living in balance with nature with images of living out of balance with nature. The title *Koyaanisqatsi* is a Hopi Indigenous word meaning “life out of balance.” In the scenes depicting the lifestyle of the fast-paced, urban, consumer society, people pass by in fast motion like sausages on an assembly line. Not only is the economy unhinged from nature in this film, but individual life is shown to have lost meaningful connection with the natural world it is embedded in. One type of question that can be asked from a functionalist perspective is therefore: How can society be organized in a functional manner that restores balance with nature?



Figure 20.3 A traditional Hopi Corn Dance. A society's rituals can integrate humans into nature or reinforce their alienation. (Figure courtesy of Tonita Peña/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

Critical Sociology

A critical sociologist will note that disequilibrium in a society's relationship with the environment does not “just happen.” From the critical sociology point of view, changes in the human/nature relationship have to be examined as outcomes of relations of power and patterns of capital investment and resource extraction. Colonialism and capitalism developed by promoting unrestricted exploitation of natural resources for short-term private profit. These were world changing, global processes based on the concept of “cheap nature” (Moore, 2016). They are systems in which non-economic values — such as community life, ecological systems, and long-term sustainability — have no role in economic calculations of returns on investment. Whereas the **commons** that sustain life are shared natural resources like air, water or land accessible to all members of a society, as commons they have no direct value in capital accumulation.

In addition, because of the history of global power relations, the issues affecting the environment are not distributed equally around the world. Drought and famine, population pressure on limited resources, slum cities, and lax controls on toxic waste are prominent environmental issues that are major issues in parts of the world. In other parts of the world, people consume resources, throw away surplus, and contribute to global warming at unsustainable rates. From this point of view, “overpopulation” is not the problem of too many people for the earth's carrying capacity — the distribution of resources is the problem. The United Nations Population Fund report (2023) notes anxiety about overpopulation (a) distracts attention from the serious, but solvable, problems of cutting emissions, redistributing wealth, and budgeting for infrastructure, health services and pension programs; and (b) tends to focus on fertility related solutions, which become a rationale for denying the rights and bodily autonomy of women and girls.

Interpretive Sociology

Interpretive sociologists note that the human/environment relationship is a product of the meanings humans attribute to it. On a global or macro scale, the perception of catastrophic climate change “defines the situation” confronting humanity and leads to various responses to it. These range from deep mistrust of the modern institutions, technology, and science that produced the problems, to the negotiation of international climate agreements to try to resolve them. As Ulrich Beck (1996) puts it, “How does modern society deal with self generated manufactured uncertainties?” Catastrophic climate change is a monumental uncertainty manufactured by human activities, a source of collective anxiety and uncertainty that humans themselves have created. Addressing it requires coming to consensus over the definition of the situation.

At a micro level, symbolic interactionists interested in the daily interaction of groups and individuals might research topics such as how attitudes toward the environment change through the impact of influencers, how individuals negotiate contradictory messages about industrial development and the environment, or how new practices in everyday life (such as recycling, green technologies, bicycling, the “100-mile” diet, and veganism) emerge from environmental concerns. One interesting question is how discredited theories that challenge global warming research continue to circulate and produce doubt about the effects of greenhouse gases. The divide between what is a publicly credible theory and what is not remains more of a symbolic interaction matter than pure science per se.

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20.1 Demography and Population



Figure 20.4 Earth's population, which recently grew to 8 billion in November 2022, could reach 9.7 billion by 2050 (UN, 2022). (Photo courtesy of Scott Cresswell/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Humanity recently hit a population milestone of 8 billion humans on Earth's surface (UN, 2022). The planet added 1 billion people since 2010 and 2 billion since 1998 — or 1 billion people every 12 years. In short, the planet is filling up. It is estimated to grow from 8 billion to 9.7 billion in 2050, and could peak at nearly 10.4 billion in the mid-2080s. How will that population be distributed? Where is population growth the highest? Where is it slowing down? Where will people live? What are the implications of population pressures for institutions, employment, risk management, environmental stresses, housing, and political conflict?


To explore these questions, sociologists turn to **demography**, or the study of populations. Demography is sociology at its most predictive; predicting future social outcomes based on current variables. Three of the most important variables affecting the issues above are rates of fertility, mortality, and migration.

The **fertility rate** of a society is a measure describing the number of children born per unit of time. Sociologists often measure fertility using the *total fertility rate*, which describes the average number of live births per woman through the duration of their reproductive period. For example, replacement-level fertility in G7 countries is approximately 2.1 births per woman, the level of child-bearing at which a new generation exactly replaces the previous one in terms of size. The total fertility rate is calculated based on the *crude birthrate* (the number of live births per 1,000 people per year).

Just as fertility measures child-bearing, the **mortality rate** is a measure of the number of people who die. The crude death rate is a number derived from the number of deaths per 1,000 people per year. When analyzed together, fertility and mortality rates help researchers understand the growth occurring in a population. If more people are born than die, the population is expanding. If more people die than are born, the population is contracting.

Another key element in studying populations is the movement of people into and out of an area. This movement is called **migration**. Migration may take the form of **immigration**, which describes movement into an area to assume permanent residence, or **emigration**, which refers to movement out of an area to another place of permanent residence. Migration might be voluntary (as when university students study abroad), involuntary (as when Somalians left the

drought and famine-stricken portion of their nation to stay in refugee camps), or forced (as when many First Nations were removed from the lands they had lived in for generations).



The image shows a chalkboard with a handwritten formula for population growth rate. At the top, it says '+ ↑ growth rate' in red. Below that, the formula is written in green:
$$= \frac{\text{current} - \text{initial}}{\text{initial}} \times 100$$

Figure 20.5 Population growth rate (Image courtesy of Sydney Brown/Khan Academy.) [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0](#)

The **growth rate** of a population, or how the population of a defined area grows or shrinks in a specific time period, is therefore a function of the number of births and deaths, as well as the number of people migrating to and from a country. It is calculated as the current population minus the initial population (at the beginning of the time period) divided by the initial population (then multiplied by 100). This gives the percentage increase relative to the initial population.

For example, Canada's growth rate in 2022 was 2.7%, the highest among the G7 countries (as has been the case for several years), and highest since 1957 when the growth rate was 3.3% (Statistics Canada, 2023a). The reason for population growth was much different than in 1957. In 1957, the record high growth rate was due to the increased number of births during

the post-war baby boom, as well as the immigration of Hungarian refugees following the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. In 2022, immigration was the sole cause of population growth, with 95.9% of the growth due to the arrival of approximately one million international immigrants. Canada is otherwise a low fertility country, with a record low of 1.40 children per woman in 2020 — far below replacement level (Statistics Canada, 2022). Canada's population hit 40 million people in 2023 (Statistics Canada, 2023b).

Population Growth

The UN Population Division (2023) estimates that more than half of the projected increase in global population up to 2050 will be concentrated in just eight countries: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines and the United Republic of Tanzania. On the other hand, Europe and Northern America are projected to reach their peak size and begin to decline before 2100.

Changing fertility, mortality, and migration rates make up the total **population composition**, a snapshot of the demographic profile of a population. This number can be measured for societies, nations, world regions, or other groups. The population composition includes the **sex ratio** (the number of men for every hundred women) as well as a **population pyramid** (a picture of population distribution by sex and age). See figures 20.5 and 20.6 for the pyramids of Canada and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.




Figure 20.6 This population pyramid shows the breakdown of the 2020 Canadian population according to age and sex. (Graph courtesy of PopulationPyramid.net.) [CC BY 3.0 IGO](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)




Figure 20.7 This population pyramid shows the breakdown of the 2020 population of the Democratic Republic of the Congo according to age and sex. (Graph courtesy of PopulationPyramid.net.) [CC BY 3.0 IGO](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)

The population pyramid provides an interesting graphic representation of the population tendencies of different countries by showing the distribution of population by age group and sex. When a population grows due to high fertility rates, it forms a steep pyramid, with the largest percentage of the population in the 0–4 age category, as is the case with the Democratic Republic of Congo (Figure 20.6). When fertility rates are low, or below replacement, it begins to take the form of a kite or oval, because there is a proportional decrease in younger age groups compared to older age groups, as is the case with the aging population of Canada. The pyramids are also useful for visualizing the future dynamics of a population. In Canada, the bulge of the baby boom generation (55 and older in 2020) is reaching retirement age, indicating issues concerning the costs of pension plans and health care, as well as issues of labour scarcity as the baby boomers leave the work force.

Table 20.1. Varying Fertility, Mortality, Migration by Country. [\[Skip Table\]](#)

Country	Populations (in millions)	Total fertility rate (children per woman)	Mortality Rate/1000	Net migration rate (migrants/1000)	Sex Ratio Male to Female	Population Growth rate
Congo (DRC)	111.8*	5.56	7.74	-0.63	1	3.13
India	1,399.2	2.07	9.65	0.12	1.06	0.7
Sweden	10.5	1.67	9.5	3.79	1.01	0.5
United States	339.7	1.84	8.42	3.01	0.97	0.68
Canada	38.5	1.57	8.17	5.37	0.98	0.73

*Note. Reason for discrepancy between the CIA data and UN data used in the population pyramid above (Figure 20.6) is unclear. (Chart data courtesy of CIA World Factbook 2023)

As Table 20.1 illustrates, countries vary greatly in fertility rates, mortality rates and net migration rates – the components that make up a *population composition* and *population growth rate*. Comparing these four countries reveals that in India, there are more men than there are women, whereas the reverse is true in Canada and the United States. The Congo has significantly higher fertility rates than any of the other four countries but has lower mortality rates. Why? Are these statistics surprising? How does the population makeup impact the political climate and economics of the different countries? What factors lead to a sex ratio in which men outnumber women? What factors lead to higher fertility rates?

Demographic Theories

Sociologists have long looked at population dynamics as central to being able to predict future outcomes and issues for societies. Four theories about population have informed sociological thought: Malthusian, zero population growth, cornucopian, and demographic transition theories.

Malthusian Theory

Thomas Malthus (1766–1834) was an English clergyman who made dire predictions about Earth's ability to sustain its growing population. According to **Malthusian theory**, three factors would prevent human population from exceeding the earth's **carrying capacity**, or how many people can live in a given area considering the limited amount of available resources. He identified these factors as war, famine, and disease (Malthus 1798). He termed these “positive checks” because they increased mortality rates, thus keeping the population in check, so to speak. He contrasts these with “preventive checks,” including birth control and celibacy, which also seek to control the population, but by reducing fertility rates.

In his *Essay on the Principle of Population*, (1798) Malthus argued that the production of food could only increase arithmetically (ie., 2, 4, 6, 8...) , while, unchecked, the population would increase at an exponential rate (ie., 2, 4, 16, 132...). Eventually, this meant that people would run out of food and begin to starve. They would go to war over the increasingly scarce resources, reduce the population to a manageable level, and the cycle would begin anew.

Of course, this has not exactly happened. The human population has continued to grow long past Malthus's predictions. So, what happened? Sociologists suggest three reasons for the continued expansion of the population of our planet. First, technological developments in food production have increased both the amount and quality of calories produced per person. Second, scientific advances have developed new medicines to curtail death from disease. Finally, the development and widespread use of contraception and other forms of family planning decreased the speed at which the population increased. But what about the future? The thesis that catastrophic overpopulation will exceed the carrying capacity of the planet is still based on the Malthusian theory. In this model, ample resources to support the Earth's population will soon run out, leading to a dismal apocalyptic future of war, famine, and disease.



Figure 20.8 Thomas Malthus (1766–1834) by John Linnell (1834) (Image courtesy of Wellcome Collection Library/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 4.0](#)

Zero Population Growth

A Neo-Malthusian researcher named Paul Ehrlich brought Malthus's predictions into the 20th century. However, according to Ehrlich, it is the environment, not specifically the food supply, that will play a crucial role in the continued health of planet's population (Ehrlich 1968). His ideas suggest that the human population is moving rapidly toward complete environmental collapse, as privileged people use up or pollute a number of environmental resources, such as water and air. He advocated for a goal of **zero population growth** (ZPG), in which the number of people entering a population through birth or immigration is equal to the number of people leaving it via death or emigration. While support for this concept is mixed, it is still considered a possible solution to global overpopulation.

Cornucopian Theory

Of course, some theories are less focused on the pessimistic hypothesis that the world's population will meet a

detrimental challenge to sustaining itself. **Cornucopian theory** scoffs at the idea of humans wiping themselves out; it asserts that human ingenuity can resolve any environmental or social issues that develop. As an example, it points to the issue of food supply. If the population needs more food, the theory contends, agricultural scientists will figure out how to grow it, as they have already been doing for centuries. In this perspective, human ingenuity has been up to the task for thousands of years and there is no reason for that pattern not to continue (Simon 1981).

Demographic Transition Theory

Other sociologists argue there are clear patterns that can be seen in population growth that show that rapid or exponential population growth is a temporary phenomenon. Modernization theorists argue that societies develop along a predictable continuum as they evolve from unindustrialized to postindustrial societies. Following the modernization thesis, **demographic transition theory** suggests that future population growth will develop along a predictable five-stage model (Caldwell and Caldwell 2006) .

The five stages of the demographic transition

The demographic transition is a model that describes why rapid population growth is a temporary phenomenon.




Figure 20.9 The five stages of the demographic transition. In the top graph, high birth and death rates with a low population total represent Stage 1. High death rates cancel out high birth rates, and the population remains low and stable. As demographic transition occurs, death rates decline due to the introduction of modern medicine and public health measures, while birth rates remain high, leading to rapid population growth. As birth rates decline to match lower death rates, population growth stops or declines. This is represented in the population pyramid shapes, which go from steep pyramidal, based on a high ratio of children to adults, to oval, based on similar population levels at each age range until around 70. (Figure courtesy of Max Roser/Wikipedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

In Stage 1, birth, death, and infant mortality rates are all high, while life expectancy is short. An example of this stage is 19th century North America. As countries begin to industrialize, they enter Stage 2, where birth rates are higher, and infant mortality and death rates drop. Life expectancy also increases. The Congo is currently in this stage. Stage 3 occurs once a society is thoroughly industrialized; birth rates decline, while life expectancy continues to increase. Death rates continue to decrease. Mexico's population is at this stage. Stage 4 is the postindustrial era of a society. Birth and death rates are low, people are healthier and live longer, and society enters a phase of population stability or even decline. Sweden and Canada are considered Stage 4. Stage 5 projects future demographic transition as uncertain. Some predict continued declining populations, but others note a slight uptick in fertility rates in post-industrial societies, coupled with potential leaps in life expectancy due to advances in medical technology.

Current Global Population Trends

As mentioned earlier, the Earth's population is over 8 billion. That number might not seem particularly jarring on its own. But consider the fact that the human population grew very slowly for most of its existence, then doubled in only half a century to reach 6 billion in 1999. Now, just over twenty years later, it has added another two billion. The latest projections by the United Nations suggest that the global population could grow to around 8.5 billion in 2030, 9.7 billion in 2050 and 10.4 billion in 2100 (UN Population Division, 2023).

A look at the graph of projected population indicates that while the actual growth rate has been falling, the total global population will continue to grow. This is driven by the momentum of past increases that are embedded in the youthful (child-bearing) age structure of the fastest growing populations (UN Population Division, 2023).

Global population size and annual growth rate: estimates, 1950-2022, and medium scenario with 95 per cent prediction intervals, 2022-2050




Figure 20.10 Global population has steadily increased since 1950 and will continue to do so, even as the population growth rate has declined. “Given that most population increase until 2050 will be driven by the momentum of past growth, further actions by Governments aimed at reducing fertility would do little to slow the pace of growth between now and mid-century, beyond the gradual slowdown indicated by the projections presented here” (Graph courtesy of UN Population Division, 2023.) [CC BY 3.0 IGO](#)

The United Nations Population Fund (2008) categorizes nations as high fertility, intermediate fertility, or low fertility. It anticipates a triple population growth between 2011 and 2100 in high-fertility countries, which are currently concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure 20.11). For countries with intermediate fertility rates (the United States, India, and Mexico all fall into this category), growth is expected to be about 26%. Low-fertility countries like China, Australia, and most of those in Europe will actually see population declines of approximately 20%. Figures 20.11 and 20.12 illustrate this trend.




Figure 20.11 Projected Population in Africa. This graph shows the population growth of countries on the African continent, many of which have high fertility rates. (Graph courtesy of USAID, 2010.) [Public Domain](#)




Figure 20.12 Projected Population in Canada. Canada has a low fertility rate, and therefore, a comparatively moderate projected population growth. (Graph courtesy of USAID, 2010.) [Public Domain](#)




Figure 20.13 Projected Population in Europe. This chart shows the projected population growth of Europe for the remainder of this century. (Graph courtesy of USAID, 2010.) [Public Domain](#)

It would be impossible to discuss population growth and trends without addressing access to family planning resources and birth control. As the stages of population growth indicate, more industrialized countries see birth rates decline as families limit the number of children they have. Today, many people — over 200 million — still lack access to safe family planning, as reported by USAID (2010). According to its report, this need is growing, with demand projected to increase by 40% in the next 15 years. Many social scholars would assert that until women are able to have only the children they want and can care for, the poorest countries would always bear the worst burden of overpopulation.

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- **Figure 20.8** [Thomas Robert Malthus](#) by John Linnell, 1834, from the Wellcome Library, reference: Iconographic Collection 727250i, Photo number: L0069037, via Wikimedia Commons, is used under a [CC BY 4.0](#) licence.
- **Figure 20.9** [The five stages of the demographic transition](#) by Max Roser, via Wikimedia Commons, is used under a [CC BY-SA 4.0](#) licence.
- **Figure 20.10** [Figure I.1 Global population size and annual growth rate: estimates, 1950-2022, and medium scenario with 95 per cent prediction intervals, 2022-2050 \[PDF\]](#) by United Nations Population Division (2023, p.3) is used under a [CC BY 3.0 IGO](#) licence.
- **Figure 20.11** Graph by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID, 2010), is in the [public domain](#).
- **Figure 20.12** Graph by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID, 2010), is in the [public domain](#).
- **Figure 20.13** Graph by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID, 2010), is in the [public domain](#).

20.2 Urbanization



Figure 20.14 The towers of Vancouver against the backdrop of Howe Sound and the Coast Mountains are an iconic image of Canadian city life. Vancouver has the most densely populated downtown of all Canadian cities (18,837 inhabitants per square kilometre) (Statistics Canada, 2022). (Photo courtesy of Magnus Larsson/Flickr.) [CC BY SA 3.0](#)

Urbanization is the process of the formation of cities. Someone specializing in **urban sociology** would study the social, political, and economic relationships that form in and around cities. In some ways, cities can be microcosms of universal human behaviour, while in others they provide a unique environment that yields their own brand of human behaviour. Defining what a city is usually brings to mind a distinction between the rural and the urban and the various associations people attach to the forms of life and people there. However, especially in the 21st century, there is no strict dividing line between rural and urban; rather, there is a continuum where one bleeds into the other. Nevertheless, once a geographically concentrated population has reached approximately 100,000 people, it typically behaves like a city regardless of what its designation might be.

The Growth of Cities

According to sociologist Gideon Sjöberg (1965), there are three prerequisites for the development of a city: First, good environment with fresh water and a favourable climate; second, advanced technology, which will produce a food surplus

to support non-farmers; and third, strong social organization to ensure social stability and a stable economy. Most scholars agree that the first cities were developed somewhere in ancient Mesopotamia, though there are disagreements about exactly where. Most early cities were small by today's standards, and the largest city around 100 CE was most likely Rome, with about 650,000 inhabitants (Chandler and Fox 1974). The factors limiting the size of ancient cities included lack of adequate sewage control, limited food supply, and immigration restrictions. For example, serfs were tied to the land, and transportation was limited and inefficient. Today, the primary influence on cities' growth is economic forces.




Figure 20.15 As this chart illustrates, the shift from rural to urban living in Canada has been dramatic and continuous. (Graph courtesy of Employment and Social Development Canada, 2014.) [Government of Canada Terms](#)

Nearly three-quarters of Canadians (73.7%) lived in one of Canada's large urban centres with a population of 100,000 or more in 2021, up from 73.2% in 2016 (Statistics Canada, 2022). (Note that Figure 20.15 above refers to the percentage of Canadians living in "population centers" with a population of 1000 or more). These large centres or *census metropolitan areas* (CMAs) accounted for most of Canada's population growth between 2016 and 2021. One of the drivers of urbanization is immigration, as more than 90% of immigrants settled in CMAs. There were six more CMAs in 2021 compared with five years earlier including Fredericton, Drummondville, Red Deer, Kamloops, Chilliwack and Nanaimo, another sign of the increasing urbanization in Canada.

Urbanization in Canada

Urbanization in Canada proceeded rapidly during the Industrial Era of 1870 to 1920. This was the origin of the **industrial city** in Canada, a city in which the major business and employment activities revolve around manufacturing, building, machining. The percentage of Canadians living in cities went from 19% in 1871 to 49% in 1920 (Statistics Canada 2011). As more opportunities for work appeared in factories, workers left farms (and the rural communities that housed them)

to move to the cities. Urban development in Canada in this period focused on Montreal and Toronto, which were the two major hubs of transportation, commerce, and industrial production in the country. These cities began to take on a modern industrial urban form with tall office towers downtown and a vast spatial expansion of suburbs surrounding them.




Figure 20.16 Calgary in 1885. Montreal and Toronto were Canada's major urban centres for most of the 19th and early 20th centuries. (Photo courtesy of William Notman (Notman & Son)/Library and Archives Canada/C-017804/ Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

Following the Industrial Era, urbanization in Canada from the 1940s onward took the form of the **corporate city**. Stelter (1986) describes the corporate city as being more focused economically on corporate management and financial (and other related professional) services than industrial production. Five features define the form of corporate cities: dispersal of population in suburbs, high-rise apartment buildings, isolated industrial parks, downtown cores of office towers, and suburban shopping malls. This development was made possible by the reorientation of the city to automobile and truck use, deindustrialization and the rise of the service and knowledge economy, and a spatial decentralization of the population.

Finally, we might note the transformation of the corporate city into a **postmodern city** form. Unlike the industrial and corporate city forms that preceded it, the postmodern city is characterized by having no obvious

centre. Postmodern cities are decentred, defined by their orientation to circuits of global consumption, the fragmentation of previously homogeneous urban cultures, and the emergence of multiple centres or cores. John Hannigan (1998) describes three related developments that characterize the postmodern city: the edge city, dual city, and fantasy city. **Edge cities** are urban areas in suburbs or residential areas that have no central core or clear boundaries but form around clusters of shopping malls, entertainment complexes, and office towers at major transportation intersections. **Dual cities** are cities that are divided into wealthy, high-tech, information-based zones of urban development and poorer, run-down, marginalized zones of urban underdevelopment and informal economic activity. Mike Davis (1990) used the term “fortress city” to describe the way that cities abandon the commitment to creating viable public spaces and universal access to urban resources in favour of the privatization of public spaces, a “militarization” of private and public security services, and the creation of exclusive gated communities for the wealthy and middle classes. **Fantasy cities** are cities that choose to transform themselves into Disneyland-like “theme parks” or sites of mega-events (like the Olympics or FIFA World Cup competitions) to draw international tourists. Victoria, B.C., for example, has branded itself as a safe, historical – “more English than the English” – heritage destination for cruise ships and other types of tourism.

Suburbs and Exurbs

As cities grew more crowded, and often more impoverished and costly, more people began to migrate back out of them; but instead of returning to rural small towns (like they had resided in before moving to the city), these people needed close access to the cities for their jobs. In the 1920s, when the majority of Canadians began to live in urban centres, suburbs also developed. **Suburbs** are the communities that surround cities, typically close enough for a daily commute in, but far enough away to allow for more space than city living affords. The pace of suburbanization increased during the postwar period (1940s-1950s) due to over-crowded city centres, the return of WWII veterans, the beginning of the baby boom, lower house prices and property taxes and the desire for spaciousness. Suburban infrastructure including

schools and highways were constructed and cars became the means of connecting outlying areas with urban industrial nodes and city centres (Belshaw, 2015).

The bucolic suburban landscape of the mid-20th century has largely disappeared due to sprawl. Urban **sprawl** is characterized by the uncontrolled growth of urban areas with a low population density, high dependence on automobiles, and poor planning. This type of development extends over vast areas of land, resulting in a significant distance between residential areas, commercial establishments, and workplaces. Such development leads to a significant segregation between residential and commercial land uses and has a negative impact on the inhabitants of these areas as well as the ecosystems and wildlife that have been displaced. It contributes to traffic congestion, which in turn contributes to commuting time. Commuting times and distances have continued to increase as new suburbs developed farther and farther from city centres. Simultaneously, this dynamic contributed to an exponential increase in natural resource use, like petroleum, which sequentially increased pollution in the form of carbon emissions.

As the suburbs became more crowded and lost their charm, those who could afford it turned to the **exurbs**, communities that exist outside the ring of suburbs. Exurbs are typically populated by even wealthier families who want more space and have the resources to lengthen their commute. It is interesting to note that unlike U.S. cities, Canadian cities have always retained a fairly large elite residential presence in enclaves around the city centres, a pattern that has been augmented in recent decades by patterns of inner-city resettlement by elites (Caulfield 1994; Keil and Kipfer 2003).

As cities evolve from industrial to postindustrial, this practice of **gentrification** becomes more common. Gentrification refers to members of the middle and upper classes entering city areas that have been historically less affluent and renovating properties while the poor urban underclass are forced by resulting price pressures to leave those neighbourhoods. This practice is widespread, and the lower class is pushed into increasingly decaying portions of the city.

Currently Canada's large urban centres are seeing both of these phenomena concurrently (Statistics Canada, 2022). Downtown areas are growing in population and density faster than before due to urban policies promoting densification and the desire to be closer to employment, services and entertainment centres. On the other hand, urban sprawl continues and in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver is accelerating due to opportunities to work from home and lower housing prices. The population of neighborhoods located between downtown areas and the farthest suburbs is also increasing, but at a considerably slower pace.

Together, the city centres, suburbs, exurbs, and metropolitan areas all combine to form a **metropolis**. When a group of metropolitan areas merge into a continuous urban area they become a **megalopolis**, a huge urban corridor encompassing multiple cities and their surrounding suburbs. The term megalopolis is commonly used to describe the Northeastern United States urban corridor, which includes cities such as Boston, New York City, Philadelphia, and Washington D.C. In Canada, the Toronto-Hamilton-Oshawa, Vancouver-Abbotsford-Chilliwack, and Calgary-Edmonton corridors are similar megalopolis formations. These metropolises use vast quantities of natural resources and are a growing part of the North American landscape.



Figure 20.17 The suburban sprawl in Toronto means long commutes and traffic congestion. (Photo courtesy of Payton Chung/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

Suburbs Are Not All White Picket Fences: The Banlieues of Paris



Figure 20.18 Scorched car in a Paris banlieue, November 2005 (Image courtesy of Alain Bachellier/Flickr.) [CC BY-SA 2.0](#)

What makes a suburb a suburb? Simply, a suburb is a community surrounding a city. However, when one pictures a suburb, the image may vary widely depending on the society. In Canada, most consider the suburbs home to upper- and middle-class people with private homes. In other countries, like France, the suburbs—or “banlieues”—are synonymous with housing projects and impoverished communities. In fact, the banlieues of Paris are notorious for their ethnic poverty, violence and crime, with higher unemployment and more residents living in poverty than in the city centre. Further, the banlieues have a much higher immigrant population, which in Paris is mostly Arabic and African immigrants. “The people who live in these communities are two times more likely to be immigrants than the national average and three times more

likely to be unemployed” (Lefebvre, 2022). This contradicts the clichéd Canadian image of a typical white-picket-fence suburb.

In 2005, serious riots broke out in the banlieue of Clichy-sous-Bois after two boys were electrocuted while hiding from the police. They were hiding, it is believed, because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time, near the scene of a break-in, and they were afraid the police would not believe their innocence. Only a few days earlier, interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy (who later became president), gave a speech touting new measures against urban violence and referring to the people of the banlieue as “rabble” (BBC 2005). After the deaths and subsequent riots, Sarkozy reiterated his zero tolerance policy toward violence and sent in more police. Ultimately, the violence spread across more than 30 towns and cities in France. Thousands of cars were burned, many hundreds were arrested, and both police and protesters suffered serious injuries.

Then-President Jacques Chirac responded by pledging more money for housing programs, jobs programs, and education programs to help the banlieues solve the underlying problems that led to such disastrous unrest. None of the newly launched programs were effective. President Sarkozy ran on a platform of tough regulations toward young offenders, and in 2007 the country elected him. More riots ensued as a response to his election. In 2010, Sarkozy promised “war without mercy” against the crime in the banlieues (France24 2010). Ten years after the Clichy-sous-Bois riot, with Socialist president, François Hollande, replacing Sarkozy and promising an end to the ghettos, circumstances were no better for those in the banlieues. “Despite years of emergency assistance plans, the *banlieues* remain in crisis...the prime minister, Manuel Valls, made the most damning indictment yet of the country’s bitter social divide, saying there was ‘territorial, social and ethnic apartheid’ in France” (Chrisafis, 2015).

Lefebvre (2022) notes that although investment has been made in urban renewal and physical infrastructure, provision of basic social services, education, child care and health in the banlieues lags far behind the rest of the country.

Urbanization Around the World

As was the case in North America, other urban centres experienced a growth spurt during the Industrial Era. In 1800, the only city in the world with a population over 1 million was Beijing, but by 1900, there were 16 cities with a population over 1 million (United Nations 2008). The development of factories brought people from rural to urban areas, and new technology increased the efficiency of transportation, food production, and food preservation. For example, from the mid-1670s to the early 1900s, London increased its population from 550,000 to 7 million (Old Bailey Proceedings Online 2011). The growth in global urbanization in the 20th and 21st centuries is following the blueprint of North American cities but is occurring much more quickly and at larger scales, especially in peripheral and semi-peripheral countries. Shanghai almost tripled its population from 7.8 million to 20.2 million between 1990 and 2011, adding the equivalent of the population of New York City in 20 years. It is projected to reach 28.4 million by 2025, third in size behind Tokyo (38.7 million) and New Delhi (32.9 million) (United Nations 2012).

Global urbanization reached the 50% mark in 2008, meaning that more than half of the global population was living in cities compared to only 30% in 1958 (United Nations 2008). Global urbanization has been uneven between core countries and the rest of the world, however. Two developments might serve to illustrate some of the stark differences in the global experience of urbanization: the formation of slum cities and global cities.




Figure 20.19 The slum city and the global city: the Favéla Morro do Prazêres in Rio de Janeiro and the London financial district show two sides of global urbanization (Photos courtesy of [top] dany13/Flickr; and [bottom] Peter Pearson/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#); [CC BY SA 2.0](#)

Slum cities refer to the development on the outskirts of cities of unplanned shantytowns or squats with no access to clean water, sanitation, or other municipal services. These slums exist largely outside the rule of law and have become centres for child labour, prostitution, criminal activities, and struggles between gangs and paramilitary forces

for control. Mike Davis (2006) estimates that there are 200,000 slum cities worldwide including La Quarantaine (“Karantina”) in Beirut, the Favéla in Rio de Janeiro, the “City of the Dead” in Cairo, and Santa Cruz Meyehualco in Mexico City. He notes that while slum residents constitute only 6% of the urban population in developed countries, they constitute 78.2% of city dwellers in semi-peripheral countries. In Davis’s analysis, neoliberal restructuring and the Structural Adjustment Programs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are largely responsible for the creation of the informal economy and the withdrawal of the state from urban planning and the provision of services. As a result, slum cities have become the blueprint for urban development in the developing world.



Figure 20.20 Saskia Sassen (1947-). (Image courtesy of Ot/ Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 4.0](#)

On the other side of the phenomenon of global urbanization are global cities like London, New York, and Tokyo. Saskia Sassen (2001) describes the **global city** as a unique development based on the new role of cities in the circuits of global information and global capital circulation and accumulation. Global cities become centres for financial and corporate services, providing a technical and information infrastructure and a pool of specialized human resources (skills, professional and technical services, and consulting services, for example) to service the increasingly complex operations of global corporations. As such, they are progressively detached, economically and socially, from their local and national political-geographic contexts. They become instead nodes in a global network of informational, economic, and financial

transactions or flows. It becomes possible in this sense to say that New York is closer to Tokyo and London in terms of the number of direct transactions between them than it is to Philadelphia or Baltimore.

Sassen (2005) emphasizes three important tendencies that develop from the formation of global cities: a concentration of wealth in the corporate sectors of these cities, a growing disconnection between the cities and their immediate geographic regions, and the development of a large, marginalized population that is excluded from the job market for these high-end activities.

The global city and the network of these cities is a space that is both place-centered in that it is embedded in particular and strategic locations; and it is transterritorial because it connects sites that are not geographically proximate yet are intensely connected to each other. If we consider that global cities concentrate both the leading sectors of global capital and a growing share of disadvantaged populations (immigrants, many of the disadvantaged women, people of color generally, and, in the megacities of developing countries, masses of shanty dwellers) then we can see that cities have become a strategic terrain for a whole series of conflicts and contradictions (Sassen, 2005).

Theoretical Perspectives on Urbanization

As the examples above illustrate, the issues of urbanization play significant roles in the study of sociology. Social diversity, economics, and human behaviour intersect in cities. Sociologists can look at urbanization through the perspectives of positivist, critical and interpretive sociology. Positivist perspectives on urbanization originated with the functionalist ecological mode of the city, critical perspectives have focused on Marxist political economy, whereas interpretive perspectives are indebted to Georg Simmel’s observations on the distinctive mental life of the metropolis.

Positivism, Functionalism, and Social Ecology

Human ecology is a functionalist field of study that focuses on the relationship between people and their built and natural physical environments (Park 1915). According to this Chicago School approach, urban land use and urban population distribution occurs in a predictable pattern once it is understood how people relate to their living environment and ecological niches. For example, in Canada, there is a transportation system geared to accommodate individuals and families in the form of interprovincial highways built for cars. In contrast, most parts of Europe emphasize public transportation such as high-speed rail and commuter lines, as well as walking and bicycling. The challenge for a human ecologist working in Canadian urban planning would be to design landscapes and waterscapes with natural beauty, while also figuring out how to provide for free-flowing transport of innumerable vehicles — not to mention parking!

Early Chicago School sociologists used an ecological model to map the zones in Chicago where high levels of social problems were concentrated. The social life of the city was seen as a **social ecology** in which human communities, like biotic communities, were bound together by complex relations of competition for resources and mutual dependence; a “process of competitive cooperation” as Park called it (1936). Like biotic communities, they argued that human communities could be analysed from an eco-system perspective as they went through periods of disruption, succession, and finally climax or maturity. As in natural ecosystems, the climax eco-system was when biotic balance and social equilibrium were achieved and maintained.

There are forces at work within the limits of the urban community—within the limits of any natural area of human habitation, in fact—which tend to bring about an orderly and typical grouping of its population and institutions. The science which seeks to isolate these factors and to describe the typical constellations of persons and institutions which the co-operation of these forces produce, is what we call human, as distinguished from plant and animal ecology (Park, 1915).

Chicago, during the 1920s and 1930s, was going through a period of disruption. It was experiencing the effects of rapid economic growth, urban expansion, and mass immigration. The Chicago School sociologists were therefore particularly interested in the **zones of transition** that emerged between established working class neighbourhoods and the manufacturing district. The city’s poorest residents tended to live in these transitional, economically deprived zones, where there was an uncustomary mixture of racialized groups, immigrant ethnic groups, and non-English speakers, and a high rate of flux as people moved in and out. They proposed that these zones were particularly prone to social disorder because the residents had not yet assimilated to the American way of life. When they did assimilate, they moved out and other newcomers moved in, making it difficult for a stable social ecology to become established there.

The **concentric zone model** (Burgess 1925) is perhaps the most famous example of human ecology. This model views a city as a series of concentric circular areas, expanding outward from the centre of the city, with various “zones” invading (new categories of people and businesses overrun the edges of nearby zones) and succeeding adjacent zones (after invasion, the new inhabitants repurpose the areas they have invaded and push out the previous inhabitants). In this model, Zone A, in the heart of the city, is the centre of the business and cultural district. Zone B, the concentric circle surrounding the city centre, is the location of the factory district and transport corridors (ports and railyards). Zone C is the zone of transition composed of formerly wealthy homes split into cheap apartments for new immigrant populations; this zone also houses small manufacturers, pawnshops, and other marginal businesses. Zone D consists of the homes of the working class and established ethnic enclaves. Zone E consists of wealthy homes, white-collar workers, and shopping centres. Beyond Zone E are the estates of the upper class (exurbs) and the suburbs.




Figure 20.21 This illustration depicts the concentric zones that make up a city: (a) central business district, (b) factory zone, (c) zone of transition, (d) working class zone, (e) middle/upper class residential zone/commuter zone. (Photo courtesy of Zeimusu/Wikimedia Commons.) [Public Domain](#)

The analysis of social ecology emphasized urban development as a natural, “organic” process based on ecological principles of competition, adaptation and natural selection. Burgess (1925) described the tendency of cities to grow in concentric circles from the central business district outward as a quasi-natural process, just as Park (1915) regarded the segregation of people into different neighbourhoods based on class, ethnicity and race as similar to natural species occupying unique niches within an ecosystem.

Critical Sociology

In contrast to the functionalist approach, the critical perspective focuses on the dynamics of power and influence in the shaping of the city. One way to do this is to examine how urban areas change according to specific decisions made by political and economic leaders. Cities are not so much the product of a quasi-natural “ecological” unfolding of social differentiation and succession, but of a dynamic of capital investment and disinvestment. City space is acted on primarily as a commodity that is bought and sold for profit. The dynamics of city development are better understood therefore as products of what Logan and Molotch (1987) call the **growth machine** — coalitions of politicians, real estate investors, corporations, property owners, urban planners, architects, sports teams, and cultural institutions, for example — who work together to intensify land usage, attract private capital to the city and lobby government for subsidies and tax breaks for investors. These coalitions generally benefit business interests and the middle and upper classes while marginalizing the interests of working and lower classes.

For example, sociologists Feagin and Parker (1990) suggested three aspects to understanding how political and economic leaders control urban growth. First, economic and political leaders work alongside each other to effect change in urban growth and decline, determining where money flows and how land use is regulated. Second, exchange value and use value are balanced to favour the middle and upper classes so that, for example, public land in poor neighbourhoods may be rezoned for use as industrial land. Finally, urban development is dependent on both structure (institutions such as local government, real estate markets) and agency (individuals and groups, including businesspeople and activists), and these groups engage in a push-pull dynamic that determines where and how land is actually used. For example, **NIMBY** (not in my backyard) movements are more likely to emerge in middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods, so these groups have more control over the usage of local land.

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

What Happened to Affordable Housing?




Figure 20.22 Maps from 2019 show the percentage of neighbourhoods in Greater Toronto and Vancouver in which a full-time minimum-wage worker can afford an average two-bedroom apartment. In fact, the absence of green or yellow (<\$15/hr and \$15–\$20/hr respectively) and the predominance of red shows that these neighbourhoods do not exist. In order to rent a two bedroom home almost anywhere in Vancouver or Toronto a wage earner had to earn more than \$25/hr, almost \$10/hr more than minimum wage in 2019. (Image courtesy of MacDonald, 2019.) [CC BY-NC-ND 3.0](#)

Having a permanent place to live is one of the basic requirements of people living in sedentary societies. Yet a major problem affecting city life in Canada since the 1990s has been the rapid increase in the price of housing and the unaffordability of home ownership and rentals. For renters it is generally recognized that the cost of accommodation should not exceed 30% of gross income (Lee, 2016), whereas for home ownership, a person who is employed full-time for an entire year should have the ability to put aside money for a down payment and pay off a mortgage within 25 years or less. These criteria seem unrealistic for many urban dwellers today.

From a political economy perspective, a key factor in the cost of housing in Canada has been the globalization of the real estate market and the treatment of housing primarily as investment property rather than as a place to live. The value of real estate has been progressively decoupled from local labour markets, making home ownership and even rental unattainable for people who live and work in cities. There is a growing disconnect between average incomes and housing prices. From 1984 to 2000, the cost of an average condominium (“condo”) or a single detached house compared to income remained relatively constant (Lee, 2016). Condos cost around 3.2 times the average income, while houses cost around 7.3 times the average income. By 2015, however, the ratio for condos doubled to more than six times income while the ratio for a detached house skyrocketed to more than 19 times income. In Vancouver, where the median after tax

household income was around \$79,500 in 2020 (Statistics Canada, 2022), the average single-family house sold for over two million dollars and ordinary condos went for eight hundred thousand dollars (Remax, 2020). High sale prices for homes have a subsequent effect in the rental market, keeping tenants in rental housing longer and reducing vacancy rates (Lee, 2016).

How can the value of housing decouple from the ability of residents to buy or rent it? One reason is the circulation of global wealth. Vancouver, for example, has become a global “gateway city” like London, New York, San Francisco, Hong Kong and Sydney, which attracts significant domestic and foreign investment in real estate speculation. In Vancouver’s case, investment has notably been from Mainland China, which has led to ethnic tensions and resurgence of anti-Asian sentiment (Lee, 2016). But the issue is not so much where the investment capital comes from, as the fact that properties are being bought to flip for a profit or to hold appreciating value as investments. As a result, Vancouver has become the least affordable market in North America (Ley, 2021). These flows of investment capital were facilitated by a powerful *growth coalition* and lax regulations, as the neoliberal provincial government benefited significantly from the inflow of funds and shared common interests with the vigorous trans-Pacific property industry. The consequence of having a housing market driven by investor-owners like pension funds, hedge funds or corporations instead of local housing needs is the perverse creation of “zombie neighborhoods” where properties remain vacant.

Unsurprisingly, property ownership in a period of rapidly increasing housing prices has also significantly increased wealth inequality (Hemingway, 2018). In 2016, the wealthiest 20% of households held 62% of the net worth of principal residences in BC, and the next 20% another 25%, meaning that the lowest 60% held only 13% share of principal residence net worth. The wealthiest 20% households also owned 80% of secondary residences or cabins, and the next wealthiest 20% owned another 15% of these. As property values for single family dwellings in Vancouver grew by \$47 billion in 2016 alone (about equal to the operating budget of the entire provincial government) and by \$1 trillion province-wide between 2007 and 2016, the richest households who own the large majority of real estate wealth are the ones who have gained by far the most from the increase in property values.

Other causes for the rise in real estate values in Vancouver, Toronto and elsewhere in Canada include growth in population largely due to international immigration, low interest rates until the early 2020s allowing higher household debt, inter-generational transfers from parents who already own homes to their children, urban space constraints on building supply and government austerity measures that have reduced public investment in affordable housing (Lee, 2016; Rozworski, 2019).

Often the price of housing is presented as a simple problem of supply and demand. Build more housing stock and the prices will go down. However, Lee (2016) argues that it is necessary to think less in terms of a *housing market* and more in terms of a *housing system* in which governments play a central role. To address the problems of the housing crisis, he makes five recommendations:

1. Build new affordable housing stock funded by the provincial and federal governments, with a focus on social and co-op housing.
2. Preserve and re-invest in existing affordable housing.
3. Create denser and inclusive housing in “complete communities”— low-carbon neighbourhoods where people live in closer proximity to where they work, shop, play and access public services.
4. Create tax and other penalties for absentee ownership and speculative investment.
5. Make property taxes fair: 1) make the property tax system fairer to renters; 2) reduce wealth inequality and improve the overall equity of the tax system; 3) curb speculation and external

investment that drives up prices; and 4) raise revenues to help finance the housing agenda proposals listed above (Lee, 2016).

Interpretive Sociology

At the micro-level of interaction, sociologists have been interested in how human interaction is affected by living in cities. The modern city is characterized by a unique way of life that is qualitatively distinct from the rural and village life that dominated human societies for millennia. From an interpretive point of view, this way of life or **urbanism** has to be understood on

its own terms and not seen simply as a product of capitalism, industrialism, or modernity (Magnusson, 2011). In what ways is the modern city not simply a place where people live but a new social form with its own idiosyncratic social problems, styles of life, and modern “mental life”?

In his famous essay “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” Georg Simmel (1971 [1903]) described how the built environment and the sheer size and anonymity of the modern city had created a unique social form, which he called the **metropolitan way of life**. This was a form of social life or inner life which he distinguished point by point from rural life. It was produced by the effect of the external or physical characteristics of the metropolis (population, size, density, anonymity, and diversity, for example) on the psyche or subjective experience of the urban dweller. As Simmel put it, “the deepest problems of modern life flow from the attempt of the individual to maintain the independence and individuality of his [sic] existence against the sovereign powers of society, against the weight of the historical heritage and the external culture and technique of life” (Simmel, 1971 [1903]). As a means of self-protection against the city’s overpowering sensory input, people cut themselves off from potentially enriching contact with others and became cold, callous, indifferent, impatient, and blasé.

Simmel’s Metropolitan Way of Life

External Qualities of the Metropolis

- A large aggregate of people “who must integrate their relations and activities into a highly complex organism”
- Busyness, bustle and noise: a “swift and uninterrupted change of outer and inner stimuli”
- Anonymity
- Money as a medium of interpersonal relations
- Specialization and division of labour

Subjective or “Mental” Qualities of the Urban Mode of Life

- Sensory overload or “intensification of nervous stimulation”
- Intellectualism as a kind of protective/distancing device
- Unmerciful matter-of-factness in personal dealings vs. personal/emotional tone of behaviour
- Cold rational reckoning/calculating in interpersonal relations
- Blasé attitude (i.e., “seen it all before”)
- Outer reserve with respect to others and tendency to antipathy, repulsion, hostility and impatience towards them
- The experience of loneliness in a crowd
- Unprecedented personal freedom
- Unique individuation, or “the working out of a way of life”
- Specialization
- Self-differentiation and expressions of personal uniqueness such as “extravagances of mannerism, caprice and preciousness”



Figure 20.23 Man in a zoot suit and eccentric hat. Simmel argues that the urban dweller experiences the need to differentiate himself to “attract the attention of the social circle” and combat anonymity (Simmel, 1971). (Image courtesy of Maria Mariscal/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

Although the metropolis, its architecture, and the variety of ways of life it contained were products of human creation and expression, as an entity it confronted the individual as an alien, concrete monstrosity that threatened to swallow city dwellers up in its “social-technological mechanism” (Simmel, 1971 [1903]). Individuals were “reduced to a negligible quality” and had difficulty “maintaining themselves under its impact.” But at the same time, the new anonymity and cosmopolitanism of the city offered the modern urban dweller an unprecedented amount of personal freedom and exposure to new ideas and ways of life. As opposed to the restrictions, pettiness and prejudices of the small community, the experience of cosmopolitan diversity enlarges “the individual’s horizon” so that the “inner life is extended in a wave-like motion over a broader national and international area” (Simmel, 1971 [1903]). In Simmel’s estimation the city was a social form (see [Chapter 7. Groups and Organizations](#)) that created freedom in a spiritualized and refined sense.

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20.3 The Environment and Society

The subfield of **environmental sociology** studies how humans interact with their environments. This field is closely related to **human ecology**, which focuses on the relationship between people and their built and natural environment. As extreme weather patterns and policy battles over climate change dominate the news, environmental sociology is garnering more attention as a source of solutions for how to address these issues.

Environmental sociologists emphasize two important dimensions of the relationship between society and the environment: (a) the impact of human activity and decision making and (b) the existence and consequences of environmental inequality and environmental racism.

The primary point of analysis has to do with the ways in which human activity transforms the natural environment and human interactions with other species. Two key concepts in environmental sociology are the concepts of **carrying capacity**, which refers to the maximum amount of life that can be sustained within an area given the limited amount of natural resources available, and **the commons**, which refers to the collective resources that humans share in common. These collective resources are typically shared natural resources like air, water, plant and animal life, or ecosystems that have remained outside of private ownership or processes of commodification and trade.

In an environmental context, the carrying capacity of different environments depends on the commons to the degree that the commons are necessary for sustaining life. When the commons are threatened through pollution or over-exploitation the carrying capacity of the environment is degraded. While both concepts can refer to a number of ecological variables from local grazing lands or to rivers, they can also be applied to the Earth as a whole. Climate change is a global issue in which the degradation of the global commons through ecologically unsustainable human activities threatens the earth's carrying capacity as a whole. Practical research in the area of environmental sociology focuses therefore on identifying the threats human societies pose to the carrying capacity of ecosystems they are embedded in as well as modifications to human practices to make them more environmentally sustainable.

Making Connections: The Big Picture

The Tragedy of the Commons



Figure 20.24 Desertification is the process in which fertile land is turned into desert through deforestation, drought, and overgrazing. (Photo courtesy of Colin Crowley/Flickr.) [CC BY 2.0](#)

The expression “the **tragedy of the commons**” was the title of an article written by Garrett Hardin in 1968, which described how a common pasture is ruined by overgrazing. In England, “the commons” referred to land that the community held in common. Hardin was not the first to notice the phenomenon. Back in the 1800s, Oxford economist William Forster Lloyd looked at the devastated public grazing commons and the unhealthy cattle subject to such limited grazing, and saw, in essence, that the carrying capacity of the commons had been exceeded. However, since no one held personal responsibility for the land (as it was open to all), no one was willing to make sacrifices to improve it.

This is a classical problem of the collective outcome of individual “rational” choices. If each user makes a

rational choice by weighing their *individual* costs and benefits with respect to the use of common resources, the *collective* outcome ultimately undermines each user's individual ability to benefit from the common resource. Their individual rational choices have an irrational collective outcome. Cattle grazers benefited from adding more cattle to their herd, but they did not have to take on the responsibility of the destroyed lands that were being damaged by overgrazing. There was an incentive for them to add more head of cattle, and no incentive for restraint.

Satellite photos of Africa taken in the 1970s showed this practice to dramatic effect. The images depicted a dark irregular area over 300 miles around. When seen from above, there was a large, fenced area, where plenty of grass was growing. Outside the fence, the ground was bare and devastated. The reason was simple: the fenced land was privately owned by informed farmers who carefully rotated their grazing animals and allowed the fields to lie fallow periodically. Outside the fence was land used by nomads. The nomads, like the herders in 1800s Oxford, increased their heads of cattle without planning for its impact on the greater good. The soil eroded, the plants died, then the cattle died, and, ultimately, some of the people died.

Hardin made an argument that the privatization of the commons would be the logical solution to overgrazing and similar issues of over-exploitation. Only an owner would be motivated to care properly for property and resources in which they were personally invested. Others argue that private ownership of property is the problem because resources are *only* seen as commodities to exploit for private profit. This is seen as an incentive for state regulation of the use of collective resources (Ostrom, 1990). In fact, closer examination of Hardin's example of the common pastures of England reveal that the communities were able to manage their commons for centuries until the Enclosure Acts between 1750 and 1850, which forced peasants off the land (Cox, 1985). The locals were not stupid and were able to regulate themselves to ensure the viability of their common resource and their own survival. The examples of overgrazing the commons were the result of large landowners deliberately over-utilizing the common resource so that they would fail and then could be privatized.

How does this affect those who do not need to graze their cattle? Well, like the cows, people all need food, water, and clean air to survive. With the increasing consumption of resources in the West, increasing world population, and the ever-larger megalopolises with tens of millions of people, the limit of Earth's carrying capacity or collective commons is called into question. Earth's carrying capacity is itself the global commons. As in the tragedy of the commons Hardin described for the pasturelands of England, each economic and state actor in the world has an interest in maximizing its own economic benefit from exploiting the environment with little compelling incentive to conserve it in the global interest. Whether for cattle or humans, when too many take with too little thought to the rest of the population, the result is usually tragedy.

Climate Change and Society

This section adapted from Islam and Kieu (2021). [CC BY-NC 4.0](#)




Figure 20.25 Map of the globe illustrating average temperature anomalies for January 1, 2023. The Northern Hemisphere was covered by exceptional warmth. (Image courtesy of ClimateReanalyzer.org.) [CC BY-NC 4.0](#)

Climate change refers to long-term shifts in temperatures due to human activity, particularly the release of greenhouse gases into the environment. It is a critical problem, spanning across societal boundaries and socioeconomic divisions. While the planet as a whole is on average warming—hence the term global warming—short-term variations of climate change can include both higher or lower temperatures and tendencies more extreme weather. There are increasingly more record-breaking weather phenomena, from “atmospheric rivers” of torrential rain causing flooding to “heat domes” causing periods of dangerously high temperatures and forest fires.

Due to the wide-ranging and deep-seated nature of its causes, researchers and policymakers face a massive task coordinating effective and developing policies to mitigate its impacts. While the scientific community has made good progress in developing an ecological imagination related to climate change, environmental sociology focuses on developing a sociological imagination to analyze these issues. “The application of a sociological imagination allows us to powerfully reframe four central questions in the current interdisciplinary conversation on climate change: why climate change is happening, how we are being impacted, why we have failed to successfully respond so far, and how we might be able to effectively do so” (Norgaard, 2018).

The comprehensive Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report released in 2023 made 10 key findings on the causes and impacts of climate change (IPCC, 2023; Boehm and Schumer, 2023).

1. **Human-induced global warming of 1.1 degrees C has spurred changes to the Earth's climate that are unprecedented in recent human history.** These changes include glacial retreats unmatched in over 2,000 years, sea level rising faster than any previous century in 3,000 years, last decade warmer than any period for 125,000 years. Additional warming will increase the magnitude of these concerns.
2. **Climate impacts on people and ecosystems are more widespread and severe than expected, and future risks will escalate rapidly with every fraction of a degree of warming.** About half the global population contend with severe water scarcity for at least a month per year and higher temperatures increase the spread of diseases such as malaria. Climate change has also slowed agricultural productivity improvements e.g., crop productivity growth in Africa has shrunk by a third since 1961. Since 2008 extreme floods and storms have forced over 20 million people from their homes every year. Even limiting global warming to 1.5°C does not guarantee safety, as at this level of warming, 950 million people will be subjected to water and heat stress.
3. **Adaptation measures can effectively build resilience, but more finance is needed to scale solutions.** At least 170 countries are considering adaptation measures, but often progress from planning to implementation is slow. Building resilience measures are often small-scale, reactive and focused on near-term risks. This is often due to limited financing, especially in developing countries.
4. **Some climate impacts are already so severe they cannot be adapted to, leading to losses and damages.** Globally, vulnerable people are struggling to adapt to climate impacts. In some cases, the limitations are 'soft' due to economic, political or social obstacles. In other cases, the adaptation limits are becoming 'hard' with climate change impacts becoming so frequent and severe that existing adaptation strategies cannot fully avoid losses and damages, e.g., rising sea temperatures affecting coral reef systems and associated livelihood and food security, and rising sea levels affecting habitation. Urgent action is needed to address the resulting losses and damages. COP27 saw some agreement to funding arrangements, but this needs to be actioned.
5. **Limiting global warming to 1.5°C this century requires deep global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions before 2025.** There is more than a 50% chance that 1.5°C global warming will be reached or passed by 2040. Without sufficient emissions reductions (43% by 2030, and 60% by 2035, relative to 2019 levels), global warming could reach 3.3°C to 5.7°C by 2100. Such global temperature levels last occurred over 3 million years ago. While there has been a reduction in the growth of emissions from the 2000s to the 2010s (2.1% growth falling to 1.3%), this is way below the reductions needed. Even if countries achieved their climate pledges the GHG emission reduction would be 7% by 2030, rather than the 43% needed.
6. **The world must rapidly shift away from burning fossil fuels – the number one cause of the climate crisis.** Strategies to avoid locking in these excess emissions include retiring existing fossil fuel infrastructure, cancelling new projects and retrofitting carbon capture and storage technologies to existing power plants., while at the same time scaling up renewable energy sources like wind and solar (now both generally cheaper than fossil fuels).
7. **The world needs urgent, system-wide transformations beyond fossil fuel reductions to secure a net-zero, climate-resilient future.** While fossil fuels are the number one source of GHG emissions, deep cuts are needed across society to limit emissions. Power generation, buildings, industry, and transport account for nearly 80% of emissions, with agriculture, forestry, and land usage accounting for the balance. For example, the transport system requires planning to minimise the need for travel, building shared and public transport, increasing the supply and affordability of electric private and commercial vehicles and buses. This needs to be supported by widespread rapid-charging

infrastructure and zero-carbon fuels for shipping and aviation. Policy measures can help drive necessary transitions such as subsidising zero-carbon technologies and taxing high-emission technologies, e.g., fossil fuel vehicles.

8. **Carbon removal is now essential to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C.** This could be by way of natural solutions such as sequestering and storing carbon in trees and soil, e.g., afforestation, as well as innovative technologies that pull CO₂ from the air. An example of a technological solution is carbon mineralisation which uses reactive minerals in rocks to chemically bind with and store CO₂ as a solid. All carbon removal has plusses and minuses. Reforestation, for example, is a relatively low-cost strategy offering benefits to communities, but may be subject to wildfires increasing the possibility of further warming. It can also displace croplands, increasing risks to food security.
9. **Climate finance for both mitigation and adaptation must increase dramatically this decade.** Public and private finance supporting fossil fuels far exceed funds directed towards climate mitigation and adaptation. While climate finance has increased 60% since 2014, it will need to increase between 3 and 6 times by 2030 to achieve mitigation alone. Funding needs to increase most for hard-pressed developing countries: sixfold for Southeast Asia and developing Pacific nations, fivefold for Africa and fourteenfold in the Middle East. This is needed by 2030 just to hold warming to 2°C. Finance for adaptation, and loss and damage, also needs to rise dramatically. Developing countries need US\$127bn per year by 2030 and US\$295bn per year by 2050. Current funding for adaptation falls well short of what is needed, being estimated as totalling less than US\$50bn per year.
10. **Climate change and collective efforts to adapt to and mitigate it will exacerbate inequality unless a just transition is ensured.** Households with income in the top 10%, largely in developed countries, emit around 45% of the world's GHGs, while families in the bottom 50% of income emit up to 15%. Yet the effects of climate change most impact the poorer and more marginalised communities. Climate change mitigations can exacerbate inequality, e.g. retiring coal-fired power stations can displace workers; halting deforestation can heighten poverty and intensify food insecurity.

Summary of the 10 points from the IPCC Synthesis report has been adapted from O'Donnell (2023). [CC BY-NC 4.0](#)

Sociology and Climate Change

Climate change is therefore a sociological concern. The primary driver behind global climate change is socio-structural in nature. Its issues are embedded within institutions, cultural beliefs, values, and social practices. Dunlap and Brulle (2015) note that sociology brings two distinct and advantageous approaches to climate change research by examining its social dimensions. First, they contend sociology is equipped with the tools to examine and provide insight into the causes, consequences, and solutions attached to climate change. Efforts to ameliorate or adapt to its impacts require a deeper understanding of the social dynamics at different levels of analysis, from the global to the micro. Second, critical sociology provides a form of social critique by examining and questioning the dominant ideologies that reinforce current socioeconomic institutions and practices affecting the global environment. Showing how such hegemonic notions sustain particular interests provides insight into how dominant players are able to restrict policy options. Climate change cannot simply be rectified by technical fixes but must be addressed in concert with other influences on human behavior such as social, political, and economic structures.

Environmental sociology can be applied in three areas to provide a framework for future research and policy: (a) examining the causes and impacts of climate change; (b) exploring equitable mitigation, adaptation and just transition strategies; (c) investigating the socio-political dynamics of environmental advocacy, social movement mobilization, public opinion and climate change denial.

Causes and Impacts of Climate Change

Climate change is affected by anthropogenic factors where increases in greenhouse gases (GHG) are largely produced by human activities. Pressures on the environment such as GHG emissions and various other environmental pressures can be simplistically traced back to two principal driving forces: population and consumption.

Two dominant types of sociological explanation of these processes include the **treadmill of production theory** (Schnaiberg, 1980; Buttel, 1994) and **ecological modernization theory** (Islam, 2013; Mol, 1995; Goldman, 2002). Proponents of the treadmill of production theory have argued that the capitalist system has prioritized economic growth over social inequality and environmental protection, whereas advocates of ecological modernization theory have asserted that as society modernizes, the ecological rationality underpinning the need to protect the environment from the strains of human development will present itself. The latter may seem to be supported by the reduction in environmental harm and GHG emissions in developed nations. However, deeper assessment has revealed that the more developed nations have been able to export the effects of their environmental problems to less developed nations, supporting the former.

Two Types of Sociological Explanation for Climate Change

Treadmill of Production Theory

- The carrying capacity of the planet is finite.
- Industrialism and development cause ecological and environmental damage.
- Rates of resource extraction is unsustainable.

Ecological Modernization Theory

- Modernization can evolve to find sustainable solutions.
- Possible to increase the productivity of resources.
- Societies will be able to develop while the environment remains viable for the future.

This highlights the global context of climate change responses: the enduring global division of labour in which the developed or “core” nations have historically engaged in unequal exchanges of labour and natural resources with the

poorer “peripheral” nations. Dealing with climate change is caught up in the underlying power dynamics and self-interest inherent in international relations. Less developed nations have feared international restraints on their efforts to grow economically to meet their own needs, while the more powerful developed nations, which are responsible for 60% of GHG emissions, have refused to curtail their own emissions. Accordingly, the less developed nations have become less willing to make sacrifices on behalf of the environment (Roberts and Parks, 2006).

An examination of the macroeconomic forces that have driven global climate change would not be complete without recognizing that at a micro-level individuals and household consumption have been major contributors to carbon and GHG emissions. It has been easy to overlook the impacts of micro consumption behavior as being a causal influence on environmental strain when blame could so readily be placed on large industries. However, sociologists have widely agreed on the large effect of growing affluence on carbon emissions through the consumption of food, water, goods, and services, through either the direct or indirect use of energy (Dietz et al., 2009; EPA, 2019; Gardner et al., 2008). Consumption patterns have had direct and indirect impacts on climate change and create a perception of *climate injustice*, especially when they have been driven by the desire for social status, conspicuous consumption, and leisure that secure one’s position in society (Bell, 2004; Veblen, 1994).

Making Connections: Sociology in the Real World

Monster Trucks and Petro-Masculinity



Figure 20.26 The phenomenon of “rolling coal” as a display of petro-masculinity. Rolling coal means retro-fitting a diesel truck so that its engine can be flooded with excess gas, producing thick plumes of black smoke (Dagget, 2018). (Image courtesy of Salvatore Arnone/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY 3.0](#)

Canada uses more energy per capita than almost any other country in the world (Natural Resources Canada, 2016). One of the factors contributing to this situation is the heavy dependence on gasoline-powered vehicles. The contribution of private vehicle ownership to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is a significant example of the role of micro-level, household consumption on climate change.

This is a self-perpetuating system referred to as **automobility**, a term that covers the full breadth of actors, materials, technologies, policies and practices that make up and reinforce private vehicle usage (Sovacool and Axsen, 2018).

Canadians possess approximately 19 million light-duty vehicles, (cars, vans, and light-duty trucks). They typically drive over 300 billion kilometers per year. Consequently, the transportation sector accounts for 27% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Canada. Within that sector, light-duty vehicles, including cars, vans, and light-duty trucks, contribute to almost half of the total emissions. With nearly one vehicle for every two Canadians, Canada claims one of the highest car ownership

rates globally.

One of the troubling trends in automobility is the growth in purchase of monster trucks. Ford’s launch of its four-door F-150 pickup truck in the late 1990s allowed families to replace sedans and minivans with vehicles that seemed to have more utility, but it started the trend towards larger, more aggressively styled trucks with 4 door cabs, massive front ends and smaller beds. The dominance of “light” trucks in Canada’s new vehicle sales has increased significantly, with these vehicles representing almost 75% of the total (Bubbers, 2019). Since 1990, the average weight of pickups has increased by 1,256 lbs or 32% (Davis and Boundy, 2020). In 2019, there were 25 models of vans, trucks and SUVs that weighed at least 5,500 pounds, approximately double the weight of a Honda Civic.

Despite the advancements in engine fuel efficiency, the overall emissions from light-duty trucks, including pickups, SUVs, and vans, have more than doubled in Canada since 1990. This increase is primarily due to the sheer increase in the number of light trucks on the roads.

There is a certain irrationality to buying monster trucks, especially given people’s awareness of climate change. The majority of truck owners live in cities where trucks are used for local commutes rather than hauling bales of hay, towing trailers or off-roading. Many consumers choose big trucks because they make them feel safer and less vulnerable on the road, which is ironic because pickups and SUVs account for about a quarter of all collisions with pedestrians and bikes, but nearly half of all the deaths (Edwards and Leonard, 2022).

But the size and styling of trucks is also part of North American *truck culture* in which trucks serve as important signifiers of race, class and gender identity. Dagget (2018) describes the formation of **petro-masculinity** as an exaggerated expression of masculinity tied to a backlash against climate change discourse. This manifests as a malicious pride in the burning of fossil fuels, the desire for ever larger and more “aggressive” trucks, climate denial, and even truck-centric “Freedom Convoy” style protests against measures to reduce emissions. In all of this, beleaguered masculine identity is the core component of reaction. It is a species of politicized *hypermasculinity* which “arises when agents of hegemonic masculinity feel threatened or undermined, thereby needing to inflate, exaggerate, or otherwise distort their traditional masculinity” (Agathangelou and Ling, 2004).

For much of the 20th and 21st centuries the privileges and affluence of the North American way of life was centred around intensive fossil fuel consumption and jobs (mostly white and male) reliant upon fossil fuel systems. While “the planet is telling us that there are limits to human freedom; there are freedoms and political choices we can no longer have” (Burke et al., 2016). Extracting and burning fuel has been a core component of white, male breadwinner/provider identity. As irrational as it may be, fossil fuels and monster trucks become potent symbols that represent autonomy, self-sufficiency, and a nostalgia for unconstrained male power. As Dagget (2018) says, “it is no coincidence that white, conservative American men — regardless of class — appear to be among the most vociferous climate deniers, as well as leading fossil fuel proponents in the West.”

The concept of petro-masculinity suggests that fossil fuel use is not driven simply by corporate interests and strategies of capital accumulation. The *ecological modernization theory* that renewable energy solutions will simply displace fossil fuels as cost, efficiency, and capacity improve neglects the way fossil fuel politics secure cultural meaning and political identities. Fossil fuel use is also driven by powerful forces of nostalgia, desire, anxiety, and beleaguered masculine identity, which poses problems for finding consensus on post-carbon energy solutions.

When petro-masculinity is at stake, climate denial is thus best understood through desire, rather than as a failure of scientific communication or reason. In other words, an attachment to the righteousness of fossil fuel lifestyles, and to all the hierarchies that depend upon fossil fuel, produces a desire to not just deny, but to refuse climate change. Refusing climate change is distinct from ignoring climate change, which is effectively what many people who otherwise acknowledge its reality do.... It demands struggle. In the case of climate change, by refusing it, one also subscribes to an accelerated investment in petrocultures (Dagget, 2018).

Recently, policies to lower carbon emissions have pushed automakers to redesign their vehicles from fuel to battery power. As a result, monster trucks have also begun to be redesigned as full EV (Electric Vehicle) models. People can have their monster trucks with half the lifetime emissions of comparable gas-powered model (Vermes, 2023). However, it is not clear effect petrol-masculinity will have on their acceptance in the market place.

Equitable Mitigation and Environmental Racism

A second emphasis of environmental sociology is **environmental inequality** and the related concept of **environmental racism**. Environmental inequality (also called *environmental injustice*) refers to the fact that low-income and marginalized people are disproportionately likely to experience various environmental problems, while environmental racism refers to the greater likelihood that racialized people experience these problems (Walker, 2012). With regard to climate change, the analysis of environmental inequity proceeds from three underlying assumptions. First, social inequalities have driven overconsumption. Second, the impacts of climate change have been experienced unequally by the rich and poor, which may extend to future generations. Third, policies that have been designed to deal with climate change have had unequal consequences for the unrepresented and the poor (Harlan et al., 2016).

Harlan et al. (2016) argue that to attain a level of understanding on climate disruption, researchers and policymakers must be sensitive to the inequalities of wealth, power, and privilege. The notion of inequality has to be extended to the rich-poor dichotomy not only within but also between nations. Within nations, toxic and polluting industries have been located in the poorer districts, because properties in such locations have been considered less valuable (Roberts and Toffolon-Weiss, 2001). Almost all hazardous waste sites are located in or near neighborhoods and communities that are largely populated by low-income and racialized people. Likewise, between core and peripheral societies, ecologically unequal exchanges occur due to resource plundering and pollution from the side effects of transnational industrial operations (e.g., tailings ponds, oil spills, mercury poisoning, etc.) (Jorgenson et al., 2011; Pellow, 2009).

Adaptation to climate change requires mitigating its effects, such as the intensity and frequency of extreme weather, the consequences of temperature variations, or the impacts on food security, livelihoods, and human health. Some communities are more vulnerable than others, and in particular there are people who are socially isolated due to their limited ability to cope with environmental stressors. However, the response to vulnerability “includes not only how climate change contributes to vulnerability, but also how climate change policy and response measures may magnify the effects of many existing drivers of vulnerability” (Mearns and Norton, 2009). In the short term, the largest impact on the disadvantaged and vulnerable has resulted less from climate change and more from the adverse consequences of climate change policy such as decreased access to affordable energy for the poor.

As climate impacts have been experienced differently across populations, enhancing the adaptive capacities of the most afflicted should offer a way to rethink policy with justice as its focus. It is not effective to try to deal with environmental issues without addressing the problem of inequality. This matters for three principal reasons: (a) there has been inequality in suffering, with the poor and vulnerable populations suffering more; (b) the poorer and less developed nations have had less bargaining power than the richer and more developed nations; and (c) the lessons from the failures of the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord have shown that an effective climate agreement cannot be achieved without addressing global inequality (Islam, 2013; Roberts, 2009).



Figure 20.27 Dryden Mill, Ontario. When factories dump dangerous chemicals into rivers and lakes, the people living nearby are likely to be low-income and racialized. Mercury contamination in Grassy Narrows poisoned many people in the Asubpeeschoseewagong (Grassy Narrows) First Nation and Wabaseemoong (Whitedog) First Nation communities in the 1960s and 1970s. The uncontrolled discharge of mercury from the Dryden Mill's chloralkali plant in Dryden into the headwaters of the Wabigoon River in Northwestern Ontario was ongoing from 1962 until 1970. It poisoned the fish that the First Nations people had depended on as a staple food for generations and produced a severe neurological disorder in victims. It was one of the worst cases of environmental poisoning in Canadian history. (Image courtesy of Shane Trist/Dhscommtech/Wikimedia Commons.) [CC BY-SA 3.0](#)

Social Movements and Change

Climate change is a deeply controversial subject, despite decades of scientific research and a high degree of scientific consensus that supports its existence. Out of a data set of 88125 climate-related papers published since 2012, Lynas *et al* (2021) found 99% consensus that contemporary climate change is human-caused. Why is climate change a controversy? Sociological studies have highlighted how social movements play a critical role in creating consensus on addressing climate change through citizen mobilization but given the contemporary political climate this can go either way.

Climate change has been a major political issue across the globe and environmental movements to address climate change at the international and national levels have been seen as a critical component of social change (Cagnigla, 2015). Environmental social movements have been effective in changing policy through three actions: policy advocacy, policy research, and opening space for political reforms (IPCC, 2018). Movements have changed the social landscape in a basic way by framing grievances in a resonating manner: providing definitions of problems, directing blame and responsibility, and examining the options for solving the problems raised. The contrast between the pioneering findings from Gallup's 1992 *Health of the Planet Survey*, which examined concerns over the environment across richer and poorer nations (Dunlap *et al.*, 1993), and the *World Values Survey*, which examined individual-level postmaterialist/ materialist values (Dorsch, 2014) against recent polls (such as Gallup, 2010; World Value Survey, 2021; Kvaløy *et al.*, 2012) has shown indications of an increasing trend toward greater awareness and understanding of climate change. This understanding has included greater concerns over climate change and general support for policies that have addressed the associated problems.

On the other hand, counter-movements against measures to address climate change like carbon pricing and regulating polluters have their roots in the anthropocentric view of the natural world: the idea that the natural world was created for human use. It is no coincidence that mobilization against climate change has emerged to deny the existence of the underpinning problems associated with it. Conservative movements and those with industrial neoliberal agendas have largely been blocking climate change policymaking. One key strategy is to manufacture uncertainty about climate science and undermine scientific reports by highlighting the inadequacy of evidence and contesting methodologies and analyses (Michels *et al.*, 2005; Oreskes *et al.*, 2010). Dunlap and McCright (2015) describe the idea of contrarian scientists who have the explicit goal of generating uncertainty by exploiting the complexities of scientific investigation. The challenges from contrarian scientists have had two aims: (1) to undermine the validity and legitimacy of climate change and (2) to attack the authority and integrity of individuals or other groups of scientists.

Recent environmental sociology has called for a new ecological paradigm (Catton and Dunlap, 1978; 1980). It developed as a shift away from the "human exemptionalism paradigm" (HEP) and the notion of a neoliberal growth imperative, both of which assumed that human societies have the ability to transcend biophysical limits and have the capacity for ever-increasing economic expansion. The association between economic growth and human development has been unsustainable over the long run. The new ecological paradigm considers society's embeddedness in nature. Kais and Islam (2018) note that the role of environmental sociology is to direct attention and sensitize policymakers to the biophysical impacts and limits of human development.

Taken as whole, the complex problem of climate change cannot be understood and addressed without uncovering its deep nexus with the socio-political issues in our societies. Herein lies the critical and crucial contributions of sociology and other social science disciplines.

Making Connections: Social Policy and Debate

Deep Ecology and the Concept of Appropriate Technology



Figure 20.28 Alan Drengson (1934–2022) was a philosopher at the University of Victoria who articulated the principles of deep ecology as an “ecosophy.” An ecosophy is a practice in which the self-realization of the self is attained “by and through direct appreciation of the ways of other beings” (Drengson, 1992). Photo used with permission.

Of the various environmentalist movements that emerged from the 1960s on, **deep ecology** is the movement that wrestled most directly with the idea that the natural world is not simply a resource to be exploited by human beings. In deep ecology, the eco-system and members of the natural world are not resources to be used because “all beings have intrinsic value” (Drengson, 1983). All beings are equally important members of a biospheric community (Naess, 1995). From the deep ecology perspective, living *with* nature requires a thorough political reorientation of human societies based on a whole ecosystem approach to re-evaluating and redesigning human activity.

In the development of the environmental movement, deep ecologists made a distinction between “shallow,” reformist ecology and a more radical “deep” ecology (Drengson, 1983). Shallow ecology is based on the idea of sustainable, but nevertheless anthropocentric or human-oriented, use of natural resources. Efforts to reduce carbon pollution, maintain habitat diversity, preserve wilderness, address pollution and air quality and so on are still focused on sustaining the survival, priorities and needs of humans. Deep ecology is based on a non-anthropocentric, “eco-spheric egalitarianism” in which all members of the eco-system have equal and intrinsic value. As Naess and Sessions (1995 [1984]) put it, “the well-being and

flourishing of human and nonhuman Life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes.”

This raises the central practical question of environmental movements: how can humans live in harmony with nature? The poet and deep ecologist Gary Snyder (1990) conceptualizes the practice of ecological harmony as a practice of *re-inhabitation*: relearning what it means to live in a place or deepening the experience and awareness of one’s home place. This means first of all to recognize that wherever one lives, one’s habitat is defined by an ecosystem and its natural parameters. A **bioregion** is defined as a geographical area that is determined not by political or administrative boundaries but by ecological systems, such as a watershed, a river estuary, a coastal environment, a mountain range or plain. For Snyder, this leads to specific way of life or ethic of bioregional stewardship — “find your place on the planet, dig in, and take responsibility from there” (Snyder, 1995).

Another outcome of deep ecology has been to propose a set of principles of environmental design and appropriate technology. As discussed throughout this chapter, many of the most serious problems confronting life in the 21st century are the products of capitalist accumulation practices and industrial scientific-technological developments that are in principle indifferent to the ecological systems in which they are embedded. As technology practices have an impact on everyday life, society, and on the ecosystem, an **appropriate technology** is defined as one that is especially suited and fit to its ecological and social context (Drengson, 1995). Criteria of appropriateness include technologies that are:

- Ecologically sound
- Equitable and sustainable
- Decentralized/human scaled
- Developed to solve genuine problems of human need
- Designed to facilitate the progress of human and other species' development: increasing the quality of life and possibilities of self-realization (Drengson, 1995).

Gary Snyder sums up the problem of ecological harmonization through the relation to “the wild” or wilderness in modern civilization. “Thoreau says ‘give me a wildness no civilization can endure.’ That’s clearly not difficult to find. It is harder to imagine a civilization that wildness can endure, yet this is just what we must try to do” (Snyder, 1990).

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Chapter 20 Resources and Activities

Key Terms

Anthropocene: The current geologic era of the planet initiated by the impact of human activity on the biosphere.

appropriate technology: A technology suited and fit to its ecological and social context.

automobility: A self-perpetuating system encompassing actors, materials, technologies, policies and practices that make up and reinforce private vehicle usage.

bioregion: A geographical area that is determined not by political or administrative boundaries but by ecological systems, such as a watershed, a river estuary, a coastal environment, a mountain range or plain.

capital accumulation: The reinvestment of profit in order to increase private capital assets and future profits.

carrying capacity: How many people can live in a given area considering the amount of available resources.

climate change: Long-term shifts in temperature and climate due to human activity.

commons: Collective resources that humans share in common.

concentric zone model: A model of human ecology that views cities as a series of circular rings or zones.

cornucopian theory: Theory which asserts that human ingenuity will rise to the challenge of providing adequate resources for a growing population.

corporate city: A city form based economically on corporate management and financial services.

deep ecology: An environmental social movement based on the principle that the eco-system and members of the natural world are not resources to be used because all beings have intrinsic value.

demographic transition theory: Theory that describes four stages of population growth, following patterns that connect birth and death rates with stages of industrial development.

demography: The study of population dynamics.

dual city: Cities that are divided into wealthy, high-tech, information-based zones of urban development and poorer, run-down, marginalized zones of urban underdevelopment and informal economic activity.

ecological modernization theory: Theoretical framework that describes human pressure on environmental systems as temporary because, as society modernizes, the ecological rationality underpinning the need to protect the environment from the strains of human development will become evident, leading to necessary reforms, innovations and environmental sustainability.

edge city: Urban formations based on clusters of shopping malls, entertainment complexes, and office towers at major transportation intersections.

emigration: The movement of people out of an area to another place of permanent residence.

environmental inequality: The condition in which low-income and marginalized people are disproportionately likely to experience various environmental problems.

environmental racism: The unequal access to a clean environment and basic environmental resources based on racialized distinctions.

environmental sociology: The sociological subfield that addresses the relationship between humans and the environment.

environmental sustainability: The degree to which a human activity can be sustained without damaging or undermining basic ecological support systems.

extractivism: The accelerated extraction of natural resources to satisfy a global demand for minerals and energy with the idea that this sustains national economic growth.

exurbs: Communities that arise farther out than the suburbs and are typically populated by residents of high socioeconomic status.

fantasy city: Cities that choose to transform themselves into Disneyland-like theme parks or sites of mega-events to draw international tourists.

fertility rate: A measure noting the actual number of children born.

gentrification: When upper- and middle-class residents renovate and live in properties in certain city areas or communities that have been historically less affluent.

global city: A unique development based on the new role of cities in the circuits of global information and global capital circulation and accumulation.

growth machine: Coalitions of politicians, real estate investors, corporations, property owners, urban planners, architects, sports teams, and cultural institutions, for example, who work together to intensify land usage, attract private capital to the city and lobby government for subsidies and tax breaks for investors.

growth rate: How much the population of a defined area grows or shrinks in a specific time period, calculated as the current population minus the initial population divided by the initial population.

human ecology: A functional perspective that looks at the relationship between people and their built and natural environment.

immigration: The movement of people into an area to take up permanent residence.

industrial city: A city in which the major business and employment activities revolve around manufacturing, building, and machining.

Malthusian theory: Theory which asserts that population is controlled through positive checks (war, famine, disease) and preventive checks (measures to reduce fertility).

megapolis: A large urban corridor that encompasses several cities and their surrounding suburbs and exurbs.

metropolis: The area that includes a city and its suburbs and exurbs.

metropolitan way of life: A form of social life distinguished from rural life and produced by the effect of the external features of the metropolis (population size, density, anonymity, and diversity, for example) on the psyche or subjective experience of the urban dweller.

migration: The movement of people into and out of an area.

mortality rate: A measure of the number of people who die.

NIMBY: A “not in my back yard” movement or protest, describing the tendency of people to protest development when it impacts them directly.

petro-masculinity: An exaggerated expression of masculinity tied to a backlash against climate change discourse.

population composition: A snapshot of the demographic profile of a population based on fertility, mortality, and migration rates.

population pyramid: Graphic representation that depicts population distribution according to age and sex.

postmodern city: A city defined by its orientation to circuits of global consumption, the fragmentation of previously homogeneous cultures, and the emergence of multiple centres or cores.

sex ratio: The ratio of men to women in a given population.

slum city: The development on the outskirts of cities of unplanned shantytowns or squats with no access to clean water, sanitation, or other municipal services.

social ecology: A sociological model in which human communities, like biotic communities, are bound together by complex relations of competition for resources and mutual dependence.

sprawl: The uncontrolled growth of urban areas with a low population density, high dependence on automobiles, and poor planning.

suburbs: The communities surrounding cities, typically close enough for a daily commute.

tragedy of the commons: The collective destruction of collective or shared resources as a product of individual cost/benefit decision making.

treadmill of production theory: Theoretical framework that describes human pressure on environmental systems as a product of capitalism, which prioritizes economic growth over social inequality and environmental protection.

urban sociology: The subfield of sociology that focuses on the study of urbanization.

urbanism: The way of life characteristic of cities and towns.

urbanization: The process of the formation of cities.

zero population growth: A theoretical goal in which the number of people entering a population through birth or immigration is equal to the number of people leaving it via death or emigration.

zones of transition: Transitional, economically deprived zones within a city, where there is a high rate of flux in population as different groups of people move in and out.

Section Summary

[20.1 Demography and Population](#)

Scholars understand demography, or the study of population dynamics, through various analyses. Factors that impact the growth rate of a population include birth rates, mortality rates, and migration, including immigration and emigration. Earth's human population is growing and projected to reach over 10 billion by the end of the century, but growth is uneven between the global north and south. Malthusian, zero population growth, cornucopian theory, and demographic transition theories all help sociologists study demography. There are numerous potential outcomes of the

growing population, and sociological perspectives vary on the potential effect of these increased numbers. The growth will pressure the carrying capacity of the already taxed planet and its natural resources.

[20.2 Urbanization](#)

Urban sociology studies the distinctive qualities of cities. Once a geographically concentrated population has reached approximately 100,000 people, it typically behaves like a city. Urbanization in North America has passed through many urban forms from the development of industrial cities, to corporate cities, postmodern cities, exurbs and suburbs, and megalopolises. The growth in global urbanization in the 20th and 21st centuries is following the blueprint of North American cities, but is occurring much more quickly and at larger scales, especially in peripheral and semi-peripheral countries. Sociological explanations for the nature of urban growth and transformation range from structural functionalism and social ecology, to critical sociology and “growth machines,” to interpretive sociology and the metropolitan way of life.

[20.3 The Environment and Society](#)

Environmental sociology studies how humans interact with their environments. Two key concepts in environmental sociology are the concepts of carrying capacity and the tragedy of the commons, both of which have been growing in significance as societies cope with extreme weather patterns and concerns over climate change. A central dynamic is the conflict between environmental sustainability and strategies of capital accumulation focused on extractivism. While everyone is at risk from pollution and climate change, poor and disadvantaged communities and peripheral nations bear a greater burden of these social-ecological issues.

Questions

Quiz: Population, Urbanization, and the Environment

[20.1 Demography and Population](#)

1. The population of the planet is projected to peak at _____ in the 2080s?
 - a. 10.4 billion
 - b. 8 billion
 - c. 25 billion
 - d. 9.7 billion
2. Which of the following issues is framed as a functionalist analysis?
 - a. The way that fertility rates are the product of individual choices
 - b. The way that societies adapt to ecological conditions
 - c. The way racism and homophobia impact the population composition of rural communities
 - d. The way that humans interact with environmental resources on a daily basis
3. What does carrying capacity refer to?
 - a. The ability of a community to absorb and house new immigrants
 - b. The amount of water a single person can carry on their head

- c. The amount of life that can be supported sustainably in a particular environment
 - d. The amount of weight that urban centres can bear if vertical growth is mandated
4. What three factors did Malthus believe would limit human population?
- a. Nasty, brutish and short
 - b. Natural cycles, maximum biological lifespan, and agricultural productivity
 - c. Birth control, family planning, female education
 - d. War, famine, and disease
5. What does cornucopian theory state?
- a. That human ingenuity will solve any issues that overpopulation creates
 - b. That new diseases will always keep populations stable
 - c. That Earth will naturally provide enough for whatever number of humans exist
 - d. That the greatest risk is population reduction, not population growth

20.2 Urbanization

6. What, in Burgess's concentric zone model, is Zone C likely to house?
- a. The city's industrial factory zone
 - b. Railyards, ports and parking lots
 - c. Formerly wealthy homes split into cheap apartments
 - d. Established ethnic enclaves
7. What are the historical prerequisites for the development of a city?
- a. Good environment with water and a favourable climate
 - b. Agricultural surpluses
 - c. Strong social organization to ensure social stability and a stable economy.
 - d. All of the above
8. To what aspect of contemporary urban development does the term "fantasy city" refer?
- a. Red-light districts
 - b. Land speculation and value of real estate decoupled from local labour markets
 - c. The recreational zones of cities constructed as theme parks for international tourists
 - d. A megalopolis
9. What led to the creation of the exurbs?
- a. Urban sprawl and crowds moving into the suburbs
 - b. The high cost of suburban living
 - c. Inner-city resettlement by elites
 - d. The voluntary simplicity movement
10. How are the suburbs of Paris different from those of most Canadian cities?
- a. They are connected by public transportation.
 - b. There are more industrial and business opportunities there.

- c. They are synonymous with housing projects and urban poor.
 - d. They are less densely populated.
11. What mental quality is common in Simmel's "metropolitan way of life"?
- a. Crowding
 - b. Blasé attitude
 - c. Emotionality
 - d. All of the above
12. What does human ecology theory address?
- a. The relationship between humans and their natural and built environments
 - b. The inhabitation of cities by opportunistic wild species like rats, racoons annd coyotes
 - c. Global warming due to greenhouse gas emissions
 - d. The relationship between humans and other species
13. What is the focus of the critical sociological study of urbanization?
- a. Growth machines
 - b. Land speculation and value of real estate decoupled from local labour markets
 - c. NIMBY and other urban social movements
 - d. All of the above

20.3 The Environment and Society

14. To what does the "commons" in the "tragedy of the commons" refer?
- a. The commonly owned livestock in the early communal soviets
 - b. The aggregated private greenspaces in a city
 - c. The common grazing lands in pre-industrial England
 - d. The common market that sets global prices for natural resources
15. Climate scientists have shown human induced climate change has already increased average global temperatures by _____ degrees and without sufficient emissions reductions there is a 50% chance that _____ degrees of global warming will be reached or passed by 2040.
- a. 3.3 C; 5.7 C
 - b. 0.4 C; 1.1 C
 - c. 1.1 C; 5.7 C
 - d. 1.1 C; 1.5 C
16. The difference between the **treadmill of production theory** and **ecological modernization theory** on the causes of climate change is:
- a. Treadmill theory focuses on habitual routines of social life whereas ecological modernization focuses on environmental engineering strategies
 - b. Treadmill theory focuses on pollution and greenhouse gas issues whereas ecological modernization focuses on environmental mitigation strategies
 - c. Treadmill theory focuses on examining the causes and impacts of climate change whereas

ecological modernization focuses on exploring equitable mitigation, adaptation and just transition strategies

- d. Treadmill theory focuses on the unsustainable logic of capital accumulation whereas ecological modernization focuses on the idea that continued development and sustainability can be balanced
17. **Automobility** is a term that describes:
- a. The social policies and practices that reinforce private vehicle usage
 - b. The increasing impact of transportation technologies on human movement
 - c. An exaggerated expression of masculinity tied to a backlash against climate change discourse
 - d. Policies to lower carbon emissions
18. The mercury contamination in Grassy Narrows that poisoned many people in the Asubpeeschoseewagong First Nation and Wabaseemoong First Nation communities in the 1960s and 1970s is best described as an example of:
- a. Environmental inequality
 - b. Environmental racism
 - c. The human exemptionalist paradigm
 - d. Extractivism

[\[Quiz answers at end of chapter\]](#)

Short Answer

20.1 Demography and Population

1. Do some additional research on the effects of public policy on population. What have been some of the effects of China's one-child policy (1979-2015) that limited the number of children a family can have? Quebec on the other hand has been trying to increase fertility rates. What have been the effects of Quebec's pronatal and family assistance policies? Are these types of policy interventions a good idea?
2. Immigration policy in Canada has been focused on addressing economic needs for labour. Why do you think Canada has one of the highest immigration rates among G7 countries? What is the effect of relying on immigration to satisfy labour needs?
3. Look at trends in birth rates from Stage 4 countries (like those in Europe) versus those from Stage 2 countries (like the Democratic Republic of Congo). How does the population makeup impact the political climate, issues and economics of the different countries? What factors lead to a sex ratio in which men outnumber women? What factors lead to higher fertility rates?

20.2 Urbanization

4. What are the differences between the suburbs and the exurbs? Do these exist in the city you live in or in a city you are familiar with? Are they distinct? Who is most likely to live in each?

5. Most major cities in core countries are to some degree postmodern and decentred. What elements of edge city, dual city and/or fantasy city characterize a city you are familiar with? In what sense is life in this cities still centered on a downtown core, and in what sense is it not?
6. Considering the concentric zone model, does it apply to the city you grew up in or are familiar with? If you grew up in a city, what type of zone were you raised in? Is this the same or different from that of earlier generations in your family? If you live in a city, what type of zone do you reside in now? Do you find that people from one zone stereotype those from another? If so, how?
7. Close your eyes and take a second to think about some recent situation in which you were in a city. Take a second to think about what was specifically “city-ish” about that situation. On a piece of paper write about it without stopping to think for two minutes. Look at what you’ve written and circle two or three things that surprise you or interest you. On a fresh sheet of paper, use these to compose an opening sentence or two about what is distinctive about city life. How does what you have selected compare to Simmel’s description of the metropolitan way of life?

20.3 The Environment and Society

8. What steps need to be taken to address climate change?
9. Can you think of a modern example of the tragedy of the commons, where public use without accountability has created a negative outcome?
10. Canadian politics often seems divided over questions of environmental sustainability and capital accumulation. Describe how the sociological imagination can provide a useful, evidence based framework for addressing these issues.

Further Research

20.1 Demography and Population

Research data on global population through the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (Population Division) [World Population Prospects](#) databases.

20.2 Urbanization

Check out Robert Neuwirth’s work on [Shadow Cities](#) to explore the world’s squatter sites where a billion people now make their homes. He describes them as thriving centers of ingenuity and innovation.

[Ellen Dunham-Jones](#) discusses the fate of underperforming suburbs and shares a vision of dying malls rehabilitated, dead “big box” stores re-inhabited, and endless parking lots transformed into thriving wetlands.

[Ed Soja’s exploration of Los Angeles](#) describes postmodern urbanism as a new type of urban form. Is Soja’s analysis of Los Angeles and the Bonaventure Hotel still useful for urban sociologists today?

20.3 The Environment and Society

Interested in learning more about the latest research in the field of human ecology? Visit the [Society for Human Ecology website](#) to discover what’s emerging in this field.

What is your carbon footprint? Find out using the [carbon footprint calculator](#).

Find out more about the deep ecology movement through [The Trumpeter](#), an environmental humanities journal dedicated to the development of an ecosophy, or wisdom born of ecological understanding and insight.

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Solutions to Section Quiz

1 A, | 2 B, | 3 C, | 4 D, | 5 A, | 6 C, | 7 D, | 8 C, | 9 A, | 10 C, | 11 B, | 12 A, | 13 D, | 14 C, | 15 D, | 16 D, | 17 A, | 18 B, [\[Return to Quiz\]](#)